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DEEPAK GUPTA
PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP
1600 20th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
Tel.: (202) 588-1000
Fax: (202) 588-7795
Email: dgupta@citizen.org
ERICA L. CRAVEN
LEVY, RAM & OLSON LLP
639 Front Street, 4th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel.: (415) 433-4949
Fax: (415) 433-7311
Email: elc@lrolaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Public Citizen,
Inc., Consumers for Auto Reliability and
Safety, and Consumer Action
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
_____________________________
)
PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC., )
CONSUMERS FOR AUTO )
RELIABILITY AND SAFETY, )
and CONSUMER ACTION, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
MICHAEL MUKASEY, )
Attorney General of the United States, )
)
Defendant. )
____________________________)
No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
ANSWER
Date: September 22, 2008
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Place: Courtroom 15, 18th Floor
Case 3:08-cv-00833-MHP Document 42 Filed 09/03/2008 Page 1 of 22
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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. The Court Should Set Concrete Deadlines By Which the Government
Must Meet Its Statutory Obligations. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. The Plaintiffs Have Standing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Plaintiffs’ Members Suffer Informational Injury. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B. Plaintiffs’ Members Suffer An Increased Risk of Harm. . . . . . . . . 10
III. The Government’s Statute-of-Limitations Defense Is Meritless. . . . . . . . 13
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American Canoe Association, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Commission, 389
F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10
American Canoe Association v. EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908 (E.D. Va. 1998) .. . . . . . . . . . 14
In re American Federation of Government Employees, 790 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986) . 2
American Insurance Association v. Selby, 624 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1985) .. . . . . . . . . 13
Bensman v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10
Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . 10, 13
Communities for a Better Environment v. EPA, 2008 WL 1994898 (N.D. Cal. 2008) .. 3
Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 793 F.2d
1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12
Center for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 2007 WL 2408901 (N.D. Cal. 2007) .. . 8, 10
Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Dugong v. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106 (N.D. Cal. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Earth Island Institute v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . 10
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Browner, 1995 WL 91324 (N.D. Cal. 1995) . . . 4, 5
Environmental Protection Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d
803 (N.D. Cal. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Felter v. Kempthorne, 473 F.3d 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Grant v. Gilbert, 324 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2003) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 12
Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Service, 230 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Humane Society v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) . . . . . . 7
In re Barr Labs, 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Institute for Wildlife Protection v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2007 WL 4117978 (D.
Or. Nov. 16, 2007) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 12
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996) .. . . . . 12
National Parks Conservation Association v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F.3d 410
(6th Cir. 2007) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
NRDC v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
NRDC v. Ruckelshaus, 1984 WL 6092 (D.D.C. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2005) .. . . 10
Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Service, 155 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . 13
Public Citizen v. Chao 2003 WL 22158985 (3d Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Public Citizen v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Public Citizen v. Federal Trade Commission, 869 F.2d 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1989) . . . . . . 7, 11
Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10
Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 489 F.3d 1279
(D.C. Cir. 2007) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 181 F.
Supp. 2d 883 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Save the Valley, Inc. v. EPA, 223 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Ind. 2002) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805 (W.D. La. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
United Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544 (1996) . . . . . . . 13
Village of Elk Grove v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1993) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
FEDERAL STATUTES
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 15
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-16
49 U.S.C. § 30502(e)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
49 U.S.C. § 33109 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
67 Fed. Reg. 17027 (April 9, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
72 Fed. Reg. 22811-01 (April 30, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Jacob Gerson and Anne O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev.
923 (2008) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Maria Heckel, Finding the Line Between Action and Inaction, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 789
(2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoguhts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
Duke L. J. 1385 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to
Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev.
59 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
437 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. Penn. L. Rev. 613 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency
Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1545 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Remedial Schedule with Concrete Deadlines: Should the Court set a
remedial schedule with concrete deadlines and retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance?
II. Standing: Do the plaintiffs have standing based on their members’ inability
to access information and increased risk of physical and economic injury?
II. Statute of Limitations: Is this suit—which seeks “to compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)—barred by the statute of
limitations, even though the government is violating an ongoing duty to act?
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT SHOULD SET CONCRETE DEADLINES BY WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT MUST MEET ITS STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS.
Because the government’s motion does not deny that its ongoing failure to
implement the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System (NMVTIS) constitutes
“agency action unlawfully withheld,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), the principal question before the
Court is one of remedy. The plaintiffs ask the Court to issue an injunction necessary to
effectuate the congressional purpose behind the Anti-Car Theft Improvements Act of 1996:
to “expedite implementation of the motor vehicle titling information system” by setting an
accelerated timeline in light of the government’s failure to meet its original statutory
deadline. H.R. REP. NO. 104-618, at 2-3 (1996). That legislation, passed in June of 1996,
required the Attorney General to implement the database no later than December 31, 1997.
