Mcdonald v. Finaly Resources, Llc

MOTION for Summary Judgment

W.D. Tex.March 23, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS WACO DIVISION CAMERON MCDONALD Plaintiff, v. NO. 6:16-CV-00307-RP FINALY RESOURCES, LLC Defendant. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: Please take notice that FINALY RESOURCES, LLC ("Finaly"), defendant in the above- captioned action, files its Motion for Summary Judgment and respectfully shows as follows: I. BACKGROUND 1. Plaintiff, Cameron McDonald alleges he was injured while employed by J-Bar Services on July 9, 2014. See Doc. 1-5, at P3 of 11. He contends that while dismantling storage tanks at the Cazey well site, an explosion occurred and from which he suffered burns to his body, broken kneecaps, a broken right tibia and broken teeth. Id. 2. Plaintiff alleges that Finaly was the operator of the well; that Finaly contracted with J-Bar Services to dismantle the tanks; and that Finaly failed to take proper steps to insure that the tanks were gas free. Id. at P4 of 11. 3. Finaly filed an Original Answer denying all allegations and asserting specific defenses, among them, Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code ("Chapter 95" or "the Act"). e I1 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 1 of 11 4. The case is set for jury trial on December 11, 2017. II. UNDISPUTED FACTS 5. Finaly owned a 100 percent working interest in the well.' Finaly retained J-Bar Services to remove the tank battery and all flow lines incident to the plugging and abandonment of the well.2 6. McDonald was employed with J-Bar Services at the time of the incident.3 He was working with tools only supplied by J-Bar Services.4 John Lutz of J-Bar Services was McDonald's supervisor.5 The tools included, among others, a cutting torch that J-Bar Services provided McDonald.6 J-Bar Services controlled the details of McDonald's work.? Prior to the accident, Mr. Lutz lead a Job Safety Analysis that McDonald participated in discussing, among other things, that fuel or sludge might be inside the tanks and that McDonald should always test the atmosphere to make sure no hydrocarbons are present.8 III. BASIS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 7. Plaintiff's allegations implicate and should be dismissed, as a matter of law, pursuant to Chapter 95 under either the traditional, or no evidence standard, or both. Alternatively, if Chapter 95 does not apply, Finaly is entitled to summary judgment under the common law. Alternatively, Finaly owed no duty to warn Plaintiff of a condition of which he was already aware. i See Ex. 1, Affidavit of Tom Finaly 2 Id. 3 See Ex. 2, Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory No. 2; Ex. 3, Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 1. 4 See Ex. 3, Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 2. See also Ex. 4, Deposition of Cameron McDonald, at P61, L13-24 5 See Ex. 3, Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 5. See also Ex. 4, Deposition of Cameron McDonald, at P67, L8-9 6 See Ex. 2, Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory No. 3. See Ex, 4. Deposition of Cameron McDonald, at P68, L13-23 See Ex. 2, Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission No. 9. See also Ex. 4, Deposition of Cameron McDonald, at P67, L1-12 8 See Ex. 4., Deposition of Cameron McDonald, at P52, L19 to P54, L14 12 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 2 of 11 IV. APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 95 8. Chapter 95 applies to a claim against a property owner or contractor for personal injury to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor arising from the condition or use of an improvement to real property where the contractor or subcontractor constructs, repairs, renovates or modifies the improvement. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.002 9. Under Chapter 95, a property owner is not liable for personal injury to a contractor or subcontractor's employee unless (1) the property owner exercises or retains some control over the manner in which the work is performed other than the right to order work to start or stop or to inspect progress or receive reports; (2) the property owner had actual knowledge of the danger or condition resulting in the personal injury; and (3) the property owner failed to adequately warn. Id. at § 95.003. 10. The Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 95 because it recognized that business property owners often want to hire someone with expertise to repair or renovate some improvement on their property, sometimes an expert is hired precisely because the work is potentially hazardous, and the contractor is expected to have a superior ability to see that the work is done safely. Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co., 152 S.W.3d 688, 699 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); Kelly v. LIN Television of Texas, L.P., 27 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied). Further underscoring the Act's purpose, Chapter 95 applies not only to claims arising out of a contractor's own work, but also claims arising out of the property owner's negligent activities. Abutahoun v, Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. 2015). I' ;.1 e 13 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 3 of 11 A. FINALY IS A PROPERTY OWNER UNDER CHAPTER 95 11. A "property owner" is a "person or entity that owns real property primarily used for commercial or business purposes." TEX Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.001(3). Finaly is a property owner because it owned a 100 percent working interest in the subject well. Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 130 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding that for purposes of Chapter 95 holder of mineral lease was a property owner); Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Properties, L.P., 878 F.Supp. 2d 744, 771 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that defendant was a property owner under Chapter 95 because it had a mineral interest in the land and was entitled to a reasonable use of the surface estate). B. PLAINTIFF IS ASSERTING A "CLAIM" AS DEFINED BY CHAPTER 95 12. All of Plaintiff's denoted claims against Finaly are for damages allegedly caused by Finaly's negligence and thus meet the definition of "claim" under the Act. TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.001(1) ("Claim' means a clam for damages caused by negligence[.]") C. PLAINTIFF WAS EMPLOYEE OF A CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR 13. Plaintiff admits he was an employee of J-Bar Services and that Finaly contracted with J-Bar Services to dismantle and remove the two storage tanks from the well. See Doc. 1-5. D. WELL SITE AMOUNTED TO REAL PROPERTY 14. "Real property" means real property primarily used for commercial or business purposes. TEx. C1V. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.001. The lease and well site amounted to real property primarily used for commercial or business purposes. Francis, 130 S.W.3d at 84. g 4 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 4 of 11 E. WORK PLAINTIFF WAS PERFORMING AMOUNTED TO CONSTRUCTING, REPAIRING, RENOVATING OR MODIFYING AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY 15. The work Plaintiff was performing - dismantling the tanks so that the well could be plugged - amounted to the construction, repair, renovation, or modification of an improvement to real property. 16. Texas courts and federal courts interpreting Texas law have construed Chapter 95 broadly and held a litany of activities as amounting to the construction, repair, renovation, or modification of an improvement to real property. See Oiltanking Houston, L.P. v. Delgado, No. 14-14-00158-CV, 2016 WL 4145997 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 4, 2016, n.p.h.) (applying Chapter 95 to claims of plaintiffs whose decedent died in an explosion when hydrocarbon fumes ignited while he was welding a flange on the end of a pipe used to transport crude oil); Spears v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 133 Fed. Appx. 129, 131 (5th Cir. 2005) (Chapter 95 applied to claims of contractor's employee who, after performing "turnaround" maintenance on heat exchanger, tripped on steel-braided hoses while toting his tools to a tool shed); Francis, 130 S.W.3d at 84 (holding that coiled-tubing washout of a well was a repair or renovation because the purpose was to rehabilitate the well so that the flow of gas could increase); Moreno v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. 04-08-00036-CV, 2008 WL 4172248 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Sept. 10, 2008, pet. denied) (applying Chapter 95 to claims of contractor who was injured when a conductor pipe rolled over him during operations to unload and move the pipe); Credeur v. MJ Oil Inc., 123 Fed. Appx. 585, 588 (5th Cir. 2004) (worker hired to filter mud, which was in turn used in drilling, fit Chapter 95's requirement of construction, repair, renovation or modification of drill site); Montoya v. Nichirin-Flex USA., Inc., 417 S.W.3d 507, g e 5 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 5 of 11 512 (Tex.App.-E1 Paso 2013, no pet.) (applying Chapter 95 and concluding applying sealant coating to roof constituted repair of the flat roof); Gorman v. Ngo H Meng, 335 S.W.3d 797, 805 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not err by determining Chapter 95 applied to claims of Gorman, who was simply inspecting the cause of electrical shock to the store's customers coming in contact with walk-in cooler); Nagle v. GOM Shelf L.L. C., No. V- 03-103, 2005 WL 1515439, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2005) (holding that worker who was trying to open a valve to test the well's flow was engaged in activity that qualifies as either repair or renovation of a well); Rosa v. Mestena Operating, LLC, 461 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (applying Chapter 95 to plaintiff's claims that he was injured at work while performing maintenance on wooden electrical poles); Fisher v. Lee and Chang P 'ship, 16 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (holding that Chapter 95 applied to claims of contractor who fell from a ladder while on property to work on roof- mounted air conditioning units); Kelly, 27 S.W.3d at 570 (holding that Chapter 95 applied to parent's claims of independent contractor's employee who was killed while removing an existing transmission line and television antenna from a broadcast tower); Ball v. PPG Industries, Inc., No. H-10-4523, 2012 WL 2499935, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2012) (applying Chapter 95 to plaintiff's work of rolling bell head of a vertical heat exchanger back into place after performing maintenance, cleaning, and hydro-testing work on the heat exchanger); Sinegal v. Ryan Marine Servs., 712 F.Supp.2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (applying Chapter 95 to stationary platform); Bryan v. Shell Offshore Inc., 179 Fed. Appx. 906 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying Chapter 95 to platform on which plaintiff stepped on a wooden deck board which gave away, causing him to fall); Covarrubias v. Diamond Shamrock Ref Co., LP, 359 S.W.3d 298, 302-03 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (applying Chapter 95 to claims of plaintiff who was injured while using I' 6 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 6 of 11 an electric-powered scissor lift to raise him up to welds he was tasked with inspecting); Phillips v. Dow Chem. Co., 186 S.W.3d 121, 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that scaffolding from which plaintiff fee was an improvement to real property); Painter v. Momentum Energy Corp., 271 S.W.3d 388, 398 (Tex.App.