CEJA v. RUDOLPH & SLETTEN, INC.

Appellant, Nancy Ceja, Answer to Petition for Review

Cal.June 27, 2011

S193493 OPSL IN THE LUN 26 SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIAceerckkop Air,ich Clerk NANCYCEJA,etal., Bae Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. RUDOLPH & SLETTEN,INC., Defendant and Respondent; PHOENIX CEJAetal., Respondent. After a Decision by the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District Sixth Appellate District Case No. H034826 Santa Clara County Superior Court, Nos. CV112520 and CV115283 ANSWERTO PETITION FOR REVIEW THE ARNS LAW FIRM Robert S. Ams, (SBN 65071) rsa@arnslaw.com Jonathan E. Davis (SBN 191346) jed@arnslaw.com Steven R. Weinmann (SBN 190956) srw@amslaw.com 515 Folsom Street, 3Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Phone: (415) 495-7800 Fax: (415) 495-7888 ATTORNEYS FOR Plaintiff and Appellant, Nancy Ceja S193493 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA NANCYCEJA,et al., Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. RUDOLPH & SLETTEN,INC., Defendant and Respondent; PHOENIX CEJA etal., Respondent. After a Decision by the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District Sixth Appellate District Case No. H034826 Santa Clara County Superior Court, Nos. CV112520 and CV1 15283 ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW THE ARNS LAW FIRM Robert S. Arms, (SBN 65071) rsa@arnslaw.com Jonathan E. Davis (SBN 191346) jed@arnslaw.com Steven R. Weinmann (SBN 190956) srw@armslaw.com 515 Folsom Street, 3" Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Phone: (415) 495-7800 Fax: (415) 495-7888 ATTORNEYS FOR Plaintiff and Appellant, Nancy Ceja TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.0.....cc ieee cccccccccecccececaccecsccccescesecestseceecsececssscesersusareeeens ii INTRODUCTIONocceccccccccccscececessccecscacreceecssecreccessesscesssauecersuucesstasececeeseeeseececesse 1 STATEMENTOF FACTSuuoccccccccccccsscccscccescecssceesuecassecesseessecesseccsceseecssssessersaceess 2 ARGUMENT000... ccecccccsesessccsscccssscccceestececssaceseecesessauuccausecesecsseceeaascecreveusessecsueretescees 3 I. REVIEW BY THIS COURT IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION CORRECTLY REALIGNED THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE DOCTRINE WITH ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE...... 3 A. Ceja’s Interpretation of Vryonis Is a Clarification of the Putative Spouse Doctrine That Realigns Case Law With the Intent of the DOCHrine..... cece ceccecccecenscecsscceeeceecessssessessecessauuceeetauessrstuttisesecesetnasce 4 B. There Are No Grounds for Review Because This Case Does Not Create a Split Between the Courts of Appeal or Raise an Important Question Of LAW...cc ceeeecccescececstsesecectseseetsseceesussesereceetscsceceusueses 7 C. The Court of Appeal’s Decision is So Thoroughas to Preclude Necessity for Review by This Court ..0......cccccccccesessccccesessesecsceseesenece 10 CONCLUSION(0... cccccccccccscesssccscscecsscsececeecessecssessesssssssesssscessusersucevaversasscesetsssseeeeeecens 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Caldwell v. Odisio (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 732.00... .eceesccesceseeeecesetseeeeeeeeeeeeenenetanees 5 Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 584 oo...eccsseeseeseeeeees passim Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Sup. Ct. (1989) 263 Cal.Rptr. 672 .0.....:cecceceseeteeseees 8 County ofLos Angeles v. Frisbie (1942)19 Cal.2d 634 ......ccesccscssccesreeestseeeesteessaes 5 Crow Irvine #2 v. Winthrop Cal. Investors Ltd. Partnership (2002) 128 CalRptr.2d 644 ooocccseeseeseeseeetseneeseeeceesecaeeasseeeeceseceaeesessseesateateees 9 Estate ofDePasse (2002)118 CalRptr.2d 143 oo... cccccccccsscssssssessessecsesesssecsesseesseeenes 8 Estate of Vargas (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 714... ..cccccccsscscecssscsteeseeseeeessteeesseesresenesens 6 Flanagan y. Capital Nat. Bank (1931) 213 Cal. 664 ....cccccceccesscsesseeetesssecessteseeseessaes 9 In re Domestic Partnership ofEllis (2008)76 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 oo... ecceeseecsenteeees 9 Inre Marriage ofDoherty (2002) 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 919 oo... ceccccecsesseeesseesetsecseeeees 9 Inre Marriage ofEllis (2002) 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 719... cccccccccscseessteeesseeesecstseeeneees 9 In re Marriage ofFlores (1988) 252 Cal.Rptr. 687 ......::cccccccsccsscseecessecsesssenaceeeeensaes 8 Inre Marriage Guo & Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491 oooecssceeesesteesteeees 5,9 In re Marriage ofMonti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50.0.0... ccceccesceseeceeseeeeeteeeeeeeeseeenes 4,5,9 In re Marriage ofRamirez (2008) 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 180.0... eccceseseecestseteesesetseseens 9 Inre Marriage ofTejeda (2009) 102 CalRptr.672 00.0... cececcsccecssesececeeessseseeseeesseeaes 9 Inre Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712........cccccccsccscsssecssseesessessssenees passim Miller v. Johnson (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 123 o...ccecccccccsscssecsscsessesesesesseesseseeeseeesaes 9 Neureither