The government, on the other hand, asks this Court to grant no relief at all. The
reason it gives is that now, after over a decade of yet more foot-dragging, it is finally taking
steps to comply with the law. Specifically, the government says that it is “making significant
progress,” that consumer access to NMVTIS will be available “by the end of this year,” and
that it is “preparing to publish a proposed rule” but needs an indefinite amount of time to
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In Sierra Club v. Thomas, for example, Congress had accorded no “special priority” to the
1/
rulemakings at issue, “[n]o statutory deadline” had been imposed, and the court could not “perceive in the
Act a generalized congressional mandate for EPA to expedite these particular rulemakings.” 828 F.2d 783,
797 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In United Mineworkers, the court found that the agency had unreasonably delayed in
the absence of a statutory deadline and criticized agency’s failure to offer a definite remedial schedule. 190
F.3d 545, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“To advise us that regulations will not issue until ‘at least December 2001’
is to provide no end-date at all. It is unresponsive to our order to provide a ‘definite schedule,’ and it offers
no assurance that the agency will remedy its continuing violation of the Mine Act.”). And in American
Federation of Government Employees, the court found that the agency had delayed but declined to
impose a mandamus remedy because the suit involved the agency’s processing of appeals generally, not a
single rulemaking or discrete action, and because the agency had published a firm timetable by which the
cases would be resolved. 790 F.2d 116, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The government also inexplicably cites Public
Citizen v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 159 (3d Cir. 2002), but there the court found unreasonable delay, “grant[ed]
Public Citizen’s petition to compel OSHA to proceed expeditiously with its hexavalent chromium
rulemaking” and ruled that if the parties failed to reach a “mutually satisfactory timetable, we will order
one of our own.” In its subsequent order, which the government fails to cite, the court did set a timetable
with concrete deadlines for agency action. Public Citizen v. Chao 2003 WL 22158985 (3d Cir. 2003).
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
2
finalize the rule and set a commencement date for the reporting of information to the
system. Govt. Mtn. at 21.
To support this argument, the government cites a handful of D.C. Circuit decisions
(Govt. Mtn. at 23-24), none of which address the mandatory nature of the deadline here,
the specific congressional intent of the 1996 Act, or the approach to statutory-deadline cases
employed by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Although the D.C. Circuit employs a relaxed1/
equitable balancing test even in statutory-deadline cases, see In re Barr Labs, 930 F.2d 72
(D.C. Cir. 1991), the Ninth and Tenth Circuits do not. Under Ninth Circuit law, where
“Congress has specifically provided a deadline for performance . . . no balancing of factors
is required or permitted.” Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1177 n.11
(9th Cir. 2002); accord Forest Guardians v. Babbit, 174 F.3d 1178, 1187-1191 (10th Cir.
1999). Moreover, as we explained in our motion for summary judgment (at 15), injunctive
relief must be granted where it is necessary to effectuate the purpose behind the statutory
deadline and where, as here, “the clear objectives and language of Congress” have “removed
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See generally Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency
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Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1545, 1554 (2001) (extensively discussing
differences between D.C. Circuit case law and approach followed by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits;
“Although the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has allowed agency discretion in the face of
blatant violations of a statutory deadline, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have recently decided that if there
is a mandatory deadline, the agency must abide by it.”); Maria Heckel, Finding the Line Between Action
and Inaction, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 789, 791-92 (2004) (discussing divergent approaches of the D.C. Circuit,
on the one hand, and Ninth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand).
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
3
the traditional discretion of courts in balancing the equities before awarding injunctive
relief.” Badgley, 309 F.3d at 1177-78. 2/
The government’s position should be rejected because it has not met its “heavy
burden of proving impossibility as a defense to non-compliance with the statutory
deadline.” Communities for a Better Environment v. EPA, 2008 WL 1994898, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. 2008). That burden “is especially heavy where, as here [the agency] has in fact ignored
that duty for several years.” Id. at *3. Courts “must carefully scrutinize an agency’s claims
of impossibility or infeasability.” Id. “Not surprisingly, courts are typically hesitant to find
impossibility or infeasibility in the face of clear congressional desires.” Jacob Gersen and
Anne O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 923, 965 n.151
(2008).
