CEJA v. RUDOLPH & SLETTEN, INC.

Respondent, Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., Petition for Review

Cal.May 31, 2011

S1004 O93med In the Supreme Court=... ofthe vi “ « MAY » State of California SS cy NANCYCESJA.et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, V. RUDOLPH & SLETTEN,INC., Defendant and Respondent; PHOENIX CEJAet al., Respondent. CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL - SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT - NO. H034826 SANTA CLARA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT - HON. MARY JO LEVINGER- CASE NOS. CV112520 and CV 115283 PETITION FOR REVIEW ROBERT G. HARRISON, ESQ. (118765) GARYP. SIMONIAN,ESQ.(177747) LECLAIRRYAN, LLP 888 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1800 Los Angeles, California 90017 (213) 488-0503 Telephone (213) 624-3755 Facsimile MICHAEL R. REYNOLDS, ESQ. 100126) RANKIN, SPROAT, MIRES, BEATY & REYNOLDS, APC 1970 Broadway, Suite 1150 Oakland, California 94612 (510) 465-3922 Telephone (510) 452-3006 Facsimile Attorneysfor Petitioner and Respondent, Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. gS COUNSELPRESS: (800) 3-APPEAL LAY PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER BY TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2...eeeseeenesseseneecsssesseenseeseeneeens lil ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW..........cccccesccssssessseesscesesseesenens 1 WHY THIS CASE IS APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW.................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ou...cc ceesceeesesseeeesssseessesseeeesseeaes4 Factual Background... ccicccssssseecessssscccceeesssseseseseeseeeeees4 Procedural History ...........ceeessssssccceeceesesssesenevesessssssssseseseceeees 7 The Court of Appeal’s Opinion .............cccccccsesseseeseessssnsecesseees8 ARGUMENT. 1.00... ccscescsssesscseecsseeeceseeeesseesseesesseesesaeseesaneessesstsenseees8 I. The Court of Appeal erred in holding that a sincere belief—no matter how unreasonable—is sufficient to establish “good faith” for putative- SPOUSE PULPOSES. ........ceecccesscccesseeceeeeeeeeeseaseseuscsseesseeseers8 A. California adopted the putative-marriage doctrine from othercivil-law JULISCICCIONS. 0.00... .ccccccceeeecsesesseecesecssceeeessceceaeeaeanes 9 B. Inthe putative-spouse context “good faith” means an honest andreasonable belief that a marriageis valid.............cee 12 C. Other civil-law jurisdictions have unanimously required a putative spouse to have a reasonable belief in the validity Of the MALTIAGE.............ccccsssssecccecscessesssessecssesees 13 D. The Court of Appeal was wrongto say that, at the time the putative-marriage doctrine wascodified, “good faith belief” did not require reasonableness.................c008 16 II. The Court of Appeal’s construction of “believed in goodfaith” violates basic rules of statutory INtELPLetatiON,..........cccsseeseececcecssanseeeesseceeenenseessenseusenes 19 A. The Court of Appeal’s construction of “good faith” renders the expression MEANINGIESS............:20ccscccceccesessesesssnsessesseeseeeanes 19 B. The Legislature has tacitly approved Vryonis’s objective standardby retaining the “believed in good faith” language in subsequent modificationsto the statute......... 20 C. The Court of Appeal’s discussion of what “good faith” meansin other, unrelated, contexts is largely irrelevant..............cccccseseeee 21 Ill. The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “good faith belief,” if allowed to stand, will unravel California’s marriage lawS. .........ccccccsesessescsscesssseees 23 IV. Nancy’s belief that she was married to Robert WAS UNLEASONADLE........ see eeesseeseneeeenteeeeeseecetsneessseesees 25 CONCLUSION...eeecess cseeeeeeeneeeaeeeseeeaeeeesseeaeeecseesneseaecneesseeees 28 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...eeccessntessseessesseessaes 30 ADDENDUM A. Opinion B. Certificate of Marriage C. Notice of Entry of Judgment, Dissolution of Marriage Declaration of Service ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Ceja v. Rudolf& Sletten, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th B84occecccsceecsenscessensessessssessssseeceseeceeeeseceuseeeeseeeuaessseeecensenspassim Estate ofDePasse (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th. 92.0.0... .ccececsesccsseers 2,13 Estate ofFoy (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 829 ......ccesscsssesesseseeeereens 18 Estate ofGoldberg (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 402 oo... ccceseeeees 10, 16 Estate ofKrone (1948) Cal.App.2d 766 .....ccccccscesssseeeseeee 9, 16, 18 Estate ofSax (1989) 214 Cal. App.3d 1300 occ eceeecessecesesseees 9 Estate of Vargas (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 714.....cccccesssseceseeeeseees 26 FEIEnterprises, Inc. v. Yoon, 194 Cal.App.4th 790...........ccc. 22 Figoniv. Figoni (1931) 211 Cal. 854 ...ccccccccscsscssscsessessecssssessees 16 Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank ofSacramento (1931) 218 Cal. 664 oo... ccccccessssrscnneesseecceeceeececessesensnsceeeseeeeeeeenss 17, 18 Garduno v. Garduno (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) 760 S.W.2d TED io eccccsscccccnssecsececaecceeeseececenensescssceescesaeseceesussceeseasesseaseceereeeees 3, 15 Hicklin v. Hicklin (Neb. 1994) 509 N.W.2d 627 .......cceceseseee 3, 15 In re Domestic Partnership ofEllis & Aiaga (2008) 162 Cal. App.4th 1000..............cccccsscsssenssccseesecccececeeceeseseucceseseeesnes 2 In re Marriage ofMonti(1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50.........cece 11 In re Marriage ofRamirez (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th TO eeccssscccccnsccecsuececssssecceesesseecceeesceeseuesseessaeescesaueceseneeceuenescees 2,13 In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712....... 2,12, 21 In re Marriage ofXia Guo andXiao Hua Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491...ececcssscsssecsseeseessessessseceesnsesseees 2,13 Klein v. United States ofAmerica (2010) 50 Cal.4th G8 0. eccceecscccssscecesssseeceeeccecseseecccuanessecteuccceceeserseeeuseseesseeseauscesseaessess 20 Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721........ccceeceeees 21 Miller v. Johnson (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 128 .....ccceceeseseseees 11 Phraner v. Cote Mark, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 166.000.000.000... 19 lil Schneider v. Schneider (1920) 183 Cal. 335 ......ccccsesseecees 10, 16, 18 Smith v. Smith (La. 1891) 10 So. 248 ...sescesesceeeesttseessseseseeen 14 Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1978) .ecscssscscssesscescscesessesscsesecsesessecsesssscsscsesssscsuseuseecaussssevavaceataenas 17 Succession ofPigg (La. 1955) 84 S0.2d 196 wo... ceecesseeeeeesesees 3,15 Vallera v. Vallera (1948) 21 Cal.2d 681...esses 11, 17, 18 Walker v. Walker(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1911) 136 S.W. V14Doeeececeesseceessseeecsscecessessacececsseeesuerssteesesessssscntseseesssessteeseas 14 Welch v. State ofCalifornia (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th L374. ccecssccceessscesseesecsncecesseeesuseceseecssusesseseessessesecusessseresnees 2,13 Williams v. Williams (Nev. 2004) 97 P.8d 1124.......ssssesesesees 3, 15 Statutes Civil Code § 4100. ........ccecesssssssssccecscecceceeessessnnenssscecneesseseeaueaeseeseess 23 Civil Code § 1780(€)...c.ceccscccccscssscssscssssssscssssssssesesesessssesassessseeses 22 Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(b)....cccsecccscssssscsessessssecsscsesessreseesenspassim Code Civ. Proc. § 872.210 ......cccccccccccccesecssssssnsenscceanscseeeneseeeeseccesees 9 Fam. Code § 17505..........cccscsssssseccccssseecceeceessssssenssseesssssceuesaecesecceues 9 Fam. Code § 17506 ..........ccccsssssssrcccenseeccecsessessssseasseecusasseeeasessecceeseees 9 Fam. Code § 2251.........cccsscccccsssssssssceeeessssncecevsssseecaneeerecesesssuees 9,11 Pen. Code § 3524 o.....ceccsssssssecessesssnseeeessssaneesesessseasauaeecececesssnnseesess 9 Rules of Court Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(D)(1) vcececccsscsesessscssescsssseessneens 1 Other Authorities 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage § 91 o......cceessssssstsnstseeeensneeececeeeeceeseees 14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (8th Ed. 2004)... seeeesseseeteeees 22 Christopher Blakesley, THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE DOCTRINE, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1985)... cceeeseseeeeeneeen 9,13, 14 iv PETITION Rudolph and Sletten, Inc. (“R&S”) submits this Petition for Review of the April 19, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District. A copy of the Court of Appeal’s Opinion, which has since been published,! is attached to this Petition as Exhibit A. Rudolph andSletten, Inc.’s petition for rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeal on May 11, 2011. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(b) gives a decedent’s “putative spouse” standingto institute a wrongful-death action. It defines “putative spouse” as a person who “believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid.” Does a person havethe requisite “good faith belief’? where he or she has an unreasonable, albeit sincere, belief that the marriage was valid? Oris a subjective belief, no matter how unreasonable, sufficient to establish good faith? WHY THIS CASE IS APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW Review by this Court is needed to secure uniformity of decision and to settle an important issue of law. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1). The Court of Appeal’s decision has created a sharp split in authority on the proper standard by whichto evaluate a putative spouse’s “good faith belief.” Before the Court of Appeal’s decision, 1 Ceja v. Rudolf& Sletten, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 584. every other published case on point had held that a putative spouse must have objective good faith, i.e., must have both an actual andreasonable belief that her marriage was valid.? Although the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the objective- reasonableness standard had become “firmly lodged” in California’s decisional law, it expressly refused to follow it, stating that “the time has come, belatedly, to... reject it.” Ceja, 194 Cal.App.4th at 597. Thus, it replaced the long-standing objective-reasonableness test with a test for good faith that hinged entirely on the putative spouse’s subjective beliefs, no matter how unreasonable. _ This creates a sharp conflict in case law on a matter of fundamental importance. As it now stands, whether a person qualifies as a putative spouse—andall the civil benefits that that entails—will depend on the District where thecaseis litigated. This will create confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistent results. A decision by this Court is necessaryto resolve this conflict. Review is also needed to correct the Court of Appeal’s erroneous analysis. The Court of Appeal basedits radical departure from precedenton the incorrect premise that California cases decided before the 1969 codification of the 2 See In re Marriage of Vryonis (2d Dist. 1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712; In re Marriage ofXia Guo andXiao Hua Sun (2d Dist. 2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491; In re Marriage ofRamirez (4th Dist. 2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 751; Welch v. State ofCalifornia (5th Dist. 2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1374; Estate ofDePasse (6th Dist. 2002) 97 Cal.App.4th. 92. See also In re Domestic Partnership ofEllis & Aiaga (4th Dist. 2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000. putative-marriage doctrine had imposedonly a subjective standardfor good faith. This is not so. None of the cases the Court of Appeal cites—either from this Court or the Court of Appeal—held any such thing. The issue simply never arose. Moreover, every otherjurisdiction that has considered the objective-test versus subjective-test issue—including Louisiana and Texas, the states from which California originally drew its putative-marriage doctrine—has used an objective reasonableness standard for evaluating the good-faith belief of a putative spouse.® Ifthe decision below is allowed to stand, California would be the first and only jurisdiction to abandon the requirement that a putative spouse have a reasonable belief in the marriage’s validity. This abandonment would have widespread harmful consequences. Because of the importance of the marital relationship,it is vital that parties who undertake to be married 3 See, e.g., Succession ofPigg (La. 1955) 84 So.2d 196, 197 (“It is well settled that the good faith referred to in these Articles [relating to putative spouses] means an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was a valid one at the timeofits confection.”); Garduno v. Garduno (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) 760 S.W.2d 735, 740 (“[Wlhen the putative spouse is aware that a former marriage existed at one time, the question becomesone of the reasonablenessof that party’s belief that the former marriage has been dissolved.”); Hicklin v. Hicklin (Neb. 1994) 509 N.W.2d 627, 631 (“Good faith, in the context of a putative marriage, meansan honest and reasonble belief that the marriage was valid at the time of the ceremony. ... [A] party cannotclose his or her eyes to suspicious circumstances.”); Williams v. Williams (Nev. 2004) 97 P.3d 1124, 1128 (“Good faith’ has been defined as an honest and reasonablebelief that the marriage wasvalid.”). exercise reasonable care to ensure that their marriageis actually valid. But if the Court of Appeal’s subjective standardisleft in place, married parties no longer will need to trouble themselves with California’s marriage prerequisites. Merely believing that one is married would havevirtually the same legal effect as actually being married. And according to the Court of Appeal, this would be so regardless of whether that belief was a reasonable one. Theneteffect of this will be to eliminate the incentive for couples to ensure that they meet the requirements of a valid marriage. This, in turn, would unravel California’s marriage laws. For all these reasons, amplified below, this Court should accept this case for review and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal. STATEMENT OF THE CASE FactualBackground Plaintiff Nancy Ceja (“Nancy”) sued defendant R&S under Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(b) for the death of her alleged putative husband, Robert Ceja (“Robert”). Robert wasfatally injured in a workplace accident. The issue in this case is whether Nancy had standing to bring a wrongful-death action. That question hinges on the facts surrounding Robert and Nancy’s marital status. Robert was previously married to Christine Ceja (“Christine”), by whom he had two children. (Appellant’s Appendix VolumeI (“AA I:”) at 128). Robert and Christine separated, and, as of 2001, Robert and Nancy had begunliving together. (AA I:119, 151). That sameyear, Robert initiated divorce proceedings and obtained joint custody of his and Christine’s two children. (AA I:151). Nancy knew that Robert was married to Christine and had had twochildren with her. (AA 1:118, 119, 128, 154; AA II:348, 403). Nancy also knew that Robert hadfiled for a divorce from Christine but says, “I did not talk about this subject with him at all.” (AA II:350). On September 24, 2003, Robert and Nancy completed an application for a “License and Certificate of Marriage.” (AA 1:157) (A copy of this documentis attached as Exhibit B). Although Nancy knew about Robert’s prior marriage, she neglected to mention it on this form. The “groom personaldata” > “ section gives “0” as Robert’s “numberof previous marriages.” (Ibid.). And the section asking how the previous marriage had been terminated (with check boxes for death, dissolution, or annulment) wasleft blank, as was the spacefor the date on which the prior marriage was terminated. (/bid.). Despite these false representations, Nancy signed the marriage license. Her signature appears in a box marked “affidavit,” underneath a statement that she and Robert were unmarried and that “the foregoing information is correct and true to the best of our knowledge andbelief.” (AA I:157). To explain why she signed a documentthat falsely stated that Robert had never before been married, Nancy—an executive assistant in the high-tech industry—said that she did not review the license“in any detail.” (AA IT:348). She “simply signed the document.” (Ibid.). Three days after they obtained the license, Robert and Nancyheld a large wedding ceremony. At that time, however, Robert wasstill married to Christine. Although Robert had initiated divorce proceedings in 2001, the dissolution did not becomefinal until December 31, 2003—1.e., three months after Robert and Nancy’s wedding ceremony. (AA I:159). (Indeed, Robert did not even movefor entry of judgmentin his divorce with Christine until a month after the wedding.) (AA I:161). Thus, Robert and Nancy’s attempted September 23, 2003 marriage wasvoid. On December 31, 2003, the Santa Clara County Superior Courtfiled a “Notice of Entry of Judgment” in Robert and Christine’s divorce. (AA I:159-61) (A copy of this documentis attached as Exhibit C). Thefirst page of the noticerecites, in large upper-case text, that the judgment