McWILLIAMS v. CITY OF LONG BEACH

Respondent’s Reply to Answer to Petition for Review

Cal.May 31, 2012

LIU,J. SUPREME COURT 5202037 FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE May 31 2012 STATE OF CALIFORNIA Frederick K. Ohlrich Clerk Deputy JOHN W. MCWILLIAMS Plaintiff and Appellant, Vv. CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant and Respondent. CITY OF LONG BEACH’S REPLY IN SUPPORTOFPETITION FOR REVIEW Of an Unpublished Decision of the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal Case No. B200831 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC361469 Honorable AnthonyJ. Mohr, Presiding CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE COLANTUONO & LEVIN,P.C. ROBERT E. SHANNON(43691) MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) J. CHARLES PARKIN (159162) SANDRAJ. LEVIN (130690) MONTEH. MACHIT (140692) TIANAJ. MURILLO (255259) 333 West Ocean Bivd., I!" Floor 300 S. Grand Ave., Suite 2700 Long Beach, CA 90802-4664 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3137 (562) 570-2200 (213) 542-5700 (562) 436-1579 (fax) (213) 542-5710 (fax) 109857.3 $202037 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JOHN W. MCWILLIAMS Plaintiff and Appellant, Vv. CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant and Respondent. CITY OF LONG BEACH’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW Of an Unpublished Decision of the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal Case No. B200831 Reversing a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC361469 Honorable Anthony J. Mohr, Presiding CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE COLANTUONO & LEVIN, P.C. ROBERT E. SHANNON(43691) MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO(143551) J. CHARLES PARKIN (159162) SANDRAJ. LEVIN (130690) MONTE H. MACHIT (140692) TIANA J. MURILLO (255259) 333 West Ocean Blvd., 11" Floor 300 S. Grand Ave., Suite 2700 Long Beach, CA 90802-4664 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3137 (562) 570-2200 (213) 542-5700 (562) 436-1579 (fax) (213) 542-5710 (fax) 109857.3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) INTRODUCTION...0.. cc cccceesseceeeeseeseeteeeseecesceeseesceeeencsecaeaeeaecaesecesaseesseesacaeseerseesens 1 LEGAL DISCUSSION.......cceeceeceeseeeseeeteeseeseccecceeessseeesseseesesenseeseeeesseasenssssensenseenes 1 I. Long Beach’s Ordinances Preclude Class Claims...........:ccceseeereees 1 II. Review Is Necessary to Resolve a Division Among the Courts of Appeal...ecccccecccceceneceecseceseseessceeseesscesseceeseseseesssseesseeesseseneeeseneneegs 3 A. Many Cases Apply Local Claiming Ordinances to Tax Refund Claims.0....ccccccceccecceeceseesesesseeecnersseesesesesseensenserseneeseenes 4 B. Ardon Did Not Overrule Batt .......ccccccccessesseeseseceseeseenseseeenees 5 lll. This Case Warrants Review to Resolve This Conflict...5 A. Similar Pending Cases Cannotbe Distinguished.................04 5 1. The Cases Presented for Notice Demonstrate the Needto Resolve the Issue Raised by the Petition........... 6 2. Recent Case Law Underscores the Urgencyof This TSSUC... cece cececesecsseneesseessessecsecseneesecenecesensesecsseesenseeseenegenes 8 IV. The Legislature Did Not Intend to Preempt Claiming Ordinances..8 A. The Difference Between §§ 905(a) and 905(b) Does Not Demonstrate Intent to Preempt Local Ordinances.................. 9 1. Section 905(e) Is Not to the Contrary«0.0.0... 10 B. Professor Van Alstyne’s Study is Legislative History of the Government Claims ACt......c.ccccccccscscesssecceeeneeeceessneceeeseeeseeeessaas 11 C. The Government Claims Act Uses Defined Terms Inconsistently oo...eeeeeeesees ces sseseseeesseseeeesesesecseseessessessseeseceeees 14 V. Construing § 905(a) to Preempt Long Beach’s Ordinances Raises Constitutional Questions...ieee ccecceescecececssscscsssesssessseccescessceaeees 16 CONCLUSIONoccececeescesesseseeseeseseeneecsseesaceesaesaeeecceeaesaeeaeeaeenesaeenaeeeteseeaeeas 17 109857.3 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE1... ccececcseeseesesseceeeseeeeeceseseeeaeneaeneees 19 il 109857.3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Ardonv. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4247oeees esecsneceseesseesseeneeesnerseecsaceeeeesereneesetenaes passim Batt v. City & County of San Francisco (2007) 155 CalApp.4® 65 oiicccseccseeceneeececssneeecsesssessasensesesseseesesnseesees 4,8 Borst v. City of El Paso De Robles, San Luis Obispo Superior Court No. CV 09-8117vceceeeeseeeteees 6 Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp. (1975) 44 CalApp.3d 460 oo.ceeecere ne eseeeeeesesessesessssseseesesseseuseesenseegs 10 California Restaurant Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.41581 ooceceneeereenenecneceseeessensesssseceesesessesenies 7 City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court, Att Court of Appeal Case No. D06156 .........ccceccccessecestncessenneeeenetessnneeeesenereeees 5, 6,8 Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803 oo.eeeect eneseteeceetsesecseseaseesesessesenseuseeeesaeeess 9,10 County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Oronoz) (2008) 159 Cal.App.4! 