SIERRA CLUB v. COUNTY OF FRESNO (FRIANT RANCH)Real Party in Interest, Friant Ranch, L.P., Supplemental BriefCal.September 20, 2018SUPREME COURT COPY SUPREME COURT FILED CASE No. 8219783 SEP 2 0 2018 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Jorge Navarrete Clerk Deputy SIERRA CLUB, REVIVE THE SAN JOAQUIN,and LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERSOF FRESNO Plaintiffs and Appellants Vv. COUNTY OF FRESNO Defendant and Respondent FRIANT RANCH,L.P. Real Party in Interest and Respondent After a Published Decision by the Court of Appeal, filed May 27, 2014 Fifth Appellate District Case No. F066798 Appeal from the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno Case No. 11CECG00726 Honorable Rosendo A.Pefia, Jr. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE8.520(d) *James G. Moose, SBN 119374 Tiffany K. Wright, SBN 210060 Laura M. Harris, SBN 246064 REMY MOOSE MANLEY, LLP 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 443-2745 Facsimile: (916) 443-9017 Email: jmoose@rmmenvirolaw.com twright@rmmenvirolaw.com Attorneys for Real Party in Interest and Respondent FRIANT RANCH,L.P. CASE NO. 8219783 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA SIERRA CLUB, REVIVE THE SAN JOAQUIN,and LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FRESNO Plaintiffs and Appellants Vv. COUNTY OF FRESNO Defendant and Respondent FRIANT RANCH,L.P. Real Party in Interest and Respondent After a Published Decision by the Court ofAppeal, filed May 27, 2014 Fifth Appellate District Case No. F066798 Appeal from the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno Case No. 11CECG00726 Honorable Rosendo A.Pefia,Jr. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.520(d) *James G. Moose, SBN 119374 Tiffany K. Wright, SBN 210060 Laura M.Harris, SBN 246064 REMY MOOSE MANLEY, LLP 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 443-2745 Facsimile: (916) 443-9017 Email: jmoose@rmmenvirolaw.com twright@rmmenvirolaw.com Attorneys for Real Party in Interest and Respondent FRIANT RANCH,L.P. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. SUMMARYOF NEW AUTHORITIES1.0.0.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeene 5 I. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE 20... ccc cececesceesseeeeesseeeeetesseeenees 8 A. This Court’s recent CEQA decisions are consistent with the rule that the substantial evidence standard applies to claims that an EIR lacks sufficient information on a required tOPIC......... csc ceseeceteeeeeeeeseenees 8 The Court should overrule Cleveland II to the extent that it holds an agency mustperform a health- correlation analysis unless the agency affirmatively demonstrates, and explains in the record, why such analysis is infeasible; the Court in BHUSDcorrectly held that CEQA doesnot require a health correlation ANALYSIS .0.....eceeceeeecececeeeeeeeeeccesseeeesceseeseeeceesseueeseseereeeeeseeeesaees 12 The state’s housing shortage highlights the need for certainty and predictability in the CEQA process.............. 15 THT. CONCLUSION2.0.eeeesseecessecneeeeceeseesseceesasesesaeenseeneeeeas 16 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT000...eeeceeceneeeeeceneeenseeneeenes 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page(s) Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.Sth 918 ooeeeeee scene eeseeescesseeesssesesneeeseneneeesenseeeees passim Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City ofBerkeley (2015) 60 Cal4th 1086 on. eeeeeeceseceeeceeessesessseeseensaseensesessensesseeseeneees 13 Beverly Hills Unified School District v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 627.00...cece eecceseeeeseeeeeeeeneseeeeees 5, 7, 12, 14, 16 Centerfor Biological Diversity v. DepartmentofFish and Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204 ooo. ecececceccccesseeseeeseseseesesesssaseceeesseaeesseeneens passim Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association ofGovernments (2017) 17 CalApp.Sth 413.0...eesscsceeeeeeeeensesseeneeees 5, 7, 12, 13, 16 Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association ofGovernments (2017) 3 Cal.Sth 497 oo. .eceeeccecceeeceeeeeceseeeseteesesenseseesnaseenaes 5, 6, 8, 9, 16 Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents ofthe Univ. ofCal. