UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ROTHSTEIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
UBS AG,
Defendant.
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08 CV 4414 (JSR)
Electronically filed
PLAINITFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) has been acting to destroy the
State of Israel and expel or murder its Jewish residents. To achieve these goals, Iran has been
waging a campaign of terrorism against Israel via various terrorist groups, including Hizbollah
and Hamas, which are proxies of Iran. See, e.g., Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp.
2d 286, 292 (D.D.C. 2003) (“Hizbollah is an Iranian proxy organization, controlled, funded and
operated by Iran…Iran’s control over Hizbollah is so far-reaching that [the federal courts have]
repeatedly held Iran vicariously liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for actions of
Hizbollah.”); id., at 292 (finding that between 1993 and 2003 “Iran has given Hamas massive
financial support and provided professional terrorist training to hundreds of Hamas operatives.”).
See also, Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003).
Iran’s involvement in terrorism has been notorious and a matter of public record
for decades. Each and every year between 1996 and 2004 (the period relevant here), the annual
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Patterns of Global Terrorism report issued by the State Department identified Iran as a leading
sponsor of terrorism, in most years described Iran as the “premier state sponsor of terrorism” or
“the most active state sponsor of terrorism,” and specifically discussed Iran’s provision of
material support to Hizbollah and Hamas.1
Additionally, between 1998 and 2004, the United States federal courts issued
numerous decisions finding Iran liable for terrorist attacks carried out by Iranian-sponsored
terrorist groups in which United States citizens were murdered or harmed. See, e.g., Cicippio v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
999 F. Supp. 1, 23 (D.D.C. 1998); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107
(D.D.C. 2000); Higgins v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000 WL 33674311 (D.D.C. 2000);
Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001); Stethem v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2002); Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F.
Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2002); Steen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2003 WL 21672820 (D.D.C.
2003); Dodge v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2004 WL 5353873 (D.D.C. 2004).
1 See:
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/overview.html;
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/sponsored.html;
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html#iran;
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/sponsor.html#Iran;
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2441.htm;
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2001/html/10249.htm;
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19988.htm;
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/31644.htm;
www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf.
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Furthermore, as the result of its terrorist activities, Iran has been officially
designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Export Administration
Act continuously since 1984. The Secretary of State made this designation—which is published
in the Federal Register and so also part of the public record—on the grounds that “Iran is a
country which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” 49 FR 2836-
02, 1984 WL 126558 (F.R.) (January 23, 1984).
Because Iran is designated as a state-sponsor of terrorism under the Export
Administration Act, all United States persons (which include “any person in the United States”)
are criminally prohibited from conducting financial transactions with Iran under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332d.
Leaving aside the specific question (discussed below) of whether § 2332d applies
to foreign corporations with United States offices (such as UBS), the provisions of § 2332d
clearly placed the general public on notice that conducting financial transactions with a
designated state-sponsor of terrorism such as Iran (which was so designated precisely because it
“has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism” 49 FR 2836-02), might
enable Iran to carry out further such attacks.
Thus, as of 1996, Iran’s involvement with and support for terrorism were blatant,
obvious and well known to the public at large.
As alleged in plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“Complaint” or “Compl.”), in
1996 the United States Federal Reserve entered an agreement with defendant UBS under which
UBS was entrusted with this nation’s currency as part of a special program known as the
Extended Custodial Inventory (“ECI”) program. This program was meant to protect the supply
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and distribution of the United States dollar in foreign countries. Under that agreement, UBS was
prohibited from providing United States banknotes to parties in Iran.
Motivated by overweening greed, between 1996 and 2004 UBS provided the
Iranian government with hundreds of millions of dollars in United States banknotes in violation
of the terms of its agreement with the United States and the provisions of § 2332d, and in utter
disregard of the notoriously well-known fact that Iran was an active and leading practitioner and
supporter of violent terrorism.
The United States banknotes provided to Iran by UBS facilitated the Iranian-
sponsored terrorist attacks in which the plaintiffs were harmed, as discussed in the Complaint
and below.
ARGUMENT
UBS has moved to dismiss the Complaint under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). For the
reasons set forth below, UBS’ motion should be denied.
POINT I
THE COMPLAINT IS NOT SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL UNDER RULE
12(B)(6)
On a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as
true the allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.
Bolt Elec., Inc. v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995). “Rule 8(a) requires only
that the complaint give the defendants fair notice of what their claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Boim
I”) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
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U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). As described below, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged in their Complaint
that the defendant knowingly aided and abetted the torts that injured them. The Complaint
therefore easily “possess enough heft,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966
(2007), to meet the “flexible ‘plausibility standard’” that the Second Circuit has held that
Twombly requires. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007).
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ADEQUATELY PLED AIDING AND ABETTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2333(A)
A. Section 2333(a) Was Enacted to Stop the Flow of Money to Terrorists and
Must Be Construed Accordingly
Plaintiffs’ primary claims are premised on 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), which provides
that: “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue
therefor….” The legislative history of § 2333(a) indicates that it was passed with the specific
purpose of facilitating lawsuits by American citizens who were injured by international terrorist
attacks.2 Congress, with the support of the administration, sought to expand federal jurisdiction
and to allow United States victims of terrorism to use the full reach of American tort law to
pursue justice. As a State Department legal advisor explained at a 1990 Senate hearing on this
issue: “this bill will provide general jurisdiction to our Federal courts and a cause of action for
cases in which an American has been injured by an act of terrorism overseas. The bill is a
2 Most of the legislative history for § 2333(a) is derived from the hearings on the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990. See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1009 n. 6.