353 ooosesceeeeseseneeseneseesesesersesseseneeneneeeeeeaees 4,5, 8 Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty Sav. & Loan Assn. (1967) 254 Cal-App.2d 585 oo.csscee essere ceereseeeenecessecssecsesaseseesssessseenees 9 Flying Dutchman Park,Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4® 1129 oescseneseesesesceeseseneetsnseeeseserecaesesesenecseseeevens 4 Goldtree v. City of San Diego (1908) 8 CalApp. 505...eeeesereneessensseescaesesencneacecaeaescacaeneeenseseenseeeesaes 10 Hanns v. City of Chico, Butte County Superior Court No. 149292 ooosesesenesseeeseneeereeeenes 6, 7 lil 109857.3 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 79 CalApp.4® 242 occccceessseseseseescsesecseseseecseseeeneresaeeeeeeseeneeaeeeees 4 J.W. Theisen v. County of Los Angeles (1960) 54 Cab.2d 170 ooccccececcseeesscsecseeseeseessnscscseseseeesseeessseesaseesaseneeseees 9 Pasadena Hotel Development Venture v. City ofPasadena (1981) 119 CalApp.3d 412 oocsecscscesscsesnescseseeaeseneectacseseereeeseees 4,13 Shames v. City of San Diego, San Diego Superior Court No. GIC831539weceeeeeceseseteeeeeeseeeeeeeeseeeees 7 Sipple v. Alameda,etal, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC462270.......cccecsseeseteeeee: 5, 6, 8 Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1928) 205 Cal. 496.0... eeseceeeeereeseecasseseaeassseaseecsaraceneseeaceeesecseeeeesseeeees 9 Stansbury v. Frazier (1920) 46 CalApp. 485... seseseseseesecseseeeseeesseseseaeaescaeacseteceeeeerereaceesens 10 Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 7 Cal.3d 48 occcece ecsessseeeeesecsnscnesesesscesscesseneeseeaeeeaeeeeeesacaesetsenentees 4 Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4973 oieseceesesesesreesensenseseaeeseeseeacseesesseaseeeeeeeeeetesaeees 16 STATUTES California Constitution, Article XI, § 5 ..ccccccccccseessessescsescesesssessssecsssseeessees 16 California Constitution, Article XI, § 7 ...ccccecccsscssessssssescssesssessecssceesseseseteeens 16 California Constitution, Article XI, § 12...cc.cccccccccsccsesseessssessscscsscsesscseeeeeeees 16 California Constitution, Article XTIL, § 32 ......cccccecseesesesessesescseseseseeseseees 16, 17 Civil Code § 3264 ...ccecsssscistesisssstntstssintssenetistiananrsiantnnieteintneee 10 Code of Civil Procedure § 1192.1 ...cccccccccssssssssescsessscssssesvseecacecceevaceceesaees 9 iv 109857.3 Government Code § 703 ...cccccscsscsssesscsesseesessessessessesecsesseessesssesessessessessessesssescees 10 Government Code § 703(a) .....:.ceeccssesssssesseceseeseeseseeaeesesesessesseseeneeasseseeaessesessees 10 Government Code § 703(b).......ceecccesesscessssesseesecsseseeceteseessseeseeseeessecseeaeeneeeseensee 10 Government Code § 810... cccccscssccsseescesseeseeseeseeescesecenseaeceaeesseeasesessenees 8, 14, 15 GovernmentCode § 810.6 .....ccecceessssessssseesssessesseeseeseesesseeaeesseeseeeesscssssesseseeaeeses 14 Government Code § 811.6 ...ccccccccsccssesscsssesscscessscsesseccssenseseascresnseesseesees 14, 15, 16 GovernmentCode § 811.8 ....ccccccccseessccssscssessccessesseecescessssesseeseneseees 4,14, 15, 16 Government Code § 905 wo... ccccecccscccsccsscceesssssessscssesscecessesesecssscssusessesscesess 3,14, 15 Government Code § 905(a) ......ccccccecscscesssseesseseesessesseseeseecensens 5, 6,9, 10, 14, 16 Government Code § 905(b) ....cccccccscessesesesesseseecsecsecsessecsecsssesaeeessceesacensees 9, 10 Government Code § 905(€) ....cccccccsesessessesesessesecseseesecseseenecsecsesessesssseesesecerenenees 10 Government Code § 911.2 oiccecccccccsesscessessescesseescesecessesseseasesecseessessesssesseeseseess 15 Government Code § 935 ...ccccccsccesssssseeesseseseessesseecescsscseessesseserecesssesecesasas 14, 15 Government Code § 935(a) .....cesessssseseesseeseseseessesseseesseeseeseeeecseessestcsesaesaeens 14, 16 Government Code § 995.2 oo.cccccecccccsssseccssecseessesensesseccnscsssecessesseecsssesseesseeses 15, 16 Government Code § 995.2(a) ...ccccccscsssssssssseseesseeseescsaesstsecsseensesessecsesseseeeseeaseaees 15 Government Code § 11342.600 .0.....ccccscessecssesseseeeeseneeceseeesessscesessessssssseeeeees 14 OTHER AUTHORITIES California Rule of Court 8.500(b)(1) 0... ccccecessesseeseeseseseeseeeeseseeeeseaeseneeseeeeneeeees 4 Law Revision Commission Recommendation and Study, (Jan. 1959) 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. ......eeieeeeeseeeeieeeeees 12,13 Long Beach Municipal Code § 3.48.060........:ceseceseeseeeeeeeeeeeeseeteeeeeees 2,3, 17 Long Beach Municipal Code § 3.68.160.........ccssssecsssceeeeseeeeeeeeeeesseeeneens 1, 3, 16 Paso Robles Municipal Code § 3.04.550 oo. ccceesceeeseneeeereeeeeenesseeeeeteeseeeneaeeees 7 