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376... cceceeecesececeeceeseeeeeeeeseesesseseenseeeenseeeeseenaenes 8, 10 Neighborsfor Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439 oo.ececeeecceseeeeseeeeeneesaeessecsessseeeessaseeaseneeseesees 13 Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County ofLos Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506... ecceecceseteneeeeeeneeteeeseeeeesseseeeesseeeeaeeessseesnesnenseesas 8 VineyardArea Citizensfor Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City ofRancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal4th 412 occeeccceeccceseeeseeceeseseseceeseessseeneeeseseenesenees 10, 11 Western States Petroleum Association v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559 occeeecceeeceeceeseteeseeceseeseseeseececeeneaeeeeeneeeneseeesees 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Statutes Page(s) Evid. Code, § 664 .0.......cccccccccesssseececeesnneeeseeeceeeeessneeessssaeessseeeeeseseseeeseesensaea 13 Gov. Code, § 65589.5 .o...cceecceececccceeeceeereerrerecseceesseseseseuessseneauerseesseeseeees 7,15 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (a)(1)(A) -..... ee eee eeeseeseeteseeseeecceseetseenneseees 15 Gov. Code, § 65589.6, subd. (a)(2)(A) oo... eee eeeceeesseeneeereeteeeeeeeeesesseneeeeees 15 Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 ........... cece eeeeceeeneeeeseseeeeeseeeesnsaneeeesesenseeesenagees 11 Regulations Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15126.2, subd. (a) ("CEQA Guidelines")........ 14 Rules Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.520(d)(1) ...... eee eeeeeeessessseeseneeceseseeeseeseeeseeesenees 5 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520(d)(1), Real Party in Interest and RespondentFriant Ranch, L.P. (“Real Party”) submits this supplemental brief addressing authorities that post-date the parties’ briefing, which concluded on July 7, 2015. This brief addresses the application to this case of this Court’s decisions in Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association ofGovernments (2017) 3 Cal.5th 497 (“Cleveland I’); Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City ofNewport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.5th 918 (“Banning Ranch’’); and Centerfor Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, as modified on denial of rehearing (Feb. 17, 2016) (“CBD”); and the Court ofAppeal decisions in Beverly Hills Unified School District v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 627, as modified (Nov.2, 2015) (“BHUSD”), and Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association ofGovernments (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 413 (“Cleveland IP’). This brief also addresses recent California legislation aimed at addressing California’s housing shortage. I. SUMMARY OF NEW AUTHORITIES At issue in Cleveland I was whether the environmental impact report (“EIR”) prepared by the San Diego Association of Governments (“SANDAG’)for a regional transportation plan/sustainable communities strategy (“RTP/SCS”) must include an analysis of the plan’s consistency with the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission reduction goals set forth in Executive Order No. S-03-05 (“Executive Order”). (Cleveland I, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 510.) The Court and the parties acknowledged that the executive authority was not a legal mandate binding on the agency in preparation of the EIR.(Seeid. at p. 513.) Finding that the EIR sufficiently apprised readers of the RTP/SCS’s conflict with the Executive Order’s targets, the Court upheld the EIR’s analysis. (/d. at pp. 516-518.) Banning Ranch examined de novo whethera city complied with CEQA’s statutory requirement to integrate CEQA review with related environmental review to the fullest extent possible. (Banning Ranch, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 935-936.) The Court held thatthe city failed to comply with this mandatory requirement. (/d. at p. 941.) CBD concerneda challengeto the significance threshold used to assess GHG emissions impacts ofa large real estate development. (CBD, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 218.) Applying de novo review, the Court held that the agency’s significance threshold complied with CEQA’s statutory and regulatory requirements. (/d. at pp. 218-22.) The Court then considered whether substantial evidence supported the agency’s choice ofthe thresholds as to the project at issue. (/d. at pp. 222-224.) Finding no such substantial evidence, the Court held the agency’s use of the threshold was an abuse of discretion. (/d. at p. 225.) Both BHUSD and ClevelandIJ involved claimsthat the respective respondent agencies abusedtheir discretion by certifying EIRsthat failed to “correlate” air quality impacts to health impacts. (BHUSD, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 666-667; Cleveland IT, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 443.) In BHUSD,the Second District Court of Appeal held that CEQA does not require an analysis showing how actual construction emissions would specifically impact public health. (241 Cal.App.4th at p. 667.) In contrast, in Cleveland IT, Division One ofthe Fourth District Court of Appeal held that SANDAGabusedits discretion in not conducting an analysis correlating the regional air quality impacts of the RTP/SCSwith specific adverse health impacts. (17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 440-441.) In 2017, the Legislature passed a series of bills intended to help facilitate the creation of more housing units to meet a vast unmet demand. Although these bills did not amend CEQA,factual findings added to Government Codesection 65589.5 discuss the depth ofthe state’s housing problem.If the Court were to hold that the de novo standard of review applies to claims challenging the sufficiency of an EIR’s analysis of a required topic, such a conclusion would introduce significant additional complexity and uncertainty into the environmental review processat a time whenpredictability is needed to help housing projects, such as Friant Ranch, proceed to construction. II. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE A. This Court’s recent CEQA decisions are consistent with the rule that the substantial evidence standard appliesto claims that an EIRlackssufficient information on a required topic. A primary issue before the Court in this case is what standard of review applies to claims that an EIR, although addressing all topics required by CEQA,failed to sufficiently address one or more of those required topics. Cleveland I, Banning Ranch, and CBD are consistent with the rule applied by this Court in its previous CEQAdecisions, and advocated for by Real Party herein, that, while the court reviews an agency’s failure to address a required topic de novo,challenges to the sufficiency of the EIR’s evaluation of the required topic are reviewed for substantial evidence. Aspart of the substantial evidence standard, agencies must “show their work”by including sufficient discussion to enable the reader to understand the “analytic route” the agency traveled from evidence to action. (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 404 citing Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County ofLos Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515.) In applying the substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court must uphold the agency’s determination that its EIR sufficiently evaluated the required topic if substantial evidence, in light of the whole record, supports that determination. In ClevelandI, the Court did not specify which standard of review applied, but the Court warned that “courts must proceed with caution the when determining the adequacy of an EIR” because “““CEQA gives lead agencies discretion to design an EIR ... .””” (Cleveland I, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 511-512.) Although not directly stated, a careful reading of the decision strongly suggests that the Court applied the substantial evidence standard of review to the question of whether SANDAGabusedits discretion in failing to explicitly analyze the RTP/SCS’s consistency with the Executive Order’s targets. In particular, the Court first noted that there is no explicit requirementto use the executive order as a threshold of significance.(Id. at 515.) In the absence of an express(i.e., “procedural” requirement), the Court examinedthe record, as a whole, including comments submitted on the draft EIR and the scientific evidence supporting the Executive Order’s targets, to determine whether SANDAGshould have included a discussion of the RTP/SCS’s consistency with the Executive Orderin the EIR. (/d. at pp. 515-517.) The Court determined,atleast implicitly, that substantial evidence would not support SANDAG’s decision to omit a discussion of the plan’s consistency with the Executive Order. The Court then considered whether the EIR sufficiently included such a discussion of the plan’s consistency with the Executive Order’s targets. The Court held that, although the EIR could have beenclearer, the EIR complied with CEQA because it presented information about the RTP/SCS’s inconsistency with the Executive Order “‘in a manner calculated to adequately inform the public and decision makers, who may not be familiar with the details of the project.’ [Citations.]”. Ud. at p. 517.) Asnoted above, the duty for agencies to provide in their EIRs the “analytic route” from evidenceto action is inherentto the substantial evidence standard of review. (See Real Party’s Answer to Amici Curiae Briefs of Association of Irritated Residents et al., Center for Biological Diversity, Leadership Counsel for Justice and Accountability, and North Coast Rivers Alliance, § II.A, pp. 5-12.) By examining the whole of the record to determine whether SANDAGlackedsubstantial evidence to omit from the EIR a discussion of the RTP/SCS’s consistency with the Executive Order, and upholding the EIR’s discussion becauseit reasonably apprised readers of the RTP/SCS’s inconsistency with the Executive Order, the Court followed the analytic framework advocated by Real Party. The Court’s analysis is also consistent with the standard of review discussed by this Court in Laurel Heights I, Western States Petroleum Associationv. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559 (WSPA), and Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City ofRancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412 (Vineyard). Banning Ranchis also consistent with, and does not disturb,the Court’s earlier reasoning in Laurel Heights I, WSPA, and Vineyard. In Banning Ranch, the Court came up with what appears to be a shorthand for 10 prior holdings regarding what is meant where an agency has “not proceeded in a mannerrequired by law.” The Court restated the distinction in Vineyard betweenfactual and proceduralissues but stated that “[w]hether an EIR has omitted essential information is a procedural question subject to de novo review.” (Banning Ranch, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 935.) This statement is consistent with the notion that a “procedural” error occurs wherethe Legislature or the Natural Resources Agency has directed agenciesto take particular actions(e.g., give notice of public review)or has completely omitted any discussion of topics that must be addressed in CEQA documents (e.g., GHGsor historical resources). The statement does not suggest that what a court regards as insufficient analysis of a required topic is somehow “procedural.” Such a reading is inconsistent with the plain, well-understood conceptof“procedure.” Because Banning Ranch raised a predominantly legal question—whether the City ofNewport Beach had violated CEQA’s requirements to integrate its environmental review with the Coastal Commission’s decisionmaking process under the Coastal Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.)—the Court applied the de novo standard and did not reach the question of whether substantial evidence supported the City’s determinations. In CBD,in keeping with the Court’s prior rulings, the Court applied de novoreview to the legal question of whether the EIR applied a legally permissible significance threshold, but applied the substantial evidence 1] standard to the agency’s choice and application of that threshold to the project at issue. (CBD, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 219, 225-226.) The Court’s analysis in CBDis consistent with the principles that lead agencies enjoy the discretion to employ the (legally permissible) analytic methodologies that they determine are appropriate to evaluate the environmentaleffects of their projects, and that the courts will review such determinations underthe substantial evidence standard. Under CBD, the courts should overturn a lead agency’s use of a legally permissible threshold if the agency’s determination to use that threshold is not supported by substantial evidence. B. The Court should overrule ClevelandII to the extent thatit holds an agency must perform a health-correlation analysis unless the agencyaffirmatively demonstrates, and explains in the record, why such analysis is infeasible; the Court in BHUSD correctly held that CEQA does not require a health correlation analysis. In Cleveland IT, the Fourth District Court ofAppeal reached a result very similar to that of the Fifth District Court ofAppeal in this case with respectto the question of whether the lead agency abusedits discretion in failing to conduct an analysis correlating a project’s regional air quality emissions to specific health impacts. In Cleveland IJ, the court held that although “the EIR identified in a general mannerthe adverse health impacts that might result from the [RTP/SCS’s] air quality impacts[,] ... the EIR failed to correlate the additional tons of annual transportation-plan-related emissions to anticipated adverse health impacts from the emissions.” 12 (Cleveland II, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 441.) Although the court in Cleveland II purported to apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the adequacy of the EIR’sair quality analysis, the court inappropriately placed the burden on SANDAGto demonstrate that it would be infeasible to provide a health correlation analysis. (/bid.) As discussed in Real Party’s Answer to Amicus Curiae Brieffiled by the South Coast Air Quality ManagementDistrict (“Answer to_ SCAQMD”), CEQA doesnot require agencies to conductall reasonably feasible studies, or to explain in their EIRs whyit has not conductedall conceivable studies. (Answer to SCAQMD,§ II.B, pp. 7-11.) Real Parties respectfully urge that this Court shouldclarify that where, as here, a petitioner claims an EIR failed to sufficiently discuss a required topic,the burdenis on the petitioner to demonstrate that the agency lacked substantial evidence to support its conclusion that the EIR’s discussion wassufficient. (Neighborsfor Smart Rail vy. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 475 (conc. & disc. Opn. of Baxter, J. [“‘a certified EIR is presumed adequate and ... ‘the party challenging the EIR hasthe burden of showing otherwise’”]; Evid. Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed”; Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City ofBerkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1105 [the burden is on the challenger in CEQA casesto show that a categorical exemption does not apply].) The burden should not be on the agencyto affirmatively 13 show that it considered and rejected all conceivable studies that were not included in the EIR. (See Answer to SCAQMD,§ II.B, pp. 7-11.) In BHUSD,the Second District Court ofAppeal correctly rejected the petitioner’s claim that the EIR for a subway project was “legally inadequate” because it failed to analyze public health impacts from construction of the Project. (BHUSD,supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 666.) The court explained that the petitioner did “not cite to any case, statute, or Guideline to support its assertion that the [EIR] was required to include an analysis showing how the actual construction emissions will specifically impact public health.” (/d. at p. 667.) The EIR in that case wascirculated with an air quality technical report that generally explained the types of health impacts associated with exposure to each ofthe identified pollutants. This wasall that CEQArequired. (/bid., citing CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (a).) Consistent with BHUSD,this Court should hold that the Friant Ranch EIR sufficiently analyzed air quality impacts by applying the significance standards adopted bythe localair district and discussing, in a general manner, the adverse health impacts associated with the air emissions evaluated in the EIR. CEQA requires nothing more. (See BHUSD, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 666 [noting that the EIR at issue relied on the regional air quality thresholds adopted by the local air district].) 14 C. The state’s housing shortage highlights the need for certainty and predictability in the CEQAprocess. The 2017 Legislative “Housing Package” has renewed focus on the need to construct more homesin California to address the State’s severe housing shortage. The Legislative factual findings added to Government Code section 65589.5 explain, among other things, “[t]he lack of housing ... 1S a critical problem that threatens the economic, environmental, and social quality of life in California.” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute proclaimsthat California has a housing supply and affordability crisis of historic proportions. The consequencesoffailing to effectively and aggressively confront this crisis are hurting millions of Californians, robbing future generations of the chanceto call California home,stifling economic opportunities for workers and businesses, worsening poverty and homelessness, and undermining the state’s environmental and climate objectives. (Gov. Code, § 65589.6, subd. (a)(2)(A).) Asdiscussed in Real Party’s opening and reply on the merits, policies favoring certainty in the CEQAprocess support application of the substantial evidence standard of review to claims that an EIR insufficiently analyzes a required topic. The need for certainty and predictability in the environmental review process is arguably even more important than ever given the State’s compelling need to improve the housing supply through the construction of new housing development projects, such as Friant Ranch. 15 Ili. CONCLUSION This Court’s decisions in Cleveland I, Banning Ranch, and CBD support the conclusion that de novo review applies to claims that an EIR failed to follow CEQA’s procedures or omitted a discussion of a required topic, but that the substantial evidence standard of review applies to claims challenging the sufficiency of an EIR’s discussion of a required topic. The Court should clarify that the court’s analysis in ClevelandI incorrectly shifted the burden to respondent to show that an analysis it had not performed wasinfeasible. The Court in this case should reacha result similar to that reached in BHUSD andhold that the Friant Ranch EIR sufficiently analyzed air quality impacts and that a health correlation analysis was not required. Lastly, the State’s policies supporting the creation ofnew housing militate against application of the de novo standard of review to claims challenging the sufficiency of an EIR’s analysis of a required topic because the de novo standard would introduce additional uncertainty into the already challenging and complex CEQAprocess. Respectfully submitted, REMY MOOSE MANLEY, LLP Dated: September 19, 2018 A. meys for Real Party in Interest and Respondent FRIANT RANCH,L.P. 16 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT Pursuant to Rule 8.520(d) of the California Rules of Court, I hereby certify that this SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFcontains 2,760 words, according to the word counting function of the word processing software used to preparethisbrief. Executed on this 19" day of September 2018, at Sacramento, —~INMES G. MOOSE California. 