Melanie Barber et al v. Johnson And Johnson Co. et al

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case or Strike Portions Of The First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 12

C.D. Cal.January 11, 2017

- 1 - DEFS.’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RICHARD B. GOETZ (S.B. #115666) rgoetz@omm.com MATTHEW D. POWERS (S.B. #212682) mpowers@omm.com HANNAH Y. CHANOINE (appearing pro hac vice) hchanoine@omm.com MATTHEW J. SMOCK (S.B. #293542) msmock@omm.com O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 984-8700 Facsimile: (415) 984-8701 Attorneys for Defendants UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MELANIE BARBER, KI BURKE, and JOSEPH GREGORIO on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL- PPC, INC., JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC., and RANIR LLC, Defendants. Case No. 8:16-cv-1954-JLS-JCG DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS OR STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULES 12(B)(1), 12(B)(6), AND 12(F) HON. JOSEPHINE L. STATON Date: March 10, 2017 Time: 2:30 p.m. Ctrm: 10A Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21 Filed 01/11/17 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:139 - 2 - DEFS.’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE than on March 10, 2017, at 2:30 p.m., in Courtroom 10A of the above-entitled court, located at 411 W. Fourth Street, Santa Ana, California, Defendants Johnson & Johnson, McNeil-PPC, Inc., Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc., and Ranir LLC will, and hereby do, move to dismiss or strike portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Action Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, and as explained in Defendants’ concurrently filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Defendants move to: 1. Dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims and prayer for injunctive relief (First Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 49(n), 80, 88, 96, 105, 112, 121, 131 & Prayer ¶ D) for lack of standing; 2. Dismiss Plaintiff Gregorio’s claims (Counts I, II, VIII, and IX) to the extent they relate to the Rembrandt Deeply White Mouthwash that he did not buy; 3. Dismiss all claims (Counts I-IX) to the extent they are based on statements that Plaintiffs do not allege they either saw or relied on, or alternatively, strike all allegations regarding those statements (FAC ¶¶ 22-24); 4. Dismiss Plaintiffs’ warranty claims (Counts I and II) under Rule 8; 5. Dismiss Plaintiffs’ warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claims (Count I) for failing to allege a particular purpose for which Plaintiffs purchased the Products; 6. Dismiss Plaintiff Gregorio’s warranty claims (Counts I and II) for failure to plead facts showing compliance with New York’s statutory notice requirements, and his implied warranty claim (Count II) for lack of privity; 7. Strike Plaintiffs’ nationwide class allegations (FAC ¶¶ 41, 54-64) Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21 Filed 01/11/17 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:140 - 3 - DEFS.’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 pursuant to Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). This Motion is based on Defendants’ concurrently filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Court’s file in this action, any matters of which the Court may properly take judicial notice, the arguments of counsel, and all supplemental papers filed at or before the hearing on this Motion. This Motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7- 3, which took place on January 4, 2017. Dated: January 11, 2017 RICHARD B. GOETZ MATTHEW D. POWERS HANNAH Y. CHANOINE MATTHEW J. SMOCK O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP BY: /s/ Matthew D. Powers MATTHEW D. POWERS Attorneys for Defendants Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21 Filed 01/11/17 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:141 MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RICHARD B. GOETZ (S.B. #115666) rgoetz@omm.com MATTHEW D. POWERS (S.B. #212682) mpowers@omm.com HANNAH Y. CHANOINE (appearing pro hac vice) hchanoine@omm.com MATTHEW J. SMOCK (S.B. #293542) msmock@omm.com O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 984-8700 Facsimile: (415) 984-8701 Attorneys for Defendants UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MELANIE BARBER, KI BURKE, and JOSEPH GREGORIO on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL- PPC, INC., JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC., and RANIR LLC, Defendants. Case No. 8:16-cv-1954-JLS-JCG MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULES 12(B)(1), 12(B)(6), AND 12(F) HON. JOSEPHINE L. STATON Date: March 10, 2017 Time: 2:30 p.m. Ctrm: 10A Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 1 of 28 Page ID #:142 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page - i - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 II. PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT .............................. 2 III. LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 3 IV. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 4 A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief ................................................. 4 B. The New York Mouthwash Claims Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Standing .................................................................................................................. 6 C. Plaintiffs Were Not Injured By Statements They Never Saw Or Relied On .......... 9 D. Plaintiffs’ Vague Warranty Claims Violate Rule 8............................................... 10 E. Plaintiffs’ Implied Warranty Claims Should Be Dismissed For Failure to Allege A “Particular Purpose” .............................................................................. 11 F. Plaintiff Gregorio’s Warranty Claims Should Be Dismissed ............................... 13 G. Plaintiffs’ “Warranty” Claims Cannot Be Brought On Behalf Of A Nationwide Class .................................................................................................. 14 V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 19 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 2 of 28 Page ID #:143 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) - ii - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CASES In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 9502003 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2009) .............................................................................11 Allen v. Hylands, Inc., 2012 WL 1656750 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2012) ..............................................................................6 Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291 (1995)....................................................................................................12 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) ....................................................................................................................7 Arthur Jaffee Assocs. v. Bilsco Auto Serv., Inc., 448 N.E.2d 792 (1983)..............................................................................................................14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................................................................................................................3 Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 2012 WL 2990766 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012).............................................................................8 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988).......................................................................................................3 Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 727 P.2d 655 (Wash. 1986).......................................................................................................18 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ....................................................................................................................3 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682 (1954) ...............................................................................................................17 Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 2011 WL 159380 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) ...............................................................................6 Castagnola v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2012 WL 2159385 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012) ............................................................................5 Catalano v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 167 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).......................................................................................14 Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 939 (S.D. Cal. 2007) .........................................................................................5 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 3 of 28 Page ID #:144 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) - iii - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 