Paso Robles Municipal Code § 3.04.561 oeeceeseseseseseeeeeceeteeeeeesesesnseseseeeneneeaes 7 Vv 109857.3 INTRODUCTION Plaintiff John W. McWilliams (“Plaintiff” or “McWilliams”) argues this case is moot and unworthy of review by assuming victory on all the contested points. There can be no doubt the parties here do contest whether the Defendant City of Long Beach (the “City”) is empowered to precludeclass claims. That question arises here andis vitally important to many others. Accordingly, this case merits review. LEGAL DISCUSSION I. Long Beach’s Ordinances Preclude Class Claims The City has consistently maintained throughoutthis litigation that Long Beach Municipal Code (“LBMC”) § 3.68.160 authorizes refunds of overpaid telephone taxes to either consumersorcarriers: A. Whenever the amountof any tax has been overpaid or paid more than onceor has been erroneously or illegally collected or received bythe city clerkorcity treasurer-city tax collector underthis chapter, it may be refunded as providedin this section. B. Aservice supplier may claim a refundor take as credit against taxes collected and remitted the amount overpaid, paid more than once, or erroneouslyorillegally collected or received, whenit is established in a manner prescribed bythe city treasurer-city tax collector that the service user from whomthetax has been collected did not owethe tax; provided, however, that neither a refund nor a credit shall be allowed unless the amountof the tax so collected has either been refunded to the service user or -1- 109857.3 credited to charges subsequently payable by the service user to the person required to collect and remit. C. Norefundshall be paid underthe provisions of this section unless the claimant established his or her right thereto by written records showingentitlement thereto. D. No refund shall be paid underthe provisions of this section unless the claimant has submitted a claim pursuantto this section. The Court of Appeal construed this ordinance, as would Plaintiff, to allow a remedyonly to carriers. (Opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Three, filed March 28, 2012 [hereinafter, “Opinion”], p. 4.) The Opinion failed to construe the second ordinancelitigated here — § 3.48.060 — which providesrules applicable generally to claims against the City,! even after the omission was noted by the Petition for Rehearing.” The Opinion apparently ignored this ordinance because the Court understood its primary holding to be the question of which this Petition seeks review:that no local claiming ordinance could apply to McWilliams’ 1 LBMC § 3.48.060 provides: “Any refund made pursuantto this chapter must be authorized by the department head with the approval of the city attorney or the city attorney and the city council, provided the refund is made within one year after payment of the moneytothecity, or if an application for a refundis filed by the person entitled to the money, the application therefor mustbefiled within such one-year period.” * See Petition For Rehearing,filed April 11, 2012, pp. 2-4. -2- 109857.3 claim, because § 905° preempts local tax refund claiming ordinances. (Opinion,p.2.) Plaintiff wishes away § 3.48.060 by arguing that § 3.68.160 controls and allows only carriers to seek refunds. Plaintiff also asserts this lack of a remedy violates due process. (See Respondent's Brief filed April 30, 2008 at p. 7; see also Complaint, Count V, CT at 20-21.) However, courts must construe legislation to preserve its constitutionality where possible. An approach moreconsistent with the separation of powers would give these ordinances the usual deference accordedto legislation, find they provide a remedy but not to class claimants, and resolve whether ordinances may barclass claims. Plaintiff's contention that the City does not challenge this argument here (Plaintiff's Answer to Petition for Review [hereinafter, “Answer”] at pp. 6, 7, 8, 10) is wishful thinking. The Petition unmistakably notes the City’s contrary arguments. (Petition for Review, pp. 4, 11.) If there were any doubt, let us dispel it now: Long Beach contends the Opinion erred in overruling thetrial court’s grant of demurrer in reliance on §§ 3.68.160 and 3.48.060, whether it did so because those ordinances were preempted or because they did not apply. I. Review Is Necessary to Resolve a Division Among the Courts of Appeal Plaintiff asks this Court to find no conflict in the law despite the plain intent of the Second District to create one. Plaintiff does so by 3 Unspecified section references are to the Government Code. -3- 109857.3 arguing that only the cases which support his position — those that rely on a simplistic reading of Government Code § 811.8’s belated definition of “statute” — are truly on point. (Answer, p. 3.) If ignoring the cases which undermine one’s position could eliminate a conflict, this Court would never need grant review under Rule 