v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1971)15 Cal.App.3d 429 oo...cesses 6 Schneider v. Schneider (1920) 183 Cal. 335... ..ccececccssesecescesecseectesseeeaeerseeeeeaeenaeenses 5 li Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681 .....cccccccccccssssssscssscsssescsccetseceerscsstsestacsesevaecs 9 Wagner v. County ofImperial (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 980....cc.ccccescesseseeveceeeseseee 4 Welch v. State (2000) 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 .o..ccceccccccsscsecssscesescestecesecsceteessecatseese 8 CA STATUTES & RULES Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60(D) ...cccccsccscssessescesscsesesssssscsesesvevsvscavecsecsvavsvscsesavaavscsesasaces 3 Fam. Code, § 300 ef Seq ..ccccccccccsssssscssssssescsssessvscvssssecsetsceassassasesecsessacseeseccacsecsaceseceases 6,7 Health & Saf. Code, §§ 103125 oo. cccccccssssessesesssssescscscscevecsvsesesteseceesecevstenecssavaeass 6,7 Cal. Rules of Court, 8.SOO(D)(1) ..cceececssesessesssssssessesssessssescsesscscscavarcassvacsesesesecacenaens 3, 7,8 iil INTRODUCTION The Petition for Review in this unremarkable appeal by Defendant and Respondent Rudolph and Sletten, Inc. (hereinafter Respondent) challenges a judgment overturning trial court ruling that erroneously applied an objective standard when evaluating Plaintiff and Appellant Nancy Ceja’s (hereinafter Appellant) belief in the validity of her marriage. The Court of Appeal’s opinion was well-reasoned in its affirmation of her right to bring a claim as a putative spouse for the death of her husband. There is nothing about the decision that requires review by this Court. The opinion finally provided much-needed clarity to the issue of how to evaluate a good-faith belief in one’s marital status. Since other courts have not yet had time to review andrule upon similar cases, there is no conflict warranting this Court’s intervention. The Petition should be denied. Nancy Ceja and Robert Ceja were married in a formal wedding ceremony on September 23, 2003, almost four years to the day before Robert’s death. (Appellant’s Appendix (“AA”) at 000425.) At all times, she believed that she had a valid marriage to Robert. (AA 000426.) Nancy filed a wrongful death action as the wife of Robert upon his untimely death in a construction accident on Respondent’s jobsite. (AA 000001.) Respondentattacked her right to bring the claim, asserting that her marriage was voidable because Robert’s divorce was notfinal until several weeks after he and Nancy married. (AA 000058.) Thus, Respondent argued, Nancy did not have a reasonable basis for believing in the validity of the marriage, and had no right to sue as a putative spouse. (AA 000058.) There is no testimonial evidence that Nancy,at any time prior to her marriage to Robert or even prior to his death four years later, knew or was aware that his divorce had not been finalized. Nonetheless, the trial court granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Nancy did not have an “objectively reasonable”belief in the validity of her marriage. (AA 000706.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in examining whether Nancy’s belief was objectively reasonable. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (Ceja) (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 584, 587.) Rather, the Court of Appeal determined that the proper question before the trial court was whetherthere were triable issues of fact concerning whether Nancy held a goodfaith belief that her marriage wasvalid. (/d. at p. 608.) Respondent’s Petition for Review contends review by this Court is necessary to resolve a circuit split andto settle the important question of what standard is appropriate when considering the good faith requirement of the putative spouse doctrine. This Petition is meritless, however, and review should be denied for three reasons: (1) this case merely presents a clarification of how to determine putative spouse status (2) it is not ripe for review because it does not cause a circuit split nor does it raise an important question of law that requires immediate attention, and (3) Respondent’s Petition does not raise any points that were not thoroughly addressed by the Court of Appeal. STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts of Nancy and Robert’s marriage and courtship were typical in every respect. They began living together in 2001, the same year Robert entered into a joint custody arrangement with his ex-wife. (AA 000119.) Nancy herself was not privy to any of the details surrounding Robert’s separation and divorce from his ex-wife. (AA 000348.) Three days before their wedding, on September 24, 2003, Robert and Nancy obtained a “License and Certificate of Marriage” from the County of Santa Clara, California. (AA 000119.) At the time, Nancy believed that their marriage would be entirely valid. (AA 000425.) Nancy and Robert celebrated their wedding by holding a large ceremony before 250 of their family members and friends in Salinas, California, on September 27, 2003. (AA 000119.) Nancybelieved she was the lawfully wedded wife of Robert from September 27, 2003 to the date of the incident. (AA 000426.) If she doubted the validity of her marriage, the couple would have held a new