LOEFFLER v. TARGET CORPORATION

Respondent’s Supplemental Brief

Cal.January 13, 2014

SUPREME COURT COPY = svetecourr LED NO. 8173972 JAN 1 3 2014 | Frank A. McGuire Clerk IN THE SUPREME COURT—..._____Deputy OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA KIMBERLY LOEFFLER, ET AL, Plaintiffs and Appellants, Vv TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court ofAppeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, No. B199287 TARGET’S SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF MIRIAM A. VOGEL(SBN 67822) DAVID F. McDOWELL(SBN 125806 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 6000 Los Angeles, California 90017-3543 Télephone: 213.892.5200 Facsimile: 213.892.5454 Attorneysfor Defendant and Respondent, TARGET CORPORATION NO. 8173972 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA KIMBERLY LOEFFLER, ET AL, Plaintiffs andAppellants, Vv TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. Petition for Review of a Decision ofthe Court ofAppeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, No. B199287 TARGET’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF MIRIAM A. VOGEL(SBN 67822) DAVID F. McDOWELL(SBN 125806 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 6000 Los Angeles, California 90017-3543 Telephone: 213.892.5200 Facsimile: 213.892.5454 Attorneysfor Defendant and Respondent, TARGET CORPORATION CYrteteeteeeteeeeeeseeseeeeeaneneeaceneaseensAONVITANOOJOALVOLILL YAD [LetttttrerereiteteeeeeeeeesesnseensnenereaeseeeeneseeeseesescsseseeeeaeseaaesNOISN'TONO D BereHLO.LVLSNOILOD.LOUdYAIWNSNOOVYOCAAN ONSIFaaHL“ASVOSIH.LAOLXAINOOAHLNIIn QurrresCuvodAHLOLXV.LSATVSAVdOHMSUATIVLAY ATaVLdaNYAAODNOINIdO§.TWAddVAOLYNOD HHLANV4d00NOILVXV.LGNVANNAATYFHL‘Tl GcrrtttettenesteeeseeessetessneeeesALVLSAHLOLLNAWASUNENIAYXV SHTVSdOANNAdAUAAYSLINGYLADUVLLVHL LASLNOFHLWOUNMONSSAVHSAALLNIVTd‘T INaWNOUYTORT JvveitnnnnenneineennSLOVEINANLIMaaaHa0KEVPOUS [ostsettuntnninnniennisnnsitensinnunisientaeetnsseNOLLONGOMINI ysssiteitnnnitienettnnnnninnnnininenneSALLRFOHLAVaoa1avi osug SINGLNOOD40ATAVL TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 380 occ cccccccssssessssssecssssssescssesscesseeeceeeeeeccce Board ofPermit Appeals v. Central Permit Bureau (1960) 186 CalApp.2d 633 v.cceccccscsssecscsssssssssssssessccessseeeccesee Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s ofCalifornia, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875 vo.cccccccsecsscsesscssesssssssescesceseces Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal4th 163 ...ccccceccccssssssesssssssesssssssececeeseeeecceeccec, Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Bd. ofEqualization (1962) 58 Cal.2d 252 ooeeccccscssssssssssssesssssesecsessessesssseeseseeees General Electric Co. v. State Board ofEqualization (1952) 111 CalApp.2d 180 viccccccecsscsssssscssssssssecssssseeeecceesses. Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429 ooo. ccccceescssssssssssssesessseseseseeeeccsseececece Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1229 o.oo cccccccccccsssssscsssssccsseeecceseseccc Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. | (1998) 17 Cal4th 553 occ cccscsssscsssssessssssssssesseseeeeseseececcecce STATUTES Civil Code Section 1656.1 oo. cccsccssssssssssssetsetsesscsesssssssscsssesseesceseceescces. Section 3529 oo. eeccccscssssssscssssscessesesssestesseseresesessesecesesceccce. ii Page(s) eseneseeeneeeees 11 seeeseeeeeseeeeaes 9 esesseeeseseaees 10 seeeseeeeeneeeees 10 eeteeesesseeneeees 9 steneeceeeneeetees 3 weeeeeeeeseesaees 11 eeteeuseeeees 2, 10 weteeseeeteneeees 10 weeeeeevesseeaeeees 3 veteeeeeaeteaeeees 9 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6001 ....ceeceeccessssessesssesssesssssesssssssssnesesssussssssssesesessseseceseeeseesecccc 9 Section 6051 oo. eececsccsssesssessneesseessessesssssssesasssssussssssssasssessseesseseeceseccecccc. 3 Section 609] os eececcsccessessseesnsessseasscssssssssusssessessusssusessusssesssssuessecceseescesce 3 Section 6901.5 eesceessecsesessessessssssssscssssssassasarssssssssesavsesseseessesececccc. 6, 7 Sections 6451-6459 woestse eeeeeeeseaseeceeseesesetenssesessscessseeeecstaceeseas 3 Sections 7152-7155 woe. ecsecessssssessecsessesssssssssssssessisssssessstseaseeseesecceecece. 