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welcome addition to our arsenal against terrorists.”3 In short, this statute was designed to “pave
the way…for victims of terrorism to seek justice via the federal courts and the possibility of civil
damages may well serve as an economic disincentive to terrorism.”4
The Senate committee report, incorporating a summary of § 2333(a) by former
Dept. of Justice attorney Joseph A. Morris, noted: “By its provisions for compensatory damages,
treble damages, and the imposition of liability at any point along the causal chain of terrorism, it
[§ 2333(a)] would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money.” S. Rep. No. 102-342, 102nd
Cong., 2d Sess. at 22 (1992), 1992 WL 187372 (see Senate Hearing at 85). In Boim the
Department of Justice again reiterated this position in an amicus curiae brief to affirm a decision
against the financial supporters of Hamas when it noted that “the Government believes that this
provision can be an effective weapon in the battle against international terrorism; it fights
terrorism by discouraging those who would provide financing for this activity.”5 Thus, § 2333(a)
is not merely a private tort, it was drafted and enacted with the public interest in mind to stop the
flow of money to terrorists and their supporters and it must be construed to further this purpose.
3 See Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts and
Administrative Practice of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2d
Sess., Jul. 25, 1990 (hereafter “Senate Hearing”), Statement of State Department deputy legal
advisor Alan J. Kreczko, at 12.
4 Id., at 17.
5 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, filed in
Boim at 2, which is annexed as Exh. 1 to the accompanying declaration of Robert J. Tolchin
(“Tolchin Decl.”) The Seventh Circuit substantially adopted the government’s account of the
legislative history of § 2333(a) in its opinion. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010.
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B, Plaintiffs Have Adequately Alleged They Are Victims of Acts of International
Terrorism Carried Out by Iran
Section 2333(a) provides United States nationals with a cause of action if they are
injured by reason of an act of international terrorism, and § 2331(1) defines “international
terrorism,” in relevant part, as activities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States; (B) appear to be intended
intimidate civilians or influence governments; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.
The Complaint alleges that Iran’s actions constituted acts of international
terrorism within the meaning of § 2331, and that plaintiffs were harmed by those acts. Compl. ¶¶
129-133. UBS does not dispute that Iran’s actions constitute acts of international terrorism.
Moreover, Iran has already been found liable for the bombings on August 30,
1997 and September 4, 1997 in which many of the plaintiffs were harmed. See Stern, 271 F.
Supp. 2d 286; Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258.
C. Plaintiffs Have Adequately Alleged UBS is Vicariously Liable for the
Iranian- Sponsored Attacks in Which They Were Harmed
Although § 2333(a) requires only that plaintiffs allege that they are victims of
“international terrorism” in order to meet its jurisdictional threshold, the statute is silent about
who may be sued and for this the courts must “look to tort law and the legislative history to
determine who may be held liable for injuries covered by the statute.” Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010;
see also, Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Boim I).
This was not an oversight on the part of Congress. As the Senate Report noted:
The substance of such an action is not defined by the statute,
because the fact patterns giving rise to such suits will be as varied
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and numerous as those found in the law of torts. This bill opens the
courthouse door to victims of international terrorism.
S. Rep. No. 102-342, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. at 45 (1992), 1992 WL 187372 (incorporating
testimony from Senate Hearing at 86).
The Seventh Circuit in Boim I specifically addressed the legislative history of
§§ 2331 and 2333 and observed it “evidences an intent by Congress to codify general common
law tort principles and extend civil liability for acts of international terrorism to the full reaches
of traditional tort law.” Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010. “The statute clearly is meant to reach beyond
those persons who themselves commit the violent act that directly causes the injury.” Id., at
1011; see also, Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 592. In sum, the history of § 2333(a) “indicates an
intent by Congress to allow a plaintiff to recover from anyone along the causal chain of
terrorism.” Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1011. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they are victims of “international
terrorism” and, as described below, that UBS facilitated “the causal chain of terrorism” that
resulted in their injuries. By providing Iran with substantial financial support and services when
UBS knew Iran was sponsoring international terrorism, UBS violated 18 U.S.C. § 2332d and
aided and abetted Iran’s acts of international terrorism.
D. Section 2333(a) Incorporated General Principles of Tort Law Including Civil
Aiding & Abetting Liability
i. UBS is Liable Under Aiding and Abetting Principles Reflected in
§ 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
To define the scope of liability of any defendant within the ambit of § 2333(a)
“Congress expressed an intent in the terms and history of section 2333 to import general tort law
principles, and those principles include aiding and abetting liability.” Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1017.
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See also, id., at 1021 (“aiding and abetting liability is both appropriate and called for by the
language, structure and legislative history of section 2333.”). In particular and as noted in the
government’s amicus brief in Boim I, Congress intended to import “civil tort law principles as
expressed in the Restatement Second of Torts, and as applied in the cases.” Id. at 1017.
The primary case setting forth theses principles of civil aiding and abetting
liability is Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which relied heavily on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 876 (1979). See Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (applying aiding
and abetting principles from Halberstam and Restatement to § 2333 claims). In Halberstam the
Court upheld a civil aiding and abetting claim for murder against a woman (Hamilton) who
knowingly assisted the burglaries of her boyfriend (Welch) by providing otherwise lawful
services such as banking and bookkeeping. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488. The defendant in
Halberstam was held liable for the murder committed during a burglary by her boyfriend
because even though she had no knowledge or intent to commit the murder, she knew that her
activities were assisting Welch’s string of burglaries and that a more serious crime could result.