was entered “DEC 26 2003” and filed on “DEC 31 2003.” (bid). Furthermore,it contains a boxed warningthat: (1) the divorce waseffective only as of the date the judgment wasfiled (i.e., December 31, 2003), and (2) neither party could remarry until after the effective date. (Ibid.).4 Nancy admits that she saw the Notice shortly thereafter. (AA I:147). Sometime during January 2004, she faxed a copyofit 4 This warning against remarrying, in bold type andall caps, states “WARNING: NEITHER PARTY MAY REMARRY UNTIL THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE TERMINATION OF MARITAL STATUS AS SHOWNIN THIS BOXli.e. December 31, 2003].” Ubid.). It was sent to Robert at his home address. (Ibid). to the Ironworkers Trust Fund to change the beneficiary designation on certain of Robert’s benefits. (AA I:147-49). Despite the fact that the documentclearly states the effective date of Robert and Christine’s divorce, despite the fact thatit contains a boxed warning against remarrying before that date, and despite the fact that Nancy admits seeing the Notice of Entry of Judgment and faxing it to the Ironworkers Trust Fund as part of an application to have her added to Robert’s benefits, she maintains that she was “unclear on the specific date of the divorce for Mr. Ceja.” (AA II:349). Thus, she claims that she thought her marriage to Robert was valid. (AA II:348). Robert and Nancy subsequently held themselves out as husband and wife but took no action to cure their invalid marriage. Procedural History Nancy brought a wrongful-death action against R&S as Robert’s “putative spouse.” (AA 1:2). R&S moved for summary judgmentor, in the alternative, for summary adjudication. (AA I:47). It argued, among otherthings, that under Codeof Civil Procedure § 377.60 Nancycould not be Robert’s putative spouse because she did not have a “good faith belief” that her marriage to him wasvalid, citing the line of case law holdingthat “good faith belief’ imposes an objective “reasonableness” standard. (Jbid.). And it also argued that no reasonable person 5 Robert’s first wife, Christine, brought a separate wrongful death action on behalf of Robert and Christine’s minor children. This action was consolidated with Nancy’s action but wassettled and dismissed by agreement. It is not part of this appeal. in Nancy’s position would havebelieved that the marriage to Robert was valid. (AA I:68). The Superior Court agreed, holding that Nancy wasnot a putative spouse because “she did not have an objectively reasonable good-faith belief in the validity of her marriage to Robert.” (AA III:706). Accordingly, it entered judgmentfor R&S. Uhid.). The Court ofAppeal’s Opinion The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed, relying principally on Nancy’s statement that she believed the marriage was valid. Ceja, 194 Cal.App.4th at 609. It rejected the defense theory that Nancy’s “lack of diligence” in reviewing the marriage certificate negated good faith. [bid. And it held that there remaineda triable issue of fact whether Nancy actually knew that Robert’s marriage wasnotfinal before they got married. Jd. at 610. Accordingly, it reversed the Superior Court’s judgment. This Petition followed. ARGUMENT I. The Court of Appeal erred in holding that a sincere belief—no matter how unreasonable—is sufficient to establish “good faith” for putative- spouse purposes. California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(b) gives a decedent’s “putative spouse” standingto institute wrongful-death claims. It defines “putative spouse” as the surviving spouse of an invalid marriage who has a good-faith belief that his or her marriage to decedent was valid: As used in this subdivision, “putative spouse” meansthe surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(b) (emphasis added). The statute does not further define “good faith belief’ or explain how it differs from an ordinary belief. To determine its meaning, one mustlook to the history of the doctrine and the cases developingit. A. California adopted the putative-marriage doctrine from othercivil-law jurisdictions. Although now codified at § 377.60(b) and elsewhere,® the putative-marriage doctrine hasits origins in case law. It is generally recognized in those states whose family law derives from French and Spanish “civil code” legal systems,e.g., California, Texas, and Louisiana. See ChristopherBlakesley, THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE DOCTRINE,60 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1985). See also Estate ofKrone (1948) Cal.App.2d 766, 768 (“Putative 6 The mostsignificant provision is Fam. Code § 2251, which gives “putative spouses”rights to “quasi-marital property.” As in Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(b), it requires that the would-be putative spouse “believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.” Jbid. The putative-spouse concept also appears in Code Civ.Proc. § 872.210, in Fam. Code §§ 17505, 17506, and in Pen. Code § 3524. The Probate Code has not codified the putative spouse doctrine, butit still is recognized by California courts in that context. See Estate ofSax (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1305. marriage’ is a phrase derived from thecivil law which once prevailed in the southwestern states and in Louisiana.”). Whenthis Court adopted the putative-marriage doctrine in the 1910’s and 20’s, it used the standard that thesecivil-law states had applied, requiring that the would-be putative spouse have a “good faith” belief that the marriage was valid. See Schneider v. Schneider (1920) 183 Cal. 335. But prior to codification in 1969, no published California case addressed whethera sincere belief in the validity of a marriage—evenif unreasonable—wassufficient to establish “good faith.”” Statements in those earlier California cases, however, strongly suggested that “good faith” required that the would-be putative spouse act reasonably. The decisionsrecited that the doctrine wasdesignedto protect “innocent” persons who had every reason to believe that they were lawfully married. Schneider, 183 Cal. at 338 (““[W]here a womanis an innocent party to a void marriage sheis entitled to the sameinterest in property acquired by the parties as if the marriage were valid.”) (emphasis added); Estate ofGoldberg (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 402, 412 (finding that the plaintiff was a putative spouse becausethe putative husband told her he was a free man and“[slhe had no 7 As discussed infra, the Court of Appeal reads the pre- codification case law to have rejected an objective standard. But the cases it cites stand for no such thing. The issue simply was never presented. Until the Court of Appeal’s decision in the presentcase, there was no published California case that held that an unreasonable, but sincere, belief in a marriage’s validity wassufficient to establish good faith. 10 reason to disbelieve him and did believe him.”) (emphasis added). They also stated that the doctrine is designed to protect the “reasonable expectations” that a marriage is valid. See, e.g., Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681, 685 (noting that the putative-marriage doctrine arose out “[e]quitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage”). And in Miller v. Johnson (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 123, the Court of Appeal opined that “there must also be a diligent attempt to meet the requisites ofa valid marriage.” Id. at 126 (emphasis added). These cases all suggested there was an objective-reasonableness component to good faith. In none of them, however, was theissue dispositive. The California Legislature first codified the putative- marriage doctrine in 1969. See Jn re Marriage ofMonti(1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 55 (describing the codification of the doctrine). This appeared in the context of the Family Law Act, andit gave putative spouses rights to marital property. (The corresponding Family Code provision now appears at Fam. Code § 2251.) The Legislature brought the putative-spouse concept to the wrongful- death statute in 1975, when it added putative spouses to the class of persons with standing to bring such claims. See Cea, 194 Cal.App.4th at 592. The Legislature enacted the present iteration of the statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60, in 1992. These statutes all required the putative spouse to have “believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.” Yet in none of them did the Legislature define “good faith.” Nor did the 11 Legislature otherwise indicate whether the term meant objective good faith or merely sincere belief. B. In the putative-spouse context “good faith” means an honest andreasonable belief that a marriageis valid. The question whether “good faith” has an objective- reasonableness componentin the putative-spouse context was first raised—and resolved—ina series of Court of Appeal cases from the 1980s onward. The leadingcase is In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712. There, the parties conducted their own “Muta” marriage, a private Islamic ceremony with only the two of them present. The couple made no attempt to comply with California’s procedural requirements for a marriage. The plaintiff claimed that she believed this was a valid marriage and that, consequently, she wasentitled to rights as a putative spouse. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It held that, to be a putative spouse, a party must have had a reasonable belief in the marriage’s validity: A properassertion of putative spouse status mustrest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to harbor a good faith belief in the existence of a valid marriage. 202 Cal.App.3d at 721. In other words, “[A] sincere but objectively unreasonable belief is not in good faith.” Jd. at 724. Applying that objective standardto the facts before it, the Vryonis court concluded that the plaintiffs belief in a valid 12 marriage—evenif honestly maintained—wasin bad faith because it was not reasonable. In the twenty-plus years since the Court of Appeal decided Vryonis, all the other Courts of Appeal addressing the issue had—until the present case—adoptedits “objective reasonableness” standard for good faith in the putative-spouse context. See, e.g., Xia Guo, 186 Cal.App.4th at 1493 (“A determination of good faith is tested by an objective standard.”); Ramirez, 65 Cal.App.4th at 756 (“[A] claim of putative spouse status mustbe based on facts that would cause a reasonable personto believe in good faith that he or she was married and that the marriage was valid under California law.”); Welch, 83 Cal.App.4th at 1878 (“A determination of good faith is tested by an objective standard.”); Estate ofDePasse, 97 Cal.App.4th at 107-08 (“A subjective good faith belief in a valid marriage by itself, even whenheld by a credible and sympathetic party, is not sufficient.”). Until the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case, the issue was thought to be well-settled. C. Othercivil-law jurisdictions have unanimously required a putative spouse to have a reasonable belief in the validity of the marriage. It was well-settled, and the objective-reasonablenesstest remains the law of every other American jurisdiction to have addressed the question. See Blakesley, THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE DOCTRINE, 60 Tul. L. Rev. at 22 (“All United States jurisdictions which recognize the putative spouse doctrine” hold that “civil effects cease to flow to the good faith putative spouse once he or 13 she has acquired knowledgeof the cause of nullity or obtained enough evidence to require investigation and has failed to investigate.”) (emphasis added).8 As a matter of hornbook family law, “good faith belief” in the putative-marriage context means an honest and reasonable belief in the validity of a marriage. See 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage § 91 (emphasis added) (The term “good faith,” when used in connection with a putative marriage, means an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage wasvalid.”) (emphasis added). See also Blakesley, THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE DOCTRINE, 60 Tul. L. Rev. at 18-19 (noting that good faith is “an honest and reasonable’ belief that the marriageis valid and that no legal impedimentexists thereto.”) (quotations andcitations omitted and emphasis added). Indeed, the law has been that way for well over a century. WhenCalifornia adopted the putative-marriage doctrine in the 1910’s and 1920's, both Texas and Louisiana—thestates on whose putative-marriage doctrines this Court modeled California’s rule—had expressly adopted an objective- reasonableness standard. Smith v. Smith (La. 1891) 10 So. 248 (“The good faith referred to, means an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage wasvalid.”); Walker v. Walker (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1911) 136 S.W. 1145, 1148 (“Good faith, we think, cannot be predicated upon negligent failure to ascertain a fact {about her 8 As Blakesley notes, this was how Spanish courts had applied the putative-marriage doctrine. 14 husband’s marital status] which was of so much importance to her and which wasof such easy ascertainment.”). California’s Sister States have consistently applied an objective standard in the intervening decades. See, e.g., Succession ofPigg (La. 1955) 84 So.2d 196, 197 (“It is well settled that the good faith referred to in these Articles [relating to putative spouses] meansan honest and reasonablebelief that the marriage was a valid one at the timeof its confection.”); Garduno v. Garduno(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) 760 S.W.2d 735, 740 (“[Wlhen the putative spouse is aware that a former marriage existed at one time, the question becomesoneofthe reasonableness of that party’s belief that the former marriage has been dissolved.”); Hicklin v. Hicklin (Neb. 1994) 509 N.W.2d 627, 631 (“Good faith, in the context of a putative marriage, means an honest and reasonble belief that the marriage was valid at the time of the ceremony.... [A] party cannotclose his or her eyes to suspicious circumstances.”). So when, in 2004, the Supreme Court of Nevada addressed the issue for thefirst time, it reviewed the case law of other states and concluded that “good faith” required reasonable conduct on the part of the would-be putative spouse. Williamsv. Williams (Nev. 2004) 97 P.3d 1124 (“Good faith’ has been defined as an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage wasvalid at the time of the ceremony.” ... Persons cannot act blindly or without reasonable precaution.”). An unreasonable belief in a marriage’s validity—even if deeply felt and sincerely held—does not constitute “good faith” in the putative-spouse context. 15 D. The Court ofAppeal was wrongto say that, at the time the putative-marriage doctrine wascodified, “good faith belief” did not require reasonableness. The central premise in the Court of Appeal’s legal analysis is that, before 1969, “good faith belief’ had a well-understood meaning that did not require that the would-be putative spouse have acted reasonably in concludingthat his or her marriage was valid. Reasoning from this premise, the Court of Appeal claims that the Legislature intended to retain this subjective-belief standard whenit codified the doctrine. 194 Cal.App.4th at 595. But the premise underlying the Court of Appeal’s argument is false. Contrary to its opinion, the California cases before 1969 did not raise—andso did not resolve—the question whether courts should measure good-faith belief in the putative-marriage context using an objective rather than a subjective standard. Even a cursory review of the decisions on which the Court of Appeal relies reveals that none of them held that a putative spouse could have a “good faith” belief even if that belief was objectively unreasonable.? 9 The cases can be sorted into two broad categories. Thefirst comprises cases in which thecourt did not discuss the issue at all. See Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, Figoni v. Figoni (1931) 211 Cal. 354, Estate ofKrone (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 766, and Estate of Goldberg (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 402. These cases, however, do not stand for the proposition that a reasonable belief is not necessary for good faith, as the question never came up. Absence of a holdingis not a holding of absence. So the lack of a clear holding regarding reasonable belief is not a holding that a party (note continued on followingpage. . .) 16 Tellingly, the Court of Appeal does not quote any language from these decisions that explicitly rejected an objective standard in favor of a subjective standard. The cases are completely silent on this critical issue. Examination reveals that they are entirely consistent with an objective-reasonableness good-faith standard.!0 (|... note continued from previouspage) can have good faith without having a reasonable belief. The issue simply did not arise. The second category of cases are ones in which the court found that the would-be putative spouse did not actually believe that the marriage was valid. Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681; Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank ofSacramento (1931) 213 Cal. 664. Because these cases hinged on the factual question about the would-be putative spouse’s state of mind, the Court of Appeal concluded that the “good faith” depends entirely on a would-be spouse’s subjective state of mind. This does not follow. The objective standardfor “good faith” requires a reasonable belief in the validity of marriage. And a person whodoes not have an actualbelief that her marriageis valid a fortiori does not have a reasonable belief. So these cases are entirely consistent with an objective standard. 10 Petitioner is not thefirst to observe this. In Spearmanv. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—reviewing exactly the same pre-1969 cases that Court of Appeal in this case relied on— concluded that the objective-versus-subjective question presented an unsettled question of California law. And, contrary to the Court of Appeal in this case, it held that an objective standard was “perfectly consonant” with pre-codification case law: [A]n objective test is perfectly consonant with the California decisions that have developed and applied the “putative spouse” doctrine ... Although no (note continuedon followingpage...) 17 In short, a review of the cases showsthat the central premise of the Court of Appeal’s opinion—i.e., that pre-1969 case law specifically did not require the belief to be reasonable—is false. This is not surprising. Rejecting an objective- reasonableness standardin favor of a pure subjective standard would mark a radical departure from the objective- reasonableness standard universally applied in putative- marriage cases. One would expect that if California wished to make such a bold step, it would have doneso explicitly, in capital letters. Yet the cases are silent about it. The fact that noneof the pre-codification cases even mentions the objective- reasonablenessversus subjective-belief issue is telling evidence that the question had not been presented. It is the dog that did not bark. (|... note continued from previouspage) California case has been cited to us that tests good faith by examiningits reasonability, the cases that have discussed good faith do not preclude such an approach.... Nowhere do these cases explicitly reject an objective test of good faith. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added)(citing, inter alia, Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank ofSacramento (1931) 213 Cal. 664, Estate of Krone (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 766, Schneider v. Schneider (1920) 183 Cal. 335, Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681, and Estate ofFoy (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 329). 18 II. The Court of Appeal’s construction of “believed in good faith” violates basic rules of statutory interpretation. A. The Court of Appeal’s construction of “good faith” renders the expression meaningless. Not only does the Court of Appeal misread the putative- spouse case law,its decision also violates ordinary rules of statutory interpretation. The question raised in this caseis, at bottom, one of statutory construction—i.e., what is the meaning of “believed in good faith” in Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(b). Courts narrowly construe the provisionsof § 377.60 that confer standing to bring wrongful-death claims. Phraner v. Cote Mark, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 166, 168. Yet the Court of Appeal did not narrowly construe the statutory language in the present case. Indeed, its interpretation of “believed in good faith” broadenedthe class of putative spouses so extensively as to render the qualifying phrase “good faith” entirely meaningless. Under the Court of Appeal’s construction, “good faith” meansthat a belief is held “honestly, genuinely, and sincerely.” But all beliefs are—by psychological necessity— honest, genuine, and sincere. Although one can make a dishonest or insincere statement, it is logically impossible to have an insincere belief Either you believe something or you do not. But if that is so, then this means that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “good faith” renders the phrase entirely meaninglessin the context of Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(b). If a “good faith” belief is just an “honest, genuine, and sincere” 19 belief, and an “honest, genuine, and sincere”belief is just a belief, then a “good faith” belief is just a belief. The phrase “good faith” does absolutely no work. It could just as well have been omitted by the Legislature.!! This Court rejects interpretations of statutory language that render phrases meaningless or redundant. See, e.g., Klein v. United States ofAmerica (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68, 80 (“[Clourts must strive to give meaning to every word in a statute and to avoid constructions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous.”). Thus, this Court should reject the Court of Appeal’s attempt to interpret “good faith” out of existence in § 377.60(b). B. The Legislature has tacitly approved Vryonis’s objective standardby retaining the “believed in good faith” language in subsequent modifications to the statute. The Court of Appeal also violated the long-accepted interpretive canon that a legislature is presumed to have acted with the knowledgeof definitive interpretations that courts have placed on statutory language. When courts have construed a statutory term in a certain way, and a legislature subsequently 11 A construction that interprets “good faith” to create an objective standard, by contrast, suffers no such problems. Under this view, “good faith belief” differs from “belief” insofar as it adds a requirementof objective reasonableness. Thus, one can havea belief without that belief being reasonable. The concept of “good faith belief’ is not coextensive with “belief.” Underthis interpretation—thecorrect interpretation—“good faith” has a clear purposefor being in the statute:it restricts the general class of beliefs to the subclass of reasonable beliefs. 20 amendsa provision but /eaves the interpretedportion intact, the legislature is presumed to have implicitly acquiesced to the construction that the courts have, prior to the amendment, placed on the retained language. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 734-35. In the two decadesfollowing the Vryonis decision, the Courts of Appeal have consistently interpreted the phrase “believed in good faith” to have an objective component. Since that time, there have been numerous amendmentsto the statutory language, both in the context of the wrongful-death statute!” and in the context of the Family Code.!3 But the phrase “believed in good faith” has remained intact, with no changes whatsoever. Had the California Legislature wished to reject the Vryonis decision’s objective-reasonableness analysis it could have—and should have—altered the statutory definition of “putative spouse.” Thefact that it did not do so is strong evidence that the Legislature agrees with the Vryonis court’s objective-reasonableness interpretation of “believed in good faith.” C. The Court of Appeal’s discussion of what “good faith” meansin other, unrelated, contexts is largely irrelevant. Finally, the Court of Appeal spends a large portion ofits opinion explaining how “good faith” is used in different areas of 12 See Stats 1996 ch 563 § 1; Stats 1997 ch 13 § 1, Stats 2001 ch 893 § 2; Stats 2004 ch 947 § 1. 13 See Stats 1992 ch 162 § 10. 21 the law (e.g., criminal law, the Tort Claims Act, and Civil Code § 1780(e), etc.). It then attempts to apply the usage of “good faith” in these contexts to the putative-marriage doctrine. This is an exercise doomedto failure. The term “good faith” is a legal chameleon, with no fixed meaning. See FEI Enterprises, Inc. v. Yoon, 194 Cal.App.4th 790, 800-04 (explaining that, under California law, “good faith” can have an objective or subjective meaning, depending on theparticular legal context). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY713 (8th Ed. 2004) (“Good faith is an elusive idea, taking on different meanings and emphases as we move from one context to another.”) (quoting Roger Brownswordet al., “Good Faith in Contract,” In Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context 1, 3 (Roger Brownsword Ed. 1999). Sometimes “good faith” denotes objectively reasonable conduct. See FEIEnterprises, 194 Cal.App.4th at 801 (noting that “where the bonafidesof a legal dispute are at issue, courts routinely apply an objective standard andciting cases). Other times it simply means a subjective belief. Jd. at 800 (citing examples). Thereis no single, correct, definition of “good faith” that applies universally across all legal contexts. Nor need the Court in the present case determine,for all time and in all contexts, what “good faith” means. The question, rather, is what “good faith” meansin the context of the putative-marriage doctrine. And on this question, the courts have been unanimous: good faith means a reasonable belief that one’s marriageis valid. See supra. Because the Court 22 of Appeal misconstrued the meaningof “good faith” in Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60(b)’s phrase “believed in goodfaith,” this Court should accept this case for review and reverse. III. The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “good faith belief,” if allowed to stand, will unravel California’s marriage laws. Not only is the Court of Appeal’s subjective interpretation of “good faith” an incorrect legal analysis, it is poor public policy. As an immediate matter, its rejection of long-standing precedent has caused a split in the Courts of Appeal that—left unaddressed by this Court—will lead to confusion and chaosin resolving putative-spouse issues. The spouse of a Los Angeles resident killed in a San Jose accident may be a putative spouse in a wrongful-death action brought in San Jose, but nota putative spouse in probate proceedings in Los Angeles. A rule that varies betweenthe districts will also invite forum shopping. This Court should grant review in orderto resolve this irreconcilable difference between California’s appellate districts. As a long-term matter, too, a subjective standard will have harmful consequences. Marriage is not a mere empty formality. It is “a personal relation arising out of a civil contract.” Civil Code § 4100. When spouses sign a marriage license, they place the public on notice of their legal union. Similarly, a Notice of Judgmentof Dissolution places the public on notice of the termination of that contract. Third parties—e.g., potential spouses, lenders, creditors, insurers, employers—rely on these representations. Because of the importance of the marital 23 relationship,it is vital that parties who undertake to be married take reasonable precautionsto see that their marriageis actually valid. If the Court of Appeal’s subjective standard is upheld, however, married parties no longer need to trouble themselves with California’s marriage prerequisites. Merely believing that one is married would have virtually the same legaleffect as actually being married. And accordingto the Court of Appeal, this would be so regardless of whether that belief was a reasonable one. The net effect of this would be to eliminate the incentive for couples to ensure that they satisfy the requirements of a valid marriage. Indeed, it would eliminate the incentive even to /earn whatone needs to doin order to get properly married in the State of California. If mere belief in a valid marriage—no matter how unreasonable—issufficient to secure the benefits of marriage, why botherinvestigating the law’s requirements? Toeffect a putative marriage, couples need not go to a courthouse. They need only to put their heads in the sand. This, of course, would unravel California’s marriage laws. If a would-be married couple “honestly, genuinely, and sincerely” believed that a common-law marriage wasvalid in California, then—underthe Court of Appeal’s holding—a court would have to honortheir belief, no matter how unreasonable. The same would hold true for a bigamous marriage, a marriageto a sibling, or any other marriage that California law now forbids. By 24 honoring unreasonable beliefs, the courts would, for all practical purposes,be forced to honorthose proscribed unions. Undoubtedly, this is why every jurisdiction to have addressed the question has held that “good faith belief’ in the putative-marriage context meansa sincere and reasonable belief. The putative-marriage cases are replete with warnings that a party cannot turn a blind eyeto circumstances showing that a marriage was invalid. See supra. So if a party wishesto avail herself of the putative-marriage doctrine, she must demonstrate that she has madea reasonable attempt to enter into a valid marriage. Forall these reasons, the Court of Appeal erred in construing “believed in good faith” to require only a subjective belief. IV. Nancy’s belief that she was married to Robert was unreasonable. If the Court of Appeal had applied an objective standard,it would have reached a completely different conclusion. The undisputed facts show that Nancy did not undertake reasonable efforts to ensure that her marriage to Robert wasvalid. To begin, Nancy knew that Robert had a prior marriage. Indeed, Nancy had helped cared for Robert and Christine’s children. Given this knowledge, Nancy had anobligation to take reasonable precautions to determine whether Robert and Christine’s divorce wasfinal before undertaking to marry Robert. Nancy did not take reasonable precautions. According to Nancy, Robert refused to discuss the proceedingsat all with her. 25 Thus, prior to his death, Nancy never determined the date when Robert and Christine’s divorce becamefinal. Nancy could have learned these facts before the wedding ceremony—either by asking Robert point blank or by consulting public records. Yet she did not do so. No reasonable person would undertake to marry a person they knew to be previously married without an explicit assurance that the prior marriage had been terminated.!4 Worse, Nancy signed a marriagelicense that plainly misrepresented Robert’s prior marital status. As noted above, the license stated that Robert had “0” prior marriages. Andit left blanks where the date of his divorce from Christine would have been indicated—had they, in fact, been divorced. These misrepresentations and omissions were obvious red flags. They would have put any reasonable person on inquiry notice about the status of Robert’s marriage to Christine. Any reasonable person in Nancy’s position would have demandeda satisfactory explanation of this serious discrepancy. Nancy, however, claims that she did not notice the misrepresentation because she did not review thecertificate “in any detail.” (AA II:348). Even if true, this is no excuse. This was an official California vital record. Nancy affixed her signature to a box entitled “affidavit,” which stated “the foregoing information 14 Thus, this case presents a completely different circumstance from theline of cases where the putative wife was assured by the would-be spousethat, at the time of their marriage, he had obtained a valid divorce from his former wife. See Estate of Vargas (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 714. 26 is true to the best of our knowledge.” (AA I:157). No reasonable person would have signed an official documentof this nature withoutfirst reviewing it. And even the most cursory review would have revealed the misrepresentation about Robert’s prior marital status. Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s suggestion in its opinion, this was nota minor mistake, easily overlooked. Ceja, 194 Cal.App.4th at 610. It went to the heart of whether Robert was legally eligible to be married. Indeed, the whole purpose of requiring applicants to disclose prior marriages and their dates of termination is to avoid the situation that arose here. A reasonable person in Nancy’s position would have read the entries on the marriage license, would have inquired why the form failed to mention Robert’s prior marriage to Christine, would have demanded to know when Robert and Christine’s divorce had becomefinal, and thus would have learned that Robert wasstill married to Christine. Nancy’s failure to do these things was, as the Superior Court found, objectively unreasonable. Finally, Nancy admits seeing the Notice of Entry of Judgment announcing the December 31, 2003 termination of Robert and Christine’s marriage. (AA I:147). Amongother things, she faxed those papersto the Ironworkers Trust Fund in January 2004. (AA J:147-49). But as with the marriagelicense, Nancy claims that she did not examine this documentclosely. (AA II:348-49). 