With respect to consumer access, the government does not appear to make any claim
of impossibility. To the contrary, the government maintains that it will provide consumer
access “by the end of this year.” Govt. Mtn. at 21. That estimate is not far off from the
schedule proposed by the plaintiffs–i.e. that the government be required to provide
consumer access consistent with the statutory requirements within 60 days of the Court’s
order. Assuming that the Court is able to issue an injunction one month after the hearing,
the deadline proposed by the plaintiffs would be within a week of the government’s
promised completion date. The government has been under the same statutory obligation
to provide consumer access to NMVTIS since 1992. There is simply no excuse for not
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requiring compliance with that obligation by a firm deadline. Even when judged by the
government’s own estimates, the deadline proposed by the plaintiffs is a reasonable one.
With respect to the required rulemaking and commencement date, the government
makes no showing of impossibility and proposes no specific time frame. Instead, the
government argues that it should be given an indefinite amount of time to complete the
rulemaking process based on declarations by Justice Department officials who contend that
an unspecified amount of time is required to study comments and go through several
rounds of internal review. Here, as in other delay cases, “the thrust of the declaration[s] is
really no more than ‘further study always makes everything better.’” Envt’l Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Browner, 1995 WL 91324, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Henderson, J.) (quoting Sierra
Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F.Supp. 892, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1984)). A declaration “pointing out
that promulgating regulations will be a complex process requiring consultation with other
agencies and allocations of time from already busy staff” is not enough to show
impossibility. Id.
In addition to generalized statements about the supposed complexity of the rule and
the need for study, one specific reason that the government gives is the alleged need for
review by the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under Executive
Order 12,866. Gov’t Mtn. at 21-22. As explained in our motion for summary judgment (at
16-17), courts have consistently refused to grant the government additional time for OMB
review where the agency is in ongoing violation of a statutory deadline: “OMB review is not
only unnecessary, but in contravention of applicable law.” NRDC v. Ruckelshaus, 1984 WL
6092, at *4 (D.D.C. 1987).
Indeed, even in cases in which the agency has not already withheld action required
by law, OMB review “imposes costly delays that are paid for through the decreased health
and safety of the American public.” Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1064 (1986).
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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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“While OMB ponders the validity of a proposed rule, or the agency’s responses to public
comments, the failure to issue health and safety rules is certain to mean deaths and injuries
that could be avoided.” Id. at 1065; see also Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 447 (2003) (noting that “OMB regulatory
analysis” causes “paralysis by analysis”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 62 (1995) (“OMB review of major rules has had
three direct effects on agency rulemaking: increased costs, increased delay, and increased
inter-branch friction.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1428-36 (1992) (describing incidents of regulatory
delay as a result of OMB review). Because it is not required by law and often serves only as
a justification for delay and political interference, OMB review provides no legitimate
excuse for noncompliance with the government’s legal obligations.
Once the government’s excuses are swept aside, we are left with the long-ignored
timetable set by Congress. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F.Supp. 165, 171 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (“[I]f the statutory deadline has passed by the time the court issues its decree, the
[agency] remains obligated to issue regulations within the time frame mandated by
Congress.”); Browner, 1995 WL 91324, at *9 (“As a starting point for setting a compliance
timetable, courts have first turned to the time frame mandated by Congress . . . Unless the
[agency] can show that compliance with its statutory obligations within that time is
impossible or infeasible, it is obligated to issue regulations within that period.”). In 1996,
when the government failed to meet its statutory deadline, Congress gave the agency one
year–until the end of 1997–to undertake every one of the actions at issue in this lawsuit:
issue regulations, set a commencement date for information reporting to the database, and
provide consumer access. It has now been more than ten years since that deadline and six
months since this lawsuit was filed. Moreover, as explained in our motion for summary
judgment (at 13 n.20), the government has repeatedly stated that it has been in the process
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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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of examining the issue and drafting rules over the past decade, and thus has had more than
enough time to study every aspect of the problem. Under those circumstances, the schedule
proposed by the plaintiffs is quite reasonable and in fact provides more time for notice and
comment that is required under the APA. Factoring in the additional time necessary to hold
a hearing on these motions and for the Court to issue a decision, the government would
likely have at least four additional months between now and the ultimate commencement
date for information reporting under the new regulations.
