STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH v. S.C.

Real Party in Interest, Center for Investigative Reporting, Reply to Answer to Petition for Review

Cal.December 19, 2013

No. 8214679 SUPREME COURTIN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA FILE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, _DEC 19.2913 Petitioner, Frank A. McGuire Clerk VEx Deputy THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING. Real Party In Interest After a Published Decision ofthe Court ofAppeal, Third Appellate District, Case No. C072325 (Justice M. Kathleen Butz), Vacating a Judgment Entered by the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2012- 80001044 (Hon. Timothy M.Frawley). REPLY OF THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTINGIN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW Duffy Carolan (State Bar No. 154988) Rochelle Wilcox (State Bar No. 197790) Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA 94111-6533 Tel.: (415) 276-6500 Fax: (415) 276-6599 Attorneys for Real Party In Interest and Petitioner THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING No. 8214679 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENTOF PUBLIC HEALTH, Petitioner, vs: | THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent. CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING. Real Party In Interest After a Published Decision of the Court ofAppeal, Third Appellate District, Case No. C072325 (Justice M. Kathleen Butz), Vacating a JudgmentEntered by the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2012- 80001044 (Hon. Timothy M.Frawley). REPLY OF THE CENTERFOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING IN SUPPORTOF PETITION FOR REVIEW Duffy Carolan (State Bar No. 154988) . Rochelle Wilcox (State Bar No. 197790) Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA 94111-6533 Tel.: (415) 276-6500 Fax: (415) 276-6599 Attorneys for Real Party In Interest and Petitioner THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTIONoeeccccsssessssesessssssseseerscssssssssssssesesesrseseneeeaes sectoees l TI. REPLY ARGUMENTS.........cccccsssssssssssssessscscssssessstescssecesesessesssacacsveees 2 A. The Petition Raises Important Legal Issues of Statewide Signficance. csseeeseeseseesssesnensensenesasseseeseeseesesesessisees 2 B. The Court ofAppeal’s Decision is Inconsistent with This Court’s Authority and Opinions of The Attorney General. .........ccsessessseesesceesees 5 C. Review is Necessary to Correct Clear EXQOr,.......0004- sesessaesensecenneessecussoessescssesseessnscesseessseessecessscestasessaaes 8 THT. CONCLUSION.cecsssesssscscseseseessesecsssesscssscssssasssessatessensenees 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Albertson v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 796 (2001)... cesssesssesesesesesesssscssssscssssssescseseseestscsesseesseneees 6, 10 In re Ward, . 227 Cal. App. 2d 369 (1964)......cceessssssscsssssssssssssscssscssesstsecesaesessacateens 9, 10 Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139 (1991)... eesssssesssssesscsescscscsssclesssssssecssseereseaeseaes 1, 2, 5, 6 McDonald v. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386 (1893)... escecsesssessscssessesssecsssesstssssnesseeseessesueessnsessecsseeseesseeeesens 9 Statutes Civil Code Section 1798.24D ..sssesssssssssssssussssssssssssssesssssssussssssstsnuensssssseee ll Health & Safety Code Section 1417.1 .ccccccsscssscsccccesesssssssscsesssssscecsesesees 6 Health & Safety Code Section 1418 oo... ccccscssscsscecesstsssssscscssessecsesess2106 Health & Safety Code Section 1420(a)(1).......... steseansenssenenecnsatensneneneseneseaeaes 7 Health & Safety Code Section 1420(a)(2)(A-C)wocccccccccssecsececssesssssesessececeees 7 Health & Safety Code Section 1421(€)..cesccssuessscsuteeeeeeeceeeccccc4 Health & Safety Code Section 1422(a).....c.cccceesescecscscecssssesssesessesessceseccecece 6 Health & Safety Code Section 1423 (a)(2) ...ccccsccscsscecsscsessssesesssescessssseccssses 8 Health & Safety Code Section 1424(c).....ccccccscscscsscssssssesststsscssteasscserscessecs 4 Health & Safety Code Section 1428(f) secstsssse seseeeessecsscssescesseeeesesseeenneees 7 Health & Safety Code Section 5328.15 ...c...ccccescssscsesecsesssssssssssssssecssesssecessesse 7 Welfare & Institutions Code Section 4514.3 w.o.cccccccscsssssescsssssessscsessescsees 11 Welfare & Institutions Code Section 4903(b)(1)......ccsccessscssseseseseseees 10, 11 Welfare & Institutions Code Section 4903(b)(2) svsesesesnseasnesnessen 11 ii Welfare & Institutions Code Section 5328.06 ..........cccccssccsesescsscescccseceeseeceee 11 Welfare & Institutions Code Section 5328.15(C).....ccccccssscsssssssssessersesescesees 10 ili I. INTRODUCTION The Court ofAppeal’s published decision fundamentally weakens