17 Sierra Club et al. v. County ofFresnoetal. Supreme Court of California Case No. $219783 (Fifth Appellate District Case No. F066798) PROOF OF SERVICE I, Bonnie Thorne, am employed in the County of Sacramento. My business address is 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800, Sacramento, CA 95814, and email address is bthorne@rmmenvirolaw.com.I am overthe age of 18 years and not a party to the above-entitled action. I am familiar with Remy Moose Manley, LLP’s practice for collection and processing mail whereby mail is sealed, given the appropriate postage and placedin a designated mail collection area. Each day mail is collected and deposited in a USPS mailbox after the close of each businessday. On September 19, 2018, I served the following: SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 8.520(d) & BY FIRST CLASS MAILbycausing a true copy thereof to be placed in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid, addressed to the following person(s) or representative(s) as listed below, and placed for collection and mailing following ordinary businesspractices. & BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OR EMAILby causing a true copy thereofto be electronically delivered to the following person(s) or representative(s) at the email address(es) listed below.I did not receive any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 19day of September 2018, at Sacramento, California. Bonnie Thorne 18 Sierra Club et al. v. County ofFresnoetal. Supreme Court of California Case No. 8219783 (Fifth Appellate District Case No. F066798) SERVICE LIST | Sara Hedgpeth-Harris CENTRAL CALIFORNIA LEGAL SERVICES 2115 Kern Street, Ste. 1 Fresno, CA 93721 Tel.: (559) 570-1259 Email: sara.hedgpeth- harris@centralcallegal.org Susan Brandt-Hawley BRANDT-HAWLEY LAW GROUP P.O. Box 1659 — Glen Ellen, CA 95442 Tel.: (707) 938-3900 Fax: (707) 938-3200 susanbh(@preservationlawyers.com Daniel C. Cederborg Bruce B. Johnson,Jr. OFFICE OF THE FRESNO COUNTY COUNSEL 2220 Tulare Street, Suite 500 Fresno, CA 9372] Tel.: (559) 600-3479 Fax: (559) 600-3480 Email: bjohnson@co.fresno.ca.us Bryan N. Wagner WAGNER & WAGNER 7110N.Fresno St, Suite 340 Fresno, CA 93720 Tel.: (559) 224-0871 Fax: (559) 224-0885 Email: bryan@wagnerandwagner.com 19 Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants Sierra Club etal. VIA EMAIL & U.S. MAIL Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants Sierra Club etal. VIA EMAIL & U.S. MAIL Attorneys for Respondents County ofFresno VIA EMAIL & U.S. MAIL Attorney for Real Party in Interest/Respondent Friant Ranch, L.P. VIA EMAIL & U.S. MAIL Clerk of the Court FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 2424 Ventura Street Fresno, CA 93721 Tel.: (559) 445-5491 Clerk of the Court SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA County of Fresno 1130 O Street Fresno, CA 93721 Tel.: (559) 457-1900 COURTESY COPIES: Margaret M. Sohagi Philip A. Seymour THE SOHAGI LAW GROUP 11999 San Vicente Blvd., Suite 150 Los Angeles, CA 90049 Tel.: (310) 475-5700 Fax: (310) 475-5707 Email: tsohagi@sohagi.com Jan Chatten-Brown Douglas P. Carstens Amy C. Minteer CHATTEN-BROWN & CARSTENS LLP 2200 Pacific Coast Highway, Suite 318 Hermosa Beach, CA 90254 Tel.: (310) 798-2400 Fax: (310) 798-2402 Email: ACM@CBCEarthlaw.com Lisabeth D. Rothman BRISCOE IVESTER & BAZEL LLP 155 SansomeStreet, 7'" Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel.: (415) 402-2700 Fax: (415) 398-5630 lrothman@briscoelaw.net 20 VIA U.S. MAIL VIA U.S. MAIL On behalf of Amici Curiae League ofCalifornia Cities, CSAC, etal. VIA U.S. MAIL On behalf of Amici Curiae Association ofIrritated Residents, et al. VIA U.S. MAIL On behalf of Amici Curiae California Building Industry Association and Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation VIA U.S. MAIL PhoebeS. Seaton Ashley E. Werner LEADERSHIP COUNSEL FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 764 P. Street, Suite 012 Fresno, CA 93721 Tel.: (559) 369-2790 Email: pseaton@crla.org Kurt R. Wiese Barbara Baird SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENTDISTRICT 21865 Copley Drive Diamond Bar, CA 91765 Tel.: (909) 396-2302 Fax: (909) 396-2961 Email: bbaird@aqmd.gov Michael W. Graf 227 BehrensStreet El Cerrito, CA 94530 Tel.: (510) 525-1208 Fax: (510) 525-1208 Email: mwgraf@aol.com Jason M. Ackerman BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 3390 University Ave., 5th Floor Riverside, CA 92502 Tel.: (951) 686-1450 Fax: (951) 686-3083 Email: jason.ackerman(@bbklaw.com; Stephan C. Volker Daniel P. Garrett-Steinman LAW OFFICES OF STEPHAN VOLKER 436 14th Street, Suite 1300 Oakland, CA 94612 Tel.: (510) 496-0600 Fax: (540) 496-1366 Email: svolker@volkerlaw.com 21 On behalf of Amicus Curiae Leadership Counselfor Justice and Accountability VIA U.S. MAIL On behalf of Amicus Curiae South Coast Air Quality ManagementDistrict VIA U.S. MAIL On behalf of Amicus Curiae The Centerfor Biological Diversity VIA U.S. MAIL On behalf of Amici Curiae AEP andAmerican Planning Association California Chapter VIA U.S. MAIL On behalf of Amicus Curiae North Coast Rivers Alliance VIA U.S. MAIL Annette A. Ballatore-Williamson On behalf of Amicus Curiae District Counsel San Joaquin Valley Unified SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY Air Pollution Control AIR POLLUTION DISTRICT District 1990 E. Gettysburg Ave. Fresno, CA 93726 VIA U.S. MAIL Tel.: (559) 230-6033 Fax: (559) 230-6061 Email: annette.ballatore-williamson@valleyair.org 22