8.500(b)(1). A. Many Cases Apply Local Claiming Ordinances to Tax Refund Claims Batt v. City & County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4* 65 is merely the latest and most cogently stated of a line of cases, including this Court’s own decision in Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 7 Cal.3d 48, and Pasadena Hotel Development Venture v. City of Pasadena (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 412, that apply local claiming ordinances to tax and fee refund claims. Indeed, in suggesting that there is no conflict in the case law, Plaintiff ignores, for example, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 79 Cal.App.4* 242, 249 n.5, which relied upon a Los Angeles ordinance to preclude a tax refund claim. Likewise, Flying Dutchman Park, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4 1129, 1139, held San Francisco’s Municipal Code governed suchsuits. Moreover, County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Oronoz) (2008) 159 Cal.App.4" 353, 365 construed Batt’s holding as dicta and declined to follow it. (Id. at n. 9.) Yet, the same division of the Court of Appeal recognized Batt’s language as a holding in this case, but summarily rejected it and Pasadena Hotel. (Opinionat11.) There is plainly a conflict between the Batt line of cases and the -4- 1098573 opinions here and in Oronoz (the sole published opinion to find local claiming ordinances preempted by § 905(a)). B. Ardon Did Not Overrule Batt Nor has this Court impliedly overruled the Batt line, as Plaintiff claims. (Answer, p. 11.) Rather, this Court distinguished those cases and expressly reserved the question whether § 905(a) permits local tax and fee claiming requirements. (Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4241, 246 n. 2 [”... [W]e do not address any issues involving preemption of the municipal code provisionsin this case.”].) lil. This Case Warrants Review to Resolve This Conflict Whether local charters and ordinances may bar class tax and fee refund claims requires decision by this Court. Indeed, Plaintiff's request for publication of the Opinion here demonstrates the continuingvitality of these issues. A. Similar Pending Cases Cannot be Distinguished Plaintiff fails to explain away the many lower cases which demonstrate the urgency of the question this Petition presents. First, Plaintiff cannot question the relevance of City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court, 4 Court of Appeal Case No. D06156 (hereinafter, “Chula Vista”). He cited the case in his request for publication of the Opinion (Exhibit A to Letter from Plaintiff / Appellant’s Counsel, Jon Tostrud, Requesting Publication, dated April 17, 2012 [‘Plaintiff’s Publication Request”].) Nor does Plaintiff meaningfully distinguish Sipple v. Alameda, -5- 109857.3 et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC462270 (MJN,* Exh. C.). He notes only that Chula Vista and Sipple are factually distinguishable from this case in some unstated way. (Answer,p. 10.) Second, Plaintiffs quibbles with the remaining cases cannot obscure that each represents a pending or recent class claim for refund of a tax or fee defended on the basis of local claiming ordinances, the applicability of which cannot be knownuntil the question Ardon reservedis resolved. I. The Cases Presented for Notice Demonstrate the Need to Resolve the Issue Raised by the Petition While Borst v. City of El Paso De Robles, San Luis Obispo Superior Court No. CV 09-8117 (hereinafter, “Borst”) (MJN, Exh. G) involves a petition that does not allege compliance with the City’s local claiming ordinance, that fact makes it demurrable. Filed concurrently with this Reply is the City’s Second Motion for Judicial Notice (“Second MJN”), Exhibit A to which is the Borst demurrerasserting a claiming ordinance. Similarly, Hanns v. City of Chico, Butte County Superior Court No. 149292 (hereinafter, “Hanns”) (MJN, Exh.I) is a class challengeto a fee. Manylocal claiming ordinances applyalike to tax and fee refund claims (as does § 905, subd.(a)),5 like the Chula Vista ordinance involved in the 4 “MIN”refers to the City’s Motion for Judicial Notice filed May1, 2012. 5 Section 905(a) exempts from the Government Claims Act and authorizes local claiming procedures for “Claims under the Revenue and -6- 109857.3 recently denied Petition for Review in Case No. S201440.° Indeed, the question presented here involves the constitutional powerof municipalities to impose claiming requirements on both tax and fee refund cases. Thus, Hanns further demonstrates the urgent need for review of these issues. Finally, Shames v. City of San Diego, San Diego Superior Court No. GIC831539 (hereinafter, “Shames”)(MJN, Exh. H) did settle several years ago as to residents’ claims for refund of sewer charges, as Plaintiff notes. However, the restaurant industry’s class challenge to those same fees wasresolved only in 2011. (California Restaurant Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.41581.) Again, both cases demonstrate that class challenges to local utility fees are of pressing current concern to lower courts, local governments and would-beclass claimants. Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion thereof, or of any penalties, costs, or charges related thereto.” 6 The City seeks notice of Paso Robles Municipal Code §§ 3.04.550 — 3.04.561 (Second MJN, Exh. C). This ordinance, like Chula Vista's, expressly forbids class claims for refunds of taxes and fees. -7- 109857.3 2. Recent Case Law Underscores the Urgency of This Issue The City seeks notice of a recent order of the Los Angeles Superior Court granting the demurrers without leave to amend in Sipple, because the plaintiffs failed to comply with claiming ordinances. (Second MJN, Exh. B.) The court concluded the Batt line of cases was not displaced by Ardon and declined to follow Oronoz. (Id. at p. 6.) By contrast, in Chula Vista, the San Diego Superior Court denied this same defense, citing Oronoz and declining to follow Batt. (See Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Publication Request.) Sipple will soon be appealed to the Second District and Chula Vista may well find its way to the Fourth District in due course. Plainly, these issues are live and much public moneyis being spent litigating and re-litigating them in various trial and appellate courts. Consistent application of the law cannot be had until this Court speaks. IV. The Legislature Did Not Intend to Preempt Claiming Ordinances The legislative history of the 1959 and 1963 statutes that enacted the Government Claims Act’ demonstrates the Legislature did not intend to preempt claiming ordinances. The City will not belabor the point, as it is addressed in the Petition at pp. 15-25 and is more properly briefed on the merits if this Court grants review. However, a few points in the Answer bear rebuttal. 7 Government Code § 810,et seq. -8- 109857.3 A. The Difference Between §§ 905(a) and 905(b) Does Not Demonstrate Intent to Preempt Local Ordinances The Legislature’s decision to exclude the phrase “other provisions of law” from what is now § 905, subdivision (a), while retaining that term in § 905, subdivision (b) was not intended to exclude local legislation from subdivision (a). Rather, the difference between “any provision of law” and “or other statute” (and between subdivisions (b) and (a)) is that the first includes judge-madelaw,and the second excludesit. In 1959, mechanics liens and stop notice claims were governed both by judge-made “equitable lien” remedies and by statutes. Mechanics’ liens cannotattach to public property. (E.g., J.W. Theisen v. County of Los Angeles (1960) 54 Cal.2d 170, 176.) Thus, a subcontractor on a public worksproject has a different remedy when a primary contractor fails to pay: a claim against public funds due the primary contractor. This Court surveyed the history of these remedies in Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 803, and explained that because mechanics liens were not available, “the courts and the Legislature evolved alternative remedies — the equitable lien and the stop notice — which attach directly to the [construction] loan fund.” (Id. at p. 827; see also Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1928) 205 Cal. 496, 502; Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty Sav. & Loan Assn. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 585, 588-590 [listing elements of judicially created equitable lien].) The statutory stop-notice remedy entitled a subcontractor to public funds due the prime contractor. (J.W. Theisen, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 177 [discussing stop notice procedure against public entities under former CCP § 1192.1].) The judge-made equitable lien -9- 1098573 remedy was also available against public entities. (Stansbury v. Frazier (1920) 46 Cal.App. 485, 488; Goldtree v. City of San Diego (1908) 8 Cal.App. 505, 508-510 [constitution required judicial remedy for mechanics and materialmen on public works projects until Legislature acted].) While Civil Code § 3264 abolished the judge-made equitable lien remedy in 1969, that remedy remained in 1959 when§ 703, subd.