Pro Marketing Sales, Inc. v. Cyber Solutions International, Llc et al

REPLY BRIEF re MOTION to Dismiss

N.D. Ga.April 19, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA GAINESVILLE DIVISION PRO MARKETING SALES, INC., Plaintiff, v. CYBER SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC. and RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 2:17-CV-00038-RWS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC.’S AND RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FRCP 12(b)(1)-(2), (6) Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 1 of 20 -i- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 II. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 4 A. Personal Jurisdiction Is Absent. ........................................................... 4 B. PMS Lacks Standing. ........................................................................... 6 C. PMS Has Not Pleaded Any Claim Sufficiently. ................................ 11 CONCLUSION. ............................................................................................ 15 Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 2 of 20 -1- I. INTRODUCTION It is unfortunate for Plaintiff PMS that non-party Priva was unable to re-pay PMS’s loan. Nothing about this, however, justifies suing Defendants Secturion or Takahashi. Indeed, PMS should be happy to know that Secturion uses an alternative to the TRSS technology PMS claims to own. That PMS instead presses forward with hollow arguments about unfounded claims invites questions into its true motivation for suing Secturion and Takahashi. Secturion and Takahashi moved to dismiss all claims against them because (1) personal jurisdiction is absent; (2) subject matter jurisdiction is absent because PMS lacks standing; and (3) PMS has not sufficiently pleaded any plausible claim. In response, PMS repeats the same flawed arguments embedded in its pleadings. Many of its points are demonstrably inaccurate. Many others are irrelevant. Having amended its Complaint prior to filing its Opposition,1 PMS’s inability to justify this lawsuit confirms that immediate dismissal is warranted. 1 After Secturion and Takahashi filed the instant motion, PMS filed an Amended Complaint and then its Opposition citing to the latter complaint. ECF Nos. 11-12. PMS’s amendment added two claims concerning a U.S. Patent, but both are against defendant CSI, who owns that patent, not Secturion or Takahashi. Because PMS’s amended pleadings do not cure the defects Secturion and Takahashi raised regarding the claims against them, Secturion and Takahashi proceed with this Reply. See Wright & Miller, 6 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1476 (motion to dismiss applies to uncured defects in subsequent amended complaint; new motion not required). Secturion and Takahashi address each of the relevant averments of PMS’s Amended Complaint herein. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 3 of 20 -2- Personal jurisdiction. Secturion and Takahashi are Utah citizens having no contacts in Georgia. PMS now argues that because Secturion has indicated it plans to sell products under development in Utah in the future, and because three years ago Secturion may have planned to use TRSS chips, this is sufficient for personal jurisdiction in Georgia. Opposition [ECF No. 12-1] at 13. That is incorrect. Standing. With respect to its declaratory judgment claims, PMS alleges that prospective statements in 2014 about Secturion’s future plans for TRSS chips create an active controversy three years later. Opposition at 15-16. Secturion, however, has presented definitive evidence that no such present controversy exists. See ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 15; ECF No. 8-6 ¶ 5 (confirming Secturion has no TRSS chips, has not used any TRSS chips in its prototypes, uses an alternative to TRSS chips, has no plans to use TRSS chips, and claims no rights in any TRSS chips or technology). As for its property claims, in February 2015, the Western District of Michigan ruled that PMS could keep what Priva formerly owned and PMS already possessed from Priva.2 In 2016 that Court ruled that its 2015 ruling conferred nothing more to PMS.3 Trial is set for this summer over whether some of those items, around 900 TRSS chips, were actually CSI-owned property that happened to 2 Case No. 1:13-CV-867, ECF No. 48. 3 Case No. 1:13-CV-867, ECF No. 75 at 5 (2016 ruling explaining that 2015 ruling was limited to Priva property “already in the possession of Pro Marketing”). Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 4 of 20 -3- be in Priva’s possession when PMS took them from Priva.4 Because PMS’s Opposition confirms that PMS’s rejected interpretation of the 2015 ruling is the only basis for standing that PMS alleges for its property claims, Opposition at 16, PMS has not met its burden to establish standing for those claims. For its creditor claims, which concern alleged fraudulent transfers by debtors, PMS likewise has failed to meet its burden to affirmatively establish standing. It concedes that it did not come into this lawsuit as a creditor of either Secturion or Takahashi. Opposition at 17-18. That concession is dispositive. Moreover, PMS now says these claims are about Priva’s “mask rights,” i.e., the right to use a federal government engineering design (referred to as a “mask” or “mask set”) to manufacture TRSS chips (also referred to as SKSIC or SKS_IC chips). Opposition at 6-7, 21-23. But Priva’s agreement borrowing the “mask set” from the federal government provided that all rights reverted to the federal government when Priva ceased operations, meaning no Priva creditor could ever reach them. Case No. 1:13-CV-867, ECF No. 45-27 (“Trusted Foundry Mask Loan” between federal government and Priva; “In the unlikely event [Priva] ceases to exist or decides to end production of the SKS_IC [chips], the [government] sponsor organization through the Trusted Access Program Office (TAPO) shall retain the rights of the SKS_IC mask set.”). This, too, negates any possibility of 4 Case No. 1:13-CV-867, ECF No. 96 (trial setting); ECF No. 86 (status report). Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 5 of 20 -4- PMS having standing for this claim. PMS has no response; but it cannot ignore this dispositive fact about the genesis of its supposed “mask rights.” Failure to state a claim. PMS’s pleadings suffer numerous defects that Secturion and Takahashi identified. Its Opposition confirms that it has not pleaded and cannot plead facts that would establish essential elements of its claims. Each of these grounds independently demonstrates that every claim for relief against Secturion and Takahashi should be dismissed. II. ARGUMENT A. Personal Jurisdiction Is Absent. Personal jurisdiction is the simplest ground for dismissal of Secturion and Takahashi as neither have sufficient Georgia contacts. For each prong of Georgia’s long-arm statute, PMS misportrays the controlling legal standard. See Opposition at 13. With respect to O.C.G.A. § 9-1- 91(1), PMS ignores that this requires a cause of action to arise out of a nonresident defendant’s transactions within Georgia. See Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). With respect to subsection (2), PMS ignores that this requires a defendant be within Georgia when it does something wrongful. See Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank of Ames, Iowa, 620 S.E.2d 352, 354 (Ga. 2005). With respect to subsection (3), PMS provides zero support establishing any “persistent course of conduct” in Georgia or “substantial revenue” from Georgia. See id. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 6 of 20 -5- Secturion’s opening brief explained that it could not have sold products in Georgia, much less products with TRSS chips, because it has never sold any products. Brief [ECF No. 8-1] at 9. PMS argues that Secturion does have products for sale, but PMS’s supposed evidence consists merely of plans for product sales dated years ago. Opposition at 12 (citing Ex. D, a 2014 CSI proposal referring to Secturion’s future plans; Ex. F, 2014 testimony about Secturion’s future plans; Ex. H, a 2015 press release about a Secturion prototype). None of these materials even mention Georgia, and none of them are evidence that Secturion has in fact made any sales. They are of no help to PMS satisfying its burden under any prong of Georgia’s long-arm statute.5 Similarly, PMS argues that Secturion solicited a PMS officer to invest in a securities offering. Opposition at 12-13. This, too, is not true (Brief at 9)-and PMS offers no evidence to substantiate this perplexing allegation or controvert Secturion’s evidence that it did not happen. Nor would this bare allegation confer jurisdiction under any prong of the long-arm statute even if it were true because it has nothing to do with any PMS claim. See Diamond Crystal, 593 F.3d at 1264. 5 PMS’s other supposed evidence for personal jurisdiction is Secturion’s website. Opposition at 12. But operating a general website does nothing to confer personal jurisdiction. E.g., Kason Indus., Inc. v. Dent Design Hardware, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (website does not confer jurisdiction where it “does not directly target Georgia residents in any way”) (citing Jordan Outdoor Enters., Ltd. v. That 70’s Store, LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1345 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (no jurisdiction for “a website that is accessible here and everywhere else”)). Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 7 of 20 -6- With respect to alleged conspiracy jurisdiction, Secturion and Takahashi explained that PMS’s allegations require factual particularity under Rule 9(b). Brief at 14. PMS fails this rule, too; it pleads no particular facts and puts forward no evidence of any alleged conspiracy in Georgia (or anywhere else). Opposition at 14-15. In sum, PMS’s arguments pertaining to personal jurisdiction are wholly deficient. PMS does not even try to justify its pleadings under the Due Process requirement-it does not cite a single authority on this issue. Opposition at 15. PMS has not met its burden. Secturion and Takahashi, therefore, respectfully request that the Court dismiss them from this case. B. PMS Lacks Standing. PMS does not dispute that it must establish standing, with evidence, to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction. It has not met its burden to do so. Declaratory judgment (Original Counts 1-2, Amended Counts 3-4). For its declaratory judgment claims, PMS has no evidence that meets the legal standard for standing, which requires establishing a live controversy. In alleging that Secturion claims a competing interest in TRSS technology, PMS points only to information from 2014 suggesting that back then, Secturion considered using TRSS chips for future products. Opposition at 15-16. This amounts to nothing “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,” as required. Brief at 16. By contrast, Secturion submitted definitive Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 8 of 20 -7- present testimonial evidence demonstrating that no controversy exists. See ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 15; ECF No. 8-6 ¶ 5 (Secturion and Takahashi have no TRSS chips or any other TRSS technology and do not claim any rights therein). Conversion (Original Count 4, Amended Count 6). Secturion contested PMS’s claim to own any TRSS chips it does not already possess. Brief at 17-18.6 PMS effectively concedes it cannot prove standing for conversion because it concedes it can do no more than “allege” that it might own property it accuses Secturion of converting. Opposition at 17. In fact, PMS has trial set this summer in Michigan against CSI concerning TRSS chip ownership. Note 4, supra. In 2016, PMS argued to the Western District of Michigan that that Court’s prior ruling, in 2015, conferred exclusive ownership of all TRSS chips, bar none, to PMS. Brief at 4 n.7; id. at 17. The Western District of Michigan flatly rejected PMS’s interpretation of the earlier ruling. Id. Nonetheless, PMS again cites the 2015 ruling, deliberately ignoring the 2016 ruling. Rather incredibly, PMS even suggests that it knows better what the Western District of Michigan meant in 2015 than that Court itself in 2016. Compare Opposition at 16 (PMS “contends that the legal and factual analysis conducted by the Michigan district court [in 2015] and the Sixth Circuit grant Pro Marketing ownership of [all] TRSS technology[.]”) with Case No. 1:13-cv-867, ECF No. 76 at 5-11 (W.D. Mich. June 28, 2016) (expressly 6 Again, Secturion and Takahashi do not claim that either of them has any such rights. They only contest PMS’s contention that PMS has such rights. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 9 of 20 -8- rejecting this very contention and explaining in detail why neither its 2015 ruling nor the Sixth Circuit’s affirmance can support this PMS contention). The Michigan proceedings do not help PMS establish standing for conversion. Fraudulent Transfer (Original Counts 5-7, Amended Counts 8-10). PMS’s theory regarding its creditor claims remains opaque. PMS apparently believes that after the federal government executed a document loaning Priva certain engineering designs called a “mask set” in 2008 in order to manufacture SKSIC/TRSS chips, the government wrongly took those “mask rights” back at some point, then CSI and Takahashi wrongfully caused the government to execute a document “releasing” that “mask set” to CSI in early 2013, and then CSI wrongfully transferred its “rights” to use that “mask set” to Secturion, somehow, at some point after that. Opposition at 20-24 & Ex. C [ECF No. 12-4]. All of this is alleged to have “prevented Pro Marketing from acquiring rights to the TRSS mask work.” E.g., Opposition at 22. PMS never explains what, if anything, it did to seek access to the “mask set” designs from the government, or why the government