Id.
“In the almost quarter-century since Halberstam was decided, many state courts
and Circuit Courts, including the Second Circuit, have adopted the Restatement’s aiding and
abetting standard.” Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 288 (2nd Cir. 2007) (per
curium) (concurring opinion of J. Hall). Restatement (Second) § 876 states in relevant part:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he
* * *
b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself, or
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c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
Id.
According to these principles, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged liability under
paragraphs (b) and (c) of § 876. First, with respect to paragraph (b), UBS knew that Iran was
engaged in criminal conduct, yet it nevertheless continued to provide extensive financial support
and services to Iran including millions of dollars in United States currency. Second, with respect
to paragraph (c), UBS’s own activities in transferring funds to Iran was a breach of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332d for which UBS is liable. See Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 585 (violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2339A, 2339B, and 2339C are sufficient to establish secondary liability under § 876(c)).
ii. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Iranian Sponsored Terrorism
Requires Only that UBS Have Been Generally Aware of Its Role
1. Intent to Facilitate Terrorism is Not Required
UBS concedes that there is civil liability for aiding and abetting state sponsors of
terrorism but asserts that the Complaint must still allege “that UBS intended the United States
banknote transactions to facilitate Iran’s ‘acts of international terrorism.’” See UBS
Memorandum of Law (“Def. Mem.”) at 3 and at 18 (quoting Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 as
requiring that defendants “desired to help those [terrorist] activities succeed”). But what UBS
fails to mention is that in a later decision, the Seventh Circuit clarified that it had only imposed
an intent requirement on aiding and abetting in Boim I because the defendants had argued that
their association with Hamas and their donations to it were protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, to avoid this First Amendment concern, the court applied a higher standard for aiding and
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abetting derived from criminal law, which required intent. As the Seventh Circuit later noted:
“We took our cue on that point from the Supreme Court’s decision in [NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)], which conditions the civil liability of an organization for
the violent acts of one of its members on proof that the organization had the specific intent to
further the aims of the wrongdoer.” Boim v. Holy Land Foundation, 511 F.3d 707, 728 (7th Cir.
2007) (“Boim II”) reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12925 (7th
Cir. June 16, 2008).
UBS, however, has never asserted that it has a First Amendment right to conduct
business with state sponsors of terrorism nor could it.
2. Knowledge and General Awareness
Since the scienter requirement of § 2333(a) does not require proof of intent for
civil aiding and abetting liability, plaintiffs need only satisfy the knowledge requirement for
aiding and abetting in § 876 of the Restatement (Second). In Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477, the
court reviewed § 876 and concluded:
Aiding-abetting includes the following elements: (1) the party
whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes
an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as
part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he
provides the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and
substantially assist the principal violation.
Id. (Emphasis added).
These elements have been subsequently applied in terrorism finance cases, see,
e.g., Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 584, and as discussed in Halberstam, these elements do not
require that a defendant know about or participate in the specific unlawful conduct that harms the
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victim. Rather, Hamilton was civilly liable for the murder committed by her boyfriend Welch
since:
it was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the activity
Hamilton helped Welch to undertake. It was not necessary that
Hamilton knew specifically that Welch was committing burglaries.
Rather, when she assisted him, it was enough that she knew he was
involved in some type of personal property crime at night--whether
as a fence, burglar, or armed robber made no difference--because
violence and killing is a foreseeable risk in any of these
enterprises.
Id., 705 F.2d at 488. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’ case against UBS is similar to that of Halberstam in that it involves a
defendant that knowingly assisted a criminal engaged in unlawful activities that ultimately
resulted in murder. Here, however, instead of assisting mere property crimes, UBS funneled
hundreds of millions of dollars to the Iranian government, knowing that the Iranian government
was directly funding numerous terrorist organizations including Hamas and Hezbollah. These
allegations are more than sufficient to satisfy the knowledge requirement imposed in civil aiding
and abetting cases by the court in Halberstam as well as by numerous other federal circuits. See,
e.g., Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 289-90 (Hall, J., concurring) (citing cases applying § 876’s
knowledge requirement and concluding banks could be civilly liable for supporting South
Africa’s apartheid regime if they provided “the principal tortfeasor with the tools,
instrumentalities, or services to commit those violations with actual or constructive knowledge
that those tools, instrumentalities, or services will be (or only could be) used in connection with
that purpose.”); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir.1975) (“liability for
aiding and abetting may be found on less than actual knowledge of the illegal activity.… How
much or how little knowledge would seem to vary with the facts of each case.”); Camp v. Dema,
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948 F.2d 455, 459, (8th Cir. 1991) (“A party who engages in atypical business transactions…
may be found liable as an aider and abettor with a minimal showing of knowledge.”)
Despite the Complaint’s extensive details regarding UBS’s “atypical business
transactions” with the Iranian government, UBS still argues that plaintiffs have not made a
“plausible allegation that UBS knowingly traded United States banknotes with the Iranian
government.” Def. Mem. at 19. This argument ignores UBS’s own concession that in 2006 it
“began voluntarily to cease doing business with the Iranian government, its officials and related
entities.” Def. Mem. at 13.