(b) — the predecessor to the present §905, subd. (b) — was enacted. (Connolly Development, Inc., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 826 n.24; see also Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 460, 464-465 [discussing Civil Code § 3264's abolition of equitable lien remedy].) Thus, the Legislature used “any provision of law” in subdivision (b) of former § 703 to include both judge-made andstatutory remedies.It is unlikely the Legislature used “any provision of law” to include municipal charters and ordinances, given that the sources of law governing this subject were common law and state — not local — statutes. Accordingly, the Legislature’s use of the terms “statute” and “any provisions of law” in former § 703, subds. (a) and (b) (and present § 905, subds. (a) and (b)) underminesPlaintiff's argument. I. Section 905(e) Is Not to the Contrary Nordoes the use of “other provisions of law” in what is now § 905, subdivision (e)§ dilute this point. By that reference, the Legislature 8 Section 905, subdivision (e) exempts from claims presentation requirements “Applications or claims for any form of public assistance -10- 109857.3 intended to allow exceptions to the Government Claims Act to derive from a variety of legal sources as to mechanics liens and welfare claims (which are heavily regulated by federal, state and County regulations and policies), and simultaneously implemented the Law Revision Commission’s advice to leave undisturbed local claiming requirements for tax and fee refunds. B. Professor Van Alstyne’s Study is Legislative History of the Government Claims Act Plaintiff cannot evade the Government Claims Act’s unambiguous legislative history. (Answer at pp. 14-15.) First, Plaintiff argues Professor Van Alstyne’s “Study” was neither a part of the Law Revision Commission’s Recommendation, “nor did it have anything to do with the Law Revision Commission’s draft statutory language.” (Answerat p. 14.) Wrong. The Study was prepared at the Commission’s express direction and provided the factual underpinning for the Commission’s recommendations: The Law Revision Commission was, therefore, authorized and directed to study and analyzethe various provisions of law relating to the filing of claims... The Commission has made an exhausting studyof existing claims statutes and judicial decisions interpreting and applying them. under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs....” -l1- 109857.3 Onthe basis of this study the Commission has concludedthat the law of this State governing the presentation of claims against governmentalentities is unduly complex, inconsistent, ambiguousanddifficult to find ... This conclusion is supported by the following facts among others disclosed by the Commission’s study...” (Recommendation and Study (Jan. 1959) 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. [“Report”] at A-7.)° Second, Plaintiff claims “Van Alstyne’s short-hand terminology, ‘claims statutes’ and ‘claims provisions,’ was never adopted by the Commission in its Recommendation . .” (Answerat p. 15.) Wrong, again. The very first paragraph of the Recommendation provides: The law of this State contains many statutes and county and city charters and ordinances which barsuit against a governmentalentity for money or damagesunless a written statementor ‘claim’ ... is communicatedto the entity ... . Such provisionsare referred to in this Recommendation and Studyas‘claimsstatutes.’” (Report at A-7.) Third, Plaintiff errs in claiming the Recommendation did not excludeall tax refunds from the proposed ClaimsAct: The proposed newstatute does not govern the presentation of all claims against all governmental entities in this State... Evenasto local public entities, however, the coverageof the new generalclaimsstatute is not universal. Like nearlyall ° See City’s Motion for Judicial Notice below,filed on April 11, 2012, Exh. A, page A-1. 109857.3 -12- existing claims statutes, it applies only to claims for money or damages. Moreover, certain types of claims for money or damagesare expressly excluded from the statute — for example, claims for tax exemptions and refunds. (b) All local public entities are authorized to prescribe by charter, ordinance or regulation claims procedures applicable to claims not governed by the general claims statute or by other statutes specifically applicable thereto. (Report at A-9 and A-10.) The Study directly informed the Commission's positions, and the Commission attached the study to the draft statute it recommendedto the Legislature.!° Indeed, the courts have ruled that the Study is legislative history of the Act: [T]he Law Revision Commission hasstated that it excluded from the scopeof the unified claims statute then proposed by the Commissionall ‘claims for tax exemption, cancellation or refund.’ (See 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) p. A-117.) ... the intent of the commission in regard to [the meaning of 905(a) and former 703(a)] may be deemedto be the intentof the Legislature. See Pasadena Hotel, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at 415, n.3. Plaintiff's effort to evade the legislative history of the Act is bootless. 10 See MJN below, Exhibit A, unmarkedtitle page stating “California Law Revision Commission Recommendation and Study relating to The Presentation of Claims Against Public Entities.” This report appears at http://clre.