IN RE I.J.

Appellant’s Reply Brief on the Merits

Cal.January 28, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN RE LJ. ET AL. (MINORS), Persons Coming Underthe Juvenile Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Respondent, Vv. J.J. (FATHER), Petitioner. ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENTOF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY Case No. S204622 Court ofAppeal No. B237271 Superior Court No. CK59248 SUPREME COURT FILED JAN 2 8 2013 Frank A. McGuire Clerk Deputy 7 cre\ 8.25(b) / The Honorable Timothy R.Saito, Judge REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER J.J. ON THE MERITS CRISTINA GABRIELIDIS California Bar No. 214557 6977 Navajo Road,Suite 303 San Diego, California 92119 Telephone: (619) 733-1328 cgabrielidis@gmail.com Attorneyfor Appellant J.J. Under Appointmentby the Supreme Court ofCalifornia CAPLA Independent Case System TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..... 00...eceens il ARGUMENT DEPENDENCY JURISDICTION OVER A MALE CHILD IS NOT JUSTIFIED WHERE HE HAS NEVER SUFFERED ANY TYPE OF HARM WHATSOEVER, AND SPECULATION CONCERNINGRISK OF FUTURE HARM IS PREMISED SOLELY ON THE FATHER’S CLANDESTINE SEXUAL ABUSE OF HIS DAUGHTER .............. 2 A. A Father presents no substantial risk of sexual abuse to his sons, as described by section 300, subdivision (d), based solely on his sexual abuse of his daughter. ....................... 2 1. Male children are not at risk ofmolestation as a result ofthe sexual abuse oftheirfemale sibling. eenee ee ee ene teen eee n een tebe eens 2 2. This Court should not rewrite section 300, subdivision (d) to assume jurisdiction over the boys based on presumptions associated with an inapplicable statute ...... 0... ccceee ee eens 5 3. The recent opinion in In re David R. explained that scientific authority supports the conclusion that a person who sexually abuses afemale child is not likely to sexually abuse a male child. ................4.-. 7 B. |.J.’s brothers were not described by section 300, subdivision (b) because therewas no evidence whatsoeverthat they were at substantial risk of serious physical harm. ..................... 10 C. [.J.’s brothers were not described by section 300, subdivision (j). ... 12 CONCLUSION 2.0...eceen eee eee ene e en eee 14 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. 2.0.0.0... cece ccc cee eee eens 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CALIFORNIA CASES Inre Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549 0.0... 6. cee eee ee ee eee 11 Inre Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849.) 2.0... 6.2 eee eee ee eee 10 In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373 2.2... eee 10 Inre David R. (December 31, 2012, B239629) ——Cal.Rptr3d_ [2012 WL 6737811] «0...6.0eee7-10, 12 Inre D.G. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1562 2.00.2eee 3 Inre LJ. et al. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1351 2.00...ceeeee eee 1 In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282 2.0.0...eeeeee 11 In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200 0...ceetee eens 6 In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48 2.00.2...ee eee eee 4, 8, 12-13 In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343 20...eeeee 9-10 In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814 2.00...eeeee 7,10 In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177 2.0... coece eee eee 13 Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586 ........... 0.022. e eee eee. 7 People v. Carskaddon (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423 2.0.6... cece cece ee eee eens 3 CALIFORNIA STATUTES Pen Code § 647.6 2.0... . cccteen ene tent eens 3 Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (a) 2.0... 2ecce eee teens 12 Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (b) 2.0...ceeee 2, 10-12 Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (d) 2.0.2... eeeee ce eee eee eee 2-5, 12 Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (€) 2.0.2... ceceeee nee eens 12 Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (i)... 6... eee eee ee eee eee tenes 12 Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (J)... 2... ecccceee eet ene 2 Welf. & Inst. Code § 355.1 0...eeeenee eens 5-6 il OTHER SOURCES Cavallin, Incestuous Fathers: A Clinical Report (1966) vol. 122, No. 10, American Journal of Psychiatry 122... 2.2...eeeeens 9 Proeve, A Preliminary Examination of Specific Risk Assessment for Sexual Offenders Against Children (2009) vol. 18, issue 6, Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 583 9, 12 Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating The Danger Posed By A Sexually Predatory Parent To The Victim's Siblings (2002) 51 Emory L.J.241 ................. 8 Wilson, Recognizing The Threat Posed by an Incestuous Parent to the Victim's Siblings: Part I: Appraising the Risk (June 2004) vol. 13, No. 2, Journal of Child and Family Studies 143 2...ccee ee een eee e eee 9 ili IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN REI.J. ET AL. (MINORS), Case No. 8204622 Persons Coming Underthe Court of Appeal No. B237271 Juvenile Law. Superior Court No. CK59248 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Respondent, Vv. J.J. (FATHER), Petitioner. APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY The Honorable Timothy R. Saito, Judge TO THE HONORABLETANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HONORABLEASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: Pursuant to rule 8.520, subdivision (a)(3) of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner J.J. respectfully submits this Reply to the Answer filed on December 24, 2012 (“Ans.”) by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) regarding the published decision in In re IJ. et al. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1351 (“Opinion”). ARGUMENT DEPENDENCY JURISDICTION OVER A MALE CHILD IS NOT JUSTIFIED WHERE HE HAS NEVER SUFFERED ANY TYPE OF HARM WHATSOEVER, AND SPECULATION CONCERNING RISK OF FUTURE HARM IS PREMISED SOLELY ON THE FATHER’S CLANDESTINE SEXUAL ABUSE OF HIS DAUGHTER Wherethere is no evidence that a father’s sons had been harmedin any way whatsoever, no competent evidencethat heis likely to harm them, no evidencethat a father has sexual interest in men or boys, and no evidencethat the boys were aware of any abusein the household, a father’s sexual abuse of his daughter does not permit an inference that he will also sexually abuse his sons. In such case, the juvenile court is without authority to declare jurisdiction over the son under Welfare andInstitutions Code section 300, subdivisions (d), (b) or (j). A. A Fatherpresents no substantial risk of sexual abuse to his sons, as described by section 300, subdivision (d), based solely on his sexual abuse of his daughter. 1. Male children are notat risk ofmolestation as a result ofthe sexual abuse oftheirfemale sibling. AsI.J.’s brothers were never sexually abused themselves, DCFS arguesthat sexual abuseincludes child molestation, which does not require a touching, and implies that Father sexually molested his sons. (Ans. 14-17.) DCFS argues that the sons werevictims of such “non-touching offenses” as potentially witnessing I.J.’s abuse, and possibly becoming sexualpredators like their father. (Ans. 13-15, 2 17, 26.) Thepotentialities argued by DCFSare quite speculative andare not the type of harm contemplated by either section 300, subdivision (d), or Penal Code section 647.6. Father does not dispute that sexual abuse may be accomplished without contact. In In re D.G. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1571, the court madethat clear whenit held that a father's solicitation of oral sex from his daughter's 16-year-old half-sister constituted sexual abuse, in violation of section 300, subdivision (d), since the act amountedto the offense of annoying or molesting the half-sister, in violation of Penal Code section 647.6. However,a father’s sexual abuse of his daughter does not equate to sexual molestation ofhis sons (or risk thereof). Ordinarily, the annoyance or molestation which is forbidden by Penal Code section 647.6, is not concerned with the state of mind ofthe child, but the objectionable acts of the defendant. (People v. Carskaddon (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423, 426.) The defendant’s conduct must be motivated by an abnormalsexual interest. (Pen. Code § 646.7.) In a case where a father sexually abuses his daughter, he is motivated by an abnormalsexualinterest in female minors. That does not mean that the father is also motivated by an abnormal sexual interest in male minors. In all of the molestation cases cited by DCFS,the criminal defendant’s actions were motivated by an abnormal sexual interest in the child; the defendant involves the child for the purpose offulfilling his own sexual gratification. (See Ans. 14-17 and cases cited therein.) Here, however, DCFS acknowledgesthat Father “may not have intended for his sons to observe the abuse of I.J.” (Ans. 17.) Father’s intent makesall the difference. Here, Father’s abnormal sexual interest and actions focused solely on his daughter. She alone wasthe victim of his molestation. Though DCFSarguesthat the boys were at risk for walking in on the abuse,it acknowledges that Father concocted elaborate schemesto get I.J. alone with him and made excuses to get Motherand the sons out of the house. (Ans. 32.) These behaviors indicated that Father’s sole sexual focus concernedhis daughter. Father had no abnormal sexual interest or actions focused on his sons. They were not sexually molested by Father. Asstated in In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48, 67-68, Penal Code section 11165.1 “refers to specific sex acts committed by the perpetrator on a victim, including child molestation . . . and does not include in its enumerated offenses the collateral damage on a child that might result from the family's or child's reaction to a sexual assault on the child's sibling.” Child molestation is plainly encompassed bysection 300, subdivision (d). However, male children may not be presumed to have been sexually molested as a result of the sexual abuse of their sister. The kind of “collateral damage” discussed by Jn re Maria R. includes the notion espoused by DCFSthat the sons may grow upto be sexual predators, or the speculation that they boys could have potentially witnessed or encountered the abuseoftheir sister. Those are not the types of harm addressed by subdivision (d). 