496 (1990) ...........................................................................................................9, 18 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992) ............................18 City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ......................................................................................................................4 Coleman v. Boston Sci. Corp., 2011 WL 3813173 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) ..........................................................................18 Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 174 Ill.2d 482 (1996) (Illinois) .................................................................................................16 Contreras v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Co., 2012 WL 12096581 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2012)..........................................................................6 Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Sys., Inc., 813 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1991) ........................................................................................................16 Darisse v. Nest Labs, Inc., 2016 WL 4385849 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016)....................................................................16, 17 Dash v. Seagate Tech. (U.S.) Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ..........................................................................................9 Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992)........................................................................................................18 Davison v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 2015 WL 3970502 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) ....................................................................15, 18 Dean v. Colgate-Palmolive, 2015 WL 3999313 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) ............................................................................6 Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 2012 WL 8716658 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) ........................................................................5, 6 In re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2007) ......................................................................11 Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (2010)....................................................................................................9 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 4 of 28 Page ID #:145 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) - iv - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dysthe v. Basic Research LLC, 2011 WL 5868307 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) ............................................................................8 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011).......................................................................................................5 Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)............................................................................................................4 In re Ferrero Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2011) .....................................................................................10 Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 129 Ariz. 574 (1981) .................................................................................................................17 Forcellati v. Hyland’s, Inc., 2014 WL 1410264 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) ..............................................................................6 Fortune View Condo. Ass’n v. Fortune Star Dev. Co., 90 P.3d 1062 (Wash. 2004).......................................................................................................17 Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ........................................................................................12 Frezza v. Google, Inc., 2013 WL 1736788 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) ..........................................................................15 In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litig., 2013 WL 4647512 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013)....................................................................13, 14 Gale v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 781 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) ....................................................................................9 Glenn v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2016 WL 3621280 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2016) ..........................................................................11 Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., 2012 WL 2847575 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012).............................................................................6 Gustafson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 294 F.R.D. 529 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (Staton, J.)............................................................................17 Henderson v. Gruma Corp., 2011 WL 1362188 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) ............................................................................6 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 5 of 28 Page ID #:146 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) - v - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Hobbs v. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ...................................................................................16 Holt v. Foodstate, Inc., 2015 WL 9592534 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2015).............................................................................8 Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1992).....................................................................................................4 In re Intel Laptop Battery Litig., 2011 WL 7290487 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2011) ..............................................................................5 Intergraph Corp. v. Stearman, 555 So.2d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ...............................................................................17 Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ................................................................................6, 10 Johns v. Bayer Corp., 2010 WL 476688 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) .................................................................................6 Jones v. Nutiva, Inc., 2016 WL 5210935 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016) ...........................................................................8 Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13 (1985).......................................................................................................12 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310 (2011) ................................................................................................................9 Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., 2012 WL 5458396 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) ............................................................................6 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (S.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d 252 Fed. App’x 777 (9th Cir. 2007) ...........................................................................................................................................9 Leonhart v. Nature’s Path Foods, Inc., 2014 WL 1338161 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014)........................................................................6, 7 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ....................................................................................................................3 Mahoney v. Endo Health Sols., 2016 WL 3951185 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 20, 2016) ............................................................................14 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 6 of 28 Page ID #:147 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) - vi - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Mangano v. Town of Babylon, 111 A.D.3d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)....................................................................................14 Mason v. Nature’s Innovation, Inc., 2013 WL 1969957 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2013).............................................................................5 Mastrangelo v. Howmedica, Div. of Pfizer Hosp. Prod. Grp., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ...........................................................................................12 Maxwell v. Unilever United States, Inc., 2014 WL 4275712 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014)............................................................................7 Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012).....................................................................................1, 11, 14, 15 McCrary v. Elations Co., LLC, 2013 WL 6403073 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2013) ...........................................................................10 McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988).......................................................................................................3 Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 861 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ....................................................................................7, 8 Mohamed v. Kellogg Co., 2015 WL 12469107 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015) ........................................................................10 Moore v. Berry, 458 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) .........................................................................................17 Morgan v. Wallaby Yogurt Co., Inc., 2014 WL 1017879 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014)............................................................................4 Mullins v. Wyatt, 887 S.W.2d 356 (Ky. 1994) (Kentucky) ...................................................................................16 Punian v. Gillette Co., 2016 WL 1029607 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016)..........................................................................12 Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273 (1973)....................................................................................................................16 Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 2012 WL 641946 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012)......................................................................15, 17 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 7 of 28 Page ID #:148 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) - vii - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Route v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 2013 WL 658251 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013).............................................................................15 In re Rust-Oleum Restore Mktg., Sales Prac. and Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ........................................................................................12 Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 2016 WL 6563348 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016)..............................................................................6 Singleton v. Fifth Gen., Inc., 2016 WL 406295 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016) .......................................................................13, 14 Smedt v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 2466881 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) ............................................................................8 Smith v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., 2014 WL 989742 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014)............................................................................12 Stephenson v. Neutrogena Corp., 2012 WL 8527784 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2012).........................................................................8, 9 Strumlauf v. Starbucks Corp., 2016 WL 3361842 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2016) ............................................................................4 T & M Solar and Air Conditioning v. Lennox Int’l Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ..................................................................................12, 13 Tasion Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ubiquiti Networks, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 630 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ........................................................................................16, 17 Tomasino v. Estee Lauder Companies, 44 F. Supp. 3d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ........................................................................................13 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010).......................................................................................9 Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2006).................................................................................................4, 5 Wang v. OCZ Tech. Grp., Inc., 276 F.R.D. 618 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ................................................................................................5 Wilens v. TD Waterhouse Grp., Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 746 (2003)......................................................................................................9 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 8 of 28 Page ID #:149 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) - viii - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ....................................................................................10 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) ..........................................................................................................................7 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 .......................................................................................................9 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535 .......................................................................................................9 Cal. Com. Code § 2315 cmt. 2........................................................................................................12 Cal. Com. Code § 2725...................................................................................................................18 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-725...............................................................................................................18 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101(a) ......................................................................................................18 Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(4).............................................................................................................18 Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(5).............................................................................................................18 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-315 .......................................................................................................................12 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) ........................................................................................................13, 14 New York General Business Law § 349 .......................................................................................3, 9 New York General Business Law § 350 .......................................................................................3, 9 Wis. Stat. § 402.725 ........................................................................................................................18 RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ................................................................................................................................1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).....................................................................................................................3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).....................................................................................................................3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ......................................................................................................................3, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ..............................................................................................................................7 Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 9 of 28 Page ID #:150 - 1 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. INTRODUCTION This case is about the relative degree of teeth whitening each of the Plaintiffs claims to have obtained from Rembrandt Deeply White + peroxide toothpaste (the “Toothpaste”) and/or Rembrandt Deeply White + peroxide mouthwash (the “Mouthwash”) (together, the “Products”). Plaintiffs do not claim that the Products failed to whiten their teeth-instead, they claim that the Products remove “surface stains” and that their teeth were not “deeply” whitened. (See, e.