PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Plaintiff and Appellant’s Petition for Review

Cal.October 13, 2010

iD IN THE SUPREME COURTOFTHE STATE OF CALIFORNIA PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES,LLC, S Plaintiff, Respondent, and Second Appellate District Cross-Appellant, Vv. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Case no. B216515 Los Angeles County Superior Court case no. BS112956 Honorable James C. Chalfant, Defendant, Appellant, and Judge of the SupeSQIRREME COURT Cross-Respondent. LED OCT 13 7010 Frederick K. Ohtrich Clark PETITION FOR REVIEW Beducy ELLIOT L. BIEN (SB¥# 90744) AMY E. MARGOLIN (SB # 168192) BIEN & SUMMERS 23 Palomino Road Novato, California 94947 Tel. (415) 898-2900 CRAIG M. COLLINS(SB # 151582) BLUM COLLINS LLP 707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 4880 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Attorneysfor Plaintiff and Respondent, PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC A S TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Authorities .. 0.0... 0... cece eee eee eeeuae iii PETITION FOR REVIEW ...0... 0.0... cece eee een nen 1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...............0000 00 1 INTRODUCTION 2.0.0...ceeenee n nen 2 SUMMARY OF THE CASE ........... 000 0cc eee e eae eeeeeneee 5 LEGAL ANALYSIS ...0. 0.00.00. 000. eee eee ene n een ens 7 I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO RESOLVE A CONFLICTIN PUBLISHED AUTHORITY WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO ADOPT ONLY ONESET OF CRITERIA FOR A SENSITIVE TYPE OF MOBILEHOME PARK SUBDIVISION .. 0.0.0.0... 0000. eee ee eee eens 7 A. THE TEXT OF § 66427.5 2...eeeee 7 B. A “STATE STATUTE” EXCEPTION WOULD GUT THE INTENDED PREEMPTION ............ 00 eee eeue 10 I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO SETTLE THE INTENDED SCOPE OF THE COASTAL ACT AND MELLO ACT ........ 12 A. THE COASTALACT 1.0.2... 0.00 e eee ee eee ee eens 12 1. The Act Does Not Apply to These Conversions ........ 0.0.0. eee ee ee eee ae 13 2. Even if the Coastal Act Applied in Other Ways,It Expressly Preserves the Force of a Statute Like § 66427.5 2.0.2... 2... ee eee. 17 B. THE MELLO ACT CONCLUSION .......... CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH OFBRIEF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE -ii- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unitied School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 207 (review denied) 0...icccc 15 California Coastal Commission v. Quanta Inv. Corp. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 579 20.0.0. 0 cece eee eee. 5, 15-16 Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City of Carson (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1487060ee 3-4 EI Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. City ofPalm Springs (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1153 (review denied) .............. 3, 8, 16 Regents ofthe Univ. ofCalifornia v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509 2...eee 10 Sequoia Park Associates v. County ofSonoma (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1270 (review denied) ............4. passim STATUTES AND RULES California Civil Code, | § 3342Lceet eens 11 California Code of Civil Procedure, §1263.210 2... eenee 8 California Government Code: § 65302 2centenes 9 § 65580 2.eeeeens 10 § 65590.o eens 2, 20-21 -iii- § 65920 2...eeeeens 7 § 66427.4 ooeeeeee een ees 9 § 66427.5 2.neces passim California Public Resources Code, § 30005 2...eeeee eee eens 17 § 30005.5 2. eee eens 18 § 30007 2...ceeence eae 18-19 § 30106 oo. eee cece cece cece eee eeeeneeeeeees 2,13 § 30213 eens 16 §30500.1 2...eeee eee 16 § 30519 Lo.eeee eee eens 18 California Rules of Court, Rule 8.500(b)(1) ..0.eeee eens 1 -iv- TO THE HONORABLE RONALD M. GEORGE, CHIEF JUSTICE OF CALIFORNIA, AND THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: Plaintiff and respondent, Pacific Palisades Bowl MobileEstates, LLC (“Palisades Bowl”), respectfully petitions for review of Part B ofthe published decision in this matter issued on August 31, 2010, by the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four. The Westlaw version of the opinion is appended. (Pacific Palisades Bow!Mobile Estates, LLC v. City ofLos Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1461 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838)}) Asthis petition will demonstrate, the case well warrants review under Rule of Court 8.500(b)(1). It presents a direct conflict of published authority and a questionable expansion of California’s coastal legislation. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Did the Legislature intend to subject a much-litigated type of mobilehome park subdivision to the exclusive control of Government Code § 66427.5, as held in Sequoia ParkAssociates v. County of Sonoma (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1270 (review denied and other published opinions; or, as held below, did the Legislature intend to permit deviations from § 66427.5 whenevera local agency cancite someotherstate statute as sub silentio authority for the deviation? 2. Did the Court of Appeal correctly hold that the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code § 30000 et seg.) and the Mello Act (Gov.Code § 65590 et seq.) even apply to the type of subdivision covered by § 66427.5 — which changesnothing but the legal structure of an existing park to permit resident ownership of existing spaces — whenbydefinition this does not “change . . . the density or intensity of use of land” (Coastal Act § 30106) and does not displace low-income residents within the meaning of the Mello Act? INTRODUCTION Government Code § 66427.5 (hereafter, “§ 66427.5”) applies to the technical subdivision or “conversion” of an existing and occupied mobilehomepark for one purpose alone: to permit at least some residents to purchase their space rather than continuerentingit. (See generally, Sequoia Park Associates, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 1270.) As stated in Govt. Code § 50780, subd. (a)(1): “mobilehomeparks provide a significant source of homeownership for California residents. . . .” Indeed, the Legislature has long supported such homeownership -2- opportunities with funding. (See, £/ Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd., v. City ofPalm Springs (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1159,citing “the . .. Mobilehome Park Purchase Fund [which] provide[s] supplemental funding to encourage andassist mobilehome park residents to purchase the mobilehome parks and convert them to resident ownership. (Health & Saf.Code, § 50780, subd. (a)).”) In 1995, however, the Legislature took forceful action to protect the foregoing policy from local interference. As the sponsorof the relevantbill complained, “[s]ome local governments have imposed a virtual roadblock to park conversion .. . .” (Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 4 [“4 AA”] at 750 (quoting Senator William A. Craven, sponsor of SB 310) Thus, the Legislature adopted a preemptive setof statewidecriteria for the approvalof this type of subdivision. (Sequoia Park Associates, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at 1282-1287) The contours of the preemption have continued to engender debate,litigation, and legislative activity. Section 66427.5 was amended again in 2002, and the opinion belowis the fourth published decision on this subject since 2002. (£/ Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd, supra; Sequoia Park, supra, and Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City ofCarson (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1487 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 822]) The controversy has also spawnedseveral recent unpublished decisions. -3- Until now, however, at least one fundamental point appeared settled. While somedifferences remain as to the intent and ramifications of § 66427.5 itself, a consensus had emerged that § 66427.5 is the only state statute governingthis specialized and sensitive form of subdivision. So all the players — local agencies, park residents, and park owners — at least knew the basic rules and could govern themselves accordingly. Not any more. The opinion below blessescriteria for this type of subdivision that have no colorable grounding in any language of § 66427.5. The opinion holds that local agencieslike the appellant, City of Los Angeles, havefree rein to block § 66427.5 subdivisionsbyciting other state statutes. In this case it was the Coastal Act and Mello Act. But the reasoning below — in direct conflict with the Sequoia Park line of cases — extends a wideinvitation to similar reasoning and results. This Court should settle the conflict and restore a modicum of certainty to this important issue of continuing statewide concern. In the process, the Court should also settle an important point about the Coastal Act and Mello Act, statutes governing a huge area of the State. While the Legislature carefully limited the reach of those statutes to avoid conflicts with other ones, the opinion below brushes thoselimitations aside and upsets the intended balance. In significant -4- part, moreover, it follows uncritically a poorly reasoned holding never followed before (California Coastal Commission v. Quanta Inv. Corp. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 579). Accordingly, this Court should disapprove Quanta's holding as well, or at least confine it to its facts, and restore the balance deliberately established by the Legislature. SUMMARYOFTHE CASE The basic facts and proceedings material to this petition can be summarized briefly. The Palisades Bowl MobilehomeParkis located at 16321 Pacific Coast Highway, across the street from Will Rogers State Beach. (9 AA at 1952) On April 23, 2007, Palisades Bowl commenced discussionswithcity officials to determine what information should be includedin its proposed application to convert its 170+ unit mobilehomepark to resident ownership. (9 AA 1952) But when Palisades Bowlfirst attempted to submit its application, on June 21, 2007, city officials claimed they were not “ready”for it because thecity had no checklist of required items. (/d.) As a result, Palisades Bowl spent the next five monthstrying to work with the City to develop such a checklist. (/d/) Finally, Palisades Bowl attemptedin vainto file its application on November13, 2007, in the hope ofat least obtaining an authoritative decision as to completeness or incompletenessof its application. (9 AA -5- 1952) Butall it received was an e-mail on November20, 2007, attempting to explain why the application had been rejected. (9 AA 1953) The e-mail also listed five items “you needto file [with] your application. . .” (2 AA 235, 9 AA 1953) They included: (1) apply for a general plan amendmentand zoning change, (2) apply for Mello Act clearance, (3) apply for a coastal development permit, (4) submit a parcel mapapplication, and (5) submit a new tenant impact report. (9 AA 1957) However, the city subsequently narrowedits position to only two of those requirements: the Mello Act clearance and the coastal developmentpermit. (9 AA 1957) After the city refused to accept the application of November13, 2007 (AA 2:236), Palisades Bowlfiled its original petition in the superior court for a writ of mandate on January 17, 2008. (1 AA 8 et seq.) Palisades Bowl brought causesof action for traditional mandamus and declaratory and injunctiverelief. Following amendments, briefing, and argument, Palisades Bowl prevailed onits contention that § 66427.5 preempted thecity’s attempt to imposecriteria for a subdivision application that were not enumeratedin that statute. Los Angeles Superior Court Judge JamesC. Chalfant issued an extraordinarily detailed analysis of the various statutes involved. (9 AA 1951-1960) Judgmentfollowed on April 13, 2009 (9 -6- AA 1998-2002) and a peremptory writ on May 7, 2009. (/d. at 2010- 2013) Thecity timely appealed as to the preemptionissues, and Palisades Bowl pursued a cross-appeal from the denialofits claims under the Permit Streamlining Act (Govt. Code § 65920 et seq.) However, it does not seek review of Part A of the opinion below on the latter subject. LEGAL ANALYSIS REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO RESOLVE A CONFLICTIN PUBLISHED AUTHORITY WHETHERTHE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO ADOPT ONLY ONESET OF CRITERIA FOR A SENSITIVE TYPE OF MOBILEHOMEPARK SUBDIVISION A. THE TEXT OF § 66427.5 There is no need to repeat Sequo/sa Park's thorough explanation why § 66427.5, both before and after its amendmentin 2002, was intendedasthe sole authority over conversion applications throughits uniform statewidecriteria. While that opinion focuses on state versus local authority, its whole premise is that § 66427.5 was intended as the exclusive statewide authority over this type of subdivision. Nevertheless, the opinion below finds a legislative intent to permit additional criteria if credibly founded on otherstate statutes. That holding cannotsurvivescrutiny, and the first reason is textual. There is a tried and true way to make statutes nonexclusive. The Legislature says so. And hereit did not. One familiar way to make a statute nonexclusive is to insert the proviso: “except as otherwise provided by statute.” An eminent domain statute, for example, provides: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all improvements pertaining to the realty shall be taken into accountin determining compensation.