Nor does UBS even begin to explain what about this allegation is implausible. On
the contrary, what is truly implausible is the assumption that UBS distributed hundreds of
millions of dollars in cash to private persons in Iran. UBS also appears to believe that Twombly
requires a plaintiff to identify in the complaint the source of his information. Twombly does
nothing of the sort.
Moreover, it is a fact of public record—one which UBS knows full well—that in
“1979, the Iranian government nationalized all Iranian banks.” Flatow v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1072 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2002). See also, Reading & Bates Corp. v. U.S., 40
Fed.Cl. 737, 744 (Fed.Cl. 1998) (“All banks in Iran … were nationalized by the Islamic
government of Iran on June 8, 1979.”). Indeed, as the Second Circuit has done, this Court can
“take judicial notice of the fact that the Iranian banks have been nationalized.” KMW Intern. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank 606 F.2d 10, 17 (2d. Cir. 1979). Because all banks in Iran are owned by
the Iranian government, they are defined as a matter of law as agencies and instrumentalities of
Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See e.g. Flatow, 308 F.3d 1065; Raji
v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 139 Misc.2d 1026, 1028, 529 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988) (Bank
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Sepah Iran is “wholly owned by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and thus [is] a
government agency or instrumentality” within the meaning of the FSIA).
In light of the above, the allegation that UBS provided the banknotes both to Iran
itself and to “agencies and instrumentalities of the government of Iran” (Compl. at ¶ 53) is not
only plausible, but extremely plausible. It would be plainly absurd to believe that the hundreds of
millions of cash dollars provided by UBS to persons in Iran were provided neither to the Iranian
government itself nor to any banks in Iran. The Twombly plausibility standard “does not impose
a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” which will support the allegation. Id.
at 1965. Since all banks in Iran are agencies and instrumentalities of Iran, there is clearly “a
reasonable expectation” that discovery will reveal that UBS provided the banknotes to agencies
and instrumentalities of Iran, exactly as alleged by plaintiffs.
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether UBS specifically knew that “U.S. banknote
transactions would actually be used to fund terrorist attacks,” Def. Mem.. at 19, as long as UBS
was generally aware that Iran was unlawfully funding terrorism. As the Complaint notes at ¶ 51,
it was public knowledge that Iran was funding international terrorism, and UBS is presumed to
have known this information and the risks of providing funds to Iran. See U.S. v. Bank of New
England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 854-56 (1st Cir. 1987) (bank held criminally liable for the
collective knowledge of its employees).
Finally, UBS argues that the publicly available information regarding the
terrorism threat posed by Iran was insufficient for it to know that Iran could possibly “provide
terrorists with the U.S. banknotes.” Def. Mem. at 20. To support its argument UBS cites Stutts v.
De Dietrich Group, 2006 WL 1867060 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 30, 2006), which held that banks could
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not be presumed to have known that providing letters of credit to Iraq in the 1980’s would
ultimately help Iraq purchase the chemical weapons components that would result in injuries to
American servicemen when Iraqi chemical storage facilities were blown up in the 1990’s. Def.
Mem. at 20. The decision in Stutts, however, is distinguishable because the transactions in Stutts
were conducted before Iraq was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. See 55 Fed. Reg.
37793 (Sep. 13, 1990) (designating Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism). Moreover, in Weiss v.
National Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 627 n. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) the court
rejected the same argument that UBS now makes and held that Stutts was inapplicable because
banks that issue letters of credit only deal in documents and have no reason to be aware of the
activities of the receipts of these letters. The court in Weiss therefore concluded that unlike the
case in Stutts, a bank could reasonably foresee “that funds provided directly to known terrorist
groups would be used to perpetrate terrorist attacks.” Weiss, 453 F.Supp. 2d at 632 n. 18. So, too,
when a bank provides funds directly to a known state sponsor of terrorism it can reasonably
foresee the risk of terrorism this poses to the general public.
iii. UBS Provided Substantial Assistance to Iranian Financed Terrorism
UBS also claims in conclusory fashion that plaintiffs have failed to allege that it
provided substantial assistance in support of Iranian financed terrorism. Def. Mem. at 21. This
claim is baseless. The Complaint alleges that UBS provided hundreds of millions of dollars to
the Iranian government which Iran, Hizbollah and Hamas need to carry out terrorism. Id. at ¶¶
52-55. As noted in the Complaint (¶¶ 109-10), in the same year as Congress enacted § 2332d, it
also passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (“ILSA”) to prohibit even foreign
companies outside the jurisdiction of the United States from providing certain forms of financial
assistance to Iran. See Pub. L. 104-172, codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note. The ILSA authorized
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the President to impose sanctions on foreign corporations if their financial support to Iran was
above $40 million, and the ILSA’s explicit policy statement affirmed “it is the policy of the
United States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism.” Similarly, a
White House fact sheet released at the time of the ILSA’s enactment made it clear that the
purpose of this law was to deny Iran “revenues that could be used to finance international
terrorism.”6 As such, the ILSA provides a solid legislative benchmark of what constitutes
substantial assistance for Iranian-supported terrorism. As detailed in plaintiffs’ Complaint, UBS
has more than surpassed this benchmark.
