Kaylee Browning et al v. Unilever United States, Inc.NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case or Stay and Motion to StrikeC.D. Cal.February 23, 20171 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES sf-3743919 WILLIAM L. STERN (CA SBN 96105) WStern@mofo.com CLAUDIA M. VETESI (CA SBN 233485) CVetesi@mofo.com LUIS GABRIEL HOYOS (CA SBN 313019) LHoyos@mofo.com MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 425 Market Street San Francisco, California 94105-2482 Telephone: 415.268.7000 Facsimile: 415.268.7522 Attorneys for Defendant UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SOUTHERN DIVISION KAYLEE BROWNING and SARAH BASILE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC., Defendant. Case No. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO STRIKE Hearing Date: April 24, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Judge: Hon. Andrew J. Guilford Ctrm: Courtroom 10D Action filed: December 16, 2016 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 1 of 38 Page ID #:55 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 1 sf-3743919 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on April 24, 2017 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in Courtroom 10D of the United States District Court of the State of California, located at 411 West 4th Street, Santa Ana, California 92701, before the Honorable Andrew J. Guilford, Defendant Unilever United States, Inc. (“Unilever”) will, and hereby does, move this Court to dismiss or stay Plaintiffs Kaylee Browning and Sarah Basile’s Class Action Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to (i) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (ii) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (iii) Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for failure to plead claims grounded in fraud with sufficient particularity, and (iv) pending Ninth Circuit decisions in two misbranding appeals. Also, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), Unilever will ask the court to strike as “immaterial” Plaintiffs’ geographically overbroad class definition. This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings on file in this matter, the Reply that Unilever plans to file, any material of which this Court takes judicial notice, and any further argument the Court might allow. This Motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, which took place on February 16, 2017 at 12:30 P.M. PST. Dated: February 23, 2017 WILLIAM L. STERN CLAUDIA MARIA VETESI LUIS GABRIEL HOYOS MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP By: Claudia Maria Vetesi Claudia Maria Vetesi Attorneys for Defendant UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 2 of 38 Page ID #:56 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES i sf-3743919 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION ................................................................... 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ........................................... 1 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................... 1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................... 2 III. THE LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................ 3 IV. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 3 A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Sue ............................................................. 3 1. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Injury in Fact ........................................ 5 2. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Actual Reliance .................................... 9 3. Plaintiffs Cannot Sue Over Products Not Purchased ............... 11 B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Plausible .................................................. 12 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Sounding in Fraud Are Not Pled With the Requisite Particularity ......................................................................... 14 D. Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail for Other, Claim-Specific Reasons ................ 16 1. Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment Claim Is Duplicative ................ 16 2. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Fails ................................................................ 18 E. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief ............................. 19 F. The Court Should Strike Plaintiffs’ Geographically Overbroad Class Definition as “Immaterial” Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ........... 20 G. In the Alternative, the Court Should Stay This Action Pending the Ninth Circuit’s Decisions in Misbranding Appeals ...................... 22 1. A Stay Will Promote the Orderly Course of Justice ................ 23 2. The Parties Will Suffer Hardship Absent a Stay ...................... 24 3. Plaintiffs Will Not Be Injured by a Stay .................................. 24 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 25 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 3 of 38 Page ID #:57 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES ii sf-3743919 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Abad v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No. CV 15-3795-GP(JPRx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016), Dkt. No. 104 .................. 11 Abad v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No. CV 15-3795-GP(JPRx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016), Dkt. No. 105 .................. 11 Abramson v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (Guilford, J.) ..................................... 3, 14 Aghaji v. Bank of Am., N.A., 247 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2016) ...................................................................... 21, 22 Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 13-cv-01279-HSG (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015), Dkt. No. 152 ....................... 23 Anderson v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ................................................................. 20 Andre Strishak & Assocss, P.C. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 752 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 2002) ....................................................... 5 Ang v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 13-cv-01196-HSG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44053 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) ................................................................................... 23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................ 3, 12 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. 11-cv-6342-PJH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138496 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2015) ...................................................................................... 23 Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................. 10 Bagget v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d (C.D. Cal. 2007) (Guilford, J.) .................................................. 17 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 4 of 38 Page ID #:58 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES iii sf-3743919 Baggett v. Hewlett Packard Co., No. SAVC 07-0667-AG, 2009 WL 3178066 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) ..................................................................................... 7 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ............................................................................................ 12 Beltran v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. SACV 12-02502-CJC(ANx), 2012 WL 12303423 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) ................................................................................... 16 Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................... 5, 18 Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, 660 F. App’x 531 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................. 18, 24 Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 15-55727, 2017 WL 24618 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) ...................................... 22 Bush v. Mondelez Int’l, Inc., No. 16-cv-02460-RS, 2016 WL 7324990 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) ................ 10 Cabral v. Supple LLC, 608 F. App’x 482 (9th Cir. 2015) .......................................................................... 9 Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................... 3 Chavez v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. CV 09-9192-GW(CWx), 2011 WL 10565797 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) ..................................................................................... 16 CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962) ......................................................................... 23, 24 Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................................... 12, 13, 15 Collins v. eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249 (2011), as modified (Dec. 28, 2011) ............................... 17 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) .............................................................................................. 3 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 5 of 38 Page ID #:59 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES iv sf-3743919 Dash v. Seagate Tech. (U.S.) Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ..................................................................... 5 Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 76 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................... 19 DeAngelis v. Timberpeg E., Inc., 858 N.Y.S.2d 410 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2008) ....................................................... 5 Denny v. Motor Ford Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995) ............................................................................... 19 Dvora v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. CV 11-1074-GW(PLAx), 2011 WL 1897349 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) .............................................................................. 10, 11 Dysthe v. Basic Research LLC, No. CV 09-8013 AG, 2011 WL 5868307 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) (Guilford, J.) ........................................................................................................ 11 Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 12 Estrada v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14-cv-01051-TLN-EFB, 2015 WL 1440466 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) ...................................................................................... 