Finally, in assessing the government’s arguments concerning the proposed timetable,
this Court should consider the example of the related National Stolen Passenger Motor
Vehicle Information System (NSPMVIS), a database of stolen-vehicle information that the
government was required to establish under the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992 within one year
of the Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 33109 (requiring Attorney General to establish “[n]ot later than
July 25, 1993,” a database containing “vehicle identification numbers of stolen passenger
motor vehicles and stolen passenger motor vehicle parts”). Despite its July 1993 deadline,
the Attorney General did not issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the
NSPMVIS until 2002. See 67 Fed. Reg. 17027 (April 9, 2002). The NPRM, issued in April
of that year, requested comments by June 10, 2002. Id. Six years later, the Attorney
General still has not issued a final version of the rule. As with NMVTIS, the government
has simply listed the NSPMVIS rulemaking on its regulatory agenda and has stated that it
plans to eventually complete the rulemaking. See, e.g., 72 Fed. Reg. 22811-01 (April 30,
2007). Given the Attorney General’s long history of delay, this Court should not defer to
promises of future compliance but should instead compel the agency action that has been
unlawfully withheld by setting firm deadlines based on the clear intent of Congress to
expedite implementation.
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II. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING.
As the government correctly acknowledges, an organization has standing to sue on
behalf of its members when (a) “at least one” of its members would have standing to sue in
his or her own right; (b) the interest the organization seeks to protect is germane to its
purposes; and (c) the claims made and relief sought do not require the individual
participation of the members. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977). Focusing on the first prong of the Hunt test, the government contends that
Public Citizen, CARS, and Consumer Action all lack standing because they have not suffered
a sufficiently concrete injury. But the government overlooks the nature of the injury to the
plaintiffs’ members, which “consists of their inability to obtain information.” FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998). As a result of the government’s ongoing failure to implement
NMVTIS, consumers are denied access to critical auto-safety information that the
government is required by statute to compile and disclose to the car-buying public. “[A]
plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must
be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.” Id. The government also overlooks the fact that
both Congress and the Justice Department have repeatedly concluded that the failure to
implement NMVTIS creates a serious and unacceptable increased risk of physical and
economic harm to consumers due to unsafe automobiles.
In this case, both types of injuries—informational injury and increased risk of
harm—satisfy the traditional Article III requirements that the plaintiffs demonstrate a
concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, is fairly traceable to the
defendant, and is redressable by a favorable decision. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438,
1453 (2007). “Only one of the [organizations] needs to have standing,” id., and “it is not
necessary for us to know the names of injured persons in order to be assured beyond any
reasonable doubt that they exist, and that the organizations to which they belong may
pursue this action on their behalf.” Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1551-52 (D.C. Cir.
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See Declarations of Mary and Robert Ellsworth (CARS members); Julia Graff (Public Citizen
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member); Ricardo T. Perez (Consumer Action member); Mark H. Steinbach (Public Citizen and CARS
member); Bernard E. Brown (Public Citizen member); Steven Taterka (CARS member); Joan Claybrook
(President of Public Citizen); Rosemary Shahan (President of CARS); Joseph Ridout (Consumer Services
Manager of Consumer Action). Also submitted herewith is the Declaration of William Brauch, Director of
the Consumer Protection Division of the Iowa Attorney General’s Office.
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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1989). Plaintiffs have filed declarations demonstrating that all three organizations have the
requisite standing, both on behalf of their members and themselves. 3/
A. Plaintiffs’ Members Suffer Informational Injury.
“It is well settled that plaintiffs may suffer injury as a result of a denial of
information to which they are statutorily entitled.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan,
2007 WL 2408901, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that environmental groups had standing
to sue the federal government, under APA § 706(1), for failure to meet a statutory deadline
to compile and release information on climate-change research). For example, in Public
Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Supreme Court held that Public Citizen had
standing to challenge the Justice Department’s failure to provide access to information, the
disclosure of which was allegedly required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, because
the inability to obtain such information “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide
standing to sue.” 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989). The Court expanded on that holding in FEC v.
Akins, concluding that individual voters had standing to sue the FEC because the agency’s
determination that an interest group was not a “political committee” under the Federal
Election Campaign Act potentially deprived voters of information that would otherwise
have to be disclosed under the Act. 524 U.S. at 24-25; see generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PENN.
L. REV. 613 (1999). Following Public Citizen and Akins, the federal circuits have identified
informational injuries sufficient to confer standing in a wide variety of statutory contexts,
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See, e.g., American Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm’n, 389 F.3d 536, 542
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(6th Cir. 2004) (ongoing failure to comply with monitoring and reporting requirements of the Clean Water
Act created informational injury); Heartwood v. U.S. Forest Service, 230 F.3d 947, 952 n.5 (7th Cir.