27 Again, Nancy’s conduct amounted,at best, to willful blindness. Nancy knew that Robert 4/ed for divorce but claims she was never told when,exactly, the divorce becameeffective. (AA II:348). And yet he gave her the legal document that stated exactly that. A reasonable person in Nancy’s circumstances would have examined it. Doing so would have revealed that Nancy’s marriage to Robert was invalid. This was apparent on the face of the notice—thefront page bore a prominent warning that (1) Robert’s divorce from Christine wasfinal on December 31, 2003, and (2) Robert was legally prohibited from marrying any person before that date. Robert and Nancy’s wedding was on September 27, 2003. So Nancy should have knownthat her purported marriage to him—which had occurred three months before Robert’s divorce from Christine was final—wasinvalid. In short, this case presents a classic situation of a would-be putative spouse whocould havediscoveredthe truth withlittle or no effort, who should have opened hereyesto facts that literally were staring her in the face, and who thusdid not have an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that her marriage was valid. CONCLUSION Because this Court needs to secure uniformity to the standard for “good faith” in the putative-marriage context, because the Court of Appeal incorrectly applied a subjective standard, and because no reasonable person in Nancy’s position could havefailed to discover that Robert wasstill married to 28 Christine at the time of Robert and Nancy’s wedding ceremony, this Court should accept this case for review and reverse the judgmentof the Court of Appeal. DATED: May27, 2011 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED LECLAIRRYAN, LLP ee, ~ By: (heete RoberFlerison, Esq. oe" GaryP. Simonian, Esq. Attorneys for Petitioner and Respondent Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. 29 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Counsel of Record herebycertifies that pursuant to Rule 8.204(c)(1) or 8.504(d)(1) of the California Rules of Court, the enclosed Petition for Review is produced using 13-point or greater Romantype,including footnotes, and contains 7,060 words, which is less than the total words permitted by the rulesof court. Counselrelies on the word count of the computer program used to preparethisbrief. DATED: May27, 2011 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED LECLAIRRYAN, LLP By: (Sauey—Eeahe -Harrison, Esq. Gary. Simonian,Esq. Attorneys for Petitioner and Respondent Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. 30 we ADDENDUM EXHIBITS Opinion Certificate of Marriage; Notice of Entry of Judgment, Dissolution of Marriage Filed 4/19/11 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT NANCYCEJAetal., H034826 (Santa Clara County Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. Nos. CV112520 & CV115283) v. RUDOLPH & SLETTEN,INC., Defendant and Respondent; PHOENIX CEJA etal., Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION Nancy and Robert Ceja were married bythe pastor of a Pentecostal church in a big wedding ceremony attended by many guests. Four years later, Robert Ceja waskilled in an accident at work. Nancy Ceja sued his employer for wrongful death. However, before filing the action, she learned that her marriage was void because the wedding had taken place a few months before Robert Ceja’s divorce from his first wife becamefinal. Consequently, to establish her standing to sue, Nancy Ceja alleged that she was a “putative spouse” under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, which defines a putative spouseas party to a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have “believed in good faith that the marriage . . . was valid.” (§ 377.60, subd. (b).) ’ Section 377.60 provides, in relevant part, as follows. “A cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another maybeasserted by Exhibit A The employer moved for summary judgment claiming that Nancy Ceja did not qualify as a putative spouse. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. Applying an objective test for putative status, the court found that it was not objectively reasonable for Nancy Ceja to have believed that her marriage wasvalid. We conclude that the court applied the wrong test. Section 377.69 requires only that an alleged putative spouse “believed in good faith” that the marriage was valid. We hold that this language does not establish an objective standard;ratherit refers to the alleged putative spouse’s state of mind and asks whetherthat person actually believed the marriage was valid and whetherheorshe held that belief honestly, genuinely, and sincerely, without collusion or fraud. In so holding, we disagree with Jn re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712 (Vryonis), which held that the statutory language incorporates an objectivetest. It follows from our holdingthat the issue before the trial court on summary judgment was not whetherthere weretriable issues of fact concerning whether Nancy Ceja’s belief was objectively reasonable. The issue was whetherthere weretriable issues concerning whether Nancy Ceja harbored a goodfaith belief. Because the record before us reveals a numberof disputed facts necessary to resolve that issue, we reverse. any of the following personsor by the decedent’s personal representative on their behalf: [{] (a) The decedent’s surviving spouse .... [§] (b) Whetheror not qualified under subdivision(a), if they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse .... As used in this subdivision, ‘putative spouse’ meansthe surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage whois foundbythe court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent wasvalid.” All further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Plaintiff Nancy Ceja appeals from a judgmententered after the trial court granted defendant Rudolph & Sletten, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment.” She claimsthetrial court erred in granting the motion on the groundthat she lacked standing to sue as a putative spouse. Weagree that the court erred and reverse the judgment. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND® In 1995, Robert married Christine. During their marriage, they had two children. Robert and Christine separated, but they shared custody of the children. In 1999, Robert met Nancy. Hetold her he was married but separated. In 2001, they started living together, and Robert filed for divorce. During this time, Nancy and Christine saw each other at events involving the children. On September 24, 2003, Robert and Nancy obtained a marriage license. The form contained areas for personal information, including whether the parties had been married before; how many times; when the marriages ended; and how they ended. Robert and Nancy each put zero for the numberofprior marriages. Robert and Nancy signed the form, which included a preprinted declaration that they were “an unmarried man and unmarried woman”and that the information provided was“true to the best of[their] knowledge.” > In a second amended complaint, Nancy Ceja added Jose Delgadillo as a plaintiff. He too worked for defendant and wasinjured in the same accident. Thetrial court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment against Delgadillo. Wefurther note that Christine Ceja, Robert Ceja’s first wife, filed a separate wrongful death action against defendant on behalf of their children. > Because Robert Ceja, Christine Ceja, and Nancy Ceja share the same surname, weusetheir first names for convenience and clarity and intend no disrespect. (See, e.g., Blache v. Blache (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 616, 618 (Blache); In re Marriage ofSchaffer (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 801, 803, fn. 2.). On September 27, 2003, Nancy and Robert were married in a ceremony in San Juan Bautista performed by AndySalinas, the pastor of a Pentecostal church. According to Nancy, over 250 people attended. Thereafter, Nancy and Robert lived together as husbandand wife until his death in 2007. On November23, 2003, Robert signed a declaration in support of his petition for dissolution, asserting, among other things, that he and Christine had entered a stipulated judgment concerning property rights. On December26, 2003, a judgmentofdissolution of marriage was entered, and notice was sent to him. The notice warned against marrying before the judgmentof dissolution wasfiled In 2004, Nancy forwarded copies of Robert’s divorce papers to his union so that she could be addedto his insurance. On September 19, 2007, Robert was killed in an accident at work. Itl. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COURT’S RULING In moving for summary judgment, defendant claimed that the evidence conclusively negated Nancy’salleged putative status. Defendant noted that (1) they were married before his divorce becamefinal, and therefore, the marriage was bigamous and void (Fam. Code, § 2201, subd. (b) [a bigamous marriage is void or voidable]); (2) before their marriage, Nancy knew that Robert had been married to Christine; (3) both of them signed a marriage license in which Robert falsely represented that he had not been married before; and (4) after the marriage, Nancy sent Robert’s divorce papers to the union. Defendant arguedthat it was not objectively reasonable for Nancy to believe her marriage wasvalid, that is, a reasonable person, knowingthese facts, could not believe in goodfaith in the validity of the marriage. In opposition, Nancy declared that she knew Robert had been married to Christine. However, they had separated, and in 2001, she understood that Robert hadfiled for divorce. She did not know what happenedafter that because he refused to discuss the subject. Nancy further declared that she did not read the marriage license closely before signing it. Nor did she read Robert’s divorce papers closely before forwarding them to his union. In addition, Nancy declared that after their marriage, she and Robert wore wedding rings, they lived together as husband and wife, they told people they were married, they filed taxes as a married couple, and they shared a bank account. Shealso adopted Robert’s surname. Nancystated that she always believed their marriage was valid. She averred that if she had doubtedits validity before the wedding, she would have postponedit; and after the wedding, if she had discovered the problem, they would have simply gotten remarried. Asnoted, the court granted defendant’s motion. Relying on Welch v. State of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1374 (Welch) and Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 712, the court found that Nancy could not qualify as a putative spouse becausea belief in the validity of her marriage wasnot objectively reasonable. Thus, since Nancy lacked standing to sue as a putative spouse, defendant wasentitled to judgment. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summaryjudgmentis granted when a moving party establishesthe right to entry ofjudgmentas a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgmentis to provide courts with a mechanism to cut throughthe parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations,trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Summary judgmentis a drastic procedure, however, and should be used cautiously so that it is not a substitute for a trial on the merits as a means of determiningthefacts. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 183.) “Upon a motion in summary judgment, the controlling question before the trial court is whether there is a material issue of fact to be tried. If the trial court determinesthere is one, it is powerless to proceed further. The issue must be decidedintrial by the finder of fact.” (Haskell v. Carli (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 124, 132; see also Brown v. Bleiberg (1982) 32 Cal.3d 426, 436, fn. 7.) On appeal from a summary judgment, an appellate court “review/[s] the record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) VI. THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE DOCTRINE To explain our analysis and conclusion concerning the standard for determining putative status, we considerit helpful to review the origin and developmentof the putative spouse doctrine (the doctrine). In California, the doctrinefirst arose as a judicially recognized equitable corollary of the community property system, which California inherited from Spanish civil law and formally adopted bystatute in 1850. (See Comment, Husband and Wife: Rights of Bigamous Wife in Community Property (1920-1921) 9 Cal. L.Rev. 68, 68-71; Comment, Domestic Relations: Rights and remedies ofthe Putative Spouse (1949) 37 Cal. Law.Rev. 671, 672; Rajan, The Putative Spouse in California Law (2000) 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 95, 97; Carlson, Putative Spouses in Texas Courts (2000) 7 Tex. Wesleyan L.Rev. 1, 3-4 [discussing origin of the doctrine in Spanish law]; 11 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Community Property, § 1, p. 529.) The community property system rests on the concept that marriage is a partnership, and the property and earnings acquired during a valid marriageare the property of both partners in equal shares. (Packard v. Arellanes (1861) 17 Cal. 525, 537; In re Marriage ofBonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 12.) The putative spouse doctrine extends this partnership concept to innocentparties of an invalid marriage. Thus, in Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681 (Vallera), the Supreme Court consideredit “well settled that a woman wholives with a man ashis wife in the belief that a valid marriage exists,is entitled upon termination of their relationship to share in the property acquired by them during its existence.” (/d. at p. 683.) The purpose of the doctrineis to protect the expectations of innocent parties and achieveresults that are equitable, fair, and just. (Coats v. Coats (1911) 160 Cal. 671, 675; Schneider v. Schneider (1920) 183 Cal. 335, 336-338 (Schneider); Caldwell v. Odisio (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 732, 736.)* The doctrine is typically applied to distribute quasi-marital property at the end of a putative marriage. The doctrine has also been recognized in a numberofrelated contexts, for example, in determining (1) the interest of a putative spouse in a decedent’s property (Feig v. Bank ofItaly etc. Ass’n. (1933) 218 Cal. 54); (2) the right to statutory benefits uponthe death of a police officer (Adduddell v. Board ofAdministration (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 243); and (3) the applicability of the rule of imputed contributory negligence applied (Caldwell v. Odisio, supra, 142 Cal.App.2d 732). The doctrine has also expanded beyondputative spouses to putative domestic partners. (In re Domestic Partnership ofEllis (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000; but see Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1172-1174 [doctrine not applicable to domestic partnership law].) Codification ofthe Judicial Doctrine In 1969, the Legislature codified the doctrine in former Civil Code section 4452, which was then part of the new, now former, Family Law Act. (Former Civ. Code § 4400 et seq.; Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3314.) That section provided, in relevant * In Coats v. Coats, supra, 160 Cal. 671, the court opined, “To say that the woman in such case, even though she may be penniless and unable to earn living,is to receive nothing, while the man with whomshelived and laboredin the belief that she washis wife shall take and hold whatever he and she have acquired, would be contrary to the most elementary conceptionsof fairness andjustice.” (/d. at p. 675; see Jacksonv. Jackson (1892) 94 Cal. 446, 463-464 (conc. opn. Harrison, J.) [recognizing “equitable grounds”to divide property between spouses upon annulment of marriage].) In contrast, common law jurisdictions apply the rule that a party to a void or voidable marriage gains norights to property acquired during the “marriage.” (See Schneider, supra, 183 Cal. at pp. 337-339 [discussing difference between common law and community property jurisdictions]; DeFrance v. Johnson (1886) 26 Fed. 891, 894 [applying commonlawrule].) part, “Whenevera determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in goodfaith that the marriage wasvalid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse... .” (See Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, pp. 3322-3323.) This particular provision authorized the equal distribution of property acquired during the putative marriage. (FormerCiv. Code, §§ 4452, 4455, 4800; see In re Marriage ofMonti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 (Monti) [discussing adoption of the former Family Law Act]; Luther & Luther, Support and Property Rights ofthe Putative Spouse (1973) 24 Hastings L.J. 311, 311-319.) In codifying the doctrine, the Legislature simply adopted existing case law and did not intend to change the definition of a putative spouseorrestrict application of the doctrine. (Monti, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 55; Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 719 [codification “was merely declaratory of existing law and not intended to work significant substantive changes”]; see In re Marriage ofXia Guo andXiao Hua Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1500 [purpose of codification was same as equitable purposeofthe judicially created doctrine]; see also, County ofLos Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [intent to overthrow “long-established principles of law” not presumed from new enactments unless such a legislative intent is expressed or necessarily implied].) In 1992, the Legislature repealed the former Family Law Act and enacted the Family Code, in which section 2251 reiterates the former Family Law Act provision concerning putative spouses. (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, §§ 3 & 10, p. 464.) In 1975, the Legislature codified the doctrine again when it amended the wrongful death statute, former section 377. (Stats. 1975, ch. 334, §2, p. 784; ch. 1241, § 5.5, p. 3190; compare with Stats. 