UM TED STA TES DISTRICT CO URT SO UTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA W EST PALM BEACH DIVISION CASE NO. 9:13-cv-80720-lfAM John Pinson, pro se Plaintiff JPM O RGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et. aI. Defendants/ FILED BY D.C. JAN 2 3 2015 STEVEN M. LARIMORE CLERS U,S. OIST. C'L S.D, OF FLA. - W RB. PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS PARTJALLY CONVERTED V OTION TO DISM ISS IDE 581 TO TH E HONO M BLE JUDGE O F THIS COURT: COM ES NOW the Plaintiff John Pinson,pro se, who hereby submits his response in opposition to the partialy converted Motion To Dismiss (DE 581 pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 56 and L.R. 56.1 tiled by Defendants JpM organ Chase Bnnk, N .A. (hereinafter tfhase'); CPCC Delaware Business Trust a/k/a CPCC Delaware Statutory Trust (hereinafter ECCPCC'); and JpMorgan Chase & Co (hereinafter EEJPMC'), and states as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. On July 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed his original verified complaint with this Court. 2. On Aug. 27, 2013, as a matter of course, Plaintiff filed his nmended verifed complaint (çtAVC') & appx gDE 06,6-11, and on Oct. 24, 2013, Chase & CPCC filed ajoint Motion to Dismiss (MTD) (DE 241. On Mar. 24, 2014 the Court entered an Order gDE 491 Denying without prejudice the Chase CPCC MTD, and providing lEplaintiff may file a Second Amended Complaint' (DE 491. On Apr. 22, 2014 Plaintiff filed a second amended verified complaint (DE 521 (tiSAC'), and on May 20, 2014, Chase, CPCC & JPMC filed a motion to dismiss (DE 581 SAC with atlached exhibit (alleged mortgage). On June 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed his opposition. Plaintiff moved to strike (DE 631 the exhibit. Defendants filed in a certified copy of exhibit (alleged mortgage) from public reeords gDE 641. Plaintiff moved to strike the eertified copy (DE 681. 5. On Aug. 26, 2014, the Court entered an order partially converting the motion to dismiss gDE 581 into a motion for sllmmaryjudgment gDE 711. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted M otion to Dismiss - Pagt 1 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 1 of 56 On Sep. 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Rule 56f motion for discovery. 7. On Oct. 2, 2014, the Court ordered (DE 751 to Etpermit discovery into the limited issue of the authenticity of the mortgage and whether Chase was the original lender, as these are the only issues raised by the subm ission of the certified copy of the mortgage by Defendants.'' The Court stated the motion to dismiss was itpartialy converted into a summary judgment motion on the issue of the certified mortgage.' See DE 75. Thereafter Plaintiff conducted discovery. 8. On Jan. 5, 2015, The Court ordered (DE 1021 denied Plaintifps requests for a continuance, for an enlargem ent of time for discovery, or for additional discovery, and ordered itplaintiff's response to respond to the converted motion to dismiss is due January 235. See DE 102 STATEM ENT OF FACTS tl-l-his is an action brought for damages for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. j1692 et seq.; and, for damages for violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) FLA. STAT. j559 (Part Vl); and for declaratory and injunctive relief.' (DE 52 !1) 10. Eçupon belief and inform ation, Plaintiffpr/ se contends that many of these practices are widespread for some or al1 of the Defendants.'' (DE 52 !2j Florida Bar records show that the managing attonwy of M W , attorney M arshall C. W atson had his 1aw license Suspended - 1 d found inwith Conditions on M ay 30 , 2013, with a file reference number of 201 151042 an 2 It is Plaintiffs understanding that W atson'sFlorida Suprem e Court CASE NO .: 5C12-2731 . suspension was due to actions similar to those in his complaint. 1 1. Defendant Chase was the subject to an investigation by 49 States Attorney's General (Oklahoma opted out) and several Federal Agencies into, among other issues, its servicing practices which resulted tlthe largest consumer financial protection settlement in US ''3 h t time. Specifically it stated tû-l-he agreement settles state and federalhistory , at t a investigations finding that ... mortgage servicers routinely signed foreclosure related docllments ... without really knowing whether the facts they contained were correct. 1 See h% ://www.;oridabr.orFnames.nsf/0/C2AF815DCA28947785256A83007987B8?OpenDocument 2 he ://www.Goridabar.orFDlvAD> E/MpDisAct.nsf/DisActFs?openFrameset&Frame=DisActToc&src=%zF DlVADM % 2FM E%2FM PDisAct.nsP%2FdaToc!OpenFo= %26AutoFramed%26MFL% 3DM arshal1% 2520Craig% 2520W atson%26lCN%3D20l l5l042%26DAD%3DSuspended%2520-%2520with%2520Conditions 3 See he ://www.nationalmodgageseûlement.coe about Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Dtfendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 2 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 2 of 56 '4 it states , ççrl-his settlem ent does not seekBoth of these practices violate the law . M oreover to hold them responsible for all their wrongs over the years and the agreement and its release '5 h this Plaintiff . (emphasis added)preserve Iegal options for others to pursue , suc as 12. Additionally, on November 19, 2013, tltlhe Justice Department, along with federal and state partners, today nnnotmced a $13 billion settlement with JpM organ - the largest settlement ,56 jy kjawith a single entity in American history - to resolve federal and state civil claims w ere itlpMorgan acknowledged it made serious misrepresentations to the public'? and Gltlhe settlem ent does not absolve JpM organ or its em ployees from facing any possible ,,8 hasis added)criminal charges. (emp 13. Chase indicated JPM C is its 100% owner in its FRCP Rule 7.1. l4. CPCC indicated that JPM C is its ultimate 100% owner in its FRCP Rule 7.1. ' h in ownership assertion is contrary to JPM C'S S.E.C. 10-K representations.g15. CPCC s c a 16. M oreover, in the M otion to Dismiss it refers to itself as CPCC Delaware Business Trust , yet lûthat entity is not listed on Florida Division of Corporations website as registered to do business in Florida, but CPCC Delaware Statutory Trust is listed. This opens an intriguing question, are these two the same entities and is CPCC Delaware Business Trust properly registered and duly authorized to transact business in Florida, and is this the reason CPCC has never responded to Plaintiff's written debt validation requests? 17. The facts set forth in the Courts M arch 26 Order relate only to the First Am ended Complaint that subsequently was replaced by the SAC (DE 591. 18. The aleged facts are set forth by Plaintiff in the SAC !51-57 and appended exhibits (DE 591. 19. Plaintiffrro se has made numerous efforts to ascertain the undisclosed identity of the alleged creditor and demanded proper validation under the FDCPA of any alleged debt , and 11defendants have not provided the sam e notwithstanding Plaintiffs m itten dem ands. 4 s ht't ://www .nationalmodgageseûlement.coe aboutee p 5 S h r//www.nationalmodgageseûlement.coe aboutee tp 6 S h ://www .justice.gov/opipr/zol3movember/l3-ag-lz37.h% lee tp 7 S h ://www .justice.gov/opipr/zo l 3movembtr/l 3-ag-1237.htmlee ttp B See he ://www.justice.gov/opipr/zol3movember/l3-ag-lz37.html 9 see he sr//www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 10 see htp://sunbiz.org/ 11 S DE 52 & 54 generaly.ee Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Dtfendants Partialy Convtrtd Motion to Dismiss - Pagt 3 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 3 of 56 20. Chase, CPCC, and JPMC, by and through their attorneyts) Marshall Watson/ Choice and Mr. W olf, attempted to collect and threatened to take a legal action they were not legally entitled to take. 21. Plaintiffprtp se ',ç FDCPA and FCCPA claim is based on the wrongful actions of defendant, not whether or not a valid debt existed with defendants, which plaintiff denies. 22. Plaintiff denies having any contractual agreem ent for credit, loans or services with the 12Defendants. - M EM OM NDU M OF LAW - 1. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON M OTION TO DISM ISS 23. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), quoting Conlev v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 'gA) complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,' ld. At 555, '(W1e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' 1d. At 570. 24. The complaint must only include 'sufficient factual allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests'. Friends ofL ake Prfcw School District v. Beebe, 578 F.3d 753, 762 (8th Cir. 2009). While 'mere labels and conclusions' will not satisfy a plaintiffs burden, there is no need for detailed factual allegation or specific facts that describe the evidence to be presented. 1d. A plaintiff satisfies their burden if they allege facts sufficient to allow a court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct'. Ashcrqft v. Iqbal, 129 W .Ct, 1937, 1950 (2009). 25. W ell-pleaded allegations of fact and every inference fairly deducible therefrom are accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). '(A) well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is im probable, and 'that recovery is very remote and unlikely.' Twomblv, 550 U .S. at 556. Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUM M ARY JUDG M ENT :2 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !33. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendalts Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Pagt 4 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 4 of 56 26. Although summaryjudgment is proper in a case in which there is no genuine dispute of material fact, this is not a case in which the Court should grant summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 27. A defendant moving for summary judgment on a plaintiff's claim must demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact by either (1) submitting summary-judgment evidence that negates the existence of a material element of the plaintiff s claim or (2) showing there is no evidence to support an essential element of the plaintifps claim . J. Geils Band Emp. Benefit Plan v. Smith Bamey Shearson, lnc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir. 1996); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. Defendant cnnnot rely on conclusory statements to establish that plaintiff has not presented evidence on an essential element of his claim . Rather, defendant must dem onstrate the absence of a genuine factual dispute. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324-25. Only if defendant meets its burden is plaintiff required to respond by summarpjudgment proof to show a genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). 28. ln determining whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact that prevents summary judgment, a coul't must consider al1 evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmovant. Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2002). The court must also resolve al1 reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of plaintiff as the nonmovant. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2005). In detennining whether to grant summaryjudgment, the court must remember that 'lclredibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of ajudge.' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. ARG UM ENTS AND AUTHO RITIES 29. The FDCPA is liberally construed in favor of the consumer to effectuate its purposes. Cirkot v. Diversified Financial Systems, lnc., 839 F.supp. 941, 944 (D. Conn. 1993),. Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1 107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002). 1. Partially Converted Sum m ary Judgm ent M otion 30. The Court stated the motion to dismiss was Epartialy converted into a summary judgment motion on the issue of the certifsed mortgage'' and did dtpermit discovery into the limited Plaintif Response in Opposititm ttl Defendants Partialy Cpnverted Motion to Dismiss - Page 5 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 5 of 56 issue of the authenticity of the mortgage and whether Chase was the original lender , as these are the only issues raised by the submission of the certified copy of the mortgage.'' gDE 751 31. A genuine issue is 'one that must be decided at trial because the evidence , viewed in the light most tlattering to the nonmovant .. would pennit a rational fact finder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.' M edina-M unoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1St. Cir.1990). 32. Plaintiff asserts genuine issues of material fact exists that preclude summary judgment. 33. Plaintiff has disputed and controverted the two limited issues in Plaintiff s Statement of M aterial Facts filed in with this opposition brief and Plaintiff's January 23 , 2015, affidavit is submitted in support of the material facts in dispute. 34. The authenticity of the mortgage is Denied. tçplaintiff states that any loan documents executed by him were initialed the on lower left side of each page not requiring a ''13 çtplaintiff states he did not sign any document with barcode mark on it whichsignature . may be found on the first page upper left of both on the Exhibit and certified copy of the '' 14 B e Plaintiff's initials do not appear and the barcode was added Plaintiffdocument . ecaus , states that ûtgtlhe alleged mortgage filed with the county clerk in-accurately reflects the '15 Plaintiff viewed alleged original documents including alleged originalagreement. mortgage and states that the çtgajlleged original doctunents shown Plaintiff were spoiled with 5'16 tt h barcode mentioned at affdavit ! 15 was covered up with whiteout onwhiteout ; gt) e '517 d the Etloan numbers were covered up with whiteout on allegedalleged originals ; an , ''iB h tiplaintiff cannot state these are original documents . ''lgoriginals. For t ese reasons, Additionally, as to alleged original documents Gfhase does not account for where documents come from, who owns documents, where documents are stored, or who the custodian of '20 ttplaintiff denies having any contradual agreem ent for credit , loans ordocuments is. ''21 ççrl-he identity of the public security owning the loan isservices with the Defendants. 13 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of Jolm Pinson !16. 14 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :15. 15 See Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of Jolm Pinson :17. 16 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson !18. 17 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !19. 18 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :20. 19 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !21. 20 xhibit A Jan 23 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !27.See E , , 21 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson :36. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partially Convtrted Motion to Dismiss - Page 6 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 6 of 56 nknown.''zz tw o affidavit is on record attesting to the authenticity of the allegedu :523 uxo affidavit is on record attesting to the accuracy of the content of the allegedmortgage . :'24 ttoetkndants have produced no affidavit , sworn and attested to by a responsiblem ortgage. party legally authorized to act on behalf of the Defendants, that verifies or supports the exhibit or the document filed by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss.'os 35. Plaintiff denies Chase was the original lender. çtplaintiff denies having any contractual 526 (irf'he identity of the publicagreement for credit, loans or services with the Defendants . 5'27 &tplaintiff states that any loan doctlments executedsecurity owning the loan is unknown . b him were initialed the on lower left side of each page not requiring a signature.''zBy tçplaintiff states he did not sign any document with barcode mark on it which may be found the first page upper left of both on the Exhibit and certified copy of the documenf'.zgon Because Plaintiff s initials do not appear and the barcode was added, Plaintiff states that CE tjhe alleged mortgage filed with the cotmty clerk in-accurately reflects the agreement.''3oIè firf'he record shows no loan application.'ol çç-lnhe record shows no wire transfer or check 502 çfrhe record shows no indentttre .'o3 içNo aftidavit is on record attestingissued from Chase. 