-E1 Paso 2008, pet. denied) (applying Chapter 95 because disassembly of drilling rig was construction of an improvement to real property and decedent was struck by a rotating head that fell from the top of a blowout preventer). F. BURDEN SHIFTS TO PLAINTIFF TO ESTABLISH CONTROL, ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND FAILURE TO WARN 17. Where, as here, the Act applies, the burden of proof shifts to Plaintiff to establish liability under Chapter 95, that is, control, actual knowledge and failure to warn. Rueda v. Paschal, 178 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment in favor of property owner where the plaintiff produced no evidence that property owner was aware of alleged defect in ladder). Control and actual knowledge are two independent and necessary elements to impose liability under Chapter 95. Pasadena Ref Sys., Inc. v. McCraven, No. 14-10-00837-CV, 2012 WL 1693697, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 15, 2012, pet. dism'd) 18. Under Section 95.003, therefore, if a claimant was constructing, repairing, renovating or modifying an improvement (or performing work that was related thereto, a property owner is not liable to an injured claimant for an unreasonably dangerous condition on the property unless three conditions are met, specifically, (1) the property owner exercised or retained some control over the claimant, other than the right start, stop, or inspect the work, (2) the property owner had actual - not merely constructive - knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous condition, and (3) the property owner failed to adequately warn the claimant of the condition. Plaintiff has no l' g e j7 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 7 of 11 evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on any one or more of the requisite three elements on which he has the burden of proof. 19. The first prong, that is, control, is a codification of the holding in Redinger v. Living, Inv., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985); Dyall, 152 S.W.3d at 699). To establish that Finaly owed a duty of care, Plaintiff has to show that Finaly (1) related to the activity that cause his alleged injuries, (2) involved either the power to direct that the work be done in a certain manner or forbid its being done in an unsafe manner, and (3) related to the injury that the alleged negligence caused. Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. 2002). "In determining whether an owner has retained this right to control, the standard is narrow. The right to control must be more than a general right to order work to stop and start, or to inspect progress. The supervisory control must relate to the activity that actually caused the injury, and grant the owner at least the power to direct the order in which work is to be done or the power to forbid it being done in an unsafe manner." Coastal Marine Serv. of Texas, Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223, 225-26 (Tex. 1999) 20. Plaintiff has no evidence that Finaly retained or exercised control over his work. 21. The second prong forecloses a plaintiff's reliance on "constructive knowledge" of defendant regarding a purported dangerous condition resulting in injury. Dyall, 152 S.W.3d at 699. The burden rests upon plaintiff to show both (1) control and (2) actual knowledge of the danger. Id. "These are two independent and necessary conditions to the imposition of liability [on defendant]." Id. "The owner may be aware of the danger, but exercise no control, or he may exercise control and have no actual knowledge of the danger; in either instance, the owner is statutorily shielded from liability." Id.; Ellwood Texas Forge Corp. v. Jones, 214 S.W.3d 693, 700 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) ("[U]nder Chapter 95, the plaintiff has the burden to show both Passe8 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 8 of 11 control and actual knowledge of the danger.") "Actual knowledge of a dangerous condition is what a person actually knows, as distinguished from constructive knowledge, or what a person should have known." Eisen v. Four Sevens Operating Co. Ltd., No. 2-08-265-CV, 2009 WL 1506916 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 28, 2009, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant in claims brought by contractor's employee who was injured by pump explosion); Alonzo v. Westin Homes Corp., No. 14-15-00898-CV, 2016 WL 7234474, at *3 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 13, 2016, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment in favor of property owner under Chapter 95) ("Both [the] control requirement and [the] actual knowledge requirement must be met before liability will be imposed on the property owner.") 22. There is no evidence Finaly knew that Plaintiff would use a cutting torch on a task that did not require one. V. ALTERNATIVE GROUND: COMMON LAW 23. Alternatively, should the Court conclude that Chapter 95 does not apply, "the common law requires the plaintiff to show that the owner exercised some control over the relevant work and either knew or reasonably should have known of the risk or danger." See Rawson v. Oxea Corp., No. 01-15-01005-CV, 2016 WL 7671375, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2016, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment) (citing Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Tex. 2016); Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985); CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. 2000)). 24. Plaintiff has testified that Finaly did not control the details of his work. There is no evidence that Finaly controlled the details of Plaintiff's work. There is no evidence that Finaly knew or reasonably should have known that Plaintiff would use a cutting torch. e I9 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 9 of 11 VI. ALTERNATIVELY. FINALY OWED NO DUTY TO WARN PLAINTIFF OF CONDITION OF WHICH HE WAS ALREADY AWARE 25. Plaintiff testified that in the pre-job safety meeting with J-Bar Services they discussed the fact there may be fuel or sludge inside the tanks and that is why Lutz instructed him to test the atmosphere.9 He admitted that under no circumstances should a person use a cutting torch when hydrocarbons are present.") He agreed that what caused the explosion was the sparks coming from the tool he was using and that under no circumstances should you create sparks while in the presence of gas." 26. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an owner or occupier of property owes no duty to warn an invitee of obvious hazards of which the invitee is already aware. General Electric Co. v. Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211, 213 (Tex. 2008) ("Must a landowner warn an independent contractor's employees of obvious hazards they already know about? Four times in the last ten years this Court has said the answer is "No.") (holding that defendants owed no duty to warn plaintiff that the ramp he used daily had no handrails); Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2015) ("a landowner generally has no duty to warn of hazards that are open and obvious or known to the invitee") (emphasis added). WHEREFORE, Defendant, FINALY RESOURCES, LLC prays that its Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in all respects, that Plaintiff take nothing, that Defendant be awarded its costs and expenses and for such other and further relief to which Defendant may show itself entitled. 9 See Ex. 4, Deposition of Cameron McDonald, at P53, L19 to P54, L20 I° Id. at P50, L22-25 II Id. at P92, L24 to P93, L5. g e 110 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 10 of 11 Respectfully submitted, WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP. /s/ Tracy Freeman TRACY FREEMAN (Attorney-in-Charge) Texas Bar No. 00793757 909 Fannin, Suite 3300 Houston, Texas 77010 (713) 353-2000 - telephone (713) 785-7780 - facsimile t racy . Ereem an@wilsonelser. com Attorney for Defendant, Finaly Resources, LLC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was electronically filed and served on all counsel in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on March S2017. Jack W. Dillard THE DILLARD LAW FIRM P.O. Box 5450 Bryan, Texas 77802 Via email jwdlaw@aotcoin /s/ Tracy Freeman Tracy Freeman g e iii Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21 Filed 03/23/17 Page 11 of 11 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 1 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 2 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 3 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 4 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 5 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 6 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 7 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 8 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 9 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 10 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 11 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 12 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 13 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 14 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 15 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 16 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 17 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 18 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 19 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 20 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 21 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 22 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 23 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 24 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 25 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 26 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 27 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 28 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 29 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 30 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 31 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 32 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 33 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 34 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 35 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 36 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 37 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 38 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 39 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 40 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 41 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 42 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 43 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 44 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 45 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 46 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 47 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 48 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 49 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 50 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 51 of 52 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-1 Filed 03/23/17 Page 52 of 52 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS WACO DIVISION CAMERON MCDONALD Plaintiff, v. NO. 6:16-CV-00307-RP FINALY RESOURCES, LLC Defendant. FINAL JUDGMENT Having considered Defendant, FINALY RESOURCES, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, along with any timely-filed response, the Court grants Defendant's motion. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant, Finaly Resources, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, that Plaintiff, Cameron McDonald take nothing from Defendant, and costs of court are assessed against the party incurring same. Signed this day of , 2017. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE P age X12 Case 6:16-cv-00307-RP-JCM Document 21-2 Filed 03/23/17 Page 1 of 1