1968, ch. 766, §1, p. 1488 {no reference to putative spouses].) Among other things, the amendmentaddedthe previously codified definition of putative spouse and addedputative spousesto thelist of those with standing to sue. Here too, the amendmentdid not change the doctrine or even the scopeofthe statute;it merely conformedthe statute to existing case law holding that a putative spouse had standing to sue.” (See Kunakoffv. Woods (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 59, 63-68 [under former § 377, “heirs” had standing, and putative spouses qualified as heirs].) In 1992, the Legislature repealed former section 377 and reenacted its content as section 377.60. (Stats. 1992, ch. 178, §§ 19-20, p. 893.)° The State ofthe Doctrine when Codified Wenow turn to a numberofcases that show how the doctrine was applied at the time it was codified, that is, cases that reveal what was required to establish putative status and how courts determinedit. In Schneider, supra, 183 Cal. 335, a woman remarried, erroneously thinking her first marriage had been dissolved after some unspecified judicial hearing. The court believed her version of what had happenedandimplicitly found that she had remarried in goodfaith and thus qualified for putative status. The court did not discuss the nature of the prior judicial proceeding or whetherit provided a reasonable basis to believe that the first marriage had been dissolved. (See Macchi v. La Rocha (1921) 54 Cal.App. 98 [putative status where parties obtained a marriage license but never solemnized the * The primary purpose of the 1975 amendmentwasto overrule the holding in Steed v. Imperial Airlines (1974) 12 Cal.3d 115, where the court held that former section 377 did not authorize unadopted stepchildren to sue for the wrongful death of stepparents. (See Stats. 1975, ch 334, §2, p. 784 [uncodified section stating intent to overrule Steed].) ® In an uncodified section of the Family Code, the Legislature declared, “A provision of this code, insofaras it is substantially the same as a previously existing provision relating to the same subject matter, shall be considered a restatement and continuation thereof and not as a new enactment.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10, p. 464.) The Legislature has also recognized putative spouse status in a numberof other statutes. (§ 872.210 [relating to partition actions]; Fam. Code, §§ 17505 and 17506 [relating to the enforcementof child support orders and location of parents]; and Pen. Code § 3524 [granting putative spouses standing to sue for the wrongful death of a prisoner].) marriage because they thought the license was enough]; Santos v. Santos (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 62 [same].) In Figoni v. Figoni (1931) 211 Cal. 354, a niece sought to have the marriage to her uncle declared void. In granting her putative status, the court found that neither party knew that such marriages between uncles and nieces had beenprohibited since 1872. (See former Civ. Code, § 59; People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44, 46 [prohibition enacted in 1872].) Because there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding, the Supreme Court affirmed without discussing whetherit was reasonable to believe that such an incestuous marriage wasvalid. Onthe other hand, in Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank ofSacramento (1931) 213 Cal. 664, the court denied a woman putative status. It found that she had not genuinely believed her marriage was valid. The record revealed that the couple had not obtained a license or had a ceremony. Moreover, the womantestified that her putative husband had told her they did not need a license because they could get along “ ‘as good as any couple that is married and better.’ ” (/d. at p. 666.) The court opined, “It would be difficult to believe that even an inexperienced foreigner, unacquainted with the laws and customs of this country, would consider that by this arrangement she had contracted a valid marriage. But plaintiff was not inexperienced. She had livedall herlife in California, and had been previously legally married and divorced. Everything in the record suggests that she viewedthe relationship not as a marriage, but as a satisfactory substitute for a marriage.” ([bid.; see Miller v. Johnson (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 123 [no honest belief whereparties obtained no license, they secured Mexican divorce and fake divorce decree under suspicious circumstances, they gave inconsistent testimony about the decree, and they had a perfunctory marriage ceremony].) In Vallera, supra, 21 Cal.2d 681, the court denied putative status to a woman who had lived with a man for several years. She said she thought they had entered into valid 10 commonlaw marriage in Michigan. However, the court found that she had not genuinely believed the marriage was valid. There had been no ceremony,there was no evidence of a common law marriage, and she actually knew that her putative husbandwasstill married and legally unable to remarry. In Estate ofKrone (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 766, a woman obtained an interlocutory divorce decree and remarried someoneelse 10 monthslater, unaware that she was required to wait one year. Later her divorce becamefinal. She thought the marriage was valid, and whenhe died, she sought a determination of her rights. The court found that she had married in good faith. The court did not discuss whetherit was reasonable for her to think her marriage wasvalid after she received notice that her divorce wasfinal. (See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti (1937) 9 Cal.2d 95 (Sanguinetti) [putative status where woman believed marriage between interlocutory and final divorce decree wasvalid.]; Estate ofFoy (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 329 [same].) In In re Goldberg’s Estate (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 402 (Goldberg’s Estate), around 1943, a man told a womanhehadseparated from his first wife and was getting divorced. This was in 1943. They never discussed the subject again. The woman had been married twice before and divorced once, and she thought her second marriage had been annulled, although there was no documentary evidenceofit. In March 1944, the two were married in Mexico in a ceremony performed in Spanish. Thereafter, they lived as husband and wife. In July 1944, there wasan interlocutory divorce decree, and the man’s divorce becamefinal in July 1945. The womantestified that all the documents concerning marriages and divorces had been stolen during a trip to Alaska. Thetrial court found that the woman had married the man believing in good faith that both were eligible to marry. (/d. at pp. 404-405, 411.) Onappeal, the reviewing court observed that there was substantial evidence undermining the woman’s claim that she thought her marriage was valid. The court 11 noted, however, that the trial court had observedhertestify and believed her testimony that she thought her marriage had been annulled and his marriage had been dissolved. The court opined, “If [the woman] believed in good faith that a valid marriage existed, then in law she wasa putative spouse. [Citation.] The belief held at the time ofthe alleged marriage is the determining factor... .” (Goldberg’s Estate, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d at pp. 411-412.) The court further explained that although the woman’s 39 66.testimony waspretty “weak,” “the testimony ofa party to the action,if believed, is sufficient to support the judgmentofa trial court even though contradicted by a great deal of contrary evidence. [Citation.] Whetheror not the required belief was held in good faith by [the woman] was a question offact to be resolved bythe trial court. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 412, italics added.) In this regard, the court opined that the conductoftheir parties after their marriage and for the next 16 years supportedthe trial court’s finding of a good faith belief. (/bid.; see Partrick v. Partrick (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 107 [where evidence concerning goodfaith belief is in conflict, reviewing court boundbytrial court’s finding].) Asthese cases reveal, when the putative spouse doctrine was codified, courts treated putative status as a factual question concerning a party’s state of mind: did he or she honestly and genuinely believe that the marriage was valid. The answer hinged in large part on the credibility of the alleged putative spouse. And in determining credibility, courts also considered the circumstances surrounding the putative marriage and the person’s level of education, marital experience, intelligence, and even the conductafter the putative marriage. If the trial court found that a party harbored a good faith belief, and if there was substantial evidence to support it, the reviewing court upheld the finding of putative status. For many years after codification, courts understood and applied the doctrine in this way. 12 For example, in Neureither v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 429 (Neureither), a referee disbelieved a woman whosaid she thought her prior marriage had been dissolved and denied her benefits as a putative spouse. Citing Goldberg, the reviewing court observed that it was bound bythetrial court’s factual determination of putative status when it was supported by substantial evidence. In Estate of Vargas (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 714, a man married a woman in 1929, and they raised a family. In 1942, while still married, the man married another woman, falsely assuring her that he was divorced. They tooraised a family, although at one point he stopped spending nights with them. Thetrial court found that the second wife believed in good faith that her marriage wasvalid. In affirming, the court noted that her testimony “was not inherently improbable,” “her credibility was a question for determination bythetrial court,” and its “acceptance of her testimony established her status as a putative spouse.” (/d. at p. 717.) In Wagner v. County ofImperial (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 980 (Wagner), a particularly pertinent case, a couple, Sharon and Clifton, exchanged personal marriage vows, Sharon used Clifton’s name, they held themselves out as husband and wife, and they had a child. When Clifton waskilled in a car accident, Sharon sued for wrongful death under formersection 377, alleging that she was a putative spouse. Although the trial court found that she harbored a goodfaith belief in the validity of her common law marriage, it denied her standing becauseher putative marriage had not been solemnized.’ (Id. at p. 982.) ” Under Family Code section 300, a valid marriage requires solemnization—i.e., a marriage ceremony performed bya person authorized to perform it. (See Fam. Code, §§ 400-401 [authorized persons].) No particular form of ceremonyis required, but the parties must“declare, in the physical presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and necessary witnesses, that they take each other as husband and wife.” (Fam. Code, § 420, subd.(a).) 13 On appeal, the court reversed. The court noted that solemnization had never been a prerequisite for putative status. It further observed that the statutory definition of a putative spouse did not require solemnization. Rather, to qualify as a putative spouse, “Sharon must only prove she had a goodfaith belief her marriage to Clifton was valid; solemnization would be at most evidence of such goodfaith belief. ... ‘[T]he essence of a putative spouseis a good faith belief in the existence of a valid marriage.’ Here the superior court specifically found Sharon believed in good faith she was validly married to Clifton. The court’s legal conclusion Sharon wasnot Clifton’s putative spouseis contrary to such express finding of good faith. The court should have held Sharon was Clifton’s putative spouse.” (Wagner, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 983.) Vryonis and the Requirement ofan Objective Standard With this understanding of how courts applied the doctrine before and after codification, we turn to Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 712, which added a further requirementfor putative status: a party’s good faith belief must also be objectively reasonable.® The pertinent facts in Vryonis are as follows. A visiting Iranian professorat UCLA named Fereshteh alleged that she was the putative spouse ofa resident professor named Speros. She was a Shia Muslim, and he wasa nonpracticing memberof the Greek Orthodox Church. They wentout together, but her religion prohibited dating without a ® Years before Vyronis, the Fifth Circuit in Spearman v. Spearman(5th Cir.1973) 482 F.2d 1203 upheld the trial court, which had applied an objective test. In finding no error, the Fifth Circuit concluded that an objective test was “perfectly consonant with the California decisions that have developed and applied the ‘putative spouse’ doctrine.” (/d. at p. 1207.) The court acknowledged that no court had ever applied such a test but opined that no court that had discussed good faith had rejected or precluded sucha test. (Ibid.) Spearmanis not binding on us, and we do notconsider its seems-all-right analysis to be persuasive support for an objective test. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190 [decisions of lower federal courts are not binding authority].) 14 marriage or formal commitment. At Fereshteh’s request, Speros agreed to a marriage authorized by her religion. Fereshteh performed the private ceremony in accordance with religiousliturgical requirements. Later, she sought to solemnize the marriage in a mosque, but Speros refused. Nevertheless, he assured her that they were married. A couple of years later, however, he announcedthat he was going to marry another woman. Fereshteh publicly revealed their marriage, but he married the other woman anyway. Fereshteh then sought a determination ofher rights as a putative spouse. (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 715-716.) Thetrial court found that Fereshteh had believed in goodfaith that she was validly married. It noted that Speros had agreed to be married, and they had a proper,albeit private, marriage ceremonyauthorized by herreligion. Speros had also assured Fereshteh that they were married, although he did not think the marriage was valid under California law. Fereshteh was unawareofhis views or California’s requirements for marriage. (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 715-716.) Onappeal, the Vryonis court rejected the trial court’s factual finding of putative status. It held that Fereshteh’s good faith belief, no matter credible and sincere, was simply not enough. Herbelief had to be tested against an objective standard. It had to be objectively reasonable, thatis, it had to rest on facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe the marriage wasvalid under California law. Noting that Fereshteh had made no effort to comply with California’s statutory marriage requirements, the court concluded that a reasonable person would not have believed he or she wasvalidly married after some private religious ceremony. Thus, because Fereshteh’s belief was not objectively reasonable, she could not have heldit in good faith and wasnotentitled to putative status. (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 714, 720-722.) Wefirst observe that in imposing an objective test for putative status, the Vryonis court, in effect, gave appellate courts the opportunity to determine putative status de 15 novo. As noted, putative status had alwaysrested on thetrial court’s factual finding concerning goodfaith belief, and that finding was upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Whether a goodfaith belief is objectively reasonable added a purely legal question to the determination of putative status, a question subject to independent review. (Cf. City ofStockton v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1524 [““whether the employee’s belief was objectively reasonable . . . is a question of law that we determine independently”’].) Next we observethat appellate courts, including this court, have adopted Vryonis, accepting its objective test without critical analysis ofits rationale. Indeed, its objective test has becomefirmly lodged in the judicial boilerplate describing the putative spouse doctrine. (See, e.g., Centinela Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 971, 975 (Centinela Hospital); Welch, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1378; Estate ofDePasse (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 92, 107-108; In re Marriage ofXia Guo and Xiao Hua Sun, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1497.) However, the time has come,belatedly, to review the analysis in Vryonis, and because werejectit, we shall do so in detail.” In adding an objective test, the Vryonis court did not rely on the long history of putative spouse casesor cite cases suggesting that a goodfaith belief, by itself, was not enough to qualify for putative status. Nor did the court find a legislative intent to establish an objective test in the history of codification of the doctrine. Rather, the source oo 6of the test was the court’s simple declaration that a ‘[g]ood faith belief” is a legal term of art, and in both the civil and criminal law a determination of good faith is tested by an objective standard.” (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.2d at p. 720.) In other words, the * Weare not alone in rejecting Vryonis. (See Bassett, California Community Property Law (2011 ed.) § 2:8, pp. 71-78 [criticizing Vryonis and its progeny].) 