3 ili INTRODUCTION In short form, here are Target’s answers to the Court’s current questions: 1. Maya cause ofaction be brought under the UCL or CLRA based on an allegation that a retailer misrepresented that it was collecting an amountas tax reimbursement whenin factthe retailer failed to remit the amount to the Board of Equalization? Yes, of course, but that isn’t this case. 2. If so, do the allegations in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint state a cause of action under the UCL or CLRA onthis theory? No. 3. If not, should Plaintiffs be afforded an opportunity to amend their complaint to state such causes of action? No, because they could not truthfully allege any such thing — they have known from the outset that Target has remitted every penny ofthe sales tax reimbursement collected Jrom its customers to the Board ofEqualization. Target submits there is nothing in the Court of Appeal opinion to prevent an injured consumer from suing an unscrupulous retailer who purports to charge sales tax reimbursement but fails to remit a like amount to the Board. But as we have said, that isn’t this case. Hence, we respectfully submit that this Court should dismiss review as improvidently granted and order republication of the Court of Appeal’s opinion, leaving for another day and another case a decision about the propriety of a UCL or CLRA lawsuit against a dishonestretailer. SUMMARYOF THE PERTINENTFACTS Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleges that Target improperly collected sales tax reimbursement from its customers who purchased hot coffee drinks to go — butin noneofits iterations did Plaintiffs’ pleading ever allege that Target failed to remit the collected sales tax reimbursement to the Board. (AA 1-11, 13-23, 85-114.) Thetrial court sustained Target’s demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend. On Plaintiffs’ appeal, Division Three of the Second Appellate District held that where, as here, the dispute is about whether sales tax reimbursement should have been charged on a particular product, California’s Constitution prohibits suits against the retailer, and that the comprehensive statutory system for sales tax refunds and associated sales tax reimbursement refunds do not authorize a private cause ofaction by a customer seeking a refund ofsales tax reimbursement. (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1229: Slip Opn., pp. 8-13.) The essence of the Court of Appeal’s opinion is that it would undermine the legislative scheme to permit a customerto unilaterally ascertain when excess sales tax had been collected (id. at p. 14). Implicit in the Court of the Appeal’s opinion is the assumption that it is talking about a retailer that remits its sales tax obligations to the Board. The opinion says nothing aboutthe situation posed by this Court’s current questions about a dishonest retailer who claims to be charging sales tax reimbursement but in fact does not remit the charged amount to the Board. That has never been the point ofthis case. LEGAL ARGUMENT I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE KNOWN FROM THE OUTSET THAT TARGET REMITS EVERY PENNYOF SALES TAX REIMBURSEMENTTO THE STATE. California’s sales tax is an excise tax imposed on retailers for the privilege ofselling tangible personal property in this state. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6051.)' Retailers mustfile quarterly sales tax returns and make quarterly payments to the state, and are subject to civil and criminal penalties for wrongfully evadingsales taxes. (§§ 6451-6459, 7152-7155.) Sales tax is imposed on the seller, not the buyer (General Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 180, 185), and the seller is authorized to seek sales tax reimbursement from the customer. (Civ. Code, § 1656.1, subd. (a).) Until the tax-exempt nature ofa particular sale is established by the Board, all gross receipts of a retailer are presumptively subject to the sales tax. (§ 6091.) It is undisputed that Target has at all relevant times paid all collected sales tax reimbursements to the Board — and, a fortiori, that it obtains no benefit from collecting sales taxes in excess of those required bystatute. Plaintiffs’ assertion that Target “has not argued in this case that it has remitted to the State the moneyit collected from Plaintiffs as sales tax reimbursement” (OB 42, fn. 11) is just plain wrong. This point has been crystal clear from the outset. ' Undesignated statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code. First, Plaintiffs did not allege anywhere in any of their complaints that Target had failed to remit to the Board the moneyit collected as sales tax reimbursement. (AA:1-11, 13-23, 85-95.) Second, Target’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (filed in May 2006) highlighted Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that Target had used the sales tax reimbursementfor its own benefit, noting the Plaintiffs could “not make such a claim as sales tax collected in Target stores is merely a pass through to the [Board of Equalization].” (AA:51.) We reiterated the point in our reply in support of our demurrer. (AA:76.) Plaintiffs’ subsequently-filed second amended complaint, the operative pleading, did not allege afailure to remit. Third, Target’s Respondent’s Brief in the Court of Appeal (p. 