E. Plaintiffs Have Adequately Alleged that UBS Is Part of the Causal Chain of
Terrorism
UBS argues that plaintiffs do not have standing because they have failed to
“plausibly allege that the attacks would not have occurred without the U.S. banknote
transactions.” Def. Mem. at 3. By arguing that its actions are not “fairly traceable” to plaintiffs’
injuries, Def. Mem. at 17, UBS simply closes its eyes to the vast body case law that connects it
to the casual chain of terrorism. Indeed, in Boim I the Seventh Circuit emphasized that because
“Congress intended to import standard tort law into section 2333, causation may be demonstrated
as it would be in traditional tort law.” Id., 291 F.3d at 1015. Subsequently, in Boim II the court
elaborated on this law with respect to the murder of David Boim:
A defendant’s conduct need not have been the sole or predominant
cause of the attack; on the contrary, consistent with the intent of
Congress that liability for terrorism extend the full length of the
causal chain, even conduct that indirectly facilitated Hamas’s
6 http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/security/archive/august/ds1_8-
7.htm .
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terrorist activities might render a defendant liable for the death of
David Boim.
Id., 511 F. 3d at 711.
In this regard, the court discussed the applicable principles of traditional tort law
and noted:
but-for causation does not demand a showing that the defendant’s
conduct was the sole cause of the plaintiff’s injury; the conduct
need only be one of the causes.… Nor must the plaintiff show that
the defendant’s conduct was the predominant or primary cause of
the injury…. A plaintiff might well be unable to show that a
terrorist organization such as Hamas depended on a particular
donor to support its terrorism, for example, or that one act of
terrorism owed its existence to a specific donation. But a careful
showing that many small donations collectively resulted in a cache
of funds that in turn enabled a series of terrorist acts would permit
a factfinder reasonably to infer a causal connection between the
contribution made by a single donor and one of the terrorist acts
made possible by that donor and others like him, even if a single
donation would not by itself have been enough to cause that
terrorist act.
Id., at 742-43 (citations to Restatements omitted). Moreover, the court in Boim II summarized:
Terrorist acts that follow within a reasonable time the donations
and other support provided by a defendant to the perpetrators of
those acts could be deemed to have been caused by those acts; and
the more significant the support provided by a defendant, the more
readily one might infer that support was a cause of later terrorist
acts.
Id., 511 F.3d at 742.
When these principles are applied to UBS’s conduct it is impossible to state that
as a matter of law UBS’s illicit conduct did not in some way facilitate the Iranian sponsored
terrorist attacks that harmed plaintiffs. Indeed, plaintiffs have alleged that UBS intentionally
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provided hundreds of millions of dollars to Iran at the same time Iran was financially supporting
the terrorist organizations that perpetrated these terrorist attacks. In fact, many of the plaintiffs in
this case have already established that their injuries are directly traceable to Iranian-financed
terrorist attacks that occurred after UBS began supplying Iran with millions of dollars. See Stern,
271 F. Supp. 2d 286; Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258. In Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 632 the
court concluded that causation was sufficiently alleged by plaintiffs when a British bank
provided funds to terrorists prior to an attack because of “the fungible nature of money and the
fact that it is difficult to say when the particular dollar given to a terrorist is actually used.”
Similar logic must surely apply when a bank willfully provides funds to a state sponsor of terror
it knows is directly funding these same terrorists.
Even more important than the factual evidence that ties UBS to the casual chain
of terrorism is that under traditional tort law plaintiffs are not the ones who are responsible for
presenting this evidence. It is a well established principle of law that when a defendant commits
a per se violation of a statute or regulation meant to protect a certain class of persons from harm,
and a person in this class is thereafter harmed, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that its
wrongful conduct was not the cause of plaintiffs’ harm. See, e.g., Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170
F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999) (“When a defendant’s negligent act is deemed wrongful precisely
because it has a strong propensity to cause the type of injury that ensued, that very causal
tendency is evidence enough to establish a prima facie case of cause-in-fact. The burden then
shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence that its negligence was not such a but-for
cause.”); Zuchowicz v. U.S., 140 F.3d 381, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts and Cardozo’s principles of causational burden shifting in cases of per se
violations); Elliott v. Michael James, Inc., 559 F.2d 759, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (proximate
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causation established in wrongful death case by proving violation of safety regulations designed
to protect against such harm). See also, Morant v. Long Island R.R., 66 F.3d 518, 522-23 (2d Cir.
1995) (federal law includes the doctrine of per se liability).
In this case, plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2332d
and its implementing regulations in 31 C.F.R. Part 596, that these laws were meant to protect
against the threat of Iranian financed terrorism, and that plaintiffs were injured as a result. These
allegations are sufficient to shift the burden of causation to UBS. Cf. Owens v. Republic of
Sudan, 412 F. Supp. 2d 99, 113 n. 20 (D.D.C. 2006) (rejecting Sudan’s arguments that its
support to terrorist organizations was de minimis and noting cases where “causation may be
presumed (subject to rebuttal proof by the defendant) for purposes of liability where the
defendant violates a law that is designed to protect others from harm and such harm occurs.”)
Lastly, although UBS argues that it cannot be liable because others helped fund
the Iranian sponsored terrorist organizations that harmed the plaintiffs, Def. Mem. at 11-12, this
argument only undermines its attempt to dismiss the complaint for lack of causational standing.