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 2 (“[T]he Deeply White Products … do not go below surface stain removal . . .”) (emphasis added); id. ¶¶ 7-9 (products allegedly did not “remove deep stains” or “deeply whiten [their] teeth”). This is not the time to address whether these Plaintiffs’ perceptions and allegations are accurate or true, whether each followed the directions on the Products, or how each of their habits may have resulted in ongoing teeth staining. At the proper time, Defendants will demonstrate that the Products, used as directed, can and do provide the benefits buyers seek. Instead, Defendants bring this Motion now because Plaintiffs’ FAC is overbroad in several key respects. Specifically, the Court should: (1) dismiss all claims for injunctive relief for lack of standing; (2) dismiss all claims under New York law over a product (the Mouthwash) that the New York Plaintiff never bought; (3) dismiss all claims to the extent that they are based on statements Plaintiffs never saw or relied on for lack of standing, or alternatively, strike allegations regarding those statements; (4) dismiss Plaintiffs’ individual warranty claims because they are impermissibly vague in violation of Rule 8; (5) dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims for failure to allege a “particular” purpose (as opposed to an “ordinary” purpose) for the Products; (6) dismiss the New York Plaintiff’s warranty claims for failure to plead facts showing compliance with New York’s statutory notice requirements, and his implied warranty claim for lack of privity; and (7) strike Plaintiffs’ proposed nationwide class pursuant to Mazza v. Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 10 of 28 Page ID #:151 - 2 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court should grant Defendants’ Motion to pare back the overbroad portions of Plaintiffs’ FAC so that the parties (and the Court) can avoid spending time and resources litigating claims that are invalid as a matter of law. II. PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT In the FAC, each of the Plaintiffs contends that they did not experience “deep whitening” when they used the Products. However, none of the Plaintiffs allege that the Products provided no benefits whatsoever or failed to whiten their teeth- their allegations are all focused on “deep whitening” or “intrinsic stains.” Plaintiff Melanie Barber, for example, alleges that she used the Toothpaste “as directed for six months but stopped using it because she did not notice any changes on the deeper stains on her teeth.” (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff Ki Burke contends that she used both Products for “about a year,” but the Products “did not deeply whiten her teeth, or affect any of the intrinsic stains on her teeth.” (Id. ¶ 8.) And Plaintiff Joseph Gregorio alleges that he only purchased the Toothpaste and purchased it “eight or nine times during the past few years.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Mr. Gregorio alleges that the Toothpaste “didn’t work to deeply whiten his teeth.” (Id.) Plaintiffs’ individual claims are all based on statements on the Products’ labels. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants made similar “deeply whiten” claims on their websites, in online videos, and in television commercials (id. ¶¶ 22-24) but the named Plaintiffs do not allege that they saw these non-label statements before they bought the Products. (See id. at ¶¶ 7-9.) Based on those allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of express warranty (Count I) and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose (Count II) on behalf of a nationwide class “consisting of all persons in the United States who, within the relevant statute of limitations period, purchased Deeply White Products.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs Barber and Burke assert claims for (1) violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) (Count Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 11 of 28 Page ID #:152 - 3 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 III), (2) violation of the California False Advertising Law (“FAL”) (Count IV), (3) violation of the “unlawful prong” of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Count V), (4) violation of the “fraudulent prong” of the UCL (Count VI), and (5) violation of the “unfair prong” of the UCL (Count VII) on behalf of a California subclass consisting of “all members of the Class who purchased Deeply White Products in California.” (Id. ¶¶ 42, 65-112.) Plaintiff Gregorio also asserts violations of New York General Business Law (“GBL”) § 349 (Count VIII) and § 350 (Count IX) on behalf of a New York subclass consisting of “all members of the Class who purchased Deeply White Products in New York.” (Id. ¶¶ 43, 113-131.) Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, restitution and/or disgorgement, and costs and fees. III. LEGAL STANDARD Motions to dismiss should be granted where, as here, Plaintiffs’ claims and prayers for relief fail to present a justiciable “case” or “controversy” under Article III, or otherwise fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6). Article III confers federal jurisdiction only when the plaintiff alleges: (1) “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant; and (3) injury that will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Dismissal of claims is also appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a plaintiff fails to allege facts that, if true, would “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to survive dismissal. Id.; see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). And, finally, under Rule 12(f), the Court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 12 of 28 Page ID #:153 - 4 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . .” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks, citation, and first alteration omitted), rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). IV. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Because the Products’ labeling and marketing can never “mislead” Plaintiffs again, they lack standing to seek injunctive relief. In federal court, claims for injunctive relief require Plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are “realistically threatened by a repetition of [the violation].” City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); see also Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing injunctive relief absent allegations that plaintiffs would suffer “the same purported injury in the future”); Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (employee lacked standing to seek injunctive relief absent any “indication in the complaint” that the employee bore “any interest in returning to work for the [employer]”). This principle applies with equal force in consumer class actions-and as several courts in this Circuit have held, plaintiffs (like Plaintiffs here) who understand the supposed “truth” about products they bought lack standing to seek injunctive relief because they are not threatened by any injury from those products in the future. See Morgan v. Wallaby Yogurt Co., Inc., 2014 WL 1017879, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014) (no standing to seek injunctive relief where “plaintiffs now know what evaporated cane juice is and have unambiguously stated that they would not have purchased the product had they known it contained added sugar”).1 This Court reached the same conclusion a 1 See also Strumlauf v. Starbucks Corp., 2016 WL 3361842, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2016) (dismissing injunctive relief relating to coffee chain’s allegedly under- Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 13 of 28 Page ID #:154 - 5 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 few years ago when it dismissed claims for injunctive relief in Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 2012 WL 8716658 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (Staton, J.): “Because Plaintiff does not believe the product works and does not intend to purchase it again, there is not a ‘sufficient likelihood that [she] will again be wronged in a similar way.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 2011)). In this case there is no threat of future injury. Just as in Delarosa, Morgan, Walsh, and Imagineering, Plaintiffs here expressly allege that they are aware of the Products’ supposed shortcomings (i.e., they do not “deeply” whiten), and have not alleged a realistic threat of future injury from those products in the future. (See FAC ¶¶ 49(n), 80, 88, 96, 105, 112, 121, 131 & Prayer ¶ D.) Their claims for injunctive relief should be dismissed with prejudice.2 filled lattes because “[t]here is no danger that [plaintiffs] will be misled in the future . . . [n]ow they know”); Mason v. Nature’s Innovation, Inc., 2013 WL 1969957, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2013) (no likelihood of future injury under Article III for product misrepresentations where “Plaintiff has no intention of buying Defendant’s skin tag removal product again in the future” and “[a]ccording to Plaintiff, the product has no efficacy with respect to the removal of skin tags, the reason why Plaintiff bought it in the first place.”); Castagnola v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2012 WL 2159385, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012) (no standing for injunctive relief where plaintiffs “do not allege that they intend to purchase [the products] in the future,” and, even if they did, “Plaintiffs now have knowledge of the terms and conditions of the program, know that HP would transfer their billing information to Regent, and know that Regent, rather than HP, administers the program”); In re Intel Laptop Battery Litig., 2011 WL 7290487, at *2-*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2011) (plaintiff failed to establish threat of future harm “as a matter of law” on false advertising claim about laptop’s battery power capabilities because “Plaintiff has knowledge of Defendants’ alleged misconduct” and “cannot show that it is realistically threatened by a repetition of the alleged violation”); Wang v. OCZ Tech. Grp., Inc., 276 F.R.D. 618, 626 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“If Wang paid an inflated price for the product based on OCZ’s alleged misrepresentations, he is in no danger of doing so again.”); Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 939, 951-52 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (no standing to seek injunctive relief where plaintiff “is now fully aware of the linens’ thread count”). 