Pro Marketing Sales, Inc. v. Cyber Solutions International, Llc et al

REPLY BRIEF re MOTION to Dismiss Renewed

N.D. Ga.June 15, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA GAINESVILLE DIVISION PRO MARKETING SALES, INC., Plaintiff, v. CYBER SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC. and RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 2:17-CV-00038-RWS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC.’S AND RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FRCP 12(b)(1)-(2), (6) Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 1 of 20 -i- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 II. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 3 A. Personal Jurisdiction Is Absent. ........................................................... 3 B. PMS Lacks Standing. ........................................................................... 6 C. PMS Has Not Pleaded Any Claim Sufficiently. ................................ 11 Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 2 of 20 -1- I. INTRODUCTION It is unfortunate for Plaintiff PMS that non-party Priva was unable to re-pay PMS’s loan. Nothing about this, however, justifies suing Defendants Secturion or Takahashi. Indeed, PMS should be very pleased to know that Secturion actually uses an alternative to the TRSS technology PMS claims to own. That PMS instead chooses to press forward with hollow arguments about unfounded claims invites questions about its true motivation for suing Secturion and Takahashi. Secturion and Takahashi have moved to dismiss all claims against them because (1) personal jurisdiction is absent; (2) subject matter jurisdiction is absent because PMS lacks standing; and (3) PMS has not properly pleaded any plausible claim. In response, PMS repeats the same flawed arguments embedded in its pleadings. Many of its points are demonstrably inaccurate. Many others are irrelevant. Having already filed an amended complaint, PMS’s inability to justify this lawsuit confirms that immediate dismissal with prejudice is warranted. In short, with respect to personal jurisdiction, PMS points to nothing demonstrating any Georgia contacts by Secturion or Takahashi. Instead, PMS emphasizes its own contacts, which are legally irrelevant here. This is a textbook case for dismissal. As for standing, PMS goes so far as to attribute a holding to the Sixth Circuit about PMS’s supposed TRSS ownership that the trial court has already explained “is not part of the holding of that court.” Cyber Sols. Int’l LLC v. Priva Sec. Corp., Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 3 of 20 -2- No. 1:13-CV-867, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83399 at *8-9 (W.D. Mich. June 28, 2016) (discussed in more detail below). PMS apparently hopes this Georgia Court will not notice that PMS already failed with this exact argument1 in PMS’s ongoing litigation against CSI in Michigan given that this is the only purported basis PMS provides for proceeding in this case. Further, PMS’s claims fail on their face. Among other things, Georgia’s anti-fraudulent transfer statutes do not apply extraterritorially and PMS does not even try to argue to the contrary. PMS further concedes that it did not come into this lawsuit as a creditor of any Defendant, which also negates its creditor claims. And PMS’s only supposed evidence linking Secturion or Takahashi to TRSS technology is materials from several years ago talking about Secturion’s then- future product development plans. Even assuming those materials accurately depicted Secturion’s old plans, they prove nothing here because Secturion in fact elected to use a different technology instead of TRSS as its development advanced to the point of building prototypes. PMS’s claims against Secturion and Takahashi should all be dismissed. 1 Compare Opposition at 5-6, 17-18 with Cyber Sols. Int’l LLC v. Priva Sec. Corp., No.1:13-CV-867 (W.D. Mich.), ECF No. 66-1 at 2-3 (PMS brief alleging TRSS ownership, which was decided against PMS in the June 28, 2016 opinion). Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 4 of 20 -3- II. ARGUMENT A. Personal Jurisdiction Is Absent. Personal jurisdiction is the simplest ground for dismissal of Secturion and Takahashi as neither have sufficient, much less significant, Georgia contacts. PMS alleges only specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. Opposition at 12. PMS cannot meet its burden because it identifies no transactions or acts in Georgia. First, with respect to O.C.G.A. § 9-1-91(1) [Opposition at 14], PMS ignores that this prong requires a cause of action to arise out of a nonresident defendant’s transactions within Georgia. See, e.g., John Gallup & Assocs., LLC v. Conlow, No. 1:12-CV-03779-RWS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87177, at *12 (N.D. Ga. June 21, 2013) (emphasizing this rule and finding personal jurisdiction lacking). Secturion’s opening brief (ECF No. 31-1, “Brief”) explained that it could not have sold products in Georgia, much less products with TRSS chips, because it has never sold any products. PMS insists that Secturion does have products for sale. But PMS’s supposed evidence consists merely of statements about plans for future product sales dated years ago. Opposition at 6-9 (citing Ex. B, a 2014 CSI proposal to the Bankruptcy Court presiding over Priva’s bankruptcy proceedings that refers to Secturion’s future plans; Ex. C, 2014 testimony about Secturion’s future plans; Ex. D, a 2015 press release about Secturion products under development that does not mention TRSS). None of these materials are evidence that Secturion has in fact made any sales. Nor are they evidence that Secturion has Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 5 of 20 -4- in fact made any sales with TRSS chips. And, none of these materials are evidence that Secturion has in fact made any sales with TRSS chips in Georgia. They are of no help to PMS satisfying its evidentiary burden to prove that its causes of action arise from Secturion “transacting business within this state” (long-arm prong (1)) or any “persistent course of conduct” in Georgia or “substantial revenue” from Georgia (long-arm prong (3)). PMS also insists that Secturion solicited a PMS officer to invest in a securities offering. Opposition at 14. This, too, is not true-and PMS offers no evidence to substantiate this perplexing allegation or controvert Secturion’s evidence that it did not happen. Nor would this bare allegation confer jurisdiction under any prong of the long-arm statute even if it were true because it has nothing to do with any PMS claim for relief. See Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). PMS also notes Secturion has a website. Opposition at 9, 13. But the law is well-settled that this changes nothing. E.g., Kason Indus., Inc. v. Dent Design Hardware, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (website does not confer jurisdiction where it “does not directly target Georgia residents in any way”). Second, O.C.G.A. § 9-1-91 (2) [Opposition at 15] requires a defendant be within Georgia when it does something wrongful. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank of Ames, Iowa, 620 S.E.2d 352, 354 (Ga. 2005). Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 6 of 20 -5- With respect to alleged fraud and fraud-based conspiracy jurisdiction, Secturion and Takahashi explained that PMS’s allegations require factual particularity under Rule 9(b). Brief at 14. PMS fails this rule, too; it pleads no particularized facts and puts forward no evidence of any alleged fraudulent act in Georgia, or any conspiracy in Georgia (or anywhere else). Opposition at 15-16. PMS’s jurisdictional focus there is solely on its own Georgia contacts, not Defendants’ actions, which is wholly misplaced. See Innovative Clinical 620 S.E.2d at 354 (prong (2) requires tort be committed in Georgia); Wells Fargo Bank v. Berkman, No. 1:10-cv-2286-TWT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18484, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2011) (conspiracy jurisdiction is not established by injury to a Georgia resident absent “implicit or explicit evidence of purposefully sought activity with or in Georgia by the non-resident”). PMS characterizes its fraudulent transfer claims as Secturion and Takahashi allegedly preventing PMS “from the rightful exercise of its rights to the TRSS technology” and “hindering [PMS’s] efforts to exercise its rights to the TRSS technology.” Opposition at 15, 16. But what efforts? What exercise? There is nothing Secturion or Takahashi could do, even if they wanted, to stop PMS from making or selling TRSS chips or doing anything else with any TRSS technology. Further, notably absent in all of PMS’s papers is anything about any particular efforts PMS took that were somehow hindered-let alone hindered by any act in Georgia by Secturion or Takahashi. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 7 of 20 -6- PMS also points to statements to the federal government as demonstrating an alleged conspiracy to defraud. Opposition at 4-5. These allegations do not confer conspiracy jurisdiction. PMS alleges fraudulent transfer-a creditor claim governed by the jurisdiction where the alleged transfer occurred. Brief at 22. Moreover, none of the alleged statements were made to PMS, or made in Georgia. PMS’s lead case about conspiracy jurisdiction, Nat. Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le- Israel, B.M., 514 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1981), thus supports Defendants. Nat. Egg focused on “intentional conduct between [defendant] and three agricultural Georgia companies” and the “presence of [defendant’s] vice president in Georgia in connection with [its] dealings.” 514 F. Supp. at 1128. It did so because “purposefully sought activity with or in Georgia” is required. Id. at 1127. In sum, PMS’s arguments pertaining to personal jurisdiction are entirely deficient. PMS has not met its evidentiary burden. With respect to Due Process, PMS does not even try to explain how Secturion or Takahashi purposefully established minimum contacts in Georgia. Secturion and Takahashi, therefore, respectfully request that the Court dismiss them from this case. B. PMS Lacks Standing. PMS does not dispute that it must establish standing, with evidence, to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction. It has not met its burden to do so. Declaratory judgment (Counts 3-4). For its declaratory judgment claims, PMS has no evidence that meets the legal standard for standing, which requires Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 8 of 20 -7- establishing a live controversy. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). PMS points to information from 2014 suggesting that back then, Secturion planned on using TRSS chips for future products. Opposition at 17; Exs. B-C. PMS also points to a press release about future products from 2015 that does not even mention TRSS chips. Id. Ex. D. This amounts to nothing even remotely “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,” as required. Brief at 16 (quoting Aetna Life Ins.). By contrast, Secturion submitted definitive present testimonial evidence demonstrating that no controversy exists. See ECF No. 31-2 ¶ 15; ECF No. 31-6 ¶ 5 (sworn statements evidencing that Secturion and Takahashi have no TRSS chips or any other TRSS technology and do not claim any rights therein). Conversion (Count 6). Secturion contests PMS’s claim to own any TRSS chips it does not already possess.2 PMS says it owns any TRSS chips no matter when, how, or by whom they were made because it foreclosed on Priva. Its sole argument here is that Priva owns all things TRSS based on a Sixth Circuit ruling in January 2016. Opposition at 5-6, 17-18 (citing Cyber Sols. Int’l LLC v. Pro Mktg. Sales, Inc., 634 F. App’x 557 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2016)). Yet PMS deliberately ignores subsequent rulings expressly to the contrary. In Cyber Sols. Int’l LLC v. 2 Again, PMS is wrong that Secturion and Takahashi claim that either of them has any such rights. Opposition at 18. They only contest PMS’s contention that PMS has such rights. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 9 of 20 -8- Priva Sec. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-867, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83399 at *8 (W.D. Mich. June 28, 2016), the Court explained the two assumptions that limit the scope of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling: (1) “that the property at issue in the counterclaim (i.e., the ‘TRSS technology’) was already in the possession of Pro Marketing” and (2) “that the ‘TRSS technology’ at issue in the counterclaim was created entirely by Priva.” Incredibly, in its Opposition, pages 5-6 & 18, PMS states that the Sixth Circuit’s holding is what the Western District of Michigan expressly said “is not part of the holding of that court.” PMS states here that “Pro Marketing owns the chips” based on what the Sixth Circuit said at 634 F. App’x at 561 (quoted immediately below). Opposition at 18. PMS made the exact same argument in the Western District of Michigan last year, who explicitly rejected it: Pro Marketing principally relies upon several statements by the Court of Appeals. According to that court, Pro Marketing “asked the district court to declare that Pro Marketing was the rightful owner of both the SKSIC and TRSS technologies and that Pro Marketing was entitled to freely exercise its rights of ownership.” Cyber Solutions, 634 F. App’x at 561. This statement is merely a paraphrase of Pro Marketing’s request for declaratory relief. It is not part of the holding of that court. Indeed, Pro Marketing never asked this Court to declare that it was the “owner” of the SKSIC and TRSS technologies, or that it was entitled to “freely exercise” its rights of ownership. Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added). PMS cannot rely on the Sixth Circuit ruling to establish ownership of TRSS chips outside its possession because the Sixth Circuit’s ruling was limited to TRSS chips within PMS’s possession. Because that is the only basis of ownership PMS Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 10 of 20 -9- provides in this Georgia case, its conversion claim fails. PMS has failed to establish standing for conversion. Fraudulent Transfer (Counts 8-10). Secturion and Takahashi challenge PMS’s status as a “creditor” to any alleged “debtor” in this case. PMS argues in response that it is a creditor of Secturion and Takahashi because it alleges they participated in fraudulent transfers “to thwart [PMS’s] rights to the TRSS technology.” Opposition at 20. The flaw in this argument is obvious: PMS has not won a judgment. PMS has no authority to support the notion that pleading a UFTA claim creates a “claim” as defined by the UFTA, which is a “right to payment.” O.C.G.A. § 18-2-71(3). Standing must be proven at the beginning of a case, and PMS’s hope that it will win in the end proves nothing. By even making this argument, PMS effectively concedes that it has no basis to allege a creditor claim. PMS did not come into this lawsuit as a creditor of either Secturion or Takahashi. That concession is dispositive. Moreover, PMS does not even try to dispute the dispositive evidence about the “mask rights” that negates PMS’s claims. The claims concern alleged fraudulent transfers of “mask work from the federal government.” Opposition at 19. PMS alleges it foreclosed on the federal government’s mask work via foreclosing on Priva. Id. But the government document loaning the government’s mask work to Priva expressly said that the mask work would revert to the government if Priva ceased operations. Brief at 3 (quoting loan document). PMS Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 11 of 20 -10- ignores this altogether because it knows this uncontroverted evidence also defeats its claims. PMS also alleges that “the federal government is unable to transfer any rights to the TRSS mask work to Pro Marketing.” Opposition at 19 (citing PMS Ex. C at 87). But the evidence PMS cites, deposition testimony from CSI, does not say this. What it actually says is that CSI never took physical possession of the mask work (which further undermines the notion that CSI could have transferred any “mask work” or “mask rights” to Secturion). There is no reason the government could not give PMS access to the government’s TRSS mask work today if the government wanted to, which also negates PMS’s theory. Finally, Secturion and Takahashi challenged PMS’s standing to invoke Georgia’s debtor laws against non-Georgians. Because PMS alleges transferors, transferees, and property located outside Georgia, the claims fail. In re Martin, 532 B.R. 859, 864, 865 (Bkr. N.D. Ga. 2015) (explaining that fraudulent transfer tort claims are governed by the law where the alleged wrongdoing occurred). PMS does not even address this dispositive argument because it has no response. Conclusion. In sum, PMS’s claims against Secturion and Takahashi all fail for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because PMS cannot establish standing to assert any of them. It knowingly misrepresents a Sixth Circuit ruling, puts forward no evidence proving standing, and ignores the facts and principles that demonstrate it has no basis to proceed against Secturion or Takahashi. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 12 of 20 -11- C. PMS Has Not Pleaded Any Claim Sufficiently. With respect to pleading requirements, PMS again fails on each point. To begin, PMS cites bad law. Opposition at 20 (citing cases prior to Twombly and Iqbal). The specifics of its pleadings fare no better, as described below. Declaratory judgment. To challenge PMS’s pleadings, Secturion and Takahashi pointed out that PMS alleged only that “Secturion claims ownership of (or rights to) TRSS wafers and TRSS chips.” ECF No. 11, ¶ 116. This threadbare and conclusory allegation is not sufficient under the Twombly/Iqbal standard because no facts are alleged to support it. In response, PMS points to documents and testimony outside the pleadings. That material is irrelevant in this Rule 12(b)(6) context because it is not pleaded in the Amended Complaint. E.g., FDIC v. Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2013). Even if that information were pleaded, it would not render PMS’s declaratory judgment claim any more plausible under Twombly/Iqbal because on its face that information concerned future plans for future products that could hypothetically use TRSS chips. Opposition Exs. B-D. PMS has not pleaded and cannot plead any actual present controversy involving Secturion. Conversion. Secturion and Takahashi challenged PMS’s conversion claim because it pleaded only a legal conclusion about property ownership, and pleaded nothing on the requisite element of property value of tangible property. PMS’s Opposition ignores these deficiencies. It repeats the same legal conclusion about property ownership. And it points to the same deficient paragraph in its Complaint Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 13 of 20 -12- about value that Secturion and Takahashi challenged in the first place because the pleading improperly lumps in intangible property. Opposition at 21-22. PMS also says “Defendants have not offered any affidavits or other evidentiary support for its assertion that Secturion does not have TRSS chips in its possession, custody, or control.” Opposition at 21. But this issue concerns PMS’s pleadings, not Defendants’ evidentiary support. PMS has not pleaded and cannot plead facts stating any conversion claim. Finally, although it does not matter in the 12(b)(6) context, PMS is also wrong about Takahashi’s declaration. Takahashi provided a current declaration saying precisely that Secturion has no TRSS chips. In particular, Takahashi stated: “Neither Secturion, nor myself, has . . . any TRSS chips, wafers, and mask work.” ECF No. 31-2 ¶ 15. He also stated “Secturion is not designing, developing, manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, or importing any product using any SKSIC/TRSS technology [claimed by PMS].” ECF No. 31-6 ¶ 5. PMS says it reads this as declaring “that Secturion asserts no rights to TRSS chips; however, Mr. Takahashi has not declared and Defendants have not provided any proof that Secturion does not have TRSS chips in its possession, custody, or control.” Opposition at 21. PMS’s reading is not credible. Lest there be any doubt about whether Secturion or Takahashi possesses any TRSS chips, Takahashi has attached an additional declaration explaining that this is precisely among the things he meant to, and did, say earlier. Second Takahashi Declaration, ¶ 3. To be Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 14 of 20 -13- absolutely crystal clear, Secturion does not have any TRSS chips in its possession, custody, or control. Id.3 Fraudulent Transfer. PMS’s creditor claims are deficient as pleaded in many respects. Initially, as noted supra at page 10, because choice-of-law principles provide that Georgia’s fraudulent transfer statutes only apply to alleged transfers in Georgia, see Martin, 532 B.R. at 865, it requires pleading an in-state act. See Peterson v. Aaron’s, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under a Georgia statute because it alleged wrongdoing outside Georgia). PMS has not, and cannot, do so. PMS must also plead this claim with factual particularity under Rule 9(b). Brief at 23. PMS does not dispute this requirement, and PMS has not met it. Instead, it again goes outside its pleadings (which is not allowed under Rule 12(b)(6)) to jumble together an assortment of allegations (which make no sense in any event, as described below). Opposition at 23-34. PMS alleges two distinct transfers. Neither is well-pleaded. PMS first alleges a wrongful transfer of “rights to the TRSS mask work” by the federal government to CSI. Opposition at 23. But neither Secturion or Takahashi is 3 PMS also alleges that Secturion’s securities offering remained open to new investors as of October 31, 2016. Opposition at 14. As Takahashi explains, this is not accurate. Certain investors who participated in the securities offering closed on October 26, 2016 have future options, but the offering is not open to new investors. Second Takahashi Declaration, ¶ 4. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 15 of 20 -14- alleged as a transferor or transferee. Furthermore, PMS is not a creditor of either the federal government or CSI. Nor can PMS explain why the federal government was not free to provide access to its TRSS mask designs to anyone it wishes, or why PMS could ever have a claim in the first place to the federal government’s mask designs loaned to Priva but never owned by Priva. Finally, PMS alleges that Takahashi made a false statement to the government because he “knew that Pro Marketing foreclosed on the SKSIC/TRSS technology.” Id. But PMS has tried multiple times to establish this point in the Western District of Michigan proceedings, and has