As the Second Circuit has noted, when multiple defendants are at fault, it is their responsibility to
disprove their causational connection to the tort. Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 389 n. 6 (citing
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (burden of causation shifted to joint
tortfeasors)). Thus, if UBS reasonably believes others may also be jointly and severally liable to
plaintiffs, it should implead them as third-party defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 14.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that “tort defendants … are responsible
for the natural consequences of their actions. Thus, an actor may be held liable for those
consequences attributable to reasonably foreseeable intervening forces, including the acts of
third parties.” Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93 (2d. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)
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(internal quotations marks, brackets and citations omitted). It was more than reasonably
foreseeable that Iran and its terrorist proxies would continue to carry out terrorist attacks and that
providing Iran with hundreds of millions of dollars in cash might assist them to do so.
POINT III
UBS’S CONDUCT WAS A CRIMINAL VIOLATION OF UNITED
STATES LAW
A. The Plain Meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2332d Prohibits UBS’s Conduct
UBS argues that its conduct “did not violate any U.S. criminal law,” Def. Mem. at
8, including “either Section 2332d or 31 C.F.R. Part 596.” Def. Mem. at 30. UBS, however,
refuses to acknowledge the plain meaning of these rules, their extensive legislative history, and
simply misconstrues Congressional testimony regarding UBS’s conduct while trying to present
this case as one premised on merely a breach of contract claim instead of a criminal violation of
United States law.
On April 24, 1996, in the same year that the ECI program involving UBS was
initiated, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub.
L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, to implement several key United States counterterrorism strategies to
stop the financing of international terrorism and to expand the scope of civil liability claims that
could be brought by victims of international terrorism. In particular, to help prevent the financing
of international terrorism by rogue governments, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2332d (§ 321 of
the AEDPA) to prohibit United States persons, including “any person in the United States,” from
engaging in financial transactions with the governments of state sponsors of terrorism because as
Congress found in § 324 of the AEDPA, 22 U.S.C. § 2377 note, “international terrorism is
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among the most serious transnational threats faced by the United States and its allies....Congress
deplores decisions to ease, evade, or end international sanctions on state sponsors of terrorism.”7
On August 22, 1996 the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued regulations to implement 18 U.S.C. § 2332d. These regulations,
now codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 596 as the “Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations,”
prohibit any “United States person” from engaging in a financial transaction with a government
that has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979. Because the Secretary of State designated Iran as a state sponsor of
terrorism in 1984 pursuant to section 6(j) after finding “Iran is a country which has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism,” 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02 (Jan. 23, 1984), the
regulations in 31 C.F.R. Part 596, in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 2332d, criminally prohibit
financial transactions with Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism.
UBS asserts these prohibitions do not apply to it because as a foreign corporation
incorporated in Switzerland it is not a “United States person” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2332d.8
7 When Congress passed the AEDPA in 1996 to criminally prohibit financial
transactions with state sponsors of terrorism, it also passed 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and amended the
FSIA to permit civil actions against state sponsors of terrorism (AEDPA § 221). This is
significant because, as noted supra, it shows Congress’ commitment to stop the flow of money
along the entire causal chain of terrorism and to supplement the civil liability provisions in 18
U.S.C. § 2333.
8 Even if 18 U.S.C. § 2332d did not directly apply to UBS, this would still not
prevent this Court from using § 2332d as a legislative guideline with regard to aiding and
abetting Iranian supported terrorism. Cf. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1015:
We hasten to add that, although proof of a criminal violation under
sections 2339A or 2339B might satisfy the definition of
international terrorism under section 2333, such proof is not
necessary to sustain a section 2333 claim. As we discuss in the
(continued next page)
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Def. Mem. at 30. In short, UBS believes that it can conduct extensive business in the United
States, maintain numerous offices here, and enjoy the benefits and protections of United States
law,9 yet it is free to engage in business with the enemies of the United States abroad and to
suffer no adverse criminal or civil liability for doing so.
This claim is baseless because both § 2332d(b)(2)(D) and 31 C.F.R. § 596.313
define a “United States person” as including “any person in the United States” (emphasis added).
A “person” is defined in 31 C.F.R. § 596.308 to include an “entity,” which is further defined to
include any corporation. As such, the plain meaning of both 18 U.S.C. § 2332d and its
implementing regulations in 31 C.F.R. Part 596 prohibit financial transactions with state
sponsors of terrorism by any corporation that is in the United States.
UBS by virtue of its numerous locations throughout the United States is without a
doubt a “person in the United States.” Cf. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., 183 F.R.D.
157, 159-160 (D.N.J. 1998). (“[The phrase] ‘located within the United States’ should be taken to
mean...a citizen, or a domestic corporation or association or governmental unit; if an alien, it
should at least mean an alien residing in the United States, or if a foreign nation corporation, one
with an office in the United States.”) (Emphasis added). UBS is therefore subject to the criminal
context of aiding and abetting, we believe Congress intended for
civil liability for financing terrorism to sweep more broadly than
the conduct described in sections 2339A and 2339B.