5'34 tN affidavit is on record attesting to theto the authenticity of the alleged mortgage . o 5535 &tD fendants have produced no affidavitaccuracy of the content of the alleged m ortgage . e , sworn and attested to by a responsible party legally authorized to act on behalf of the Defendants, that verifies or supports the exhibit or the document filed by Defendants in 5'36 çtplaintiff was told by Chase representative Bennysupport of their motion to dismiss. M ilan verbally that the investors in the public security were overseas in China and Europe 22 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !5. 23 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson :12. 24 xhibit A Jan 23 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :13.See E , , 25 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !14. 26 s Exhibit A Jan 23 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !36.Ce , , 27 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !5. 28 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :16. 29 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !15. 30 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :17. 3' see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :38. 32 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :39. 33 s Exhibit A Jan 23 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !40.ee , , 34 Exhibit A Jan 23 2015 affidavit of John Pinson T12.See , , 35 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :13. 36 Exhibit A Jan 23 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !14.See , , Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motioft to Dismiss - Page 7 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 7 of 56 and the loan was securitized into the public security before its closing and funding, and that ,,37Chase facilitated the securitization . 36. Other genuine issues of material fact are in dispute as follows: 37. Ownership of the Ioan is in dispute. Disclosing the present owner of the debt is specifically required and should always be tçmaterial.'' W allace v. W ashington M utual Bank, F.A ., 683 EçN owner of the loan is identified on the record.'o8 çt-f'he recordF .3d 323 (6th Cir. 2012). o 539 tt-f'he identity of the public security owningdoes not show who the seller of the loan was. '540 çt-l-he sponsor of the public security is unknown.'4l çtN'o owner of thethe loan is unknown. loan security has identified specifically who all the investors are who own the unnamed public security that owns the loan, and have produced no affidavit by a competent person ,,42 tw o affidavit is onduly authorized by the unnamed public security and attesting to facts . '543 Etplaintiff was told by Chase representativerecord attesting to ownership of the loan . Benny M ilan verbally that the investors in the public security were overseas in China and Europe and the loan was securitized into the public security before its closing and funding, ,,44and that Chase facilitated the securitization. 38. Correct identification of the debt collector and the owner of the debt is ttm aterial.'' W allace v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2012). Despite Plaintiff's repeated requests under RESPA, TILA and FDCPA, the defendants and specifically Chase did not identify the public security in question. 39. M isrepresenting the financial consequences of not paying a debt is Efm aterial.'' Lox v. CDA, Ltd., 689 F.3d 8 18 (7th Cir. 2012). Here Defendants made threats where they had no ownership in an alleged debt. çt-f'he record does not show when the loan was sold.'4540 . W hen Ioan was sold is in dispute. Etl'he record does not show who the seller of the loan was.'46 ttplaintiff was told by Chase representative Benny M ilan verbally that the investors in the public security were overseas in 37 see Exhibit A, Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :28. 38 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson !2. 39 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson !4. 40 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !5. 41 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !6. 42 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !7. 43 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :26. 44 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :28. 45 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !3. 46 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !4. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 8 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 8 of 56 China and Europe and the loan was securitized into the public security before its closing and ,,47funding , and that Chase facilitated the securitization. 41. Identity of Servicer is in dispute. Defendants have in a conclusory fashion alleged Chase as servicer where no foundation exists and sufficient facts are not in evidence to support the ttplaintiff states that Chase Home Finance LLC was the servicer.'XB tEplaintiffassertion. 5'49 ççplaintiff never received any transfer of servicerreceived no notice of transfer of senicer . 5950 Additionally , appended Exhibits B C & D show Chase Home Finance LLC asnotice. , , 51ser vicer. 42. CPCC'S right to m anage public security is in dispute. Defendants have in a conclusory fashion alleged CPCC had a right for which no fotmdation exists. EGNO owner of the loan is '552 çt-f'he identity of the public security owning the loan isidentified on the record. '553 çtrl'he sponsor of the public security is unknown .''s4 çiNo owner of the loanunknown. security has identified specifically who all the investors are who own the ulm nmed public security that owns the loan, and have produced no affidavit by a competent person duly ,,55 qw o agreement is onauthorized by the unnamed public security and attesting to facts . h in authorization for CPCC to m anage public security.''s6 çr etkndants haverecord s ow g failed to show agreements authorizing CPCC to manage the unknown security that owns the loan and have produced no affidavit by a competent person duly authorized and attesting to ''57 çtNo affidavit is on record attesting to ownership of the loan . ''58the sam e . 43. CPCC 'S right to authorize Chase to act is in dispute. Defendants have in a conclusory fashion alleged CPCC had a right for which no fotmdation exists. çr efendants have failed to show any agreem ent authorizing Chase to act on behalf of CPCC and have produced no ,59 qvpjaijatifr statesaffidavit by a competent person duly authorized and attesting to the same . 47 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson :28. 48 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson !29. 49 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !30. 50 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson :32. 51 Exhibits B C & D .See , , 52 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !2. 53 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !5. 54 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !6. 55 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of Jolm Pinson !7. 56 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of Jolm Pinson !8. 57 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson !9. 58 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !26. 59 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson $1 1. PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted M otion to Dismiss - Page 9 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 9 of 56 '' 60ûtThe identity of the public secmitythat Chase Home Finmwe LLC was the servicer. ',61 Eç-l-he sponsor of the public security is unknown . ''6z EtNoowning the loan is unknown. owner of the loan security has identified specifically who a1l the investors are who own the uzmam ed public security that owns the loan, and have produced no affidavit by a competent erson duly authorized by the unnamed public security and attesting to facts.'' 63GçNoP agreement is on record showing authorization for CPCC to manage public security.''64 iiDefendants have failed to show agreements authorizing CPCC to manage the unknown security that owns the loan and have produced no affidavit by a competent person duly ,,65authorized and attesting to the snme. II. Defendants' M otion To Dismiss 44. W hen considering a defendant's motion to dismiss , a court must construe the factual allegations in the complaint in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff. Barker v. Riverside Ck/)?. Ot-fîce ofEduc., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009)., see Bell Atl. Corn. v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). If the complaint provides fair notice of the daim and the faetual allegations are sufficient to show that the right to relief is plausible , a court should deny the defendant's motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009); Twomblv, 550 U.S. at 555-56; Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). 45. To bring these m atters in controversy before the Court, the Plaintiffrrtp se did file his second amended verified complaint gDE 521 outlining statements of fact that point to documents that are appended (DE 541 to his verified complaint and which documents the defendant fails to allege as being untnze. 46. ln their M TD, the Defendants complain about substantive detk iencies in PlaintifFs SAC , but fails to refute or deny any of the appended documents as fact evidence. Alleged Substantive Desciencies A. Defendants Allege incorporation of irrelevant allegations of count 1. into count ll. 47. First, Defendants allege Etplaintiff has incorporated the irrelevant allegations of first count into the second count' See MTD2 !8. Defendants allege çtirrelevant allegations'' but Plaintiff 60 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 20l 5 affidavit of John Pinson !29. 61 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !5. 62 see Exlzibit A , Jan 23, 2015 aftidavit of John Pinson !6. 63 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !7. 64 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !f8. 65 see Exhibit A , Jan 23, 2015 affidavit of John Pinson !9. Plaintiff Responst in Opposition to Defendafts Partialy Convtrted Motion to Dismiss - Pagt 10 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 10 of 56 pro se argues this is baseless as Defendants identify SAC !58, but fail to state how it might be irrelevant since it incorporated relevant factual information into the count. M oreover, since the FCCPA m irrors the FDCPA, and since the Plaintiff s FCCPA claim s m irror plaintiff's FDCPA claim s, it is relevant that the FCCPA allegations and factual allegations were restated under FDCPA in full. 48. The FCCPA unequivocally states its goal- to provide the consumer with the most protection possible under either the state or federal statute. See FLA. STAT. j 559.552 ('In the event of any inconsistency. . . the provision which is more protective of the consumer or debtor shall prevail.') Further, the fact that the FCCPA deemed its remedies cumulative reveals that the Florida legislature contemplated dual enforeement- that ag) ' . . debt eolector' could quite possibly be subject to the sanctions and enforcement provisions of both of the various states or the FDCPA. See L eBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners. 601 F. 3d 1 185 (1 1th Cir. 2010). B. Defendants Allege failure to set forth exactly what CPCC or JPM C did in violation. 49. Second, Defendants complain that ttplaintiff has not set forth any allegations about what CPCC or ... JPMC did in violation of the law'' See MTD2 !9. Defendants fail to recognize Plaintiffs facts at SAC !:23-57. Specifically Plaintiff has identified the relation between Defendants at SAC ::51-55. Plaintiff has clearly identified Defendants as tdebt collectors'' see SAC !512-22. çtA.t a1l times material to the allegations of this Complaint, Defendants were acting as debt collectors with respect to collection of Plaintiff s alleged debt but nonexistent debt with Defendants'' (SAC !221. These statements are not mere legal conclusions', they are specific factual allegations, but Plaintiff seeks discovery to plead with greater specificity on the corporate Defendants actions. 50. Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co.. 51 1 F.3d 1300. 1303 (1 1th Cir.2008). 'W hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a plaintiff s obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his Nentitlegmentl to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a fonnulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'' 1d. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544. 127 S.Ct. 1955. 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omittedl). 'Furthermore, the plaintiff s factual allegations, when assumed to be true, 'must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.f' ld. (snme). Plairtiff Response ilz Opposition to Dtfendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 11 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 11 of 56 51. Here, consumer Plaintiff was the object of collection activities including the receipt of communications 'in connection with the colledion of any debt'. Plaintiff has not argued that the commtmications received were limited to those filed as exhibits to his complaint or to the facts related to those actions of W olf and M W . çt-f'he com munications in question here are a11 related to the collection of a consumer debt' LSAC !271. tr efendants are tdebt collectors'' as defined in the FDCPA'' (SAC :211. EECHASE communicated an alleged involvement of CPCC such that it appears CHASE was prompted to act by CPCC'' (SAC !311. Plaintiff has in fact received other comm tmications from Eçlps4organchase & Co. JpM organ Chase Bank, N.A.' that state explicitly tEW E ARE DEBT COLLECTORS'' and that some or all5 defendants would already possess. It is reasonable to eonclude that Defendants were acting within the scope of their corporate stnzcttlre and relationships , when Gtdirectly or tindirectly' engaged in the collection of alz alleged debt for a third party' (SAC !551 the Elpublic security managed by CPCC Delaware Business Trust' (SAC :281 which ECHASE failed to identify'' (SAC !291 specificaly, despite Plaintifs repeated efforts including, but not limited to, his Qualified Written Requests and Demands for Debt Validation. 52. lt is axiomatic that a corporation like Chase, CPCC, and JPM C cmm ot act other than through their ofticers, employees, and agents. Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp.. 764 F.2d 138 1. 1385 (1 1th Cir.1985) ('The rule is well established that a comoration is an artificial entity that can act only through agents..'). 53. However, at the pleading stage, the Plaintiff could not possibly have had aecess to the inside CPCC and JPM C inform ation necessary to prove conclusively--or even plead with greater specificity- the factual basis for holding CPCC and JPMC liable for conduct in violation of FDCPA and FCCPA. That is why Courts allow for discovery. At the pleading stage, the Court assess only whether Plaintiff s allegations are 'enough to raise a right to relief above the speeulative level.' M ills v. Foremost Ins. Co.n 51 1 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir.2008à (quoting Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 555. 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65). Giving Plaintiff, which is at a clear infonnational disadvantage, some benefit of the doubt to go along with the specific facts he has pled, its allegation that W olf and M W were acting on behalf of CPCC and JPM C through Chase, reaches at least above the speculative level. See United Technolozies Corp. v. Mazer. 556 F. 3d 1260 (1 1th Cir. 20091. Plaintiff Responst in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 12 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 12 of 56 54. After conducting scheduling conference and discovery conference , the pro se Plaintiff did tak.e steps to signal to the district court his need for discovery by, on D ec 23 , 2013, filing his unilateral scheduling report, proposed discovery plan and protective order (DE 39j and then filing, on Dec 27, 2013, his motion to approve scheduling report , proposed discovery plan and protedive order (DE 40q, but the motion was denied without prejudice (DE 41) by the court on Jan 3, 2014. C. Defendant are unclear what specisc acts by the defendants plaintiff challenges. 