16 phrase “good faith belief’ necessarily and automatically incorporates an objective standard of reasonableness. In support, the court quoted excerpts from Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County ofSan Francisco (1988) 44 Cal.3d 839 (Russ Bldg. Partnership), Perduev. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913 (Perdue), Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77 (Theodor), People v. Ruggles (1985) 39 Cal.3d 1 (Ruggles), and In re Arias (1986) 42 Cal.3d 667 (Arias). These excerpts share two qualities. None suggests that “good faith belief’ inherently meansa belief that is also objectively reasonable; and theyare irrelevant in determining what the requirements for putative status are or arguably should be. From Russ Bldg. Partnership, supra, 44 Cal.3d 839, the court quoted this sentence: “A vested right requires more than a good faith subjective belief that one has it.” Ud. at p. 853; Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 720.) In that case, the Supreme Court held that the scope of a developer’s vested right to complete a project depended on a permit condition, and the meaning of the condition posed a legal question of statutory construction. Thus, the developer’s subjective understanding of the condition did not determine the scope ofits vested rights. Viewed in context, the excerpt does not imply that “good faith belief’ imports an objective standard of reasonableness. The court did not mention or use that standard to evaluate the developer’s subjective understanding of the permit condition. It simply interpreted the condition undertherules of statutory construction. Thus,it is illogical to assert that because the developer’s subjective understanding of the condition did not determineits vested rights, a good faith belief should not be enoughto establish putative status. On the contrary, prior to Vryonis, a goodfaith belief had always been enough. Finally, and ironically, we note that the excerpt does not separate or distinguish “good 17 faith” from “subjective belief’; rather, it expressly joins the two into a single phrase, implicitly acknowledging that a “goodfaith belief’ can be purely subjective. From Perdue, supra, 38 Cal.3d at page 924, the Vryonis court quoted the following passage: “ ‘The recent decision in Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 128 offers an analogyto the present litigation. Hertz’ car rental agreement permitted it to determine unilaterally the price charged for gas usedto fill the tanks of returned rental cars. Plaintiffs suit alleged that Hertz fixed unreasonably high prices,in breach ofits duty of good faith and fair dealing. Discussing this cause of action, the court said that “[t]he essence ofthe goodfaith covenant is objectively reasonable conduct. Under California law, an open term in a contract must befilled in by the party having discretion within the standard of good faith and fair dealing.” [Citation.]’ ” (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 720.) In Perdue (and the Hertz case it cited) the issue was whether a contracting party breached the implied covenantof goodfaith and fair dealing.” In Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 44 (Storek), the court explained that on the issue of breach, “the concepts of objective reasonableness and subjective good faith do merge. The Supreme Court has said that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has both a subjective and an objective component—subjective goodfaith and objective fair dealing. ‘A party violates the covenant if it subjectively lacks belief in the validity ofits act or if its conduct is objectively unreasonable.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he covenant of good faith can be breached for objectively unreasonable conduct, regardless of the actor’s motive.’ [Citations.]” (Ud. at pp. 61-62, fn. 13, first italics added, quoting 10 “Tn every contract there is an implied covenant of goodfaith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which injuresthe right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1949) 34 Cal.2d 559, 564; accord, Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 43.) 18 Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 372-373.) Viewedin light of this distinction between subjective intent (good faith) and objectively reasonable conduct(fair dealing), the excerpt does not mean that the subjective element of good faith mustitself be objectively reasonable. Moreover, unlike the dual aspects of the implied covenant, putative status has always been defined only in terms of a good faith belief. Thus, this excerpt does not, in our view,establish that “good faith belief’ incorporates an objective standard. Nor does the excerpt suggest that a good faith belief in the validity of a marriage should be tested against an objective standard of reasonableness. The Vryonis court’s reliance on excerpts from criminalcasesis also misplaced. From footnote 13 in Theodor, supra, 8 Cal.3d at page 98, the court quoted this passage: “* “Tf subjective good faith alone werethetest, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” [Citation.] “Good faith . . . is immaterial, and cannotserve to rehabilitate an otherwise defective warrant.” [Citation.]” (Vrvonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 720.) From Ruggles, supra, 39 Cal.3d 1, the court offered this sentence: “ ‘The probable cause determination that will validate a warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle must be based on objective facts that couldjustify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely the subjective good faith of the police officers.’ ” (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 720.) And from Arias, supra, 42 Cal.3d at page 696,the court reiterated “ ‘ “[r]easonableness,” of course, is an objective standard, requiring more than goodfaith.’ ” (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 721.) In Theodor, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, the Supreme Court decided whattypes of false or erroneous statements must be excised from a search warrant affidavit before it is tested for probable cause. The court held thatif it was reasonable for the affiant to include such 19 statements, they could be considered;if it was unreasonable, the statements must be disregarded. The court further explained that in evaluating whetherit was reasonable to include a particular statement, the affiant’s good faith belief that it was accurate is irrelevant. In Ruggles, supra, 39 Cal.3d 1, the court held that a police officer’s belief that he had probable cause for a search wasirrelevant in determining its propriety because probable causeis tested by an objective standard. In Arias, supra, 42 Cal.3d 667, the court held that whether Youth Authority officials acted in good faith wasirrelevant in determining whetherthe installation oflistening devices in a chapel violated Penal Code section 2600, which prohibits restrictions on the right of religious expression unless the restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate penalogicalinterest. Neither the excerpt nor the criminal cases they came from suggest that “goodfaith belief” incorporates an objective standard. In each ofthese cases, the objective standard was required by the Fourth Amendmentand Penal Codesection 2600."’ In contrast, the definition of putative spouse has never required a reasonable goodfaith belief or even used the word “reasonable.” In sum, the Vryonis court’s declaration that “good faith belief’ necessarily incorporates an objective standard of reasonableness lacks any supportive authority. Moreover, even cursory research refutes that notion and reveals that long before Vryonis, courts have understood the concepts of good faith and reasonableness to be separate and distinct and, as a consequence,used different tests to evaluate them. (Mattei v. Hopper " The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches andseizures, shall not be violated, and no warrantsshall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, andparticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Italics added.) Penal Codesection 2600 provides, in relevant part, “A person sentenced to imprisonmentin a state prison may during that period of confinement be deprived of such rights, and only suchrights, as is reasonablyrelated to legitimate penologicalinterests.” (Italics added.) 20 (1958) 51 Cal.2d 119, 123; Guntert v. City ofStockton (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 203, 210- 211 (Guntert); Storek, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) In People v. Nunn (1956) 46 Cal.2d 460, the court explained that “[t]he phrase ‘good faith’ in common usage has a well-defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state ofmind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation.” (/d. at p. 468, italics added; see Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Internat., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 93, 106, fn. 3 [good faith is “commonly thoughtof as subjective in essence”; Brown Derby Hollywood Corp. v. Hatton (1964) 61 Cal.2d 855, 858-860 [good faith belief is a subjective state of mind and can exist even if belief is erroneous]; Heney v. Sutro & Co. (1915) 28 Cal.App. 698, 702 [good faith means honestly, without collusion, fraud, knowledge offraud, or intent assist in unlawful design]; cf. Smith v. Selma Community Hosp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1, 35 [“bad faith” is a subjective standard].) Reasonableness, on the other hand, refers to an objective quality determined with reference to commonexperience and generally refers to something that is arrived at logically, enjoys factual support, andis not arbitrary or capricious. (Guntert, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at pp. 203, 210-211; Storek, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) Thus, when the question is whether a party acted in goodfaith, the inquiry concerns the party’s subjective state of mind and whetherit is genuine and sincere or tainted by fraud, dishonesty, collusion, deceit, and unfaithfulness. Whether a reasonable person would have acted similarly under the same conditionsis not relevantto that inquiry. On the other hand, when the question is whether a party acted reasonably, the inquiry is whether a reasonable person underthe similar circumstances would have acted in the same way. In this context, whether the party acted in goodfaith is not relevant. 21 Both civil and criminal casesreflect the distinction between goodfaith and reasonableness and the difference in how each is determined. In Knight v. City ofCapitola (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 918 (Knight) (disapproved on other groundsin Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532, fn. 7), this court reviewed an award ofcosts to the defendant undersection 1038, which permits such recovery when a proceeding under the Tort Claims Actis not brought “with reasonable cause and a goodfaith belief that there wasa justifiable controversy.” (§ 1038, subd. (a).) We explained that “[g]ood faith, or its absence, involves a factual inquiry into the plaintiff's subjective state of mind [citations]: Did he or she believe the action was valid? What washis or herintent or purpose in pursuing it? A subjective state of mind will rarely be susceptible of direct proof; usually the trial court will be required to inferit from circumstantial evidence. Because the good faith issueis factual, the question on appeal will be whether the evidence of record wassufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding.” (/d. at p. 932.) On the other hand, “Reasonable cause is to be determined objectively, as a matter of law, on the basis of the facts knownto the plaintiff when he or she filed or maintained the action. Once whatthe plaintiff (or his or her attorney) knew has been determined, or found to be undisputed, it is for the court to decide ‘ “whether any reasonable attorney would have thoughtthe claim tenable ....” ’ [Citations.] Becausethe opinion of the hypothetical reasonable attorney is to be determined as a matter of law, reasonable cause is subject to de novo review on appeal.” (/bid.; accord, Langhorne v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 225, 238-239 [“good faith mistake” under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (a)(2) posed factual question reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence]; Alpha Mechanical, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. ofAmerica (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1319. 1338-1339 [penalty assessments under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7108.5 and Civil Code, § 3260 based on lack of 22 a “ ‘good faith’ ” or “ ‘bonafide’ ” dispute involves personal qualities and a factual inquiry into subjective state of mind].) Corbett v. HowardDodge, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 915 (Corbett) is particularly pertinent here. It involved Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (e), which authorizes an award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing defendantif the trial court finds that “the plaintiff's prosecution of the action was not in good faith.” Theissue there was whethera subjective or objective test governed the determination of goodfaith. (Corbett, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 920-921.) In holding that a subjective test applied, the court pointed out that this subjective test also applied in determining whether to award expenses undersection 128.5 that a party incurred because of an opposing party’s “bad-faith actionsortactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (§ 128.5, subd. (a); Corbett, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 921-923.) The court further observedthat“good faith” had uniformly been construed to require a subjective test involving a factual inquiry into the actor’s actual state of mind. (Corbett, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 923.) Criminal cases similarly distinguish the concepts of good faith and reasonableness. For example,it is settled that in certain circumstances, a good faith mistake of fact or law constitutes a defense whenit negates the knowledgeor specific intent element of a charged offense.” (People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425-1427 (Russell); see Pen. Code, § 26, subd. Three; e.g., People v. Eastman (1888) 77 Cal. 171, 171-172; People v. Holmes (1910) 13 Cal.App. 212, 216-217; People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 592.) In such situations, the good faith mistake need not be objectively reasonable, andit is error to instruct jurors that it must be. (People v. Navarro (1979) 99 2 «© «A mistake of fact” is where a person understandsthe facts to be other than they are; whereas a “mistake of law” is where a person knowsthe facts as theyreally are, but has a mistaken belief as to the legal consequencesofthose facts.’ [Citations.]” (People v. LaMarr (1942) 20 Cal.2d 705, 710.) 23 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10; see Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3406 (2011) p. 1009 [do not instruct that good faith belief must be reasonable knowledgeor specific intent element of offense].) Onthe other hand, where the defendant is charged with a general intent crime or where consentis a defense to a sexual offense, a good faith mistake of fact or law or a good faith but mistaken belief in consent constitutes a defenseonlyifit is also objectively reasonable. (See, e.g., People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155; People v. Cole (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 483; People v. Noori (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 964, 976-977; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137.) Similarly, a good faith but mistaken belief in the need to defend oneself or another against imminent dangerof great bodily injury will negate the malice element required for a murder conviction and thus can limit a defendant’s culpability for an unlawful homicide to voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 996-997, overruled on other grounds in People v. Sarun Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201; People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 88; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199.) Again, if the mistaken belief is held in goodfaith, it need not be objectively reasonable to have an exculpatory effect. On the other hand,if one reasonably believes in the need to defend oneself or another against imminentperil, one’s conductis justified and criminal. (See 1 Witkin & Eptstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, §§ 64, 65, pp. 400-401.) ®’ We acknowledgethat in People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, the court rejected a proposed mistaken-belief instruction because it did not require a goodfaith belief. (/d. at pp. 138-140.) In dicta, the court explained, “‘ ‘Whether a claim is advanced in good faith does not depend solely upon whether the claimant believes he was acting lawfully; the circumstances mustbe indicative of good faith.’ [Citations.] For example, the circumstancesin a particular case might indicate that although defendant may have ‘believed’ he acted lawfully, he was aware of contrary facts which rendered sucha belief wholly unreasonable, and hencein bad faith.” (/d. at p. 140.) 24 Last, we observe that courts and the Legislature consistently demonstrate their understanding that good faith is distinct from reasonableness and doesnot incorporate an objective standard. For example, when courts intend to require conductthat is both in good faith and objectively reasonable, they do so expressly and unequivocally. (See, e.g., United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [creating exception to the exclusionary rule based on good faith and objectively reasonable reliance on warrant]; People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967 [recognizing defense to sale of unregistered securities based on reasonable goodfaith belief that securities were exempt]; People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d 143 [recognizing defense to rape based on reasonable and goodfaith belief that victim consented]; People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529 [samere statutory rape based on good faith and objectively reasonable belief that victim was not underage]; People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798 [same re defense to bigamy based on reasonable good faith belief in divorce]; Baker v. American Horticulture Supply, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1059 [recognizing defense to willful failure to pay commission based on reasonable goodfaith belief that claim for commissionis invalid].) Likewise the Legislature uses express, unequivocal language whenit intends to require conductor belief that is both held in good faith and objectively reasonable. (See, e.g., §§ 1985.3, subd. (g) [“a reasonable and goodfaith attempt”]; 1985.6, subd.(f)(4) [same]; 2023.010, subd. (i) [same]; Civil Code, § 56.36, subd. (d)(1) [same]; Fin. Code, Wedo not read the court’s comment to meanthat to qualify as a goodfaith belief, it must be objectively reasonable. In our view, the court was merely explaining that if a person knowsfacts that refute a rational belief in something and willfully ignores those facts in order to maintain thatbelief, then that “belief” is not held honestly—i.e., in good faith. (See, e.g., In re Marriage ofRecknor (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 539 [party’s knowledgethat first marriage had not been dissolved before second marriage precluded finding of putative status]; People v. Vineberg, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 127 [facts known to defendant negate alleged good faith belief]; Miller v. Johnson, supra, 214 Cal.App.2d 123 [while still married, plaintiff went to Mexico and went through farcical divorce and marriage procedures]; People v. Proctor (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 269 [knownfacts negate actualbelief].) 25 § 50124, subd. (a)(4) [same]; Gov. Code, §§ 11507.7, subd. (a) [same]; 60373, subd.(b) [same]; 68092.5, subd. (c) [same]; Pen. Code, § 278.7 [“with a good faith and reasonable belief’]; Pub. Util. Code, § 588, subd. (b)(1) [“reasonable, good faith belief’]; compare with Fin. Code, § 5204, subd. (b) [requiring only goodfaith belief]; Gov. Code, § 8547.2 [same].) In this case, we have found no evidence suggesting that when the Legislature codified the doctrine, it intended to require that an alleged putative spouse’sbelief in the validity of a marriage be both held in goodfaith and objectively reasonable. This is understandable because, as noted, the Legislature intended only to continuethejudicial doctrine as it had been understood andapplied. At this point, it is helpful to recap our analysis and discussion. The original judicial definition of a putative spouse required only a goodfaith belief in the validity of a marriage. The Legislature codified that definition without intending to change it. The Vryonis court engrafted an objective test to the statutory definition based onthe legally unsupported view that “goodfaith belief’ necessarily incorporates an objective standard. However, good faith and objective reasonableness are separate and distinct concepts, and each is evaluated differently. The determination of good faith belief focuses on a party’s subjective state of mind and evidence of honesty, sincerity, faithfulness, fraud, or collusion and not on whetherthe belief is objectively reasonable. And when courts and Legislature intend to require conductorbelief that is both held in good faith and objectively reasonable, they do so clearly. In light of our discussion, we holdthat the statutory definition of putative spouse in section 377.60 is clear and unambiguous. It requires a goodfaith beliefin the validity of a marriage. Giving the statutory language its ordinary meaning, we hold that the phrase “believed in good faith” refers to a state of mind and beliefthat is held honestly, 26 genuinely, and sincerely, without collusion or fraud. It does not require that the belief also be objectively reasonable. Wepresumethat the Vryonis court considered it sound policy to impose an objective test for putative status and give reviewing courts authority to independently review putative status determinationsbytrial courts. We observethat before the doctrine wascodified, it was an equitable judicial doctrine, and courts were free to mold and modify it in response to changing social conditions and evolving notions of fairness and justice. However, once the doctrine becamea creature ofstatute, deciding policy and changing the definition of putative spouse and the application ofthe doctrine in response to it becamethe sole prerogative of the Legislature. In our view, the Vryonis court intruded upon the Legislature’s prerogative. It is a well-settled rule that courts must not add provisionsto a statute under the guise of statutory interpretation to accomplish a purposethat does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 15, disapproved on other groundsin /n re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544,fn. 5; People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471, 475; see § 1858.) Here, the court’s addition of objective reasonablenessto the statutory requirement of a goodfaith belief amountedto judicial legislation without even an attemptto disguise it as statutory construction. Weacknowledgethat courts have uncritically accepted Vryonis and appliedits objective test for many years. However,this history does not automatically give its analysis legitimacy or forever protect it from critical scrutiny, and we are not bound to follow it. (See 9 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 498, pp. 558- 559.) Althoughstare decisis is a sound rule of public policy and servesthe interests of certainty, stability, and predictability in the law, “it nevertheless should not shield court- created error from correction.” (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 924.) 27 Indeed,the field of legal history is littered with reexamined and then discarded judicial holdings that had been binding precedent for years. (E.g., People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 924 [reexamining andrejecting the holding in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351]; Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 510 [same re holding in Alexander v. State Personnel Bd. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 198]; Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 93 [samere holding in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 752].) Here, the policy of stare decisis carries little weight. Despite its widespread acceptance, Vryonis did not solely occupythe field. Rather, its holding created a conflict with prior cases holding that putative status was a factual question that required only a finding of good faith belief, which was upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (E.g., Goldberg’s Estate, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d 402; Neureither, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 429; Wagner, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 980; see Centinela Hospital, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 975-976 [recognizing conflict.) Finally, on the issue of legislation, we acknowledgethat after Vryonis, the Legislature enacted section 377.60 and amendedit a few times. (See Stats. 1992, ch. 178, § 20, p. 893; Stats. 1996, ch. 563, § 1, p. 3143; Stats. 1997, ch. 13, § 1, p. 31; Stats. 2001, ch. 893, § 2, p. 7283; Stats. 2004, ch. 947, § 1, p. 7297.)'* These circumstances implicate the rule of statutory construction “that when the Legislature amendsa statute withoutaltering portions of the provision that have previously been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial construction. Accordingly, reenacted portions of the statute are given the sameconstruction they received before the amendment. “ After Vryonis, the Legislature also repealed former Civil Code section 4452,the original codification of the doctrine, and reenacted it as section 2251 of the Family Code. (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, §§ 3 & 10, p. 464.) 28 [Citations.]” (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 734-735.) However, wefind the presumption inapplicable. Asnoted, Vryonis created a conflict with prior cases holding that putative status required only a goodfaith belief and not a good faith and reasonable belief. Whenthere is an unresolved conflict in the judicial holdings concerning the application ofa statute, its reenactment cannot reasonably be deemedlegislative acquiescencein either side of the conflict. 15 Although our discussion focuses solely on the addition of an objective test, the Vryonis court added another requirement. The court opined that it was not enough to believe in the validity of a marriage. Rather, to qualify for putative status, one had to believe in good faith that the marriage complied with California’s statutory requirements for a lawful marriage. Turningto the facts before it, the court reasoned that because Fereshteh had made no attempt to comply with the statutory prerequisites for lawful marriage, she could not have actually believed that her private religious ceremony had resulted in a lawful California marriage. (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 722-723.) Weneed not analyze the court’s reasoning becausehere, the record establishes that Nancy and Robert attempted to comply with the statutory requirements. Wenote, however,that at least one commentator—Professor Bassett—finds this aspect of Vryonis particularly troubling. He questions the equation ofa belief that a marriageis valid, as required by statute, with the belief that a marriage is Jawful in that it complied with the California’s statutory requirements. He opines that this equation considerably narrows the traditional scope of the putative spouse doctrine and suggests that ignorance of the statutory requirements and the inevitable failure to comply with them preclude a good faith belief. According to Professor Bassett, this approach to determining putative status is overly formalistic and inconsistent with the equitable origin and purpose ofthe doctrine. (Bassett, California Community Property Law, supra, § 2:8, pp. 74-79.) Professor Bassett’s critique raises legitimate concerns aboutthe propriety of this additional requirement. Wenote that while the circumstances surrounding a marriage are relevant in determining goodfaith belief, ignorance of the law and failure to comply with statutory prerequisites have not invariably precluded finding of good faith belief and putative status. (See, e.g., Vallera, supra, 21 Cal.2d at pp. 682-684 [no effort to get married in California]; Wagner, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 980 [solemnization not a prerequisite to putative status]; Monti, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 52-54, 56 [no effort to comply with California law]; Sancha v. Arnold (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 772 [putative status based on common law marriage]; Santos v. Santos, supra, 32 Cal.App.2d 62 [putative status despite inability to speak English and ignorance of marriage laws].) 29 Error in Granting Summary Judgment Given ourrejection of Vryonis, we conclude thatthe trial court erred in applying an objective standard to determine Nancy’s putative status and granting summary judgment on the groundthat a belief in the validity of her four-year marriage to Robert wasnot objectively reasonable.’® That error, however, does not necessarily require reversal. On appeal “[w]e need notdefer to the trial court and are not bound bythe reasons in its summary judgmentruling; we review the ruling ofthe trial court, notits rationale. [Citation.]” (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) Again, the issue before the trial court was not whether there weretriable issues concerning whether Nancy’s belief was objectively reasonable. The determinative question was whetherthere weretriable issues concerning whether Nancybelieved in good faith that her marriage was valid. We concludethat there were. Whether Nancy harbored a goodfaith belief involves a factual inquiry into her subjective state of mind: what did she know andbelieve; and washerbelief honest, sincere, and genuineortainted by fraud or collusion. (See Knight, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 932.) The determination of putative status also involves an inquiry into the circumstances before, during, and after the marriage. For example, suppose in Vryonis that Fereshteh had lived with Speros for many yearsafter their religious marriage, raised a family, and accumulated a substantial amount of property, and he then decided to lawfully marry oneofhis students. In our view, denying Fereshteh a share of the property as a putative spouse because she was unaware of and thus made no attempt to comply with California’s marriage laws would seem inconsistent with the fundamental equitable purpose of the doctrine: to protect the expectations of innocent parties to a marriage that later proves to be invalid. '© Althoughthetrial court also relied on Welch, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 1374, that case simply applied Vryonis to deny an alleged putative spouse standing to sue for the wrongful death of the man with whom she hadlived as husband and wife for 30 years. Simply put, as goes reliance on Vryonis, so goes reliance on Welch. 30 In her declaration, Nancy said she believed her marriage was valid. She stated that Robert told her he was getting a divorce from Christine and then refused to discuss it any further. (Cf. Goldberg’s Estate, supra, 203 Cal.Appl.2d 402 [man told womanthat he was separated and getting a divorce].) She said she did not read the marriage license closely, implying that she did not know that Robert had falsely represented his marital history. She stated that she did not read the final divorce papers that he received and she then forwardedto his union. (Cf. Sanguinetti, supra, 9 Cal.2d 95 [womanbelieved her marriage wasvalid although divorce notyet final]; Estate ofFoy, supra, 109 Cal. App.2d 329 [same].) Nancy also asserted, in essence, that if she had knownthat there was a problem before her wedding she would have postponedit; and if she had later learned that the wedding took place a few months too soon, they would have gotten remarried after the divorce becamefinal. If true, these statements could support a finding of good faith belief and establish putative status. However,the truth ofNancy’s statements depends on hercredibility. The credibility of a declarant, in general, cannot be assessed adequately in a motion for summary judgment; it is more appropriately determined through actual examination and cross-examination, during whichthetrier of fact can hear her testimony, observe the witness’s demeanor, and decide whetherthe witness is being truthful. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 856; McCaskey v. California State Auto. Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 987, fn. 24; Looney v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 521, 539; see also 437c, subd. (e).) Defendant’s argument below andthetrial court’s reasoning werethat given the misrepresentation in the marriage license that Robert had no prior marriages, a reasonable person could not believe in good faith that the marriage was valid. As we have explained, whether a reasonable person would harbora beliefis irrelevant. Therefore, that theory does not support denial of putative status on summary judgment. 