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.210, subd. (a)) In that case, the Legislature plainly contemplated role for otherstatutes. But no such language appears in § 66427.5. Norare there wordsto that effect in the key provision cited by Sequoia Park andits predecessor, F/ Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd., as evidence of a strong preemptive intent. The provision reads: [tlhe scope of the hearing shall be limited to the issue of compliance with this section. (Subd. (e)) “This section” means § 66427.5. Period. Had the Legislature contemplated a role for any otherstatutes in the application process, whetherdirectly or through local implementation, this would have been a logical place to say so. The Legislature could have modified the passage to conclude: “compliance with this section or any other applicable statute.” Or, perhaps: “any other applicable statute orits local implementation.” But no such language appears. It is also telling, finally, that Govt. Code § 66427.4, immediately preceding § 66427.5, expressly allows supplementalcriteria for a different kind of park conversion, one designed to close the park and convert the land “to another use.” (§ 66427.4, subd. (a)) On that subject, the Legislature provided: “[tlhis section establishes a minimum standard for local regulation of conversions of mobilehome parks into other uses and shall not prevent a local agency from enacting more stringent measures.” The absenceof such a proviso in § 66427.5, or any similar language, ts compelling evidence of an intent to make its enumerated criteria exclusive of any local criteria — whetheror not otherstate statutes could becited in their defense. Nor should the courts effectively insert a proposition into a statute so plainly at odds withits text. As this Court stated in Regents ofthe Univ. ofCalifornia v. -9- Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 531: “[wlhat[the Legislature] did not speak we should not claim to hear.” B. A “STATE STATUTE” EXCEPTION WOULD GUT THE INTENDED PREEMPTION The same conclusion follows from the consequencesof the holding below. The broad sweepof the proposed “state statute” exception would decimate the preemptive force of § 66427.5. /nnumerable local ordinances and policies rest on state law to one extent or another. In Sequoia Park, for example, Sonoma County had deviated from § 66427.5 by requiring applicants to document compliance with “the goals and policies of the General Plan Housing Element. . . .” (Quoted at 176 Cal.App.4th 1288) But such housing elements are directly compelled by onestate statute (Govt. Code § 65302, subd. (c)) and heavily influenced by others. (Govt. Code §§ 65580 efseq.) Accordingly, the “state statute” rationale advancedin the present case would have produced a contrary result in Sequoia Park. But the “state statute” exception would sweep much more broadly. Local governments bent on evasion could cite the foregoing -10- land-usestatutes alone to justify innumerable deviations. Those statutes alone authorize local action on a myriad of issues such as highways, terminals, military installations, forests, soils, rivers, harbors, fisheries, pollution, erosion, open space, noise, earthquakes, floods, and tsunamis. Beyondthe land-use statutes, however,lies a vast trove ofstate law that local governments hostile to § 66427.5 could invoke. For example, why not require applicants to track down every dog within 25 miles of the mobilehomepark andfile a report on their safety? Under the “state statute” rationale, a city could easily point to Civil Code § 3342.5, which admonishesthat “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to preventlegislation in the field of dog controlby anycity, county, or city and county.” (Subd.e)) Sequoia Park properly rejected the “housing element”rationale for evading § 66427.5 even thoughit rests squarely on state law. This Court should now reject the entire “state statute” rationale. It would invite interference with conversion applications any time a local agency could cite a statute relevant in any way to a mobilehomeparkorits proposed conversion to resident ownership. If that were sufficient to avoid the preemptive force of § 66427.5, it would effectively repeal the statute. Andthatis the Legislature’s prerogative, not the courts’. -11- REVIEW IS WARRANTEDTO SETTLE THE INTENDED SCOPE OF THE COASTAL ACT AND MELLO ACT Even assuming arguendo that some state statutes mightjustify a deviation from § 66427.5, neither the Coastal Act nor the Mello Act would do so. Their own language and purposebartheiruseto justify local stonewalling of a conversion application under § 66427.5. Moreover, their construction below would upset a delicate balance deliberately established by the Legislature between those statutes and others arguably covering similar issues. A. THE COASTAL ACT Palisades Bowl will first demonstrate that the Coastal Act does not even apply to conversions governed by § 66427.5. But to whatever extent it might otherwise apply to mobilehomeparks, severalofits provisions preserve the limitations imposed on local government authority by § 66427.5. -12- 1. The Act Does Not Apply to These Conversions The attempt to invoke the Coastal Act in this case rests on a very slim reed. The Act’s definition of the “development”it covers includes the phrase “any other division of land.” (Pub. Res. Code § 30106) But that phrase appears in a clause whoseonly subjectis a “change in the density or intensity of use of land... .” And the conversions governed by § 66427.5, by definition and settled case law, do not effect such a change. Hereis the pertinent definition of “development,” without changing any word or punctuation, but separating out and numbering independentclauses and emphasizing the oneatissue here: “Development” means, on land, in or under water, [1] the placementor erection of any solid material or structure; [2] discharge or disposal of any dredged material or of any gaseous,liquid, solid, or thermal waste; [3] grading, removing, dredging, mining, or extraction of any materials; [4] changein the density or intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to, subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act (commencing with Section 66410 of the Government Code), and any otherdivision of land, including lot splits, except where the land division is brought aboutin -13- connection with the purchase of such land by a public agencyfor public recreational use; [5] change in the intensity of use of water, or of access thereto; construction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any structure,["] including anyfacility of any private, public, or municipalutility; and [6] the removal or harvesting of major vegetation other than for agricultural purposes, kelp harvesting, and timber operations whichare in accordance with a timber harvesting plan submitted pursuantto the provisions of the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (commencing with Section 4511). The plain meaning of Clause 4 is that the Act applies to a “change in the density or intensity of use” of coastal land. And that reflects the dominant purposeof the Act. But then, wisely or unwisely, Clause 4 cites examples of methods by which such a change can be made: “including, but notlimited to, subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act... and any otherdivisionof land, including lotsplits. . . .” Both grammatically andlogically, the illustrative methodscited in Clause 4 do notalter the defining subject identified at the beginning of the clause: changes in density or intensity of use. And when a statementhasa defining subject like that, especially one soplainly stated as here, it impresses a meaning andlimits on any examplesthat follow. " A subsequentdefinition of “structure” has no bearinghere. -14- Otherwise, such examples could too easily be taken out of context, ignoring and distorting the plain meaning of the statement as a whole. Indeed, that very flaw wasidentified and rejected in American Civil Rights Found. v. Berkeley Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 207 (review denied). The appellant was relying on one phrase in a constitutional provision. The Court of Appeal responded: “The argumentdistorts the language of the constitutional provision by omitting the subject ofthe sentence... ." (/d. at 218; italics added) The same flaw underminesthe principal authority the opinion cites to the contrary on Clause 4: California Coastal Commissionv. Quanta Inv. Corp., supra, 113 Cal. App.3d 579, 605-609. Without addressing the defining subject of Clause 4, the opinion by Justice Auerbachheld that the phrase “division of land” wassufficient to apply the Coastal Act to a conversion of apartments into a stock cooperative. Quanta said nothing about the context of that phrase in a clause whose only subject was a changein density or intensity of use. Instead, Quanta focused exclusively on the examples of methods, reasoning that a “division of land” must be construed atleast as broadly as a “subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision MapAct. . . .” True enough, subordinate phrases ordinarily have the same import when usedfor similar purposes in the same statement. But the -15- nature of that common import dependsonthe defining subject of the statement. With respect, Quanta erred by taking subordinate phrases completely out of context, and thereby giving the Coastal Act an expansive reach that cannot be reconciled with the grammar, logic, and purpose of Clause 4. The opinion below marksthefirst time Quanta has ever been followed onthis point, and part ofits rationale is now moot.’ Accordingly, the present case presents an apt opportunity to disapprove this holding or, at a minimum,limit it to stock cooperatives. In the present case, for example,it is well settled that mobilehome park conversions under § 66427.5 entail no changein use of the land — let alone a changein “density or intensity” as contemplated by the Coastal Act. £/ Dorado squarely held that “a change in form of ownership [under § 66427.5] is not a change in use.” (96 Cal.App.4th 1153) Similarly, Sequoia Park held that, notwithstanding a conversion under § 66427.5, “the mobilehome park will continue to operate as such, * Quanta reasonedthat, if a stock cooperative conversionaffects affordable housing, it “may have an impact of concern in this area of [Coastal] Commission interest” (113 Cal.App.3d at 588and 609) But the statutory language twice cited to thateffect, in Pub. Res. Code § 30213, was deleted the next year. (SB 626; Stats.1981, c. 1007, p. 3900, § 2) And the samebill added a provision that “[nJo local coastal program shall be required to include housing policies and programs.” (/d., § 3, codified as P.R.C. § 30500.1) -16- merely transitioning from a rental to an ownership basis.” (176 Cal.App. 4th 1296) Onthis record, then, this Court should hold that the Coastal Act wasneverintended to apply to conversions under § 66427.5 because they entail no changein the density orintensity of use of coastal land. 2. Evenif the Coastal Act Applied in Other Ways,It Expressly Preserves the Force of a Statute Like § 66427.5 Unlike § 66427.5, which leaves no room for parallel or supplemental rules onits subject matter, the Coastal Act repeatedly acknowledgessuch rules and expressly preserves their force. Andit does so on the very subject of local authority. As a result, to whatever extent the Legislature may have intended the Coastal Actto apply to mobilehomeparks, the Act expressly preservesthe limitations on local authority foundin statute like § 66427.5. To begin with, Pub. Res. Code § 30005, subd. (a), addresseslocal power “to adopt and enforce additional regulations, not in conflict