55. Plaintiff has pled specific facts in his second nmended verified complaint gDE 52J and in the appended documents rDE 541. He has cited the statutory violations in each count. As stated above, these statements are not mere legal conclusions; they are specific factual allegations , but Plaintiff seeks discovery to plead with greater specificity on the corporate Defendants actions. Nevertheless, Plaintiff will discuss specifics below of Defendants violations of FDCPA and FCCPA, after he refutes defendants frivolous assertions: of no collection activity', that resjudicata applies; Plaintif not object of colection activity of constuner debt; Chase, CPCC, and JPM C are not çdebt collectors''. 56. The plaintiff has met the elements to state a cause of action against any of the defendants. Accordingly, the Defendants m otion to dismiss the SAC should be denied. 57. Plaintiff s verified complaintgDE 011 was amended as a matter of course before any Defendant was served. Thereafter Plaintiff faced a M otion to Dismiss from Defendants on his First Amended Complaint (DE 091. The Court denied Defendants motion to dismiss first amended complaint, and provided for Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff filed a second nmended verified complaint gDE 521 and now faces Defendants motion to dismiss SAC. Plaintiff notes that neither motions to dismiss filed by Defendants raise the sam e issues. Plaintiff's amendm ents served to better plead his case; not to cause delay or prejudice any party. Therefore, if the Court detennines Plaintiffrr/ se has failed to state a claim, in the interest of justice, Plaintiff pro se asks the Court to grant leave and suficient time to nmend his complaint. D. lnterpretation of exhibits are subject to the Least Sophisticated Consumer Standard and disagreements in interpretation are fact m atters for fact finder. 58. As referenced in MTD2 page 6 !3 Defendants assert tthe well-pleaded factual allegations are set forth in paragraph 4 above, as contradicted by the language in the exhibits, set forth in Plaintif Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Pagt 13 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 13 of 56 paragraphs 3-6 above''. Plaintiff disputes Defendants conclusions drawn by re-writing Plaintifps complaint, and unsupported inferences drawn from the exhibits that require facts not in evidence to validate. E:At all tim es m aterial to the allegations of this Complaint , Defendants were acting as debt collectors with respect to collection of Plaintiff's alleged debt but nonexistent debt with Defendants'' gDE 52 !221. Gç-l-he communications in question here are all related to the collection of a consumer debt'' (DE 52 !271. tçAlleged debt is not in question here. But the fact as to how it was or was not validated and wrongful actions of the Defendants in an attempts to collect the alleged debt, violated rights of the Plaintiff and the 1aws...' (DE 52 !251 59. Plaintiff also disputes conclusions and inferences drawn from the exhibits. Specifically, Defendant alleges JpM organ Chase Bank, N .A. as servicer; whereas, The June 1, 2012 letter states tf hase' not JpM organ Chase Bank, N .A., and, Chase Hom e Finance, LLC was the original servicer and Plaintiff has received no notice of transfer of servicing rights, thus JpM organ Chase Bank, N.A. could not be the servicer. Defendants have not produced a loan servicing agreem ent between CPCC and Chase. 60. Further, Defendant alleges JpM organ Chase Bank, N .A. as Eioriginal m ortgagee'' , and it is undisputed the ttloan'' was sold to a public security, but questions remains as to when this sale occurred and was the loan table funded, thus JpM organ Chase Bank , N.A. would have no rights as a creditor, original or otherwise, the ttloan'' having been sold into a public security and the unidentified security would be the lGloan'' creditor. Defendants have provided no information related to loan sale terms or date or identity of public security. The documents filed in with Plaintiffs SAC do not show Chase was the seller of the loan and only reference that the loan was sold. 61. Additionally, to the extent that Defendants allege the August 17, 2012 letter sets forth the authorization for Chase to act for CPCC as the servicer of the ttdebt'' the letter states tçloan'' not debt or m ortgage, and, Chase Hom e Finance, LLC was the original servicer and Plaintiff has received no notice of transfer of servicing rights, thus JpMorgan Chase Bank, N.A . could not be the servicer. Defendants have not produced a loan servicing agreement between CPCC and Chase authorizing Chase to act for CPCC. 62. Finally, Plaintiff has received multiple communications from Defendants identifying multiple tinvestors' in the loan, not just one, but the unidentified public security would be the loan Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partially Convtrted Motion to Dismiss - Page 14 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 14 of 56 creditor not the investors individually. If the loan was sold to the public security , what was sold the note or the mortgage or the note and the mortgage? How could the loan be çQa valid and enforceable financial obligation with Chase' where it is undisputed the loan was sold to a public security? If loan was sold to a public security , then only the public security could enforce the loan. 63. The fact remains no public seeurity has been identitied, no loan servicing agreement has been shown, no transfer of servicing rights has been shown , no loan transfer date has been shown, no mortgage transfer has been shown. Defendants fail to show the owner of the loan . 64. The present owner of the debt must be identified in a reasonable malmer. Luzinski v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 05-CV-1322, 2007 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 71788 (E.D.Wisc. Sept. 26, 2007); Bode v. Encore Receivable Management, lnc., 05-CV-1013, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64477, 2007 WL 2493898 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 30, 2007). 65. Disclosure of a servicing agent or another debt colledor instead of the owner of the debt is not sufficient. Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, No. 10-14618 , 674 F.3d 1238; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5613, 2012 W L 971800 (11th Cir. Mar. 15, 2012); Shoup v. Mccurdy & Candler, 465 Fed. Appx. 882, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6443 (1 1th Cir. March 30, 2012); Hepsen v. Resurgent Capital Services, LP, 09-15435, 2010 U .S.APP. LEXIS 12587 (1 1th Cir., June 17, 2010). 66. Defendant's conclusory assertions regarding interpretation of exhibits refer to facts-not-in- evidence. W here the parties reasonably disagree on the proper inferences that can be drawn from exhibits, resolution is for the trier of fact- not for the court. Thus, m aterial facts are in dispute and these issues are best submitted to the finder of fact, the jury. 67. In determining the well-pleaded factual allegations, where there is a contradiction between the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading and an exhibit, the exhibit governs. Crenshaw v. f ister. 556 F. -3d 1283. 1292 (1 1th Cir. 2009) (quotinz Gr/-/'l?k Indus.. Inc. v. Irvin. 496 F.3d 1189. 1206 (11th Cir. 20074). 68. çEln Jeter we explained that where the parties reasonably disagree on the proper inferences that can be drawn from the debt collector's letter, resolution is for the trier of fact- not for the court on summary judgment. See Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1 176. For these reasons, this issue is one best submitted to the finder of fact.'' f eBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partnersn 601 F. 3d 1 185 (11th Cir. 20101. Plaintiff Rtsponse in Opposition to Ddendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 15 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 15 of 56 THE PRO SE'S PLEADINGS 69. Defendants allege Plaintiffpr/ se failed to state a claim mzd attempt to hold the Plaintiff pro se 's complaint to the pleading standard of Bar licensed professional attorneys . Plaintiffpro se argues this is not the case. 70. ''Following the simple guide of rule 8(t) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice'.. 'The federal rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skil in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits .' The cou!.t also cited Rule 8(9 FRCP, which holds that a1 pleadings shal be construed to do substantialjustice. Conlev v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957). 71. 'Allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded , are sufficient'... ''which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 72. 'Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise baniers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important , but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of ajustjudgment.' Matv v. Grasseli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938). 73. ln his second amended verified complaint (DE 52q, the Plaintiffpro se alleges claims for violations of FDCPA and FCCPA by defendants, and has listed factual allegations and appended fact evidence to the complaint which Defendants fail to refute the validity thereof . 74. An FDCPA claim has nothing to do with whether any underlying alleged debt is valid . An FDCPA claim concerns the methods of collecting the alleged debt. lt does not arise out of any alleged transaction creating the alleged debt. See Azar v. Havter, 874 F. Supp. 13 14 (N.D. Fla. 1995). 75. The FDCPA and FCCPA violations alleged in the complaint are based on the Defendants' actions and or omissions and/or methods of attempting to collect on an alleged debt which is nonexistent with Defendants, and any alleged debt is not at issue here. The FDCPA 15 U.S.C. j1692 et. seq. 76. Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Pradiees Act 'to eliminate abusive debt colledion practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 16 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 16 of 56 abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to prom ote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.' 15 U.S.C. j 1692(e). The FDCPA prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection methods, conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor, and the m aking of any false, m isleading, or deceptive statem ents in connection with a debt, and it requires that collectors make certain disclosures. 15 U.S.C. jj 1692d, 1692e, 1692f. The FDCPA applies to 'debt collectors,' as deEned as 'any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.' 15 U.S.C. j 1692a(6). Title 15 U.S.C. 1692e generally prohibits the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means to collect a debt. 15 U.S.C. j 1692e. See Acosta v. Camnbell, Court of Appeals, 1 lth Circuit 2009 THE FDCPA IM PO SES A STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD. 77. The FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. j 1692, et seq., is a strict liability statute, Tavlor v. Perrin, L andrv deL aunav tt Durand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997): see also fmvfn v. Mascoti, 112 F. Supp. 2d 937 (N.D. Cal. 2000): Pittman v. JJ Mac fny'rc Co. nfNevada, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 609 (D. Nev. 1997). 'Because the Act imposes strict liability, a consumer need not show intentional conduct by the debt collector to be entitled to damages.'' Russell v. Equifax. A.R.S., 74 F. 3d 30, 33-34 (2' Cir. 1996). THE FDCPA M UST BE LIBEM LLY CO NSTRUED IN FAVOR OF CONSUM ER DEBTORS. 78. The FDCPA is a remedial statute. Hamilton v. United Healthcare ofL ouisiana, Inc., 310 F 3d 385, 392 (5th Cir. 2002). The remedial nature of the FDCPA requires that courts interpret it liberally. Clark v. Capital Credit (:ç7 Collection Services, Inc., 460 F. 3d 1 162, 1 176 (9th Cir. 2006). ''Because the FDCPA, like the Tnlth in Lending Act (TILA) 15 U.S.C. j 1601 et seq., is a remedial statute, it should be construed liberally in favor of the consum er.' Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F. 3d 1107, 1117 (20th Cir. 2002). TH E FDCPA IS TO BE INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE W ITH THE LEAST SOPH ISTICATED CONSUM ER STANDARD. 79. The FDCPA is to be interpreted 'under an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consum er standard.' Gonzales v. Kqv, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Sir. 2009) (quoting Gaswami v. Am. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 17 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 17 of 56 Collections Enter.. Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 2004); Tavlor v Perrin, L andrv. deL aunav (fr Durand, 103 F.3d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. l 997). The court must ''asstlme that the plaintiff-debtor is neither shrewd nor experienced in dealing with creditors.' Goswami v. Am. Collections Inten, Inc., 377 F.3d at 495. The FDCPA was passed to eliminate 'abusive , deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.' Baranv-snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327,332 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing IS U.S.C. j 1692(a)). Courts use the 'least sophisticated consumer' standard, an objective test, when assessing whether particular conduct violates the FDCPA. Harvev v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 2006). The least sophisticated consumer test is objective and is designed 'to ensure that the FDCPA protects a1l consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.' Kistner v. f Jw Offices ofMichael P. th i 2008) (quotations and citation omitted).Margelefs#, L L C, 518 F. 3d 433, 438 (6 Cr. Claims under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act adhere to the unsophisticated consumer standard. See Grammon v. GC Services L td. Partnership. C .A. 7(l 1 1)1994, 27 F. 3d 1254, on remand 162 F. R. D . 313. In colloquial tenns the least sophisticated consum er would be the Eçvillage idiof'. THE FDCPA PROTECTSCONSUM ERSFROM DEBT COLLECTOR M ISCONDUCT 80. The tçAct is primarily a consum er protection statute, and we have consistently interpreted the statute with that congressional object in mind.' Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs. fnc., 516 F.3d 85 (2nd Cir. 2008). The FDCPA is lçan extraordinarily broad statute'' and must be enforced çtas Congress has m itten it.'' Frev v. Ganzwish, 970 F.2d 1516 (6th Cir. 1992). The FDCPA should be construed to accomplish the regulatory goals intended by Congress. Avala v. DialAdiustment Bureau, Inc., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30983 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 1986). tç-f'he Sixth Circuit has described the statute as textraordinmily broad' and its tenns must be literally enforced.'' Deere v. Jvitch, Block & Rathbone L .L .P., 413 F. Supp. 2d 886 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 8 1. lt-l-he Act is designed to protect consumers who have been victimized by unscrupulous debt collectors, regardless of whether a valid debt actually exists.'' Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982). çtg-l-lhe FDCPA is designed to protect consumers from the tmscrupulous antics of debt collectors, irrespective of whether a valid debt actually exists.'' Keele v. Wexler, 149 F/3d 589. 594 (7th Cir. 1998). PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 18 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 18 of 56 82. A non-debtor who wms subjected to abusive colledion tacties may not maintain an adion for violations of j 1692c(c), since that section is limited to violations directed at a çtconsumer'' as defined in the Ad, but may maintain an action for violation of jj 1692d and 1692e, which have no such limitation and therefore apply to anyone who is the victim of prescribed m isconduct. M ontgomely v. Huntington Bank dr Silver Shadow Recoverv , Inc., 346 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2003). FCCPA 83. The FCCPA is Florida's counterpart to the FDCPA . It provides additional protections and is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with the FDCPA . Both statutes define 'debt' in exactly the same manner. FLA STAT. j 559.5541); f eBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1 187 n.2 (1 lth Cir. 2010). 