Perez v. Kelly et alMOTION for Summary Judgment W.D. Wash.June 30, 2017 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 1 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Honorable James L. Robart UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE ____________________________________ PEDRO TOMAS PEREZ PEREZ, ) ) Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Plaintiff, ) ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR v. ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, Secretary of ) Homeland Security; et al., ) ) Defendants. ) Noted for Consideration: ) September 22, 2017 INTRODUCTION Plaintiff, Mr. Perez, moves for summary judgment. Under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., he has challenged Defendants’ denial of his petition for U nonimmigrant status. He alleges the following legal errors, all of which are found within the administrative record (see Dkt. # 13): (1) Defendants failed to consider all credible evidence found within the administrative record; (2) Defendants considered irrelevant evidence and evidence not a part of the record; (3) Defendants failed to consider one of Plaintiff’s arguments relevant and dispositive to his petition; and (4) Defendants misinterpreted state law. The relevant facts, which are found within the administrative record, are not in dispute (or cannot be disputed). Dkt. # 12 at 4-5. Mr. Perez submits that the record is now sufficiently developed for Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 1 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 2 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the Court to rule on his complaint and moves for summary judgment in favor of all of Plaintiff’s claims. FACTS The facts of this case were previously set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. # 1), and they are either not in dispute or should not be disputed (Dkt. # 12 at 4-5). Mr. Perez petitioned for U nonimmigrant status, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). Dkt. # 13 at 76. He included with his petition a Form I-918 Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification (“Certification”) from the Renton Police Department, which certified that Mr. Perez was the victim of harassment under RCW § 9A.46.020. 1 Dkt. # 13 at 84-86. He also included a police report, upon which the Certification was based, which provides that the suspect harassed Mr. Perez, that he specifically threatened to make Mr. Perez “disappear,” and that the threats placed Mr. Perez in fear for his safety to the extent that he quit his job and moved. Dkt. # 13 at 110-111. Finally, he included a petition for an anti-harassment order, which further demonstrated that the suspect made threats against Mr. Perez’s life. Dkt. # 13 at 116-118. The anti-harassment order was referenced in the Certification. Dkt. # 13 at 86. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied his petition, finding that the crime of harassment was not a qualifying criminal activity listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). Dkt. # 13 at 71-73. Mr. Perez appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office 1 Defendant claims to lack knowledge or information sufficient to admit to this fact. Dkt. # 12 at 2. However, the Certification clearly states that “[t]he applicant is a victim of criminal activity involving or similar to violations of one of the following Federal, State or local criminal offenses. – Harassment,” that the “criminal activity occurred [on] 8/2009 – 10/2011,” and that “the statutory citation(s) for the criminal activity being investigated or prosecuted, or that was investigated or prosecuted” was RCW “9A.46.020 Harassment.” Dkt. 13 at 84-85. Indeed, Defendants themselves “determin[ed] that [Mr. Perez] was a victim of the offense of harassment in Washington State, as certified on the Form I-918 Supplement B,” and that the police department “detected … harassment committed against [Mr. Perez][.]” Dkt. # 13 at 4-6. Thus, Defendants have already concluded that Mr. Perez was the victim of harassment under RCW § 9A.46.020, and therefore cannot dispute this fact. Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 2 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 3 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (“AAO”), which dismissed his appeal, finding that harassment was not “substantially similar” to felonious assault, a qualifying criminal activity, and that the record did not demonstrate that the certifying agency detected or investigated felony harassment or felonious assault. Dkt. # 13 at 29-34. Mr. Perez filed a Motion to Reconsider with the AAO, which denied his motion. Dkt. # 13 at 2-8. The AAO concluded that the crime of felony harassment was not detected by the Renton Police Department, because the Certification did not specify whether the crime detected was simple harassment or felony harassment and the police report did not demonstrate that felony harassment was detected. Dkt. # 13 at 4-6. The AAO also concluded that, even if felony harassment was detected, such offense is not “substantially similar” to felony assault under Washington State law. Dkt. # 13 at 6-8. It did not address whether the felony harassment “involved” felony assault. 2 Id. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence that it “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 2 Defendants claim that USCIS did consider Mr. Perez’s “involving” argument. Dkt. # 12 at 7. However, Defendants cite to the AAO’s first decision (dismissing the appeal), whereas Mr. Perez claims the AAO failed to consider the “involving” argument in its second decision (denying the motion to reconsider). Defendants cannot dispute that the AAO failed to consider the “involving” argument in its second decision. In any event, the AAO likewise failed to sufficiently consider the “involving” argument in its first decision. See below, pp.9-10. Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 3 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 4 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 “A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982). To successfully oppose summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and, by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The opposing party’s evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; see also Butler v. San Diego District Attorney’s Office, 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating if defendant produces enough evidence to require plaintiff to go beyond pleadings, plaintiff must counter by producing evidence of his own). ARGUMENT I. Statutory and Regulatory Framework of U Nonimmigrant Status A noncitizen who has been the victim of certain criminal activity that resulted in substantial harm to the noncitizen, and who is cooperative in the investigation or prosecution of such criminal activity, is eligible for U nonimmigrant status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). A petitioner for U nonimmigrant status must submit a certification from a law enforcement agency or prosecutor’s office verifying that the petitioner was the victim of qualifying criminal activity and has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in the “investigation or prosecution” of such criminal activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1). “Investigation or prosecution Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 4 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 5 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 refers to the detection or investigation of a qualifying crime or criminal activity, as well as to the prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of the perpetrator of the qualifying crime or criminal activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(5) (emphasis added). The regulations are clear that mere detection satisfies the “investigation or prosecution” requirement; actual charges are not required. See 72 Fed.Reg. 53014, 53020 (Sept. 17, 2007) (“the detection of criminal activity is within the scope of a law enforcement officer’s investigative duties”). “[T]he term ‘investigation or prosecution’ should be interpreted broadly[.]” Id. A U nonimmigrant status petitioner must also demonstrate that s/he was the victim of criminal activity “involving” a qualifying crime listed in the statute, including “felonious assault,” or “similar activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). The regulations define “similar activity” as offenses “in which the nature and elements of the offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of criminal activities.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(9). A petitioner may submit “any credible evidence relevant” to the petition, which includes both the Certification and “[a]ny additional evidence” to establish that s/he “is a victim of qualifying criminal activity” and that “the criminal activity is qualifying.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). “USCIS shall conduct a de novo review of all evidence submitted in connection with [the petition] and may investigate any aspect of the petition.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(4) (emphasis added). Since no standard is specified by law, a petitioner for U nonimmigrant status must prove eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010) (“Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.”); see also Matter of Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 5 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 6 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (BIA 1997) (noting that the petitioner must prove eligibility by a preponderance of evidence in visa petition proceedings). II. Defendants violated the statute and regulations, and conflicted with other agency decisions, in concluding that felony harassment was not detected. A. Defendants ignored credible and relevant evidence in the record that, together with the other evidence in the record, demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the law enforcement agency “detected” felony harassment as the crime of which Plaintiff was the victim. In Washington State, harassment is a gross misdemeanor. RCW § 9A.46.020. However, harassment is a felony if the defendant knowingly “threaten[s] to kill the person threatened or any other person” and “by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.” RCW §§ 9A.46.020(1)(b) and (2)(b)(ii). Defendants’ determination that felony harassment was not detected failed to consider credible and relevant evidence, in violation of the statute and regulations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(4); 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14(c)(2)(ii) and 214.14(c)(4). Defendants completely ignored part of the police report 3 that provides the suspect had threatened to “make [Mr. Perez] disappear” and that Mr. Perez quit his job and moved because “he was scared that [the suspect] might do something to him.” Dkt. # 13 at 111. Felony harassment involves a threat to kill where the victim is placed in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. A threat to make someone “disappear” is reasonably interpreted as a threat to kill. See State v. Hahn, 271 P.3d 892, 893-94 (Wash. 2012) (requesting to make someone “disappear” constituted a “solicitation to kill”). Nothing in the record undermined the credibility of the report. Nevertheless, Defendants failed to 3 Indeed, the AAO itself acknowledged it must consider the entire police report: “Our factual inquiry focuses only on whether the [Certification] and accompanying reports establish that the certifying agency investigated or prosecuted a qualifying crime[.]” Dkt. # 13 at 5 (emphasis added). Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 6 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 7 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 mention this part of the police report, which demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the police at least detected (as that term is broadly interpreted) felony harassment. Defendants also erroneously limited its inquiry to “the Certification and accompanying reports,” for which it cites no authority. Dkt. # 13 at 5. Defendants are in direct violation of the statutory and regulatory mandate to consider “any credible evidence” relevant to “any aspect” of the petition, which includes of what crime was investigated. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(4); 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14(c)(2)(ii) and 214.14(c)(4). Indeed, in two other decisions, the AAO instructed that its “inquiry focuses on whether the [Certification], and the record as a whole, establishes that the certifying agency detected, investigated, or prosecuted a qualifying crime.” Dkt # 1, Exh. 9 at 2, 8 (emphasis added). In another decision, the AAO considered evidence other than the police report (a medical report) in determining whether a qualifying crime was detected. Dkt. # 1, Exh. 9 at 3-4 (Matter of E-U-, 2016 WL 6694792, *3-4 (AAO Oct. 20, 2016)). Here, the AAO failed to consider Mr. Perez’s petition for an anti-harassment order, which the Certification explicitly references, and which further shows that the suspect made threats against Mr. Perez’s life. Dkt. # 13 at 86, 116-118. Again, nothing in the record undermines the credibility of such evidence, and the police itself relied on such evidence in detecting harassment. Thus, in failing to consider such relevant and credible evidence, Defendants’ decision is contrary to the law and contradicts other agency decisions. B. Defendants considered other evidence that was either irrelevant or not a part of the record. Defendants’ determination that felony harassment was not detected is also internally contradictory. While acknowledging that “the fact that felony harassment charges were not actually filed does not preclude a finding that the offense was detected by the certifying agency Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 7 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 8 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 or other law enforcement,” Defendants ignore this rule and proceed to rely on the fact that charges were not filed: “The report also specifically indicated that the threats to the Petitioner ‘were not defined enough … to file harassment charges’ against the perpetrator of the offense.” Dkt. # 13 at 5. Defendants do not explain how that part of the report precluded a finding that felony harassment was detected or even investigated. The law enforcement agency certified that Mr. Perez was the victim of harassment, and the AAO accepted this much from the certification. 4 The fact that no charges were filed meant that the law enforcement agency believed there was insufficient evidence to support a charge, whether for general harassment or felony harassment, but it did not necessarily mean that felony harassment was excluded as a detected crime. Defendants also erred by relying on a subsequent Certification that was filed during the appeal, while at the same time finding that the Certification “proferred on appeal does not satisfy the regulatory requirements listed at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i) for required initial evidence, where it was not submitted as initial evidence with the Form I-918 and was not executed within the six months preceding the filing of the instant Form I-918.” Dkt. # 13 at 5 n.2. Defendants cannot consider evidence which they have found cannot be considered. Such action is classic arbitrariness. Pursuant to the laws Defendants themselves recognized, these pieces of evidence should not have been considered. III. Defendants ignored one of Plaintiff’s argument and misapprehended state case law in concluding that the felony harassment detected fell within a qualifying crime. A. Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s argument that the felony harassment of which he was a victim “involved” a qualifying crime. 4 See above, FN 1. Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 8 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 9 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The U visa statute provides that “the criminal activity referred to in this clause is that involving one or more of the following or any similar activity in violation of Federal, State, or local criminal law: … felonious assault[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (emphasis added). The statute is clear that qualifying criminal activity can be either “involving” an enumerated crime or “similar” to an enumerated crime. Neither the statute nor the regulations define “involving” a qualifying crime. In similar contexts, the term “involving” has been construed broadly by both the federal courts and the agency, “to encompass any offense or act that is closely related or closely connected to its object of reference.” See Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2012) (“[W]e conclude that for purposes of [8 U.S.C. § 1227](a)(2)(B)(i), a crime ‘involves’ possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana for personal use if the particular acts that led to the alien’s conviction were closely related to such conduct.”); Medina v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting the term “involving” broadly by finding that, “under the plain words of [8 U.S.C. §] 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), it is virtually impossible to conclude that personal use of less than 30 grams of marijuana is not an offense ‘involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.’” (emphasis in original); United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113 (2nd Cir. 2003) (in deciding whether particular predicate offenses “involved” the distribution of controlled substances under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), the court required only that the offender’s conduct be closely “related to or connected with” the offending activity). However, such an inquiry is fact-based. Cf. Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. at 39 (a determination of whether a single offense “involves” simple possession of marijuana is “fact-specific” and “does not suggest a focus on the formal elements of generic offenses”). Here, Defendants’ determination that felony harassment, even if detected, was not a qualifying crime overlooked Mr. Perez’s argument that he was the victim of felony harassment Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 9 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 10 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 “involving” felonious assault. Indeed, Defendants themselves acknowledged in the AAO decisions that “a qualifying crime … may occur during the commission of non-qualifying criminal activity[.]” Dkt. # 13 at 5, 21; see also 72 FR 53014, 53018 (Sept. 17, 2007) (“In addition, qualifying criminal activity may occur during the commission of non-qualifying criminal activity.”). However, Defendants failed to conduct such factual inquiry, and instead focused on the “substantially similar” question, which, in contrast, deals only with the nature and elements of the offenses (see 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(9)). Dkt. # 13 at 6 (“The inquiry, therefore, is not fact-based, but rather entails a comparison of the nature and elements of the statutes in question.”), 21. The mere fact that Defendants explicitly stated they were not conducting a factual inquiry demonstrates their failure to consider the “involving” argument. Thus, Defendants’ examination of just the elements of each crime did not address Mr. Perez’s separate and equally dispositive “involving” argument. 5 B. Defendants misapprehended state case law in determining that felony harassment is not substantially similar to felonious assault. Defendants’ reliance on state case law in concluding that felony harassment is not substantially similar to felonious assault is misplaced. Defendants relied on State v. Mandanas, 262 P.3d 522 (Wash.App. 2011), which held that felony harassment and second degree assault in Washington State are “distinct offenses” and, therefore, are “not the same in law” for purposes of double jeopardy. 262 P.3d at 526. However, the mere fact that they are distinct offenses does not mean that felony harassment cannot be substantially similar to felony assault, or event that it cannot “involve” felony assault; the U visa statute’s plain language does not preclude distinct offenses involving or being similar to one another. Moreover, Mandanas dealt with a different 5 See above, FN 2. Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 10 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 11 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 second degree assault provision (assault with a deadly weapon – RCW § 9A.36.021(1)(c)) than the one Mr. Perez has relied on (assault with the intent to commit a felony – RCW § 9A.36.021(1)(e)). Indeed, Mandanas explicitly distinguished its case from State v. Leming, 138 P.3d 1095 (Wash.App. 2006), which held that convictions for felony harassment and second degree assault under RCW § 9A.36.021(1)(e) were predicated on the same facts, and therefore constituted double jeopardy under the same evidence test. 262 P.3d at 527, citing Leming, 138 P.3d at 1102. Defendants’ attempt to distinguish Leming is equally unavailing. Leming held that the same facts of intending to place a victim in fear that the defendant would carry out his threat to kill her could support a conviction for both felony harassment and second degree assault, a felony, under RCW § 9A.36.021(1)(e) (assault with intent to commit a felony). 138 P.3d at 1102. Those same facts were “Leming’s threat to snap Leah’s neck and her fear that he would carry out the threat.” Id. The court concluded that “the convictions were the same in fact and in law.” Id. (emphasis added). While the underlying felony for the second degree assault conviction was felony harassment in Leming, that is precisely what Mr. Perez argued before USCIS. Dkt. # 13 at 26. Mr. Perez demonstrated the same minimum facts as in Leming, that he was the victim of a threat to kill (“make him disappear”) that placed him in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out (quitting his job and moving to another residence). Dkt. # 13 at 86, 103-126. Pursuant to Leming, such facts meet the elements of both felony harassment and assault in the second degree at RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e) (i.e. felonious assault). Thus, the record demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the felony harassment of which Mr. Perez was a victim either involved or was substantially similar to felonious assault. CONCLUSION Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 11 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 12 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants’ decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Thus, this Court should GRANT Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and GRANT his prayers for relief provided in the complaint. Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 2017. s/Henry Cruz Henry Cruz (WSBA #38799) Rios & Cruz, P.S. 811 First Ave, Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 Tel: (206) 749-5600 Fax: (206) 749-5800 Email: henry@rioscruz.com Attorney for Plaintiff Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 12 of 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Henry Cruz Summary Judgment - 13 Rios & Cruz, P.S. Case No. 2:17-cv-00249-JLR 811 First Ave., Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 749-5600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC FILING I, Henry Cruz, hereby certify that on June 30, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system. Dated this 30th day of June, 2017. s/Henry Cruz Henry Cruz (WSBA #38799) Rios & Cruz, P.S. 811 First Ave, Suite 340 Seattle, WA 98104 Tel: (206) 749-5600 Fax: (206) 749-5800 Email: henry@rioscruz.com Attorney for Plaintiff Case 2:17-cv-00249-JLR Document 17 Filed 06/30/17 Page 13 of 13