with this act, imposing further conditions, restrictions, or limitations with respect to any land or water use or other activity which might adversely affect the resourcesof the coastal zone.” That broad powerarguably -17- extends to mobilehome parks. But while § 30005(a) declares that the CoastalAct does notlimit that power, the subdivision begins: “[e]xcept as otherwise limited by state law... .” Thus, § 30005(a) expressly preservesall other state-law limitations on the local powerit addresses. Accordingly, howeverelse the Coastal Act might authorize local action involving mobilehome parks, the Act expressly preservesthe limitations of local power under a statute like § 66427.5. If there were truly a tension or conflict as the city maintains, the Legislature plainly intended § 66427.5 to control. To the same effect is Pub. Res. Code § 30005.5. It provides, in relevant part: “[nJothingin this division shall be construed to authorize any local government. . . to exercise any powerit does not already have under the Constitution and lawsofthis state or that is not specifically delegated pursuant to [P.R.C.] Section 30519.” As applied here, one of the “lawsofthis state” denies any powerto local governments to impose criteria for conversion applications not enumerated in § 66427.5. Nor does P.R.C. § 30519 address that subjectat all. Again, P.R.C. § 30005.5 expressly defers to a power-limiting statute like § 66427.5. Finally, P.R.C. § 30007 providesin pertinent part: “[nlothingin this division shall exempt local governments from meeting the requirements ofstate . . . law with respect to providing low- and -18- moderate-income housing . . . or any other obligation related to housing imposed by existing law or any law hereafter enacted.” Section 66427.5 is one such requirement. It compels local governments to approve any conversion map meeting the uniform statewidecriteria. And the purpose of that requirement is to maintain California’s mobilehome parks as sourcesofaffordable housing. The appellant city’s own opening brief below so acknowledges. It correctly points out that the Legislature: establish[ed] a fund to help residents acquire the mobilehomeparks in which they reside . . . . [because] mobilehomeparks provide a significant source of homeownership for California residents. . . . [The Legislature] further identifie[d] pressures on the park owners to convert the parks to other uses which create a dangerto residents most in need of affordable housing. . . Therefore, . . . the Legislature intended to encourage and facilitate the conversion of mobilehomeparks to resident ownership, and for the governmentto provide supplemental funding. (AOB 36) Wecannotsay it any better. But the Legislature’s same policy — “to encourage and facilitate” these conversions — also explainsits determination in § 66427.5 to prohibit local deviations and obstructions. -19- In addition, § 66427.5 addresses the affordability of rents at a converted park. It speaks of “avoid[ing] the economic displacementof all nonpurchasing residents”(introductory par.); gives residents an “option” to purchase, not a command(subd.(a)); and controls rent for all who do not purchase, in accordance with their means. (Subd. (f)) For the foregoing reasons, § 66427.5 is precisely the type of legislation identified in P.R.C. § 30007. Andit follows that the latter statute expressly preserves the force of § 66427.5 against any contrary reading of the Coastal Act. B. THE MELLO ACT The Mello Act is much shorter than the Coastal Act, and needs only one provision to establish its deferenceto statutes like § 66427.5. Govt. Code § 65590, subd. (h), states: “[n]o provision of this section shall be construed as increasing or decreasing the authority of a local governmentto enact ordinancesor to take any other action to ensure the continued affordability of housing.” In other words, the Mello Act expressly preserves any other law thatlimits local authority within the scope of subdivision (h). -20- Onesuchlaw is § 66427.5. Asfully explained in the preceding sectionof this petition, both the text and underlying policy of § 66427.5 address “the continued affordability of housing” within the meaning of the Mello Act. And the latter, accordingly, expressly preserves the limitation in § 66427.5 on local powers onthat subject. Finally, it makes perfect sense for the Mello Act to deferin that way. The essence of the Act is to require replacement, when necessary, of low- or moderate-income housing in a coastal area. (Govt. Code § 65590, subd. (b)) Indeed, while the Act includes mobilehome park conversions within its primary coverageclause,’ the latter contains a restriction dramatically confirming the Act’s focus on a /oss of housing units in a coastal area, notjust a change in the form of ownership. And as shownpreviously, conversions governed by § 66427.5 entail no loss of housing units atall. Underits primary coverage provision, subdivision (b), the Mello Act applies only to “residential dwelling units occupied by persons and families of low or moderate income. . . .” But subdivision (b) goes on to limit that phrase sharply. A separate paragraph provides: * The general coverage clause, subdivision (b), uses the term “conversion,” whose definition in subd. (g)(1) includes a mobilehome park conversion. -21- [flor purposesofthis subdivision, a residential dwelling unit shall be deemed occupied by a person orfamily of low or moderate income/fthe person or family was evicted from that dwelling unit within one yearpriorto thefiling of an application to convert or demolish the unit andif the eviction wasfor the purpose of avoiding the requirements of this subdivision. . . . (Italics added) In sum, given the Mello Act’s focus on replacing /ost housing units, the Legislature had no reasonatall to disturb a statute like § 66427.5 that threatens no suchloss. CONCLUSION Forall the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant review and hold, on the merits, that Govt. Code § 66427.5 was intended as the exclusive set of criteria for the relevant park subdivisions, and nothingin the Coastal Act or Mello Act suggests a contrary intent. DATED: October 12, 2010 Respectfully submitted, BIEN & SUMMERS By: [S/ ELLIOT L. BIEN AttorneysforPlaintiff and Respondent, PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES, LLC -22- CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH OF PETITION The undersigned, counsel for the plaintiffs and appellants, hereby certifies pursuant to Rule 14(c)(1), California Rules of Court, that the foregoing petition is proportionately spaced, has a 13-point typeface, and contains 4,350 words as computed by the word processing program (WordPerfect X4) used to prepare the petition. DATED: October 12, 2010 /S/ ELLIOT L. BIEN Westlaw. Page 1 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California. PACIFIC PALISADES BOWL MOBILE ESTATES,LLC,Plaintiff and Appellant, Vv. CITY OF LOS ANGELES,Defendant and Appellant. No. B216515. Aug. 31, 2010. Background: Mobile home park owner brought action against city, seeking writ of manda- mus and declaratory relief, challenging city's denial of owner's application for conversion of park to resident ownership, alleging that city could not require owner's application to comply with Mello Act or Coastal Act, and alleging that city violated Permit Streamlining Act. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, No. BS112956,James C. Chalfant, J., entered judgment directing issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding city to deem owner's ap- plication complete, and determining that city had complied with Permit Streamlining Act. Parties appealed and cross-appealed. Holdings: The Court of Appeal, Willhite, J., held that: (1) city complied with Permit Streamlining Act, and (2) city could require owner to comply with Mello Act and Coastal Act. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. West Headnotes [1] Zoning and Planning 414 <>1385 414 Zoning and Planning 414VIII Permits, Certificates, and Approvals 414VIII(A) In General 414k1385 k. Mobile homes;trailer parks. Most Cited Cases City's failure to maintain a checklist of all requirements specifically governing approval of ap- plication for conversion of mobile home park to resident ownership did not require, pursuant to Permit Streamlining Act, that park owner's park-conversion application be deemed com- plete, but only precluded city from prospectively requiring itemsleft off of approval checklist city had provided owner. West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code §§ 65940, 65942. [2] Zoning and Planning 414 €1425 414 Zoning and Planning 414VIII Permits, Certificates, and Approvals 414VIII(B) Proceedings on Permits, Certificates, or Approvals 414k1424 Determination 414k1425 k. In general. Most Cited Cases © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 2 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) E-mail sent by case manager of city planning department to mobile home park owner, explain- ing why owner's application for permit to convert park to resident ownership was incomplete, was sufficient to substantially comply with requirements of Permit Streamlining Act govern- ing determination of completeness of application; even though e-mail did not mention Permit Streamlining Act, e-mail enumerated five items that owner had failed to include in applica- tion. West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code § 65943. [3] Zoning and Planning 414 <>1420 414 Zoning and Planning 414VIII Permits, Certificates, and Approvals 414VIII(B) Proceedings on Permits, Certificates, or Approvals 414k1418 Notice and Hearing 414k1420 k. Notice. Most Cited Cases Zoning and Planning 414 €1425 414 Zoning and Planning 414VIII Permits, Certificates, and Approvals 414VIII(B) Proceedings on Permits, Certificates, or Approvals 414k1424 Determination 414k1425 k. In general. Most Cited Cases Section of municipal code defining written notice did not apply to determination of complete- ness of permit application under Permit Streamlining Act, and thus e-mail sent by case man- ager of city planning department to mobile home park owner, explaining why owner's applica- tion for permit to convert park to resident ownership was incomplete, was a sufficient determ- ination of completeness even if e-mails could not constitute written notice pursuant to muni- cipal code. West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code § 65943. [4] Environmental Law 149E ¢<132 149E Environmental Law 149RIV Water, Wetlands, and Waterfront Conservation 149Ek129 Permissible Uses and Activities; Permits and Licenses; Management 149Ek132 k. Coastal areas, bays, and shorelines. Most Cited Cases Zoning and Planning 414 €--1413 414 Zoning and Planning 414VIII Permits, Certificates, and Approvals 414VIN(B) Proceedings on Permits, Certificates, or Approvals 414k1413 k. Application; plans and specifications. Most Cited Cases Portion of statute governing conversion of mobile home parks to resident ownership, limiting scope of hearing of local agency on approval of a tentative map proposed by a park owner seeking conversion to issue of compliance with statute, did not preclude city from requiring that park owner who sought conversionof park located within coastal area submit a permit ap- plication that included an application for clearance under Mello Act and an application for a © 2010 ThomsonReuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 3 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) coastal development permit under Coastal Act; although mobile home conversion statute was intended to further important policy of encouraging conversions while protecting nonpurchas- ing residents, policy considerations behind Mello Act and Coastal Act were more extensive, seeking to balance protection of coastal resources and development by providing a compre- hensive statutory scheme regulating land use planning throughout coastal zone. West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code §§ 65590, 66427.5; West's Ann.Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 30600. See 9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2001) §§ 25:19, 25:38, 25:50; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 335; 12 Witkin, Summaryof Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, §§ 790, 863; Cal. Jur. 3d, Real Estate, § 1086; Friedman etal., Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2009) ¢ 11:198.5 (CALANDTENCh. 11-E).