two statutory schemes designedto protect the state’s most vulnerable populations.It also injects uncertainly into statewide administrative obligations, enacted to makepublic information about serious breaches of patient-care standards at long-term health carefacilities. It does 80 by subjecting long-term health care facilities and the state departments overseeing them tothe specterofcivil liability under the Lanterman Actfor disclosing the very information that the Legislature declared must be disclosed under the Long-Term Care Act. This is not an insular Public Records Act matter as the DPH would have this Court believe. Instead, this Petition goeswell beyond CIR’s statutory and constitutionalrights of access to public records and raises important issues oflegislative intent over the protection and security of mentally and developmentally disabled individuals residing in long-term health carefacilities throughoutthis state. It is, as Amicus Curiae California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (“CANHR”) aptly describes, a matter affecting the most vulnerable segment of an already vulnerable population. Thus,this Petition indisputably presents an “important question of law”that must be resolved by this Court in order to ensure that individuals with mental illnesses or developmentaldisabilities continue to receive the protection that the Legislature intended them to have under the Long-Term Care Act’s mandatory disclosure provisions and to avoid the administrative quagmire that the Court ofAppeal’s decision will create. DPH’sother argumentsagainst review also should be rejected. DPH completely ignores Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d 139 (1991), effectively conceding that the Court ofAppeal’s decision conflicts with this Court’s holding in that case. There, this Court rejected the very type of “two-tiered system of enforcement” under the Long-Term Care Act that the Court ofAppeal has mandated here. Id. at 148. Nor wouldthis Court’s review be meaningless, as DPH claims. Tothe contrary, it is DPH that has misappliedthe rules of statutory construction — as is demonstrated by the fact that the majority decision did not adopt DPH’s arguments but instead | attempted to harmonize the statutes. As the dissent recognized below, the Long-Term Care Actis the later-enacted and morespecific statute. The Court ofAppealerred in abrogating the Long-Term Care Act’s disclosure mandate, which is a key remedial provision adopted bythe Legislature to protect individuals in long-term health care facilities. In short, the issues raised in CIR’s Petition readily meet the standard for granting review and deserve this Court’s attention. Il. REPLY ARGUMENTS A. The Petition Raises Important Legal Issues of Statewide Signficance. DPH’sattemptto cast this case as oneofinsular appellate error _ affecting CIR alone perhapsbestillustrates why review by this Court is necessary. DPHis ultimately responsible for the care and protection of mentally and developmentally disabled patients residing in long-term care facilities throughoutthe state. Though the Court ofAppeal’s published decision runs roughshod overtwostatutory schemes designedto protect this population, DPH seesthis Petition as addressing no important legal issue. Answerat 8. Rather than explain its position, DPH argues that the court correctly harmonized the Long-Term Care Act and the Lanterman Act by compromising both statutory schemesin the mannerthatit did — that is, by carving out of the Long-Term Care Actthe obligation to makepublic the citations issued for seriousviolations of patient care standards when those violations involve mentally and developmentally disabled patients receiving services under the Lanterman Act, while allowing disclosure of other information contained within the citations that is potentially covered under this same Act. | No coherent theory of statutory construction allows a court to selectively repeal provisions of twoacts in the guise ofharmonizing them. Setting aside DPH’s merits arguments, however,this Petition unquestionably presents importantlegal issues of statewide significance. Asaptly explained by CAHNR inits letter brief in support of the Petition, this case raises profoundissues ofpublic significance far beyond a _ harrow reconciliation of competing statutes. It involves ill and disabled individuals completely dependenton facilities ownedor overseen by the state for their daily care and whose ongoing and future welfare depends on remediation ofseriousviolations ofpatient-care standards at these facilities. Secrecy over thoseviolations for the most vulnerable of this population, those with mental and developmentaldisabilities, “fundamentally protects only those State hospitals or regional centers which have been found wanting by the