11) noted Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that Target had retained the sales tax reimbursementit collected from its customers. Fourth, the point was made in Target’s Answer to the Attorney General’s Court of Appeal amicusbrief (pp. 14, 18, fn. 12), where we said it was “undisputed that Target has already paid all sales taxes it collected (including thosethat, allegedly, were not due) to the state.” Fifth, Target’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Petition for Review by this Court (at p. 1) stated quite clearly that “[n]o retailer benefits from charging moresales tax than is actually due becauseall collected sales taxes are paid to the State Board of Equalization .... There is no financial gain for retailers, who donotget to keep any money chargedassales tax.” Sixth, Target’s Answer Brief on the Merits repeatedly emphasized the point, asking (pp. 2-3), “What’s in this supposed scam for Target? Nothing. Every penny collected by Target as reimbursement for sales tax appears as exactly that onits books and records, and is regularly paid over to the State Board of Equalization (Plaintiffs do not allege otherwise).” We said the same thing on page 7 (“It is undisputed that Target has at all relevanttimes paid all collected sales tax reimbursements to the Board — and, a fortiori, that it obtains no benefit from collecting sales taxes in excess of those required bystatute”), page 18 (“Where (as here) the funds have already been remitted to the state, the consumer’s remedy is to complain to the State Board of Equalization”), page 23 (“Where (as here) the funds have already been remitted to the state, consumers who believe they have paid excess sales tax reimbursement may complain to the State Board of Equalization and obtain refunds without the need for litigation”), and again on page 24 (“When a business charges sales tax reimbursement on a presumptively taxablesale and remits the tax to the Board, there is no unscrupulous conduct”). Seventh, we repeatedourrefrain in Target’s Consolidated Answerto Amicus Curiae Briefs filed in this Court, where we said (p. 3) that Plaintiffs, the Attorney General, and Plaintiffs’ other amici “ignore the undisputed fact that Target hasat all relevant times paid all collected sales tax reimbursements to the Board — and,a fortiori, that it obtains no benefit from collecting sales taxes.” Wesaid it again in the samebrief(p. 7, fn. 5) in response to Consumer Watchdog’s amicus brief, explaining that “every pennyofsales tax reimbursementcollectedis paid to the state... .” Eighth, we said it most recently in our answer to Carmen Herr’s Amicus Brief (p. 1), where we emphasized that “a retailer has nothing to gain (but does have customers to lose) ifit charges more than its competitors — andthat, by chargingsales tax reimbursement qua sales tax reimbursement (and reflecting that charge on every receipt), Target creates a record for the State Board of Equalization to audit to make sure Target pays every cent due to the state. What’s in it for Target? Nothing.” And, finally, on page 4 of that brief, we explained that, even assuming “Target charged sales tax reimbursement on a non-taxable item, there is no benefit to Target — because every penny collected for sales tax reimbursementis paid to the State Board of Equalization. [{] No one has evertried to explain why Target wouldintentionally charge sales tax reimbursementthat isn’t due. It wouldn’t.” Wouldn’t you think that if Plaintiffs had any evidenceto the contrary they would have said so by now? Ofcourse they would, but the point is they cannottruthfully allege that Target failed to pay every penny ofsales tax to the Board. For this reason, a decision by this Court that leave to amend should be granted would do nothing more than delay the inevitable — because Target would answer, then move for summary judgment on the groundthat all collected sales tax reimbursement has been paid to the Board (as can be shownby Target’s receipts and filings with the Board). This is not the case contemplated by this Court’s current questions. Hi. THE REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE AND THE COURTOF APPEAL’S OPINION GOVERN REPUTABLE RETAILERS WHO PAY SALES TAX TO THE BOARD. Section 6901.5 compels a retailer who has collected excess sales tax reimbursement to return the money to the customer who paid it or, if the customer cannot be identified, to remit the funds to the state.” Where (as here) the funds have already been remitted to the state, the consumer’s remedy is to complain to the Board of Equalization — which has every reason to act on a legitimate complaint, and no reason at all to ignore it. The Court of Appeal opinion likewise assumes an honest retailer with established record-keeping procedures, sales receipts that reflect sales tax reimbursement