SAN DIEGO, CITY OF v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY

Appellants, San Diego Metropolitan Transit System and San Diego Association of Governments, Supplemental Brief

Cal.January 15, 2015

[See fee exempticAlRREMECOURT FL Smee Uh x Supreme Court Case No. 8199557 JAN 1 5 2015 IN THE SUPREME COURT _ OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA Frank A. McGuire Clerk Deputy SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTSand SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM, Petitioners and Appellants, V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant and Respondent. SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESSOF SAN DIEGO ASSOCATION OF GOVERNMENTS AND SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM After a Decision by the Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division One Case No. D057446 From the Judgmentofthe Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, Honorable Thomas Nugent San Diego Superior Court, Superior Court Case No. GIC 855643 (Lead Case) [Consolidated with Case Nos. GIC 855701; 37-207-00083692-CU-WM-CTL; 37-2007-00083768-CU-TT-CTL; 37-2007-00083773-CU-MC-CTL] THE SOHAGI LAW GROUP,PLC SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF Margaret M. Sohagi, State Bar No. 126336 GOVERNMENTS Philip A. Seymour, State Bar No. 116606 John F. Kirk, General Counsel, Nicole H. Gordon, State Bar No. 240056 State Bar No. 149667 11999 San Vicente Boulevard, Suite 150 401 B Street, Suite 800 Los Angeles, California 90049-5136 San Diego, California 92101 Telephone: (310) 475-5700 Telephone: (619) 699-1997 Facsimile: (310) 475-5707 Facsimile: (619) 699-1995 Attorneys for Petitioners and Appellants SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTSand SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM. Il. Il. Table of Contents Page INTRODUCTION0000cecceeseseeecsseseeceseeeessessseseesestesseseesseseesens 1 THE EDUCATION CODE AMENDMENTSCITED BY CSU DO NOT RENDER THE ISSUES CONCERNING CSU’S OBLIGATIONSTO MITIGATE OFF-SITE ENVIRONMENTALIMPACTS MOT......cccccceesccsessesecesestesseeens 2 A. CSU Cannot Avoid Issuance of a Writ of Mandate and Remandfor Further Administrative Proceedings By Conceding that the Legal Basis for One of its Arguments No Longer Exists.........cecceessscessesseeeesseeeeseeseseceessesseesessessesecenes 2 B. A Change in the Law Favoring SANDAG/MTSandthe City of San Diego Does Not Makethe Case Moot................. 3 C. The Changes to the Education Code Do Not MootAll or Even Most Issues Relating to CSU’s Obligationsto Mitigate Traffic or Other Impacts .............ccccccssecseseeeseseeeeeesees 5 D. There is No Basis for Remanding the Traffic Mitigation Issue to the Trial Court for Further Proceedings, as Opposedto Issuing a Writ of Mandate Requiring CSU to Reconsider its Prior Decision and Findings at the Administrative Level. ........sccecescsseessessesecesstessessseesessssseseceese 8 E. CSU Mischaracterizes the Additional Issues to Be Decided by this Court ..........ecsesseescesseessseseceesessensesessesecseeeaees 9 CONCLUSIONooo.cece eeeeseeseescececcecesenseseeessececesseenseensensceseeeneens 10 i SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS Table of Authorities Cases Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666.00...eee eeeeeeeeeseseeeeseeeeeeesseceaesseeseetsnesesseeenseseees 4 Californiansfor Alternatives to Toxics v. California Dept. ofPesticide Regulation (2006) 136 CalApp.4th 1049 ooo... ececsessessessesseeeseeeeeeseeessessesesseeseessenes 2 Citizensfor Non-Toxic Pest Control v. Department ofFood & Agriculture (1986) 187 CalApp.3d 1575 oo...ei eccecesserserseeeeseeeseeeeeeeeeseeeesnees 3,4,9 Citizensfor Restoration ofL Street v. City ofFresno (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 340.0... cecscsesessesseseessesssessseeenssecesseeesesssesesssees 2 City ofLos Angeles v. County ofLos Angeles (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 952 oeeeeceessecesseseeceresceseeseenseesnessecsssseceesneneee 4 City ofMarina v. Board ofTrustees ofthe California State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341 occeecsscesesseseseesensesseeseeeseeesessesesseesseseeestesseees 3 Communitiesfor a Better Environmentv. City ofRichmond (2010) 184 CalApp.4th 70 oo... ceeeccsesesseseeseesseesecssesssecesessseseatesseeseenes 9 County ofSan Diego v. Brown (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1054 ooo...eeeessescescenesseeseeseeesseeneeseeseesseenesaes 4,8 Golden Gate Holdings LLC v. East Bay Regional Park District (2013) 215 CalApp.4th 353 ooo.eeeecesecsesecseeeessecsseeseeeeceseeseesecseeeeeees 2 Tisher v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1991) 