2 Some courts have argued that enforcing Article III’s standing requirements in consumer class actions could “thwart the objective of California’s consumer Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 14 of 28 Page ID #:155 - 6 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B. The New York Mouthwash Claims Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Standing Next, the Court should dismiss New York Plaintiff Gregorio’s claims based on the Mouthwash because he did not buy it. (See FAC ¶ 9.) Here, Mr. Gregorio lacks Article III standing to bring claims over the Mouthwash because “there can be no requisite pecuniary injury where plaintiff did not [himself] purchase the product at issue.” Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (emphasis original).3 Some courts in this Circuit have allowed plaintiffs in class actions to pursue claims over products they did not buy under limited circumstances-i.e., when the product at issue is “substantially identical” to a product the plaintiff did buy. See, e.g., Leonhart v. Nature’s Path Foods, Inc., 2014 WL 1338161, at *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014). But that line of cases should not govern here. protection laws . . . .” Henderson v. Gruma Corp., 2011 WL 1362188, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (citation omitted); see also Dean v. Colgate-Palmolive, 2015 WL 3999313, at *8-*9 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015). However, as this Court-like many others-have made clear, “Article III trumps both California law and the Erie doctrine.” Delarosa, 2012 WL 8716658, at *3; see also Forcellati v. Hyland’s, Inc., 2014 WL 1410264, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (King, J.) (same, following Delarosa); Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 2016 WL 6563348, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016) (same, citing Delarosa). 3 See, e.g., Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., 2012 WL 2847575, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012); Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., 2012 WL 5458396, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (plaintiffs could not have suffered particularized injury for unpurchased products); Contreras v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Co., 2012 WL 12096581, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2012); Allen v. Hylands, Inc., 2012 WL 1656750, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2012) (no standing to “assert claims arising out of any alleged false or misleading statements” relating to unpurchased homeopathic products); Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 2011 WL 159380, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (dismissing claims for unpurchased ice cream “Dibs” product where plaintiff failed to allege “that he purchased Defendant’s Dibs products or otherwise suffered any injury or lost money or property with respect to those products”); Johns v. Bayer Corp., 2010 WL 476688, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 15 of 28 Page ID #:156 - 7 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 First, the logic of those cases-i.e., allowing a plaintiff to pursue claims he would otherwise lack simply because the case is brought as a putative class action-violates the bedrock principle that Rule 23 cannot modify or enlarge any party’s underlying substantive rights without running afoul of the Article III and Due Process constraints on the Rules Enabling Act. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). There is no question that if Gregorio brought his claims on an individual basis, his claims over the Mouthwash would fail-and he should not be allowed to evade that outcome simply by styling the FAC as a class action complaint. Second, those cases do not govern here in any event because the product that Gregorio did buy (the Toothpaste) is not “substantially identical” to the Mouthwash. Leonhart, 2014 WL 1338161, at *4-*5; Maxwell v. Unilever United States, Inc., 2014 WL 4275712, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014); Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 861, 871 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The two products are different-the Toothpaste is (obviously) a paste while the Mouthwash is a liquid, they are used in different ways4 and have different ingredients.5 Even the Products’ respective peroxide formulations are different: the Toothpaste contains “urea peroxide,” while the Mouthwash contains “hydrogen peroxide.” (Id.) The Products’ labels are also different, and the statements Plaintiffs claim are “misleading” vary between the different Product labels. (Compare FAC ¶ 19, with 4 Compare FAC ¶ 19 (“brush teeth thoroughly, preferably after each meal or at least 2 times a day, or as directed by a dentist or physician”), with FAC ¶ 20 (“pour 10 mL (2 teaspoonfuls),” “rigorously swish 10 mL of rinse between your teeth for 1 minute and then spit out,” “do not swallow the rinse,” and “do not eat or drink for 30 minutes after rinsing”). 5 The Toothpaste’s active anti-cavity ingredient is sodium monofluorophosphate and the Mouthwash’s is sodium fluoride. (FAC ¶¶ 19-20.) Out of the many different ingredients in the Products (eleven for the Mouthwash and fourteen for the Toothpaste) only four ingredients overlap: “flavor,” “sodium saccharin,” “propylene glycol,” and “calcium disodium EDTA.” (Id.) Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 16 of 28 Page ID #:157 - 8 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 FAC ¶ 20.) Even minor variations in the product label or packaging can be fatal to claims over non-purchased products. See Jones v. Nutiva, Inc., 2016 WL 5210935, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016) (two unpurchased coconut oils did “not [] contain the same allegedly misleading statements” as the third purchased oil); see also Miller, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 870-71 (various unpurchased white chocolate products were not substantially similar to purchased chocolate because “[t]hey look different” and “they are labeled differently”); Holt v. Foodstate, Inc., 2015 WL 9592534, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2015) (vitamin products not substantially similar where the packaging was “significantly different”). In fact, even where plaintiffs allege that a manufacturer made “the exact same representations” across multiple products, courts have not hesitated to exclude unpurchased products on standing grounds. Smedt v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 2466881, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014); see, e.g., Stephenson v. Neutrogena Corp., 2012 WL 8527784, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2012) (five facial care products not substantially similar to facial cleanser marketed with similar statements). The fact that both Products contain peroxide (albeit different types of peroxide) does not make them “identical” either. As Judge Guilford observed a few years ago: “Having a few common ingredients is simply not enough to show the Products are the same or even ‘nearly identical.’ …. After all, just because an Old Fashioned and a Manhattan both have bourbon doesn’t mean they’re the same drink.” Dysthe v. Basic Research LLC, 2011 WL 5868307, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011); see also Holt, 2015 WL 9592534, at *2 (no substantial similarity between multivitamin products, even though “there is overlap of some ingredients in some of the products”). Under these circumstances, the Products are far from “substantially identical” such that Mr. Gregorio should be allowed to pursue claims over a product he never bought. In short, this is not a case where the products at issue are just different flavors of ice cream. See, e.g., Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 2012 WL Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 17 of 28 Page ID #:158 - 9 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2990766, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012) (different ice cream flavors substantially similar). The Toothpaste and Mouthwash at issue here have different ingredients, different labels, and are used in different ways. They are too different to lump together for standing purposes. Stephenson, 2012 WL 8527784, at *1. Plaintiff Gregorio’s claims in Counts I, II, VIII, and IX should be dismissed to the extent they relate to the Mouthwash that he never purchased. C. Plaintiffs Were Not Injured By Statements They Never Saw Or Relied On Article III also bars Plaintiffs from basing their claims on statements or representations that they neither saw nor relied upon.6 And here, the FAC is clear 6 Plaintiffs’ express warranty and consumer protection claims all require a showing of a causal connection between the challenged statements and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. See CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 496, 503-06 (1990) (while “[t]he critical question is not whether the buyer believed in the truth of the warranted information,” the express warranty must be “a part of the bargain” and “shown to have been relied on as part of the contract”); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (dismissing California express warranty claims); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17204, 17535; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 326 (2011) (construing “as a result of” under FAL and UCL to mean “caused by”); Wilens v. TD Waterhouse Grp., Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 746, 754 (2003) (In CLRA claim, “causation [is] a necessary element of proof”); see, e.g., Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (S.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d 252 Fed. App’x 777 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing UCL and FAL claims because the plaintiffs failed to plead reliance in failing to “allege that they saw, read, or in any way relied on the advertisements” or allege that they “entered into the transaction as a result of those advertisements”) (emphasis in original); Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1361-67 (2010) (UCL and CLRA claims dismissed where plaintiff failed to allege he read alleged misrepresentations at issue); Gale v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 781 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (dismissing GBL § 349 where no allegation that plaintiffs saw any of defendants’ non-label statements and therefore “could not have been the cause of [their] injury, there being no connection between the deceptive act and the plaintiff’s injury”); Dash v. Seagate Tech. (U.S.) Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 357, 360 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (GBL § 350 requires reliance on the allegedly false advertising). Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 18 of 28 Page ID #:159 - 10 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 that the only statements Plaintiffs allege seeing and relying upon are the statements on the product packaging itself. (FAC ¶¶ 7-9.) Yet the FAC is riddled with allegations about television advertisements, websites, and other non-label forms of marketing-none of which any of the Plaintiffs allege they ever saw. (Id. ¶¶ 22- 24). Because these unseen non-label statements played no role in Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, permitting Plaintiffs to base their claims on those statements “would be an affront to state and federal standing rules.” Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing claims based on website not seen by plaintiffs). For this reason, courts routinely hold that Plaintiffs lack standing to “challenge materials [they have] not alleged [they] read or relied upon.” Mohamed v. Kellogg Co., 2015 WL 12469107, at *2, *3, *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015) (same); see also In re Ferrero Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111-12, 1114-18 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (same); McCrary v. Elations Co., LLC, 2013 WL 6403073, at *7-*11 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2013) (same); Ivie, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (same). So too here: the Court should dismiss or strike Plaintiffs’ allegations of supposedly “false” statements made outside the label because Plaintiffs never reviewed or relied on any of those statements. D. Plaintiffs’ Vague Warranty Claims Violate Rule 8 In the FAC, Plaintiffs purport to assert claims for “express warranty” and “breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose” on behalf of a nationwide class. (FAC ¶¶ 41, 53-64.) But even though such “warranty” claims will necessarily depend on state substantive law, Plaintiffs never identify the substantive law(s) they contend govern those claims. (Id.) The choice of substantive law is a key threshold issue-as set out below in the next section, Plaintiff Gregorio has failed to plead necessary elements of those claims that would be required under New York law (Gregorio’s state of residence). But more fundamentally, Plaintiffs’ failure to identify the law(s) governing these claims is improper because it makes it impossible for the Court (and Defendants) to evaluate Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 19 of 28 Page ID #:160 - 11 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 whether Plaintiffs have stated claims for relief under the law(s) Plaintiffs seek to invoke (whatever they are). Thus, on their current allegations, Plaintiffs’ warranty claims (Counts I and II) should be dismissed for failing to comply with the most basic Rule 8 principles. See Glenn v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2016 WL 3621280, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2016) (dismissing vague “unjust enrichment” claim brought on behalf of a national class because the court found it “prudent to refrain from guessing what state law or laws Plaintiffs are using as the basis for their unjust enrichment claims”); In re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2007) (same); see also In re Aftermarket Auto. Lighting Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 9502003, at *6-*7 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2009) (“Courts routinely dismiss claims where no plaintiff is alleged to reside in a state whose laws the class seeks to enforce.”). E. Plaintiffs’ Implied Warranty Claims Should Be Dismissed For Failure to Allege A “Particular Purpose” As set out above, Plaintiffs do not specify the substantive laws that apply to their warranty claims. That said, under well-established choice of law principles, the laws of the state where a customer resides and bought the Products at issue will typically govern that customer’s claims. See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2012). If, in fact, Plaintiffs are seeking to bring implied warranty claims under the laws of their home states (California and New York) then their claims for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (Count II) fail because they have not alleged a “particular” purpose that differs from the Products’ “ordinary” purpose (i.e., whitening teeth). Under both California and New York law, an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose arises “‘only where (1) the purchaser at the time of contracting intends to use the goods for a particular purpose, (2) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know of this particular purpose, (3) the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for the particular Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 20 of 28 Page ID #:161 - 12 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 purpose, and (4) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know that the buyer is relying on such skill and judgment.’” Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 25 (1985)); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-315; Mastrangelo v. Howmedica, Div. of Pfizer Hosp. Prod. Grp., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 439, 443 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). And, critically, under both California and New York law, the alleged “‘particular purpose’” must be different from “‘the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used’” because it contemplates a buyer’s “‘specific use . . . which is peculiar to the nature of his business.’” Smith v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., 2014 WL 989742, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014) (quoting Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1295 n.2 (1995)); Mastrangelo 903 F. Supp. at 443 n.1 (same); see also N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2; Cal. Com. Code § 2315 cmt. 2.7 In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that the “particular purpose” at issue here is “deep whitening.” (FAC ¶ 61.) But they have not alleged any facts showing that this purpose is particular to the individual Plaintiffs, or to explain how that “particular purpose” differs from the ordinary purpose for which customers buy the Products. See Smith, 2014 WL 989742, at *8 (alleged “particular purpose” for high-speed and efficient washing machine was “ordinary” and not particular, because “[plaintiff] purchased it to wash her laundry, which is the ‘ordinary’ purpose of a washing machine.”); Punian v. Gillette Co., 2016 WL 1029607, at **1-2, *18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016) (batteries marketed as lasting ten years in storage); T & M Solar and Air Conditioning v. Lennox Int’l Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 855, 861, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing claim over solar panels because the alleged particular use was “the very purpose that Defendant marketed and sold the solar panel systems”); see also In re Rust-Oleum Restore Mktg., Sales Prac. and 7 By contrast, the implied warranty of merchantability (which is not at issue here) embodies “‘ordinary purposes for which goods are used’” and “‘go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.’” Id. Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 21 of 28 Page ID #:162 - 13 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 772, 802-05 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (rejecting “particular purpose” claims because “‘an ‘ordinary use’ cannot also serve as the requisite ‘particular purpose’”). Because Plaintiffs do not allege a particular purpose distinct from the ordinary purpose for which “Defendants marketed and sold” the Products, T & M Solar, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 877, Count II must be dismissed. F. Plaintiff Gregorio’s Warranty Claims Should Be Dismissed Assuming, again, that Plaintiff Gregorio is seeking to bring his warranty claims under New York law, those warranty claims should also be dismissed because he fails to allege facts to show compliance with New York’s notice requirements for both warranty claims (Counts I and II) and privity for his implied warranty claim (Count II). Lack of statutory notice. Mr. Gregorio has not alleged any facts demonstrating compliance with New York’s statutory notice requirements. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) requires notice to the seller of the breached warranty “within a reasonable time” after the buyer “discovers or should have discovered any breach or [the buyer will] be barred from any remedy.” N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (emphasis added). Courts have dismissed warranty claims, both express and implied, where the consumer fails to allege facts plausibly demonstrating sufficient and timely notice after discovery of the breach. See In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litig., 2013 WL 4647512, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013) (“Plaintiffs fail to allege in the First Amended Complaint that they even provided sufficient notice . . . let alone notice within a reasonable time after discovery of a breach.”); see also Tomasino v. Estee Lauder Companies, 44 F. Supp. 3d 251, 261-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (dismissing implied and express warranty claims over efficacy of facial cream in absence of allegation of notice); Singleton v. Fifth Gen., Inc., 2016 WL 406295, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016) (complaint did “not even allege when Plaintiff discovered the alleged breach”). Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 22 of 28 Page ID #:163 - 14 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Here, Mr. Gregorio alleges only that he purchased the Toothpaste “eight or nine times during the past few years.” (FAC ¶ 9). He alleges neither when he discovered the supposed breach (see Singleton, 2016 WL 406295, at *12), nor that he notified Defendants of the breach at all (see In re Frito-Lay, 2013 WL 4647512, at *27), much less facts demonstrating that his notice was given within a reasonable time after discovering the “breach” under N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). (See FAC ¶¶ 53-64). Because Mr. Gregorio has failed to allege the facts necessary to show compliance with New York’s statutory notice requirements, Mr. Gregorio’s individual warranty claims (Counts I and II) should be dismissed. Lack of privity. Mr. Gregorio’s New York implied warranty claims also fail for lack of privity, which is an essential element in cases that, like this case, do not involve personal injury claims. Mahoney v. Endo Health Sols., 2016 WL 3951185 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 20, 2016) (dismissing claim); Catalano v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 167 F. Supp. 3d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same); Mangano v. Town of Babylon, 111 A.D.3d 801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); see also Arthur Jaffee Assocs. v. Bilsco Auto Serv., Inc., 448 N.E.2d 792, 792 (1983) (affirming motion for summary judgment on implied warranty claim for lack of privity). Here, Mr. Gregorio alleges only that he bought the Toothpaste “from several retailers.” (FAC ¶ 9.) Since Mr. Gregorio has alleged no facts demonstrating a direct relationship between him and Defendants, his implied warranty claim must be dismissed. G. Plaintiffs’ “Warranty” Claims Cannot Be Brought On Behalf Of A Nationwide Class Finally, the Court should strike Plaintiffs’ proposed “nationwide” warranty class (Counts I and II) under Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). As Plaintiffs seem to recognize, consumers’ claims are usually governed by the laws of the state where they reside and where they purchased and used the products at issue. (See FAC ¶¶ 65, 80, 88, 96, 105, 112, 121 (asserting statutory consumer fraud claims on behalf of New York and California Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 23 of 28 Page ID #:164 - 15 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 subclasses).) Yet at the same time, the “warranty” claims Plaintiffs seek to pursue are (unlike their consumer fraud claims) purportedly brought on behalf of a single nationwide class. Under the circumstances, this Court should strike those “nationwide” class allegations. As the Ninth Circuit made clear in Mazza, nationwide class treatment is not appropriate where material differences exist in the laws of the jurisdictions where the proposed class members purchased the products at issue. As the Ninth Circuit explained: “each foreign state has an interest in applying its law to transactions within its borders and . . . , if California law were applied to the entire class, foreign states would be impaired in their ability to calibrate liability to foster commerce[,]” and “California’s interest in applying its law to residents of foreign states is attenuated.” Id. at 593-94. Decisions following Mazza have made clear that “the principle articulated in Mazza applies generally and is instructive even when addressing a motion to dismiss.” Frezza v. Google, Inc., 2013 WL 1736788, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). In fact, in analogous cases, i.e., where members of a proposed class purchased the products at issue throughout the United States, Mazza is “not only relevant but controlling” at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at *5. Thus, “many courts have decided against deferring the choice of law decision until discovery or class certification where, as here, the material differences are sufficiently obvious from the pleadings.” Davison v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 2015 WL 3970502, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (dismissing California UCL and CLRA claims asserted on behalf of a national class). Indeed, in the wake of Mazza, several courts have identified material differences in states’ warranty laws that precluded class actions from going forward on a nationwide basis-including at the motion to dismiss stage. See Route v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 2013 WL 658251, at *7- *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013) (granting motion to strike nationwide class express warranty claim); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 2012 WL 641946, at *5-*7 (S.D. Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 24 of 28 Page ID #:165 - 16 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Ohio Feb. 28, 2012) (same); see also Darisse v. Nest Labs, Inc., 2016 WL 4385849, at *12-*15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016) (denying motion for certification of a nationwide implied warranty class). As set out below, those same material differences will be at issue here-states have different requirements regarding (1) pre-suit notice, (2) privity, (3) reliance, and (4) limitations periods. Pre-suit Notice: “[S]ome states require notice for a claim of breach of express warranty while others do not.” Tasion Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ubiquiti Networks, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 630, 636 (N.D. Cal. 2015).8 In some jurisdictions requiring notice, “some require pre-litigation notice while others do not.” Id.9 Other states, meanwhile, do not require notice to the manufacturer itself (as opposed to a retailer) while others do.10 Compare Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Sys., Inc., 813 P.2d 736, 741 (Colo. 1991) (notice only required to be given to the immediate seller), with Hobbs v. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (“[R]emote manufacturers should be afforded the same protections as sellers, either by way of notice provided directly to them, or through notice provided to them by the direct seller from the buyer.”). As this Court recently noted when denying certification of a nationwide consumer protection 8 Compare Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 174 Ill.2d 482, 492 (1996) (Illinois) (notice not required where the seller has actual knowledge of the defect or are notified by the complaint), with Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 284 (1973) (Oregon) (notice is an essential element of an express warranty claim that must be pleaded). 