2000) (because the National Environmental Policy Act requires environmental assessments “to provide
stakeholders with information necessary to monitor agency activity,” failure to perform an assessment
creates “a cognizable injury-in-fact for plaintiffs who are deprived of this information”); Public Citizen v.
FTC, 869 F.2d at 1543 (plaintiffs have standing where “they are being deprived of information and
warnings that will be of substantial value to them and to which they are legally entitled” under the
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act). The circuits have uniformly held that “[t]he
inability to obtain information required to be disclosed by statute constitutes a sufficiently concrete and
palpable injury to qualify as an Article III injury-in-fact.” Grant v. Gilbert, 324 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.
2003); see Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that
“informational injuries may be the basis for injury in fact for standing purposes”), cert. granted on other
grounds, 28 S. Ct. 1118 (2008); Bensman v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F.3d 945, 955 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding “ample authority” for view that “informational injury” is “sufficiently concrete harm to satisfy the
constitutional standing inquiry.”).
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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from government-sunshine and election law to health, safety, and environmental
regulation.4/
In this case, the informational standing inquiry is easy. See id. at 654 (“After Akins,
there are, with respect to information, many easy cases.”). The plaintiffs have submitted
declarations from several of plaintiffs’ members who are prospective automobile
purchasers. See, e.g,. Ellsworth Decl., Graff Decl., Perez Decl., Steinbach Decl., Brown Decl.
The Attorney General is required by the Anti-Car Theft Act to compile vehicle-history
information from insurers and junk and salvage yards and to release that information to
such consumers. See 49 U.S.C. § 30502(e)(C) (providing that the Attorney General or
designated system operator “shall make available . . . to a prospective purchaser of an
automobile on request of that purchaser . . . information in the System about that
automobile.”). The statute constitutes a legal entitlement to information because it
“affirmatively obligates the Government to provide access” to the information identified by
the statute. Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Here, as in Akins, the
injury in fact that plaintiffs have suffered “consists of their inability to obtain information”
that, on plaintiffs’ view of the law, the statute requires the Attorney General “make public.”
Id. at 21. That this harm may be “widely shared” by prospective automobile purchasers does
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See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is not
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necessary for a plaintiff challenging violations of rules designed to reduce the risk of pollution to show the
presence of actual pollution in order to obtain standing.”) (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 155-61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 943-45,
947-51 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs;
threatened injury constitutes ‘injury in fact.’”); Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 973-74, 976-77 (9th Cir.
2001) (“[E]vidence of a credible threat to the plaintiff’s physical well-being from airborne pollutants falls
well within the range of injuries to cognizable interests that may confer standing.”).
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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not defeat standing. Id. at 23-24; see also Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. at 449-450 (“fact
that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint” does not diminish
the injury).
The plaintiffs’ informational injuries also easily satisfy the elements of traceability
and redressibility. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 25 (plaintiffs “readily satisf[y] the standing
requirements” where they suffer an injury because they are deprived of information to
which they are entitled, that injury is “directly caused” by the government’s failure to
implement NMVTIS, and the injury is “redressable by the relief [sought]—namely, access
to” the information); American Canoe, 389 F.3d at 543 (“because the injury itself is lack of
information, it necessarily follows that the defendants’ actions in failing to follow its
monitoring and reporting obligations, which deprived Kash of information, ‘caused’ or is
‘fairly traceable’ to the alleged injury.”); Brennan, 2007 WL 2408901, at *11-12.
B. Plaintiffs’ Members Suffer An Increased Risk of Harm.
In addition to their informational injury, the plaintiffs’ members also have standing
in this case for another, independent reason: The government’s failure to implement
NMVTIS exposes them to an increased risk of harm of physical and economic injury
associated with unsafe and unreliable automobiles. See Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 846, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n increased risk of harm
can itself be injury in fact sufficient for standing.”). That risk encompasses both the5/
dangers caused by future car purchases and the risks associated with deferring future
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Compare Ellsworth Decl. ¶ 4-8 (describing their teenage son’s death in a car crash due to
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undisclosed vehicle history and stating: “We have another son. Before we purchase a vehicle for him, we
want to know its complete history and particularly whether it was ever totaled in a crash, flood, or other
incident.”), and Graff Decl. ¶ 4 (expressing concern “that the government’s failure to establish the
database makes it more likely that I will be exposed to title-washing and similar types of auto fraud and
that the car I purchase might actually end up being worth less than it seems”); with Taterka Decl. ¶ 10
(expressing “reluctan[ce] to make a purchase” given lack of reliable vehicle-history information;
“Consequently I continue to drive vehicles which may be nearing the end of their useful lives.”); see also
Brauch Decl. ¶ 6-7.
