Rhoades v. Allen-Bradley Company et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

E.D. Pa.November 17, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEONA V. RHOADES, Executrix of the Estate of DEWEY T. RHOADES, Plaintiff, vs. ALLEN-BRADLEY CO., et al., Defendants. : : : : : : : : : MDL 875 CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-05844-ER ASBESTOS CASE DEFENDANT FORD MOTOR COMPANY’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b)(2), AND FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b)(6) Defendant Ford Motor Company requests that this Court grant its Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the Complaint against Ford Motor Company for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Respectfully submitted, DUANE MORRIS LLP Dated: November 17, 2016 By: /s/ Sharon L. Caffrey______ Sharon L. Caffrey, Esquire (49519) Dawnn E. Briddell, Esquire (47329) Alyson Walker Lotman (207148) 30 S. 17th Street Philadelphia, PA 19103-4196 215-979-1180 856-874-4273 215-979-1020 (fax) 856-874-4633 (fax) Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEONA V. RHOADES, Executrix of the Estate of DEWEY T. RHOADES, Plaintiff, vs. ALLEN-BRADLEY CO., et al., Defendants. : : : : : : : : : MDL 875 CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-05844-ER ASBESTOS CASE DEFENDANT FORD MOTOR COMPANY’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b)(2), AND FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b)(6) Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 19 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................1 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS ..........................................................................................................3 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................. 3 B. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT FORD IS SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN PENNSYLVANIA ............. 4 C. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER R. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................................................. 10 IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................13 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 19 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Annex Telecom Co. v. Brown, No. 13-4605, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146136 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2014) .......................................................................................................................... 10 In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 5394310 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014) ......................................................................................................................... 7-8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).................................................................................... Passim Barth v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., No. CV 16-2140, 2016 WL 4502352 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016) ............................................................................................. 4 Bell Atlantic Corp., et al. v. Twombly, et al., 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ......................................... Passim Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 390 (D. Conn. 2014) ................................................................ 7 Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016) ....................................................... 4 Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) ............................................. 5-6, 8, 10 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell and Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) ....................................... 10-11 Efford v. Jockey Club, 796 A.2d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) .............................................................. 4 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) .............................................................. 11 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) ........................................ 8 Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) ........................................ 8 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)........................................................... 4 Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1251 (3d Cir. 1994) ..................................... 3 Lindemann v. Foster Wheeler Corp., et al., No. 07-63080, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111052 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2010) .............................................................................................. 11 Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 3 Mendel v. Williams, 53 A.3d 810 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) .................................................................. 4 Pitts v. Ford Motor Company, 127 F.Supp.3d 676 (S.D. Miss. 2015) ......................................... 7-10 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 4 of 19 iii Scoggins v. Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ............................................................ 5 Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., Cause No. 1422-CC00457 (Mo. Cir. January 12, 2015) ......................................................................................................................................... 7 Walden v. Fiore, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) .................................................................... 6 Statutes 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(a) ..................................................................................................................... 4-5 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(b) ..................................................................................................................... 4-5 Other Authorities Constitution of the United States ................................................................................................... 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ..................................................................................................................... 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B) ................................................................................................................ 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) ..................................................................................................................... 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) .................................................................................................. 