**839 Blum Collins and Craig M. Collins, Santa Monica, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Jeri L. Burge, Assistant City Attorney, **840 and Amy Brothers, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant. Aleshire & Wynder, William W. Wynder and Sunny K. Soltani, Irvine, for Amicus Curiae Palisades Bowl] Residents’ Association, Inc. and City of Carson in support of City of Los Angeles. Law Office of William J. Constantine and William J. Constantine for Amicus Curiae The Golden State Manufactured Home Owners' League in support of City of Los Angeles. Bien & Summers, Elliot L. Bien, Novato, and Amy E. Margolin for Amicus Curiae Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association in support of Pacific Palisades Bow! Mobile Estates, LLC. WILLHITE,J. *1466 The California Legislature enacted a statute-Government Code FNI section 66427.5- that facilitates the conversion of mobilehome parks to resident ownership by limiting a local authority's traditional power to regulate development within the local authority's territory when the proposed developmentis the conversion of a mobilehome park. That statute imposes certain specific requirements on the subdivider seeking the conversion (aimed at preventing the displacement of current residents, particularly those with lower incomes), and provides that the scope of the hearing at which the local authority may approve, conditionally approve, or deny the tentative map “shall be limited to the issue of compliance” with the specific re- quirements set forth in the statute. (§ 66427.5, subd.(e).) FN1. Further undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. But the Legislature also enacted a statute-section 65590, part of the Mello Act-that “establishes minimum requirements for housing within the coastal zone for persons and famil- ies of low or moderate income” (§ 65590, subd. (k)) and requires local governments to deny the conversion of mobilehome parks within the coastal zone unless certain requirements have been met (§ 65590, subd. (b)). The Legislature also enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme that regulates all development within the coastal zone-the California Coastal Act of 1976 ( © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 4 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.) (the *1467 Coastal Act)-a provision of which requires any person wishing to undertake any development within the coastal zone to obtain a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission and/or a local agency, depend- ing upon the circumstances. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30600, subd.(a).) This case presents the question: What happens when conversion to resident ownership is sought for a mobilehome park that is located in the coastal zone? Does the limitation on the scope of the hearing set forth in section 66427.5, subdivision (e), prohibit the local authority from requiring compliance with the Mello Act and the Coastal Act? In this case, the City of Los Angeles (the City) rejected as incomplete the application of Pacific Palisades Bowl Mo- bile Estates, LLC (Palisades Bowl) for conversion of its mobilehome park-whichis located in the coastal zone-because the application failed to include an application for clearance under the Mello Act and an application for a coastal development permit under the Coastal Act. The trial court found that the City abused its discretion by requiring compliance with the Mello Act and requiring Palisades Bowl to apply to the City for a coastal development permit, and entered judgment directing issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus commandingthe City to deem Palisades Bowl's application complete. We conclude that, despite the limiting lan- guage in section 66427.5, the Mello Act and Coastal Act apply to a mobilehomepark conver- sion **841 within the coastal zone, and the local authority must ensure compliance with those acts in addition to compliance with section 66427.5. Wealso address Palisades Bowl's cross-appeal, challenging the trial court's ruling that the City substantially complied with the requirement under the Permit Streamlining Act (§ 65920 et seq.) to provide, within 30 days after a development applicationis filed, written notification that the application is incomplete. In light of the record, we affirm that ruling. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter with directions to deny Palis- ades Bowl'spetition. BACKGROUND Palisades Bowl owns a mobilehome park with more than 170 units, located across Pacific Coast Highway from Will Rogers State Beach. In August 2006, residents of the park weretold that Palisades Bowl intended to subdivide the park to residential ownership. Concerned about protecting residents in the event of a forced conversion, as well as health and safety issues and code violations at the park, the Palisades Bowl Residents' Association, Inc. (Residents' Asso- ciation) hired an attorney and, in March 2007, began discussions with Palisades Bowl about a global agreementto satisfy the needsofall parties. *1468 In the meantime, Palisades Bowl hired an engineering firm to help get approvalofits subdivision application. In April 2007, Robert Ruiz, a design engineer/project manager for the engineering firm, went to the City's Division of Land office and asked for a list of items needed to file a mobilehome park conversion application. The person at the counter told him that the City did not have a list specifically for mobilehome park conversions, but there was such a list for tentative tract map applications, which was what Ruiz would need to submit. Later that month, Ruiz spoke by telephone with Lynn Harper, a city planner at the Department © 2010 ThomsonReuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 5 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) of City Planning assigned to supervise the Parcel Map unit within the Division of Land. They discussed various issues related to the proposed mobilehome park conversion, including the various requirements Harper said Palisades Bowl would needto satisfy to obtain approval. Following that conversation, Harper sent Ruiz a package of materials, including various forms and instructions (such as those related to Mello Act clearances and coastal developmentper- mits), and a tract map checklist. In June 2007, Ruiz again wentto the City's Division of Land office, and said he wantedto file an application to convert the mobilehomepark. The person at the counter told Ruiz that Palis- ades Bowl needed to include applications for a zone change and a general plan amendment. Ruiz insisted that understate law, Palisades Bowl did not need a zone changeorgeneral plan amendment. The person at the counter told Ruiz that the City would not accept the application becauseit was incomplete. Shortly thereafter, Harper asked Michael LoGrande, Chief Zoning Administrator for the De- partment of City Planning, to assign a case managerto the matter to work directly with Palis- ades Bowl. LoGrande appointed Richard Ferguson as case manager in August 2007. Overthe next few months, Ferguson had several communications with representatives of Palisades Bowl, both telephonic and by e-mail, regarding variousissues, including the requirements Pal- isades Bow] neededto satisfy and the allowable scope of the City's review of the proposed subdivision. At the same time, Ferguson was conducting research and meeting with other City Planning staff to determine exactly what items Palisades Bowl would needtofile with its ap- plication. On November 9, 2007, he sent an e-mail to a Palisades Bow] **842 representative, to update him onthestaff's latest discussion about what was needed. He noted “[{t]here is still some discrepancy on what need[s] to be done before the map [application] can be filed,” par- ticularly with regard to a zoning issue, andthat the staff had not yet decided what the proper vehicle should be to remedytheissue. Four days later, on November 13, 2007, Ruiz, his superior, and Palisades Bowl's lawyer went to the Division of Land to submit Palisades *1469 Bowl's conversion application. Harper was called to the counter. She examined the application and found it was missing applications for a zone change, a general plan amendment, a coastal development permit, and a Mello Act af- fordable housing determination. She told the Palisades Bowl representatives that she would not accept the application for filing, and called Ferguson to the counter. Ferguson told the rep- resentatives that the missing applications needed to be included with the conversion applica- tion, and that he would send them a follow-up e-mail. Palisades Bowl's lawyer told Harper and Ferguson that Palisades Bowl believed that the application, which was being submitted under section 66427.5, was complete, and that the City had an obligation to acceptthe applic- ation, review it, and provide a written completeness determination. The representatives left the application on the counter, along with a letter from the lawyer summarizing Palisades Bowl's position that the application is governed by 66427.5, that the City may not refuseto acceptthe application, and that the Permit Streamlining Act, particularly section 65943, applied to the application. On November 20, 2007, Ferguson sent an e-mail to Palisades Bowl's engineer,listing “the items you need to file your application.” Those items were: (1) an application for a zone © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 6 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) change and a general plan amendment; (2) an application for a coastal development permit (Ferguson noted that because the site is in a dual jurisdiction, Palisades Bowl would need clearance from both the City and the Coastal Commission, and the Commission requires de- velopersto file with the local agency before filing with the Commission); (3) an application to the Housing Departmentfor clearance under the Mello Act; (4) a copy of the tenant impact re- port required under section 66427.5, following the format ofthe City Advisory Agency; and (5) the Parcel Mapapplication package using form CP-1801.° **~ FN2. A year later, on November 19, 2008 (while this case was beforethetrial court), the City sent a “Letter of Correction” to Palisades Bowl's representatives stating that the list should be corrected to delete item 1 (no application for zone change or general plan amendment was necessary) and to change the reference in item 5 from “Parcel Map”to “tentative tract map” using form number CP-6110 rather than CP-1801. Nofurther action was taken, by the City or Palisades Bowl, until Palisades Bow!filed the pe- tition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief in this case, on January 17, 2008. After amendment, the petition/complaint alleged that the City failed to com- pile a proper list of items needed to apply for a mobilehomepark conversion(i.e., a checklist), improperly refused to accept Palisades Bowl's application, and failed to notify Palisades Bowl in writing of any deficiencies in its application, and therefore the application should be deemed complete under the Permit Streamlining Act. The petition/complaint also alleged that the City lacks *1470 discretion to impose any requirements other than those set forth in sec- tion 66427.5, and asked the court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate, injunction, order, or declaration commanding the City to compile a checklist specifically for mobilehome park conversions, deem Palisades Bowl's application complete,**843 process the application under the limited review Process qnandated by section 66427.5, and make a decision approving or denying the application. FN3. The petition/complaint asserted four causes of action: for administrative manda- mus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), for traditional mandamus (CodeCiv. Proc., § 1085), for declaratory relief, and for injunctiverelief. In August 2008, Palisades Bow] filed a motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus and de- claratory relief. Although the notice of motion stated that the motion sought a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the City to, among other things, review the application only for compliance with section 66427.5, Palisades Bowl's memorandum of points and authorities only addressed the City's alleged failure to provide a checklist for mobilehome park conver- sions and its failure to make a timely completeness determination. Thetrial court denied the motion. It found that, although the City “probably” violated section 65940 of the Permit Streamlining Act by failing to provide achecklist for mobilehome park conversions, no partic- ular remedy flowed from that failure. But it concluded that Ferguson's November 20 e- mail substantially