9 Compare Tasion, 2014 WL 1048710, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) (California) (under California law,“notice must be provided before the lawsuit-notice that is after, or contemporaneous with, the filing of the lawsuit is insufficient”), with Mullins v. Wyatt, 887 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Ky. 1994) (Kentucky) (pre-litigation notice not required, only reasonable notice to be determined as an issue of fact). 10 States similarly diverge over whether pre-suit notice is required for breach of implied warranty claims. See Darisse, 2016 WL 4385849, at *12 (identifying three states that require pre-suit notice, one state that does not, and five states where the complaint can constitute notice). Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 25 of 28 Page ID #:166 - 17 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 class, such “differences are not trivial as they go to putative class members’ rights to bring [warranty] claims.” Gustafson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 294 F.R.D. 529, 539 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (Staton, J.). Privity: Although “California provides an exception to the requirement of privity for purchases where the plaintiff relied on the product’s labels or advertising, … other states bar claims for breach of express warranty in the absence of privity and a third category have no requirement of privity at all.”11 Rikos, 2012 WL 641946, at *5.12 In addition, some states require privity for some types of express warranty claims, but not for others. See, e.g., Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 129 Ariz. 574, 580 (1981) (privity required for express warranty claim under Arizona’s Uniform Commercial Code, but not for non-U.C.C. express warranty claim). As with pre-suit notice, these different privity requirements will be material because they could easily be outcome-determinative: Under several states’ laws (those that require privity) members of the proposed class-who purchased the products from “several retailers” and not Defendants (FAC ¶¶ 7-9)-would be barred from recovery as a matter of law. Reliance: Next, “some jurisdictions require reliance (or something similar) for a claim of breach of express warranty while others do not.” Tasion, 308 F.R.D. at 636. Georgia requires reliance. Moore v. Berry, 458 S.E.2d 879, 881 (Ga. Ct. 11 States similarly diverge over whether privity is required for breach of implied warranty claims. See Darisse, 2016 WL 4385849, at *12 (identifying eight states that do not require privity and fifteen that do). 12 See also, e.g., Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 695 (1954) (recognizing exception to express warranty privity requirement where “the purchaser of a product relied on representations made by the manufacturer in labels or advertising material”); Intergraph Corp. v. Stearman, 555 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“Privity is required in order to recover damages from the seller of a product for breach of express or implied warranties.”); Fortune View Condo. Ass’n v. Fortune Star Dev. Co., 90 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Wash. 2004) (“[C]ontractual privity is not required to create express warranties.”) (emphasis in original). Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 26 of 28 Page ID #:167 - 18 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 App. 1995). California requires reliance where privity is absent. See Coleman v. Boston Sci. Corp., 2011 WL 3813173, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011). New York requires the express warranty be “a part of the bargain” and “shown to have been relied on as part of the contract,” but not that the buyer believed the truth of the warranted information. CBS Inc., 75 N.Y.2d at 503-06 . And Washington, by contrast, does not require reliance but requires awareness of the alleged warranty. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 727 P.2d 655, 669 (Wash. 1986). New Jersey similarly requires that the buyer be made aware of the alleged warranty, creating a presumption of reliance that can be rebutted. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 569 n.34 (3d Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). Finally, some states, such as Virginia, do not have a reliance requirement at all. See Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 338-39 (Va. 1992). As with pre-suit notice and privity, these various formulations of reliance (or lack thereof) are material because a particular class member’s ability to recover could easily turn on which state’s law applies to their claims. Statutes of Limitations: Finally, states also diverge on the statutes of limitations for warranty claims. For example, Colorado has a three year limitations period for warranty actions (both express and implied), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 4-2- 725, 13-80-101(a), Wisconsin’s is six years (both express and implied), Wis. Stat. § 402.725, California’s is four years (both express and implied), Cal. Com. Code § 2725, and Iowa’s is five years for implied warranties and ten years for express warranties, Iowa Code Ann. §§ 614.1(4), (5). Thus, a class member who purchased the Products between 2012 and 2013 may or may not be able to recover at all, depending on which state’s law applies. In short, Plaintiffs’ vague “warranty” claims cannot proceed on behalf of a national class, Davison, 2015 WL 3970502, at *2 n.3, and should be dismissed or stricken from the FAC. Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 27 of 28 Page ID #:168 - 19 - MEM. OF P. & A. ISO DEFS.’ MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant this Motion and strip out the portions of Plaintiffs’ FAC and related claims that are invalid as a matter of law. Dated: January 11, 2017 RICHARD B. GOETZ MATTHEW D. POWERS HANNAH Y. CHANOINE MATTHEW J. SMOCK O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP BY: /s/ Matthew D. Powers MATTHEW D. POWERS Attorneys for Defendants Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 28 of 28 Page ID #:169 - 1 - DEFS.’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RICHARD B. GOETZ (S.B. #115666) rgoetz@omm.com MATTHEW D. POWERS (S.B. #212682) mpowers@omm.com HANNAH Y. CHANOINE (appearing pro hac vice) hchanoine@omm.com MATTHEW J. SMOCK (S.B. #293542) msmock@omm.com O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 984-8700 Facsimile: (415) 984-8701 Attorneys for Defendants UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MELANIE BARBER, KI BURKE, and JOSEPH GREGORIO on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL- PPC, INC., JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC., and RANIR LLC, Defendants. Case No. 8:16-cv-1954-JLS-JCG [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULES 12(B)(1), 12(B)(6), AND 12(F) HON. JOSEPHINE L. STATON Date: March 10, 2017 Time: 2:30 p.m. Ctrm: 10A This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(f). The Motion was heard on March 10, 2017. After considering the papers submitted and the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:170 - 2 - DEFS.’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 1. All Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief prayer (First Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 49(n), 80, 88, 96, 105, 112, 121, 131 & Prayer ¶ D) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of standing; 2. Plaintiff Gregorio’s claims (Counts I, II, VIII, and IX) are DISMISSED for lack of standing to the extent they relate to the Rembrandt Deeply White Mouthwash that he did not buy; 3. All claims (Counts I-IX) are DISMISSED to the extent they are based on statements that Plaintiffs do not allege they either saw or relied on; 4. Plaintiffs’ warranty claims (Counts I and II) are DISMISSED under Rule 8; 5. Plaintiffs’ warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claims (Count I) are DISMISSED for the additional reason that they fail to allege a particular purpose for which Plaintiffs purchased the Rembrandt Deeply White Products; 6. Plaintiff Gregorio’s warranty claims (Counts I and II) are DISMISSED for the additional reason that he fails to plead facts showing compliance with New York’s statutory notice requirements, and his implied warranty claim (Count II) for the additional reason that he fails to plead privity; and 7. Plaintiffs’ nationwide class allegations are STRICKEN from the FAC pursuant to Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). Specifically, Paragraphs 41, 54, and 60 of the FAC are STRICKEN IN THEIR ENTIRETY. In addition, the phrases “Class” and “Class Members” are STRICKEN from Paragraphs 56-58, 61-64. Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:171 - 3 - DEFS.’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS 8:16-CV-1954-JLS-JCG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: By:_____________________________ The Honorable Josephine L. Staton U.S. District Judge Central District of California Case 8:16-cv-01954-JLS-JCG Document 21-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:172