84. The FCCPA unequivoeally states its goal- to provide the consumer with the most protection possible under either the state or federal statute. See FLA. STAT. j 559.552 ('In the event of any inconsistency. . . the provision which is m ore protective of the consumer or debtor shall prevail.') Further, the fact that the FCCPA deemed its remedies cumulative reveals that the Florida legislature contemplated dual enforcement- that ag1 '... debt collector' could quite possibly be subject to the sanctions and enforcement provisions of both of the various states or the FDCPA. See L eBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F. 3d 1 185 - Court of Appeals , 1 1th Circuit 2010. W olf's visit gave rise to num erous violations. 85. W olf visited Plaintiff's property sent by M arshall W atson/choice Law . W atson/choice acted for Chase. Chase has not denied they employed W atson/choice. Chase alleges CPCC authorized Chase to act. Plaintiff has received threatening communications in violation sent jointly by Chase and JPMC. lt is clear Defendants' are liable for Wolf's actions where W olf communicated private tinancial inform ation to third parties where the third party had no need to know and was embarrassing to Plaintiff as it would be to any reasonable person. Zortm an v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., lnc., 819 F.supp.zd 874, 879 (D.Minn.201 1) (ûE(lt isj possible to commtmicate with someone in spite of lacking a deliberate or purposeful intent to convey something to that particular person- for example, one may communicate with an unintended audience.') Further, no 1692g notice was sent to Plaintif by any Defendant after Wolf's visit and Defendants do not deny this fact. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 19 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 19 of 56 86. ETield agents'' who work for creditors, particularly in connection with mortgage debts , and who visit consumers for the pup ose of delivering communications and inducing them to communicate with the creditor, are tçdebt collectors.' Siwulec v. J.M. Adjustment Servs., LLC, N o. 1 1-2086, 2012 U .S. App. LEXIS 4201, 465 Fed.Appx. 200 (3rd Cir. March 1, 2012); Simpson v. Safeguard Properties, L.L.C., No. 13 C 2453, 2013 W L 2642143 @ .D.lll ., June 12, 2013). 87. lt may be said that the purpose of a comm unication is the response it gets. W olps visit may have been to prompt Plaintiff to contact Defendants. Requests that the consumer telephone the debt collector induce the consumer to waive his right to veritication by failing to make the request in writing, as required. M iller v. Payco-General American Credits , Inc., supra, 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991); W oolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D. Conn. 1990). Plaintiff contacted Defendants in writing. Wolps visit was the initial communication. lt m atters not Defendants responded to Plaintiff's letter , Plaintiff's letter was sent in response to W olf's visit - the initial commtmication. 88. M ost courts have held that whether a communication or other conduct violates the FDCPA is to be determined by analyzing it from the perspective of the 'least sophisticated debtor . '' Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993); Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, de Launay & Durand, l03 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997). Least sophisticated debtor may be likened to the village idiot. lf a complaint or other document expressly represents that authority exists when it does not, 51692e is violated. United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 266 (6th Cir. 1992) (''A threat is . . . an apperance to the victim.'). 89. A ttcom munication'' need not refer to the debt. For example, a request for financial information for the pumose of restructuring or modifying a loan is a içcommtmication , '' even if there is no 'explicit demand for paym ent.' Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010). 90. lt is not necessary to show that the plaintiff was actually misled by a collection notice . Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d at 227 (7th Cir. 1996); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997). All conduct specifically prohibited or disclosures specitically required by the FDCPA is ttmaterial.'' M ark v. J. C. Christensen & Assoc., lnc., 09-100, 2009 U.S.DiSt. LEXIS 67724, * 1 1 (D.Minn. Aug. 4, 2009)*, W arren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir. 2012) (violations of 1692e41 1) are always ûtmaterial'). For example, disclosing the present PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 20 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 20 of 56 owner of the debt is specifically required and should always be tGmaterial.'' W allace v. W ashington Mutual Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2012). Threats may be implicit as wel as express. Statements that a debt wil be subject to 'legal review' or 'wil be transferred to an attonwy' are implicit threats of suit. Drelman v. Van Ru Credit Cop ., 950 F,supp. 858 @ .D.Ill. 1996),. United States v. National Financial Services, lnc., 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996). 91. Under either the 'least sophisticated' or 'unsophisticated' consumer standard (village idiot), a collection communication which can plausibly be read in two or more ways, at least one of which is m isleading, violates the law. Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 , 35 (2d Cir. 1996). Melillo v. Shendell & Assocs., P.A., Case No. 1 1-62048-ClVCOHN/ SELTZER, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9248, * 13 (S.D.F1a., Jan. 26, 2012) ('ga) debt colection leter is deceptive where it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate.') 92. Cases hold that any contradiction of the 51692g wanzings is a violation, and that it is not necessary to establish a violation that the contradiction be 'threatening' or visually overshadow the required notice. Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996); Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F.supp. 521 (E.D.Pa. 1996); Flowers v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections, 96 C 4003, 1997 U.S.DiSt. LEXIS 3354, 1997 WL 136313 @ .D.Ill. Mar 19, 1997). In other words, anything that confuses unsophisticated consumers as to their j 1692g rights, is suftkient to violate j1692g. 93. Plaintiff received no 1692g notice after W olf's visit. Count I - Plaintifrs FDCPA Claim 94. ln Count l of the complaint, Plaintiffrrtp se alleges a claim for violations of the FDCPA . The Plaintiffpr/ se m ust prove the following essential elements to support a claim for 15 U .S.C. j1692 against each defendant: (1) the plaintif has been the object of debt-collection activity arising from an alleged consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector under 15 U.S.C. j 1692a(6); and (3) the defendant has violated, through acts or omissions, j1692 of the FDCPA. The complaint provides defendant with fair notice of the claim. See frtptp/o' , 578 F.3d at 581. Plaintiff pro se 's verified complaint provides m ore than labels and conclusions and is m ore than a fonnulaic recitation of the elem ents of an FDCPA claim , and further the verified complaint offers appended documents as fact further evidencing his claim. Plaintifflksponse in Opposition to Ddendants Partially Convertd Motion to Dismiss - Page 21 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 21 of 56 95. In support of his claim for FDCPA violations, Plaintiff pro se m ade the following factual allegations for each element: (1) That Plaintiff is a EGconsumer' as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. j 1692a(3), Fla. Stat. j 559.5542) and Fla. Stat. j 501.20347) (SAC !!1 1, 591 and çtgtlhe communications in question here are all related to the collection of a consumer debt' (SAC :271, and that Plaintiff was the object of colection activities including the receipt of comm unications 'in connection with the collection of any debt', and that Plaintiff was 66threatened in written communications by Defendants , through M W , with a collection action GtTHIS IS AN ATTEM PT TO COLLECT A DEBT''67 d furtherwherein defendants stated , an , CCIMPORTANT NOTE: FEDEM L LAW REQUIRES US TO NOTIFY YOU THAT THIS :68 2) oetkndants chase,COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT ;( CPCC, and JPMC are ççdebt collectorgsj'' as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. j 1692a46) and Fla. Stat. j 559.55(6) (DE 52 !512-22, 601, and Defendant Chase also states in a mitten tçW e are a debt collector'6g Defendant Chase has indicated in writing that itcommunication , is acting on behalf of CPCC, and CPCC was acting directly or indirectly through Chase (SAC !531, making CPCC a respondent superior and vicariously liable for actions of Chase, and JPMC acted directly or indirectly (SAC !554, 551 and is vicariously liable (SAC !515, 511 and a respondent superior (SAC !516, 521; (3) Defendants have violated, through acts or omissions, j1692 the FDCPA. trefendants' violations include, but are not limited to, the following:'' (DE 52 !611 COLLECTION ACTIVITY ARISING FROM A CONSUM ER DEBT 96. ln Stricklin v. Jefferson Canital Svstems, LL C. Dist. Court. SD lllinois 201 1, Neither the Eleventh Circuit nor any other circuit has established a bright-line rule for determining whether a communication from a debt collector was made in connection with the collection of any debt. Most district courts analyzing this issue rely on several decisions from the Seventh Circuit for guidance with respect to the relevant factors. Parker v. M idland Credit M anazement, Inc. 874 F. Supp. 2d 1353 - M D Florida 2012. the absence of a demand for paym ent is not dispositive of whether the debt collector made the commtmication in connection to debt collection. See Horkev v. J VD.B. tf Assoc., Inc.n 333 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2003). ... ln concluding the FDCPA applied to the phone call, the court looked to its intent. Although the caller made no demand for 66 see DE 54 pages 12-18 , 20-21. 67 DE 54 pages 13 16See , 68 see DE 54 pages 15 ! 1. 69 see DE 54 page 2l. PlaintifResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 22 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 22 of 56 payment, the debt collector specitically intended the call to induce the debtor to settle her debt; thus, it triggered the FDCPA. 1d. at 774. The Seventh Circuit further refined the relevant inquiry in Ruth v. Triumph P'ships. 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 20091. ... Ruth illustrates the relationship among the parties is also a factor determinative of whether a comm unication falls within the scope of the FDCPA . ... Therefore, the question is whether an unsophisticated, but reasonable consumer would believe the debt collector sent the communication in colmection with the collection of a debt. f#. at 798. M ost recently, in Gburek v. f itton L oan Servicing L P. 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit stressed again that a demand for payment is not in itself determinative of whether a debt collector made a communication in connection to debt collection. The debtor at issue was in default on her mortgage loan. The loan servicer sent her three letters offering to discuss 'foreclosure alternatives' and asking for financial infonnation to initiate this process. ln reversing the district court's grant of the loan servieer defendant's motion to dismiss, the Gburek Court determined a loan servicer m ade num erous comm unications with a debtor in connection with debt collection, as it intended the communications to cause the debtor to settle or discuss the debt. 1d. at 384- 3.4 (citinz Horkey. 333 F.3d at 772-74; Ruth. 577 F.3d at 798-99). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has clearly emphasized the relationship of the parties, the intent of the com mtm ication, as well as dem and for payment, determine whether a comm unication falls within the scope of the FDCPA. Stricklin v. Jqlferson Capital Svstems, L L C. Dist. Coul't SD llinois 201 1 97. Thus, Plaintiff has reasonably pled he was the object of colection activities including the receipt of communications 'in connection with the collection of any debt'. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY HERE 98. Defendants erroneously argue that Res Judicata applies; Plaintiff contends it does not as Defendants fail to present any valid argument of issue preclusion or claims preclusion. 99. Defendants cite: Astron Indus. Assoc.. Inc. v. Chrvsler M otors Corp.; Razsdale v. Rubbermaid. Inc.; and, Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, US.A., Inc., and in each of these cases the parties entered into a tçstipulation of dismissal'', whereas in the instant matter Plaintiff and M W did not have a Etstipulation'', and thus the cases are not analogous. Further, in each case cited, resjudicata applied to subsequent cases filed, whereas in the instant matter there is no previous case, thus resjudicata does not apply as there is but only one case here. Plaitltiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 23 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 23 of 56 100. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a plaintiff from bringing before the court claims that were or could have been resolved in an earlier proceeding. Razsdale v. Rubbermaid. 193 F.3d 1235. 1238 (1 1th Cir. 1999). Claim preclusion applies as between two cases if: (1) a final judgment is entered on the merits in the first case; (2) the judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction', (3) the cases' parties are identical (or privies of those parties); and (4) the claim for relief (f/k/a cause of action) is the snme in both cases. Griswold th Cir 2010à. A eause of action is thev. Countv of Hillsborouzh. 598 F.3d 1289. 1292 (11 . same if it involves tthe same nucleus of operative facts, or is based on the same factual predicate, as a form er adion.'' Ragsdale. 193 F.3d at 1239. W here claim preclusion applies , it bars all claims that were or could have been raised in the prior litigation. Griswold. 598 F.3d at 1293. COM M UNICATIONS AIM ED AT COLLECTING A CONSUM ER DEBT 101. Defendant erroneously argues that tigtlhere are no allegations in the complaint that set forth that the defendants' actions were aimed at collecting a consumer debt' IDE 58 pg.9 !2q, whereas the complaint states: ir efendants regularly collects or attempts to collect debts from consumers' (SAC !191 and çtgalt all times material to the alegations of this Complaint, Defendants were acting as debt collectors with respect to collection of Plaintiffs alleged debt but nonexistent debt with Defendants' (SAC !221 and tç-l-he commtmications in question here are al1 related to the collection of a consllmer debt' (SAC !271 and çrefendants continue to attempt to enforce and colect an alleged non-existent debt with Defendants' (SAC !571 indicating commtmications are not limited to those appended to the SAC , thus Plaintiff has set forth allegations that comm tmications are all related to the collection of a consumer debt . 102. In Foti v. NCO Finqncial Svstems, Inc.n 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 - Dist. Ct .s SD N Y 2006 ln West v. Nationwide Credit, 998 F.supp. 642, 644 (W .D.N.C.1998), the ... West court noted that 'liln interpreting the meaning of a statute, it is wel setled that ' (tlhe 'plain meaning' of statutory language controls its construction,'' and went on to examine the dictionary definitions of 'regardingo' 1d. (quoting *657 Summit Inv. & Dev. Cop. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 610 (1st Cir. 1995)). In particular, the court noted: 'Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1st ed.1983) defines the tel'm Aregard' as, inter alia, -to relate to,' while it provides the following definition of the tenn Nregarding': Awith respect to: concerning.'' 1d. 