231 CalApp.3d 349 oo. ccesesseseseeeseeseeescseeseeessesseesesseenaees 10 Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880 .........cccecccssesesseseeseesecsseeeeeseseeenseeseseesseseaeeaee 2 Statutes Education Code § 89770........ccccsscccssscssssssesessesseesscsssecsssessscesscessecseeseresaneeas 6 Education Code § 89771 .....ccccccccscccsssesscsscssessesssescesssecssecetecessesesesseceeesesees 6 Education Code § 89772........cccccccccccsssssssssscesessseesssecsseecessesessneeessecseeacseeeees 6 Education Code §§ 89770-89772 .......ccccscesssscssseeseesscessesseeessecssecseseeseeneaes 7 ii SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS Table of Authorities (continued) Page Regulations CEQA Guidelines § 15088 0...esesessescesrseseeesseeccsesesessesseesecseeseenseesseses 9 CEQA Guidelines § 15128 oo... ccccccsecsscesseeccssncesssseecessssecssesssesscsceeses 9 ill SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS I. INTRODUCTION One majorissue in this case — but hardly the only issue — is whether respondent California State University (“CSU”) could satisfy its obligations under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) to mitigate offsite environmental impacts merely by requesting mitigation funds from single source — a special appropriation by the state Legislature — with the full knowledge that the funding request might be denied, and despite the fact that other potential sources of mitigation funds were available. CSU contends in its Supplemental Brief Regarding Impact ofNew Statute on Appeal (“CSU Supplemental Brief”) that this issue has been rendered atleast partially moot by recent amendments to the Education Code affecting CSU’s budget process and spending authority. CSU requests that after two other issues in the case are resolved by this Court, the case be remandedtothetrial court for further proceedings concerning CSU’s obligation to mitigate off-site environmental impacts. Appellants San Diego Association of Governments (“SANDAG’”) and San Diego Metropolitan Transit Systems (“MTS”) do not agree that the issue of CSU’s mitigation obligations has been rendered moot. Neither do SANDAG/MTSagreethat a remandto the trial court for further proceedings on this issue would be appropriate even if the issue were deemedpartially moot. Lastly, SANDAG/MTSdo not agree with CSU’s characterization of the issues remaining to be decidedin the caseor, for that matter, with CSU’s characterization of the issues claimed to be moot. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS Il. THE EDUCATION CODE AMENDMENTSCITED BY CSU DO NOT RENDER THE ISSUES CONCERNING CSU’S OBLIGATIONS TO MITIGATE OFF-SITE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS MOOT A. CSU Cannot Avoid Issuance of a Writ of Mandate and Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings By Concedingthat the Legal Basis for One of its Arguments No Longer Exists CSU’srequests disclose considerable confusion aboutthe doctrine of mootness. In the CEQA context, as in other contexts, “A case becomes moot whena court ruling can have nopractical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.” (Californiansfor Alternatives to Toxics v. California Dept. ofPesticide Regulation (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1069; Golden Gate Holdings LLC vy. East Bay Regional Park District (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 353, 366.) A CEQAcaseis not mootif a court ruling could lead to revision of an environmental impact report or reconsideration and possible adoption ofadditional mitigation measures or other additionalrelief. (Citizensfor Restoration ofL Street v. City ofFresno (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 340, 362-363; Golden Gate Holdings, 215 Cal.App.4th 353, 366-367 [compliance with writ issued bytrial court did not render case moot where petitioner requested expandedrelief on appeal]; Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888 [completion of challenged project did not render case moot whereadditional mitigation measures could be imposed on remand].) That is precisely the situation here. The changes in the Education Code relied on by CSU do not cure CSU’sprior failures to comply with CEQA. CSU is apparently conceding that it can no longerrely on oneofits chief rationales for failing to fund off- 2 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS site environmental mitigation measures,i.e., its assertion that dictum in City ofMarina v. Board ofTrustees ofthe California State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341, 367 limited its obligations to mitigate off-site impacts to requesting an appropriation of mitigation funds by the Legislature. (See