Rodgers et al v. Equifax Information Services, Llc et al

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support

N.D. Ga.March 13, 2017

- 1 - IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION JASON BRENT RODGERS AND KENDRA D. RODGERS, Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC; EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.; AND PNC BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (INC.), Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-CV-04740-SCJ-JSA DEFENDANT EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT COMES NOW Defendant Experian Information Services (“Experian”), by and through counsel, and respectfully moves (the “Motion”) this Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) [Doc. 3] filed by Plaintiffs Jason Brent Rodgers and Kendra D. Rodgers, (“Plaintiffs”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In support thereof, Experian submits herewith its Memorandum of Law containing arguments and citations of authorities. WHEREFORE, Experian prays for the following relief: (a) That Plaintiffs’ action be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice; and Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 22 - 2 - (b) For such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. Dated: March 13, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /s/ William H. Rooks William H. Rooks Georgia Bar No. 906785 JONES DAY 1420 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 800 Atlanta, GA 30309-3053 Telephone: (404) 581-8891 Facsimile: (404) 581-8330 wrooks@jonesday.com An Attorney for Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 2 of 22 - 3 - IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION JASON BRENT RODGERS AND KENDRA D. RODGERS, Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC; EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.; AND PNC BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (INC.), Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:16-CV-04740-SCJ-JSA MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is fatally flawed. Though bringing claims under the auspices of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Plaintiffs’ case in reality asks that Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) play the role of a bankruptcy court. Rather than being concerned with any factual inaccuracies in their credit reports, Plaintiffs seek to hold Experian liable for failing to adopt Plaintiffs’ legal conclusions about unsettled questions of law related to Plaintiffs’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy and its effects on their mortgage loan. Such efforts fly in the face of courts across the country, which have repeatedly held that the FCRA Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 3 of 22 - 4 - does not require credit reporting agencies like Experian to adjudicate these sorts of legal disputes. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ claims against Experian arise under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and involve the accuracy of a reported mortgage debt following Plaintiffs’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy. For background, this brief begins with an overview of the pertinent law, and then describes Plaintiffs’ factual allegations and legal claims. I. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT. The FCRA seeks “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). Pertinent here, the statute requires credit bureaus (technically, “consumer reporting agencies” or “CRAs”) to maintain “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of credit data, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); and to reasonably investigate consumer disputes about the accuracy of credit data, a process called “reinvestigation,” Id. § 1681i(a). Recognizing that disputes with the CRAs may not resolve all disputes, the statute allows consumers to dispute information directly with their creditors (sometimes called “data furnishers) as well as to place statements indicating that the consumer Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 4 of 22 - 5 - disputes the way a particular account is reporting. Id. at § 1681s-2(8); § 1681i(b). II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS. A. The Parties. Plaintiffs are residents of Whitefield, Georgia, and are consumers as defined by the FCRA. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–3.) Defendant Experian is a “consumer reporting agencies” under the FCRA. (Id. at ¶¶ 4–7.) Experian collects consumer credit information from various sources, organizes and stores the information, and then makes it available to authorized third parties, like lenders. (Id.) B. Plaintiffs’ Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. Plaintiffs purchased a property in Cohutta, Georgia, on August 4, 2003, obtaining a mortgage loan with a predecessor of PNC Bank. (See id. at ¶¶ 13–15.) Plaintiffs later jointly filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy on July 13, 2012, listing their loan with PNC Bank on Schedule D to their petition. (See id. at ¶ 16; In re Rodgers, 4:12-bk-42100, Doc. 1 at 14 (N.D. Ga. Jul. 13, 2012). Plaintiffs’ Chapter 13 plan proposed that they would “make all post-petition payments directly to each mortgage creditor as those payments ordinarily come due” and indicated that Plaintiffs would cure a pre-petition arrearage of $839 during the plan. See id., Doc. 2 at 4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jul. 13, 2012). The plan also indicated Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 5 of 22 - 6 - that Plaintiffs would not pay anything on a second mortgage owed to Citimortgage. (See id.) Plaintiffs’ plan was confirmed on October 