2. This Court should not rewrite section 300, subdivision (d) to assume jurisdiction over the boys based on presumptions associated with an inapplicable statute. DCFSacknowledgesthat section 355.1 is not directly applicable to this case as that presumption wasnottriggered in this matter. (Ans. 19.) It is not. Here, the juvenile court never found that Father had been “found in a prior dependency hearing . . . to have committed an act of sexual abuse,” and thus, there was no prima facie evidence that the boys were described by section 300. (§ 355.1, subd. (d)(3) [emphasis supplied].) Yet, DCFS arguesthat had Father previously,“years earlier,” been convicted of sexual abuse, the section 355.1 presumption would have been triggered and Father’s children (regardless of gender) would have been declared dependents unless Father rebutted that prima facie evidence and persuaded the juvenile court that he no longer posed a threat. That’s a lot of “ifs.” Father agrees that had the circumstances been different, section 355.1 would apply. But Father also notes that had the boys beengirls, section 300, subdivision (d) would have applied to them based on the sexual abuseoftheir sister. The facts are what they are, and section 355.1] does not apply in any way. DCESarguesthat because the juvenile court could declare jurisdiction over the boys in a future dependency proceeding based on the adjudicatedallegations of past sexual abuse,it “logically follows” that the juvenile court had authorization to assert jurisdiction over the boys here and now. (Ans. 19-20.) The argument of DCFSis a non sequitur asit ignores the issues oftiming as well as the different standards of proof associated with the two statutes at issue here. Sections 300 and 355.1 are not fungible. Section 355.1 requires a very low standard ofproof (akin to a “notice”) and shifts the burden of proofto the parent. Section 300 requires a more exacting preponderanceofthe evidence standard and does not allow for any shifting of the burden ofproof. Section 355.1 is not persuasive authority in this case because the Legislature did not intend for it to substitute for findings pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d) where sexual abuse is being alleged in court for thefirst time. Ifit so intended, it could have made that abundantly clear, in either subdivision (d) itself or the body of section 355.1. In In re J. W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, the court stated that oneprinciple of statutory construction assumesthat every part of a statute serves a purpose andthat nothing is superfluous. Anotherprinciple, commonly known underthe Latin name of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is that the expression of onething in a statute ordinarily implies the exclusion of otherthings. (/d., at p. 209.) Here, the inclusion of the words “prior dependency hearing”operate to exclude from the ambit of section 355.1, the current dependency hearing. The Legislature utilized the word “prior” on purpose, andit should be ascribed its natural meaning. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 595 [When construing a statute, the reviewing court must first look to the words ofthe statute and give those words their normal, ordinary meaning.].) The legislative history of section 300 indicates “an unmistakable intention to narrow the grounds on whichchildren may be subjected to juvenile court jurisdiction.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.) This court should not permit the expansion ofjuvenile court jurisdiction to include factual scenarios whichare plainly unintended by thestatutory language. 3. The recent opinion in In re David R. explained thatscientific authority supports the conclusion that a person who sexually abuses afemale child is notlikely to sexually abuse a male child. Shortly after DCFSfiled its Answer, the SecondDistrict Court of Appeal, Division One, issued its opinion in In re David R. (December 31, 2012, B239629) Cal.Rptr.3d___— [2012 WL 6737811], holding thatthe fact that a father sexually abusedhis six-year-old stepdaughter (S.G.) was insufficient, by itself, to support a finding that father’s two-year-old son (David) was at substantial risk of sexual abuse. In that case, in an apartment away from the family home with no oneelse present, father forced S.G. to masturbate him to ejaculation and fondled 7 her breasts. The juvenile court found jurisdiction over David pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j) based solely on its view that “It’s been long established that both sexes are at risk when this type of abuse occurs.” The reviewing court held that this was a “misunderstanding of the law.” (/d. at *1.) The In re David R. court agreed with the reasoning of Jn re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48,68, that a father’s sexual abuse of his female daughters was, standing alone,insufficient to establish a substantial risk of sexual abuseoftheir male sibling. In particular, the court agreed with the Jn re Maria R. court’s observation that no contrary decisions had ever “cited any scientific authority or empirical evidence to support the conclusion that a person who sexually abuses a female child is likely to sexually abuse a male child.” (In re David R., supra, 2012 WL 6737811 at *2, citing In re Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.) The court in In re David R. itself cited to scientific authority which supported the conclusion