State agency charged with investigating and exposingtheir serious violations ofpatient rights by allowing virtually all useful information about those violations to be buried,” as explained by CANHR. Secrecy further serves to insulate DPH from public scrutiny ofits role in investigating serious violations of patient-care standards at long-term care facilities serving developmentally and mentally disabled individuals.' " Because the issuanceofthree “AA”citations against a facilit within a single year — rather than the date of the occurrenceofthe violations — triggers the obligation to initiate proceedings to suspend or revoke a facility’s license, and because DPH completely controls the timing of the Thus, for the agency charged with protecting long-term care residents throughoutthis state to say that this case raises no importantlegal issue is irresponsible and, perhaps, bestillustrates why this case needs review. AS explained in CIR’s Petition, the Court ofAppeal’s decision not only undermines two statutory schemesaimedat protecting vulnerable populations,it creates substantial uncertainties over the state’s administrative obligations. By holding that some information contained in the citations involving mentally and developmentally disabled individuals must be protected under the Lanterman Act, the Court of Appeal’s decision introducesthe potential for civil liability for wrongful disclosure of confidential information under the Lanterman Act should DPH guess wrong in fulfilling its obligations to make public the citations under the Long-Term Care Act. Not only will this lead to less information being made public than expressly intended by the Legislature in enacting the Long-Term Care Act, but it exposes thestate to substantial liabilities that did not previously exist. The decision also imposes statewide administrative burdens onthestate to redact ill-defined categories of information from the citations, at risk ofcivil sanctions, which did not previously exist. And, it requires that these same ill-defined standards be applied to the long-held obligation to make public information aboutcitations through the state’s on-line consumerservices system. It further sets up an untenable dichotomyofpublic disclosure by requiring redaction of citations requested under the Public Records Act but issuance of any given citation, public oversight ofDPH’srole is important. Health & Safety Code § 1424(c). As CIR showedbelow,if not for the delay in issuing a third citation against Fairview Developmental Center for violationsthat all occurred in 2009,that facility’s license arguably should have been revoked. 2 PE 301:4-21. That DPH inissuing citations against state run developmental centersis essentially penalizing the state, is yet another reason why public oversight of DPH’s role in conducting investigations and in issuing citations is particularly important. not of those posted at a facility or otherwise requested under Section 1428 of the Health and Safety Code. DPHdoesnot dispute CIR’sinterpretation of the Court ofAppeal’s decision. Instead, DPH arguesthatthe record before this Court is not ripe for review because the consequencesofthe decision have yet to occur. Answerat 12. Actual harm to the populations intended to be protected - underthestatutes at issue here or unequalapplication ofthe constitutional right of access are not prerequisites to review. The Court ofAppeal’s decision unquestionablyraises importantlegal issues that will impact the populationsintendedto be protected under two statutory schemes,the public: seeking transparencyover the state’s citation system, and DPH,regional centers and long-term carefacilities now required to implement the Court of Appeal’s decision if not corrected by this Court. B. The Court of Appeal’s Decision is Inconsistent with This Court’s Authority and Opinions of The Attorney General. As DPHpoints out, the Court ofAppeal’s decision is a matter offirst impression, which now governsthe disclosure ofcitations by DPH, DDS, regional centers and long-term health care facilities throughoutthis state. There has been no other published decision interpreting the Lanterman Act and Long-Term Care Actin this manner. But what DPHfails to address — and what warrants this Court’s review — is that by carving out ofthe protections of the Long-Term Care Actfacilities caring for mentally and developmentally disabled individuals, the decision sets up the very type of “two-tiered system of enforcement” under the Actthat this Court rejected in Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 143. There, a county argued that government owned,as opposedto privately owned, long-term health care facilities should be exempt from the Long-Term Care Act’s citation penalties under the Government Tort Claim Act. In considering this