18, 2012. (See id. at Doc. 17 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2012). A discharge order was later entered November 16, 2015. (See id. at Doc. 53.) The order does not identify which debts are, or are not, discharged. (See id.) Instead, the order states, “[T]he debtor is discharged from all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under 11 U.S.C. Section 502” and then provides several categories of debts that are not discharged. (See id. at 1.) C. Experian’s Credit Reporting and Plaintiffs’ Disputes. On March 25, 2016, following the discharge of Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy, Plaintiff Jason Rodgers obtained his Experian credit report, which showed the PNC account as discharged with a recent balance of $0. (See id. at ¶¶ 78–79). This was allegedly inaccurate because “Mr. Rodgers was continuing to make mortgage payments. . . .” (Id. at ¶ 80.) Three months later, on September 26, 2016, Plaintiff Jason Rodgers sent Experian a dispute letter. (Id. at ¶ 84.) Experian then contacted PNC Bank through e-Oscar to reinvestigate. (Id. at ¶ 86.)1 Following the dispute, Plaintiff Jason Rodgers’ PNC Bank account with Experian continued to report a $0 recent balance and a discharged status. (Id. at ¶¶ 88–89.) 1 Alhough immaterial to the issues raised in this motion, Plaintiff alleges in the alternative that Experian did not contact PNC. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94-97.) Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 6 of 22 - 7 - III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND LEGAL CLAIMS. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on December 14, 2016, amending it on January 6, 2016, to add claims against Experian. (See Docs. 1, 3.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (reasonable procedures) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (reasonable reinvestigation). (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 151–71.) Plaintiffs specifically base their claims against Experian on the failure to include additional mortgage payments made by Plaintiff Jason Rodgers. (See id. at ¶¶ 80, 88.) Plaintiffs allege that these violations were both negligent and willful. (See id. at ¶¶ 167–68.) LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the Court to dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]”). While courts must accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 7 of 22 - 8 - “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). For a claim to be plausible, plaintiff must put forth “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of Experian’s liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The Court must reject mere legal conclusions. Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153–54 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709–10 (11th Cir. 2010)). A district court may dismiss a complaint with prejudice where the plaintiff fails to allege any additional facts to support a cause of action, and leave to amend would be futile. See, e.g., Locke v. SunTrust Bank, 484 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff “did not allege ‘any additional facts to support a cause of action,’” and the district court concluded that “leave to amend . . . would be futile”). Finally, “A district court may take judicial notice of certain facts without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment . . . Public records are among the permissible facts that a district court may consider.” Universal Express, Inc. v. U.S. S.E.C., 177 F. App’x 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 8 of 22 - 9 - ARGUMENT Plaintiffs’ claims trade on the complex nature of Chapter 13 bankruptcies, asking this Court to hold that Experian could be liable for its failure to adopt Plaintiffs’ legal conclusions about the meaning and effect of their bankruptcy. The FCRA, however, does not task credit bureaus with becoming bankruptcy tribunals, staffed with legally trained employees who can appropriately adjudicate legal disputes. This is why courts around the country have repeatedly rejected any attempt to impose such requirements. Instead, the FCRA provides other remedies for consumers when a dispute to the credit bureaus does not resolve the issue. At bottom, this case is an attempt to extend the FCRA beyond its limits, and as such, it must be dismissed. I. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE A FACTUAL INACCURACY. A. The Element of Inaccuracy. The existence of inaccurate information is a part of the prima facie case a Plaintiff must allege to plausibly state a claim under § 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a). See, e.g., Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 327 F. App’x 819, 826 (11th Cir. 2009) (“To establish a prima facie violation of § 1681e(b), a consumer must present evidence that [] a credit reporting agency’s report was inaccurate”); Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156–60 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In order to Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 9 of 22 - 10 - make out a prima facie violation of [§ 1681e(b)] the Act implicitly requires that a consumer must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing “inaccurate” information . . . under [§ 1681i] of FCRA to make reasonable efforts to investigate and correct inaccurate or incomplete information brought to its attention by the consumer.”). B. Plaintiffs Do Not Plead Any Factual Inaccuracies. As an initial matter, the Amended Complaint is unclear as to what, exactly, is inaccurate in Experian’s reporting, although a review of the relevant law and allegations sheds some light. When a debt is discharged in bankruptcy, the debt itself continues to exist, even if the debtors’ creditors are enjoined from collecting on the obligation against the debtor personally. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (“a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim—namely, an action against the debtor in personam—while leaving intact another—namely, an action against the debtor in rem.”); In re Irby, 337 B.R. 293, 295 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (explaining that it is “a common misconception . . . that the bankruptcy discharge eliminates the very existence of a debt. But this is not the case.”). Accordingly, the Federal Trade Commission has indicated that discharged debts should report with a $0 balance to indicate that the consumer is no longer personally liable on the debt. See Federal Trade Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 10 of 22 - 11 - Commission, 40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, an FTC Report with Summary of Interpretations (July 2011), at 55–56, 68.2 Courts have held that there is no obligation under the FCRA to report any further payments a consumer makes on a debt that has been discharged. See Horsch v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 94 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that reporting $0 on a discharged debt was not inaccurate because “making payments on the mortgage to prevent foreclosure did not mean that [the plaintiff] truly owed anything on the discharged account”) (citing Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Co., 559 Fed. App’x 733, 734 (10th Cir. 2014)). Here, Plaintiffs allege that their mortgage account was not discharged (see Am. Compl. at ¶ 22), and that Experian’s reporting was inaccurate because they were continuing to make payments on the PNC loan. (See id. at ¶¶ 80, 88.) Taken together, these allegations amount to a claim that Experian’s reporting (both before and after Plaintiffs’ disputes) was inaccurate because the loan was not discharged in their bankruptcy. The PNC account, per Plaintiffs, should not be reporting a $0 balance, and should be reporting the payments Plaintiffs have made on the loan after their bankruptcy petition was filed. 2 The Report is available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/reports/40-years-experience-fair-credit-reporting-act-ftc-staff-report- summary-interpretations/110720fcrareport.pdf. Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 11 of 22 - 12 - There is, however, a fundamental problem in Plaintiffs’ efforts to anchor liability to this reporting: determining whether they are correct is not a factual matter, but requires interpretation and application of legal principles that are less than clear. Plaintiffs are not claiming, for instance, that Experian is reporting them as past-due on their mortgage payments, when in fact they had made timely payments, or even that a court has declared their PNC mortgage non-dischargeable. If they were, it is conceivable that simply reviewing a cancelled check or a court docket would resolve their dispute. Instead, there is no court order or other document that lays out the scope of Plaintiffs’ discharge and its specific impacts on the PNC debt or otherwise states that the PNC debt is not discharged. Instead, the discharge order does not specify which debts are actually discharged, stating “the debtor(s) is discharged from all debts provided for by the plan,” and then listing broad categories of debts that not be discharged. See In re Rodgers, 12-42100, Doc 53, (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2015). The PNC debt is specifically provided for in the plan, explaining how the debtors would pay PNC directly and would use their plan to cure prior arrearages. See id. at Doc. 2, at 4. Nor is there a provision in the bankruptcy code that prohibits discharging mortgage debts in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (describing how secured claims may be provided for in the plan); In Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 12 of 22 - 13 - re Curtis, 322 B.R. 470, 481 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (explaining that under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) “modification may include converting a secured claim to an unsecured claim, even on a debtor’s principal residence, where the claim is wholly unsecured” and that the claim may be discharged); see also Horsch, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 665 (describing part of putative class as Chapter 13 debtors who continued to pay their mortgages in order to stave off foreclosure). All of which suggests that, in contrast to Plaintiffs’ contentions, the PNC debt was in fact discharged. Plaintiffs may be correct that the PNC debt falls into one of the general exclusions listed on their discharge order, but as things stand currently, this is an open legal question. And of course, determining the exact meaning of Plaintiffs’ discharge order is the purview of the bankruptcy judge who issued the order. See, e.g., Cave v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that lower courts are afforded deference in interpreting their own orders). C. The FCRA Does Not Require Experian to Make Legal Determinations. Plaintiffs’ claim is a dispute over the unspecified legal effects of their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings as applied to the PNC account. But it is well settled that the FCRA governs factually accurate reporting and does not extend to such “legal inaccuracies.” See, e.g., Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 1991); (holding that “a [§ 1681i] claim is properly Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 13 of 22 - 14 - raised when a particular credit