that a person who sexually abuses a female child is not likely to sexually abuse a male child. The court explained: The studies that have been doneonsiblings’ risk of sexual abuse by their fathers show that in cases of a father's incest with a daughter, in the absence of other indicators of risk, “the male child is not likely to be victimized.” (Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating The Danger Posed By A Sexually Predatory Parent To The Victim's Siblings (2002) 51 Emory L.J. 241, 263-264.) Thus, where a female child is the initial victim of abuse, “the abuser likely will prey upon other female children in the household, while leaving the male children alone.” (/d. at p. 287.) A study published in the Journal of Child Sexual Abuse found that in 157 cases of sexual abuse within a family, 135 of the male perpetrators abused only female children (86%), 13 abused only malechildren (8.3%) and nine victimized both male and female victims (5.7%). (Proeve, A Preliminary Examination of Specific Risk Assessment for Sexual Offenders Against Children (2009)vol. 18, issue 6, Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 583, 585 (hereafter Proeve).) (In re David R., supra, 2012 WL 6737811 at *2-*3.) The court in Jn re David R. noted that no expert testimony wasoffered to the juvenile court in support of the “substantial risk.” Moreover,thoughthere are risk factors for abuse, identified in research on the subject, DCFS offered no evidence regarding these and the juvenile court never consideredanyrisk factors: “Other indicators of risk” may include the sexual proclivity of the molester. Is he an indiscriminately promiscuous adult; a pedophile; a pure incest offender? (Cavallin, Incestuous Fathers: A Clinical Report (1966) vol. 122, No. 10, American Journal of Psychiatry 122, 1132-1138.) Has he molested unrelated boys? (Wilson, Recognizing The Threat Posed by an Incestuous Parent to the Victim's Siblings: Part I: Appraising the Risk (June 2004)vol. 13, No. 2, Journal of Child and Family Studies 143, 153). One study found that the father's age when he abuses the minor female and his own sexual abuse as a minor affected the probability that the father would cross the gender boundary.(Proeve, supra, at p. 586.) Finally, the comparative sexual developmentofthe molested female and a male sibling may be a factor affecting the male's risk of molestation. (See § 300, subd. (j), quoted at pp. 2-3, fn. 3, ante.) (Un re David R., supra, 2012 WL 6737811 at *3.) In his dissent, Judge Mallano agreed with the reasoning ofJn re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, which presumedrisk of sexual abuse to a son where a daughter has been sexually abused, and stated that a father’s sexual abuse ofhis child was prima facie evidence constituting a presumption andin this case “Father offered no evidence that he wasnot a risk to his son.” (In re David R., supra, 2012 WL 6737811 at *3 (dis. opn. ofMallano, P.J.).) The type of burden shifting espoused by Judge Mallano is alarming. It is axiomatic that the petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderanceofthe evidencethat the child whois the subject of a petition comes underthe juvenile court's jurisdiction. (In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379; In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849.) Wherethe county agency fails to introduce any evidence, including expert testimony, to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that a male childisat risk of sexual abuseas a result of the sexual abuse ofhis sister, it fails to establish that the child is described by section 300, subdivision (d). B. 1.J.’s brothers were not described by section 300, subdivision (b) because there was no evidence whatsoeverthat they were at substantial risk of serious physical harm. Section 300, subdivision (b) means whatit says. “Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm orillness.” (In re Rocco M., supra,| Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) Boys are not at a substantial risk of seriously physical harm asthe result of the sexual abuseoftheir sister. 10 DCESargues that section 300, subdivision (b) applies to the instant scenario because sexual abuse constitutes bodily harm. (Ans. 27-29.) Father agrees that sexual abuse is offensive to a child’s body and their physical well-being. However, it remains that a father’s sexual abuse of his daughter does not equate to sexual abuse of, or substantial risk of the same, to his son. DCFScautionedthat a court need not wait until a child is injured to protect him. (Ans. 29.) DCFSglosses over the fact that here, the boys here had a good relationship with their Father and wanted it to continue. Evidence of past conduct maybe probative of current conditions, and a child mustbe at risk of harm during the jurisdictional hearing for the court to sustain the petition. (in re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 289-290; In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549, 558-559.) In this scenario, past conduct indicated that Father did not harm the boys, but treated them well. That fact was probative of current conditions and current risk of harm. DCFSarguesthat the boys here were at risk of harm because Father’s actions were so “aberrant” and “depraved,” and it was impossible to say what Father