RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT v. STIGLITZ

Intervener, Riverside Sheriff’s Association, and Real Party in Interest, Kristy Drinkwater, Letter Brief

Cal.April 24, 2014

Michael P. Stone, P.C.* MunaBusailah, P.C.* Michael P. Stone Muna Busailaht Stephen P. Chulak Michael D. Williamson Robert M. Todd Travis Poteat Robert Rabe t Theodore H. Dokko + Solicitor, England and Wales { Barrister, England and Wales April 21, 2014 Frank A. McGuire Supreme Court Clerk/Administrator Supreme Court of California 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102-4797 Stone Busailah, LLP A Partnership of Professional Law Corporations* SUPREME COURT FILED APR 2 4 2014 Frank A. McGuire Clerk Con Deputy (} PRINCIPAL OFFICE 200 East Del Mar Boulevard, Suite 350 Pasadena, California 91105 Telephone: (626) 683-5600 Facsimile: (626) 683-5656 Q RIVERSIDE COUNTY OFFICE 6215 River Crest Drive, Suite A Riverside, California 92507 Telephone: (951) 653-0130 Facsimile: (951) 656-0854 Re: Riverside County Sheriffs Departmentv. Jan Stiglitz (Riverside Sheriffs’ Association, Intervener and Appellant); No. S206350 Dear Mr. McGuire: On April 16, 2014, this Court directed the parties to serve and file supplementalletter briefs addressing the following questions: (1) Assumingthat a motion for discovery of officer personnel records maybefiled in an administrative proceeding (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd.(a)), and a hearing officer has authority to determine that the motion states good cause for discovery (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3)), is there any existing statutory mechanism that would allow the matter to be transferred to the superior court for an in camera review ofthe records by a judicial officer (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b))? (2) Ifno existing statutory mechanism applies, do we have the authority to create such a transfer mechanism? RECEIVED APR 24 2014 CLERK SUPREME COURT Frank A. McGuire Supreme Court Clerk/Administrator April 21, 2014 Page 2 Real Party in Interest, Kristy Drinkwater, and Intervener, Riverside Sheriffs’ Association,' do not know of any existing statutory mechanism that would specifically allow the matter to be transferred to the superior court for an in camera review ofthe recordsby a judicialofficer. This Court does, however, have the authority to create such a transfer mechanism. This Court has the Inherent Power to Create a Procedural Mechanism In addition totheir inherent equitable powerderived from the historic powerofequity courts, all courts have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory authority. (Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 636-637; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272, 287-288.) “Courts have inherent power,as well as power undersection 187 of the Code of Civil Procedure’, to adopt any suitable methodofpractice, both in ordinary actions and special proceedings,if the procedureis not specified by statute .... It is not only proper but at times may be necessary for a court to follow provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are harmonious with the objects and purposes of the proceeding although those provisions are not specifically made applicable by the statute which creates the proceeding.” (Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 815, 825, fn. omitted, see also Code Civ. Proc., § 128, [Legislature has recognized the authority of courts to manage their proceedings and to adopt suitable methods of practice].) “[AJll courts have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory 'Wrongly spelled Riverside Sheriff’s Association in the caption. *Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides: “Whenjurisdiction is, by the constitution or this code, or by any other statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise ofthis jurisdiction,if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformableto the spirit of this code.” Frank A. McGuire Supreme Court Clerk/Administrator April 21, 2014 Page 3 authority. [Citations.]” (Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry (1990) 219 Cal. App. 3d 9, 19; disapproved on other grounds in Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 896-897; accord, Rutherfordv. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967.) These powersare derived from the state Constitution. (People v. Castello (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1247; Cal. Const., arts. III, § 3, and VI, § 1.) "Courts are not powerless to formulate rules ofprocedure where justice demandsit." (Adamson v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 505, 509, citing Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 318-319.) The inherent powers derived from article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution are not dependent onstatute. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 266-267; see Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29, 33-34.) These powersentitle courts to"'. . . adopt any suitable methodofpractice, both in ordinary actions and special proceedings, ifthe procedure is not specified by statute or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council.' [Citation.]" (Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 805, 812-813.) Thus, a court has the inherentauthority to create a new form ofprocedurein a particularcase, where justice demands it. (Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-1378.) "'The ... power arises from necessity where, in the absence of any previously established procedural rule, rights would be lost or the court would be unable to function.' [Citation.]" (James H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 175-176 [juvenile court had inherent power to hold a competency hearing despite absence ofexpressstatutory authority]; see also Jn re AmberS. (1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 1260.) It is axiomatic that discovery provisions are to be liberally construed in favor of disclosure "unless clearly prohibited by statute or policy considerations." (Browne v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 610, 614; cf. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 172-173; Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 372.) If this Court were to create a transfer mechanism to allow the matter to be transferred from the administrative proceeding to the superior court for an in camera review of the records by a judicial officer, it would not be creating anew method ofcivil discovery beyondthat authorizedbystatute, (see Holm v. Superior Court (1986) 187 Cal. App. 3d 1241, 1247), but using its inherent and other powersto create and adopt a form of procedure based on a reasonable Frank A. McGuire Supreme Court Clerk/Administrator April 21, 2014 Page 4 interpretation ofthe relevant statutory provisionsthatis within the scope ofdisclosure already formulated bythe legislation. Conclusion Forty years ago, in Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, this Court, "in the absenceoflegislation" (Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816), used its inherent power and authority to judicially create a mechanism whereby a defendant, who wasasserting self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer, could discover officer personnel records. (11 Cal.3d at pp. 535-537.) Should this Court determine a motion for discovery ofofficer personnel records may be filed in an administrative proceeding, a hearing officer has authority to determine that the motion states good cause for discovery, and it is necessary for the matter to be transferred to the superior court for an in camera review ofthe recordsby ajudicial officer - this Court, now acting within the framework of guiding legislation, may use its inherent power and authority to create a transfer mechanism from the administrative proceeding to the superior court. Cordially, STONE BUSAILAH, LLP MICHAEL P. STONE ROBERT RABE by ROBERT RABE 7 | Attorneys for Real Party in Interest, Kristy Drinkwater, and Intervener, Riverside Sheriffs’ Association B b W Y W N o O O o S N NH N A N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES: I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am overthe age of 18 years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 200 E. Del Mar Blvd., Suite 350, Pasadena, CA 91105 On April Fry14 I served the foregoing document described as LETTER BRIEF onthe followinginterested parties in this action Supreme Court of California 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102 (original and 8 copies via Federal Express) Bruce D.Praet Ferguson, Praet & Sherman 1631 E. 18" Street Santa Ana, CA 92705 Jan Stiglitz, Arbitrator California Western School of Law 225 Cedar St. San Diego, CA 92101 Richard Levine Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine 1428 Second Street, Suite 200 Santa Monica, CA 90401 JamesE. Trott 19665 Surfbreaker Ln Huntington Beach, CA 92648 Michael Morguess 1440 N Harbor Blvd Ste 900 Fullerton, CA 92835 Helen Schwab Green & Shinee 16055 Ventura Blvd #1000 Encino, CA 91436 Kathleen Bales-Lange Crystal E. Sullivan County Counsel of the County of Tulare 2900 West Burrel Avenue Visalia, CA 93291 R h Ww W W N o S e N N H D M N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Clerk of the Court California Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division Two 3389 12" Street Riverside, CA 92501 Clerk of the Court County of Riverside 4050 MainStreet Riverside, CA 92501 Office of the Attorney General 1300 “TI” Street Sacramento, CA 95814 /x/ VIA MAIL I deposited such envelope in the mail at Pasadena, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. Asfollows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion ofthe party served, service is presumedinvalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. /X/ (State) I declare under penalty of perjury underthat lawsofthe State of California that the foregoingis true and correct. Executed on April #22014,at Pasadena,a}