3, 10, 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ..................................................................................................................... 1 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1024(c) ........................................................................................................................ 2 United States Constitution ........................................................................................................... 4-5 United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause ..................................... 4 Suspects Due Process clause .......................................................................................................................... 4 subsection (a) .................................................................................................................................. 4 section (b) ....................................................................................................................................... 4 section (a) ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 5 of 19 1 I. INTRODUCTION Defendant, Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), by and through its undersigned counsel, Duane Morris LLP, hereby moves to dismiss Plaintiff Leona Rhoades’ Complaint, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff alleges that exposure of her decedent, Dewey Rhoades (“Mr. Rhoades”) to asbestos and asbestos products caused him injury. There are no allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint that Mr. Rhoades had exposure to Ford products of any kind in Pennsylvania. Ford is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan; Ford is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. Without allegations of asbestos exposure in Pennsylvania, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not establish that Ford is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this matter. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with the pleading requirements of Iqbal and Twombly. Plaintiff names Ford as a defendant without alleging any actions or omissions of Ford that took place in Pennsylvania. There are no allegations that any exposure to any Ford products of any kind caused Mr. Rhoades’ injuries. Ford is not placed on notice of the allegations against it. This Complaint should be dismissed. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS Ford is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on October 21, 2016, naming Ford as a Defendant along with numerous other companies. See Complaint, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. Although not specifically alleged, it appears Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 6 of 19 2 from the Complaint1 that Mr. Rhoades was a resident of the State of Florida at the time of his death on April 2, 2016. See Exhibit A, ¶1. Plaintiff alleges that her decedent, Mr. Rhoades, was exposed to asbestos from 1964 to 1991 from his employment as a tool maker in Erie, PA, while serving in the U.S. Navy as a power plant mechanic onboard the USS Dalgren in dry dock at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, from his employment as a flight equipment mechanic, and from his work on drilling rigs. See Exhibit A, ¶6(a-d). Plaintiff also alleges that Mr. Rhoades “did all the brake and gasket work and clutches on his cars.” See Exhibit A, ¶6(e). Referring to the work history above, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Mr. Rhoades “was clearly exposed to asbestos at 6(a) and (b) and (c) sites set forth supra. Plaintiff is investigating to see whether there is any other exposures.” See Exhibit A, ¶¶7, 11. Plaintiff does not allege that Mr. Rhoades was exposed to asbestos from working with brakes, gaskets, and clutches under Paragraph 6(e). See Exhibit A, ¶7. Nor does Plaintiff state where Mr. Rhoades performed brake, gasket and clutch work and whether any of the brake, gasket or clutch work took place in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff does not state the makes of the vehicles on which Mr. Rhoades worked or the brands of brakes, gaskets and clutches. The Complaint contains no allegations of any contact between Mr. Rhoades and any Ford products, much less in Pennsylvania. See Exhibit A.2 1 In her Complaint, Plaintiff incorporated by reference all the allegations of certain complaints filed in unrelated lawsuits in Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, and the Master Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Master Pleadings Procedure in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶8. None of these other complaints was attached or served on Ford with the Plaintiff’s Complaint. 2 Ford also notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint was improperly verified by Plaintiff’s attorney in violation of Pa. R. Civ. P. 1024(c). Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 7 of 19 3 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS The Complaint fails to allege any facts on which this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford. There are no facts plead which establish any acts or omissions of Ford in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to adequately state a claim against Ford. The allegations do not create plausible claims against Ford, as there are no allegations supporting a claim against Ford for negligence or strict liability. The Complaint should be dismissed. A. STANDARD OF REVIEW In deciding motions to dismiss, courts must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1251, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994), as well as “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim." Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222, n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004)("[t]he purpose of this rule is to avoid the situation where a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim that is based on a particular document can avoid dismissal of that claim by failing to attach the relied upon document" (citation omitted). Id. at 222. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim that can survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels, conclusions; a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements is insufficient. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level…." Bell Atlantic Corp., et al. v. Twombly, et al., 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (further explaining that a merely “conceivable” claim is not sufficient). The Complaint does not provide fair notice of Plaintiff’s Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 8 of 19 4 claims and factual allegations that-when accepted as true-are plausible and rise above mere speculation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-556. B. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT FORD IS SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN PENNSYLVANIA In order for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, including a foreign corporation, there must be both a statutory and constitutional basis to do so. Efford v. Jockey Club, 796 A.2d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); see also Barth v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., No. CV 16-2140, 2016 WL 4502352, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016). Because a state’s assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation exposes that corporation to the state’s “coercive power,” “[t]he reach of that coercive power, even when exercised pursuant to a corporation's purported ‘consent,’ may be limited by the Due Process clause.” Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639-41 (2d Cir. 2016). See also Mendel v. Williams, 53 A.3d 810 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution limits the authority of a state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.”) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)). See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that exercising general personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant must not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”). The Pennsylvania Long-Arm statute establishes personal jurisdiction over persons outside of this Commonwealth-its reach extends to the fullest extent allowed by the United States Constitution. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(b). The general rule stated in subsection (a), provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person “who acts directly or by an agent to a cause of action or other matter arising from” one of ten types of specified conduct. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(a). However, section (b) is a catchall provision authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 9 of 19 5 persons who do not come within one of the express provisions of the ten subsections of section (a), so long as the minimum requisites of federal constitutional law are met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(b) (“the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all persons to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States”). As a practical matter, each of the ten subsections of § 5322(a) are wholly subsumed within the catchall provision of § 5322 (b). Scoggins v. Scoggins, 555 A.2d 1314, 1319 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). Consequently, the only appropriate focus in a Pennsylvania personal jurisdiction analysis is whether the minimum requisites of Constitutional due process have been met. Id. The United States Constitution permits states to authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”. Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general. Daimler, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754-758 (2014). Specific jurisdiction requires that “the in-state activities of the corporate defendant had not only been continuous and systematic, but also gave rise to the liabilities sued on.” Id. at 755 (internal quotations omitted). By contrast, general jurisdiction requires a finding that “continuous corporate operations within a state are so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently clarified that “[w]ith respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Id. at 760 (internal quotations omitted). Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 10 of 19 6 1. Ford Is Not Subject To Specific Jurisdiction In Pennsylvania On Plaintiff’s Claims. Ford is not subject to specific jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in this case because Plaintiff’s claims are not premised on any “in-state activities” of Ford. Daimler, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754-758. In other words, Plaintiff does not allege in the Complaint that Mr. Rhoades’ damages arise from any conduct of Ford in Pennsylvania. For the Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford in this case, “Plaintiff’s cause of action” must “arise out of [Ford’s] conduct or actions occurring in Pennsylvania.” Id. Put differently, there must be a “relationship among [Ford], the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (citation omitted). For jurisdiction to comport with the limits of due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum state. Walden, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1122-23. Here there is no such relationship. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff’s claims arose from any acts of Ford in Pennsylvania. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Rhoades worked on his own vehicles, but it does not allege when or where this work took place, that such work exposed him to Ford asbestos-containing products or that those vehicles were Fords. Plaintiff is a resident of Florida. There is no information as to where Mr. Rhoades lived when he worked on any cars. Without any allegations concerning Ford products and Mr. Rhoades in Pennsylvania, Plaintiff has no evidence that Ford engaged in any “suit-related conduct” that “create[d] a substantial connection” with Pennsylvania, such as would support specific jurisdiction over Ford in this case. Id. Recent asbestos cases confirm that the Court does not have specific personal jurisdiction over Ford. One district court dismissed Plaintiff’s asbestos complaint because it did not allege Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 11 of 19 7 that Plaintiff’s claims arose from the defendants’ activities in the forum state. In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 5394310, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014) (“[t]he plaintiffs do not allege, and cannot allege, that the Court has specific jurisdiction (based on the long-arm statute or constitutional due process) over any of the defendants as their claims do not arise from the defendants’ activities in the Virgin Islands.”). Another court has held that it did not have specific jurisdiction over a defendant where “the Plaintiff’s claims . . . do not arise out of or relate to [the defendant’s] activities within” the forum state. Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 390, 397 (D. Conn. 2014). A third court, in Missouri, has held that there was no specific jurisdiction over an asbestos defendant where the complaint did “not allege that [the defendant] committed any act in Missouri in connection with Plaintiff’s claims.” Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., Cause No. 1422-CC00457 (Mo. Cir. January 12, 2015). And a fourth court, in Mississippi, has held that there was no personal jurisdiction where there was a lack of evidence sufficiently demonstrating a meaningful connection between Plaintiff’s injuries and Ford’s Mississippi contacts as identified by Plaintiffs. Pitts v. Ford Motor Company, 127 F.Supp.3d 676, 686 (S.D. Miss. 2015) (“The mere fact that Plaintiffs were injured in Mississippi does not, by itself, create specific jurisdiction over Ford in Mississippi.”). The same is true here; Plaintiff does not allege a connection between Ford’s Pennsylvania contacts and Mr. Rhoades in this case. This Court therefore may not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford. 2. Ford Is Not Subject To General Jurisdiction In Pennsylvania. Ford is not subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. General jurisdiction over Ford does not apply because Ford’s affiliations with this Commonwealth are not so continuous and systematic as to render Ford essentially at home in this Commonwealth, or comparable to a Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 12 of 19 8 domestic Pennsylvania corporation. Daimler, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. at 754-758. Although Ford does business in many places, including Pennsylvania, that fact is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over a defendant- “otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing business.’” Id. at 762 n. 20; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984) (noting that mere purchases or sales, even at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a state’s assertion of general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant). Plaintiff may argue that Daimler should be limited to cases involving corporations from foreign countries, but this is clearly a wrong interpretation and understanding. Justice Ginsburg’s express definition in Daimler of a “foreign corporation” included both “sister-state or foreign-country” corporations. Daimler, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. at 754 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (emphasis added); see also In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 875, 2104 WL 5394310 at *2 (“[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations….”)(citations omitted). Plaintiff may also argue that general jurisdiction may be exercised over Ford under a theory that it does business in Pennsylvania. In Pitts, the Southern District of Mississippi applied the Daimler Court’s analyses to Ford’s activities in Mississippi and found that Ford was not subject to general jurisdiction in Mississippi. The Pitts Court applied the same Goodyear analyses employed by the Daimler Court, stating that “[w]here a defendant is a foreign corporation, the corporation's affiliations with the state must be ‘so continuous and systematic’ as to render it essentially ‘at home’ in the forum state.” 127 F.Supp.3d at 683 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 at 919). Further, Pitts noted that a corporation is generally “‘at home’ Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 13 of 19 9 in the state where it is incorporated and the state where it maintains its principal place of business.” Pitts, 127 F.Supp.3d at 683 (citing Daimler, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. at 760). Plaintiffs in Pitts bought a Ford vehicle in Texas and drove it to Mississippi, where plaintiffs were involved in a collision in Biloxi. Plaintiffs sued Ford under a defect in design, engineering and manufacturing theory, and argued that Ford was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Mississippi because: Ford is qualified and registered to do business in the State of Mississippi, licensed to sell or distribute new automobiles in Mississippi, contracts with Mississippi based dealers, provides operational guidelines to Mississippi dealers, has purchased a Mississippi dealership, advertises in Mississippi, and has an agent for service of process in Mississippi. Id. at 683. The Pitts Court rejected Plaintiff’s allegations, holding that: even assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations, the contacts Plaintiffs identify are insufficient to establish that Ford is susceptible to general jurisdiction in the State of Mississippi. A defendant corporation may be found subject to general jurisdiction in a particular state where “that corporation's ‘affiliations with the [state] are so ‘continuous and systematic,’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum [state].'” The record is clear that Ford is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business in Mississippi. The contacts that Plaintiffs have identified Ford as having with Mississippi demonstrate that Ford is at most “doing business” in Mississippi, and those contacts do not reveal activities that are so “continuous and systematic” as to render Ford “at home” in Mississippi. Id. (quoting Daimler, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. at 761) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations, even if taken as true, do not establish general jurisdiction over Ford in this case. Even under a general “doing business” theory, under Pitts, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any facts that support a finding of general jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that Mr. Rhoades engaged in any business or activities involving Ford Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 14 of 19 10 or Ford products in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any Ford product sold in Pennsylvania to which Mr. Rhoades was exposed or worked with. Ford is merely sued in this case as one of many named corporations for which there is no connection to Mr. Rhoades or his illness. To subject Ford to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania based upon Plaintiff’s Complaint would violate due process. Plaintiff’s Complaint presents no exceptional circumstances that would allow Ford to be considered “at home” in Pennsylvania outside its state of incorporation (Delaware) or principal place of business (Michigan). Id. at 761 n. 19; see also Annex Telecom Co. v. Brown, No. 13- 4605, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146136, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding no general jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant in Pennsylvania under a Daimler analysis where plaintiff had not presented “extensive and persuasive facts demonstrating connections with the forum state.”). When appraising Ford’s activities in its entirety, “nationwide and worldwide,” it could hardly be considered “at home” in Pennsylvania, as it would be in Delaware or Michigan. Pitts, 127 F.Supp.3d at 684. Thus, Ford is not “at home” in Pennsylvania such that it is amenable to general jurisdiction in the State. Daimler, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. at 755, 760. Doing business in Pennsylvania “is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over Ford.” Pitts, 127 F.Supp.3d at 683. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of- state Defendant Ford. C. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER R. 12(b)(6) The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to adequately state a claim against Ford. Applying the Iqbal and Twombly doctrine, the Third Circuit in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell and Sons, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010), applied a two part analysis that district courts in this Circuit must conduct when determining whether a complaint adequately states a claim. “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 15 of 19 11 separated”, meaning “[t]he District Court must accept all of the complaints’ well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id., at 219. Second, the reviewing court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint do more than allege a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; it must “show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-5 (3d Cir. 2008)). “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown’-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 1556 U.S. at 679. Here, the Complaint fails to satisfy the Third Circuit’s application of the Iqbal and Twombly doctrine. Plaintiff has not adequately stated her claims against Ford. Plaintiff makes allegations of asbestos exposure, states that Mr. Rhoades was exposed to non-Ford sources of asbestos, but does not describe any exposure to Ford products. This vague manner of pleading is insufficient under the Federal Rules. In Lindemann v. Foster Wheeler Corp., et al., No. 07- 63080, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111052, *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2010), this Court held that although Pennsylvania state procedural rules provided that “in an asbestos action, the filing of an appearance by a defendant constitutes (1) a denial of all averments of fact in the complaint (2) an allegation of all affirmative defenses and (3) a claim for indemnification and contribution from any other party,” defendants have an obligation, pursuant to federal procedural rules, to answer the complaint upon removal to federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, if defendants are required to answer pursuant to Federal Rules upon removal, then Plaintiff’s Complaint must also comply with the pleading requirement of the Federal Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case clearly does not meet the standards set forth in Iqbal and Twombly. Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 16 of 19 12 Plaintiff’s cause of action is not well-pleaded and Plaintiff has not shown entitlement to relief against Ford. Plaintiff has not even made “threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action,” as she wholly fails to set forth facts showing any act or omission by Ford in her Complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint has gaping holes where Plaintiff should have set forth the facts supporting her claims against Ford, but are missing. Further, those limited facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are exactly the “mere conclusory statements” that the Supreme Court found insufficient in Iqbal. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not provide any information concerning Mr. Rhoades’ exposure to asbestos from Ford products, the time period during which any such exposure may have taken place, the jurisdiction in which any such exposure may have occurred, the types of alleged asbestos products attributable to Ford to which Mr. Rhoades was exposed, or the manner of contact with any products attributable to Ford. Plaintiff is requiring the Court to “infer” that Mr. Rhoades has a cause of action against Ford due to a general declaration of exposure to asbestos; however, she has not “shown” that she is entitled to relief as required under Iqbal and Twombly. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed. Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 17 of 19 13 IV. CONCLUSION The Complaint, in its entirety, fails to establish that this Court should exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford, and should be dismissed as to Ford pursuant to R. 12 (b)(2). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Ford liable for Mr. Rhoades’ injuries, no facts have been plead that clearly establish such liability or make a plausible claim against Ford, and the Complaint be dismissed as to Ford pursuant to 12(b)(6). For these reasons, Ford respectfully requests that this Court grant Ford’s motion to dismiss the Complaint. Respectfully submitted, DUANE MORRIS LLP Date: November 17, 2016 By: /s/ Sharon L. Caffrey_______ Sharon L. Caffrey, Esquire (49519) Dawnn E. Briddell, Esquire (47329) Alyson Walker Lotman (207148) 30 S. 17th Street Philadelphia, PA 19103-4196 215-979-1180 856-874-4273 215-979-1020 (fax) 856-874-4633 (fax) Attorneys for Defendant Ford Motor Company Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 18 of 19 14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 17th day of November, 2016 I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be electronically filed and served upon Plaintiff’s counsel via e- mail and via first class mail. _/s/ Dawnn E. Briddell____ Dawnn E. Briddell Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18 Filed 11/17/16 Page 19 of 19 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 4 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 5 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 6 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 7 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 8 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 9 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 10 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 11 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 12 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 13 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 14 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 15 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 16 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 17 of 18 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-1 Filed 11/17/16 Page 18 of 18 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA LEONA V. RHOADES, Executrix of the Estate of DEWEY T. RHOADES, Plaintiff, vs. ALLEN-BRADLEY CO., et al., Defendants. : : : : : : : MDL 875 E.D. Pa. No.: 2:16-CV-05844 (Judge Eduardo C. Robreno) ASBESTOS CASE CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT FORD MOTOR COMPANY Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 7.1(a), Defendant, Ford Motor Company, by and through the undersigned counsel, makes the following disclosures: 1. The Defendant is a non-governmental corporate party; and 2. Ford has no parent corporation. As of December 31, 2015, no publicly-traded companies have disclosed that they own 10% or more of Ford’s common stock. DUANE MORRIS LLP By: /s/ Sharon L. Caffrey Sharon L. Caffrey (ID No. 49519) Dawnn E. Briddell (ID No. 47329) Alyson Walker Lotman (ID No. 207148) Attorneys for Defendant Ford Motor Company Dated: November 17, 2016 Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 2 - 2 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Dawnn E. Briddell, certify that on November 17, 2016, a true and correct copy of Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Corporate Disclosure Statement pursuant to R. 7.1 was served upon Plaintiff’s counsel and all counsel of record via ECF filing. /s/ Dawnn E. Briddell Dawnn E. Briddell Case 2:16-cv-05844-ER Document 18-2 Filed 11/17/16 Page 2 of 2