failed each time. Brief at 4-5. PMS second alleges that CSI wrongfully transferred “rights to design and build high speed cryptographic products incorporating the TRSS chips to Secturion Systems.” Opposition at 24. This is a bizarre theory; no one has exclusive rights to design and build high speed cryptographic products. And again, PMS has never set forth any facts showing that Priva ever had exclusive rights to use TRSS chips, such that PMS could have received any such rights via foreclosure. Regardless, PMS has not pleaded any particularized facts about any such alleged transfer from CSI to Secturion. Fed. R. Civ. P 9(b). And, even accepting as true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) that such a transfer occurred, PMS is still not a creditor of CSI or Secturion. PMS also contends that the alleged transfers were made with “actual intent to hinder, delay and defraud” PMS by Secturion and Takahashi. Opposition at 24. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 16 of 20 -15- But PMS concedes that “intent” averments are directed at transferors. Opposition at 22 (describing claim as “transfers of property by the debtor if the debtor made the transfer . . . with [wrongful] actual intent . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted). Neither Secturion nor Takahashi are pleaded as transferors. Finally, Secturion and Takahashi challenged PMS’s damages pleadings because there is no UFTA basis for them. Brief at 24. PMS now concedes that the relief it seeks is “to set aside transfers of property by the debtor.” Opposition at 22. This confirms PMS has no basis to plead damages. With its fraudulent transfer creditor claims, PMS appears insistent on trying to ram a square peg through a round hole. Its arguments confirm, however, that it has not pleaded, and cannot plead, any such claim against Secturion or Takahashi. Attorneys’ Fees and Punitive Damages. PMS argues that it can plead claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees without pleading facts supporting such relief. Opposition at 25. This is incorrect. PMS must plead such facts, and it has not done so. See, e.g., Moore v. Mylan, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (dismissing count “because plaintiff has listed the elements for punitive damages without actually stating any facts”). * * * In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, and those in its motion to dismiss, Defendants Secturion and Takahashi respectfully request dismissal of all claims asserted against them in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 17 of 20 -16- Dated: June 15, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /s/ J. David Hopkins J. David Hopkins (dhopkins@jdhopkinslaw.com) Georgia Bar No. 366505 J. David Hopkins Law LLC 1720 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 520 Atlanta, GA 30309 Telephone: (404) 353-5184 /s/ Joel C. Boehm Joel C. Boehm (pro hac vice) (jboehm@wsgr.com) WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C. 900 S. Capital of Texas Highway Las Cimas IV, 5th Floor Austin, TX 78746 Telephone: (512) 338-5418 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC. AND RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 18 of 20 -17- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE The undersigned hereby certifies pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 that this brief has been prepared in Times New Roman, 14 point font, a font and point selection approved by this court in Local Rule 5.1. /s/ Joel C. Boehm Joel C. Boehm Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 19 of 20 -18- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA GAINESVILLE DIVISION PRO MARKETING SALES, INC., Plaintiff, v. CYBER SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC. and RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI, Defendants. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 2:17-CV-00038-RWS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On June 15, 2017, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia, using the electronic case filing system of the Court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel and/or pro se parties of record electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2). /s/ Joel C. Boehm Joel C. Boehm Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33 Filed 06/15/17 Page 20 of 20 Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33-1 Filed 06/15/17 Page 1 of 3 Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33-1 Filed 06/15/17 Page 2 of 3 Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 33-1 Filed 06/15/17 Page 3 of 3