CSU Opening Brief, pp. 28-29.) However, this concession simply increases, not eliminates, the likelihood that CSU will be required to reopen andrevise its environmental impact report and reconsideroffsite traffic mitigation measures on remand. Far from eliminating this Court’s ability to grant practical, effective relief, the changes in CSU’s budgetary options simply eliminate one excuse for failing to mitigate off-site impacts whenthecaseis remandedfor further administrative proceedings. B. A Changein the Law Favoring SANDAG/MTSandtheCity of San Diego Does Not Make the Case Moot Although CSU cites a numberofcases in support ofits position, none are actually helpful to CSU. All are either easily distinguishable or actually undermine CSU’s own arguments. CSU cites Citizensfor Non-Toxic Pest Control v. Department ofFood & Agriculture (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1584 for the proposition that the court in a mandamusaction should applythe law in effect at the timeofits decision rather than the law in effect at the time of the challenged administrative actions. How this helps CSU is a complete mystery. In Citizensfor Non-Toxic Pest Control, the court did notfind the case moot. It simply determined that the respondent’s actions in that case were inconsistent with the new law,and that the lower court’s determination that the respondent had violated CEQA remainedcorrect, if for slightly different reasons. The court thus affirmedthe trial court judgment ordering issuance of a peremptory writ. (/d. at 1586-1589.) In this case, CSU nowessentially 3 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS concedesthat it can no longer rely on oneofits previousrationales for refusing to fund off-site environmental mitigation measures. The appropriate remedyis, as in Non-Toxic Pest Control, to affirm the judgmentof the court of appeal and remandthe case to CSU for corrective action, not remand the case to the trial court for a dismissal. SANDAG/MTSrecognize that, in some cases, a changein the law may render a case mootbecause the legal duty the respondentis accused of violating no longer exists, and a writ of mandate will not issue to compel performance of a duty that no longer exists. (See, e.g., County ofSan Diego v. Brown (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1090.) That is simply the opposite of the situation here. The change in the law relied on by CSU has madeits legal position even less defensible, not absolvedit of any previously existing legal duty. This is also not a case in which a challenge to a statute, tax measure or funding scheme has been rendered moot by repeal or supersession of the challenged measures. (See, e.g., City ofLos Angeles v. County ofLos Angeles (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 952, 958.) As discussed further below, the subject matter of this case has always been CSU’srefusal to fund or otherwise provide for mitigation of offsite environmental impacts,not the constitutionality of the budget appropriation process that CSU previously claimed as an excuse for failing to reliably fund off-site mitigation. Lastly, this is not a case where voluntary compliance with a lower court judgmenthas rendered the case moot. (Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 671.) CSU is not concedingit will revise its EIR or affirmatively commit to funding the mitigation measuresatissue. It is instead requesting a remandto the trial court so it can simply re-litigate the relevant issues from a slightly different perspective. In CSU’s words, a remandis requested “for 4 SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS the trial court to consider anew the appropriateness of CSU’s economic infeasibility determination” and to allow the trial court to “oversee any further developmentofthe factual record that may be necessary to resolve these issues in light of CSU’s new statutory funding scheme.” (CSU Supplemental Brief, p. 12.) This hardly suggests that the central issue of CSU’s responsibility to mitigate off-site environmental impacts has become moot. C. The Changes to the Education Code Do Not Moot All or Even Most Issues Relating to CSU’s Obligations to Mitigate Traffic or Other Impacts CSU’s mootness argument also badly misperceives the scope of the issues in question. Indeed, CSU argumentsare internally contradictory on this point, as well as inconsistent with how the issues have previously been defined by the Court of Appeal, by appellants SANDAG/MTSandthe City of San Diego, and by CSUitself. The Court of Appeal addressed CSU’s City ofMarina argument in greatdetail in its published opinion (Slip Opn., pp. 14-38), but did so as part of a larger issue as to whether CSU