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
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purchases. “In this case, the concreteness of the asserted injury is evident: Injuries from6/
car accidents—including death, physical injuries, and property damage—are plainly
concrete harms under the Supreme Court’s precedents.” Public Citizen, Inc. v. National
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Injuries from car
accidents are particularized—each person who is in an accident is harmed personally and
distinctly. The Supreme Court has made clear, moreover, that the fact that a number of
people could be similarly injured does not render the claim an impermissible generalized
grievance.’” Id.
This leaves only the question of the likelihood of the increased harm, an issue on
which the administrative record provides ample evidence because Congress and the Justice
Department have both spoken directly on it. When it enacted legislation requiring the
government to expedite its implementation of NMVTIS, Congress made a judgment that
timely implementation“would prevent thieves from obtaining legitimate vehicle ownership
documentation and deter other serious consumer fraud related to transfer of motor vehicle
ownership” and concluded that the costs of such fraud for consumers “remain unacceptably
high, due in part to the failure to implement [NMVTIS].” H.R. REP. NO. 104-618, at 2-3
(1996). Congress’s judgment on that question of predictive fact is entitled to deference. See
Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d at 1550 n.16 (“In analyzing questions of standing, we have
frequently noted the propriety of judicial deference to congressional judgments of likely
cause-and-effect relationships.”); cf. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 793 F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“If setting a higher
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Although courts have adopted divergent standards for the requisite risk of harm based on the
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nature and severity of the injury, the showing here would be sufficient under any standard. Compare Hall
v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (“evidence of a credible threat to the plaintiff’s physical well-
being” is sufficient); Village of Elk Grove v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The injury is of
course probabilistic, but even a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy—to
take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical—provided of course that the relief sought would, if
granted, reduce the probability.”); Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1458 n.23; and Covington v.
Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 652-53 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, concurring) with Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring proof of “substantial” increased risk,
based on record evidence or experts); and Public Citizen v. NHTSA, 489 F.3d at 1292 (same).
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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standard cannot result in vehicles with increased fuel efficiency, then the entire regulatory
scheme is pointless.”). The Justice Department’s own cost-benefit analysis of NMVTIS,
which examined in detail the likely benefits in terms of reduced consumer fraud, confirms
Congress’s empirical assessment of the increased risks to consumers caused by the
government’s failure to implement NMVTIS, risks that would relieved if NMVTIS were
implemented. See Logistics Management Institute, NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE
INFORMATION SYSTEM COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2001) at AR 621-627 (quantifying benefits
to consumers in the form of “safer vehicles” and “greater value for their money if they are
paying fair market value for a clean vehicle.”). This evidence is sufficient to show that the
plaintiffs’ members have injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the government’s
inaction and that may be redressed by a favorable judgment. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 793
F.3d at 1334 (consumers had standing to challenge regulations reducing fuel economy
standards “because the vehicles available for purchase will likely be less fuel efficient than
if the fuel economy standards were more demanding”). 7/
* * *
Because the plaintiffs’ members have standing to sue in their own right, because the
plaintiffs’ aim of furthering consumer protection and safety with respect to automobiles is
clearly related to the subject of the litigation (see Claybrook Decl., Shahan Decl., Ridout
Decl.), and because plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief that does not require the
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The second prong of the Hunt test is “undemanding,” requiring no more than “mere pertinence
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between litigation subject and organizational purpose.” Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park Serv., 155 F.3d
1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Humane Soc’y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see Am. Ins.
Ass’n v. Selby, 624 F. Supp. 267, 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (“[A]n association’s litigation interests must be truly
unrelated to its organizational interests before a court will declare that those interests are not germane.”).
The government (at 11 n.6) does not challenge the germaneness of Public Citizen’s and CARS’
organizational purposes and because a single plaintiff’s standing is sufficient, there is no need to go no
further. But the government bizarrely singles out Consumer Action, claiming (at 11:14-12:2) that its
“interest in protecting its members from auto fraud” is “incidental.” That argument is not only extraneous,
but wrong. See Ridout Decl. ¶ 3 (“Since Consumer Action’s inception in 1971, helping individuals navigate
the used-car buying process has been integral to our mission.”).
As for the third prong, the introduction to the government’s brief (at 2:7-9) suggests it will be
contested, but the suggestion is never followed up. In any event, the individual-participation prong is
“merely prudential,” and is “designed to promote efficiency,” mainly by weeding out suits that require
individual proof of damages. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 951 n.9 (9th Cir.