charges to customers, and reports filed with the Board (along with sales tax payments) that can be reconciled with the receipts. Noneofthis has anything to do with the hypothetical situation posed by this Court’s current question. If a charlatan opens a widget business, claimsto be chargingsales tax reimbursement, butfails to set up an account with the Board and pockets the amounts charged as “sales tax reimbursement,” the charlatan can be sued six-ways to Sunday — for fraud, violations of the UCL and CLRA, and probably for various criminal offenses. So what? That’s not this case. ? Section 6901.5 states: “When an amount represented by a person to a customeras constituting reimbursement for taxes due underthis part is computed upon an amountthatis not taxable or is in excess of the taxable amount andis actually paid by the customerto the person, the amount so paid shall be returned by the person to the customer upon notification by the Board of Equalization or by the customer that such excess has been ascertained. In the eventofhis or her failure or refusal to do so, the amount so paid, if knowingly or mistakenly computed by the person upon an amount that is not taxable or is in excess of the taxable amount, shall be remitted by that persontothis state.” IH. IN THE CONTEXTOF THIS CASE, THERE IS NO NEED FOR A CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTE. In a July 6, 2009 amicusletter in support of review in this case, the Attorney General insisted the Court ofAppeal’s decision “opens. a loophole that would allow unscrupulous businesses to take advantage of consumers and collect greater sums from them than the consumers actually owe, free from the worry that they can be held accountable under California’s consumer protection statutes and subject to the remedies provided by these - laws.” (Italics added.) Implicit in the Attorney General’s letter was the erroneous assumption that this case involves the situation now posed by this Court’s questions — an unscrupulous business that isn’t paying its sales tax obligation to the state, and thus is defrauding its customers whenit claims to becollecting “sales tax reimbursement.” Where (as here) we are dealing with an honest business, there is no wrongful conduct, no fraud, and (significantly) no benefit of any kindto the retailer — who pays every pennycollected to the state and thus does not benefit in any way. A business is unscrupulous whenits wrongful conduct gives it an economic advantage, not where (ashere)itis compelled to charge more for the benefit of a taxing agency,notforitself. When a business chargessales tax reimbursement on a presumptively taxable sale and remits the tax to the Board, there is no unscrupulous conduct. There is no loophole in the consumer protection laws. There is no wrong without a remedy because there is no wrong. Target is not, as the Attorney General suggests, the perpetrator of an illegal scheme. There are no ill-gotten gains for Target to retain. Target has not cheated Plaintiffs or anyone(asPlaintiffs suggest) in any manner. With respect, it appears as though Plaintiffs and the Attorney General — and now this Court — have in mind someother lawsuit, not this 3one. In this case, Plaintiffs’ right to complain to the Board about any perceived mistake (such as chargingsales tax on hotcoffee to go if, in fact, it is not taxable) provides a perfectly adequate remedy. The Board has every reason to respond to consumer complaints and the law presumesthat a governmental agency complies with its legislative mandate. (Civ. Code, § 3529; Board of Permit Appeals vy. Central Permit Bureau (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 633, 642.) The State Board of Equalization is the agency charged by the Legislature with administering and maintaining the integrity and uniformity of the sales tax system. (§ 6001 et seq.; Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1962) 58 Cal.2d 252, 255-256.) The Board has the expertise to apply the relatively artificial and self-contained concepts spelled out in the Revenue and Taxation Code, and there is no reason to * In their July 10, 2009 amicusletter in support of review (p.6), Michael McClain, Avi Feigenblatt and Gregory Fisher, plaintiffs in a similar case pending in thetrial court (McClain v. Sav-On Drugs, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 325272), offer essentially the same conclusory assertions as those made by the Attorney General, adding a claim that, by “collecting unlawful sales tax reimbursement on non- taxable purchases, dishonestretailers can increase their Profit margins by 8.25%, not only harming consumers but also giving themselves an unfair advantage over honest retailers... .” (Italics added.) They do not explain howit is competitively advantageousfor a retailer to charge more