31 Althoughthat theoryis not viable, it could still be argued that even if, as Nancy stated, she did not read the license carefully, her failure to do so and her signing it despite the misrepresentation reflect a lack of diligence that, as a matter of law, negates a good faith belief. However, wereject this theory as a ground for granting summary judgment as well. Although a marriagelicense is a requirementfor a valid marriage (Fam. Code, §§ 300, 350), some defects in a marriage license, including intentional misrepresentations, do not invalidate a subsequent marriage. (Seeid., § 306.) In Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 805, the court held that although the applicants knowingly provided false names on their marriagelicense,their subsequent marriage, which was properly solemnized, wasvalid. (Id. at pp. 809-810.) It follows that one who provides false information on a marriage license canstill believe in good faith that his or her marriage was valid because the misrepresentation does not necessarily preclude one from believing in good faith that a later, properly solemnized marriage wasvalid. This would especially be so where,as here, a party claims that he or she was unaware of the misrepresentation on the license. Moreover, even if a marriage was rendered void for some reason completely unrelated to the misrepresentation in a license such as consanguinity, we would fail to see why the misrepresentation in the license should preclude putative status, where the parties solemnized the marriage and thereafter held themselves out as husband and wife, raised a family, and acquired property together. In our view, it would be anomalousand unfair to ignore the defects in a license when a marriage is otherwise valid but use the defects to deny putative status to parties whose marriage is rendered void for some reason unrelated to the defective marriage license. It is true that when a party knowsfacts that are inconsistent with a rational belief in the validity of a marriage—e.g., actual knowledge that a previous marriage has not 32 been dissolved—that very knowledge can undermine an honest andsincere belief in the validity of the marriage. However, knowing that a license is inaccurate is not necessarily the same as knowingthere is a legal impedimentto a lawful marriage andnot necessarily inconsistent with a goodfaith belief in the validity of a later properly solemnized marriage. In short, if knowing that a marriage license is defective does not necessarily preclude putative status, then we do not considerthe failure to read a license and discover an inaccuracy or misrepresentation necessarily to be so inconsistent with a good faith belief in the validity of a marriage as to preclude putativestatus. Here, the license was inaccurate and misleading because it represented that Robert had no previous marriage. This inaccuracy does not necessarily establish an impediment to marriage, and whether Nancy knew aboutit is a triable issue of fact. The more pertinent question, however, is whether Nancy knew that Robert’s divorce wasnotfinal before they got married. That too wasa triable issue offact. In sum, having independently reviewed the pleadings in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment, wefind triable issues of fact that preclude summary judgment on the issue of Nancy’s putative status. VII. DISPOSITION The judgmentis reversed. Plaintiff is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) 33 WE CONCUR: PREMO,J. ELIA,J. Ceja et al. v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. H034826 34 RUSHING,P.J. Trial Court: Trial Judge: Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants Nancy Cejaet al.: Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent Rudolph & Sletten, Inc.: Ceja et al. v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. H034826 35 Santa Clara County Superior Court Superior Court Nos.: CV112520 and CV115283 The Honorable Mary Jo Levinger The Arns Law Firm Robert S. Arns Jonathan E. Davis Steven R. Weinmann Rankin, Sproat, Mires, Beaty & Reynolds Michael R. Reynolds Lisa T. Ungerer COUNTYof SANTA CLARA | SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA ‘ “ \ LICENSE AND'CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE #200043OO6604 STATS PLE Lesage (CAUST 95LECHELE~ MANU NO ERASUELES, WHETEOUTD, CROTHAR ALTERATIONS =—«~< LOCAL RESISTRATION WLMSER TA WAME OFGROOMiene Tie woos — 2 CATEOF—om WEAR ROBERT Iwrcuonas CEJA . 06/20/1968 SA. RESOENCE#0MDMER 120 DPCOCE |50, —cursae 4. STATE OF BIRTH CAPONE,OTERCTE t 105$ BL BOLYO AVE. |9so00 RA, JCA Groom «, ThO , DATA - ra © ECATION-VUARS COMPLETED \ aes ' ¢ 12 b T a”: , a . : 2 A ne ROBERT UBALLE CRIA joa’; ': _|vrcerm'wanre'brag’; sc o> V2 WARE OF BRIDEFeiterry va wo 130, M von rT pe A 1OREOeae NANCY ey DALINDA —j CORTEZ. . =: Seance ee 09/13 1964 j aa pawetnS_apeatAORN é 1468 = OF COCR wo.baie 5.STATEOF RTH ae «| 1055 EBL SOLYO:AVB. \. BROS 5 PEROOWAL ei “DATA , i dt he ou7H THTeesrOrmOOONS OTAMIKNONI:——WLSTo YHBAST OF CURRNOLDAND . | aver’ TonnoroeColacTnToWalNoMaNONvO Tr RUFAoaNTLO TRLeLAACERTFICATSOF tyewEnal AFFIDAVIT [riSonATUREOFOROON —s a : = , »- te =o ~ oe . = ' eeNEeSaNaTRETReer ; E BRR Fes “LICENSE aN EEONTele ys Sanooe WieR 150, 20, CON wr ii TO MARRY 1 . 4 257997: > SANTASCLARA a 09/24/a003,. 42/23/2003 BE TREO COTY CER. (AF Sear =a 1 i , _ BRENDA DAVIS st> os 7 tl i WITHESS(ER) on "9/0. Hnehss v2, “She daseCA FI7/O ? #¥ »~ a , . Oh, eg N - 94IRAE INACCEREDANCEWNTDELISSOF @ STATECrCmurormen et G re i “OFAERT corre - : ae WRMACE , orvicvs.on pEnoeN lon 36 2 Z Zz iF ‘(ree careom . joSAMYeAssGALT1S7GfBettarome| SSRIAOVoPe 95. i YAS ALES v ° eS BRENDADAVSVIS w» (andioQ bth NOV STATE OF CALICO, DEF ‘OFDA.THSERVICES,OFFICEOF STATEREGISTRAR * , Tcewtneproprpigsisignature of Deputy County Clesk-Recordes. CERTIFIED COPY OF VITAL-RECORD Seen STATE OF CALIFORNIA I \g5 *¥ROl1310294 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA estMerah |, Regina Aicornendras, Santa, Cara County Gari-Recorder, do hereby certly that r tis is. a bus andeprodction of the document officially my Office. If a Winess my hand end official seal this > day By a__/ » Ls : oob157 § Exhibit B e ATTORNEY OF PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, sate bar nurnber, and address) FOR COURT USE ONLY PREPARED BY: SUB MEYERS . _. ROBERT NICHOLAS CEJA LDA #5, SANTA CLARA COUNTY Tt ED ‘055. EL SOLYO AVENUE 1261 LINCOLN AVENUE #201 nied CAMPBELL, CA 95008 SAN JOSE, CA 95125' 108.295.6955 03 DEC 3! AM IO: 08 TELEPHONE NO: 408-879-0436 FAX NO: IRD Top7 ATTORNEY FOR (Namex_ IN PRO PER CHIEF Bile. £2R/CLERK SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA SUPERat TOE CA streeraporess: 170 PARK CENTER PLAZA COU wr ot LARA waning aooress: (SAME) OP “rHTy crryanoze cove: SAN JOSE, CA 95113 BRANCHNAME:FAMILY DIVISION PETIMONER: ROBERT NICHOLAS CEJA RESPONDENT: CHRISTINA ELLEN CEJA , cs CASE NUMBER: . NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 401FL097535 You are notified that the following judgment was entered on (date): DEC 26 2003 1. [XJ Dissolution of Mariage 2. [__] Dissolution of Mariage— Status Only 3. (_] Dissolution of Marriage — Reserving Jurisdiction Over Termination of Marital Status 4. (_} Legal Separation 5. __] Nultity 6. (__) Parent-Child Relationship 7. {-_] Judgment on Reserved Issues 8. [__] Other (specify): C. HOVERpate: DEC 31 2003 cai tome Clerk, by ottlcerctorkHOYER, Deputy — NOTICE TO ATTORNEY OF RECORD OR PARTYWITHOUT ATTORNEY— Underthe provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1952, if no appeal is filed the court may order the exhibits destroyed or STATEMENTSIN THIS BOX APPLY ONLY TO JUDGMENTS OF DISSOLUTION Effective date of termination of marital status (specify): DATE THIS JUDGMENT IS FILED WARNING: NEITHER PARTY MAY REMARRY UNTIL THE EFFECTIVE DATE OFTHE TERMINATION OF . MARITAL STATUS AS SHOWN IN THIS BOX. CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING | certify that | am not a party to this cause and that a true copy of the herote was natedneOVER fully prepaid, in a sealed envelope addressed as shown below,and thatthe notice was mailed C. HOVE at (rate: SAN JOSE , Califomlaxir} Torre OtficeriClerk on : e: Clerk, by_Chief Executive cer. Deputy Date: DEC 3 1 2003 3 [ROBERT NICHOLAS CBJA | | CHRISTINA ELLEN CEJA | 1055 EL.SOLYO AVENUE 436 GIANNOTTA WAY CAMPBELL, CA 95008 SAN JOSE, CA 95133 | | oc&L - 000159| Adopied for Mandatory Use Poge ttForm NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ‘ Family Code, §§ 2338, 7836, 7637 to0onan1200% (Family Law—Uniform Parentage—Custodyand Support) sohytins . Exhibit C FL.-170 ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY {Name, stale ber numver, and address): FOR COURT USE OMLY . PREPARED BY: SUB MEYERS ROBERT NICHOLAS CEJA LDA #5, SANTA CLARA COUNTY —1055 EL SOLYO AVENUE 1261 LINCOLN AVENUE #201 onyMPBELL, CA 95008 ; SAN JOSE, CA 95125 2 408.295.6955 ~ irTELEPHONE NO; 408-879-0436 FAKNO.: \TTORNEY FOR (Names IN PRO PER SUPERIOR COURTOF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | L street aporess: 170 PARK CENTBR PLAZA MauinG AdoREss: (SAME) , crrvanoze cove: SAN JOSE, CA 95113 DEC 2 6 2003 BRANCHNAME: FAMILY DIVISION MARRIAGE OF Ki RE PETITIONER: ROBERT NICHOLAS CEJA rea of Senta Qara . DEPUTYRESPONOENT: CHRISTINA ELLEN CEJA DECLARATION FOR DEFAULT OR UNCONTESTED CASE WUMBER: [XJ] DISSOLUTION or [_] LEGAL SEPARATION 101FL097535 ITE: Hems 1 through 16 apply to both dissolution andlegal separation proceedings.) | deciare that if | appeared in court and were swom, | would testify to the truth of the facts in this dectaration. ! agree that my case will be provenby this declaration and that | will not appear before the court unless { am ordered by the court to do so. All the Information inthe [X_] Petition [__]Response is true and correct. DEFAULT OR UNCONTESTED(Checka orb) a. (X) The defautt of the respondent was entered oris being requested, and | am not seeking any relief not requestedin the petition. OR > {—) The parties have agreed that the matier may proceed as an uncontested matter without notice, and the agreement Is attached or it Is incorporated in the attached marital settlement agreementor stipulated judgment. MARITAL SETTLEMENTAGREEMENT (Check a orb) 1. [XC] Theparties have entered intoan [__] AGREEMENT or [X] STIPULATED JUDGMENT regarding their property and marital rights, including support, the original of which Is or has been submitted to the court, | request the court to approve the agreement. OR [) There ls NO AGREEMENT or STIPULATED JUDGMENT,and the following statements are true (check at feast one, including Kem (2) ifa community estate exists): (1) C_] There are no community or quasi-community assets or community debts to be disposed of bythe court, (2) (_) The community and quasi-community assets and debts are listed on the attached completed current Property Declaration (form FL-160), which Includes an estimate of the value ofthe assets and debts that | propose to be me distributedto‘eachparty-Thedivisionin theproposedJudgment(FamilyLaw}(form-Ft=t80}is ‘afairand equal division of the property and debts,or if there Is a negative estate, the debts are assigned fairly and equitably.ECLARATION OF DISCLOSURE (Check a, b, or c) . EX) Both the petitioner and respondent have filed, or are filing concurrently, a Declaration Regarding Service ofthe Declarationof Disclosure (form FL-141) and Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150).Cy This matter is proceeding default. | am the Petitioner in this action and have filed a proof of service of the preliminaryra!Declar tion of Disclosure {| FL-140) with the court. | hereby waive receiptofthe final Declaration of Disclosure (formFL-140)from the respondent. This matter Is as an uncontested action. Service ofthe final Declaration ofDisclosure (form FL-140)Is mutuallywaived by both parties. waiver provision executed by both parties under penalty of perjury ig contained in the maritalsettlement agreement or proposed judgment, or other separate stipulation. XJ CHILD CUSTODYshould be ordered as set forth in the proposed Judgment(Family Law) (form FL-180). &_} CHILD VISITATION should be ordered as set forth in the proposed Judgment(Family Law) (form FL-180). POUSAL AND FAMILY SUPPORT ifa support orderorattomey fees are requested, submit a completed Income and Expenseeclaration (form FL-150), unless a current form Is on file. Include your best estimate of the other party's income. heck at least one ofthe folowing) : Xx] | knowingly give upforever any right to receive spousal support. L_] | ask the court to reserve jurisdiction to award spousal support in the future to (name): 000160{__) Spousal! support should be ordered as set forth in the Proposed Judgment (Family Law) (form FL-180). Cc) Family support should be ordered as set forth in the proposed Judgment (Family Law) (form FL-180). Paget of 2avant fr Mandy Goa DECLARATION FOR DEFAULT OR UNCONTESTED Fomiy Code, $2336 Fev.danny 1. 20034 DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION Cal Fates of Cour, rae 1249 , (Family Law) 8 PETITIONER: ROBERT NICHOLAS CEJA 101FL097535 RESPONDENT: CHRISTINA ELLEN CEJA 10. [XJ CHILD SUPPORTshould be ordered as setforth in the proposed Judgment(Family Law) (lorm FL-180). 11. a. | [7] amrecelving [X] amnotrecelving [__] intend to apply for public assistancefor the child or children listed in the proposed order, b._To the best of my knowledge the other party [_] is (X] isnot receiving public assistance. 12, (=) Petitioner [_] Respondent Is presently receiving public assistance and all support should be made payable to the local child support agency at the address set forth In the proposed judgment. A representative ofthe local child support agency has signed the proposed judgment, 13. if there are minor children, check and complete item a and item b orc: a. My gross (before taxes) monthly incomeIs as follows: $ 4,568 b. The estimated gross monthly incomeof the other party Is as follows: $ 2,700 c. [(_] have no knowledgeof the estimated monthly incomeofthe other party for the following reasons(specify): d. [_} I request that this order be based on [(_] Petitioners [_] Respondent's eaming ability. The facts in support of my estimate of eaming ability are (specify): (__] Continued in Attachment 13d. ; 14. [_] PARENTAGE of the chitdren of the Petitioner and Respondent bom prior to their marriage should be ordered as setforth in the proposed Judgment (FamilyLaw) (form FL-180). A declaration regarding parentage Is attached, 15. [J ATTORNEY FEES shoud be ordered as set forth in the proposed Judgment (Family Law) (form FL-180). 16. There are irreconcilable. differences that have led to the irremediable breakdown of the mariage and there Is no possibility of saving the mantiage through counseling or other means. 17. ‘This declaration may be reviewed by a commissioner sitting a3 a temporary judge who may determine whether to grantthis request or require my appearance under Family Code section 2336. STATEMENTS IN THIS BOX APPLY ONLY TO DISSOLUTIONS — items 18 through 21 18. Petitioner and/or the Respondent has been a residentof this county for at least three months and of the State of Califomia for at least six months continuously and immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition. 19, | ask that the court grant the request for a judgment for dissolution of marriage based upon irreconcilable differences and that the court make the orders set forth in theproposed Judgment (Family Law) (form FL-180) submitted with this dectaration. 20. (—] This declaration Is for the termination of marital status only. | ask the court to reserve jurisdiction overall issues whose determination is not requested In this declaration. 21. (] Petitioner [—_] Respondent requests restoration of his/her former name as set forth in the proposed Judgment! (Family Law) (form FL-180). . . THIS STATEMENT APPLIES ONLY TO LEGAL SEPARATIONS 22. | ask that the court grant the request for a Judgment for legal separation based upon Ireconcilable differences and that the court make the orders set forth in the proposed Judgment (Family Law) (form FL-160) submitted with this dectaration. | UNDERSTAND THAT AJUDGMENT OF LEGAL SEPARATION DOES NOTTERMINATE A MARRIAGE AND 1 AM STILL MARRIED. 23. [__] Other (specify): | declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing Is true and correct. Date: 10-23-03 ROBERT NICHOLASCEJA » x AAGrp (TVPE OR PRINT NAME) { TURE OF DECLARANT) P"SSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION FL-170 fRev, Jarnucary 1. 2000} DECLARATION FOR DEFAULT OR UNCONTESTED 000164 Pope 3 12 (Family Law) ; State of California ) Proof of Service by: County of Los Angeles ) v US Postal Service ) Federal Express ], Maurice Harrington, declare that I am not a party to the action, am over 18 years of age and my business address is: 354 South Spring St., Suite 610, Los Angeles, California 90013. On 95/27/2011 declarant served the within: Petition for Review upon: 1 Copies FedEx ¥ USPS 1 Copies FedEx W USPS Robert Stephen Ams Anne Jones Kepner Steven Richard Weinmann Needham Davis et al LLP The Ams Law Firm 1960 The Alameda #210 515 Folsom St 3rd FI San Jose, CA 95126 San Francisco, CA 94105 Counsel for Respondent, Counsel for Appeliants, Nancy Ceja, et al Phoenix Ceja, et al 1 Copies FedEx ¥ USPS 1 Copies FedEx Y USPS Clerk, Clerk, Sixth District Court of Appeal Santa Clara County Superior Court 333 West Santa Clara Street Downtown Superior Court Suite 1060 191 North First Street San Jose, CA 95113 San Jose, CA 95113 For the Hon. Mary Jo Levinger, the address(es) designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing the number of copies indicated above, of same, enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapperin a Post Office Mail Depository, under the exclusive custody and care of the United States Postal Service, within the State of California, or properly addressed wrapperin an Federal Express Official Depository, under the exclusive custody and care of Federal Express, within the State of California I further declare that this same day the original and copies has/have been hand delivered for filing OR the original and 13 copies has/have been filed by ¥ third party commercial carrier for next business day delivery to: y ty Clerk, Supreme Court of California 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102-4797 I declare under penglty of perjyry that the foregoingis true and correct: Signature: Nex— o