ceremony. (AA 000427.) From the date of their wedding until Robert’s death, Nancy and Robert held themselves out as a married couple in numerousrespects. (AA 000427.) Nancy changed her last name to Ceja; the two held a joint checking account while living together as husband and wife; they filed their taxes under the designation ‘married but filing separately’; they told anyone that asked that they were married; and they always wore wedding rings indicating their commitmentto one another. (AA 000427.) ARGUMENT 1 REVIEW BY THIS COURT IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION CORRECTLY REALIGNED THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE DOCTRINE WITH ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE. Review should be denied for the simple reason that this case is not ripe for review because the case is merely a clarification and reinterpretation of existing case law. Furthermore, there is no circuit split because the courts of appeal have not had opportunity to consider the ramifications of the case. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1).) The statutory requirements for a finding of putative spouse statusare clear. In the context of a wrongful death claim, the court must find that the putative spouse believed in goodfaith that their marriage to the decedent was valid. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd. (b), italics added.) The Court of Appeal thoroughly analyzed the putative spouse doctrine in case law andits later statutory codification. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 590-596.) Through this analysis, the court determined that prior to and after codification, “courts treated putative status as a factual question, concerning a party’s state of mind.” (id. at p. 595.) That critical factual question is whetherthe putative spouse honestly and genuinely believes that the marriage wasvalid.” (/d. citing Wagner v. County ofImperial (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 980, 983 [following In re Marriage ofMonti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 56, in holding that “the essence of a putative spouse is a good faith belief in the existence of a valid marriage.”].) Accordingly, since good faith belief is a question for the finder of fact, the Ceja court was correct when it reversed and remanded the case backto the trial court. The Court of Appeal also addressed the source of the trial court’s opinion, Jn re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712 (Vryonis). Going against precedent, Vryonis imposed an objective test for putative status. (Vryonis, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 720) In doing so, the Vryonis court added a purely legal dimensionto the determination of putative status without regard to the long history of putative spouse case law, which clearly required that putative spouse status be determined by the finder of fact. The Petition for Review relies upon Vryonis to support its contention that the Court of Appeal’s decision creates a sharp split in authority on the proper standard by which to evaluate a “good faith belief.” Far from creating a split in the circuit courts, the Court of Appeal’s decision is a well-considered clarification of the putative spouse doctrine based on the plain language of the statute and a plethora of authority in support ofits analysis. A. Ceja’s Interpretation of Vryonis Is a Clarification of the Putative Spouse Doctrine That Realigns Case Law With the Intent of the Doctrine. The Court of Appeal’s 33-page decision showed the reasons it was necessary to confront and clarify Vryonis. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.) The - Ceja court outlined how Vryonis’ addition of an objective reasonableness standard to the good- faith requirement for putative spouse status deviated from the established precedent. (/d. at p. 4 596.) The court recognized that its decision departed from Vryonis, and by doingsoit rightfully cabined application of Vryonis to its facts. (/d.) In its analysis, the Court of Appeal first examined the putative spouse doctrine beginning withits early application. (Id. p. 590.) The putative spouse doctrine is rooted in the community property system, andits intent was to “protect the expectations of innocent parties” when a marriage dissolves. (/d., citing Schneider v. Schneider (1920) 183 Cal. 335, 336-338; Caldwell v. Odisio (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 732, 736.) The innocent parties referred to by the court are those, like Nancy Ceja, whobelieve they are part of a valid marriage. Moreover, application of the doctrine helps courts to divide marital property accumulated during the course of a marriage in a mannerthat is “equitable, fair, and just.” (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 590.) The putative spouse doctrine was codified in its modern form in 1969,as part of the now- former Family Law Act. (dd. at 591.) The Ceja court found that “in codifying the doctrine, the Legislature simply adopted existing case law and did not intend to change the definition of a putative spouse orrestrict application of the doctrine.” (/d., citing In re Marriage of Monti, supra, 135 Cal.App.3dat p. 55; In re Marriage Guo & Sun (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1500 [purpose of codification mirrored equitable purposeof the judicially-created doctrine]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [generally, intent to overthrow “long- established principles of law” not presumed from new enactments unless such legislative intent is expressed or necessarily implied].) The Ceja court was guided by the equitable purpose ofthe doctrine when they opted to reinterpret the Vryonis decision, which they held was out ofline with both precedentandlegislative intent. (/d.) The Petition for Review relies on Vryonis but ignores the clear pre-Vryonis precedent whereby a grant ofputative status only followed a factual examination of a party’s state of mind to determine if the party held a good faith belief. (See Neureither v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 429; Estate of Vargas (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 714, 717 [holding that the putative spouse’s “credibility was a question for determination by the trial court”].) The Ceja court simply returned the putative spouse doctrine to these roots, requiring that good-faith in the validity of one’s marriage be determined bythe fact-finder, without any requirement of objective reasonableness. In Vryonis, the parties conducted a private religious ceremony without witnesses or any type of legal solemnization. (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 716.) At no point in their relationship did the couple attempt to comply with any procedural requirements for a valid California marriage. (/d.) The plaintiff, however, claimed that her belief in the validity of the marriage was enoughto achieve rights as a putative spouse. (/d.) On appeal, the Vryonis court held that the plaintiffs belief, even if it was sincere and credible, also needed to meetthe test of objective reasonableness. (id. at pp. 714, 720-22.) The court found that her belief lacked objective reasonableness it could not be held in good faith. (/d.) Accordingly, the plaintiff was not entitled to putative status.' (/d.) Unlike the parties in Vryonis, Robert and Nancy Ceja made every effort to comply with California’s procedural requirements for marriage: they obtained a California marriagelicense, and participated in formal wedding ceremony. (AA 000425.) The statutory scheme requiresthat . parties complete several steps in the marriage process: mutually consent; obtain a license from the county clerk; and solemnize the marriage. (Fam. Code, § 300 et seq.; Health & Saf. Code, §§ 103125, 103175.) Further, the person conducting the marriage ceremony must satisfy additional ' Applying the “goodfaith belief” standard to the exceptionally weak facts of Vyronis, it seems likely that the Court of Appeal in that case would have come to the same conclusion even without applying the “objective reasonableness”test. 6 requirements. That person must: determine that the parties have obtained a valid marriage license; authenticate the marriage by signing the certificate of registry and arrangingforat least one witness to sign the certificate; and finally, return the certificate of registry to the county clerk for filing. (Fam. Code, § 300 et seq.; Health & Saf. Code, §§ 103125, 103175.) Nancy and Robert complied with each of these requirements, whereas the parties in Vryonis did not comply with any of them. This factual distinction alone was enough to prompt the Court of Appeal to reconsider application of Vryonis to every case. Once the court undertook reexamination of Vryonis and the putative spouse doctrine, it was clear that requiring an objective reasonableness test did not further the true intent of the doctrine, which is to protect innocent parties. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 596.) Further, by examining the cases and rationale underlying the Vryonis decision, the Court of Appeal thoroughly discredited the application of an objective reasonableness standard to a putative spouse inquiry and made clear why its continued application was improper. (/d.) B. There Are No Grounds for Review Because This Case Does Not Create a Split Between the Courts of Appeal or Raise an Important Question of Law. The California Rules of Court direct this Court to exercise its discretionary grant of review when a case presents a split among the circuits or addresses an important area of law. (Cal. Rules of Court, 8.500(b)(1).) This case meets neither criteria, and thus review bythis Court is inappropriate. First, a circuit split of authority does not arise each time a Court of Appeal revisits or overturns a previous decision. Here, the Court of Appeal’s decision relegated Vryonis to its facts, which are dissimilar from the current case. The Petition for Review claims that this case will cause confusion among the Courts of Appeal that will eventually lead to . “chaos in resolving putative spouse issues.” (Resp’t Pet. 23.) This claim is simply overstated. 