9 In fact, according to UBS’s own corporate documents it employs more
American citizens than any other nationality including employees from Switzerland. See UBS
Handbook 2006/2007 at 23 “Composition of UBS’s workforce by citizenship,” available at
http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/investors/annual_reporting2006/handbo
ok/0007?contentId=115535&name=hb0607_e_final.pdf
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prohibitions against engaging in financial transactions with state sponsors of terrorism just as any
other person who is in the United States, even though UBS may have been incorporated in
Switzerland. Were this not the case, corporations with offices in the United States but
incorporated abroad could completely bypass United States sanctions regimes through this
loophole for both state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist organizations. The legislative history
of United States terrorism sanctions and § 2332d indicates that Congress would never have
intended this result, and it is clear that these laws apply to the activities of United States persons
no matter where their activities are conducted in the world. Indeed, in June 1997 the House
Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the threat posed by state sponsors of terrorism and
the financial support they provide to terrorist organizations and reiterated that 18 U.S.C. § 2332d
was passed “to prohibit all financial support of U.S. persons with these countries regardless of
where these transactions took place.”10 (Emphasis added).
The absurdity of UBS’ argument is underscored by the fact the definition of a
“United States person” in § 2332d and its implementing regulations is materially identical to the
definition contained in the United States Global Terrorism Sanctions regulations, see 31 C.F.R.
§ 594.315, issued by the President Sept. 11, 2001, pursuant to Exec. Or. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg.
490708 (Sept. 23, 2001). These regulations also apply to “any person in the United States” and
block financial transactions with Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden and terrorist groups such as Hamas
and Hezbollah. Under UBS’s construction, foreign corporations would be allowed to freely
10Prohibition on Financial Transactions with Countries Supporting Terrorism Act
of 1997 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 2 (Jun. 10, 1997) (opening statement of Chairman Bill Mccollum).
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operate within the United States and engage in financial transactions with Al Qaida and Osama
bin Laden abroad with no criminal ramifications.11
B. The Department of Justice Has Interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2332d to Include
Foreign Corporations in the U.S.
UBS’s argument that a “United States person” does not include a foreign
corporation in the United States is further contradicted by the Department of Justice, which
indicted Bayoil S & T, a Bahamas corporation doing business in this country, after it was
discovered Bayoil S & T had violated 18 U.S.C. § 2332d and engaged in financial transactions
with the Hussein regime when Iraq was still classified as a state sponsor of terrorism. Although
the charges against Bayoil S &T were later dismissed in U.S. v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), this decision interpreting § 2332d(b)(2) is, respectfully, fundamentally flawed.
Specifically, the decision in Chalmers erroneously held that the Supreme Court
had “interpreted ‘United States persons’ as excluding foreign corporations.” Chalmers, 474 F.
Supp. 2d at 565 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000)).12 In
fact, Crosby only held that the definition of “United States persons” in United States human
rights sanction laws against Burma’s government preempted a Massachusetts law that was
broader in scope because the state law imposed state government sanctions not only against
11 In addition, the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations that were passed pursuant to
President Clinton’s Exec. Or. 12947 (Jan. 23, 1995) also define a “United States person” to
include “any person in the United States.” 31 C.F.R. § 595.315. Thus, according to UBS, these
sanctions regulations would not apply to it, even though they block the property of, among
others, Al Qaida, Hamas, and Hezbollah and subject violators to the criminal penalties specified
in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.§ 1701 et seq.) (“IEEPA”).
12 Even though the court in Chalmers relied on it, neither the government’s brief
nor the defendant’s brief in that case addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in Crosby.
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Burma’s government but against foreign corporations that did business in Burma even if they
were not otherwise subject to United States jurisdiction. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379. The Supreme
Court in Crosby concluded that the state law was thus more restrictive than the federal law
because it “imposes restrictions on foreign companies as well as domestic, whereas the federal
Act limits its reach to United States persons.” Id. at 379. Contrary to the conclusion in Chalmers,
the Supreme Court’s language in Crosby never actually addressed whether a foreign corporation
that was in the United States was excluded from the definition of a United States person.
C. The Treasury Department Never Negated the Possibility of Criminal
Enforcement Actions against UBS
UBS also attempts to overcome the plain meaning of § 2332d and its
implementing regulations by selectively quoting congressional testimony from former OFAC
Director R. Richard Newcombe during a hearing on UBS’s violations. Specifically, UBS notes
his statements that “we do not have jurisdiction over UBS Zurich—there’s no enforcement
action that we can take against that bank … we are not involved in the ECI program. It goes to
banks over which we do not have jurisdiction.” Def. Mem. at 8.13
What UBS fails to include with its carefully crafted quotation was that Mr.
Newcombe was merely referring to enforcement actions and investigations that could be taken
13 Citing Oversight of the Extended Custodial Inventory Program: Hearing on the
Recent Events Involving the Union Bank of Switzerland-Zurich which Violated its ECI
Agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York by Engaging in U.S. Dollar Banknote
Transactions with Countries Subject to Sanctions by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control, which Administers and Enforces Economic Sanctions Against
Targeted Foreign Countries Before the S. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
108th Cong. at 10-11 (2004) (“May 20, 2004 Senate Hearing”) (statement of R. Richard
Newcombe) (attached to Def. Mem. as Cantor Decl. Exh. 3).
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against the bank branch “UBS Zurich,” and he was certainly not ruling out the possibility of
criminal enforcement measures against its corporate parent “UBS AG.” Indeed, UBS’s cunning
use of ellipses after Mr. Newcombe’s statement that “there’s no enforcement action that we can
take against that bank” simply omits his next words “we do have other matters open that I
cannot comment about to determine if there is U.S. jurisdiction and if U.S. laws have been
violated.” (Emphasis added). Mr. Newcombe’s statement regarding jurisdiction over “UBS
Zurich” occurred shortly after Chairman Richard Shelby asked what penalties and enforcement
actions had occurred against the people actually involved in the conspiracy to funnel money to
Iran.14 In this respect, Mr. Newcombe’s statements are accurate because these foreign employees
are not “United States persons” and are not directly subject to the extraterritorial application of
United States law and jurisdiction.