argument, the Court extensively reviewed several provisions of the Long-Term Care Act, including its public posting mandates, and concludedthat “the Act’s provisions are designed to implementthe Legislature’s declared public policy objective of ‘assur[ing] that long-term health care facilities provide the highest level of care possible.’” Id. at 143 (citing Health & Safety Code § 1422(a)). The Court held that “granting immunity to public entities from the penalties would be contrary to the intentofthe Legislature to provide a citation system for the imposition ofpromptand effective civil sanctions against long-term health care facilities in violation of the laws and regulationsofthis state.” Id. (citing Health & SafetyCode § 1417.1). This “two-tiered system of enforcement ofthe Health and Safety Code provisions ... contradicts the very public policy that the Legislature sought to implement with the citation and penalty provisions ofthe Act.” Id. at 149. By carving out of the protections of the Act long-term health care facilities caring for mentally and developmentally disabled patients, including each ofthe state-owned developmental centers which were the subject of CIR’s Public Records Act request, the Court ofAppeal’s decision uniquely insulates an entire class offacilities expressly intended to be included within the Act’s mandates. See Health & Safety Code § 1418. In the process, it deprives the most vulnerable of an already vulnerable population from the protections of the Act. The Court ofAppeal’s carve-out cannot be reconciled with this Court’s decision in Kizer, and for this additional reason review should be granted. | | The decision also contradicts this Court’s decision in Albertson v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 796 (2001), and opinions issued by the Attorney General finding exceptions to the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions in later enacted specific statutes designed to protect vulnerable populations, such asat issue here. Petition at 21-23. DPH arguesthat these authorities do not apply because they addressthe confidentiality provisions of Section 5328 ofthe Welfare and Institutions Code not Section 5328.15 , which DPH argues controls because it was enacted after the Long-Term Care Act. Answer at 7. However, as foundbythetrial court and reiterated by the dissent below, Section 5328.15 authorizes disclosure of information to licensing personnel conducting licensingduties under separate chapters of the Health and Safety Code. Health & Safety Code § 5328.15. It neither — incorporates the separately chaptered provisions ofthe Long-Term Care Act contained in Chapter 2.4 ofDivision 2 of the Code, nor repeals by implication those provisions. Tr. Ct. Order at 10; Dis. Opn. at 11. It makes sense that Section 5328.15’s provisions authorizing disclosurein licensing investigations do not govern citation investigations becauseall ofthe necessary authorizations to conducta citation investigation already were set forth in the earlier-enacted Long-Term Care Act. See, e.g., Health & Safety Code §§ 1420(a)(1); 1420(a)(2)(A-C); 1421(a); 1428(f). Thus, DPH’s reliance on Section 5328.15, as purportedly the later enacted provision that controls over the Long-Term Care Act, remains misplaced. That section simplydoes notrepeal by implication the public access mandates ofthe Long-Term Care Act as DPH would like this Court to believe. In short, the Court ofAppeal’s decision contradicts authority ofthis Court and ignores case law construing the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisionsin light of later enacted specific statutes protecting vulnerable populations. C. Review is Necessary to Correct Clear Error. While the Court ofAppeal noted the generalrules of statutory constructionin its opinion,it failed to apply them;and,it ignored entirely the construction mandate ofthe California Constitution. Instead, it held that the Long-Term Care Act’s provision requiring that the citations “describe with particularity the nature of the violation” (Health & Safety Code § 1423 (a)(2)) trumpsthe Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provision, but the Lanterman Actcontrols over the Long-Term Care Act’s requirementthat “all relevant facts” be madepart of the public record. Opn. at 19-22. Its sole explanation for this holding is contained in twolines after. discussing the purposeofboth acts: This congruence ofpopulation and purpose, andthis effectuation ofpurpose from opposite directions, creates a complementarity of methods to effectuate the common purposefor this commonpopulation. In this way, these confidentiality and public accessibility provisions can be harmonized. Opn. at 19. It then proceeded to selectively enforce only certain provisions ofboth acts in the guise ofharmonizing them. DPH doesnot defend the court’s theory ofharmonization. Instead,it argues that the Court ofAppeal reached the right result because the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provision is the more specific statute that governs over the Long-Term Care Act. Answerat 9. Specifically, it claims that because the Lanterman Act pertains to a subclass of long-term patients covered under theLong-Term Care Act, the Lanterman Act controls. This theory of construction was not adopted by the Court ofAppeal andit was specifically rejected by the dissent. Dis. Opn. at 9, n. 9. Moreover, the cases on which DPHrelies for this theory of construction are inapposite. As explained by the dissent, the McDonald v. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386 (1893), case does not involve conflicting statutes or statutory construction. Dis. Opn. at 9, n. 9. Rather, that case involved a provision of the 1879 California Constitution prohibiting the Legislature from passing special or local laws regulating the practice of courts ofjustice. In connection with this provision, the Court explained that a statute may be considered a general law (and hence constitutional) even though it does not affect all the people of the state. Id. at 391. It was in this context that the Court explained, “[a] statute which affects all the individuals of a class is a general law, while one whichrelates to particular personsor thingsofa class is special.” Id. McDonald thus hasno application to this case. The othercase relied on by DPH,In re Ward, 227 Cal. App. 2d 369 (1964), involved two sentencingstatutes that conflicted when applied against a minor defendant convicted ofselling marijuana. Onestatute (former Health and Safety Code Section 11531) provided that every person whosells marijuana shall be punished by imprisonmentfrom five yearsto life and shall not beeligible for parole or release until he or she has served not less than three years. The other statute (former Penal Code section 1202b) provided that for anyperson who was underthe age of23 years at the time of committing a felony orfelonies, the court may, notwithstanding any other provision of law fixing or affecting the penalty for the felony or felonies, specify that the minimum term of imprisonmentshall be six “months. The court concluded that former Penal Code Section 1202b wasthe more specific provision that created an exception to the general sentencing statute under Section 11531 for persons under the age of 23. This was because Section 11531 began with the “generic” phrase “[e]very person,” while former Section 1202b applied only to persons underthe age of 23 years and used the phrase “notwithstanding any other provisions of law fixing or affecting the penalty for the offense.” In re Ward, 227 Cal. App. 2d at 374-75; see also Dis. Opn.at 9, n. 9. Asnoted by the dissent, the Lanterman Act’s confidentiality provisions were not madeto apply “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” Rather, “these provisions have been held to be general in nature and subject to numerous exceptions, both within the Lanterman Act and outside of that enactment. (see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5328, subds. (a)-(y), 5328.01 et seq.; Albertson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 805.)” Dis. Opn. at 9,n.9. The Long-Term Care Act, by contrast, is phrased in specific language mandating the disclosure of the exact administrative record at issue in this case, and thusis the specific statute that controls as foundbythetrial court. Thus, DPH’s novel theory of statutory construction does not support the results reached by the Court ofAppeal. Nor does DPH’sreliance on a provision of the Welfare and Institutions Code, enacted in September of 2012, authorizing the disclosure of citations and other information to the state’s protection and advocacy agency (“P&A”) advanceits position. See Welf. & Inst. Code § 5328.15(c). DPH argues that there would be no needfor this provision if unredacted citation reports were authorized through the Long-Term Care Act. Answer at 10-11. Thelegislative history to SB 1377 and existing law governing P&A’s investigations on behalf of developmentally impaired individuals show that the bill was enactedto clarify P&A’s existing rights of access to certain unredacted administrative records in carrying out abuse investigations. It wasnot enacted to grant a new right of access to unredactedcitation reports that did not exist before. Under existing Welfare and Institutions Code Section 4903(b)(1), authorizing P&A access to records of developmentally 10 impaired individuals in connection with abuse and neglect investigations, P&Aalready hadthe right of access to: Information and records prepared or received in the course of providing