'Based on these definitions, the court believes the ordinary meaning of the term 'regarding' is consistent with the broader interpretation advocated by Plaintiff . '' PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Convelted Motion to Dismiss - Page 24 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 24 of 56 Thus, given the choice of language by Congress, the FDCPA should be interpreted to cover communications that convey, directly or indirectly, any information relating to a debt, and notjust when the debt colector discloses specific information about the particular debt being collected. lndeed, a narrow reading of the term 'commtmication' to exclude instances such as the present case where no specific information about a debt is explicitly conveyed could create a significant loophole in the FDCPA, allowing debtors to cixcumvent the j 1692e(11) disclosme requirement, and other provisions of the FDCPA that have a threshold 'communication' requirem ent, merely by not conveying specific information about the debt. ... Such a reading is inconsistent with Congress's intent to protect consumers from 'serious and widespread' debt collection abuses. Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc.. 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 - Dist. Ct.s SD NY 2006 DEFENDANTS ARE DEBT COLLECTORS 103. Here, Plaintiff has pled properly that Defendants are debt collectors. See supra !70. 104. Defendants attempt to assert that they m ay fall under the exclusions of 15 U .S.C. j1692a(6)(F). Plaintiff argues this is not the case and disputes the snme and demands strict proof thereof. 105. As discussed supra at !44-52, the original servicer is Chase Home Finance, LLC and Plaintiff has received no notice of transfer of servicing rights to any other entity as servieer , thus JpM organ Chase Bank, N.A. could not be the servicer. 106. lt is undisputed that the loan was sold to a public security. lt is also undisputed that the public security was not identified by any Defendant. lt is unknown when the loan was sold to the unidentified public security. lt is unknown what was sold to the unidentified public security, the note or the mortgage or the note and mortgage? This inquiry is relevant and necessary here. 107. lt is undisputed that the communications sent to Plaintiff allege a debt to be in default and it is undisputed that the debt was sold to a unidentified public security, therefore it is relevant to inquire as to the date of the loan sale to determine if the exclusion in 15 U .S.C. j1692a(6)(F)(iii) might apply. This fact could be determined through discovery, yet given the undisputed fact that the loan was sold into an unidentified public security, it is thus plausible that none of the defendants were Gtthe consumer's creditor' as only the public security would be considered the consumer's creditor. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 25 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 25 of 56 108. It is tmdisputed that the loan was sold to an unidentified public security, therefore it is plausible that the exclusion in 15 U.S.C. j1692a(6)(F)(ii) would not apply, as therefor Defendants would not be tthe consum er's creditor'. 109. If the m ortgage was sold without the note, then the security instrument becom es a nullity and Defendants assertion of &ça valid and enforceable financial obligation with Chase' gMTD2 !5) was false, and the tassertion was false, in that CHASE did not own the debt' (SAC !!46, 491. The buyer would have to enter an agreement with the servicer or appoint and enter an agreement with new servicer, and notify the borrower of the transfer. Plaintiff has received no such notice. Cf. ln rc Foreclosure Cases. 521 F. Supp. 2d 650. 653 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that one who did not acquire the note which the mortgage secured is not entitled to enforce the lien of the mortgage). In re VEAL .Banltr. Appellate Panels (9th Circuit 201 1) (if the deed of trust was assigned without the note, then the assignee, 'having no interest in the underlying debt or obligation, has a worthless piece of paper.') 1 10. It is undisputed that the loan was sold to an tmidentified public security. If the note and mortgage were sold to an unidentified public security, then Defendants assertion of :ça valid and enforceable financial obligation with Chase' (MTDZ jg51 was false, and the Eçassertion was false, in that CHASE did not own the debt'' (SAC !!46, 491. The buyer would have to enter an agreement with the servicer or appoint and enter an agreement with new servicer , and notify the borrower of the transfer. Plaintiff has received no such notice. If the note was sold it would follow as in supra at !81, unless the buyer (the unidentified public security) was limited to taking only the note. In re VEAL . Bankr. Appellate Panel. (9th Circuit 201 1) (When a note is split from a deed of trust the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.') 1 12. Carpenter v. f onzan. 83 U.S. 271. 274-75 (1872) ('The note and mortgage are inseparable; the fonner as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the m ortgage with it, while an assignm ent of the latter alone is a nullity.f') CPCC IS A DEBT COLLECTOR 1 13. Plaintiff has pled properly and sufficiently that CPCC is a debt collectors. See supra !70 1 14. It is undisputed that the loan was sold to an unidentified public security. lt is undisputed that CPCC m anages the security. Even if JpM organ Chase Bank, N .A. was servicer, which Plaintiff disputes, then CPCC would be neither a creditor or a servicer, and to prove a bona Ptaintif Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 26 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 26 of 56 fide fiduciary obligation would require such documents to be produced to evidence the relationship in order to invoke 15 U.S.C . j1692a(6)(F)(ii) exclusion, and no such bona fide fiduciary obligation has been produced. Thus it is plausible that CPCC tçdirectly or itindirectly'' engaged in the collection of alz alleged debt for a third party'' through Chase as Plaintiff indicated in his SAC . See SAC !53. JPM C IS A DEBT COLLECTOR 1 16. Plaintiff has pled properly and suffciently that JPM C is a debt collector . See supra !70 1 17. Defendant argues Plaintiff has only alleged JPM C is a parent com pany , and Plaintiff cotmters this is not the case. This was discussed supra at j535-40. 1 18. The cases Defendants cite in support are not analogous to the instant m atter . ln White v. Goodman, a case centering around flat rating letters by a 1aw tqrm , the individual party is a shareholder lawyer owning less that 100% of stock. ln Petit v. Retrieval M asters Credit Bureav Inc, the case centers around misleading name of defendant and fails to use the least sophisticated consumer standard, the individual party is the company president a partial shareholder. In United Technologies Corp v. M azer, the case is for crim inal thef't of blueprints by the partial om wr/president of a corporation who acted outside the scope of his employment. 1 19. JPM C, as 100% owner of both CPCC and Chase, does exercise control and intluence over CPCC and Chase. It is axiomatic that a corporation like Chase , CPCC, and JPM C calmot act other than through their oftkers, employees, and agents. Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp. 764 F.2d 1381. 1385 (1 1th Cir.1985) ('The rule is well established that a corporation is an artificial entity that can act only through agents....'). 120. Thus it is plausible that JPM C exereises control or influence over CPCC and Chase to the extent that JPMC Gtdirectly or tindirectly' engaged in the collection of an alleged debt for a third party through its subsidiaries'' Chase and or CPCC as Plaintiff indicated in his SAC . See SAC !554, 55. Newman v. CheckRite Cal.. Inc.. 912 F. Supp. 1354. 1372 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding actor could be liable for any debts he atempted to collect directly or indirectly in violation of FDCPA) Plaintiff also pled JPM C has vicmious liability and is a respondent superior . See SAC !515, 16, 51, 52, and has indicated JPMC personally involved (SAC !554, 551, and this can be a fact matter for the fact finder. Brumbelow v. f Jw Olflces of Bennet (f Delonçv, P.C.. PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 27 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 27 of 56 372 F. Supp. 2d 615. 617-22 (D. Utah 2005) (finding that indirect participation by oversight of debt collection corporation raised factual question regarding whether defendants were personally liable for FDCPA violations as çdebt collectors'); Kistner v. f tzw Offlces of th cir 2008) (holding soleMichael P. Aftzraec/cfs'/o', LL C. 518 F.3d 433- 436- 437-38 (6 . member of limited liability corporation individually liable for FDCPA violation as a tçdebt collector''); Brumbelow, 37l F. Supp. 2d at 621 (finding that individuals with supervisory authority over corporations and involvement in procedures can be liable , regardless of lack of personal knowledge about particular debt collection). 122. Defendants argue that veil piercing is required for vicarious liability and respondent superior liability; Plaintiff argues this is not the case. Schwarm v. Craiqhead. 552 F. Supp. 2d 1056. 1070-73 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that shareholder, director, or officer meeting requirem ents of Etdebt collector'' can be liable for violations of FDCPA even if corporate veil is not pierced). Thus it is plausible that viearious liability or respondent superior liability can be attributed to JPMC as Plaintiff argues supra at !535-40. CH ASE IS A DEBT COLLECTO R 123. Plaintiff has pled properly and sufficiently that Chase is a debt collector . See supra !70 124. Defendant Chase also states in a m itten communication tçW e are a debt collector'' Defendant Chase has indicated in writing that it is acting on behalf of CPCC'' See supra !70; SAC !21. 125. Defendants argue that as a servicer Chase would not be a debt collector; Plaintiff argues this is not true as even if JpM organ Chase Bank, N.A. was servicer, which Plaintiff disputes, the Eleventh Circuit held in a published opinion that ''gaj communication related to debt collection does not become urlrelated to debt collection simply because it also relates to the enforcement of a security interest.' Reese, 678 F.3d at 1218*, Birster, 48 l F. App'x at 583 ('gA)n entity can both enforce a security interest and collect a debt.'). 126. Bridge v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB. 68 1 F. 3d 355 - (6th Cir. 20121, the Court reversed the district court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' FDCPA claim . The Court held that the mortgage servicer and the purchaser of the mortgage were subject to the FDCPA (despite their arguments and the plaintiffs' allegations that the mortgage was not in default) because the mortgage servicer treated the mortgage as if it were in default and attempted to colled it as a defaulted debt. PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 28 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 28 of 56 Defendants seek to admit into evidence an exhibit attached to the m otion to dismiss and argue that the Court m ay consider the exhibit without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and cite Universal Exnress 1nc v. US. S.E. C. . Plaintiff objects to this exhibit being considered, deem s it inappropriate, and argues the citation is read improperly, specifically in regard to public records. Plaintiff argues court docum ents are public records that could be considered, but county public records and the like are not authenticated the same as court documents, and therefore the court should disregard the exhibit. 128. Generally, only the complaint, and any attachments thereto, are considered in deciding a motion to dismiss. Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield ofFlorida, Inc.. 1 16 F.3d 1364. 1368 (1 1th Cir. 1997). A court may however take judicial notice of some facts when considering a motion to dismiss. Horne v. Potter. 392 Fed. Appx. 800. 802 (1 1th Cir. 20101. Doctlments from prior cases involving parties are Gtpublic records not subject to reasonable dispute because they garel capable of acclzrate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy could not reasonably be questioned.' J#. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Universal Express. Inc. v. US. SEC, 177 Fed. Appx. 52s 53 (1 1th Cir. 20064. No surprise results from a court considering court documents from earlier cases between the same parties. See Brvant v. Avado Brands, Inc. l 87 F.3d 1271. 1279 (1 1th Cir. 19991. PRO HIBITED ACTS - VIOLATIONS OF FDCPA 129. Plaintiff has met the other elem ents for violations of FDCPA, he will now address the violations of statute: Violation of 15 U.S.C. i 1692g: tipinson did not receive from Defendants the required FDCPA 15 U.S.C. 51692g disclosure notice within tive day of W olps visit, or at any time thereafter'' (DE 52 !371. At no time has Plaintiff received a 1692g validation rights notice from any of the Defendants. 131. 'Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires that a debt collector send a validation notice to the debtor, infonning the debtor that he or she has thirty days to dispute the debt and to request the name and address of the original creditor.'' Elliot v. GC Servs., L P. N o. 8:10-cv- 1976-T-24TBM s 2011 W L 5975671. at *4 (M .D. Fla. Nov. 28. 20111. The courts have detennined that the notice must be provided in a manner that effectively comm unicates its PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 29 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 29 of 56 contents to the least sophisticated of consum ers. See Ellis v. Solomon (:t Solomon, PC.. 591 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 20101. ('To recover damages under the FDCPA, a consumer does not need to show intentional conduct on the part of the debt collector.'); Sims v. GC Servs. L .P. 445 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 20061. (The tmsophisticated consumer standard applied. Since the FDCPA is a strict liability law, the good or bad intent of the debt collector is immaterial.l; Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp.. 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982). (Applies unsophisticated consumer standard. Also, a consumer need not dispute the validity of a debt to recover for a failure to provide a proper notice of validation rights provided by j 1692g.). 132. Violation of 15 U.S.C. 11692f461: ln a written communication MW stated CTHIS FIRM REPRESENTS THE PLAINTIFF IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THAT HAS BEEN ':70 h county court records show no foreclosure action wasFILED AGAINST YOU , yet t e pending at that tim e and no foreclosure action has been filed since that date, nor could there be, as Chase or CPCC did not own the alleged debt and defendants do not refute that fact. This was a violation in that Defendants, through M W , threatened to unlawfully take consumer Pinson's property, and ttwas a false assertion of a legal right to collect'' (DE 52 !!35, 47, 491. As counsel, MW was acting for and directed by Chase, JPMC, and CPCC. 133. Violation of 15 U.S.C. $1692f(1): The defendant, through MW, threatens çtplease be advised that the foreclostlre action will continue until the total reinstatem ent funds are 501 These statem ents appear contradictory,received in compliance with this letter . notwithstanding the fact that the County Court records show no foreclosure action was pending at that time and no foreclosure action has been filed since that date, nor could there be, as Chase nor CPCC did not own the alleged debt and defendants do not refute that fact. This was a violation in that Defendants attempted to collect an nmotmt it had no right to collect because Defendants did not own the Alleged Debt, and Defendant states that he disputed the Alleged Debt. As counsel, M W was acting for and directed by Chase, JPM C, and CPCC. 134. Violation of 15 U.S.C. k1692e(14): Plaintiffpro se has received debt collection communications from various entities such as but not limited to: çf hase''; Gtchase Home Finance''' tçBarlk One Financial Services lnc''; çtchase Home Lendinf'; ttocwen''; Eçchase 70 s DE 54 page 15 !( 2.ee 71 DE 54 page 14 ! 