made an adequateeffort to mitigate off- site traffic impacts. The opinion also found that CSUfailed its duty to mitigate by failing to consider alternative sources of funding foroff-site mitigation and alternative programmatic traffic reduction measures. (Slip. Opn., pp. 33-40.) In its Petition for Review, CSU correspondingly framedthe issues presented as follows: [D]oes a state agency satisfy its obligation under CEQA to mitigate the off-site environmental impacts of a project by requesting funds for such mitigation from the Legislature, consistent with this Court’s viewsas stated in Marina? Or, as the 5 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS Court ofAppeal held here ... must the agency also addressinits Environmental Impact Report (EIR) ‘[t]he availability ofpotential sources of funding other than the Legislature’ and demonstrate ‘compelling reasons’ showing these sources cannot, as a matter of law, be used to pay for mitigation.’ (Petition for Review,p. 2.) In briefing on the merits, all parties have extensively addressed the larger scope of CSU’s duty to mitigate, including the availability of alternate non-legislative funding sources and CSU’sclaim that any attempt to require consideration of non-state funds violates separation of powersprinciples. (See CSU OpeningBrief, pp. 29-37, 40-50; SANDAG AnswerBrief, pp. 5- 13, 16-18, 25-32; City of San Diego AnswerBrief, pp. 25-33, 37-40.) Even in its current Supplemental Brief asserting mootness, CSU acknowledges arguing that “it was prohibited by statute from re-allocating revenues from non-state sources (e.g., parking and dorm fees, tuition, donations) to pay for off-site traffic mitigations.” (CSU Supp.Brief, p. 4.) The changesin the Education Code cited by CSU do not moot any of these broader issues. Education Code § 89770 merely authorizes CSU to pledge (subject to variouslimitations) portions of its annuallegislative General Fund support appropriation to secure and repay bondsissued under the authority of the State University Revenue Bond Act. Education Code § 89771 authorizes CSUto utilize funds from its annual General Fund support appropriation to fund “pay-as-you-go”capital outlay projects. Education Code § 89772 requires CSU to submit detailed annual reports of expenditures of funds under these twostatutes to the Legislature and Departmentof Finance, presumably so these expenditures can be monitored and future appropriations adjusted as deemed necessary by the Legislature. Nothingin these statutes directly addresses funding for CEQA 6 SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS mitigation measures. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that CSU could not reassert somevariation on its past legislative prerogative or separation of powers arguments even in the wake of these statutes. CSU appears to contend these amendments are significant because they break down an allegedly rigid previous distinction between appropriations for operating expenses and appropriations for capital projects, and consequently give CSU greater flexibility in allocating appropriated funds. However, CSU does not concedethat these statutes affirmatively require it to fund off-site mitigation measuresofthe type at issue in this case. Neitheris it evident that these new statutes, standing by themselves, dramatically change existing law. SANDAG/MTSandthe City appellants have always contended that CSU had sufficient budget flexibility under previous law to fund offsite mitigation measures without special legislative authorization. (SANDAG/MTSAnswer Brief, pp. 27-29; City of San Diego AnswerBrief, pp. 25-29.) Thislitigation arose only when CSU,seeking to capitalize on its strained interpretation of City ofMarina, choseto carve out funding for off-site mitigation measures as a separate budgetline-item in the proposed capital budget submitted to the Legislature. CSU seemsto be admitting that with the advent of Education Code §§ 89770-89772, it can no longerrely on this tactic. However, nothing on the face of these statutes would inherently preclude CSU from engaging in some revised form of manipulation of the budget process in the future, nor inherently preclude CSU from resurrecting some of the arguments advanced in this case if it did so. CSUalso is clearly not abandoningits position on the unavailability of alternate sources of funding for off-site mitigation, i.e., funds from sources other than a direct legislative appropriation, such as endowments,grants, or user fees. (CSU OpeningBrief, pp. 40-50; SANDAG AnswerBrief, pp. 25- 7 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS 32; City of San Diego AnswerBrief, pp. 25-33.) While CSU contendsthat Education Code § 