complied with the Permit Streamlining Act's requirement that the City provide a written completeness determination. FN4. The court also found that the City's refusal to accept Palisades Bowl's application for filing was unlawful, because it would render the Permit Streamlining Act meaning- © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 7 187 Cal-App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal-App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) less. In response to Palisades Bowl's request, the court granted Palisades Bowl leave to file a second amendedpetition/complaint to address whether the City could require Palisades Bowl to provide the items.listed in Ferguson's e-mail. Palisades Bow] filed the second amendedpe- tition/complaint, “"~ and brought a second motion for peremptory writ of mandate and declar- atory relief. It argued that the City abused its discretion by requiring Palisades Bowl to submit any additional items because the City failed to provide a proper checklist. Alternatively, it ar- gued that the City abused its discretion by requiring Palisades Bowl to submit the items set forth in Ferguson's e-mail because those items either were already submitted or they cannot be required in light of section 66427.5. In its opposition to the motion, the City noted that it no longer asserted that Palisades Bowl was required to apply for a zone change or general plan amendmentand that no new tenant survey or tenant impact report was required. Thus, the only items the City maintained were *1471 required were a Mello Act clearance, a coastal develop- ment permit from the City and the Coastal Commission, and a complete tentative tract map application. FN5. The amendments to the petition/complaint went far beyond the scope of the court's order granting leave, however, and the trial court granted the City's motion to strike those portions that exceeded the scope (including the addition of another defend- ant, the Residents' Association). Thetrial court granted the motion. It found that, under the Permit Streamlining Act, the City could not require Palisades Bowl to submit a complete tentative tract map application because Ferguson's e-mail did not list that as a missing item. The court also concluded that the lan- guage of section 66427.5, subdivision (e), precluded the City from requiring compliance with the Mello Act and the Coastal Act. The court entered judgment and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus commandingthe City to (1) vacate its November 20, 2007 decision finding Pal- isades Bowls application incomplete; (2) deem the application complete; and (3) evaluate the application for approval, conditional approval, or disapproval within the time limits set **844 forth in the applicable statutes and ordinances. The City appeals from the judgment, and Palis- ades Bowlcross-appeals. DISCUSSION On appeal, the City contends the Mello Act and the Coastal Act can be harmonized with sec- tion 66427.5, andthatthe trial court erred by finding that section 66427.5 precluded the City from requiring Palisades Bowl to comply with the Mello Act and Coastal Act. It its cross-ap- peal, Palisades Bowl contendsthetrial court abused its discretion in finding that the City sat- isfied the requirement of the Permit Streamlining Act to provide a written completeness de- termination. Webegin our analysis with Palisades Bowl's contention in its cross-appeal. A. Must the Application Be Deemed Complete Under the Permit Streamlining Act? The California Legislature enacted the Permit Streamlining Act in 1977, declaring “that there © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 8 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) is a statewide need to ensure clear understanding of the specific requirements which must be met in connection with the approval of development projects and to expedite decisions on such projects.” (§ 65921.) The act requires every state and local agency to “compile one or morelists that shall specify in detail the information that will be required from any applicant for a developmentproject” and to make those lists available to all applicants and any person who requests that information. (§ 65940, subd. (a).) The lists must also indicate the criteria the agency will apply to determine the completeness of an application submitted toit. (§ 65941.) After an application is received by an agency, the agency must “determine in writing whether the application is complete and... immediately transmit the determination to the applicant.” (§ 65943, subd. (a).) If the *1472 determination is not made within 30 days after the application is received, the application “shall be deemed complete for purposes of this chapter.” (Id.) If, within the 30-day period, the application is determined not to be complete, the determination must “specify those parts of the application which are incomplete and... indicate the manner in which they can be made complete, including a list and thorough description of the specific information needed to complete the application.” (Id.) The completion determinationis critic- al, because once an application is accepted as complete, the agency cannot require additional information or documentation not previously specified, although it can require the applicant to clarify, amplify, correct, or otherwise supplementthe information required for the application. (§ 65944, subd.(a).) In its cross-appeal, Palisades Bowl argues thatthe trial court abusedits discretion by finding the City made a timely completeness determination because (1) the City could not have made a completeness determination because it did not maintain any checklist specifically for mo- bilehome park conversions; (2) the City improperly refused to accept Palisades Bowl's applic- ation; and (3) Ferguson.sNovember 20 e-mail wasinsufficient to satisfy the requirement of a written determination. FN6. Wenote that, although these were the only issues raised in the cross-appellant's opening brief portion of Palisades Bowl's initial brief on appeal, a significant portion of its reply brief on the cross-appeal addressed other issues, namely issues raised in the City's appeal. Inclusion of those issues in the reply brief was improper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.216(b)(3).) Therefore, we grant the City's motion to strike pages 26-37 of Palisades Bowl's reply brief. Palisades Bowlalso filed a request for judicial notice in conjunction with its reply brief, asking us to take judicial notice of portions ofthe le- gislative history relating to section 66427.5. Those documentsrelate only to the issues in the City's appeal, and haveno relevance to the issues in the cross-appeal. Therefore, wedeny that request as untimely. In any event, two of the documents for which Palis- ades Bowlseeksjudicial notice are letters from a single legislator (albeit the bill's au- thor) to the Governor and to another legislator; such letters generally are not con- sidered in construing a statute. (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 906 P.2d 1057.) The third document, a Senate Select Committee on MobilehomesBill Analysis, although a proper subject of judicial notice, provides noinsight into the legislative intent regarding the issue presented in this ap- peal-whether section 66427.5 precludes the application of the Mello Act and Coastal Act to the conversion of mobilehome park within the coastal zone. © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 9 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) **845 1. Failure to Maintain Checklist [1] Palisades Bowl argues that section 65942 of the Permit Streamlining Act precludes the City from making a determination that Palisades Bowl's application was incomplete. That stat- ute requires agencies to revise the checklists mandated by section 65940 as needed to keep them current and accurate, and provides that those revisions can only be applied prospect- ively; the statute states that, except in certain circumstances, an agency cannot determine that an application is incomplete for failing to include information *1473 required by a revision made after the application was submitted. (§ 65942.) Palisades Bowl reasonsthat, since the City did not maintain a checklist for mobilehome park conversions, under section 65942, the City cannot determine that an application is incomplete for failing to include items that do not appear on the required checklist, and therefore Palisades Bowl's application should be deemed complete. We are not convinced. There is no AReption that the City did not maintain a list specifically for mobilehome park conversions. Butasthe trial court correctly noted, to the extent the City's failure to do so violated section 65940, the Permit Streamlining Act does not provide a remedy for any such violation. Contrary to Palisades Bowl's argument, section 65942 does not require that the ap- plication be deemed complete. That statute simply precludes prospective application of revi- sionsto list. In any event, the City did maintain (and provided to Palisades Bowl) list that it contended applied to Palisades Bowl's proposed conversion, albeit one that included numer- ous items that could not be required under section 66427.5. As the trial court properly found, the only effect of sections 65940 and 65942 is to preclude the City from requiring any items not on thelist it provided to Palisades Bowl. FN7. Palisades Bowlhasaskedusto take judicial notice of a checklist for mobilehome park conversions the City recently adopted. This documentis not relevant to the issue here, and therefore we deny the request. (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358, 875 P.2d 73 [only relevant materials may be judicially noticed], overruled on another ground in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 163 P.3d 106.) 2. Refusal to Accept Application Palisades Bowl argues that the City's refusal to accept its application on November 13, 2007 was improper becauseit was an attempt to avoid the time limit set forth in the Permit Stream- lining Act for making a completeness determination. We agree that the City cannot circum- vent the Permit Streamlining Act by refusing to accept an application for filing. (See Beck De- velopment Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.) But while the City's refusal was improperand is not to be condoned,it is ir- relevant here because, as the trial court noted, the City acted on the application by timely sending an e-mail explaining why the application was incomplete. **846 3. Ferguson's E-mail as Completeness Determination © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 10 187 Cal-App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) [2] Palisades Bowl argues that Ferguson's e-mail should not be considered a completeness de- termination under section 65943 because (1) the e-mail stated the five items listed were the items Palisades Bowl neededto file its *1474 application; (2) section 65943 requires the com- pleteness determination to be in writing, and the e-mail does not constitute a “written” determ- ination as defined in the Los Angeles Municipal Code; and (3) the e-mail could not constitute an official action by the City because it did not comply,qvith certain provisions of the Muni- cipal Code related to actions taken on tentative maps. Weconcludethetrial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the e-mail constituted substantial compliance with section 65943. FN8. Palisades Bowlhas asked usto take judicial notice of the Municipal Code sec- tions at issue. We grant that request. First, as the trial court observed, “[w]hile there is no language in the e-mail suggesting that it constitutes the City's completeness determination under the Permit Streamlining Act, and Fer- guson's e-mail concedesthat the application has not been acceptedforfiling, it is quite clear from the e-mail that Palisades Bowl needed to present five [specified] items.... Clearly, Fer- guson determined that the Application was not complete.” The court cited Lewis v. City of Hayward (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 103, 222 Cal.Rptr. 781 in support of its finding of substan- tial compliance. In that case, the appellate court found substantial compliance where a city failed to provide a formal written determination of completeness to the developers, butit made clear through repeated requests for additional information that it did not consider the ap- plications to be complete. (/d. at p. 112, 222 Cal.Rptr. 781.) Although the trial court here ac- knowledged that the case was distinguishable on several grounds, it