5.See PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 30 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 30 of 56 Hom e Finance LLC''; EtlpM organ Chase''; ItJPM Chase''' EflpM organ Chase Balzk NA''; 5 Rchase M ortgage Banking''; tçchase Fulfillm enf'; t'JP M organ Chase & Com pany , Fam ily of Companies', regarding an un-validated alleged debt. This was a violation in that names other than the true nam es of the debt collector were used. Violation of 15 U.S.C. 11692e41 1): The initial communication from M W on behalf of and directed by Chase, JPM C, and CPCC was tton Saturday , July 28, 2012 ...lwhenl Barry A. W olf on instruction of W ATSON did ... show written instructions from W ATSON . .. asserting CHASE owned the debt and had authorized W ATSON to collect on their behalf . '' (DE 52 :34) At that time the Plaintiff was not notified Chase, JPMC, or CPCC was a tçdebt collector'' and that Etany information obtained will be used for that purpose' even though Wolf attempted to obtain infonnation on consumer (DE 52 !341. Further, the MW August 9, 11 f i1s to state it is a Etcommunication from a debt collector'' This was2012 , communication a . a violation in that M W failed to disclose it was a debt collector in the initial communication and failed to disclose it was a debt collector in subsequent communications and as counsel , M W was acting for and directed by Chase, JPM C , and CPCC. 136. Section 1692c provides debtors the 'extrem ely important protection' of prohibiting debt collectors from contacting third parties, including a debtor's employer , relatives (other than the debtor's spouse), friends or neighbors, for any pupose other than obtaining 'location inform ation.' See also S. Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698-99. There are a few highly regulated exceptions where the debtor consents, a court has granted pennission or to effect a post-judgmentjudicial remedy. j 1692c; F.T.C. Oftkial Staff Commentary j 805(b), 53 Fed. Reg. 501044 S. Rep. No. 382 , at 4. As stated by the Senate, 'gsluch contacts are not legitimate collection practices and result in serious invasions of privacy, as well as loss of job.'' ld. Debt collectors cannot communicate a consumer's personal affairs to third persons'. Id. 137. W olf commlmicated Plaintifps confidential and private financial infonnation with Plaintifps extended family and guests, at Plaintifps home, prior to Plaintiff encountering W olf. This was extremely embarrassing to Plaintiff where third parties had no reason to know information commtmicated by W olf. Contacts with the consumer's relatives, other than the spouse, violate the FDCPA. W est v. Costen , supra, 558 F.supp. 564 (W .D.Va. 1983). 72 s DE 54 page l2.ee Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 31 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 31 of 56 The section is violated by any com munication to a third party, even if the debt is not expressly referenced, other than one that strictly complies with the provision allowing location inform ation to be gathered. Thus, discussing a threat of foreclosure with third parties is illegal. W est v. Nationwide Credit, lnc., 998 F. Supp. 642 (W .D. N.C. 1998); Shaver v. Trauner, 97-1309, 1998 U.S.DiSt. LEXIS 19648 (C.D.ll1., Jul. 31, 1998) (class and adoption of denial of motion to dismiss), 1998 U.S.DiSt. LEXIS 19647 (C.D.Ill., May 29, 1998) (Magistrate Judge's denial of motion to dismiss). 139. Violation of 15 U.S.C. i1692e(10): çton Saturday, July 28, 2012 ..-lwhenl Barry A. W olf on instruction of W ATSON did ... show written instructions from W ATSON ... asserting CHASE owned the debt and had authorized WATSON to collect on their behalf.'' (DE 52 !341 At that time the Plaintiff was not notified W atson was a ttdebt collector'' and that tany information obtained will be used for that purpose'' even though W olf attempted to obtain inform ation on the consum er. This was a violation in that M W used false representations and deceptive means in attempt to collect an Alleged Debt and information on consum er and as counsel, M W was acting for and directed by Chase, JPM C, and CPCC. Additionally, Defendants, through M W , asserted Plaintiff was in foreclosure when there was no foreclosure action; this was a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any gallegedl debt. In a written communication defendant stated tûTHIS FIRM REPRESENTS THE PLAINTIFF gchasel IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THAT ''73 he county Court records show no foreclosureHAS BEEN FILED AGAINST YOU , yet t action was pending at that time and no foreclosure action has been filed since that date, nor could there be, as Chase or CPCC did not own the alleged debt and defendants do not refute that fact. This was a violation in that M W used false representations and deceptive m eans in attem pt to collect an Alleged Debt, as counsel, M W was acting for and directed by Chase, JPM C, and CPCC.Further, Defendant Chase, in a August 17, 2012 communication stated ç1 i 1id legally enforceable financial obligation with Chase''M notwithstandingthis loan s a va , the fact that on June 1, 2012, Plaintiff pro se was notified tiYour loan was sold into a public '' in response to Plaintifps Qualified Written Request?s a factsecurity managed by CPCC , Defendants do not refute. This was a violation in that Defendant used false representations 73 see DE 54 page 15 T 2. 74 see DE 06-1 page 20 ! 1. 75 see DE 06-1 page 4 ! 2. PlaintiffResptmse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 32 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 32 of 56 and deceptive means in attempt to collect an Alleged Debt. Chase was acting on behalf of CPCC. Violation of 15 U.S.C. j1692e(8)2 Defendants threatened to report and reported 76information to the credit bureaus even though the consumer disputed the alleged debt in writing. This was a violation in that defendant failed to report the debt was disputed. 142. Reporting to credit bureaus is a communication within the FDCPA . Allegation that collection agency falsely reported the balance of an account to a credit bureau survived motion to dismiss. See Davis v. Trans Union, L .L .C.. 526 F. Supp. 2d 577 (W .D. N.C. 2007). 143. Violation of 15 U.S.C. 41692e421: ln a written commtmication defendants, through M W , stated CT HIS FIllM REPM SENTS THE PLAINTIFF IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION ''11 h County Court records show noTHAT HAS BEEN FILED AGAINST YOU , yet t e foreclostzre action was pending at that tim e and no foreclosure action has been filed since that date, nor could there be, as Chase, JPM C, or CPCC did not own the alleged debt and defendants do not refute that fact. Thus, as in other com munications consumer received, the defendants falsely represented the character, nmount or legal status of the (allegedl debt. This was a violation in that Defendant m isrepresented the character, am ount, and legal status of the debt, by stating that a foreclosure action had been filed when none had, and that Chase, JPM C, or CPCC was owed an alleged debt when Chase, JPM C, or CPCC did not own the alleged debt and did not have a legal right to collect. As counsel, MW was acting for and directed by Chase, JPMC, and CPCC. Violation of 15 U.S.C. ô 1692d: In a written communication defendant stated ECTHIS FIRM REPRESENTS THE PLAINTIFF IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THAT HAS '578 h County Court records show no foreclosure actionBEEN FILED AGAIN ST YOU , yet t e was pending at that time and no foreclosure action has been filed since that date, nor could there be, as Chase, JPM C, or CPCC did not own the alleged debt and defendants do not refute that fact. Plaintiff received m ultiple communications stating a foreclosure action had been comm enced against him , where the fact is that none was filed, and thus this action, as others, naturally harassed, oppressed and abused the Plaintiff, and this tmfair and deceptive conduct was unnecessary on the part of Defendants. This was a violation in that Defendant 76 see DE 54 page 21 last paragraph. '' see DE 54 page 15 ! 2. 78 s DE 54 page 15 ! 2.ee Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 33 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 33 of 56 stated that a foreclosure action had been tiled when none had, and that Chase, JPM C, or CPCC was owed an alleged debt when Chase, JPM C, or CPCC did not own the alleged debt and did not have a legal right to collect, thus harassing, oppressing and abusing Pinson. As counsel, M W was acting for and directed by Chase, JPM C, and CPCC. Congress included this general proscription in recognition of its inability to foresee every conceivable abusive debt collection m ethod. According to the Senate report: 'this bill prohibits in general term s any harassing, unfair, or deceptive collection practice. This will enable the courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct which is not specitically addressed.'7g Consequently, a collector m ight violate the general proscription even though its conduct falls 80 ,% Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs.. Inc.. 15 F.3d 1507outside the specifc listed activities. ee (9th Cir. 19944,. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc.n 760 F.2d 1 168 (11th Cir. 19854; Robinson v. ManagedAccounts Receivables Corp.. 654 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 20091; Bank v. Pentazroup Fin., L .L .C.. 2009 W L 1606420 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 20091; Cirkot v. Diversiûed Svs., Inc.. 839 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1993); Grasslev v. Debt Collectors, Inc.. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22782 (D. Or. Dec. 4- 1992); Rulvna v. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc.. 478 F. Supp. 980. 981 W .D. 111. 19791,. Henderson v. Credit Bureau, Inc.. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19138 (W .D.N.Y. Julv 13e 19891., Rilev v. Gizuiere, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (E.D. Cal. 2009). The term 'harass' is not defined in the Act, but examples of actionable harassment are 81 I the absence ofprovided by the prohibitions in the subsections of 15 U .S.C. j 1692d. n specific statutory definition, a word should be accorded its ordinary meaning, as given in the dictionary. Thus, the term 'oppress' means 'to .. persecute by unjust .. use of force or ',82 d the term 'abuse' means 'to use wrongly orauthority ... weigh heavily upon, an 79 see S . Rep. No. 382, 95th Con g., 1st Sess. 4, at 4, reprinted at 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696 80 H.R. Rep. No. 1202, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977) ('ltlhis section provides a general rule prohibiting any debt colector from harassing or intimidating any person in connection with the collection of any debt or the threat or attempt to do so. Six examples of what constitutes harassment or intimidation are enumerated. These examples do not limit the general application of this rule against harassment or intimidation.'); FTC Official Staff Commentary j 806-1 . B1 l22 Cong. Rec. 117792 (daily ed. July 28, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Wylie) ('(w)e have talked about threats and harassment in the bill. They are not necessarily words of vajueness. All we have to do is go to the dictionary to Gnd out that 'harass' means to worq and impede by repeated wralds; exhaust, fatigue, to annoy continuously. Harass is to harass in a manner to injure, grleve or afflict; to cause to suffer because of belief; to annoy with persistent or urgent approaches, to pester'); Rozga, FTC lnformal Staff Letter (Sept. 5, 1978),* Kolarov, FTC Informal Staff Letter (Dec. 6, 1977). 82 American Heritage Dictionary 872 (2d College Ed. 1982). Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted M otion to Dismiss - Pagt 34 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 34 of 56 ''83 dth of these term s indicates thatim properly ... to hurt or injure by maltreatment. The brea Congress intended broad prohibitions against improper debt collection conduct. ln Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc. 760 F.2d 1 168 (1 1th Cir. 1985) the Eleventh Circuit addressed the standard of analysis for claims under section 1692d , and used 'a susceptible consumer' standard as analogous to the ''least sophisticated consumer'' standard used under section 1692e. W hether a constlmer is more or less likely to be harassed, oppressed , or abused by certain debt collection practices does not relate solely to the consumer's relative sophistication; rather, such susceptibility might be affected by other circumstances of the consumer or by the relationship between the consumer and the debt collection agency. For example, a very intelligent and sophisticated consumer might well be susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse because he is poor (i.e., has limited access to the legal system), is on probation, or is otherwise at the mercy of a power relationship .... Thus, we hold that claim s tmder section 1692d should be viewed from the perspective of a consum er whose circum stances m akes him relatively m ore susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc.. 760 F.2d 1168. 1 179 (1 1 th Cir. 19851. 147. The pllrase 'conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass' requires that courts should use objective standards in determining whether this provision has been violated. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc.. 760 F.2d 1 168 (1 1th Cir. 1985),' Rulyna v. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc.. 478 F. Supp. 980. 982 G .D. 111. 1979) The debt collector's intent may be inferred from his misconduct. See Brandt v. L C. Svs., Inc.n 2010 W L 582051 (M .D. Fla. Feb. 19. 2010) ('lntent may be inferred by evidence that the debt collector continued to call the debtor after the debtor had asked not to be called and had repeatedly refused to pay the alleged debt, or during a time of day which the debtor had informed the debt collector was inconvenient.'); Krapf v. Collectors Training Inst. t?f 111.. Inc.. 2010 W L 584020 (W .D.N.Y. Feb. 16e 20104. 148. lnsofar as Plaintiff stated tr efendants' violations include, but are not lim ited to'', the plaintiff also alleges: 83 American Heritage Dictionary 872 (2d College Ed. 1982). Plaintif Response in Opposition to Defeadants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 35 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 35 of 56 149. Violation of 15 U.S.C. #1692e(5): Chase, JPM C, and CPCC failed to conduct a reasonable investigation with regard to Plaintiff s written dispute and demand for 84 i Defendants failed to com ply with Fla . Stat. j559.715 and threatened avalidation . S nce lawsuit, and falsly represented it had filed a lawsuit, with an improper party, Defendants did take anll action that cnnnot legally be taken thus violating 15 U.S.C. j1692e(5). See L eBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners. 601 F. 3d 1 185 - (1 1th Cir. 2010). This was a violation in that Chase, JPMC, and CPCC by and through counsel MW did make threat to take any action that cnnnot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. 150. These factual allegations show a right to relief that is plausible. That is, when the factual allegations are asstlmed to be true, they show a right to relief that is more than mere speculation. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.. 588 F.3d 585. 594 (8th Cir. 20094; Fowler v. UPMC Shadvsiden 578 F.3d 203. 21 1-12 (3d Cir. 2009); see Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 555-56,. Brooksn 578 F.3d at 58 1. Count 11 - Plaintifrs FCCPA Claim 151. ln Count 11 of the complaint, plaintiff alleges a claim for violations of FCCPA. The elements of a FCCPA claim are (1) the plaintiff has been the object of debt-collection activity arising from an alleged consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt collector under Fla. Stat. j 559.55(6)., and (3) the defendant has violated, through acts or omissions, Fla. Stat. j 559.72 of the FCCPA. The complaint provides defendant with fair notice of the daim. See Brooks, 678 F.3d at 58 1. Plaintiffpro se 's verified complaint provides more than labels and conclusions and is more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of an FCCPA claim, and further the verified complaint offers appended documents as fact further evidencing his claim . 152. The FCCPA applies to debt collectors as well as creditors and alleged creditors. 