thanits competitors, nor do they explain how “dishonest retailers increase their profit margins” by any amount when every penny charged for sales tax reimbursement is directly related to another penny paid to the state to satisfy the retailer’s tax obligation. There is no “profit.” assumethat, given the opportunity to respond to a complaint, it would do nothing. On the real facts of this case, there is no unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice, and no need for a remedy under the UCL, the CLRA, or any other statute or common law cause of action. (Budrow v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 875, 884 [where the conduct alleged is not illegal or wrongful, there is no claim under the UCL]; cf. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 561.) Notto puttoo fine a point onit, but the raison d’étre of this lawsuit and others like it is attorneys fees.* Target recognizes this Court’s general support of legitimate UCL and CLRA actions but suggests this case is nothing of the kind. To the contrary, this is a case in which thetrial court and Court of Appeal saw xobeneficial purpose, only a substantial danger of injustice where a defendant bound to follow the law was sued by two people who paid sales tax reimbursement on allegedly exempt drinks. Since Target has done nothing deserving of punishment and since the plaintiffs have essentially nothing to gain even if they win, the only possible beneficiaries of this lawsuit are the plaintiffs’ lawyers. As this Court put it in the context of a class action in which the recovery to the individuals could at best be de minimus, “when the * The two grant and holds pending before this Court, Yabsley v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 8176146, and Apple v. Superior Court (Herr), $209295, are factually indistinguishable from Loeffler v. Target vis-a-vis the newissue raised by the Court’s request for supplementalbriefing. 10 individual’s interests are no longer served by group action, the principal — if not the sole — beneficiary then becomes the class action attorney. To allow this is ‘to sacrifice the goal for the going,” burdening if not abusing our crowded courts with actions lacking proper purpose.” (Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 386; and see Linder y. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.) CONCLUSION For all the reasons explained above, Target submits that this lawsuit is entirely lacking in merit, that the trial court correctly sustained Target’s demurrers, that Plaintiffs could not truthfully amendto allege that Target has failed to remitits sales tax obligations to the Board of Equalization, that the Court of Appeal opinion is correct, and that this Court should dismiss review as improvidently granted and order the republication of the Court of Appealopinion. Dated: January 10, 2014 Respectfully submitted, Morrison & Foerster Lip Miriam A. Vogel JL L Attorneysfor Defendant and Respondent, Target Corporation Il CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to rule 8.204(c) of the California Rules of Court and in reliance on the computer program used to prepare this brief, counsel certifies that the text of this brief (including footnotes) was produced using 13 point Romantype and contains 2,976 word Dated: January 10, 2014 Miriam A. Vogel WA 12 PROOF OF SERVICE I declare that I am employed with the law firm of Morrison & Foerster LLP, whose address is 707 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90071-3543. Iam nota party to the within cause, and I am over the age of eighteen years. I further declare that on January 10, 2014, I served a copyof: TARGET’S SUPPLEMENTALBRIEF BY U.S. MAIL [Code Civ. Procsec. 1013(a)] by placing a true copy thereofenclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as follows, for collection and mailing at Morrison & Foerster LLP, 707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 6000, Los Angeles, California 90017-3543 in accordance with Morrison & Foerster LLP’s ordinary business practices. Tam readily familiar with Morrison & Foerster LLP’s practice for collection and processing of correspondencefor mailing with the United States Postal Service, and knowthatin the ordinary course of Morrison & Foerster LLP’s business practice the documentdescribed above will be deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same date that it is placed at Morrison & Foerster LLP with postage thereon fully prepaid for collection and mailing. Please see attached ServiceList. I declare under penalty ofperjury underthe laws ofthe State of California that the foregoingis true and correct. Executed at Los Angeles, California, January 10, 2014. C. Bibeau COMeau- (typed) (signature) la-1235434 SERVICE LIST Loeffler. v. Target Corporation California Supreme Court