89770(a)(1) “now provides CSU with somediscretion to employ non-state funds for capital projects,” it concurrently maintains that its ability to do so “remains limited by otherstatutes ... and restrictions inherent in some of those sources.” (CSU Supp.Brief, p. 8.) As CSU itself ultimately concedes,“The [new] statute does not, however, moot the generalissue in the litigation of how CSU can properly determine economicinfeasibility under CEQAin light of the new funding system.” (Supp. Brief, p. 11.) D. There is No Basis for Remanding the Traffic Mitigation Issue to the Trial Court for Further Proceedings, as Opposed to Issuing a Writ of Mandate Requiring CSU to Reconsiderits Prior Decision and Findings at the Administrative Level. While CSU’s arguments about mootness are merely without merit, its request that the case be remandedto thetrial court (and not to the Court of Appeal) for further proceedings on these issuesis frivolous. If the issues are truly moot, there is, by definition, nothing left to decide. A remandto the trial court for purposes of entering a dismissal may be appropriate where a case has truly become moot. (County ofSan Diego, 19 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1090.) But as even CSU concedes, many issues remain to be resolved. CSU cites no authority suggesting that a case may be remandedto thetrial court simply to commencea new roundoflitigation involving most of the same basic issues, with the possibility of yet another appeal and even another petition to this Court, due merely to an intervening non-dispositive change in existing law. If CSU is concedingthatits legal position on a controlling issue is no longer defensible in light of changesin the law,the correct procedure would beto issue a writ of mandate directing CSU to vacateits prior certification of the EIR and approval of the campus master plan and 8 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS reconsiderin light of the changed law (and the Court’s ruling on other issues). (Cf. Citizensfor Non-Toxic Pest Control, 187 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1588-1589.) The fact that the law is now even Jess favorable to CSU than before is hardly a justification remandto the trial court. E. CSU Mischaracterizes the Additional Issues to Be Decided by this Court CSU concedesthat at least two issues in this case muststill be decided by this Court: issues relating to CSU’s Transportation Demand Management (“TDM”) mitigation measure and CSU’s analysis of transit impacts. (CSU Supp. Brief, pp. 1-2.) In doing so, however, CSU grossly mischaracterizes these issues. Thevalidity of CSU’s TDM mitigation measure is not a question of “factual findings” as CSU suggests, but concerns the procedurallegality of deferring actual formulation of this mitigation measure. (Slip Opn., pp. 58- 62; Communitiesfor a Better Environmentv. City ofRichmond (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 92.) The subject of transit impacts, as addressed by the Court of Appeal and in SANDAG/MTS’briefs, in fact includes four distinct issues, only one of which concerns CSU’slast-minute purported “finding” on transit impacts. These issues consist of the following: (1) whether CSU erred procedurally by failing to actually investigate potential transit impacts; (2) whether CSU failed to adequately respond to comments concerning transit impacts (CEQA Guidelines § 15088); (3) whether, if transit impacts were deemed insignificant, CSU erred procedurally by failing to state the reasonsfor this conclusion in the EIR (Guidelines § 15128); and (4) whether CSU’slast minute exculpatory “finding”that transit impacts were insignificant was legally sufficient and supported by substantial evidence. (Slip Opn., pp. 62- 9 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS 82; SANDAG/MTSAnswerBrief, pp. 33-48.) Ironically, the only one of these issuesthat is arguably mootis the last issue,i.e., the substantial evidence question that CSU contends the Court shouldstill decide. This issue is arguably moot because CSUfailed to address thefirst three issues in its Opening Brief and, thus, effectively waived any claim oferrorin the Court of Appeal’s ruling on these issues. (Slip Opn., pp. 71-79 andfn. 