153. In support of his claim for FCCPA, plaintiff made the following factual allegations for each element: (1) That Plaintiff is a ttconsllmer' as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. j 1692a(3), Fla. Stat. j 559.5542) and Fla. Stat. j 501.20347) gDE 52 !!1 1, 761, and that 84 s DE 54 page 6.ee Plaintif Respoftse in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 36 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 36 of 56 85 b Defendants through M WPlaintiff pro se was threatened in a written comm unication y , , 86 h rein defendants stated ETHIS IS AN ATTEM PT TOwith a collection action w e 5'87 d further CtIMPORTANT NOTE: FEDERAL LAW REQUIRESCOLLECT A DEBT , an , US TO NOTIFY YOU THAT THIS COM M UN ICATION IS AN ATTEM PT TO '588 tt-l-he communications in question here are all related to theCOLLECT A DEBT ; coledion of a consumer debf'gDE 52 !271; (2) Defendants are çfdebt eoledortsl' as that tenn is defined by 15 U.S.C. j 1692a46) and Fla. Stat. j 559.55(6) (DE 52 !512-14, 18-21, 60, 764, and is clearly and urmmbiguously stated by Defendant Chase in a mitten E:W e are a debt collector''Bg and Defendant Chase has indicated in writingcommunication , that it is acting on behalf of CPCC, and CPCC was acting through Chase , m aking CPCC a respondent superior; the defendant has violated, through acts or omissions, Fla. Stat. j 559.72 of the FCCPA. Plaintiff did aver he is a consumer (DE 52 !1 1j : çç-l-he communications in question here are a1l related to the collection of a consumer debt'(DE 52 !27) Res Judicata does not apply as argued by Plaintiff supra at !573-75. 156. The Plaintifps FCCPA claims mirror plaintiff's FDCPA claims, the FDCPA allegations and factual allegations were restated under FCCPA in full. çtplaintiff alleges and the information in paragraphs 1 through 74.55 (DE 52 :75). 157. Additionally, since plaintiff's FCCPA claims mirror plaintifps FDCPA claims and 'The FDCPA is a federal law and accordingly state law defenses are not relevant here.' Hamid v. Stock dr Grimes. LLP. N o. 11-2349. 2012 W L 2740869. at 20 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Pa. 2012). 158. The FCCPA is Florida's counterpart to the FDCPA. lt provides additional protections and is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with the FDCPA. Both statutes define 'debt' in exadly the same mamwr. FLA STAT. j 559.55(1)) L eBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners. 601 F.3d 1185. 1187 n.2 (11th Cir. 20101. 159. Unlike the FDCPA, the FCCPA applies to anyone attempting to collect a debt , not just those defined as 'debt collectors.' However, the FCCPA narrows liability by adding a requirem ent for knowledge of falsity as to claim s made. FLA. STAT. j 559.7249); see also 85See DE 09 ! 20. 86See DE 54 pages 12-18 , 20-21. 87See DE 54 pages 1 3 , 16 88 S DE 54 pages 15 ! l .ee 89 s DE 54 page 2 l .ee Plaintif Respolue in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 37 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 37 of 56 Mccorriston v. f .I'1: r, Inc.. 536 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2008) ('plaintiff must prove, as part of the prim a facie case alleging a violation of the FCCPA , that Defendants had actual knowledge that their claim of a right to enforce the debt' does not exist.). 160. Defendant Chase and CPCC had ltactual knowledge'' that the alleged debt was not legitimate. Defendants were placed on notice that the alleged debt was disputed by Plaintiff when Pinson sent dispute and debt validation letters via US M ail as the dispute letter triggers a requirement to conduct a reasonable investigation into the disputed facts. Defendant Chase was placed on notice that the alleged debt was disputed by Plaintiff tr n July 23 2012 Pinson sent Chase a dispute and debt validation lettergo via USwhen , , Mail' 162. Defendant CPCC was placed on notice that the alleged debt was disputed by Plaintiff Gr n July 23 2012 Pinson sent CPCC a dispute and debt validation lettergl via USwhen , , M ail'' 163. ln response to Plaintiff's debt validation letters, Defendants, instead of providing Plaintiff 92proper validation under the FDCPA, sent Plaintiff threatening communications representing that they had filed a foreclosure action against Plaintiff where none had been filed , thus Defendants misrepresented that a legal action had already been taken that in fact had not , nor could not because Chase or CPCC did not own the alleged debt. As cotmsel, W atson was ading on behalf of Chase and CPCC. Since FDCPA prohibits actions and unfair practices that may not involve communicating diredly with the consumer,pro se alleges that Chase was debt colledor's agent and that JPMC and CPCC are vicariously liable for its agent's acts and under the doctrine of respondent superior, and survives motion to dismiss. See Gathing v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Svs., Inc.n 2010 W L 889945 (W .D. M ich. M ar. 10. 20101. 165. lt is undisputed that the loan was sold to a public security. Fla. Stat. j559.715 requires in part that çthe assignee m ust give the debtor written notice of such assignment as soon as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the 593 plaintiff received no notice from any assignee , and alleged assignee is unknown todebt. 90See DE 54 generally . 91 s DE 06-1 page 6.ee 92 s DE 06-1 pages 12-1 8.ee 93 h //www.;senate.gov/Laws/Statutes/20l2/559.7l5See tp: Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 38 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 38 of 56 Plaintiff. tGon July 23, 2012, Pinson sent CPCC a dispute and debt validation letter via US ,,94 i ttempts toM ail Certified # 701 1 2970 0002 4191 6770 Return Receipt Requested n a identify the alleged entity that referred to by Chase as purchasing the alleged debt . As of this date CPCC has never responded (DE 52 !561 to requests. Further, iton April 13, 2012 , Plaintiff sent a letter to CHASE, questioning the debt and CHASE'S authority to collect' (DE 52 !261 in the form of a qualitied writen request questioning ownership of the alleged debt and Chase has never identified the owner of the alleged debt . 166. Counsel preparing foreclosure documents have an obligation to make a reasonable i to ensttre that factual contentions set forth in pleadings have evidentiary support . 95inqu ry This duty applies to the lender's preparation of pleadings related to an affirmative action for judicial foreclosure. 167. Servicers and their attorneys who misrepresent the authority to foreclose implicate not only court rules such as Rule 1 1, but may also violate statutory prohibitions against unfair and deceptive acts and improper debt collection practices. 168. The duty created under Rule 1 1 certainly encompasses investigation into the facts related to current ownership of notes and mortgages, as these facts form the very basis for the foreclosure proceeding. Courts have beeome increasingly vigilant in exercising their own authority under Rule 1 l to scrutinize mortgage servicers' filings for blatantly inconsistent content related to the authority to foreclose. M ainsource Bank v. Winafeld. 2008 W L 4061415 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 2. 2008) (upholding imposition of Rule 1 1 sanctions against plaintiff who filed foreclosure action when it was not real party in interest). See also Wells Fargo Bank v. Reves. 867 N.Y.S.Zd 21 W .Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (scheduling hearing to consider sanctions for frivolous litigation conduct in bringing foreclosure action when public records indicated that mortgage had never been assigned to named plaintiff when action filedl; Countrvwide Home Loans, Inc. v. Tqvlor. 843 N.Y.S.Zd 495 (N .Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (sanctions appropriate if plaintiff continues to bring actions accompanied by similar defective documentation of standing). 169. Careless foreclosure practices undermine the functioning of the courts and hal'm property rights of homeowners, investors, and purchasers of properties at foreclosure sales . Although 94 DE ()9 ! 22 and DE 06-1 page 6.See , 95 see Fed . R. civ. P. 1 1. PlaintiffResponse in Opposition to Defendants Partially Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 39 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 39 of 56 Rule 1 1 does not function primarily as a fees-shifting provision, it does authorize a court to order that the offending creditor pay the objecting homeowner's atonzey fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(4). See Kirk Capital Corn. 16 F.3d 1485. 1490 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Kunstlern 914 F.2d 505, 522-523 (4th Cir. 1990); W'hite v. Gen. Motors Corp. 675. 684 (10th Cir. 19904; Fed. Home L oan Mortz Corp. v. Raia. 918 N.Y.S.Zd 397 (tablels 2010 W L 4750043 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. Nov. 23e 2010) (applying New York attorney disciplinary rules, court imposes sanctions against attorney who misrepresented plaintiffs standing to pursue post-sale holdover action against borrower; attonwy fees of $14,532.50 ordered paid to Voltmteer Lawyers Project). 170. Defendants were on notice Plaintiff disputed the alleged debt and as debt collectors Defendants had a duty to investigate any claims. M W as Council for Chase and CPCC , failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and subsequently represented it had taken a legal action and filed a lawsuit against the Plaintiff, when M W , on behalf of Chase and CPCC did not have a right to take a legal action. lf Defendants had properly investigated, then these acts may not have occurred. Any person who violates the FCCPA is liable for actual damages and up to $1,000 in additional damages, if the court allows, unless 'the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error.' FLA. STAT. j 559.7742)-(3). Unlike the FDCPA, the FCCPA permits awarding punitive dnmages. ld. 172. The FCCPA tmequivocally states its goal- to provide the consum er with the m ost protection possible under either the state or federal statute. See FLA. STAT. j 559.552 ('In the event of any inconsistency. . . the provision which is more protective of the consumer or debtor shall prevail.f') Further, the fact that the FCCPA deemed its remedies cumulative reveals that the Florida legislature eontemplated dual enforcement- that ag1 '. .. debt collector' could quite possibly be subject to the sanctions and enforcement provisions of both of the various states or the FDCPA. See L eBlanc v. Unfund CCR Partners, 601 F. 3d 1 185 - Court of Appeals, 1 1th Circuit 2010 173. Defendants failed to conduct a reasonable investigation with regard to Plaintiff's written 96 since Defendants failed to comply with Fla . Stat.dispute and demand for validation . j559.715 and threatened a lawsuit, and falsly represented it had filed a lawsuit, with an improper party, Defendants did take angl action that cannot legally be taken thus violating 15 96See DE 06-1 page 6. Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 40 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 40 of 56 U.S.C. j1692e(5). See L eBlanc v. Unfund CCR Partners, 601 F. 3d 1 185 - Court of Appeals, 1 1th Circuit 2010, and in doing so violated FLA. STAT. j 559.72(9). This was a violation in that Defendants, being infonned of a dispute, knowing the alleged debt was not legitimate did claim, attempt and tllreaten to enforce an alleged debt and assert the existence of some legal right when the right did not exist by sending a letter falsely stating a foreclosure action was filed. 174. These factual allegations show a right to relief that is plausible. That is, when the factual allegations are œsstzmed to be true, they show a right to relief that is m ore than m ere speculation. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2009)) see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581. 175. Further, Chase did state the alleged debt ttwas sold into a public sectlrity managed by CPCC Delaware Business Trust and may include a number of investors'' therefore CPCC did not own the alleged debt and therefore as manager of the alleged security CPCC was acting through Chase. 176. Further, any alleged debt is not in question here tmder a FDCPA and/or FCCPA claimts). CONCLUSION 177. The facts raised in the complaint are not m ere speculation. ln ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court is required to construe the allegations in the pleadings liberally and draw al1 reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff 178. Plaintiff has adequately disputed the lim ited issues that were converted by the Coul't to Summary Judgment M otion and thus Summary Judgment should be denied. 179. At this stage in the litigation the Plaintiff does bclieve that additional violations exist , and they should be properly identified and determined through proper Discovery including ESl Discovery. 180. Plaintiff has shown a pattern of similar violations by Defendants as published by both the Supreme Court of Florida and the Justice Department of the United States of America . 18 1. Plaintiffrro se has pleaded facts sufficient to allow a court, drawing on 'judicial experience and common sense', to infer ''more than the mere possibility of misconduct' , which easily satisfies his burden of pleading under the FDCPA and FCCPA at this stage. See Plaintif Response in Opposition to Ddtndants Partialy Convtrted Motion to Dismiss - Page 41 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 41 of 56 Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 129 S.C. at 1950. Plaintiff has also alleged that he has been damaged by the Defendant Chase, JPM C, and CPCC. Plaintiff claims should therefore survive dismissal . W HEREFO RE, Plaintiff respedfully requests that this honorable Court enter an order denying Defendants Chase, CPCC, and JPMC'S partially converted Motion To Dismiss (DE 581 pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 56 and L.R. 56.1. In the altenmtive, if the Court determines Plaintiff pro se has failed to state a claim, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant leave and suftkient time to amend his complaint. Dated: January 23, 2015 espedfully Submitted,A h, ' xk sq . % ' John Pinso npro se 526 W estF d Road W est Palnï ach, Florida 33401 561-329-2524 john@pinson.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l hereby certify that a tnze and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court, and is served by CM /ECF upon entry into the docket on al1 cotmsel, by the mandatory CM /ECF system, on the Service List below. Signed January 23, 2014 l Jolm Pins n Service List Thom as H Loffredo, Esq. tom.loffredo@gray-robinson.com Gray Robinson, P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 1000 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: (954) 761-81 1 1 Fax: (954) 761-81 12 Attornev for Defendants: JpM organ Chase Bank, N .A.; M ichael D. Lessne, Esq. Michael.lessne@gray-robinson.com Gray Robinson, P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 1000 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: (954) 761-8111 Fax: (954) 761-81 12 Attornev for Defendants: JpM organ Chase Bank, N .A.; Plaintif Response in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 42 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 42 of 56 CPCC Delaware Business Tnzst, a/k/a CPCC Delaware Statutory Trust; JpM organ Chase & Co. CPCC Delaware Business Trust, a1V a CPCC Delaware Statutory Trust; JpM organ Chase & Co. L/ J .'pnnz é-w Ja / /n ' 7.7 z d t N -Jfb/ses T& Vt A -b Plaintiff Rtsponse in Opposition to Defendants Partialy Converted Motion to Dismiss - Page 43 of 43 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 43 of 56 E xhibit EiA '' Jolm Pinson v. JpM organ Chase Bank, N.A., et al. - CASE NO.: 9:l3-cv-80720-KAM /lJ Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 44 of 56 AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN PINSON IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONVERTED M OTION TO DISM ISS NOW COM ES the Aftiant, John Pinson of Palm Beach County, Florida who is over the age of 21 years, competent to testify and has not been convicted of a felony or misdem eanor of m oral turpitude or any felony criminal offense and declares as follows under penalty of perjury regarding Case No.: 9:13-cv-80720-KAM ; John Pinson v. JpM organ Chase Bank NA et al.: l . Plaintiffs affidavit is in support of his opposition to converted motion to dism iss. No owner of the Ioan is identified on the record. The record does not show when the loan was sold. The record does not show who the seller of the loan was. 5. The identity of the public security owning the loan is unknown. 