Case No. $173972 Joseph J. M. Lange Lange & Koncius, LLP 222 North Sepulveda Boulevard Suite 1560 El Segundo, CA 90245 Jeffrey Alan Koncius Kiesel & Larson, LLP 8648 Wilshire Boulevard Beverly Hills, CA 90211 Leslie A. Bailey Arthur H. Bryant Public Justice, P.C. 555 12th Street, Suite 1230 Oakland, CA 94607 Benjamin Israel Siminou Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire LLP 2550 Fifth Avenue, 11th Floor San Diego, CA 92103 Phillip Jon Eskenazi Hunton & Williams, LLP 550 W. HopeStreet, Suite 2000 Los Angeles, CA 90071 J. Bruce Henderson Attomey at Law 4294 Kendall Street San Diego, CA 92109 Barry Dion Keene Attorney at Law 1047 - 56th Street Sacramento, CA 95819 Lal207611 Attorneysfor Plaintiffs and Appellants Kimberly Loeffler, et al. Via U.S. mail Attorneysfor Plaintiffs andAppellants Kimberly Loeffler,etal. Via U.S. mail Attorneysfor Plaintiffs andAppellants Kimberly Loeffler, et al. Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Carmen Herr, Heidi Spurgin, Mark Hegarty, Joseph Thompson Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Albertson's, Inc. Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae William T. Bagley Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Barry Dion Keene Via U.S. mail SERVICE LIST Loeffler. v. Target Corporation California Supreme Court Case No. $173972 John Lee Waid California State Board of Equalization 450 N Street, MIC: 82 Sacramento, CA 95814 Sharon J. Arkin The Arkin Law Firm 333 S. Grand Avenue, 25th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90012 Pamela Pressley Foundation for Taxpayer & ConsumerRights 1750 OceanPark Boulevard, Suite 200 Santa Monica, CA 90405 Richard Thomas Williams Holland & Knight, LLP 633 West Fifth Street, 21st Floor Los Angeles, CA 90013 Andrew Eugene Paris Alston & Bird, LLP 333 S. HopeStreet, 16th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 ThomasAlistair Segal The Kick Law Firm, APC 201 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 350 Santa Monica, CA 90401 Lal207611 Amicus Curiae State Board of Equalization Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Consumer Attorneys of California Via U.S. mail Amici Curiae Consumer Watchdog, Foundation for Taxpayer & ConsumerRights, National Association of Consumer Advocates, Public Good Via U.S. mail Amici Curiae CVS Caremark Corporation, CVS Pharmacy,Inc. Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae DIRECTV,Inc. Via U.S. mail Amici Curiae Avi Feigenblatt, Gregory Fisher and Michael Mcclain Via U.S. mail SERVICE LIST Loeffler. v. Target Corporation California Supreme Court Case No. $173972 Taras Peter Kihiczak The Kick Law Firm, APC 900 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 230 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Albert Douglas Mastroianni Mastoianni Law Firm 633 West Fifth Street, 28th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90013 Alexandra Robert Gordon Office of the Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102 Joyce E. Hee Office of the Attorney General 1515 Clay Street, Suite 2000 P.O. Box 70550 Oakland, CA 94612 Albert Norman Shelden Office of the Attorney General 110 West "A"Street, Suite 1100 San Diego, CA 92101 Frederick W. Kosmo Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP 550 West "C" Street, Suite 1050 San Diego, CA 92101 Theresa Osterman Stevenson Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP 550 West "C" Street, Suite 1050 San Diego, CA 92101 Lal207611 Amicus Curiae Michael McClain Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Jason Frisch Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Kamala Harris Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Kamala Harris Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae Kamala Harris Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae PETCO Animal Supplies Stores, Inc. Via U.S. mail Amicus Curiae PETCO Animal Supplies Stores, Inc. Via U.S. mail SERVICE LIST Loeffler. v. Target Corporation California Supreme Court Case No. $173972 Judith Esther Posner Reed Smith, LLP 355 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2900 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Margaret Anne Grignon Reed Smith, LLP 355 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2900 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Clerk of the Court California State Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Three 300 South Spring Street, 2nd Floor North Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013-1213 Clerk of the Court Los Angeles County Superior Court 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attn: The Honorable Michael L. Stern Lal207611 Amicus Curiae Rite Aid Corporation Via U.S. mail Attorneysfor Amicus Curiae Walgreen Company Via U.S. mail Via U.S. mail Four copies Via U.S. mail