nevertheless found the case was support for its conclusion that the City in this case substantially complied with its statutory duty to provide a formal determination of completeness by sending an e-mail that stated exactly what five items were required for completeness. We agree. The Ferguson e-mail communicated to Palisades Bowlthat its application was not complete, and that it needed to provide five specific items for the application to be deemed complete. [3] Palisades Bowl's argument that the e-mail could not be a completeness determination due to lack of compliance with the Los Angeles Municipal Code is not persuasive. Whileit is true that the e-mail may not constitute “written” “notice” as defined in sections 11.01(a) (“written”) and 11.00(i) (“notice”) of the Municipal Code, those definitions apply only to words used or requirements set forth in the Municipal Code. (See L.A. Mun.Code, §§ 11.00(i) [““Whenever a notice is required to be given under this Code ...” (italics added) ]; 11.01(a) (“The following words and phrases whenever used in this Code shall be construed as defined in this section”(italics added) ].) Thus, the Municipal Code definitions do not contro] the de- termination whether Ferguson's e-mail satisfies the Permit Streamlining Act. Similarly, the re- quirements set forth in section 17.06 of the Municipal Code, delineating the process to be used by the City when taking action on a tentative map, do not *1475 apply because a completeness determination is not an action taken on a tentative map. As the code provision itself makes clear, the “action” at issue is the City's approval, conditional approval, or disapproval of a tentative map (L.A.Mun.Code, § 17.06(A)(2))-an action that cannot occur **847 until after the tentative map application is deemed complete. © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 11 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Palisades Bowl was not en- titled to have its application deemed complete due to the City's failure to comply with the Per- mit Streamlining Act. B. Does Section 66427.5 Preclude the City From Requiring Compliance With the Mello and Coastal Acts? [4] Having determined that the City substantially complied with the Permit Streamlining Act, weturn now to the issue raised by the City's appeal: whether the limitation on the City's dis- cretion set forth in section 66427.5 precludes the City from requiring compliance with the Mello Act and the Coastal Act. We begin our analysis with an examination of the language of the relevantstatutes. 1. Section 66427.5 Section 66427.5 is primarily directed to the protection of mobilehomepark residents in the event of a conversion of the park to resident ownership. It provides as follows: “At the time of filing a tentative or parcel map for a subdivision to be created 'from the con- version of a rental mobilehomepark to resident ownership, the subdivider shall avoid the eco- nomic displacementof all nonpurchasing residents in the following manner: “(a) The subdivider shall offer each existing tenant an option to either purchase his or her con- dominium or subdivided unit, which is to be created by the conversion of the park to resident ownership, or to continue residencyas a tenant. “(b) The subdivider shall file a report on the impact of the conversion upon residents of the mobilehomepark to be converted to resident owned subdividedinterest. “(c) The subdivider shall make a copy of the report available to each resident of the mobile- homeparkat least 15 days prior to the hearing on the map by the advisory agencyor, if there is no advisory agency,by the legislative body. *1476 “(d)(1) The subdivider shall obtain a survey of support of residents of the mobilehome park for the proposed conversion.... [The remainder of subdivision (d) specifies how the sur- vey is to be conducted, and provides that “[t]he results of the survey shall be submitted to the local agency uponthefiling of the tentative or parcel map,to be considered as part of the sub- division map hearing prescribed by subdivision (e).”] ““(e) The subdivider shall be subject to a hearing by a legislative body or advisory agency, which is authorized by local ordinance to approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove the map. The scope of the hearing shall be limited to the issue of compliance with this section. “(f) The subdivider shall be required to avoid the economic displacementof all nonpurchasing residents in accordancewith the following: © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 12 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) “(1) As to nonpurchasing residents who are not lower income households, as defined in Sec- tion 50079.5 of the Health and Safety Code, the monthly rent ... may increase from the pre- conversion rent to market levels ... in equal annual increases over a four-yearperiod. “(2) As to nonpurchasing residents who are lower income households, as defined in Section 50079.5 of the Health and Safety Code, the monthly rent ... may increase from the preconver- sion rent by an amount equalto the average monthly increasein rent in the four years immedi- ately preceding the conversion, except that in no event shall the monthly rent be increased by an amount greater than the average monthly **848 percentage increase in the ConsumerPrice Index for the most recently reported period.” (§ 66427.5.) Two portions of the statute are important for this case. The first is subdivision (f), quoted im- mediately above, which seeks to “‘avoid the economic displacement of all nonpurchasing res- idents” by providing specified rent controls for statutorily defined “lower income households” for the duration of their mobilehome tenancies (subd. (f)(2)), and by providing for yearly rent increases over a four-year period up to market level for nonpurchasing residents who are not “lower income households” (subd. (f)(1)). These rental protections for nonpurchasing resid- ents are important in considering whether section 66427.5 forbids local agencies from enfor- cing the Mello Act (§§ 65590 and 65590.1). The secondcritical portion of the statute is subdivision (e), providing that the scope of the hearing at which the local agency must approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove the pro- posed tentative map “shall be limited to the issue of compliance with this section.” (§ 66427.5 , Subd. (€).) Two prior decisions interpreting subdivision (e) have held that it precludes *1477 local authorities from “inject[ing] ... factors [other than those set forth in the statute] when considering an application to convert an existing mobilehomepark from rental to a resident- ownerbasis.” (Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1297, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 669; see also El Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. City of Palm Springs (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1163-1164, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 [the city did not have powerto impose mitigating conditions on mobilehome park owner].) Neither decision, however, ad- dressed a situation in which the local authority imposed requirements that it contended were mandated by anotherstate statute, and thus neither controls here. Wenoted this distinction in another case decided today, Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City of Carson (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1487, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 in which weinvalidated a local ordinance of the City of Carson. That ordinance specified, through shifting presumptions based on the percentage of residents' support, how the survey of residents required by section 66427.5, subdivision (d)(1) would be considered by the local agency in determining whether to approve a proposed conversion as a “bona-fide resident conversion.” (Colony Cove, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1487, pp. ---- - ---- , 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 823). Finding no material difference between the Carson ordinance and the one disapproved in Sequoia Park (id at p. ----,114 Cal.Rptr.3d 823), we invalidated the Carson ordinance, and agreed with the holding of Se- quoia Park to the extent it precludes enforcement of local ordinances that “conflict[ ] with section 66427.5 by ‘deviating from the state-mandated criteria’ and adding to the ‘exclusive statutory requirements of section 66427.5.’ [Citation.]” (id at p. ----, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 823.) However, based on the language of subdivision (d)(5) of section 66427.5, which provides that © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 13 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) the “[t]he results of the survey shall be submitted to the local agency..., to be considered as part of the subdivision map hearing prescribed by subdivision (e),” we disagreed with Sequoia Park to the extent it “[c]onstru[ed] the statute to eliminate the power of local entities and agencies to consider the results of the survey when processing a conversion application.” ( Colony Cove, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. ----, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 823 italics added.) As we noted in Colony Cove, our decision in that case (like the prior decisions in Sequoia Park and El Dorado ) did not address the issue raised here, involving the contention that the local au- thority has imposed additional requirements mandated **849 by a different state statute. (/d. at p. ----, fn. 9, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 823.) 2. The Mello Act The Mello Act (§§ 65590 and 65590.1) was enacted in 1981 “to preserve residential housing units occupied by low- or moderate-income persons or families in the coastal zone.” (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1552-1553, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465 (Venice Town Council ); accord, *1478Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 738, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563.) The act “transferred the responsibilities for providing affordable housing within the coastal zone from the Coastal Commission to local governments.” (Coalition of Concerned Com- munities, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 741, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563 (conc. opn. of Moreno, J.).) It is undisputed that Palisades Bow] is located within the coastal zone. Section 65590 of the act provides in relevant part: “(a) In addition to the requirements of Art- icle 10.6 (commencing with Section 65580), the provisions and requirements of this section shall apply within the coastal zone as defined and delineated in [the Coastal Act]. Each re- spective local government shall comply with the requirements of this section in that portion of its jurisdiction which is located within the coastal zone. [{] (b) The conversion or demolition of existing residential dwelling units occupied by persons and families of low or moderate in- come, as defined in Section 50093 of the Health and Safety Code, shall not be authorized un- less provision has been made for the replacement of those dwelling units with units for per- sons and families of low or moderate income. Replacement dwelling units shall be located within the same city or county as the dwelling units proposed to be converted or demolished. The replacement dwelling units shall be located on the site of the converted or demolished structure or elsewhere within the coastal zone if feasible, or, if location on the site or else- where within the coastal zone is not feasible, they shall be located within three miles of the coastal zone.... [{[] (g) As used in this section: [{[] (1) ‘Conversion’ meansa changeofa resid- ential dwelling, including a mobilehome,as defined in Section 18008 of the Health and Safety Code, or a mobilehomelot in a mobilehomepark, as defined in Section 18214 of the Health and Safety Code ... to a condominium, cooperative, or similar form of ownership.” The re- mainderof the statute provides requirements and guidelinesto assist the local authority in car- rying out its duties under the statute, the details of which are not relevant for the purposes of this case. The relevant language makes clear that the focus of the Mello Act is the preservation of af- © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 14 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) fordable housing units for low and moderate income persons and families within the coastal zone. Thus, subdivision (b) of section 65590 forbids local agencies from approving any con- version or demolition of existing affordable housing “unless provision has been madefor the replacement of those dwelling units with units for persons and families of low or moderate in- come,” which replacement units are to be located “within the coastal zone if feasible, or, if location on the site or elsewhere within the coastal zone is not feasible, they shall be located within three miles of the coastal zone.” The court in Venice Town Council observed that sec- tion 65590, subdivision (b) “imposes a mandatory duty on local governments to require re- placement housing as a condition of granting a permit to demolish or convert housing units which are occupied by low or moderate income *1479 persons or families.” (Venice Town Council, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465.) As we discuss, post, the Mello Act's focus on the continued availability**850 of affordable housing units in the coastal zone must be contrasted with the considerably more limited focus of the rental protections provided by section 66427.5, subdivision (f), which protect only against economic displace- mentof current nonpurchasing residents of the mobilehome park being converted. 