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub019.pdf. -13- 109857.3 C. The Government Claims Act Uses Defined Terms inconsistently That § 935 references “statute or regulations” in cross-referencing § 905 and “charter, ordinance or regulation” in authorizing local claiming requirements shedslittle light on the meaning of “statute” as used in § 905, subdivision (a). The Government Claims Act does not use these terms consistently. Rather, because these definitions were added to a complex statute in 1963 with another purpose in mind, they must be applied with care, as § 810 directs (“Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, the definitions contained in this part govern the construction of this division.”). Careful review of the Act demonstrates its use of the defined terms “statute” (§ 811.8), “enactment” (§ 810.6) and “regulation” (§ 811.6) are contradictory and haphazard, yielding anomalous results if these definitions are consistently applied. For example, § 935(a) authorizes municipalities to enact claim procedures under certain circumstances. It refers to such procedures “prescribed in any charter, ordinance or regulation adopted by the local public entity.” But § 811.6 defines a “regulation” as a rule, regulation, or standard adopted by the United States or an agency of the State under the respective federal and state Administrative Procedure Acts. Thus, local public entities cannot enact “regulations.” (§ 811.6; see also § 11342.600 [defining “regulation” under Administrative Procedure Act as adopted by a “state agency”].) Therefore, § 935(a)’s authorization for local claiming requirements by “regulation” is meaningless unless the stated definition is -14- 109857.3 ignored, as § 810 invites (definitions apply “unless the provision or context otherwise requires”). This use of the term “regulation” in § 935, inconsistent with that term’s definition in § 811.6, underminesPlaintiff's claim that § 811.8’s definition of “statute” was intended to govern § 935 and §905. Why assume precision as to the choice of one term when imprecision is obviousin the use of another in the very same codesection? A similar example appears in provisions governing conflicts of interest between public entities and their employees. Section 995.2, subd.(a) authorizes a public entity to refuse to defend an employeeif there is a specific conflict of interest between their positions in litigation. Section 995.2 defines such a “specific conflict of interest” as “a conflict of interest or an adverse or pecuniary interest, as specified by statute or by a rule or regulation of the public entity.”!! Section 911.2 defines “public entity” to include local governments. Thus, a “public entity” — including a local government — has three means to identify conflicts of interest which entitle it to refuse to defend an employee: a statute, a regulation ora rule. However, the Act’s definitions of “statute” (§ 811.8) and “regulation” (§ 811.6) excludelocallegislation. Here again, the Act authorizes local governments to do whatits definitions prohibit. As before, the plain intent of the Legislature can be accomplished only by disregarding the Act’s definitions of “statute” and “regulation” because “the provision or context otherwise requires.” " All emphasesare supplied. -15- 109857.3 Given the goal of statutory interpretation to “ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law,” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4*r 973, 977), it is inappropriate to apply § 811.8’s definition of “statute” and § 811.6’s definition of “regulation” to § 935(a) and § 995.2. It is equally inappropriate to apply § 811.8’s definition of “statute” to § 905, subd. (a)’s preservation of local rules for tax and fee refund claims. V. Construing § 905(a) to Preempt Long Beach’s Ordinances Raises Constitutional Questions The City does not ignore Article XI, § 12, which empowers the Legislature to impose claiming procedures on charter cities. However,that powercoexists with the taxing powerof charter cities under Article XI, § 5 and the police power of counties and all cities under Article XI, § 7. If § 905, subdivision (a) reflects an intent to preempt local claiming ordinances as applied to tax refund claims, a new constitutional question arises — where does the City’s power to tax end and the Legislature's power to regulate claims begin? That question can be avoided if § 905, subdivision (a) is given the sweep originally intended in 1959 and is not misconstrued dueto the 1963 addition of § 811.8’s definition of “statute.” Plaintiff argues Ardon resolved whether Article XIII, § 32 applies to Long Beach’s ordinances. (Answer, p. 18.) He assumes this case is controlled by Ardon, a position Plaintiff can take only by ignoring the Petition. City ordinances apply here, notwithstanding the Opinion’s erroneous conclusion that § 3.68.160 does not apply, and its failure to -16- 109857.3 construe § 3.48.060. Accordingly, this case squarely raises the question reserved in Ardon whether 