7 Further treatment of the putative spouse doctrine is needed before it could be said that a true split in the circuits has formedasa result of Ceja. More likely, other Courts of Appeal will recognize the Ceja opinion for what it is — a clarification of the putative spouse doctrine and a return to its true intent. Such clarification was necessary here because Vryonis was an outlier in the putative spouse case law, and thusits widespread application to every situation was improper. As discussed above, the application of an “objective reasonableness” standard to the good faith inquiry deviated from the case precedent and the history of the putative spouse doctrine. (See, Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 605.) Review by this Court would be premature until the Courts of Appeal have the opportunity to examine both Ceja and Vryonis, apply them to the specific facts of different cases and therefrom discern if there truly is a split in authority. Accordingly,thereis no need for this Court to intervene in order to secure uniformity of decision between the Courts of Appeal. Next, the Petition for Review claims that the Court of Appeal’s decision will “unravel California’s marriage laws.” (Resp’t Pet. 23.) This is another gross overstatement, and review should not be granted on these grounds. This Court is directed to grant review in orderto settle important questions of law. (Cal. Rules of Court, 8.500(b)(1).) The putative spouse doctrine is neither a crucial aspect of California’s marriage laws nor does it arise with enough frequency that it could be considered an important question of law.’ Respondent goes too far in attempting to position this doctrine as one of great importanceto this Court. * To illustrate, Vryonis was cited by only 11 cases, not including Ceja, reported in California since 1988. (See In re Marriage ofFlores (1988) 252 Cal.Rptr 687, 691; Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Sup. Ct. (1989) 263 Cal.Rptr. 672, 674; Welch v. State (2000) 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 430, 432; Crow Irvine #2 v. Winthrop Cal. Investors Ltd. Partnership (2002) 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 644, 647; Estate of DePasse (2002) 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 154; In re Marriage of Doherty (2002) 126 8 The Petition further asserts that eliminating the objective reasonableness requirement from the putative spouse doctrine will erode the institution of marriage in California. Contrary to Respondent’s overblownfears, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ceja does not create a situation in which any two people may arbitrarily declare themselves married and expect to receive the benefits of putative spouse status. Instead, the decision merely returns the doctrineto its pre- Vryonis requirement:that a finder of fact must determine whether one holds a goodfaith belief in the validity of their marriage. (See In re Marriage of Monti, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 56.) This also ensures that putative spouses who innocently believedin the validity of their marriage will receive equitable treatment in the event of an untimely death such as occurredhere. Respondent’s argumentclings to the idea that there is only one way a person may achieve putative spouse status: if he or she is absolutely unable to discover that the marriageis invalid. Respondents assert a wrongful reading of the Ceja opinion, whereby a mere beliefin the validity of a marriage, standing alone, is enough to render that marriage valid. This assertion fails becauseit ignores the actual holding of the Ceja opinion which recognizes the crucial role of the fact-finder. In a case where putative spouse status is asserted, the party asserting a putative marriage would not be relieved of its obligation to convince the fact-finder that its belief was indeed held in goodfaith. Prior to Vryonis, there were numerouscases that denied putative spousestatus to parties who alleged good faith belief. (See, Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank (1931) 213 Cal. 664; Miller v. Johnson (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 123; Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681.) In those cases, the plaintiffs’ assertions of good-faith beliefs crumbled under the scrutiny of the fact finder, Cal.Rptr.2d 919, 921; In re Marriage ofEllis (2002) 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 719, 721; In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis (2008) 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 404; In re Marriage of Ramirez (2008) 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 184; In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 102 Cal.Rptr.672, 674; In re Marriage of Xia Guo and Ziao Hua Sun (2010) 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 911.) whoseresponsibility it is to determine whether an alleged good-faith belief is genuine. Following Ceja, a plaintiff who asserts putative spouse status will still bear the burden of proving to the finder of fact, by a preponderance of evidence, that their good-faith belief in the validity of their marriage is genuine. Here, Nancy’s good faith belief is amply supported by the numerous actions she and Robert took to establish themselves as married andto live their lives as a married couple. However, whether Nancy’s belief is genuine, based on the information whichshe had,is a triable issue of fact which the Court of Appealproperly returned to thetrial court. ? In this case and in any subsequent putative spouse action, the finder of fact