3. The Coastal Act The Coastal Act “is an attempt to deal with coastal land use on a statewide basis.” (Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 571, 205 Cal-Rptr. 801, 685 P.2d 1152; see also Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 [“a fundamental purpose of the Coastal Act is to ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local government’’].) While the California Coastal Commission has “the primary responsibility for the implementation of the provisions of [the Coastal Act] and is designated as the state coastal zone planning and managementagency for any andall purposes” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30330), the act gives to local governments a substantial role in land use decisions. (See, e.g., Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30500, 30519, 30600, 30600.5 ) Several provisions of the Coastal Act are relevant to this case. The first is Public Resources Code section 30600, subdivision (a), which provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (e) [which provides for exceptions in the case of emergency work], and in addition to obtaining any other permit required by law from any local government or from anystate, regional, or local agency, any person ... wishing to perform or undertake any developmentin the coastal zone, other than a facility subject to Section 25500, shall obtain a coastal developmentper- mit.” The remainder of section 30600 delineates whether the coastal development permit is to be obtained from the local government or the Coastal Commission. Subdivision (b)(1) gives local governments the option, before its local coastal program is certified, to “establish pro- cedures for the filing, processing, review, modification, approval, or denial of a coastal devel- opment permit.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30600, subd. (b)(1).) If a local government does not exercise this option, the coastal development permit must be obtained from the Coastal Commission until the local government's local coastal program is certified. (*1480 Pub. Resources Code, § 30600, subd. (c).) Once a local coastal program is certified, the coastal development permit must be obtained from the local government. (pub. resources code, § 30600, subd. (d).) © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 15 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) FN9.If the local governmentexercises this option, it must adopt a resolution establish- ing those procedures, notify the Coastal Commission, and take appropriate steps to no- tify the public. Once it does so, “[t]he provisions of subdivision (b) of [Public Re- sources Code] Section 30600 shall take effect and shall be exercised by the local gov- ernment.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30620.5, subd.(b).) Anotherstatute that relates to whether a local government or the Coastal Commission is re- sponsible for issuing coastal development permits is Public Resources Code section 30600.5. That statute mandates the delegation of authority for issuing coastal development permits to local governments within 120 daysafter certification of a land use plan (one of two parts of a local coastal program), unless the developmentis subject to Public Resources Code sections 30519 or 30601. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30600.5, subd. (b).) Public Resources Codesection 30601 provides that in certain areas within the coastal zone, a coastal development permit must be obtained from both the local government(if authority for issuing permits has been delegated to the local government) **851 and the Coastal Commission. (These areas generally are referred to as dual jurisdiction zones; it is undisputed that Palisades Bowlis in a dual juris- diction zone.) If a local governmentexercises its option under Public Resources Code section 30600, subdi- vision (b), several regulations promulgated pursuant to the Coastal Act “to enable the Califor- nia Coastal Commission to carry out the purposes and provision of the Act” (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13001) govern. Section 13302 oftitle 14 of the California Code of Regulations sets out the required content of a coastal development permit program, and sections 13303 through 13307 set forth the procedure to be used for adopting such a program. Most important for our purposes, section 13301 providesthat, “[flollowing the implementation of a coastal develop- ment permit program by a local government... any person wishing to perform a development within the affected jurisdiction ... shall obtain a coastal development permit from the local government. If the development is one specified in Public Resources Code [section] 30601, a permit must also be obtained from the commission in addition to the permit otherwise re- quired from the local government; in such instances, an application shall not be made to the commission until a coastal development permit has been obtained from the appropriate local government.” (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13301.) Together, these statutes and regulations establish that, before certification of a local coastal program, authority to issue coastal development permits must be delegated to the local gov- ernment in two circumstances: if a land use plan has beencertified (Pub. Resources Code, § 30600.5, subd. (b)), or if the local governmentexercises its option under Public Resources Code section 30600, subdivision (b)(1) and adopts a coastal development permit program that is accepted by the Coastal Commission (Pub. Resources Code, § 30620.5, subd. (b); Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13301). As relevant to this case, the City exercised its option in 1978, and the Coastal Commission *1481 accepted the City's program, issuing a “public information memo” to “ all interested parties” stating that “[a]s of November 27, 1978, the City of Los Angeles will assume primary authority for issuing coastal development permits for those portions of the coastal zone located within the city limits of the City of Los Angeles.” The memo provided a summaryof the permit issuing system the City would employ, and notedthat there were certain dual jurisdiction zones in which coastal development permits would have to be © 2010 ThomsonReuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 16 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) obtained from both the City and the Coastal Commission. The memoalso stated that “[a]ny developmentthat requires a coastal commission permit in addition to a coastal permit from the City of Los Angeles mustfirst obtain its coastal permit from the City of Los Angeles before applying for a permit from the [Coastal] Commission.... In other words, where dual permits are required, no one may apply to the coastal commission for a permit until after the City of Los Angeles has completed its action on the coastal permit application and hasso notified the [Coastal] Commission.” The final provision of the Coastal Act relevant to this case is Public Resources Code section 30106, which defines “development,” since a coastal development permit is required onlyif a person “wishfes] to perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone.” (Pub. Re- sources Code, § 30600, subd. (a).) “Development”is defined as, among other things, “change in the density or intensity of use ofland, including, but not limited to, subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act (commencing with Section 66410 of the Government Code), and any other division of land, including lot splits, except where the land **852 division is brought about in connection with the purchase of such land by a public agency for public recreational use.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106.) Thus, a project that involves a subdivision under the Subdivision Map Act constitutes development for the purposes of the Coastal Act. (Cf. La Fe, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 231, 240, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 [Section 30106 by its terms recognizes that a subdivision of land or lot split can result in changes in the density or intensity of use of property”].) There is no question that the conversion of a mo- bilehomepark to resident ownership is a subdivision under the Subdivision Map Act. Govern- ment Code section 66427.5, which governs such conversions, is part of the Subdivision Map Act, and the statute itself refers to the “subdivision to be created from the conversion of a rental mobilehomepark to resident ownership.” (See also El Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. City of Palm Springs, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160, 118 Cal-Rptr.2d 15 [noting that mo- bilehome park conversion is a subdivision under the definition of “subdivision” found in § 66424].) Thus, a mobilehome park conversion is a “development” for which a coastal devel- opment permit is required under the Coastal Act. (See California Coastal Com. v. Quanta In- vestment Corp. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 579, 170 Cal.Rptr. 263 [holding that the conversion of existing apartment units into a stock cooperative form *1482 of ownership constitutes a devel- opment which falls within the permit jurisdiction of the various Coastal Commissions under the California Coastal Act of 1976].) 4. The Conflict Between Section 66427.5 and the Mello and Coastal Acts Asthe above discussion demonstrates, there are three statutory mandates involvedin this case: (1) section 66427.5 requires the City to limit its hearing on the approval or disapproval of Pal- isades Bowl's application to the issue of compliance with the requirements of that statute (i.e., whether Palisades Bowl offered each existing tenant the option to purchase or continueresid- ency as a tenant, filed a tenant impact report and madea copy available to each resident, and obtained a tenant support survey in accordance with the statute); (2) the Mello Act requires the City to deny the conversion unless provision is made for the preservation of low and mod- erate income housing units; and (3) the Coastal Act requires Palisades Bowl to apply to the City and the Coastal Commission for, and the City to review the application for, a coastal de- © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 17 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) velopment permit. The statutes create a conflict of mandates: the City cannot comply with the mandates of the Mello and Coastal Acts while also complying with section 66427.5's mandate to limit its consideration of Palisades Bowl's conversion application to compliance with sec- tion 66427.5. The trial court concluded that the mandatory duty required by the Mello Act was superseded by section 66427.5 for two reasons. First, the court found that the language of section 66427.5 was a clear “expression of the Legislature's intent to limit a local authority's power to impose conditions” on a mobilehome park conversion. Second, the court found that, because section 66427.5 provides protection for low income nonpurchasing residents in the form of rent con- trol, and the purpose of the Mello Act is to protect low and moderate incometenants, “[t]his dual protection of mostly the same persons showsthat the Legislature intended the specific statute (section 66427.5) to control over the more general Mello Act.” On close inspection, we cannot agree with the trial court's reasoning. The Mello Act and sec- tion 66427.5 do not offer the same protections to “mostly” the same **853 persons. As we have noted, section 66427.5, subdivision (f), protects against economic displacement only of current “nonpurchasing residents” of the mobilehomepark being converted. Subdivision (f)(2) provides that for “nonpurchasing residents” whoare classified as “lower income households,” rent is controlled during the current tenancy. But once such residents depart, the units may be sold or rented to anyone, regardless of income. They are thus lost as affordable housing units, with no requirement that they be replaced, resulting in a decrease over time in the number of units available to low incomepersonsor families. *1483 Similarly, for current residents classified as “not lower income households,” subdivi- sion (f)(1) provides only the limited protection of specified yearly rental increases over a four- year period up to market level. There is no restriction on the amount of rent that may be charged thereafter. Thus, there is only a modest short-term protection for moderate income tenants while they reside in their units. And of course, once vacated, the units may be sold or rented without any affordable housing restriction whatsoever. That the Legislature enacted these protections against the economic displacement of current nonpurchasing residents does not meanit intended to supplant application of the Mello Act to mobilehome park conversions in the coastal zone. Overtime, the effect of section 66427.5, subdivision (f), is a decrease in the availability of housing units for low and moderate income persons or families. As applied to the limited geographic area of the coastal zone, this result contravenes the specific mandate of the Mello Act, which forbids local agencies from approv- ing “[t]he conversion... of existing residential dwelling units [in the coastal zone] occupied by persons and families of low or moderate income,... unless provision has been madeforthe re- placement of those dwelling BRITSwith units for persons and families of low or moderate in- come.” (§ 65590, subd. (b).) Put differently, the Mello Act preserves the availability of housing units in the coastal zone dedicated to persons and families of low or moderate in- come; section 66427.5 would diminish the availability of such dedicated housing units. In short, the protections for low and moderate income persons and families provided by section 66527.5 do not provide the kind of protection so clearly mandated by the Mello Act. © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 18 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) FN10. Typically, housing units for low or moderate income persons or families are provided and preserved through the use of recorded covenants or deedrestrictions that restrict the sale or rental of those units to qualified persons or families for a period of time, ranging from five years to infinite duration. (See Padilla, Reflections on Inclu- sionary Housing and a Renewed Look At Its Viability (1995) 23 Hofstra L.Rev. 539, 554-555.) Under the interim Mello Act administrative procedures adopted by the City and currently in use, the restrictions apply for not less than 30 years. Wealso do not agree with thetrial court's conclusion that section 66427.5 is the more specific statute and therefore supersedes the Mello Act. It is true that “[uJnder well-established prin- ciples of statutory interpretation, the more specific provision ... takes precedence over the more general one.... [Citations.] To the extent a specific statute is inconsistent with a general statute potentially covering the same subject matter, the specific statute must be read as an ex- ception to the more general statute.” (Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 857, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 21, 890 P.2d 43.) But this principle applies only where the court can state with confidence that, as applied to the subject matter at hand, one statute is truly more specific. Here, *1484 in terms of subject matter, each statute is both general and specific: **854 sec- tion 66427.5 is specific as to the type of developmentit governs but general as to the location of that development; the Mello Act is general as to the type of development it governs (although it specifically includes mobilehomepark conversions) but specific as to the location of the development. Thus, it cannot be said, as applied to conversions of mobilehome parks located in the coastal zone, that section 66427.5 (which applies specifically to mobilehome park conversions but generally as to location) is more specific than the Mello Act (which ap- plies specifically to developments in the coastal zone but generally to the category of develop- ment). With regard to the Coastal Act, the trial court found that the City's requirement that a de- veloper obtain a coastal development permit from the City was not a requirement mandated by statute because “[t]he Coastal Act allows, but does not require, a local agency such as the City to adopt local procedures requiring an applicant to obtain a coastal development permit from that local agency first.” Thus, the court concluded the City's requirement was mandated only by the City's local law and therefore section 66427.5 preempts that local law. Again, we dis- agree. That the City elected in 1978 to exercise its option under Public Resources Code section 30600, subdivision (b)(1), does not make the requirement to obtain a coastal development from the City a local requirement rather than a state mandate. As discussed above, under the relevant statutes and regulations, once the City adopted a coastal development permit program that was accepted by the Coastal Commission, the requirement for developers to obtain a coastal development permit from the City becamea state mandate. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30600, subd. (b), 30620.5, subd. (b); Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13301.) Weare thus left with two state mandates (the Mello Act and the Coastal Act) that conflict with a third state mandate (section 66427.5). Application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction-examination of the plain meaning of the statutory text and the legislative history to determine legislative intent-does not assist us here, because neither the statutory text nor © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 19 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R.13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) the legislative history provides insight into the legislative intent as to which statute prevails. In such cases, the Supreme Court instructs us to “turn to an analysis of the relevant policy considerations as they bear on the question of legislative intent.” (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 668, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 390, 74 P.3d 166.) To be sure, the policy behind section 66427.5 is an important one-to encourage conversions of mobilehome parks to resident ownership while protecting nonpurchasing residents. (See *1485FE] Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. City of Palm Springs, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 15; Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1298, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 669; Health & Saf.Code, § 50780, subd.(b).) Butthe policy considerations behind the Coastal Act-as well as the Mello Act, inasmuchasits genesis was the Coastal Act (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 741, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563 (conc. opn. of Moreno, J.))-are far more extensive. The Coastal Act seeks to ensure a balance between protection of coastal resources and development, by providing a comprehensivestatutory schemeregulating land use planning throughout the coastal zone. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30001; Yost v. Thomas, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 565-566, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801, 685 P.2d 1152.) As the Legis- lature has declared, “the California coastal **855 zone is a distinct and valuable natural re- source, of vital and enduring interest to all the people,” and “the permanentprotection of the state's natural and scenic resources is a paramount concern to present and future residents of the state and nation,” which requires “[t]hat existing developed uses, and future developments [be] carefully planned and developed consistent with the policies of [the Coastal Act].” (§ 30001, subd. (a), (b), (d).) With regard to the low and moderate incomehousing preservation provision originally found in the Coastal Act, and now found in the Mello Act, the Coastal Commissionstated that it “ ‘is a recognition that meaningful access to the coast requires hous- ing opportunities as well as other forms of coastal access.’ [Citation.] ‘The access, economic development and environmental policies of the Coastal Act all provide that the coastal zone will not be the domainofa single class of citizens but will instead remain available to the en- tire public; the provision of affordable housing benefits not only those wholive in it butall members of society.” ” (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. vy. City of Los Angeles, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 741, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563 (conc. opn. of Moreno, J.), quoting Cal. Coastal Com., Interpretive Guidelines on New Construction of Housing (1981) § ILA, p. 13 and § UB,p. 14.) In light of the “paramount concern” for protecting coastal resources by regulating develop- ment as expressed in the Coastal Act (and by implication, the Mello Act), we conclude that section 66427.5 does not preclude the City from imposing conditions and requirements man- dated by the Mello Act and Coastal Act on a subdiyiderseeking to convert to resident owner- ship a mobilehomeparklocated in the coastal zone. FN11. In our decision in Colony Cove filed today, we noted the uncertainty created by section 66427.5 regarding the issue involved in that case: how local agencies are to consider and use resident surveys in the subdivision map hearing. (Colony Cove, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. ----, fn. 18, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 823.) Referring to Colony Cove and the present case, we stated our hopethat the Legislature “will recognize the © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 20 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 (Cite as: 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838) dilemmafaced by local agenciesillustrated by [these cases] ..., and act to clarify the scope of [local agencies'] authority and responsibilities” in considering mobilehome park conversion applications. (/bid.) We repeat that hopehere. *1486 DISPOSITION The judgmentis reversed. Thetrial court is directed to vacate the peremptory writ of manda- mus issued May 7, 2009, and to enter judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles. The City shall recover its costs on appeal. We concur: EPSTEIN,P.J., and MANELLA,J. Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2010. Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles 187 Cal.App.4th 1461, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,514, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,805 END OF DOCUMENT © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL The undersigned declares: | am over the age of 18 years and am nota party to the above entitled cause. | caused to be served -- PETITION FOR REVIEW by enclosing true copies of said documentin envelopes with proper postage prepaid and addressed to -- CarmenA.Trutanich, Esq. Attorneysfor City of Los Angeles City Attorney / Amy Brothers, Esq. Deputy City Attorney 200 North Main Street, 700 CHE Los Angeles, CA 90012 Linda Sue Loftin, Esq. Attorneysfor Palisades Bowl The Loftin Firm Residents Assoc., Inc. 5760 Fleet Street #110 Carlsbad, CA 92008 Clerk, California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four 300 South Spring Street 2nd Floor, North Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013 Clerk, Los Angeles Superior Court Honorable James C. Chalfant (Dept. 85) 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 and placing samefordelivery by the United States Postal Service in my usual manner on the date stated below. The foregoingis true and correct. Executed underpenalty of perjury at Novato, California. DATED: October 12, 2010 [S/ ELLIOT L. BIEN