report contains a factual deficiency or error that could have been remedied by uncovering additional facts that provide a more accurate representation about a particular entry”) (emphasis in original); DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that determining the validity of a mortgage loan “is not a factual inaccuracy that could have been uncovered by a reasonable reinvestigation, but rather a legal issue that a credit agency . . . is neither qualified nor obligated to resolve under the FCRA”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010) (“reinvestigation claims are not the proper vehicle for collaterally attacking the legal validity of consumer debts”); Wright v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 805 F.3d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that the FCRA did not require the CRAs to determine the validity of tax liens because “[a] reasonable reinvestigation, however, does not require CRAs to resolve legal disputes about the validity of the underlying debts they report”); Hupfauer v. Citibank, N.A., No. 16 C 475, 2016 WL 4506798, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2016) (dismissing claims following a Chapter 13 discharge in part because “requiring a third party such as a credit bureau to determine whether a specific account was discharged in a particular consumer’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy would impose an unfairly heavy burden on that Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 14 of 22 - 15 - party . . . This is precisely the kind of legal question that credit reporting agencies are neither qualified nor obligated to answer.”). Here, there is no simple fact of the matter as to whether Plaintiffs PNC account was or was not discharged. Mortgage debts can be discharged in a Chapter 13, see 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(5); In re Curtis, 322 B.R. at 481, and Plaintiffs’ plan plainly provides for the debt, suggesting that by the discharge order’s own terms, that claim was in fact discharged. But, as the order itself notes, there are some exceptions. This sort of complexity—which is inherent in Chapter 13 bankruptcies—is why the United States Bankruptcy Court’s Official Chapter 13 Form discharge order warns the reader: “Because the law is complicated, you should consult an attorney to determine the exact effect of the discharge in this case.” See Form 3180W, Chapter 13 Discharge, uscourts.gov (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b3180w_0.pdf). Indeed, even the nationwide plaintiff’s bar seems confused by the complexity of a Chapter 13 discharge, frequently bringing FCRA claims where Experian is not reporting a mortgage as discharged. See, e.g., Andria v. Equifax Info. Serv. LLC, et al., No. 1:17-cv-00527-TWP-MJD, Doc. 1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 19, 2017) (alleging Experian reported inaccurate information in part for failing to report a mortgage account as Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 15 of 22 - 16 - discharged); Long v. Bayview Loan Serv. LLC, No. 1:16-cv-11762 (Doc. 1), (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2016 (same). This legal complexity dooms Plaintiffs’ case against Experian. The FCRA does not require CRAs to proactively monitor bankruptcy court dockets, review the proceedings, and interpret their meaning, so there can be no general liability under § 1681e(b). See, e.g., Childress v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 790 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that there is no duty under § 1681e(b) to pull and review bankruptcy dismissals where that “would [] require a live human being, with at least a little legal training, to review every bankruptcy dismissal and classify it”); Hupfauer, 2016 WL 4506798; George v. Chex Sys., Inc., No. 16-2450-JTM, 2017 WL 119590, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2017) (granting a motion to dismiss because “the ‘maximum possible accuracy’ standard of § 1681e does not require [the CRA] to check PACER prior to preparing a report”).3 And there can be no liability for Experian under § 1681i because no amount of factual reinvestigation could have 3 The FCRA provides other remedies for Plaintiffs. They can dispute the debt directly with PNC, or add a statement of dispute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(8); § 1681i(b); Wright, 805 F.3d at 1244 (“The FCRA expects consumers to dispute the validity of a debt with the furnisher of the information or append a note to their credit report to show the claim is disputed.”). Or, if Plaintiffs were determined to pursue a claim against Experian, they should have first obtained a judicial determination that the PNC loan was not, in fact, discharged, and provided that determination to Experian. See DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 68 (“If a court had ruled the mortgage invalid and [the CRA] had continued to report it as a valid debt, then [Plaintiff] would have grounds for a potential FCRA claim.”). Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 16 of 22 - 17 - resolved the dispute as to the exact meaning of Plaintiffs’ discharge order which, even today, is undetermined and requires judicial determination about its scope and effects. See Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1160. In the end, Plaintiffs ask this Court to stretch the FCRA well beyond its bounds and far beyond limits that courts around the country have recognized. Put simply, the FCRA does not require Experian to act as a de facto bankruptcy tribunal, deciphering and applying complex issues of law, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Experian must be dismissed. II. PLAINTIFFS INVOCATION OF INDUSTRY STANDARDS CANNOT SAVE THEIR COMPLAINT. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is littered with accusations that Experian’s reporting is inaccurate because it does not comport with industry standards embodied in the Consumer Data Industry’s Credit Resource Reporting Guide (the “CRRG). (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–43, 81–82.) Yet, despite repeatedly invoking supposed violations of industry standards, at no point do Plaintiffs explain which specific provisions of the CRRG or other industry standard was supposedly violated here.4 Notably, Plaintiffs state that the guidelines embodied in the CRRG 4 Had Plaintiffs fully reviewed the 2015 version of the Credit Resource Reporting Guide they cite, they would have noted that no part of the Guide tells the user how to interpret and construe the bankruptcy court’s orders, and even tells the lender to consult with their legal department when the Chapter 13 plan is unclear. Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 17 of 22 - 18 - are published “to assist furnishers with their compliance requirements under the FCRA.” (See id. at ¶ 29 (emphasis added).) As with Plaintiffs’ attempts to hold Experian liable for adjudicating legal claims, courts around the country routinely dismiss claims like these founded on vague invocations of the purported industry standards embodied in the CRRG. See, e.g., Mortimer v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C-12-01959 JCS, 2013 WL 1501452, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2013) (“Defendant’s alleged noncompliance with the Metro 2 Format is an insufficient basis to state a claim under the FCRA.”); Mestayer v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc, No. 15-CV-03645-EMC, 2016 WL 631980, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) (same); Devincenzi v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 16-CV-04628-LHK, 2017 WL 86131, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017) (holding that otherwise accurate reporting “is not rendered unlawful simply because a Plaintiff alleges that the reporting, though accurate, was inconsistent with industry standards”). And in those rare instances where courts have held that a violation of the CDIA’s guidelines can state a claim, it is usually where a furnisher’s alleged violation of industry standards is directly and explicitly tethered to the alleged inaccuracy. See, e.g., Nissou-Rabban v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 15CV1675 JLS (DHB), 2016 WL 4508241, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2016) (denying data furnisher’s motion to dismiss where Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 18 of 22 - 19 - plaintiff specifically alleged that Metro-2 standards required reporting “no data” instead of the charge-off that was reported). Here, Plaintiffs do not specifically allege how Experian violated Metro-2 of the CDIA’s guidelines. To the extent Experian can decipher a specific violation alleged, it is the implication found in Plaintiffs’ allegations that the CDIA guidelines require monthly reporting (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 34) and the allegations that Plaintiffs were not being credited with payments made after their November 2015 discharge. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 48–49.) But this misses the mark. First and foremost, this implied theory rests on the same legal determinations discussed above as it assumes that Plaintiffs’ PNC account was not actually discharged. If the account was discharged, then there is no obligation to report any post-discharge payments. See Horsch, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 674. Second, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege any link between any industry standard and any inaccurate data. At most, Plaintiffs have pleaded that the CDIA requires furnishers to report data each month; Plaintiffs have not pleaded that the CDIA requires furnishers to report any payments received on discharged debts, or somehow requires Experian to forcibly require a data furnisher to report such information. Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 19 of 22 - 20 - Accordingly, Plaintiffs attempts to bolster their Complaint by peppering it with allusions to industry standards cannot save their claims against Experian, which should be dismissed. CONCLUSION For all of these reasons, Experian respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Dismiss, and dismiss all claims in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint against Experian, and do so with prejudice. Dated: March 13, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /s/ William H. Rooks William H. Rooks Georgia Bar No. 906785 JONES DAY 1420 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 800 Atlanta, GA 30309-3053 Telephone: (404) 581-8891 Facsimile: (404) 581-8330 wrooks@jonesday.com An Attorney for Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 20 of 22 - 21 - The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing document has been prepared in accordance with the font type and margin requirements of Local Rule 5.1 of the Northern District of Georgia, using a font type of Times New Roman and a point size of 14. /s/ William H. Rooks William H. Rooks An Attorney for Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 21 of 22 - 22 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of March, 2017, I caused the foregoing to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to all counsel of record. /s/ William H. Rooks William H. Rooks An Attorney for Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Case 1:16-cv-04740-SCJ-JSA Document 14 Filed 03/13/17 Page 22 of 22