It is simply misleading, however, for UBS to construe the lack of enforcement
powers over employees and documents at a bank branch in Zurich Switzerland as equivalent to a
lack of enforcement powers over UBS AG, which is the same corporate body that has numerous
offices in the United States.15 UBS AG is therefore indisputably a person in the United States
and is subject this country’s jurisdiction as a single corporate entity whether or not the United
States is capable of sanctioning the employees of any particular foreign branch.
14 May 20, 2004 Senate Hearing at 9.
15 See UBS, Group structure and shareholders: “None of the Business Groups of
UBS or its Corporate Center are separate legal entities. They operate out of the parent bank, UBS
AG, through its branches worldwide.” available at http://www.ubs.com/
1/e/investors/annual_reporting2006/handbook/0028.html .
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POINT IV
UBS IS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR AIDING AND ABETTING VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Plaintiffs’ claims against UBS are also premised on violations of international
law, which prohibits providing support for crimes against humanity and genocide. Customary
international law (the law among nations) is a fundamental part of federal common law. See The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The law of nations forms an integral part of the
common law, and a review of the history surrounding the adoption of the Constitution
demonstrates that it became a part of the common law of the United States upon the adoption of
the Constitution.”); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111
(1987). Because the Supreme Court has ruled that jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “will
support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin,” Illinois
v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972), plaintiffs also assert international law claims. See also
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1201 at n. 5 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that where a tort is
actionable under international law “the suit arises under federal common law, and thus federal
jurisdiction may … be premised upon § 1331”) (citing cases).
In Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 274-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) the
court concluded that international law prohibits genocide, crimes against humanity, and
terrorism. It also prohibits aiding and abetting these crimes. Id., at 285-87. As detailed in the
Complaint (¶¶ 47-50), it is has been the explicit and notorious policy of the government of Iran
to eradicate the State of Israel and expel or murder its Jewish residents. To further this policy,
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Iran openly provides financial support to Islamic organizations that share its goals including
Hamas and Hezbollah. Despite knowing about this policy and Iran’s extensive financial support
for its unlawful goals, UBS willfully provided Iran with vast sums of currency that were used to
facilitate Iran’s criminal activities. Accordingly, UBS is liable to plaintiffs for aiding and
abetting Iranian violations of international law because “acts which in themselves may be
benign, if done for a benign purpose, may be actionable if done with the knowledge that they are
supporting unlawful acts.” Id. at 291 (holding that defendant Arab Bank was liable for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and terrorism if it knowingly provided financial services and support to
terrorist organizations).
UBS argues that plaintiffs’ customary international law claims are preempted by
§ 2333, but it openly concedes that these claims “inadequately” fit within the scope of § 2333.
Def. Mem. at 24. The defendant’s admission is absolutely correct, and the definition of
“international terrorism” in § 2331 does not encompass the crime of genocide, which requires
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” or crimes
against humanity, which require “a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population.” Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 274-75 quoting the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
UBS’ preemption argument should therefore be rejected, since: “In order to abrogate a common-
law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.”
U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). Section § 2333 does not speak directly, or at all, to jus
cogens violations such as genocide and crimes against humanity.
Moreover, it would be strange to conclude that Congress intended § 2333 to
preempt the international customary law prohibiting terrorist bombings and terrorist financing
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that was cited in Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 276-79, since § 2333 was enacted in 1992 whereas
the international treaties that crystallized the customary international law in this sphere were only
signed in 1997 and 1999, as discussed in Almog. Furthermore, as noted supra, the legislative
history of § 2333 explicitly stated that “[t]his bill opens the courthouse door to victims of
international terrorism.” S. Rep. No. 102-342, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. at 45 (1992). As such,
UBS’ preemption argument is completely at odds with the intent of Congress to expand federal
jurisdiction in favor of American victims of terrorism. Lastly, for the reasons stated above in
respect to aiding and abetting violations of § 2333, plaintiffs have adequately alleged a claim for
aiding and abetting violations of international law.
POINT V
PLAINTIFFS’ ISRAELI LAW CLAIMS ARE ADEQUATELY PLED
In addition to their claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and customary international
law, the Complaint also asserts causes of action for negligence, breach of statutory duty and
aiding and abetting under Israeli law, pursuant to this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
UBS asserts that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Israeli law. However,
as shown in the attached Declaration of Israeli tort law expert Dr. Boaz Shnoor, UBS’ arguments
(which rely on an outdated monograph and UBS’ American counsel’s own personal exegesis of
Israeli law) are baseless, and the Israeli law causes of action are indeed all adequately pled.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion should be denied in its
entirety.
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Dated: New York, New York
October 2, 2008
Respectfully submitted,
JAROSLAWICZ & JAROS, LLC
Attorneys for the plaintiffs
By:
Robert J. Tolchin
225 Broadway, 24th floor
New York, New York 10007
(212) 227-2780
TARNOR, PLLC
Nathaniel A. Tarnor
1200 G Street, NW, Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 684-8172
NITSANA DARSHAN-LEITNER & CO.
Israeli counsel for the plaintiffs
10 Hata’as Street
Ramat Gan, 52512
Israel
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