was going to do in the future. (Ans. 29.) Any act of sexual abuse against a child could be described using the many inflammatory adjectivesutilized by DCFS. All acts of sexual abuse could be considered “aberrant” so that all children may be considered to beat risk as the result of an act of sexual abuse. This renders 11 the term “aberrant”to be fairly meaningless. The term “aberrant” should be reserved, in the context of the issue presented here, for the 5.7% of male sexual abuse perpetrators who abused both male and female victims. (/n re David R., supra, 2012 WL 6737811 at *3, citing Proeve.) Absent any evidence in support, a juvenile court should not be permitted to presumethat a father falls within that 5.7% of male sexual abuse perpetrators. Wherethe only evidence of abuseifthe father’s sexual abuse ofhis daughter, that is not sufficient to support a finding that male children areat substantial risk of serious physical harm under section 300, subdivision(b). C. 1.J.’s brothers were not described by section 300, subdivision (j). Wherethere is no additional evidence or expert testimony regarding risk to a son as a result of the sexual abuseofhis sisters, the son is not aware ofhis father’s sexual abuse ofhis sister, and the son has suffered no form of abuse(asset forth in subdivisions(a), (b), (d), (e) or (i)), the juvenile court may not declare jurisdiction over the son pursuant to subdivision (j). (Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 63-70.) DCESarguesthat the boys were at risk of learning to becomesexual predators like their Father, and thus were described by section 300, subdivision (j). (Ans. 32.) However, possibly learning to becomea sexual!predatoris not a type of 12 harm identified under any of the subdivisions of section 300. DCFS never alleged that the brothers actually suffered any specific harm as a result of I.J.’s abuse. (Jn re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 198.) There is no authority for the notion that possibly learning to becomea sexual predator is a type of harm addressed by any provision undersection 300. The knowledgethat a parent has abusedthetrustoftheir sister, or other collateral consequences of sexual abuseofa sibling, does not show jurisdictionis proper undersection 300 where a male child is concerned. Here, the record contains no evidence showingthe brothers suffered actual harm, and the record was devoid of evidence that they were at substantial risk of suffering any type of specific future harm. As such, they were not described by section 300, subdivision (j). Un re Maria R., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.) 13 CONCLUSION In deciding the issue raised in this case, the split among the courts of appeal reflects the division between passionate outrage and reasonedinterpretation of statute and standards of evidence. Where a father has sexually abusedhis daughter, it almost never meansthat he will also sexually abuse his sons. A juvenile court must have some evidence beyond the daughter’s abuse(e.g., scientific evidence, or factual evidence of the father’s proclivity to molest boys), to support any conclusion to the contrary. This Court should reverse the Opinion. Respectfully submitted, Date: January 22, 2013 CRISTINA GABRIELIDIS California Bar No. 214557 6977 Navajo Road, Suite 303 San Diego, California 92119 Telephone: (619) 733-1328 cgabrielidis@gmail.com 14 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that: Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520(c)(1), and according to the Word Perfect document word count function, the attached reply brief contains 3697_ words(a reply brief must not exceed 8,400 words). — ~ Dated: January 22, 2013 raf2E&t ” WV CRISTINA GABRIELIDIS i5 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN RE I.J. ET AL. (MINORS), Persons Coming Underthe Juvenile Law. Case No. 8204622 PROOF OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, say: I am over eighteen years of age, a resident of the County of San Diego, State of California, not a party to the within action, and my business addressis 6977 Navajo Road, Suite 303, San Diego, California 92119; and I served one copy ofthe within as follows: Clerk, Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, Division Eight 300 So. Spring St. 2nd Floor, North Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013 Mr. Emery El Habiby, Deputy County Counsel Los Angeles County Counsel Dependency (Appeals) Division 201 Centre Plaza Drive, Suite 1 Monterey Park, California 91754 Also emailed to: Eelhabiby@counsel.lacounty.gov California Appellate Project Los Angeles Office 520 S. Grand Avenue, Fourth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (Attorney for Mother) Karen Rose, LADL #3 1000 Corporate Center Drive, Suite 400 Monterey Park, CA 91754 (Attorney for Children) (Attorney for Father) Juan Valles, CLC #1 Renelde Espinoza, LADL #4 Children’s Law Center, Sixth Floor 1000 Corporate Center Dr., Ste. 420 201 Center Plaza Drive Monterey Park, CA 91754 Monterey Park, CA 91754-2177 Office of the Clerk J.J. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles [confidential address] 201 Centre Plaza Drive Monterey Park, CA 91754 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoingis true and correct. Executed January 22, 2013 at San Diego, CA. CRISTINA GABRIELIDIS 17