9 Fagan v. Neutrogena Corp., No. 5:13-CV-01316-SVW-OP (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), Dkt. No. 166 ........................................................................................................ 23 Figy v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................. 16 Fisher v. Monster Beverage Corp., 656 F. App’x 819 (9th Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 9 Goudie v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. EDCV 15-0533 AG (DTBx), 2015 WL 12803765 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) ...................................................................................... 17 Grgurev v. Licul, No. 1:15-cv-9805-GHW, 2017 WL 377937 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2017) ....................................................................................... 4 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 6 of 38 Page ID #:60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES v sf-3743919 Grivas v. Metagenics, Inc., No. SACV 15-01838-CJC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016), Dkt. No. 33 ................... 23 Gustavson v. Mars, Inc., No. 13-cv-04537-LHK, 2014 WL 6986421 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014) .............................................................................. 23, 24 Ham v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................. 20 Ham v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-02044-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2015), Dkt. No. 59 .................... 23 Haskins v. Symantec Corp., 654 F. App’x 338 (9th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 16 Henderson v. Gruma Corp., No. CV 10-04173 AHM, 2011 WL 1362188 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) .................................................................................... 13 Herrera v. Estee Lauder Cos., No. SAVC 12-01169-CJC(ANx), 2012 WL 12507876 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) ................................................................................... 16 In re Apple & AT & T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................................... 18 In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practice & Prods. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App’x 672 (3d Cir. 2014) ........................................................................... 9 In re Ferrero Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ............................................................... 11 In re First Am. Home Buyers Protection Corp. Class Action Litig., 313 F.R.D. 578 (S.D. Cal. 2016) ................................................................... 20, 21 In re Ford Tailgate Litig., No. 11-CV-2953-RS, 2014 WL 1007066 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) ........... 17, 18 In re Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. Overcharging Litig., 167 F. Supp. 3d 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ................................................................... 8 Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 5:12-cv-02554-RMW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015), Dkt. No. 85 ................... 23 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 7 of 38 Page ID #:61 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES vi sf-3743919 Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-cv-1935 DMS (JMA), 2010 WL 476688 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) ....................................................................................... 12 Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 12-01633 CRB, 2014 WL 2702726 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014) ............................................................................. passim Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) ......................................................................... 3, 14 Khasin v. R.C. Bigelow Inc., No. 3:12-cv-02204-WHO, 2016 WL 4502500 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) ................................................................................... 19 Koller v. Med Foods, Inc., No. 14-cv-02400-RS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167760 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015) .................................................................................... 23 Kosta v. Del Monte Foods, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 217 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ................................................................. passim Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310 (2011) ....................................................................................... 4, 7 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) ................................................................................ 23, 24, 25 Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., No. 12-cv-02646-RMW, 2016 WL 4585819 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) .................................................................................... 19 Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. C 11-05188 SI, 2012 WL 5458396 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) .................... 11 Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496 (2003) .............................................................................. 12 Leonhart v. Nature’s Path Foods, Inc., No. 13-cv-00492-BLF, 2015 WL 3548212 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2015) .......... 23, 24 Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................. 13 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 8 of 38 Page ID #:62 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES vii sf-3743919 Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................. 24 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......................................................................................... 3, 4 Luman v. Theismann, 647 F. App’x 804 (9th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 20 Mains v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-05652-EJD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51816 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2016) .................................................................................... 23 Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998) .................................................................................... 4 Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 21 McGill v. Gen, Motors Corp., 647 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996) ...................................................... 4 Moody v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV 15-5186-DMG, 2016 WL 6604627 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) ....................................................................................... 5 Morgan v. Wallaby Yogurt Co., No. 3:13-cv-00296-JD (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016), Dkt. No. 93 ............................ 23 Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 322 F. App’x 489 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................... 13 Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995) ................................................................................. 4 Otto v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-01411-SVW-DTB (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013), Dkt. No. 35 .......................................................................................................... 17 Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................... 17 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 9 of 38 Page ID #:63 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES viii sf-3743919 Pardini v. Unilever U.S., Inc., No. 13-cv-01675-SC, 2015 WL 1744340 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) ................. 23 Park v. Welch Foods Inc., No. 5:12-cv-06449-PSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144463 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) .................................................................................... 23 Parker v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 3:13-cv-0690-SC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014), Dkt. No. 74 ........................... 23 Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1583 (2008) .............................................................................. 8 Red v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02232-ODW(JPR), 2015 WL 9484398 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) .................................................................................. 4, 7 Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................... 9 Romero v. Flowers Bakeries, LLC, No. 14-cv-05189-BLF, 2016 WL 469370 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016)............. 10, 23 Saavedra v. Eli Lily & Co., No. 2:12-cv-9366-SVW-MAN, 2013 WL 6345442 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) .................................................................................... 19 Samet v. Kellogg Co., No. 5:12-cv-01891-PSG, 2015 WL 6954989 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015) .................................................................................................................... 23 Simpson v. Cal. Pizza Kitchen, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (S.D. Cal. 2013) ................................................................. 8 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2017) ...................................................................................... 4, 5 Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., No. 08-2746 JF, 2009 WL 1635931 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2009) ........................... 19 Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 2000) ................................................................................. 4 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 10 of 38 Page ID #:64 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES ix sf-3743919 Swearingen v. Amazon Preservation Partners, Inc., No. 13-cv-044202-WHO (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2016), Dkt. No. 76 ...................... 23 Swearingen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-05332-SC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2015), Dkt. No. 36 ............................ 23 Thomas v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 12-cv-02908-BLF, 2015 WL 6674696 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) ............................................................................... 23, 24 Tietsworth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................................... 21 Torrent v. Yakult U.S.A. Inc. SACV 15-00124-CJC(JCGx), 2015 WL 4335076 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) ..................................................................................... 21 Treiber v. Aspen Dental Mgmt., Inc., 94, F. Supp. 3d 352, 363 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) .......................................................... 8 TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 821 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ................................................................. 13 Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, -- F.3d --, No. 14-55980, 2017 WL 460663 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2017) ........... 4, 5, 7 Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 3, 14 Victor v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., No. 13-CV-02976-WHO, 2016 WL 4502528 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) ............................................................................. 19, 20 Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................... 12 Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., No. 12-CV-1586-SC, 2015 WL 4451424 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2015) .................. 23 Zwart v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 5:10-cv-03992-JF (HRL), 2011 WL 767750 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2011) .................................................................................... 12 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 11 of 38 Page ID #:65 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES x sf-3743919 Statutes Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. ......................................................................................................... 2 Cal. Civ. Code § 17200 et seq. ....................................................................................................... 2 Cal. Com. Code § 2314(c) .............................................................................................................. 18 N.Y. Com. Law § 2-314(c) (McKinney 2017) ............................................................................... 18 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 ...................................................................................................................... 2 § 350 ...................................................................................................................... 2 Other Authorities Ashley Weatherford, Is Your Scrub Giving You Wrinkles, New York Magazine (Aug. 11, 2016), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/07/your- scrub-giving-you-wrinkles.html. ........................................................................... 7 Lauri Shea, Why St. Ives Apricot Scrub is Terrible For Your Skin- You Can Start Feeling Guilty now (July 25, 2014), http://www.etherealauraspa.com/blog/apricot-scrub. ........................................... 6 Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, “Non-Comedogenic,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noncomedogenic. ...................... 14 Sheri Roselle, Medical Esthetician at Toronto Dermatology Centre, Exfoliation Are You Doing it Right (Jul. 24, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4v8NO3SaWh0 ........................................... 6 St. Ives, Face Care Products, http://www.stives.com/product- category/face-care (last visited Feb. 23, 2017) ............................................... 2, 11 Stephanie Montes, How St. Ives Apricot Scrub is Destroying Your Skin, The Zoe Report (Mar. 10, 2016), http://thezoereport.com/beauty/skincare/st-ives-apricot-scrub-is- destroying-your-skin/ ............................................................................................ 6 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 12 of 38 Page ID #:66 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 1 sf-3743919 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT This is a no-injury case. Plaintiffs, buyers of St. Ives Apricot Scrub (the “Product”), have filed this purported class action based essentially on the premise that the Product is a face exfoliant that contains finely-ground walnut shell powder, which they fear (without basis) could potentially cause skin damage. Yet, notably, Plaintiffs do not allege they even used the scrub, let alone that they experienced any ill effects. No matter, say Plaintiffs, everyone should get his or her money back by challenging three statements on the Product label: (1) that it “deeply exfoliates to reveal smooth skin,” (2) is “dermatologist tested,” and (3) is “non-comedogenic.” Each such statement is true. Plaintiffs nonetheless seek an array of damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit. Beyond alleging no-injury, the Complaint is hobbled by two fundamental defects. The first is junk science. Plaintiffs cite three blog posts by self-proclaimed “aestheticians” and “stylists” that hawk their own line of products, plus a magazine that quotes a dermatologist who actually contradicts Plaintiffs’ fears. The second is context. The Product comes in three levels of exfoliation (“Deep,” “Moderate,” and “Gentle”) and the label plainly identifies the “Exfoliation Factor” the consumer is buying, much as a can of chili peppers might say “Mild,” “Medium,” and “Hot.” Given that disclosure, Plaintiffs can no more sue over the “Exfoliation Factor” on these Products than, say, a buyer of canned chilies could sue over buying “Hot” when she could have bought “Mild.” For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Complaint for a host of reasons, including lack of standing under Article III and the California and New York consumer protection statutes, as well as implausibility and failure to plead with particularity. In addition, the Court should strike Plaintiffs’ nationwide class claims. Alternatively, the Court could stay this lawsuit, given the pendency of two Ninth Circuit appeals whose outcomes may be controlling, Jones v. ConAgra Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 13 of 38 Page ID #:67 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 2 sf-3743919 Foods, Inc., No. C 12-01633 CRB, 2014 WL 2702726 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014), and Kosta v. Del Monte Foods, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 217 (N.D. Cal. 2015). If it did, this Court would be in good company: 20 other district courts have stayed similar product labeling cases pending Jones and Kosta. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Kaylee Browning and Sarah Basile bring a nationwide class action1 based on defendant’s alleged false labeling and marketing of its St. Ives Apricot Scrub (the “Product”).2 (Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 1.) They contend Unilever markets the Product as a facial “scrub” that “deeply exfoliates to reveal smooth skin.” The packaging says it is “dermatologist tested” and “non-comedogenic.” (Id. ¶ 2) Unilever’s crime, it seems, is that the Product’s primary exfoliating ingredient is crushed walnut shell powder, which they say can cause skin damage. (Id. ¶ 3.) They also contend that the product is not “recommended by dermatologists,” and “contains several comedogenic ingredients.”3 (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiffs claim that had they known the Product was not fit to be used as a facial scrub, they would not have bought it or paid less. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 18-19, 48.) From all this, Plaintiffs assert seven claims: (i) California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.), (ii) California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Cal. Civ. Code § 17200 et seq.), (iii) fraud, (iv) New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349, Deceptive Acts or Practices; (v) New York Gen. Bus. 1 Plaintiffs also seek to certify California and New York subclasses. 2 There are several different varieties of St. Ives Apricot scrubs: e.g., “Apricot Blemish Control” scrub, “Apricot Fresh Skin” scrub, and “Apricot Oil” scrub. See St. Ives, Face Care Products, http://www.stives.com/product- category/face-care (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). While Plaintiffs do not specify which scrub they bought, the only product pictured is the “Apricot Fresh Skin” scrub. (Compl. ¶ 2.) As such, Unilever presumes for purposes of the motion that the complaint is limited to the St. Ives “Apricot Fresh Skin” scrub. 3 Notably, Plaintiffs list several allegedly offending ingredients (Compl. ¶ 14) but never define what “comedogenic” means. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 14 of 38 Page ID #:68 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 3 sf-3743919 Law § 350, False Advertising; (vi) unjust enrichment; and (vii) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Plaintiffs pray for declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, restitution, interest, attorney’s fees, costs, and injunctive relief. (Compl., “Prayer For Relief,” §§ A-H.) III. THE LEGAL STANDARD A court must accept all factual allegations pled in the Complaint as true, Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996), but need not accept unreasonable inferences or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (“[B]are assertions…amount[ing] to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim” are not entitled to an assumption of truth (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))). Moreover, the Complaint must be pled with particularity. That is because Plaintiffs allege that Unilever engaged in a scheme of false advertising (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19), which suggests a “unified course of fraudulent conduct.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2009); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2003); Abramson v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (Guilford, J.) (dismissing UCL, CLRA and FAL claims for failure to state a claim with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b)). IV. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Sue. The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims due to lack of Article III standing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and lack of “statutory” standing under California UCL and N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law sections 349 and 350. Article III standing, of course, is a threshold requirement for federal court jurisdiction. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). To have standing, a plaintiff must plead and prove “injury in fact,” causation, and Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 15 of 38 Page ID #:69 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 4 sf-3743919 redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “[I]njury in fact” requires damage to “a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (internal citations omitted). “[F]or an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2017) (citation omitted). An injury is “concrete” if it is “‘de facto;’ that is, it must actually exist.” Id. The UCL standing requirement is even narrower. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, -- F.3d --, No. 14-55980, 2017 WL 460663, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2017) (holding that even though a claim for violations of a federal statutory claim may satisfy Spokeo, it does not satisfy Prop 64’s “injury in fact” requirement). Plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she “‘surrender[ed] in a transaction more, or acquire[d] in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have.’” Red v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02232-ODW(JPR), 2015 WL 9484398, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) (quoting Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 323 (2011)). Moreover, the economic damage must have been “caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 322. Under New York law, a claim under Sections 349 and 350 requires that Plaintiffs plead and prove “that [they] suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.” See Grgurev v. Licul, No. 1:15-cv-9805-GHW, 2017 WL 377937 at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2017) (quoting New World Solutions, Inc. v. NameMedia Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 287, 329 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015)); Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 611 (N.Y. 2000). Furthermore, “to state a claim under the New York deceptive acts statute, a plaintiff must allege a material deceptive act or practice directed to consumers that caused actual harm.” Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 63 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 741, 744-45 (N.Y. 1995) (plaintiff “must Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 16 of 38 Page ID #:70 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 5 sf-3743919 show that [he or she] engaged in a material deceptive act or practice that caused actual, although not necessarily, pecuniary harm”); McGill v. Gen, Motors Corp., 647 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996). The same is true for New York’s false advertisement statute. Dash v. Seagate Tech. (U.S.) Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 357, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); DeAngelis v. Timberpeg E., Inc., 858 N.Y.S.2d 410, 414 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2008); Andre Strishak & Assocs., P.C. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 752 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402-03 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 2002). Plaintiffs flunk this test. They lack standing to sue. 1. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Injury in Fact. Plaintiffs claim the Product is unsuitable as a facial scrub because it contains finely-ground walnut shells. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 18-19.) Notably, however, they do not allege that it caused them any physical or personal injury. They are asymptomatic. All they did was buy the Product; they do not even allege that they used it. As such, this is just a “Fear of Skin Damage” case—not enough to establish injury. Plaintiffs will disagree and say that purchase alone is injury. They are wrong. This is no ordinary false advertising case. It is essentially a product liability case. So, even if a minority of customers experienced symptoms, it does not mean that persons who are asymptomatic can recover. That would be like suing Planters Peanuts because a tiny subset of consumers are allergic to peanuts. Buying is not enough, not where the gravamen of the Complaint is that St. Ives damages skin. The harm Plaintiffs complain about is not the harm they suffered. They may as well sue over a puddle in which they did not slip-and-fall. Nor can Plaintiffs manufacture standing by alleging fear of future injury. In Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit rejected standing in a case against Apple over concerns about hearing loss because plaintiffs failed to allege that “hearing loss from iPod use is actual or imminent.” See also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (Article III requires an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” and Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 17 of 38 Page ID #:71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 6 sf-3743919 “it must actually exist”); Van Patten, 2017 WL 9484398, at *3 (same); Moody v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. CV 15-5186-DMG (Sx), 2016 WL 6604627, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing under the UCL where they could potentially avoid the alleged future economic harm). Worse, Plaintiffs’ claim is based on junk science. Consider Sheri Roselle. She is a self-proclaimed renowned “medical aesthetician,” and her 4-minute “YouTube” video on which Plaintiffs rely (Compl. at 3 n.4) opens with a pitch hawking a competing line of skin products. Sheri advises that consumers not use anything with walnut shells. Why? Because they are “not round.” She does not even mention St. Ives.4 Or consider the blog post “How St. Ives Apricot Scrub Is Destroying Your Skin,” posted in “The Zoe Report” by a self-proclaimed “stylist,”5 which is cited in footnote 5 of the Complaint. Zoe ends with a list of “safer alternatives” that you can purchase—via direct link from her blog.6 Then there is Lauri Shea (Compl. at 3 n.6), who publishes a blog on the website of the spa she also happens to own, pitching her services and peddling products that compete with St. Ives.7 Finally, there is a New York Magazine article that, if anything, impeaches Plaintiffs’ own claim. It mentions the Product only in passing, referring to a single 4 See Sheri Roselle, Medical Esthetician at Toronto Dermatology Centre, Exfoliation Are You Doing it Right (Jul. 24, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4v8NO3SaWh0. 5 Her name is Rachel Zoe. (See http://thezoereport.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2017)). 6 See Stephanie Montes, How St. Ives Apricot Scrub is Destroying Your Skin, The Zoe Report (Mar. 10, 2016), http://thezoereport.com/beauty/skincare/st-ives- apricot-scrub-is-destroying-your-skin/. 7 See Lauri Shea, Why St. Ives Apricot Scrub is Terrible For Your Skin- You Can Start Feeling Guilty now (July 25, 2014), http://www.etherealauraspa.com/blog/apricot-scrub. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 18 of 38 Page ID #:72 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 7 sf-3743919 dermatologist who does not say (as Plaintiffs allege) that the Product is unsuitable or should not be used. 8 Rather, Dr. Schultz speaks of face scrubs generally. And if there is skin damage, he faults user error and not the scrub: “The problem is that the typical scrubber is totally unpredictable. The length of time the person scrubs and the amount of pressure applied while scrubbing are two variables that can lead to irritated skin.”9 Another dermatologist is quoted, Dr. Lancer, who treats stars such as Beyoncé. He contradicts Plaintiffs’ theory by “advocate[ing] scrubbing every day so that helpful active ingredients in moisturizers can penetrate the skin more efficiently.”10 This is exactly the opposite of what Plaintiffs allege. Not only is Plaintiffs’ science bad, so are their economics. In Van Patten, plaintiff alleged that he received unwanted text messages in violation of a federal statute. This did not satisfy the UCL because “regardless of how many text messages Van Patten received during a month, he still paid the same monthly fee.” 2017 WL 460663, at *10. Here, as in Van Patten, there is no economic injury. In California, courts find UCL standing lacking when a plaintiff gets exactly what he paid for, even if the plaintiff alleges that he “lost money” or “paid more” for the products than he otherwise would have. See Red, 2015 WL 9484398, at *4 (plaintiff lacked UCL standing where plaintiff received exactly what she thought she was purchasing); Baggett v. Hewlett Packard Co., No. SAVC 07-0667-AG (RNBx), 2009 WL 3178066, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) (Guilford A. J.) (plaintiff lacked UCL standing where the ink toner he bought lasted for at least 2,000 pages, as advertised by defendant); Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 322 (holding that 8 Ashley Weatherford, Is Your Scrub Giving You Wrinkles, New York Magazine (Aug. 11, 2016), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/07/your-scrub-giving- you-wrinkles.html. 9 Id. 10 The only person cited in the article that completely rejects the use of scrubs is a “skincare expert” that speaks about scrubs generally, does not have a medical or other relevant education, and does not mention the Product specifically. See id. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 19 of 38 Page ID #:73 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 8 sf-3743919 UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims must be prosecuted exclusively “by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of” the unfair competition); Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1583, 1591 (2008) (plaintiffs lacked UCL standing where they had “received the benefit of their bargain, having obtained the bargained-for insurance at the bargained-for price”); Simpson v. Cal. Pizza Kitchen, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“[A]n economic injury typically requires a loss of the plaintiff’s benefit of the bargain, such as by overpayment, loss in value, or loss of usefulness.”) The same is true under New York General Law Sections 349 and 350. See Treiber v. Aspen Dental Mgmt., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 352, 363 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under Sections 349 and 350 because “[t]he named plaintiffs do not assert that they were harmed by the dental work performed by licensed dentists at the Practices, that they were billed for services they did not need or receive, or that they experienced any other legally cognizable injury. They do not allege that they received improper dental treatment nor that defendants’ dentists committed malpractice. Instead, they received dental services for which they paid and therefore suffered no harm.”); In re Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. Overcharging Litig., 167 F. Supp. 3d 524, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs have no standing because they “do not make a single allegation of inflated pricing specific to a particular purchase of theirs. Instead, each alleges only that, from time to time, he bought pre-packaged food at Whole Foods stores”). Plaintiffs challenge three specific marketing statements as deceptive: (1) that the Product “deeply exfoliates to reveal smooth skin,” (2) that it is “dermatologist tested,” and (3) that it is “non-comedogenic.” (Compl. ¶ 2.) They claim that had they known these statements were false and misleading, they would not have purchased the Product. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) Notably, however, Plaintiffs do not allege that the Product did not perform as advertised on their skin. For example, they do not allege that the Product did not “deeply exfoliate” their skin or that their pores Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 20 of 38 Page ID #:74 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 9 sf-3743919 became clogged (i.e., that the Product was comedogenic). Moreover, they do not challenge that the Product was “dermatologist tested,” but instead misconstrue the statement to mean “dermatologist recommended.” (Id. ¶ 12.) In short, Plaintiffs received exactly what the labels promised: an exfoliating facial scrub. As such, they suffered no economic injury and their claims are not actionable under the UCL or New York General Law sections 349 and 350. 2. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Actual Reliance. You cannot be deceived by something you never saw. Plaintiffs must allege that they heard or saw each challenged representation and made their purchase as a result. Cf. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2003) (consumer lacked standing to pursue UCL claim based on allegedly false statements printed on the “jacket” of a video that he purchased by telephone and failed to see pre-purchase); Estrada v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:14-cv-01051-TLN-EFB, 2015 WL 1440466, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (plaintiff cannot have been injured by statements made after she purchased the product); Cabral v. Supple LLC, 608 F. App’x 482, 483 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing class certification where all class members did not see or receive challenged misrepresentations). While the Complaint states that “Defendant markets St. Ives as a facial ‘scrub’ that ‘deeply exfoliates to reveal smooth skin’… [and] the packaging represents that it is ‘dermatologist tested’ and ‘non-comedogenic,’” Plaintiffs do not allege that they actually saw or relied on any of those statements prior to purchase. Instead, they vaguely assert that they “relied on Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive marketing of St. Ives as a facial scrub. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.) This is insufficient. See Fisher v. Monster Beverage Corp., 656 F. App’x 819, 822-3 (9th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff alleged that he read and relied on Monster’s affirmative representations); In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practice & Prods. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App’x 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s dismissal because plaintiff “has not alleged any harm to him: he does not allege that his health was impaired Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 21 of 38 Page ID #:75 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 10 sf-3743919 by the use of Avandia” and “fails to allege what advertising materials or information he or his (unidentified) prescribing physician read or relied on”). Other cases are to the same effect.11 The disconnect is especially acute for the non-comedogenic statement, which only appears on the back label of the Product. If Plaintiffs had read the back label—as they must admit, or they would have no claim—they would have also seen a green dial titled “Exfoliation Factor” dial icon. This icon shows whether the exfoliation is “Deep,” “Moderate,” or “Gentle”: This icon explains that this particular Product is a “deep” and powerful 11 Dvora v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. CV 11-1074-GW(PLAx), 2011 WL 1897349, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (no claim over website statements that plaintiff never read); Romero v. Flowers Bakeries, LLC, No. 14-cv-05189-BLF, 2016 WL 469370, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016) (plaintiff’s claims were too generalized to provide a basis for reliance, and therefore implausible); Bush v. Mondelez Int’l, Inc., No. 16-cv-02460-RS, 2016 WL 7324990 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (same); Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims because they “fail to allege that they purchased their Android phones in reliance on any misrepresentation or omission by Apple”); see also Section IV.C, supra. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 22 of 38 Page ID #:76 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 11 sf-3743919 exfoliator, not to be used more than a couple times a week to avoid damaging the skin. Right below the dial is a full list of ingredients (including walnut shell powder and other allegedly comedogenic ingredients), as well as detailed directions on how to use the scrub properly. In short, the back label warns the consumer about the abrasiveness of the scrub they are buying. Thus, Plaintiffs—and by definition, every putative class member—knew exactly what they were getting prior to purchase. Again, Plaintiffs do not allege to have read and relied on the disputed marketing statements. As such, they lack standing to pursue their claims. See Dvora, 2011 WL 1897349, at *8 (no claim over website statements that plaintiff never read); In re Ferrero Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (same). 3. Plaintiffs Cannot Sue Over Products Not Purchased. Plaintiffs claim they purchased St. Ives Apricot Scrub. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19.) Unilever sells several varieties of the St. Ives Apricot Scrub, including, but not limited to, “Apricot Blemish Control” scrub, “Apricot Fresh Skin” scrub, and “Apricot Oil” scrub.12 Plaintiffs do not specify, but the only product pictured is the Apricot Fresh Skin Scrub. (Compl. ¶ 2.) To the extent Plaintiffs are bringing a claim for any other variety of the St. Ives Apricot Scrub, they lack standing. (Id. ¶ 13.) Cf. Abad v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No. CV 15-3795-GP(JPRx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016), Dkt. No. 104 at 5-6 (Plaintiffs lack standing with respect to products they did not purchase) and No. 105 (granting motion to dismiss in part based on tentative ruling); Dysthe v. Basic Research LLC, No. CV 09-8013 AG (SSx), 2011 WL 5868307, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) (Guilford, J.) (“plaintiff does not have standing to bring CLRA, UCL, or warranty claim based on a product 12 See St. Ives, Face Care Products, http://www.stives.com/product- category/face-care (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 23 of 38 Page ID #:77 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 12 sf-3743919 that she never purchased); Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. C 11-05188 SI, 2012 WL 5458396, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (plaintiffs could not have suffered a particularized injury for products they did not purchase). Plaintiffs “cannot expand the scope of [their] claims to include [] product[s] [they] did not purchase.” Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-cv-1935 DMS (JMA), 2010 WL 476688, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010); see also Zwart v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 5:10-cv-03992-JF (HRL), 2011 WL 767750, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2011) (plaintiff cannot establish injury, reliance, or causation as to products he did not purchase). B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Plausible. Even if this Court finds standing, Plaintiffs’ claims are utterly implausible. Under Rule 8(a), “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Statements are actionable only if they are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. See Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the California consumer protection statutes are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test); Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016); Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (2003). Plaintiffs challenge three statements on the Product’s label as false and misleading: (1) that it “deeply exfoliates to reveal smooth skin,” (2) that it is “dermatologist tested,” and (3) that it is “non-comedogenic.” (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs also allege that Unilever omitted the fact that the Product “causes skin damage” because the primary ingredient is crushed walnut shell powder, which purportedly “has jagged edges that cause micro tears in the skin when used as a scrub.” (Id. ¶¶ 3, 12.) Plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim under any of these theories. First, the label statements are true. The Product deeply exfoliates skin, it was Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 24 of 38 Page ID #:78 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 13 sf-3743919 tested by dermatologists, and it is non-comedogenic. Plaintiffs do not challenge the veracity of the first two claims: their complaint is that the exfoliation is too deep (and as a result, damages your skin), and they do not contend the Product is not “dermatologist tested.” Instead, they claim the marketing suggests the product is “Dermatologist recommended.” (Id. ¶ 12.) The labels never said that. As for non-comedogenic, Plaintiffs allege that some of the ingredients are comedogenic, but they provide no facts other than their say-so. (Id.) As such, the label statements are truthful commercial speech, which is not actionable under the UCL, CLRA, and FLA because it is protected under the First Amendment. See Henderson v. Gruma Corp., No. CV 10-04173 AHM (AJWx), 2011 WL 1362188, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (holding that the statement “With Garden Vegetables” is a truthful statement and therefore not actionable). Second, Plaintiffs’ interpretation is implausible. As noted above, the statement “deeply exfoliates” is true. To the extent Plaintiffs are claiming that the statement “… to reveal smooth skin” (Compl. ¶ 2) is misleading, that statement is non-actionable puffery. See Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 964, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citations omitted) (holding that statements that are “subjective” or “[g]eneralized, vague, and unspecified . . . constitute mere puffery upon which a reasonable consumer could not rely, and hence are not actionable.”), aff’d, 322 F. App’x 489 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999) (general claims about product quality or superiority are puffery); Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2016). Put differently, Plaintiffs must identify statements that “make a specific and measurable advertisement claim.” TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830-32 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). “To reveal smooth skin” is not specific or measurable. Rather, it is vague, subjective, and unquantifiable. Similarly, the plain meaning of “dermatologist tested” is just that: it was Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 25 of 38 Page ID #:79 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 14 sf-3743919 tested by dermatologists (which it was), not that it is recommended by dermatologists (which the label does not say). Third, reasonable consumers may generally understand that “non- comedogenic” is an adjective defined as “not tending to clog pores (as by the formation of blackheads)”.13 But it is not plausible to think that consumers would be familiar with the list of chemical compounds and other ingredients that the Plaintiffs are challenging as “comedogenic.” Fourth, context matters. Anyone who saw the “non-comedogenic” statement necessarily would have seen the “Exfoliation Factor” dial icon. Given this context, it is implausible that Plaintiffs, or any other reasonable consumer, would be confused as to the level of exfoliation provided by the product, or by the inclusion of walnut shell powder. C. Plaintiff’s Claims Sounding in Fraud Are Not Pled With the Requisite Particularity. Even if plausible, Plaintiffs’ claims fail because they are not pled with sufficient particularity. Rule 9(b) applies a heightened standard that requires a party to state with particularity the circumstances constituting all claims that are based on allegations of a unified course of fraudulent conduct, whether affirmative misrepresentations or omissions. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2003). “Averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged,” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124 (citation omitted), as well as the circumstances indicating fraudulent conduct. See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106. Most recently, this Court held in Abramson v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (Guilford, J.) that a claim of unfair conduct must be pled under a 13 See Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, “Non-Comedogenic,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noncomedogenic. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 26 of 38 Page ID #:80 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 15 sf-3743919 heightened pleading standard. Plaintiffs’ bare-bones Class Action Complaint does not plead with sufficient particularity the circumstances that led to their reliance on Unilever’s alleged misrepresentations and “fraud.” Plaintiffs simply say in a conclusory fashion that they “purchased St. Ives,” “relied on Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive marketing of St. Ives as a facial scrub,” and that “[h]ad Defendant disclosed that St. Ives is not fit to be used as a facial scrub because it causes skin damage, [they] would have been aware of that and [they] would not have purchased St. Ives.” (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.) They also claim that the Product has the three statements (discussed above) that are misleading. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.) This is not sufficiently particular for several reasons: First, Plaintiffs do not specify which variation of the Apricot Scrub they purchased.14 The court is left guessing. Second, Plaintiffs do not allege that they actually read, much less relied on, the statements at issue. They simply say that “Defendant markets St. Ives” using these statements. (Id. ¶ 2.) For example, the statement “non-comedogenic,” was only printed on the back of the Product’s bottle. To see it and rely on it, the Plaintiffs would have had to turn the product around to read the back of the bottle. Plaintiffs do not allege they did this. Again, the Court is left guessing. Third, Plaintiffs do not explain what they thought the label statements at issue meant. What exactly did they think the terms “deeply exfoliates to reveal smooth skin,” “dermatologist tested,” and “non-comedogenic” mean? Plaintiffs fail to define these terms according to how they, and other consumers similarly situated, understood the terms. They also fail to allege how they know that the ingredients listed in Paragraph 13 of their Complaint are “highly comedogenic ingredients.” Once again, the Court is left guessing. (Compl. ¶ 13.) 14 As mentioned above in footnote 3, Unilever has an entire suite of different St. Ives Apricot Scrubs. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 27 of 38 Page ID #:81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 16 sf-3743919 Fourth, Plaintiffs do not articulate what they expected the Product to do, and how it failed to deliver on those expectations. Indeed, they fail to allege that they even used the Product. Again, the Court is left guessing. Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements are not sufficiently particular under recent Ninth Circuit precedent, which holds that to plead reliance with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b), it is the plaintiff’s duty to provide sufficient detail. See Haskins v. Symantec Corp., 654 F. App’x 338, 339 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Because Haskins’s complaint did not allege that she read and relied on a specific misrepresentation by Symantec, she failed to plead her fraud claims with particularity as required by Rule 9(b)”); see also Chavez v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. CV 09-9192-GW(CWx), 2011 WL 10565797, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (dismissing fraud-based claims where complaint did not identify “what specific misrepresentations [plaintiffs] allegedly saw, when they viewed them, or how they relied upon them”); cf. Herrera v. Estee Lauder Cos., No. SAVC 12-01169- CJC(ANx), 2012 WL 12507876, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (claims fail 9(b) where plaintiff “failed to plead when she saw [challenged statement], and what specific products she purchased in reliance on it.”); Beltran v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. SACV 12-02502-CJC(ANx), 2012 WL 12303423, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (website claims failed 9(b) where plaintiff failed to “specify when she visited the website, the specific contents of the misrepresentation, or that she relied on the misrepresentation to make specific purchases”); Figy v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“all natural” claims failed Rule 9(b) where plaintiffs did not “plead what they believe ‘All Natural’ to mean, what the offending ingredients are, and what is unnatural about them”). At the very least, the Court should dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims for failing to provide sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b). Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 28 of 38 Page ID #:82 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 17 sf-3743919 D. Plaintiffs’ Claims Fail for Other, Claim-Specific Reasons. 1. Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment Claim Is Duplicative. Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is duplicative of their legal remedies under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL. All of these causes of action seek the same remedy: repayment of the full purchase price. This Court has dismissed an unjust enrichment claim where “[p]laintiff will be able to pursue his remedies through [other] claims [including UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims], and the unjust enrichment claim will add nothing to his available relief.” Bagget v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d, 1261, 1271 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (Guilford, J.). Equity requires dismissal of this duplicative legal remedy. See Goudie v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. EDCV 15-0533 AG (DTBx), 2015 WL 12803765, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (Guilford, J.) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because it was based on the same facts as plaintiff’s UCL claim); Collins v. eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 260 (2011), as modified (Dec. 28, 2011) (affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim because “plaintiffs’ remedies at law are adequate (counts alleged under the CLRA, the UCL, and common law fraud), [so] a claim for restitution, alleging that [defendant] has been unjustly enriched by its fraud, is unnecessary. This conclusion follows from the general principle of equity that equitable relief (such as restitution) will not be given when the plaintiff’s remedies at law are adequate.”). See also Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Under California [] law, unjust enrichment is an action in quasi-contract, which does not lie when an enforceable, binding agreement exists defining the rights of the parties.”); Otto v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-01411-SVW-DTB (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013), Dkt. No. 35 at 11 (“[N]o factual allegations of wrongdoing by Defendant remain. Thus, there is no basis to infer that any actions which inured to the benefit of Defendant were unjust”). Plaintiffs seek remedy under unjust enrichment based on the same facts in Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 29 of 38 Page ID #:83 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 18 sf-3743919 their CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims, and other claims. In re Ford Tailgate Litig., No. 11-CV-2953-RS, 2014 WL 1007066 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014), is instructive. There, the court dismissed a duplicative unjust enrichment claim, stating that, “[p]laintiffs are, of course, entitled to plead alternative claims.” Id. at *5. “However, ‘where the unjust enrichment claim relies upon the same factual predicates as a plaintiff’s legal causes of action, it is not a true alternative theory of relief but rather is duplicative of those legal causes of action.’” Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Apple & AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“plaintiffs cannot assert unjust enrichment claims that are merely duplicative of statutory or tort claims”). A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit held that a claim for unjust enrichment is superfluous and duplicative where the recovery is the same whether viewed as restitution or unjust enrichment. See Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, 660 F. App’x 531, 535 (9th Cir. 2016) (“in most cases, as in this one, the defendant’s benefit is equal to the plaintiff’s loss… so restitution and disgorgement are functionally the same remedy. Dole’s wrongfully obtained profits are equal to the victims’ losses: the total price premium paid by all misled purchasers”). Because in this case all claims are based on the same facts and request the same remedy, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim duplicates their other claims, and should be dismissed with prejudice. 2. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Fails. Plaintiffs allege that Unilever breached the implied warranty of merchantability because “St. Ives is not fit to be used as a facial scrub because it causes skin damage.” (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.) Both California and New York law require Plaintiffs to allege how the products were not merchantable (“fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” See, e.g., Cal. Com. Code § 2314(c); N.Y. Com. Law § 2-314(c) (McKinney 2017); Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 30 of 38 Page ID #:84 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 19 sf-3743919 590 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2009) (breach of implied warranty occurs when a product “lacks even the most basic degree of fitness for ordinary use”) (citation omitted); Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., No. 08-2746 JF, 2009 WL 1635931, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2009) (implied warranty “does not impose a general requirement that goods precisely fulfill the expectation of the buyer”) (citation omitted); Denny v. Motor Ford Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 736 n.4 (N.Y. 1995) (“A warranty of fitness for ordinary purposes ‘does not mean that the product will fulfill [a] buyer’s every expectation’”) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs have not alleged facts (as they must), supporting that the scrubs they purchased did not perform as advertised. They have no allegations that they used the scrubs at all, much less that they did not provide deep exfoliation or that they caused any damage to their skin. All the “evidence” they provide are unsubstantiated and isolated reviews by third party “aestheticians” and a vague magazine article. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-10, Section IV.A.1) Plaintiffs have not alleged that the particular scrubs they purchased somehow did not work on their skin, or did not meet their own personal expectations, in violation of the implied warranty of merchantability. In fact, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have not even alleged that they used the Product, much less that it was useless for its intended purpose. E. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief. A plaintiff who does not allege his intent to purchase the product in the future lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. See Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., No. 12-cv-02646-RMW, 2016 WL 4585819, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (“[plaintiff], however, does lack standing because she has made no showing that … she intends to purchase Twinings’ tea again in the future”); see also Saavedra v. Eli Lily & Co., No. 2:12-cv-9366-SVW-MAN, 2013 WL 6345442, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013); Khasin v. R.C. Bigelow Inc., No. 3:12-cv-02204-WHO, 2016 WL 4502500, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016); Victor v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., No. 13-CV- 02976-WHO, 2016 WL 4502528, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016); Davidson v. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 31 of 38 Page ID #:85 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 20 sf-3743919 Kimberly-Clark Corp., 76 F. Supp. 3d 964, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014). To bring a claim for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must allege they would purchase the product at issue in the lawsuit. See Anderson v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1235 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“As such, [plaintiff] still would not purchase Defendant’s products even if it was ordered to remove the ‘All Natural’ label; the offensive unnatural ingredients would still be there”). See also In re First Am. Home Buyers Protection Corp. Class Action Litig., 313 F.R.D. 578, 612 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (plaintiffs had no standing to seek injunctive relief in an alleged nationwide class action brought against a provider of home warranty protection plans because they had not indicated they would buy again). Here, Plaintiffs do not claim that they would purchase the Product again. Injunctive relief is also improper because Plaintiffs cannot be “deceived” by the Product’s labeling again. “To maintain standing, Plaintiffs must show a sufficient likelihood that they will be injured by [defendant] again in a similar way and that the future injury can be redressed by injunctive relief.” Luman v. Theismann, 647 F. App’x 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2016). In this case, there is no danger that Plaintiffs will purchase the allegedly infringing Product again because they now know what its ingredients are and the alleged damage it can cause to their skin. See Victor, 2016 WL 4502528, at *6 (holding that consumer of food items “cannot establish that he is likely to suffer the same injury in the future because . . . there is no danger that they will be misled in the future”) (citation omitted); Ham v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Consumers who were misled by deceptive food labels lack standing for injunctive relief because there is no danger that they will be misled in the future”) (citation omitted). F. The Court Should Strike Plaintiffs’ Geographically Overbroad Class Definition as “Immaterial” Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Plaintiffs’ nationwide class allegations fail. The Court should strike them. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), “this Court has authority to Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 32 of 38 Page ID #:86 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 21 sf-3743919 strike class allegations prior to discovery if the complaint demonstrates that a class action cannot be maintained.” Tietsworth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Such is the case here. Plaintiffs’ nationwide class violates Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). Ms. Browning is a California resident, and Ms. Basile is a New York resident. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19.) They seek to assert claims under California’s UCL and N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Sections 349 and 350 on behalf of “all persons in the United States who purchased St. Ives.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) Under Mazza, however, “each class member’s consumer protection claim should be governed by the consumer protection laws of the jurisdiction in which the transaction took place.” 666 F.3d at 594. As such, Ms. Basile’s claims are governed by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Sections 349 and 350 and Ms. Browning’s are governed by California’s UCL, CLRA, and FAL statutes. Other individuals who purchased the Product in N.Y. can join Ms. Basile’s class Sections 349 and 350, and other individuals who purchased the Product in California can join Ms. Browning’s class under the UCL. What they cannot do is assert claims on behalf of a nationwide class of people under either of these state statutes. Federal courts in this state have recently struck geographically overbroad and ambiguous class definitions of a similar tenor. See Torrent v. Yakult U.S.A. Inc., SACV 15-00124-CJC(JCGx), 2015 WL 4335076, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (striking a class defined as “[a]ll persons in the state of California who purchased Yakult” because the qualifier “in the state of California” is ambiguous); In re First Am. Home Buyers Protection Corp., 313 F.R.D. at 602 (in an alleged nationwide class action brought against a provider of home warranty protection plans, each purchaser’s consumer protection law claims would be governed by his or her own home state’s laws). California law is to the same effect. Aghaji v. Bank of Am., N.A., 247 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2016). In Aghaji, the court held that non-California residents Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 33 of 38 Page ID #:87 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 22 sf-3743919 cannot sue the California-based servicer of their mortgage loans absent evidence that the alleged servicing errors occurred at the California facilities. Id. at 1120. Plaintiffs cannot pursue claims under California or New York law on behalf of consumers who purchased the Unilever Product in another state. The Court should strike the nationwide class averments. G. In the Alternative, the Court Should Stay This Action Pending the Ninth Circuit’s Decisions in Misbranding Appeals. In the alternative, the Court should stay Plaintiffs’ claims pending the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in two misbranding appeals, each of which bears on Plaintiffs’ request for class certification: (1) Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 12-01633 CRB, 2014 WL 2702726 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014) (appeal filed July 15, 2014); and (2) Kosta v. Del Monte Foods, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 217 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (appeal filed October 2, 2015). These appeals address unanswered questions regarding class certification requirements in similar “misbranding” cases, including the following: (i) if and how the ascertainability,15 commonality, and predominance requirements of Rule 23 can be met in these cases; (ii) whether reliance on—and materiality of—labels can be presumed; and (iii) the requirements for injunctive relief standing. The Court must answer each of these questions when considering Plaintiffs’ class certification request. As noted above, at least 20 district courts in California have stayed “misbranding” cases pending these Ninth Circuit 15 In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether, to obtain class certification, class representatives must demonstrate that there is an “administratively feasible” means of identifying absent class members in a related case. See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 15-55727, 2017 WL 24618, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017). The court held there is no such requirement. Id. Furthermore, the court specifically stated that it did not address ascertainability in its decision. Id. at *2 n.3. For example, the court did not discuss what happens when product labels or ingredients change during the class period. In this case, Unilever has changed the label of the St. Ives Apricot Scrubs since the Plaintiffs purchased the Product. Also, Briseno is silent on the two remaining issues in Jones and Kosta: (ii) reliance and materiality of labels, and (iii) the requirements for injunctive relief. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 34 of 38 Page ID #:88 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 23 sf-3743919 decisions.16 This Court should too. Courts weigh three factors when considering whether a stay is appropriate: (1) the possible damage that may result from granting a stay; (2) the hardship or inequity that a party may suffer if the stay is not granted; and (3) “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” See CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)) (the “Landis factors”). Each Landis factor weighs in favor of a stay here. 1. A Stay Will Promote the Orderly Course of Justice. Staying this case will promote the orderly course of justice. In ruling on Jones and Kosta, the Ninth Circuit will provide substantial guidance—if not new law—on questions related to any class certification decision. The Ninth Circuit’s 16 See, e.g., Fagan v. Neutrogena Corp., No. 5:13-CV-01316-SVW-OP (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), Dkt. No. 166; Swearingen v. Amazon Preservation Partners, Inc., No. 13-cv-044202-WHO (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2016), Dkt. No. 76; Morgan v. Wallaby Yogurt Co., No. 3:13-cv-00296-JD (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016), Dkt. No. 93; Mains v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-05652-EJD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51816 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2016); Grivas v. Metagenics, Inc., No. SACV 15-01838- CJC (DFMx) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016), Dkt. No. 33; Ang v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 13-cv-01196-HSG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44053 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016); Romero v. Flowers Bakeries, LLC, No. 14-cv-05189-BLF, 2016 WL 469370 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016); Koller v. Med Foods, Inc., No. 14-cv-02400-RS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167760 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015); Ham v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-02044-WHO (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2015), Dkt. No. 59; Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 5:12-cv-02554-RMW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015), Dkt. No. 85; Samet v. Kellogg Co., No. 5:12-cv-01891-PSG, 2015 WL 6954989 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015); Thomas v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 12-cv-02908-BLF, 2015 WL 6674696 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015); Park v. Welch Foods Inc., No. 5:12-cv- 06449-PSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144463 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015); Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. 11-cv-6342-PJH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138496 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2015); Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., No. 12-CV-1586-SC, 2015 WL 4451424 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2015); Leonhart v. Nature’s Path Foods, Inc., No. 13-cv-00492-BLF, 2015 WL 3548212 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2015); Pardini v. Unilever U.S., Inc., No. 13-cv-01675-SC, 2015 WL 1744340 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015); Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 13-cv-01279-HSG (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015), Dkt. No. 152; Swearingen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-05332-SC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2015), Dkt. No. 36; Parker v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 3:13-cv- 0690-SC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014), Dkt. No. 74; Gustavson v. Mars, Inc., No. 13- cv-04537-LHK, 2014 WL 6986421 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014). Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 35 of 38 Page ID #:89 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 24 sf-3743919 decisions in “Jones, Brazil, and Kosta are [therefore] likely to provide substantial guidance on issues material [to] the instant case.” See Thomas, 2015 WL 6674696, at *3. A stay would accordingly “be the most efficient and fairest course . . . [as] there are ‘independent proceedings which bear upon the case.’” Gustavson, 2014 WL 6986421, at *3 (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co of Pittsburgh, PA v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 11-04897 JW, 2012 WL 219428, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (quoting Levya v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979))). The third Landis factor applies. 2. The Parties Will Suffer Hardship Absent a Stay. Staying this case will also conserve the parties’ resources and enable a more efficient and less expensive resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims. If this case goes forward, both parties would expend significant time and resources pursuing class certification discovery. They would also expend considerable resources briefing and arguing class certification and/or summary judgment motions, which may be rendered inapposite by the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate rulings. Avoiding such unnecessary expense weighs in favor of a stay. Cf. Thomas, 2015 WL 6674696, at *3; Leonhart, 2015 WL 3548212, at *3; Gustavson, 2014 WL 6986421, at *3. 3. Plaintiffs Will Not Be Injured By a Stay. The final Landis factor also applies: Plaintiffs will not be injured by a stay. Plaintiffs have not alleged any intent to purchase the Product in the future, nor can they be “duped” again by supposedly false and misleading labels. Plaintiffs have had no physical or personal injury as a result of using the Product. Accordingly, they cannot be harmed again, and thus will not be injured by a stay. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs oppose a stay because it would delay any monetary recovery, their argument is unpersuasive. See Gustavson, 2014 WL 6986421, at *3; CMAX, Inc., 300 F.2d at 269; Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110-12 (9th Cir. 2005). And a stay would not be indefinite. The Jones and Kosta appeals are fully briefed. A stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s guidance will Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 36 of 38 Page ID #:90 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES 25 sf-3743919 not harm Plaintiffs; it will benefit both the parties and the Court. Because each Landis factor applies, the Court should stay Plaintiffs’ claims pending the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Jones and Kosta. V. CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, Unilever respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, strike the Plaintiffs’ class action averments, or, in the alternative, grant the motion to stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Jones and Kosta. Dated: February 23, 2017 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP By: /s/ Claudia Maria Vetesi Claudia Maria Vetesi Attorneys for Defendant UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 37 of 38 Page ID #:91 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Case No. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES sf- 3743919Case No. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 23 day of February, 2017, the foregoing document was filed electronically on the CM/ECF system, which caused all CM/ECF participants to be served by electronic means. Dated: February 23, 2017 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP By: /s/ Claudia Maria Vetesi Claudia Maria Vetesi Attorneys for Defendant Unilever United States, Inc. Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15 Filed 02/23/17 Page 38 of 38 Page ID #:92 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING UNILEVER’S MOT. TO DISMISS OR STAY COMPLAINT CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES sf-3742722 WILLIAM L. STERN (CA SBN 96105) WStern@mofo.com CLAUDIA M. VETESI (CA SBN 233485) CVetesi@mofo.com LUIS GABRIEL HOYOS (CA SBN 313019) LHoyos@mofo.com MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 425 Market Street San Francisco, California 94105-2482 Telephone: 415.268.7000 Facsimile: 415.268.7522 Attorneys for Defendant UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SOUTHERN DIVISION KAYLEE BROWNING and SARAH BASILE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNILEVER UNITED STATES, INC., Defendant. Case No. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT UNILEVER UNITED STATES INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO STRIKE Hearing Date: April 24, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Judge: Hon. Andrew J. Guilford Ctrm: Courtroom 10D Action Filed: December 16, 2016 Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15-1 Filed 02/23/17 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:93 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING UNILEVER’S MOT. TO DISMISS OR STAY COMPLAINT 1 CASE NO. 8:16-CV-2210-AG-KES sf-3742722 On February 23, 2017, Defendant Unilever United States Inc. (“Unilever” or “Defendant”) filed a motion to dismiss or stay Plaintiffs Kaylee Browning and Sarah Basile’s (“Plaintiffs’”) class action complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to: (i) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (ii) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (iii) Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for failure to plead claims grounded in fraud with sufficient particularity, and (iv) pending Ninth Circuit’s decisions in two misbranding appeals. Unilever also moved to strike Plaintiffs’ class definition as “immaterial” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The motion came on for hearing on April 10, 2017. Based on the supporting and opposing papers, other related documents filed with the Court in connection with this motion, and the papers and records on file in this action, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: , 2017 HONORABLE ANDREW J. GUILFORD United States District Court Judge Case 8:16-cv-02210-AG-KES Document 15-1 Filed 02/23/17 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:94