6. The sponsor of the public security is unknown. No owner of the loan security has identified specifically who a1l the investors are who own the unnamed public security that owns the loan, and have produced no affidavit by a competent person duly authorized by the unnamed public security and attesting to facts. 8. No agreement is on record showing authorization for CPCC to manage public security. Defendants have failed to show agreem ents authorizing CPCC to manage the unknown security that owns the loan and have produced no affidavit by a competent person duly authorized and attesting to the same. 10. No agreement is on record showing CPCC authorized Chase to act. 1 1 . Defendants have failed to show any agreement authorizing Chase to act on behalf of CPCC and have produced no affidavit by a competent person duly authorized and attesting to the same. 12. No affidavit is on record attesting to the authenticity of the alleged mortgage. l 3. No affidavit is on record attesting to the accuracy of the content of the alleged mortgage. 14. Defendants have produced no affidavit, sworn and attested to by a responsible party legally authorized to act on behalf of the Defendants, that verifies or supports the exhibit or the docum ent filed by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss. Affidavit ot- John Pinson in support of opposition to converted motion to dismiss - Page 1 of 3 r p/.r Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 45 of 56 1 5. Plaintiff states he did not sign any document with barcode mark on it which may be found on the first page upper left of both on the Exhibit and certified copy of the document and the number on the left side 1:4261886+15' is unknown to Plaintiff. 16. Plaintiff states that any loan documents executed by him were initialed the on lower left side of each page not requiring a signature. l 7. The alleged mortgage filed with the county clerk in-accurately retlects the agreement. 1 8. Alleged original documents shown Plaintiff were spoiled with whiteout. 19. The barcode mentioned at affidavit ! 15 was covered up with whiteout on alleged originals. 20. Loan numbers were covered up with whiteout on alleged originals. 21. Plaintiff cannot state these are original documents. 22. Chase previously represented in Palm Beach County Court case no. 502009ca01 5823 that the alleged Note was lost or destroyed. 23. Chase does not account for how the alleged Note was found or retrieved. 24. No affidavit is on file attesting to haw the alleged Note was found or retrieved. 25. No afsdavit is on record attesting to ownership of the alleged Note. 26. No affidavit is on record attesting to ownership of the loan. 27. Chase does n0t account f0r where documents come from, who owns documents, where documents are stored, or who the custodian of docum ents is. 28. Plaintiff was told by Chase representative Benny M ilan verbally that the investors in the public security were overseas in China and Europe and the loan was securitized into the public security before its closing and funding, and that Chase facilitated the securitization. 29. Plaintiff states that Chase Home Finance LLC was the servicer. 30. Plaintiff received no notice of transfer of servicer. 31 . Plaintiff was told he needed to become delinquent in order to apply for any loan modification. 32. Plaintiff never received any transfer of servicer notice. 33. Plaintiff denies having any contractual agreement for credit, loans or services with the Defendants. 34. Defendants have not filed and answer to complaint or affirmative defenses. Defendants have not provided initial disclosures. Affidavit of John Pinson in support of opposition to converted motion to dismiss - Page 2 of 3 ze / 1/15k. Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 46 of 56 35. Defendants have filed no affidavits. 36. Plaintiff denies having any contractual agreement for credit, loans or selwices with the Defendants. 37. Plaintiff merely seeks suffkient information to make proper factual representations to the Court. 38. The record shows no loan application. 39. The record shows no wire transfer or check issued from Chase. 40. The record shows no indenture. NOTARY'S VERIFICATION STATE OF FLORIDA j COUNTY OF PALM BEACH j On this day personally came before me the above-named Affiant, who proved his identity to me to my satisfaction, and he acknowledged his signature on this Affidavit in my presence. AFFIRM ATION I hereby aftirm that l prepared and have read this Affidavit and that l believe the foregoing statements in this Affidavit to be true and correct, and the basis of these beliefs is my own direct personal knowledge of the statements described herein. Further the Affiant sayeth naught. Signed in Palm Beach County, Florida 7 3 2015January , John nson Signature of Notary . seal .*%. *'' creeAAe s GAMBARqQTM+% . >. .. ?/-k . - p ). s:al: nf Flirle. k. k Nourk u# . . . . ,lzv g,/ Mk Cnmm ixplfe Atlj 6, 2Q1 ej '%: oswve ca--*4e # 'F 01*14 Affidavit of John Pinson in support of oppositicm to converted motit)n to dismiss - Page 3 of 3 4 /> 4. Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 47 of 56 Exhibit iiB '' John Pinson v. JpM organ Chase Bank, N.A., et al. - CASE NO.: 9:13-cv-80720-KAM W Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 48 of 56 CHASE /Chase Home Finance LLC (AZ1-2516) 1820 East Sky Harbor Circle South Phoenix, AZ 85034-4810 1.,11...111,11,11,11111.,.1,11,1,1,1,,11111,11.111.11111,11,1 866 CMS 842 001 2010319 - NNNNNNNNNNNN JOHN D PINSON PO BOX 3386 PALM BEACH, FL 33480.1586 November 15 , 2010 = = '= x- < c- - w0 * = = = * - = - o= = - Y o = o e o = D - * -= m e o - m Your Account Requires Your lmmedlale Attention Account: 100-900-496490010759 Property Address: 526 W ESTW OOD ROAD WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401 Dear John D Pinson: Chase Home Finance LLC (;%Chase') lnas not yet received your overdue paymentts) on the above-referenced accounl. It is important thal you bring your account curront or contact us immediately at (8Q0) 219-6659 to discuss options for resolving your delinquency. lf paymenl has already been made, please disregard this notice. Please remit $2,595.08 immediately to the address provided below. Overnight Mail: Chase Home Finance LLC Regular Mail: Chase Home Finance LLC Atention Box 78035 Attention Chase Paymont Processing Mail Codo AZ1-2516 Mail Code AZ1-2516 1820 East Sky Harbor Circle South PO BOX 78035 Phoenix, AZ 85034-4810 Phoenix, AZ 85062-8035 Funds may also be sent using Western Union Quick Colect. Please use the folowing information and remember to include your account number. Code Cky: CAM Code State: WI Alter the transaction is complete, please contact us with the lo-digit Voney Transfer Control Number (MTCN). Note that Western Union charges a feo for their seNices. If. you are uneble to make gt paymtmt at this time, please rontact us immediately. lN.h.i,le alternativss may Gtil! bl available, we need to hear Irom you to determine which option may best fit your needs. Wo Iook forward to working with you and, while no guarantees can be made, wo believe it would be beneficial for al parlies to allempt to work out a resolution. If you have any questions, ptease contact us at (800) 219-6659. We have experienced professionals who are available to help you. At Chase) we value you as a customer and want to ensure your continued salisfaction. Sincerely, Colections Depadment Chase Home Finance LLC (800) 21 9-6659 (800) 582-0542 TDD / Text Telephone %' Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 49 of 56 :66 CMS :42 001 2010 19 - NNNNNNNNNNNN Chase is a debt collector. If you are represented by an atomey, please refer this letter to your attomey and provide us with the attorney's name, address, and telephone number. To the ement your origlnal obllgation was discharged, or is subject to an automatlc stay of bankruptcy under Title 11 of the United Slates Gode, this notice is for compliance and/or inlormational jurposes only and does not constitute an atlempt to colect a debt or to impose personaj liability 1or such oblgation. ()L.708 N / s Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 50 of 56 E xhibit iéC '' John Pinson v. JpMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al. - CASE NO.; 9:13-cv-80720-KAM z--''---) - //- Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 51 of 56 CHAEEOcha se Home Finance LLC (AZ1-2516) 1820 East Sky Harbor Circle South Phoenix, AZ 85034-4810 l..lI1I.lII,I.1II.'lI1III.1..Il,III.I,II.1II,,II.lx.II,'l..I,l 3939 CMS M2 X 1 2011097 - NNNNNNNNNNNN JOHN D PINSON PO BOX 3386 PALM BEACHI FL 33480-1586 April O7 , 201 1 Your Account Requires Your Immedlate Attention Account: 100-K 0-496490010759 Propedy Address: 526 WESTWOOD ROAD WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401 Dear John D Pinson: Chase Home Finance LLC (1'chasen) has made several atempts to contact you regarding your past-due paymentts) on the above-reforenced account. W e are concemed that we have neither received payment nor received a response from you indicating your intentions for bringing your account current. This continued delinquency may be reported to tbo various consumer rcporting agencios and may have an adverse effect on your credil rating. lf payment has already been sent, please disregard this notice. To resolve your delinquency, please remit $3,892.62 immediately to the address provided below. Ovemight Mail: Chase Home Finance LLC Regular Mail: Chase Home Finance LLC Atlention Box 78035 Atention Chase Payment Procossing Mail Code M 1-2516 Mail Code AZ1 -2516 1820 East Sky Harbor Gircle South PO BOX 78035 Phoenix, AZ 85034-4810 Phoenix, AZ 85062-8035 Funds may also be sent using Westem Union Quick Colect. Please use 1ho folowing information and remember to includo your account number. Code City: CAM Code State: W1 After the transaction is complete, please contact us with the lo-digit Money Transfer Control Number (MTCN). Note that W estern Union charges a fee for their services. lf you are unable to remit tho ful amounl due at this time, alternatives to foreclosure may stil be available. Please contact us immediately at (800) 219-6659 in order to discuss your optbns. We Iook forward to working with you and, while no guarantees can be made, we bekieve it would be benef icial for al1 padies to attempt to work out a resolution. At Chase, we value you as a cuslomer and want to ensure your continued satisfaction. Sincerely, Coledions Depadment Chase Homo Finance LLC (800) 21 9-6659 (800) 582-0542 TDD / Text Telephone W Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 52 of 56 Chase is a debt collector. lf you are represented by an atorney, please refer this letter to your attomcy and provide us with the attorney's name, address, and telephone number. To the exlent your orlglnal obllgatlon was dlscharged, or is subject to an automatlc stay of bankruptcy under Tltle 11 of the United States Cee, thls notice is for compliance and/or Informallonal purqoses only and does not constitute an atlempt to colect a debt or to impose personal liability for such obllgatlon. CL71O U, / , Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 53 of 56 E xhibit iéD '' ( I / John Pinson v. JpM organ Chase Bank, N.A., et a1. - CASE NO.: 9:l3-cv-80720-KAM ' Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 54 of 56 180 NORTH WEST 49TH STREET, SUITE $120 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA 33389 Teleçhone (954) 453.0365 Facslmilo (954) 771-6052 Tol Free (800) 441-2438 Jkme 24, 20l l PINSON, JOI-lN D 526 WESTW OOD ROAD, WEST PALM BFACII, FL 33401 RE: Property Address: 526 WESTWOOD ROAD WEST PM M BEACH, FL 33401 Owner: PINSON , JOI4N 1) Mortgagor: JOl1N D PINSON Otzr File #: l 1-13285 Loan #: 00000001 0397108 Dear Sir/Madam: W AEm IL JOHNW INSONCOM This flrm rcpresents BANK ONE FINANCIAL SERW CES, INC., CHASE HOM E FW ANCE, the holder of the mortgage on the abtwe referenced property. W e are attempting to coled the money due under that mortgage and any information obtained from you will be used for that purpose. 0. client has provided us with the folowing information as to amounts required for reinstatement: Monthly payments from February l , 2O1 l throug,h 6/24/201 l Property Inspection Brokcr's Pricc Opinion Previous Foreclostre Cost (File# 09-26189) Actual Forcclosurc Cost Actual Foreclosure Attomey's Fee Total $ 6,487.70 $ 28.00 $ 162.00 $ 671 .6O $ 400.00 $ 650,00 $ 8,399.30 * **For information regarding a short sale, repayment plan or other Ioss mitigation opportunities please contact our loss mitigation department @ 1-800-441-2438. Upon receipt of the above smn in the form of casïer's eheck or certified ftmds and upon fmal vehfication by our client, the subject action will be dismissed. Until such rœeipt, the action wil be prosecuted in a normai fashiono and this leter shal not be construed as an agreement on the part of the PlainEff in any way to abate said prosecution. l l-l 3285 / J-//-? Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 55 of 56 The irlfpppxtij)! jlgpyinld in thi? lsttr!q hyj blrrt provided by Plaintif or Plaintiff s servicing agent and will be valid until h: ie jljikilj Ai. ifjlWik. 2#I%t, ktkW jj:'yirkfiilëtkrt THE ctl#AE'c'r AMOUNT t)# HJNDS MUST BE# g à# jtjké, , è , ju: tljj: jtj ljkyk: tyjjjju. ajyujja ,j):. Axy zzwpx RecElvEn az-z'zaREcslvsn z& oià y Fzc . .: . . . . ,! . .., .,, ..,.:. .. .. . , . :., . rHE nxvE zfxo vluE zxozc,x/#b kéèéii iiiii ii: kèikiY kb. kfzxsrzzw zwr Fvsns Mvsv BE IN THE FO#M OF CERTIFIED FTWDJ #zl YABLE TO 'W./W # 0NE FINAK IAL JFRFX FJ. INC.'. CHECKS M zl. DE JM YABLE TO ANY 0. THER ENTITY OR IN ANY OTHER FO#M WILL N0T BE ACCEPTED. This firm does not insure the validity or accuracy of the information uontained herein. A1 irtfonnation and sums tendered are subject to fmal verification and approval of lender, Please contact this office orior to tenderin: anv--flm- ds to verify the totl amount due. R'he Foreclosure Action wil continue tmtil a1 ftmds are received and accepted by otu' office. Acceptance of funds is subject to fmal approval and verification by our client. Should you have any questions. or require additional infonnation, please do not hesitate to eonàct this office. Digitaly slgned by Miti Smith * * * DN:cn=Mitzi smith , oaiaw Oflces of Marshal C. watson, ou=payoff& Reinstatement Department, emai=miui.smith@marshalwatson.com, c=US Date: 201 1 .06.24 1 1 :30:08 -04'00' The Law Ot-fices of Marshall C. Watson, P.A. IG ORTANT NOTE: VEDERAL LAW REQUIRES US TO NOTWY YOU TIIAT Tm S COMM UM CATION IS AN AW EM PT TO COLLECT A DEBT. ALL N ORMATION OBTAINED W ILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. IF YOU HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED IN BANKRW TCY. THIS IS NOT AN AW EM PT TO COLLECT THE DEBT PERSONALLY, BUT TO PROVD E OPTIONS TO AVOID FORECLOSURE. IM PORTANT NOTE: COM WCTING THIS OFFICE OR THE LOAN SERVICER W ILL NOT SUSPEND YOUR OBLIGATION TO M Alc YOUR M ORTGAGE PAYM ENTS. TIIIS OFFICE WILL CONTINUE ALL COLLECTION AND FORECLOSURE ACTIVI'FY UNLESS AND UNTIL A W ORKOUT PLAN HAS BEEN COD LETED AND YOU W ILL BE RESPONSIBLE FORANY AND ALL FEES AND EXPENSES m CIJRRED THROUGH THIS ACTION. RESPONDG G TO Tm S DOES N0T TERM G A'I'E YOUR OBLIGATION TO TN ELY RESPOND TO THE COURT IN THE PENDING FORECLOSURE ACTION. THIS FIRM REPRESEM 'S THE PLAINTIFF IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THAT HAS BEEN FILED AGM NST YOU. THEREFORE YOU SHOR D SEEK ANY Ae ALL AVAILABLE REG DW S/DEFENS . .WS INCLUDWGRETAGING COU ETENT LEGAL COUNSEL WH0 WKLACT IN YoUR BEST INTEREST. THIS Fm M DOES NOT REPRESENT YOU AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS SUCH. ALL DECISIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT YOU QUALIFY FOR THESE LOSS M ITIGATION PROGRAMS W ILL BE M ADE BY THE LOAN SERVICERUNOT THIS FTRM. IF YOU ARE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, PLEASE FORW ARD THE LETTER TO YOUR ATTORNEY. 1 1-13285 Case 9:13-cv-80720-KAM Document 107 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/26/2015 Page 56 of 56
