Pachmann v. Shasta Beverages Inc et al

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

C.D. Cal.February 10, 2017

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS K&L GATES LLP 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard Eighth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: 310.552.5000 Facsimile: 310.552.5001 Christopher J. Kondon (SBN 172339) christopher.kondon@klgates.com Saman M. Rejali (SBN 274517) saman.rejali@klgates.com Kate G. Hummel (SBN 305783) kate.hummel@klgates.com Attorneys for Defendants SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC. and CHRIS WEDDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA KLAUS PACHMANN, Plaintiff, vs. SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC., a Delaware corporation; CHRIS WEDDLE, an individual and DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS THE SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE COMPLAINT Date: March 27, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept. 10C [Concurrently filed with Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Christopher J. Kondon; [Proposed] Order] [Assigned to the Honorable S. James Otero] Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9 Filed 02/10/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:99 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 27, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 10C at the above captioned court located at 350 West 1st Street, Tenth Floor, Los Angeles, California 90012, the Honorable S. James Otero presiding, Defendants Shasta Beverages, Inc. and Chris Weddle will and hereby do move to dismiss Plaintiff Klaus Pachmann’s (“Plaintiff”) Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Motion is made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion; the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto all pleadings, papers and records on file with this Court in this action; and all other such argument and evidence as may be presented to the Court in connection with the motion. This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3 which took place on February 10, 2017 and described pursuant to Judge Otero’s Standing Order in the Declaration of Christopher J. Kondon filed herewith. K&L GATES LLP Dated: February 10, 2017 By: /s/ Kate G. Hummel Christopher J. Kondon Saman M. Rejali Kate G. Hummel Attorneys for Defendant SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC. and CHRIS WEDDLE Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9 Filed 02/10/17 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:100 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS K&L GATES LLP 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard Eighth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: 310.552.5000 Facsimile: 310.552.5001 Christopher J. Kondon (SBN 172339) christopher.kondon@klgates.com Saman M. Rejali (SBN 274517) saman.rejali@klgates.com Kate G. Hummel (SBN 305783) kate.hummel@klgates.com Attorneys for Defendants SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC. and CHRIS WEDDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA KLAUS PACHMANN, Plaintiff, vs. SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC., a Delaware corporation; CHRIS WEDDLE, an individual and DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS THE SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE COMPLAINT Date: March 27, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept. 10C [Concurrently filed with Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss; Declaration of Christopher J. Kondon; [Proposed] Order] [Assigned to the Honorable S. James Otero] Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-1 Filed 02/10/17 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:101 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND This case arises from the employment of Plaintiff Klaus Pachmann (“Plaintiff”), who worked for approximately twenty-three years as a maintenance mechanic for Shasta Beverages, Inc. Plaintiff alleges six causes of action against his employer: (1) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (2) Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (3) Discrimination on the Basis of Disability; (4) Failure to Accommodate Disability; (5) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process; and (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff improperly alleges his sixth cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). As explained below, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that could support the imposition of individual liability on his supervisor, Chris Weddle. In addition, Plaintiff’s claim for IIED is specifically barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act. Thus, because Plaintiff’s claim for IIED cannot prevail as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action should be dismissed with prejudice. II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS1 Plaintiff was employed as a maintenance mechanic by Shasta Beverages, Inc. for about twenty-three years until his termination on January 15, 2016. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges that on May 5, 2015, Plaintiff underwent back fusion surgery and took FMLA leave thereafter. Compl. ¶ 11, 12. Plaintiff alleges that on August 30, 2015, he was released to return to work without restrictions. Compl. ¶ 11. On or about October 2, 2015, Plaintiff alleges he tore his rotator cuff outside of work. Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff further alleges that on November 9, 2016, he had surgery to repair the torn rotator cuff and took a leave of absence after discussing time off with 1 For purposes of this Motion only, the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are accepted as true. Furthermore, as this motion pertains only one of Plaintiff’s causes of action, these facts are highlighted to the exclusion of others that do not bear on this motion. Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-1 Filed 02/10/17 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:102 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS his supervisor, Chris Weddle. Id. Plaintiff alleges his physician put him on leave until February 10, 2016. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff further alleges that during his leave, his employment was terminated on January 15, 2016 due to his disability and “accommodation of time off to treat his disability.” Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16. Plaintiff ultimately concludes that his exposure to disability discrimination and retaliation constitutes “extreme and outrageous” conduct, forming the basis for his sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Compl. ¶ 73. III. PLAINTIFF’S SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED A. Judicial Standard Upon motion by a defendant, a district court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) due to the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Wood v. Aeges Wholesale Corp., No. 1:09-CV-536-AWI- GSA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57151, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2009) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). In ruling on such a motion, the district court accepts as true all allegations of material fact. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit. . . . Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Id. Over the course of its recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the pleading requirements in federal court, and the standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), the Court observed: [A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-1 Filed 02/10/17 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #:103 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Additionally, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court explained: To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As shown below, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not meet these standards, and should therefore be dismissed with prejudice. B. Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Fails To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009) (internal citations omitted). i. Plaintiff Has Failed To Allege Extreme And Outrageous Conduct It is fundamental that extreme and outrageous conduct “does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities, but Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-1 Filed 02/10/17 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #:104 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS only to conduct so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499, n.5 (1970) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1051. Discipline, demotion, criticism, and termination are a normal part of the employment relationship and do not constitute outrageous conduct. Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 25 (1990). Significantly, even discriminatory personnel management decisions do not constitute outrageous conduct, because “[m]anaging personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society.” Janken v. GM Hughes Elec., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (1996). Here, Plaintiff’s claim against his supervisor, Chris Weddle, for IIED fails as a matter of law. Plaintiff has made no factual allegations regarding the behavior of Mr. Weddle that could arguably support a cause of action for IIED. Rather, Plaintiff contends he “discussed” taking a leave of absence with Mr. Weddle after undergoing surgery for a torn rotator cuff, and then proffers a legal conclusion, claiming Plaintiff’s subjection to discrimination and retaliation constitutes “extreme and outrageous” conduct. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 73. Plaintiff provides no factual allegations pertaining to Mr. Weddle’s conduct or any assertions of whether it could conceivably rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous.” See Compl. ¶¶ 72-76. In the absence of any allegations, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for IIED against Mr. Weddle. ii. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by the Exclusivity Provisions of the California Workers’ Compensation Act Plaintiff also cannot state a claim for IIED because an employee’s claim against an employer for IIED arising out of the employment relationship is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the California Workers’ Compensation Act. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 162 (1987) (holding that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred plaintiff’s claim of intentional Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-1 Filed 02/10/17 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #:105 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS infliction of emotional distress); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 25 (1999) (affirming sustaining of demurrer to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on grounds that such claim was subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity provisions); see also Cal. Lab. Code § 3600 et seq. (stating that the Workers’ Compensation Act prohibits all claims of intentional misconduct that arise in the course of employment.) In his IIED claim, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “severe emotional distress, anxiety, pain and suffering, physical injuries, [and] physical sickness . . .” as a result of the circumstances surrounding his termination. See Compl. ¶ 74. In Shoemaker v. Myers, the California Supreme Court held that such claims are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the California Workers’ Compensation Act. 52 Cal. 3d at 25. In Shoemaker, the terminated employee’s first amended complaint included an IIED claim and allegations of physical injury resulting from acts related to his termination. Id. Defendants demurred to the IIED cause of action, among others, and the trial court sustained the demurrer based upon the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation laws. Id. at 10. Plaintiff then sought to file a second and third amended complaint where he omitted any references to physical injury. Id. The court refused to ignore the omission of the physical injury allegation, noting that the first amended complaint was verified, and finally dismissed the complaint without further leave to amend. Id. at 10-11. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the IIED claim, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that injuries arising from termination of employment ordinarily arise out of and occur in the course of employment and are within the exclusive purview of workers’ compensation law. Id. at 19-20. Moreover, the court stated that even if the conduct relating to the decision to terminate “may be characterized as intentional, unfair or outrageous, it is nevertheless covered by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions.” Id. at 25. Here, Plaintiff’s IIED claim against Mr. Weddle is barred because it is covered by the exclusivity provisions of the worker’s compensation law. The conduct that Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-1 Filed 02/10/17 Page 6 of 7 Page ID #:106 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff alleges gives rise to his emotional distress claim against Mr. Weddle—the circumstances surrounding the termination of his employment (i.e., subjection to discrimination and retaliation)—clearly arose within the course and scope of his employment. As such, Plaintiff’s IIED is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act and Plaintiff cannot prevail as a matter of law. IV. CONCLUSION There is nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint that suggests, must less expressly alleges, that his supervisor, Chris Weddle, engaged in anything other than employment-related conduct. Plaintiff does not allege that Mr. Weddle spoke to him in a rude, disrespectful or inappropriate matter, or that Plaintiff was called names or yelled at. Rather, Plaintiff simply alleges that he “discussed” a leave of absence with Mr. Weddle and then concludes, without any factual basis, that Plaintiff’s allegedly being subjected to discrimination and retaliation constitutes “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Plaintiff’s inclusion of an IIED claim on these facts is unsustainable. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act. Case law mandates that recovery for a physical injury resulting from employment-related acts must be pursued through California’s workers’ compensation law. Here, Plaintiff’s allegation that he endured “anxiety, pain and suffering, physical injuries, [and] physical sickness” as a result of his termination falls squarely within the purview of the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act. As such, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for IIED cannot prevail as a matter of law and should therefore be dismissed with prejudice. K&L GATES LLP Dated: February 10, 2017 By: /s/ Kate G. Hummel Christopher J. Kondon Saman M. Rejali Kate G. Hummel Attorneys for Defendant SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC. and CHRIS WEDDLE Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-1 Filed 02/10/17 Page 7 of 7 Page ID #:107 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER J. KONDON K&L GATES LLP 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard Eighth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: 310.552.5000 Facsimile: 310.552.5001 Christopher J. Kondon (SBN 172339) christopher.kondon@klgates.com Saman M. Rejali (SBN 274517) saman.rejali@klgates.com Kate G. Hummel (SBN 305783) kate.hummel@klgates.com Attorneys for Defendants SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC. and CHRIS WEDDLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA KLAUS PACHMANN, Plaintiff, vs. SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC., a Delaware corporation; CHRIS WEDDLE, an individual and DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER J. KONDON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Date: March 27, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept. 10C [Concurrently filed with Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; [Proposed] Order] [Assigned to the Honorable S. James Otero] Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-2 Filed 02/10/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:108 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER J. KONDON DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER J. KONDON I, Christopher J. Kondon, declare as follows: 1. I am an attorney duly authorized to practice law before all of the courts of the State of California and the United States District Court for the Central District of California. I am a partner at the law firm of K&L Gates LLP, attorneys of record for Defendants Shasta Beverages, Inc. and Chris Weddle (collectively, “Defendants’). I have personal knowledge of each of the facts set forth herein, and could and would competently testify thereto if called upon to do so. 2. On February 10, 2017, I met and conferred with Laurel Haag of the Law Offices of Carlin & Buchsbaum, counsel for Plaintiff Klaus Pachmann, regarding the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint and the necessity of a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action. Ms. Haag stated that an investigation of the background facts establishing the basis for Plaintiff’s complaint is continuing, but that Plaintiff’s counsel does not currently have additional facts or details to add to the complaint. 3. As Plaintiff’s counsel’s offices are in Long Beach, California and defense counsel is located in Los Angeles, California, the parties conducted the meet and confer by telephone to avoid incurring the attorneys’ fees that would be presented by traveling for an in-person meeting. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California on February 10, 2017. ____________________________________ Christopher J. Kondon Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-2 Filed 02/10/17 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:109 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 [PROPOSED] ORDER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA KLAUS PACHMANN, Plaintiff, vs. SHASTA BEVERAGES, INC., a Delaware corporation; CHRIS WEDDLE, an individual and DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE COMPLAINT [Assigned to the Honorable S. James Otero] Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-3 Filed 02/10/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:110 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 [PROPOSED] ORDER ORDER The Court, having read and considered Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action in Plaintiff’s Complaint and its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, HEREBY ORDERS that: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED for all the reasons set forth in their Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Specifically, Plaintiff has made no factual allegations regarding the behavior of Mr. Weddle that could support a cause of action for IIED. In addition, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act. There being no remaining claims against Defendant Chris Weddle, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Weddle is dismissed from this action. Dated: By: Hon. S. James Otero U.S. District Court Judge Central District of California Case 2:17-cv-00920-SJO-JC Document 9-3 Filed 02/10/17 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:111