2002). “[I]ndividual participation is not normally necessary when an association seeks prospective or
injunctive relief for its members,” United Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544,
535-37, 546 (1996), and “the declaratory and injunctive relief requested” in this case “is clearly not of a
type that requires the participation of any individual member.” Humane Soc’y, 840 F.2d at 53.
Finally, the government also challenges the plaintiffs’ organizational standing—the groups’ ability
to sue on behalf of themselves—but the Court need not reach that issue. See Envt’l Protection Info. Ctr. v.
Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 814 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Patel, J.) (“Because EPIC need only
demonstrate that it has standing on behalf of its members and has done so adequately, the court will not
address PALCO’s organizational standing arguments.”).
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participation of individual members, all three prongs of the Hunt test for associational
standing are satisfied. 8/
II. The Government’s Statute-of-Limitations Defense is Meritless.
Both in its motion for judgment on the pleadings and in its motion for leave to
amend, the government raises yet another procedural obstacle: the statute of limitations.
Although, for reasons that may be obvious, there is no limitations period specifically
applicable to unreasonable-delay claims under the APA, the government asks this Court to
mechanically apply the general six-year limitations period for actions against the federal
government, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), and conclude that this action is time-barred. The
government, in other words, asks the Court to rule in its favor not because it has delayed
too little, but because it has delayed too long. Under the government’s theory, an agency
may inform the public that it plans to comply with its statutory obligations (whether in
good faith or not) and then, as soon as six years have gone by, evade those ongoing legal
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Courts of Appeals: Felter v. Kempthorne, 473 F.3d 1255, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“This court has
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repeatedly refused to hold that actions seeking relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) to ‘compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed’ are time-barred if initiated more than six years after an
agency fails to meet a statutory deadline.”); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
480 F.3d 410, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude this case presents a series of discrete violations
rather than a single violation that may or may not be ‘continuing’ in nature. Courts have long
distinguished continuing violations, which toll the applicable statutes of limitations, from repetitive
discrete violations, which constitute independently actionable individual causes of action.”); Wilderness
Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The Society’s complaint alleges continuing
violations by the Government. It does not complain about what the agency has done but rather about what
the agency has yet to do.”); In re United Mine Workers of America Intern. Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (“Because the UMWA does not complain about what the agency has done but rather about what
the agency has yet to do, we reject the suggestion that its petition is untimely and move to a consideration
of the merits.”); In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“faced with a clear
(continued...)
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obligations and remain free of judicial oversight. Even leaving aside thorny problems that
would arise concerning when exactly a claim begins to accrue, that is a startling result–one
that appears to directly contradict the intent of section 706(1) of the APA.
The first problem for the government is that its defense—which it did not raise in its
answer to the complaint or at the case management conference, see Answer at 1 (Doc. # 6);
Joint Case Management Statement at 6 (Doc. # 13)—fails as a matter of law, and so the
government’s motion to amend should be denied on the basis of futility. See Bonin v.
Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the
denial of a motion for leave to amend.”); California ex rel. Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances
Control v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2004); (“Futility includes the
inevitability of a claim’s defeat on summary judgment.”). The government acknowledges
that “courts have criticized the assertion of a limitations defense in a delay case” as “grossly
inappropriate,” in part because such a defense would allow a federal agency to “immunize
its allegedly unreasonable delay from judicial review.” Govt. Mtn. for Judg. at 21-22. That
is an understatement. In fact, the federal courts have overwhelmingly rejected the
suggestion that federal agencies may shield themselves from judicial review of failures to
meet ongoing statutory obligations by asserting statute-of-limitations defenses to claims
that agency action has been unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld. 9/
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statutory mandate, a deadline nine-years ignored, and an agency that has admitted its continuing
recalcitrance,” challenge was timely).
District Courts: Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F.Supp.2d 805, 814-22 (W.D. La. 2007) (“The
Secretary’s obligation to follow the law . . . did not cease simply because the proscribed deadline for
compliance passed.”); Save the Valley, Inc. v. EPA, 223 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (“[A]
failure to act cannot logically ever trigger a statute of limitations.”); S. Appalachian Biodiversity Project v.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 181 F.Supp.2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (“The statute of limitations
commences to run anew each and every day that the Service does not fulfill the affirmative duty required
of it.”); Am. Canoe Ass’n v. EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“Plaintiffs’ § 706(1) claim of
unreasonable or unlawful delay is not time-barred, however, since application of a statute of limitations to
a claim of unreasonable delay is grossly inappropriate, in that it would mean that EPA could immunize its
allegedly unreasonable delay from judicial review simply by extending that delay for six years.”); NRDC v.
Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The practical effect of imposing a statute of limitations in
a suit such as this is to repeal the mandatory duties established by Congress.”)
Public Citizen v. Mukasey, No. CV 08-0833 (MHP)
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
15
These courts have reached that conclusion for three independent, complementary
reasons. First, they have held that, given the nature of the government’s ongoing violation
of the law, the statute of limitations is not triggered at all. See, e.g., Nat’l Parks
Conservation Ass’n v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F.3d at 416-17; S. Appalachian
Biodiversity Project v, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 887 (“In short, the statute of limitations has
never commenced to run.”). Second, they have held that even if the statute has begun to
run, the continuing-violations doctrine precludes its application. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass’n,
30 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (“EPA’s delay is better understood as a continuing violation, which
plaintiffs may challenge at any time provided the delay continues.”); Schoeffler, 493 F.
Supp. 2d at 817-21. And third, based on the policies behind statutes of limitations generally,
the APA, and the specific statutes at issue, the courts have declined to read a general statute
of limitations in a manner that would eviscerate a specific ongoing statutory obligation and
thus immunize illegal conduct. See, e.g., NRDC v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. at 159-60.
Without analyzing these cases, the government asks this Court to reject the
consensus approach, pointing to “a district court in this Circuit [that] has refused to be
swayed by such logic.” Govt. Mtn. for Judg. at 21-22 (citing Inst. For Wildlife Prot. v. U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Serv., 4118136, at *8 (D. Or. July 25, 2007). But what the government
doesn’t disclose is that the decision it cites is a magistrate’s report that was subsequently
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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
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overruled by the district court. See Institute for Wildlife Protection v. U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 2007 WL 4117978 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007) (Brown, J.). Both the district
judge, in a particularly thorough opinion, and the magistrate judge recognized that “the
weight of authority supports Plaintiff’s contention that either the statute of limitations is
not applicable to cases of agency inaction or that each day’s inaction by [the agency] is a
separate violation that triggers the statute of limitations anew. Id. at *4 (citing cases).
The second problem for the government is that § 2401(a) cannot be characterized
as “jurisdictional” under binding Ninth Circuit precedent, and thus does not foreclose
application of the continuing violations doctrine. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125
F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e hold that § 2401(a)’s six-year statute of limitations is not
jurisdictional, but is subject to waiver.”) (citing Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.
89, 95 (1990)); see Dugong v. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Patel,
J.). The government claims that a new decision, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008), “casts doubt on the continued viability” of Cedars-Sinai.
Govt. Mtn. for Judg. at 19. But mere “doubt” is not enough; district courts may only depart
from Ninth Circuit precedent when intervening authority is “clearly irreconcilable,” Miller
v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), a standard the government does
not even attempt to satisfy. In any event, the two decisions are fully compatible: the
Supreme Court in Sand actually reaffirmed the “general rule,” announced in Irwin and
followed in Cedar-Sinai, that limitations periods applicable to the government are
presumptively subject to equitable tolling. Sand, 128 S. Ct. at 755. The Court held only that
this presumption gives way in the face of “a definitive earlier interpretation of the
statute”—in that case, the special statute governing the Court of Federal Claims, which had
been strictly interpreted since 1883. Id. (explaining that the statute in Irwin, “while similar
to the present statute in language, is unlike the present statute in the key respect that the
Court had not previously provided a definitive interpretation.”). Here, the only applicable
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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and to Amend
“definitive interpretation” of § 2401(a) is the Ninth Circuit’s, which holds that the
limitations period is not jurisdictional.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Attorney General should be declared to have violated
the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, the Anti-Car Theft Improvements Act of 1996, and the
Administrative Procedure Act in withholding the actions necessary to establish the National
Motor Vehicle Title Information System within the time frame mandated by Congress. The
Court should order the Attorney General to complete its responsibilities according to the
remedial schedule proposed by the plaintiffs.
Dated: September 2, 2008 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Deepak Gupta
________________________
DEEPAK GUPTA
Public Citizen Litigation Group
1600 20th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 588-1000
(202) 588-7795 (fax)
Email: dgupta@citizen.org
ERICA L. CRAVEN
Levy, Ram & Olson LLP
639 Front Street, 4th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 433-4949
(415) 433-7311 (fax)
Email: elc@lrolaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Case 3:08-cv-00833-MHP Document 42 Filed 09/03/2008 Page 22 of 22