intake, assessment, evaluation, education, training, or other supportive services, including but notlimitedto, medical records... Welf. & Inst. Code § 4903(b)(1). Separately, P&A had the right of access to: Reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, injury, or dea occurring at the program, facility, or service while the individual with a disability is under the care of a member of the staff of a program,facility, or service, or by orfor a program,facility, or service, that describe anyorall ofthe following ... (A) Abuse, neglect, injury, or death... Welf. & Inst. Code § 4903(b)(2); see also Welf. & Inst. Code § 4514.3, 5328.06; Civ. Code § 1798.24b. This later section would includecitations issued by DPH, amongother administrative records generated by DPH in the process of conducing complaint investigations. According to the author of SB 1377, despite this existing law, in 2009 DPH changedits policyofproviding accessto such reports for individuals with mental health or developmentaldisabilities and instead started — _ providing heavily redacted reports. ‘See CIR’s RJN, Ex. A at 4 (Senate Bill Analysis). Under this new policy, DPH required P&A to submit “an individual written request to receive an unredacted record for the case.” Id. Though there was no dispute as to P&A’s right of accessto the reports, and DPH would eventually provide them,this “extra layer of bureaucratic process” caused significant delays “jeopardize[ing] the well-being of the individuals involved.” Id. at 5. The needforthebill, as expressed by the author, states: While it is arguable that existing law provisions already give the P&A agencythe right to access these reports (Welf. & Inst. Code Secs. 4902(), 4903(a)-(b)), to the extent that the P&A 1] agency’s accessto full reports is obstructed by redacting information and only providing the full, unredacted version upon specific written request, the addition of these types of. unredacted records to the existing list of records in Section 4903 would arguably add necessary clarity and expedite the processin the interest of these persons with disabilities who are affected by delays in accessto records. Id. (emphasis added); see also DPH’s RJN 1535-1549 (Leg. Council’s Digest) (“This bill would provide that the authority. to access these records includesaccess to an unredacted facility evaluation report form, unredacted complaint investigation report form, unredacted citation report ....”) (emphasis added). Thus, far from supporting DPH’s argument, the legislative history of SB 1377 showsthatit was enactedto clarify existing access rights because DPH wasarbitrarily thwarting thoserights. Thus, contrary to DPH’scontention, review likely will not merely confirm the Court ofAppeal’s decision. It is necessary to correct clear error. Ill. CONCLUSION. The Court of Appeal’s decision threatens to undermine important protections overa class of individuals arguably the most vulnerable in California. It imposes new, onerous and uncertain obligations onthestate that most certainly will lead to less information being made public than intended by the Legislature in enacting the Long-Term Care Act. Andit is a dangerous step backwards into what was once described as a system shrouded in secrecy before measures weretaken to shine light on the care /// /// 12 and treatment afforded individuals whoreside in long-term health care facilities in this state. For these reasons, and those morefully set forth in CIR’s Petition for Review, review by this Court should be granted. Dated: December 19, 2013 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP By: Ap. (onL Duffy Carolan Attorneys for Real Party In Interest The Center for Investigative Reporting 13 COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE I certify that pursuant to Rules of Court 8.204(c) and 8.504(d), this Reply in Support of the Petition for Review is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 13 points, and contains 3,559 words. By: Bll LoaA. Duffy@gtolan Dated: December 19, 2013 DWT23084850v2 0200375-000100 PROOF OF SERVICE I, Janis Wooley, declare as follows: I am employedin the City and County of San Francisco, State of California, in the office of a memberofthe bar of this court, at whose direction the service was made. I am over the age ofeighteen (18) years, and nota party to or interested in the within-entitled action. I am an employee ofDAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP,and mybusiness address is 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800, San Francisco, California 94111. On December 19, 2013, I caused to be served the following document: REPLY OF THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW I caused the above documentto be served ontheinterested parties at the addresses listed below by the following means: [