will act as a gate-keeper, preventing frivolous claims for putative spouse status. The fact-finder’s decision will also be subject to review by the Courts of Appeal, and if necessary by this Court. With such extensive safeguards in place, the possibility that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ceja will unravel California’s marriage laws is unlikely in the extreme. C, The Court of Appeal’s Decision is So Thorough as to Preclude Necessity for Review by This Court. The Court of Appeal thoroughly addressed all pertinent aspects of the putative spouse doctrine. It considered the history, legislative intent, and case law application of the doctrine in detail. The treatment of the putative spouse doctrine in most prior Courts of Appeal decisions was cursory at best, and the majority blindly used the Vryonis requirement of “objectively reasonable good faith” as boilerplate language. Here, as discussed above, the Court of Appeal dissected the putative spouse doctrine, from its roots in Spanish civil law to its modern * The Court of Appeal noted that Nancy’s statements, to the effect that she did not read the marriage license or Robert’s final divorce papers closely, if true, would support a finding of good faith belief and would establish putative status. (Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 609.) Respondent’s motion for summary judgment relied on an implicit discrediting of Nancy’s statements, which the Court of Appeal held could only be adequately assessed by the finder of fact. Ud.) 10 application. The analysis is sound and it would be a poor use of this Court’s resources to retread this ground before the other Courts of Appeal have examined the decision and determined whetherto follow it, expand uponit, or discardit. Respondent’s Petition refers to the case law of other states to support its assertion that an objective reasonableness component is a critical part of the putative spouse calculus. This examination is erroneous becauseit urges review outside the scope of what is needed here. It is neither necessary nor prudent for this Court to examine the history of the putative spouse doctrine in other states. How other states treat the putative spouse doctrine has no relevant impact on its contemporary application in California. il CONCLUSION The Petition for Review submitted by Respondent is meritless because it neither asserts an important question of law nor presents a necessity to secure uniformity of decision and because granting review on an issue so thoroughly addressed by the Court of Appeal before other Courts of Appeal have weighed in, would be a waste of judicial resources. For these andall foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Respondent’s Petition for Review. Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, Nancy Ceja 12 CERTIFICATION REGARDING LENGTH OF BRIEF I hearbycertify that this brief contains 3857 words, including footnotes, as established by the word count of the company program utilized for the preparation ofthis brief. I declare and certify under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing statement is true and correct and that this certification was executed on June 27, 2011 at San Francisco, California. Staven R. Weinmann (SBN 190956) 5{VFolsom Street, 3" Floor San Francisco, California 94105 Phone:(415) 495-7800 Fax: (415) 495-7888 Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, Nancy Ceja 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, declare as follows: I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years and not a party to, nor interested in, the above-entitled action. I am an employee of The Arms Law Firm, A Professional Corporation, and my business address is 515 Folsom Street, 3Floor, San Francisco, CA 94105 On the date indicated below I served the following ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW onall interested parties in the above cause, by: XX HAND DELIVERYbyplacing a true and correct copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with the name and address ofthe party to receive the document. Such document was then given to the service or individual signing the bottom ofthis Proof of Service showing delivery made. The envelopes were addressedas follows: Mike Reynolds [ONE COPY] RANKIN, SPROAT, MIRES, BEATY & REYNOLDS 1970 Broadway,Suite 1150 Oakland, CA 94612 PHONE:510-465-3922 FAX: 510-452-3006 Counsel for Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. Anne Kepner [ONE COPY] NEEDHAM, KEPNER, FISH & JONES 1960 The Alameda, Suite 210 San Jose, CA 95126 PHONE:408-244-2166 FAX: 408-244-7815 Counsel for Plaintiffs Phoenix Ceja and Seneca Ceja by and through their Guradian ad Litem Christine Ceja William F. Fitzgerald O’SULLIVAN & HUDSON 560 Mission Street, Suite 2100 San Francisco, CA 94105 PHONE:(415) 227-2300 FAX:(415) 227-2360 Counsel for Lien Claimant Zurich American Insurance [ONE COPY] Hon. Mary Jo Levinger Santa Clara Superior Court {Case Number 108CV112520] 191 N.First Street [ONE COPY] San Jose, CA 95113 Clerk of the Court Supreme Court of California [ORIGINAL and THIRTEEN 350 McAllister Street COPIES} San Francisco, CA 94102 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 27, 2011 at San Francisco, California. upfaown_ “ALEXIS BLOOM