905(a) does, and can, preempt local tax and fee refund claiming ordinances. That question is informed by the scope of Article XIIL, § 32’s second sentence, which requires legislative authorization for tax refund claims. CONCLUSION The Petition before this Court, unlike the straw man Plaintiff would prefer to oppose, poses a question reserved by Ardon that is roiling the lower courts. The question urgently warrants this Court’s attention and this case provides a complete record and able counsel on both sides of the dispute to aid the Court in its resolution. This Court should grant this Petition to resolve an important question for the benefit of tax and fee refund claimants, local governments and the Californians they serve. DATED: May30, 2012 ROBERT E. SHANNON J. CHARLES PARKIN MONTE H. MACHIT LONG BEACH CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 333 West Ocean Blvd., 11t* Floor Long Beach, CA 90802-4664. (562) 570-2200; (562) 436-1579 (fax) -17- 109857.3 1098573 MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO SANDRA J. LEVIN TIANA J. MURILLO COLANTUONO & LEVIN, PC | Hana O. Ww Tiana J. Murillo 300 So. Grand Avenue,Ste. 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3134 (213) 542-5700; (213) 542-5710 (fax) ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT - 18 - CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CAL.R.CT. 8.504(d) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.504(d), the foregoing Reply in Support of Petition for Review by Defendant the City of Long Beach contains 3,977 words(including footnotes, but excluding the tables and this Certificate) and is within the 4,200 word limit set by Rule 8.504, subd.(d), California Rules of Court. In preparing this certificate, I relied on the word count generated by Wordversion 14, included in Microsoft Office Professional Plus 2010. Executed on May30, 2012, at Los Angeles, California. COLANTUONO & LEVIN, PC MICHAEL G. COLANTUONO SANDRAJ. LEVIN TIANA J. MURILLO Sida Oy. eel~ Tiana J. Mutillo -19- 109857.3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Kimberly Nielsen, the undersigned, declare: 1. That declarant is and was,at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, over the age of 18 years, and nota part to or interested in the within action; that declarant’s business address is 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2700, Los Angeles, California 90071. 2. That on May30, 2012, declarant served the CITY OF LONG BEACH’S REPLY IN SUPPORTOF PETITION FOR REVIEW via U.S. Mail in a sealed envelope fully prepaid and addressedto the parties listed on the attached Service List. 3. That there is regular communication betweenthe parties. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 30th day of May, 2012, at Los Angeles, California. COLANTUONO & LEVIN,@.C. Churlife nperly Nielsen - 20 - 109857.3 McWilliamsv. City of Long Beach,etal. Case No. B200831 Service List COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTSIN THIS ACTION AND THE RELATED ACTIONS OF ARDONV. CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND GRANADOSV. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES: Francis M. Gregorek Rachele M.Rickert WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP 750 B Street, Suite 2770 San Diego, CA 92101 (619) 239-4599 (619) 234-4599 (fax) Nicholas E. Chimicles Timothy N. Matthews Benjamin F. Johns CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP One Haverford Centre 361 West Lancaster Avenue Haverford, PA 19041 (610) 641-8500 (610) 649-3633 (fax) timothymathews@chimicles.com Jon A. Tostrud 9254 Thrush Way West Hollywood, CA 90069 (310) 276-9179 -2?1- 109857.3 McWilliamsv. City of Long Beach,et al. Case No. B200831 Service List Sandra W. Cuneo CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA 330 South Barrington Ave., #109 Los Angeles, CA 90049 (424) 832-3450 (424) 832-3452 (fax) COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTSIN THE RELATED ACTION OF ARDONV. CITY OF LOS ANGELES: Carmen A.Trutanich Noreen S. Vincent Brian I. Cheng OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 200 North Main Street, Suite 920 Los Angeles, CA 90012 COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTSIN THE RELATED ACTION OF GRANADOSV. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES: Albert Ramseyer Office of the County Counsel 648 Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012-2713 Erica L. Reilley Jones Day 555 South FlowerStreet, Fiftieth Floor Los Angeles, California 90071-2300 -22- 109857.3 McWilliams v. City of Long Beach,etal. Case No. B200831 Service List COURTESY COPIES TO: Honorable Anthony J. Mohr Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles 600 S. Commonwealth Ave. Los Angeles, CA 90005 Clerk of the Court California Court of Appeal Second Appellate Division 300 S. Spring Street, 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90013 -23- 109857.3