cannot give PMS access. Among all the persons mentioned above, the only PMS debtor is Priva. Secturion and Takahashi thus challenged PMS’s status as a “creditor” to any alleged “debtor” in this case. PMS argues in response that it is a creditor of Secturion and Takahashi because it “asserts claims against all Defendants in this case.” Opposition at 18. The flaw in this argument is obvious: PMS has not won a Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 10 of 20 -9- judgment. Standing must be proven at the beginning of a case, and PMS’s hope that it will win in the end proves nothing. By even making this argument, PMS effectively concedes that it has no basis to allege a creditor claim against Secturion or Takahashi. Moreover, the evidence about the “mask rights” at issue disproves every premise in PMS’s theory because Priva’s “mask” rights reverted to the government. See Case No. 1:13-CV-867, ECF No. 45-27 (“Trusted Foundry Mask Loan” quoted supra at page 3). Secturion and Takahashi pointed out how this, too, negates any possibility of PMS standing for this claim. Brief at 19 n.11. PMS has no response, and ignores this equally dispositive point altogether. Finally, Secturion and Takahashi challenged PMS’s standing to invoke Georgia’s debtor laws against non-Georgians. PMS now argues that the alleged fraudulent transfer or transfers occurred before July 1, 2015, i.e., before the latest version of Georgia’s anti-fraudulent transfer statutes took effect. Opposition at 17. Under the prior version that PMS now says it relies upon, however, choice of law principles equally preclude extraterritorial application. See O.C.G.A. § 18-2-80 (2010) (“the principles of law and equity” apply to such claims); In re Martin, 532 B.R. 859, 864, 865 (Bkr. N.D. Ga. 2015) (explaining choice of law analysis for fraudulent transfer claims, including that fraudulent transfer tort claims are governed by the law where the alleged wrongdoing occurred). Because PMS alleges transferors, transferees, and property located outside Georgia, the claims Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 11 of 20 -10- fail. Even PMS’s security agreement with Priva provides that New York law governs, not Georgia law. Opposition Ex. A [ECF No. 12-2] at 11. Inventorship (Amended Count 1). In discussing subject matter jurisdiction, PMS points offhand to its claim for adding an unnamed co-inventor to a U.S. Patent on which Takahashi is the named inventor. Opposition at 15. While this might require Takahashi to provide fact witness testimony if the claim proceeds,7 it does not create a claim against him because he assigned that patent to CSI. PMS does not contend otherwise. In sum, PMS’s claims against Secturion and Takahashi all fail for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because PMS cannot establish standing to assert them. It knowingly cites a case for a proposition that the same Court expressly rejected, 7 This claim does not appear well-pleaded. Patents are presumed to name the correct inventors, and the contrary must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This showing requires proving-and thus pleading under Twombly/Iqbal- a significant contribution to the claimed invention that was communicated to the named inventor, consisting of concepts unknown in the prior art. E.g., Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980-81 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Nartron Corp. v. Schukra USA Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1179- 84 (Fed. Cir. 2012). PMS’s Amended Complaint pleads only some of these elements, and only in threadbare fashion. Moreover, PMS’s claim to own that patent exclusively through assignment by an alleged co-inventor misunderstands black letter patent law. Co-inventorship would result in co-ownership of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 262; Israel Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that co- inventor’s assignee is co-owner of patent). Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 12 of 20 -11- puts forward no evidence proving standing, and ignores the facts and principles that demonstrate it has no basis to proceed against Secturion or Takahashi. C. PMS Has Not Pleaded Any Claim Sufficiently. With respect to pleading requirements, PMS again fails on each point. To begin, PMS cites bad law. Opposition at 18 (citing cases prior to Twombly and Iqbal). The specifics of its pleadings fare no better, as described below. Declaratory judgment. To challenge PMS’s pleadings, Secturion and Takahashi pointed out that PMS alleged only that CSI claimed rights in TRSS technology. Brief at 21. PMS has now amended to plead that “Secturion claims ownership of (or rights to) TRSS wafers and TRSS chips.” ECF No. 11, ¶ 116. This threadbare and conclusory allegation, however, is not sufficient under the Twombly/Iqbal standard because no facts are alleged to support it. Nor could PMS further amend to plead any facts showing any such “claim” by Secturion. Secturion and Takahashi have unequivocally stated that neither claim ownership of, or rights to, any TRSS technology. See Brief at 16, 21; ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 15; ECF No. 8-6 ¶ 5. In its Opposition, PMS points to 2014 testimony by Mr. Douglas Benefield, who was on Secturion’s board of directors in 2013. That testimony is irrelevant in this Rule 12(b)(6) context because it is not pleaded in the Amended Complaint. E.g., FDIC v. Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2013). Even if information from that testimony were pleaded, it would not render PMS’s Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 13 of 20 -12- declaratory judgment claim any more plausible under Twombly/Iqbal because on its face that testimony concerned future plans for future products that could hypothetically use TRSS chips. Opposition Ex. F [ECF No. 12-7] at 59. PMS has not pleaded and cannot plead any actual present controversy involving Secturion. Conversion. With respect to pleading ownership of TRSS chips and wafers outside PMS’s possession, PMS points to its pleadings interpreting the Western District of Michigan’s 2015 ruling. Opposition at 19. This is improper for the reasons described above-namely, that District Court expressly rejected PMS’s interpretation in a subsequent ruling, precluding PMS’s contentions. Secturion and Takahashi also challenged PMS’s conversion claim because it pleaded nothing on the requisite element of value. PMS’s Opposition ignores this deficiency. In its Amended Complaint, PMS states that “the value of the TRSS technology, including TRSS chips and TRSS wafers, exceeds five million dollars.” ECF No. 11 ¶ 140. This is no help: conversion is limited to physical items, and PMS still does not specify any value of any physical TRSS chips and TRSS wafers by themselves, separate from any TRSS technology “rights.” See Brief at 21-22 (property value is a required element); RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Zaller, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1295 n.15 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“a claim for conversion of intangible property does not exist under Georgia law”). Finally, PMS says “Defendants have not offered any affidavits or other evidentiary support for its assertion that Secturion does not have TRSS chips in its Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 14 of 20 -13- possession, custody, or control.” Opposition at 19. But this issue concerns PMS’s pleadings, not Defendants’ evidentiary support.8 PMS has not pleaded and cannot plead facts stating any conversion claim. Fraudulent Transfer. PMS’s creditor claims are deficient as pleaded in many respects. Initially, as noted supra at page 9, because choice-of-law principles provide that Georgia’s fraudulent transfer statutes only apply to alleged transfers in Georgia, see Martin, 532 B.R. at 865, this requires pleading such an act. See Peterson v. Aaron’s, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under a Georgia statute because it alleged wrongdoing outside Georgia). PMS has not, and cannot, do so. PMS must also plead this claim with factual particularity under Rule 9(b). Brief at 22. PMS does not dispute this requirement, and PMS has not met it. Instead, as described supra at page 8, PMS jumbles together in its Opposition an assortment of allegations that make no sense, some of which are not even pleaded in its Amended Complaint, and none of which state a claim against Secturion or Takahashi with particularity. See Opposition at 21-24. Next, PMS states that its theories all concern a wrongful transfer by a PMS debtor. Opposition at 20. But it first alleges a wrongful transfer of Priva’s TRSS 8 Here, too, further amendment would be futile. As Secturion and Takahashi showed in contesting jurisdiction, PMS is wrong: Takahashi provided a current declaration saying precisely that Secturion has no TRSS chips, as well as an affidavit from last fall saying the same. ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 15; ECF No. 8-6 ¶ 5. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 15 of 20 -14- “mask rights” by the federal government, who is obviously not PMS’s debtor, to CSI. Opposition at 21-22 (citing pleadings). PMS also appears to allege that CSI wrongfully transferred “mask rights” to Secturion. Opposition at 23 (citing pleadings). This never happened, and most certainly is not pleaded with any particularized facts about any such alleged transfer. Fed. R. Civ. P 9(b). And, even accepting as true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) that such a transfer occurred, CSI is not pleaded as PMS’s debtor either. PMS also contends that the alleged wrongful transfers were made with “actual intent to hinder, delay and defraud” PMS by Secturion and Takahashi as of March 2013. Opposition at 23, 24 (citing pleadings). Again, like the government and CSI, neither Secturion nor Takahashi are pleaded as PMS’s debtors. In a similar vein, neither Secturion nor Takahashi are pleaded as transferors. PMS concedes that “intent” averments are directed at transferors. Opposition at 20 (describing claim as “transfers of property by the debtor if the debtor made the transfer with [wrongful] actual intent . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, PMS’s allegations about early 2013 do not help PMS state a plausible claim because on their face they assume that Secturion and Takahashi had actual knowledge of the fact of PMS’s “rights” to the government’s “mask set” at that time. See id. To the contrary, PMS concedes that the most anyone could have known in early 2013 was that PMS “claimed rights to the TRSS technology,” Opposition at 24. PMS cannot plausibly plead fraud on the theory that Secturion Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 16 of 20 -15- or Takahashi supposedly knew in 2013 that sometime in the future, PMS would successfully establish its TRSS “mask rights” claim-which it still has not done. See, e.g., Jones v. Int’l Inventors Inc. East, 429 F. Supp. 119, 130 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (fraud claims concern “a past or present fact” not “future facts or events”). Finally, Secturion and Takahashi challenged PMS’s damages pleadings for PMS’s fraudulent transfer claims because there is no statutory basis for them. Brief at 24. PMS now concedes that the relief it seeks is “to set aside transfers of property by the debtor.” Opposition at 20. This confirms PMS has no basis to plead damages. With its fraudulent transfer creditor claims, PMS appears insistent on trying to ram a square peg through a round hole. Its arguments confirm, however, that it has not pleaded, and cannot plead, any such claim against Secturion or Takahashi. Attorneys’ Fees and Punitive Damages. PMS does not even try to defend its pleadings on this front-it does not advance a single argument. See Opposition at 25. These pleadings likewise fail. Brief at 24-25. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, and those in its motion to dismiss, Defendants Secturion Systems, Inc. and Richard J. Takahashi respectfully request dismissal of all claims for relief asserted against them in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 17 of 20 -16- Dated: April 19, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /s/ J. David Hopkins (dhopkins@jdhopkinslaw.com) Georgia Bar No. 366505 J. David Hopkins Law LLC 1720 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 520 Atlanta, GA 30309 Telephone: (404) 353-5184 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC. AND RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI OF COUNSEL: WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C. Joel C. Boehm (pro hac vice application pending) (jboehm@wsgr.com) 900 S. Capital of Texas Highway Las Cimas IV, 5th Floor Austin, TX 78746 Telephone: (512) 338-5418 Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 18 of 20 -17- CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE The undersigned hereby certifies pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 that this brief has been prepared in Times New Roman, 14 point font, a font and point selection approved by this court in Local Rule 5.1. /s/ J. David Hopkins Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 19 of 20 -18- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA GAINESVILLE DIVISION PRO MARKETING SALES, INC., Plaintiff, v. CYBER SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, SECTURION SYSTEMS, INC. and RICHARD J. TAKAHASHI, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 2:17-CV-00038-RWS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On April 19, 2017, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia, using the electronic case filing system of the Court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel and/or pro se parties of record electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2). /s/ J. David Hopkins Case 2:17-cv-00038-RWS Document 17 Filed 04/19/17 Page 20 of 20