24; Tisher v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 349, 361.) Since the case must be remandedforfull reevaluation and reconsideration of the issue of transit impacts in any event, there would belittle pointin this Court addressing the sufficiency ofthe evidence in the current administrative record concerning CSU’s previous “finding”ontheissue. Ii. CONCLUSION Forthe reasons stated in this brief, CSU hasfailed to establish that any dispositive issue in this case had been rendered moot, or that there is any basis for a remandtothe trial court. This Court should proceed directly to a hearing and decision on the merits ofall issues, save those which CSU concedesare no longerin dispute. DATE: January 14, 2015 By: Bel. Margaret M. Sohagi Philip A. Seymour Nicole H. Gordon THE SOHAGI LAW GROUP, PLC Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTSand SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM W:\C\192\012\00345553.DOC 10 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT The text of the SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS OF SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS (SANDAG) AND SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM consists of 2,793 words, including footnotes. The undersigned legal counsel has relied on the word count of the Microsoft Word 2013 Word processing program to generate this brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c)(1).) DATE: January 14, 2015 By: thf Nicole H. Gordon THE SOHAGI LAW GROUP, PLC Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTSand SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM W:AC\T92\012\00345553.DOC i SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) ss. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) Atthe time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County ofLos Angeles, State of California. My business address is 11999 San Vicente Boulevard, Suite 150, Los Angeles, California 90049. On January 14, 2015, I served true copiesofthe following document(s) described as SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESSOF SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS(SANDAG) AND SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM ontheinterested parties in this action as follows: BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY:I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package provided by the overnight service carrier and addressedto the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnightdelivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnightservice carrier or delivered such document(s) to a courier or driver authorized by the overnight service carrier to receive documents. I declare under penalty ofperjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoingis true and correct. Executed on January 14, 2015, at Los Angeles, California. Cheron J. McAleece VWwrdpr0e Printed Name Signature ii SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS SERVICE LIST John F. Kirk, General Counsel SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS 401 B Street, Suite 800 San Diego, California 92101 Telephone: (619) 699-1997 Facsimile: (619) 699-1995 Email: jki@sandag.org Karen Landers, General Counsel SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM 1255 Imperial Avenue, Suite 1000 San Diego, California 92101-7490 Telephone: (619) 231-1466 Facsimile: (619) 234-3407 Email: karen.landers@sdmts.com MarkA.Kressel Jeremy B. Rosen Bradley S. Pauley HORVITZ & LEVY LLP 15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18" Floor Encino, CA 91436-3000 Telephone: (818) 995-0800 Facsimile: (818) 995-3157 Email: MKressel@horvitzlevy.com Email: BPauley@horvitzlevy.com Email: JRosen@horvitzlevy.com ili ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTSSAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTSSAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS SERVICE LIST Michael S. Haberkorn MarkJ. Dillion Danielle K. Morone GATZKE, DILLON & BALANCE LLP 2762 Gateway Road Carlsbad, California 92009 Telephone: (760) 431-9501 Facsimile: (760) 431-9512 Email: mhaberkorn@gdandb.com Email: mdillion@gdandb.com Email: dmorone@gdandb.com Christine Leone, Chief Deputy City Attorney Jan I. Goldsmith, City Attorney OFFICE OF THE SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY 1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100 San Diego, California 92101 Telephone: (619) 533-5800 Facsimile: (619) 533-5856 Email: Leonec@sandiego.gov Email: GoldsmithJ@sandiego.gov Hon. Thomas P. Nugent SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT, DEPT.30 325 South Melrose Drive Vista, California 92081 Telephone: (760) 201-8030 Clerk of the Court CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH DISTRICT, DIVISION 1 750 B Street, #300 San Diego, CA 92101-8189 Telephone: (619) 744-0760 WAC\192\012\00345553.DOC ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTSCITY OF SAN DIEGO AND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO TRIAL COURT JUDGE (1) ELECTRONICALLY SUBMITTED COPY SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF ON ISSUE OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS