Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices And Products Liability Litigation

Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction OMNIBUS MOTION TO DISMISS

D.N.J.May 19, 2017

39161366v.1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION MDL No. 2738 NOTICE OF DEFENDANT PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS COUNCIL’S MOTION TO DISMISS Return Date: June 19, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED DEFENDANT PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS COUNCIL’S NOTICE OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 9:00 a.m. on June 19, 2017, or such other time and date set by the Court, Defendant Personal Care Products Council, by its undersigned counsel, will move before the Honorable Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J., United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Clarkson S. Fisher Building & U.S. Courthouse, 402 East State Street, Room 2020, Trenton, NJ 08608, for an entry of an Order granting Defendant Personal Care Products Council’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaints. PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that in support of its motion, Defendant Personal Care Products Council will rely on the Memorandum of Law and the accompanying Declaration of Mark A. Pollak and the attached exhibits submitted herewith. A proposed form of Order is also submitted herewith. PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Defendant Personal Care Products Council requests oral argument on its motion. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 3130 2 39161366v.1 Dated: May 19, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Thomas T. Locke, Esq. Thomas T. Locke (DC Bar No. 454144) Rebecca Woods (DC Bar No. 468495) James R. Billings-Kang (DC Bar No. 984152) SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 975 F Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 Telephone: (202) 463-2400 Facsimile: (202) 828-5393 tlocke@seyfarth.com rwoods@seyfarth.com jbillingskang@seyfarth.com Sheryl L. Axelrod (NJ Bar No. 017091994) THE AXELROD FIRM, PC The Beasley Building 1125 Walnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 Phone: (215) 461-1770 Facsimile: (215) 238-1779 saxelrod@theaxelrodfirm.com Attorneys for Defendant Personal Care Products Council Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256 Filed 05/19/17 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 3131 39020976v.3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION MDL No. 2738 DEFENDANT PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS COUNCIL’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS Thomas T. Locke (DC Bar No. 454144) Rebecca Woods (DC Bar No. 468495) James Billings-Kang (DC Bar No. 984152) SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 975 F Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 Telephone: (202) 463-2400 Facsimile: (202) 828-5393 tlocke@seyfarth.com rwoods@seyfarth.com jbillingskang@seyfarth.com Sheryl L. Axelrod (NJ Bar No. 017091994) THE AXELROD FIRM, PC The Beasley Building 1125 Walnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 Phone: (215) 461-1770 Facsimile: (215) 238-1779 saxelrod@theaxelrodfirm.com Attorneys for Defendant Personal Care Products Council Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 20 PageID: 3132 i 39020976v.3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................................................................................ 1 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2 I. This Court Has Authority to Dismiss Lawsuits Based on Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. ......................................................................................................................... 2 II. Plaintiffs Cannot Meet Their Burden of Establishing Personal Jurisdiction. ..................... 3 A. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Long-Arm Jurisdiction. ............................................... 4 B. General Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over PCPC. .................................................. 7 C. Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over PCPC................................................... 9 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 13 Exhibit A - Identification of Pending Lawsuits to which Motion to Dismiss Applies Exhibit B - Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, 2015 WL 1403148 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015) Exhibit C - Long-Arm Statutes from Applicable Jurisdictions Exhibit D - Declaration of Mark A. Pollak Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 2 of 20 PageID: 3133 ii 39020976v.3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Allaham v. Naddaf, 635 Fed. App’x 32 (3d Cir. 2015)..........................................................................................3, 4 Block Indus. v. DHJ Indus., 495 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1974) .....................................................................................................5 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) .............................................................................................................9, 10 Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................5 Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................8 Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 14-cv-00627, 2015 WL 1403148 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015) ..........................................2, 12 Citadel Group Ltd. v. Wash. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 536 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................................4 Coen v. Coen, 590 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2007) .....................................................................................................5 Conwill v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., No. 09-4365, 2009 WL 5178310 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2009) ....................................................11 Copia Commc’n v. AMResorts, L.P., 812 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................................5 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) .................................................................................................................8 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................4 D’Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2009).........................................................................................................3 Fed. Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989) .....................................................................................................5 Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 3 of 20 PageID: 3134 iii 39020976v.3 Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842 (11th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................6 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) ...............................................................................................................7, 8 Graziose v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Nev. 2001) ......................................................................................12 Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553 (3d Cir. 1994).......................................................................................................4 In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. 794 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1969) ............................................................................2 Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 2010) ......................................................................11 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ...................................................................................................................9 Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute Co., 531 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1976) .............................................................................................5 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colo., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) ...........................................................................................................6, 7, 8 Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981) ...................................................................................................4 Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) .........................................................................................................4, 9, 10 Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2005) .....................................................................................................5 J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) ...............................................................................................................9 Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................5 Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................................5 Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) ...................................................................................................................10 Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 4 of 20 PageID: 3135 iv 39020976v.3 In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., No. 04-400, 2005 WL 1625040 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2005) .........................................................3 Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................7 Le Bleu Corp. v. Standard Capital Grp., 11 Fed. Appx. 377 (4th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................5 Matthews v. Brookstone Stores, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (S.D. Ala. 2007)....................................................................................12 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ...............................................................................................3 Miles v. WTMX Radio, 15 Fed. Appx. 213 (6th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................5 Estate of Moore v. Carroll, 159 F. Supp.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2016) .........................................................................................5 Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1995) ....................................................................................................11 O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007).......................................................................................................4 Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501 (D.N.J. 2011) ............................................................................................4 Planning Group of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Mineral Properties, Ltd., 246 P.3d 343 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) .........................................................................................4 Ploense v. Electrolux Home Prods., 882 N.E.2d 653 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) ..................................................................................10, 11 Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001)...............................................................................................5 Riggs v. AHP Settlement Trust, 421 Fed. App’x 136 (3rd Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................................3 Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Intern. Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) .........................................................................................5 Rivera v. Ballys Park Place, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 611 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ...................................................................................3, 10 Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 5 of 20 PageID: 3136 v 39020976v.3 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) .................................................................................................................10 Sieber v. Campbell, 810 So. 2d 641, 644 (Ala. 2001) ................................................................................................4 Siskiyou Prop., LLC v. Bennett Holdings, LLC, 13 Fed. Appx. 553 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................5 St. Louis v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 982-09652, 2003 WL 23277277 (Mo. Cir. Dec. 16, 2003) ..............................................11 Stanton v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 340 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................5 Sugartown Worldwide LLC v. Shanks, Civ. A. No. 14-5063, 2015 WL 1312572 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2015) ........................................11 Szabo v. Med. Info. Bureau, 127 Cal. App.3d 51 (1981) ......................................................................................................10 Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................5 Ex parte United Ins. Companies, Inc., 936 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 2006) ....................................................................................................12 Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1996).........................................................................................................4 Walden. Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 904 (W.D. Mo. 2010) ....................................................................................11 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) .........................................................................................................2, 11 Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, 607 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2010) .....................................................................................................4 Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991) .......................................................................................5 Wince v. Easterbrooke Cellular Corp., 681 F.Supp.2d 688 (N.D.W.Va. 2010) ......................................................................................5 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) .............................................................................................................4, 10 Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 6 of 20 PageID: 3137 vi 39020976v.3 Yanmar Co. v. Slater, 386 S.W.3d 439 (Ark. 2012) ......................................................................................................4 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) .....................................................................................................5 In re Zofran (Onbansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:15-cv-13760-FDS, 2016 WL 2349105 (D. Mass. May 4, 2016) .....................................2 Statutes Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-929 .......................................................................................................7 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(1) ...............................................................................................................7 Ga. Code Ann. § 9-10-91 .................................................................................................................7 Idaho Code Ann. § 5-514 .................................................................................................................7 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.210 .........................................................................................................7 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3 .......................................................................................................5 Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57 ..............................................................................................................7 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 506.500 .................................................................................................................7 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382 ....................................................................................................7 Wis. Stat. Ann. 801.05 .....................................................................................................................7 Other Authorities Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) .................................................................................................................7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) ....................................................................................................................7 U.S. Constitution Due Process Clause ...............................................................................3, 4, 6, 11 Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 7 of 20 PageID: 3138 39020976v.3 In their amended master complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they or their decedents developed ovarian cancer from Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder® and/or Shower to Shower® (the “Products”). Plaintiffs name the Johnson & Johnson entities as defendants because Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. manufactured the Products. Plaintiffs name Imerys Talc America, Inc. as a defendant because, for a period of time, it supplied the talc used as an ingredient. A minority of Plaintiffs also name as a defendant Personal Care Products Council (“PCPC”), a non-profit trade association for the cosmetics industry. PCPC does not design, manufacture, sell or regulate any cosmetic products. PCPC should be dismissed based on lack of personal jurisdiction from the lawsuits identified on Exhibit A and any other lawsuit in which a plaintiff seeks to have a trial in a jurisdiction other than Washington, DC or New Jersey. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February 6, 2017, PCPC filed a motion to dismiss all then pending MDL lawsuits based on lack of personal jurisdiction and because the First Amendment, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and anti-SLAPP statutes preclude liability for lobbying and related activities. On March 16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Master Complaint. Case Management Order (“CMO”) No. 3 provides that, consistent with the Short Form Complaints filed pursuant to CMO No. 2, the allegations set forth in the Amended Master Complaint are incorporated in each lawsuit. A minority of Plaintiffs in jurisdictions other than Washington, DC or New Jersey subsequently asserted claims against PCPC. PCPC seeks dismissal of those lawsuits based on lack of personal jurisdiction. PCPC is participating in discovery in connection with the lawsuits emanating from Washington, DC subject to Plaintiffs’ agreement that such participation does not waive jurisdictional issues. After the jurisdictional issues are resolved, PCPC intends to file a motion for summary judgment based on the First Amendment, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, anti-SLAPP statutes, and other grounds. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 8 of 20 PageID: 3139 2 39020976v.3 ARGUMENT PCPC has no contacts and transacts no meaningful business in any jurisdiction other than Washington, DC. PCPC has consented to personal jurisdiction for talc lawsuits filed and litigated in New Jersey. In all other jurisdictions, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists over PCPC. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted PCPC’s motion to dismiss a talc lawsuit making the same allegations. See Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 14- cv-00627, 2015 WL 1403148, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015), attached as Exhibit B (holding that “Due process requires that a Defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the state”) (citing Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014)). PCPC likewise should be dismissed from the cases identified on Exhibit A.1 I. THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO DISMISS LAWSUITS BASED ON LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION. PCPC’s Motion is properly before this Court. “In a multidistrict litigation, a transferee court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if the transferor court would have had jurisdiction.” In re Zofran (Onbansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:15-cv-13760-FDS, 2016 WL 2349105, at *3 (D. Mass. May 4, 2016). MDL transferee courts have authority to resolve motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. 794, 794 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1969) (holding that motions to “dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are 1 Exhibit A includes two parts: Part I and Part II. Part I identifies all of the lawsuits in the MDL that lack personal jurisdiction over PCPC in which PCPC has already been served (as of May 18, 2017). Part II identifies all of the lawsuits in the MDL in which PCPC has yet to be served (as of May 18, 2017). PCPC should be dismissed from every case identified both in Part I and Part II. To the extent that PCPC is served with any additional lawsuits outside of DC or New Jersey after May 18, 2017, they too should be dismissed for all of the reasons set forth herein. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 9 of 20 PageID: 3140 3 39020976v.3 being routinely considered by courts to which multidistrict litigation has previously been transferred”). See also Riggs v. AHP Settlement Trust, 421 Fed. App’x 136, 137 (3rd Cir. 2011) (noting that “[t]he District Court . . . dismissed the complaint against [defendant] for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)”). Personal jurisdiction is a two-step analysis. MDL courts first determine whether jurisdiction exists pursuant to the long-arm statute of the state where the transferee court is located or where a lawsuit filed directly in the MDL court will be transferred following pretrial proceedings. If there is long-arm jurisdiction (or the forum state’s long-arm statute is coterminous with federal due process considerations), then the MDL court determines whether the exercise of jurisdiction violates the principles of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists under the second part of the analysis, an MDL transferee court analyzes the law of its Circuit. See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., No. 04-400, 2005 WL 1625040, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2005); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 435, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). II. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT MEET THEIR BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICTION. Plaintiffs bear the burden of making a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction. Allaham v. Naddaf, 635 Fed. App’x 32, 36-37 (3d Cir. 2015); D’Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009). To meet their burden, “plaintiff[s] may not rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant’s . . . motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; instead, the plaintiff[s] must present competent evidence, such as sworn affidavits, to support [their] jurisdictional allegations.” Rivera v. Ballys Park Place, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 10 of 20 PageID: 3141 4 39020976v.3 “Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is appropriate if the relevant state’s long-arm statute permits the assertion of jurisdiction without violating federal due process.” Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 506 (D.N.J. 2011). “[T]he central inquiry is whether the defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Under the Due Process Clause, personal jurisdiction may be established under either “general” or “specific” theories. Allaham, 635 Fed. App’x at 37-38 (citing Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’n Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1559 (3d Cir. 1994)). “A court has general jurisdiction when a defendant has ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum state.” Id. at 38 (quoting O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007)). “A court has specific jurisdiction when a plaintiff’s claim arises from a defendant’s actions within the forum state, such that the defendant could ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into the state’s courts.’” Id. (citing Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))). A. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Long-Arm Jurisdiction. Exhibit C sets forth the relevant portions of the state long-arm statutes for the lawsuits identified on Exhibit A. Twenty-five of the relevant states have long-arm statutes that are expressly, or by operation of case law, coextensive with federal due process analysis. Accordingly, courts collapse the two inquiries into the federal due process analysis. Those states are: Alabama: Sieber v. Campbell, 810 So. 2d 641, 644 (Ala. 2001); Alaska: Ins Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981); Arizona: Planning Group of Scottsdale v. Lake Mathews Mineral Prop., 246 P.3d 343, 346 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc); Arkansas: Yanmar Co. v. Slater, 386 S.W.3d 439, 443-44 (Ark. 2012); California: Doe v. Unocal Corp., Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 11 of 20 PageID: 3142 5 39020976v.3 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001); Illinois: Citadel Group Ltd. v. Wash. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 536 F.3d 757, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2008); Iowa: Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, 607 F.3d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 2010); Louisiana: Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2014); Maryland: Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396-97 (4th Cir. 2003); Massachusetts:2 Copia Commc’n v. AMResorts, L.P., 812 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2016); Michigan: Miles v. WTMX Radio, 15 Fed. Appx. 213, 214 (6th Cir. 2001); Minnesota: Coen v. Coen, 590 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2007); Nebraska: Stanton v. St. Jude Med., 340 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2003); Nevada: Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002); New Mexico: Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006); North Carolina: Le Bleu Corp. v. Standard Capital Grp., 11 Fed. Appx. 377, 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Oklahoma: Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991); Oregon: Siskiyou Prop., LLC v. Bennett Holdings, LLC, 13 Fed. Appx. 553, 555 (9th Cir. 2001); Pennsylvania: Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001); South Carolina: Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute Co., 531 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1976); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 657 (4th Cir. 1989); South Dakota: Estate of Moore v. Carroll, 159 F. Supp.3d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir. 2016); Block Indus. v. DHJ Indus., 495 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1974); Tennessee: Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 616 (6th Cir. 2005); Texas: Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008); Virginia: Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261(4th Cir. 2002) and West Virginia: Wince v. Easterbrooke Cellular Corp., 681 F.Supp.2d 688, 691 (N.D.W.Va. 2010). Thus, the personal 2 The First Circuit expressed a possible split regarding this interpretation. As with the other states discussed below, however, none of the eight factors set forth in the Massachusetts long arm statute apply to PCPC. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 12 of 20 PageID: 3143 6 39020976v.3 jurisdiction inquiry in those states is the same as the federal due process inquiry discussed below in Parts II. B. and C. Other relevant states have long-arm statutes that have varying requirements. In each instance, these long-arm statutes do not confer jurisdiction here. PCPC is a non-profit trade association that represents the interests of the cosmetic and personal care products industry. See Declaration of Mark A. Pollak (“Decl.”) ¶ 4 (attached as Exhibit D). PCPC is the successor or continuation of the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (“CTFA”). Decl. ¶ 4. PCPC does not design, test, manufacture, market, sell or regulate any cosmetic or personal care products containing talc, or any other chemical agreement. Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5. PCPC is not licensed to do business in any of the forum states. Decl. ¶ 6. PCPC has no agent for service of process in any of the forum states. Decl. ¶ 7. PCPC neither owns nor leases property, nor holds liens or mortgages on any real property in any of the forum states. Decl. ¶ 8. PCPC has no address, phone number, bank account, or office in any of the forum states. Decl. ¶ 9. None of PCPC’s employees are based in any of the forum states nor do PCPC’s employees regularly travel to or conduct business in any of the forum states on PCPC’s behalf. Decl. ¶ 10. PCPC has never brought a lawsuit in a court in any of the forum states. Decl. ¶ 11. PCPC maintains no records or any other property in any of the forum states. Decl. ¶12. Finally, contrary to Plaintiffs’ specious allegations, as discussed below, PCPC has not lobbied any state governments in relation to talc. Decl. ¶ 19. As to the lawsuits transferred from Florida, its long-arm statute on general personal jurisdiction extends to the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause. See Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2010). Although PCPC holds an annual meeting in Florida, that does not constitute being “at home in the forum.” See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colo., S.A. v. Hall, Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 13 of 20 PageID: 3144 7 39020976v.3 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). Florida’s specific jurisdiction long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to operating a business in Florida, committing a tortious act there, having or using real property there, and causing injury to a person by manufacturing or selling a product used in Florida. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(1) (quoted in Exhibit C). PCPC has not engaged in any of those acts. See Decl. ¶¶ 5,6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 19. As to the lawsuits transferred from or the direct-filed lawsuit where Plaintiff’s home state is Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Ohio, or Wisconsin, the long-arm statutes of those states set forth various factors for establishing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, including doing business in the state, causing injury by manufacturing or selling a product used in the state, or having or using real property there. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-929; Ga. Code Ann. § 9-10-91; Idaho Code Ann. § 5-514; Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.210; Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 506.500; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382; Wis. Stat. Ann. 801.05 (each is quoted in Exhibit C). None of those acts apply here. See Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 19. Accordingly, under their long-arm statutes, personal jurisdiction does not exist in Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin, and the Court need not continue its analysis as to the lawsuits filed in those states. With respect to Florida, there is no specific jurisdiction under that state’s long-arm statute. And, as discussed in the next part, there is no general jurisdiction in Florida or any other states. B. General Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over PCPC. To be subject to general jurisdiction, the nonresident corporation must have developed “continuous and systematic general business contacts” with the forum state “so as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum.” Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Because it requires extensive and Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 14 of 20 PageID: 3145 8 39020976v.3 sustained contacts, “most courts[ ] are hesitant to exercise general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.” Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 708 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 (2014) (“general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary scheme.”); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 925 (“[S]pecific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reduced role.” (quotation marks omitted)). General personal jurisdiction over PCPC plainly does not exist as to the forum states at issue. The Pollak Declaration establishes that PCPC has no or few business contacts with the forum states, much less the sort of contacts that are “so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home” in those states. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). See Decl. ¶¶ 5-19. Having a meeting once a year in Florida, occasionally lobbying in Pennsylvania, and having a contract with a publisher and a warehouse in Maryland do not render PCPC “essentially at home” in those forums. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; see also Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A foreign corporation cannot be subject to general jurisdiction in a forum unless the corporation’s activities in the forum closely approximate the activities that ordinarily characterize a corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of business.”). In Daimler, the plaintiff, who was seeking to recover for injuries sustained in a foreign jurisdiction, sued a nonresident corporation in California based on general personal jurisdiction. 134 S. Ct. at 751-52. The plaintiff argued that general jurisdiction existed because one of the defendant’s subsidiaries conducted business in California. Id. at 752. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that, even if the subsidiary was at home in California for purposes of general jurisdiction and its conduct could be attributed to the defendant, “there would still be Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 15 of 20 PageID: 3146 9 39020976v.3 no basis to subject [the defendant] to general jurisdiction in California, for [its] slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.” Id. at 760. As emphasized by Daimler, the relevant test for determining whether a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction is whether the defendant itself has “affiliations with the [forum] State . . . so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. at 761 (quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiffs cannot establish that PCPC is essentially “at home” anywhere other than Washington, D.C., there is no general jurisdiction as to the cases identified in Exhibit A. C. Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Over PCPC. The exercise of specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate only if: (1) “the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), (2) the cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant’s activities within the state, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985), and (3) exercising jurisdiction over the defendant does “not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Only by purposefully establishing contacts does a defendant “submit[ ] to the judicial power of an otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is exercised in connection with the defendant’s activities touching on the State.” J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality op.). Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing that PCPC purposefully established contacts in the forum states. In their Amended Master Complaint, Plaintiffs attempt to correct the fatal flaw of their prior complaints. The prior complaints failed to allege that PCPC directed any activities towards the relevant states. Now, Plaintiffs repeatedly allege that PCPC “interact[s] with and influenc[es] local, state and federal governmental agencies on issues related to…the regulation and marketing of talc based body powders and the PRODUCTS.” Amended Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 16 of 20 PageID: 3147 10 39020976v.3 Master Compl. ¶¶ 12, 35, 134, 139, 161, 163, 164(d), 166, 199. With respect to purported interactions with local and state governments, those allegations are false. PCPC has not lobbied state or local governments regarding talc. Decl. ¶¶ 5, 19. Plaintiffs may not rely on their specious allegations to withstand PCPC’s motion to dismiss. “[I]nstead, the plaintiff[s] must present competent evidence, such as sworn affidavits, to support [their] jurisdictional allegations.” Rivera, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 615. Plaintiffs will not be able to do so, notwithstanding the over 600,000 pages of documents that have been produced by defendants in this litigation. Plaintiffs also allege that “[t]he actions of Defendant PCPC in Washington DC has and have had repercussions throughout the talc industry, and in all states of the United States.” Amended Master Compl. ¶ 12. Not only is that allegation an admission that PCPC’s “actions” took place in Washington, DC, the assertion is legally irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes. Merely causing alleged “repercussions” in a forum is not sufficient grounds for establishing jurisdiction there. See Szabo v. Med. Info. Bureau, 127 Cal. App.3d 51, 55 (1981) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen[, 444 U.S. at 296 (holding that “[m]erely causing an effect in the forum state is not sufficient to justify personal jurisdiction.”)]). As the United States Supreme Court observed, Plaintiffs “confuse[] the question of [defendant’s] liability with that of the proper forum in which to determine that liability.” Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 95 (1978). See also Ploense v. Electrolux Home Prods., 882 N.E.2d 653, 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“As both Kulko and World-Wide Volkswagen teach, it is not enough that the [trade association] caused or contributed to an ‘effect’ in [the forum]…. [it] must have purposefully aimed at the state in causing the effect.”) (citations omitted). Moreover, contacts that other defendants may have with the transferee states cannot be the basis for jurisdiction. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. “The requirements of International Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 17 of 20 PageID: 3148 11 39020976v.3 Shoe . . . must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that a plaintiff cannot “satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between . . . third parties and the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2015). “Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for jurisdiction over him.” Id. The Due Process Clause does not permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on the conduct of alleged third-party “co-conspirators.” This principle is exemplified here, where the Complaints do not allege that any “conspiracy” activities took place in any of the forum states. See, e.g., Sugartown Worldwide LLC v. Shanks, Civ. A. No. 14-5063, 2015 WL 1312572, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2015). Although the Court need look only to Third Circuit law, courts in the forum states themselves have long adhered to these bedrock due process principles traceable from International Shoe to Walden. See, e.g., Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (“[I]t does not appear that the law imposes personal jurisdiction on a party based solely on a co-conspirator’s actions.”); St. Louis v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 982-09652, 2003 WL 23277277, at *7 (Mo. Cir. Dec. 16, 2003) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction cannot constitutionally be obtained over [nonresident] based on the imputed forum- related conduct of other, non-affiliated Defendant companies alleged to be ‘co-conspirators’. . . Rather, personal jurisdiction can only properly be based on [nonresident’s] own forum-related conduct.”); Ploense, 882 N.E.2d at 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (no personal jurisdiction based on “conspiracy theory” over a nonresident trade association with no contacts in state); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995) (“We decline to recognize the assertion Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 18 of 20 PageID: 3149 12 39020976v.3 of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely upon the effects or consequences of an alleged conspiracy.”); Conwill v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., No. 09-4365, 2009 WL 5178310, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2009) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit has never adopted a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Matthews v. Brookstone Stores, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1066 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (citing Ex parte United Ins. Cos., 936 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 2006)) (requiring plaintiff to plead with particularity the conspiracy and overt acts taken within Alabama). As one federal court succinctly explained in dismissing a lawsuit with similar allegations against another trade association also located solely in the District of Columbia: [T]here is not a specific act enumerated by Plaintiffs that [the trade association] committed in, or directed at, [the forum state] that gave rise to their Complaint. General allegations that the “Defendants,” (which would generically include [the trade association]) “intentionally and deliberately withheld warnings and concealed information to the consuming public and to Plaintiffs concerning the severity of the products’ toxic effects,” and “conducted a sales and marketing campaign to promote the sale of the aforementioned products and willfully deceived plaintiffs, and the general public, as to the health risks in using the aforementioned product,” even if true . . . does not establish personal jurisdiction over [the trade association] because it does not sell, market, or promote any of the products referenced in the Complaint-in [the forum state], or anywhere else. The Complaint makes general allegations but fails to specify which particular defendant did what, or when. The “consuming public” includes “millions of individuals” throughout the United States. Such a claim does not allege activities directed at or conducted in [the forum state]. This is not a case where this Defendant manufactures or sells products which it should know will likely be purchased in [the forum state]. Graziose v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1153 (D. Nev. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Cebulske, No. 14-cv-00627, 2015 WL 1403148, attached as Exhibit B (dismissing PCPC from talc lawsuit). Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 19 of 20 PageID: 3150 13 39020976v.3 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, PCPC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss PCPC from all of the lawsuits naming it as a defendant. Dated: May 19, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Thomas T. Locke, Esq. Thomas T. Locke (DC Bar No. 454144) Rebecca Woods (DC Bar No. 468495) James Billings-Kang (DC Bar No. 984152) SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 975 F Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 Telephone: (202) 463-2400 Facsimile: (202) 828-5393 tlocke@seyfarth.com rwoods@seyfarth.com jbillingskang@seyfarth.com Sheryl L. Axelrod (NJ Bar No. 017091994) THE AXELROD FIRM, PC The Beasley Building 1125 Walnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 Phone: (215) 461-1770 Facsimile: (215) 238-1779 saxelrod@theaxelrodfirm.com Attorneys for Defendant Personal Care Products Council Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-1 Filed 05/19/17 Page 20 of 20 PageID: 3151 EXHIBIT A Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 12 PageID: 3152 39021023v.1 EXHIBIT A-Part I (as of May 18, 2017) Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 1. Abell v. Johnson & Johnson, (W.D. Ky. No. 3:16-cv-00722) X 2. Adams v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09498) X Louisiana 3. Albertine v. Johnson & Johnson, (W.D. La. No. 6:17-cv-00212) X 4. Alexander v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01576) X Alabama 5. Alfred v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01485) X Louisiana 6. Anderson (B.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Mo. No. 4:17-cv-01232) X 7. Anderson (E.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-07087) X Louisiana 8. Applefield v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03080) X Florida 9. Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson, (N.D. Ala. No. 2:16-cv-01927) X 10. Bahnsen v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01254) X Ohio 11. Bailey v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02258) X Texas 12. Baldridge v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02174) X Missouri 13. Ball v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01783) X Tennessee 14. Batman v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01784) X South Dakota 15. Bearfield v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D.Ark. No. 2-17-cv-00068) X 16. Belcher v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-03452) X New York 17. Bellanger v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09500) X Louisiana 18. Berg v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01291) X Louisiana 19. Berghaus v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02262) X Ohio 20. Bezue v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09564) X Louisiana 21. Bier v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. La. No. 2:16-cv-15961) X Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 2 of 12 PageID: 3153 2 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 22. Birdsong v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08810) X Texas 23. Boggs v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02219) X South Carolina 24. Brazzel v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02192) X Nevada 25. Broughton v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01121) X Kentucky 26. Brown (B.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09508) X Louisiana 27. Brown-Harrison v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Penn. No. 2:16-cv-06029) X 28. Burgess v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01125) X Alabama 29. Byrd v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09513) X Louisiana 30. Carlin v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08699) X Pennsylvania 31. Casey v. Johnson & Johnson, (W.D. Ky. No. 3:16-cv-00477) X 32. Cerrone-Kennedy v. Johnson & Johnson, (W.D. Mo. No. 5:16-cv-06091) X 33. Chapman v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03362) X Nevada 34. Chauvin v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09567) X Louisiana 35. Chopin v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. La. No. 2:17-cv-01928) X 36. Cobb v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02349) X New York 37. Colon v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01160) X New York 38. Daniel v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02260) X Oklahoma 39. Daniels v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. La. No. 2:16-cv-15963) X 40. Davis v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-07844) X Massachusetts 41. Daviston v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01131) X Alabama 42. Diamonds v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01503) X Louisiana 43. Donohue v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02399) X Massachusetts Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 3 of 12 PageID: 3154 3 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 44. Edwards (T.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02066) X North Carolina 45. Eidson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02753) X South Carolina 46. Elliott v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09514) X Louisiana 47. Ellis v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02866) X Louisiana 48. Engle v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01583) X Louisiana 49. Fenstemaker v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Mo. No. 4:16-cv-00938) X 50. Ferguson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D. S.C. No. 9:16-cv-03543) X 51. Ferrell (M.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08812) X Oklahoma 52. Finley v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Penn. No. 2:17-cv-01394) X 53. Fiore v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Penn. No. 2:16-cv-06609) X 54. Fisher v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01050) X New York 55. Ford v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02370) X Missouri 56. Foster (N.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02259) X Louisiana 57. Foster (V.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01134) X Iowa 58. Franklin v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01135) X Tennessee 59. Gendelman v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Penn. No. 2:16-cv-06596) X 60. Geslicki v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01433) X Illinois 61. Giles v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01158) X Idaho 62. Gipson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01486) X Louisiana 63. Graves v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03215) X Alabama 64. Gray v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08966) X Louisiana 65. Grelling v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03294) X Pennsylvania Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 4 of 12 PageID: 3155 4 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 66. Hammond v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09378) X Louisiana 67. Handy v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Penn. No. 2:16-cv-04608) X 68. Harper v. Johnson & Johnson, (D. S.C. No. 1:16-cv-03516) X 69. Harris (C.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01502) X Louisiana 70. Harris (R.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09522) X Louisiana 71. Hartwell v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01487) X Louisiana 72. Hayes v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01660) X New York 73. Heath v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01571) X California 74. Herrington v. Johnson & Johnson, (D. Or. 6:17-cv-00151) X 75. Hestress v. Johnson & Johnson, (M.D. Fla. No. 8:17-cv-00218) X 76. Hildabrand v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01159) X Kentucky 77. Hill v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01136) X New York 78. Holmes v. Johnson & Johnson, (N.D. Tex. No. 3:16-cv-03348) X 79. Hudson v. Johnson & Johnson, (W.D. La. No. 5:17-cv-00216) X 80. Huggins v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01269) X Texas 81. Hughes v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03267) X Mississippi 82. Jackson (C.)v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02603) X Pennsylvania 83. Jackson (U.)v. Johnson & Johnson, (S.D. Ala. No. 1:17-cv-00129) X 84. Jarrett v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01575) X Kentucky 85. Jiminez v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01582) X Connecticut 86. Jobe v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03474) X Tennessee 87. Johnson (D.)v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-07664) X Minnesota Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 5 of 12 PageID: 3156 5 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 88. Johnson (L.)v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02605) X New Mexico 89. Jolla v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08774) X Louisiana 90. Jones-Wilder v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09571) X Louisiana 91. Kane v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02494) X Kentucky 92. Karrick v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02653) X Louisiana 93. Kearney v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02865) X North Carolina 94. Kent v. Johnson & Johnson, (N.D. Okla. 4:16-cv-00728) X 95. Kernan v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03465) X Alaska 96. Kidd v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02263) X Wisconsin 97. Kihn v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02188) X Michigan 98. Kniskern v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-00904) X Maryland 99. Kuntz v. Johnson & Johnson, (N.D. Tex. No. 3:16-cv-02353) X 100. Kwas v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01137) X Tennessee 101. Lafontant v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01051) X New York 102. Landry v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01504) X Louisiana 103. Lee v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-08805) X Louisiana 104. LePage v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02189) X Minnesota 105. Lozano v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02191) X New York 106. Lubben v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08942) X California 107. Maxwell v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02184) X Florida 108. McClendon v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-00943) X Georgia 109. McDermitt-Weber v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01138) X New York Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 6 of 12 PageID: 3157 6 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 110. McDowell v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02697) X Missouri 111. Meredith v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09562) X Louisiana 112. Meyer v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08964) X Louisiana 113. Montz v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09523) X Louisiana 114. Moore v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Ky. No. 2:17-cv-00009) X 115. Moral v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02532) X Louisiana 116. Morris (B.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01140) X Alabama 117. Morris (C.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-00549) X Texas 118. Mule v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01141) X Louisiana 119. Musgrove v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-06568) X Illinois 120. Nelson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02264) X Alabama 121. Norman v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. La. No. 2:17-cv-01967) X 122. Nunley v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03476) X Tennessee* 123. O’Cain v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02607) X South Carolina 124. Ortiz v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02606) X Louisiana 125. Paniagua v. Johnson & Johnson, (W.D. Mo. No. 4:17-cv-00232) X 126. Papa v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Wis. No. 2:17-cv-00285) X 127. Parker v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02747) X Maryland 128. Parmentier v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01935) X Florida 129. Passander v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-09229) X Connecticut 130. Patterson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08815) X Louisiana 131. Pauley v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03487) X North Carolina* Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 7 of 12 PageID: 3158 7 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 132. Payne v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01654) X Alabama 133. Payseur v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02190) X North Carolina 134. Perez v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01643) X Illinois 135. Perkins v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02371) X Kentucky 136. Petersen v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01971) X Nebraska 137. Phillips v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-07336) X Texas 138. Potts v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01142) X Alabama 139. Reade v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02265) X Massachusetts 140. Richards v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-06661) X Florida 141. Robinson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-07502) X Mississippi 142. Rudnick v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01853) X Michigan 143. Salyer v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01143) X Tennessee 144. Sawyer v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03274) X North Carolina 145. Scaglione v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01970) X New York 146. Schofield v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08331) X New York 147. Segreaves v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09119) X Pennsylvania 148. Sherlock v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02751) X Kentucky 149. Shinske v. Johnson & Johnson, (M.D. Fla. No. 8:16-cv-02317) X 150. Shoup v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-07889) X South Dakota 151. Sillars v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08831) X Louisiana 152. Sissac v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09524) X Louisiana 153. Smaagaard v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01144) X Kentucky Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 8 of 12 PageID: 3159 8 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 154. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-00881) X Virginia 155. Snyder v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08816) X Indiana 156. Spencer v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01390) X Illinois 157. Story-Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01152) X North Carolina 158. Swan v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02008) X New Mexico 159. Tetlow v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-07893) X Louisiana 160. Thompson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01564) X Georgia 161. Thorpe v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08827) X Maryland 162. Treadwell v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-09495) X Florida 163. Turner (Ma.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01035) X Kentucky 164. Turner (Mi.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03182) X Maryland 165. Tyree v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02608) X Michigan 166. Upchurch v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01851) X California 167. Velardo v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01154) X Tennessee 168. Wagenknecht v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08828) X Indiana 169. Walker (A.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-07503) X Georgia 170. Walker (D.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (E.D. Tenn. 1:17-cv-00087) X 171. Walker (S.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08963) X Louisiana 72. Welch v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03139) X Texas 173. West v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02604) X Tennessee 174. Williams (A.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08829) X Alabama 175. Williams (E.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01150) X Louisiana Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 9 of 12 PageID: 3160 9 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction 176. Williams (J.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-01507) X Georgia 177. Williams (S.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:16-cv-08738) X Nevada 178. Willmore v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-03277) X Tennessee 179. Wilson v. Johnson & Johnson, (N.D. Ala. No. 2:16-cv-01287) X 180. Yacenech-Emerson v. J & J, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01795) X Maryland 181. Young v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02403) X Georgia Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 10 of 12 PageID: 3161 10 39021023v.1 EXHIBIT A-Part II (as of May 18, 2017) Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction Not Yet Served 1. Abraham v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. No. 3:17-cv-02255) X Oregon X 2. Arnoff v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-09228) X New York X 3. Baker v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02760) X Texas X 4. Batiste v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-7499) X Louisiana X 5. Bell v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02871) X Georgia X 6. Blazio v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07489) LA X Louisiana X 7. Brooks v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02081) TX X Texas X 8. Bruce v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-1367) X South Carolina X 9. Bussinger v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02730) MO X Missouri X 10. Crisostomo v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01633) X California X 11. Darnold v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-00096) X West Virginia X 12. Dawson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-8749) X Florida X 13. Edwards (A.) v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-00627) X Kentucky X 14. Farquharson v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01650) X Arizona X 15. Forsberg v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02780) X Texas X 16. Haddix v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02569) X Indiana X 17. Hicks v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07428) X Georgia X 18. Houston v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-00713) X Louisiana X 19. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01850) X South Carolina X 20. Husain v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02832) X New York X 21. Hvizdos v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-00047) X Ohio X Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 11 of 12 PageID: 3162 11 39021023v.1 Case Name And Docket No. (Court of Origin) No Personal Jurisdiction MDL Direct-Filed: Home Jurisdiction Not Yet Served 22. Jones v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02211) X New York X 23. Knight v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02910) X Michigan X 24. Koehler v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-01666) X New York X 25. Long v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02469) X Louisiana X 26. Marchetti v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-08082) X Georgia X 27. Matthews v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07490) X Louisiana X 28. Poche v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07501) X Louisiana X 29. Prout v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07774) X Louisiana X 30. Provenza v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-00516) X California X 31. Ramos v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02470) X Tennessee X 32. Renn v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02856) X Kentucky X 33. Resor v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07989) X Louisiana X 34. Russo v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02206 ) X New York X 35. Spenny v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07884) X Minnesota X 36. Strickland v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-07337) X Georgia X 37. Vallot v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-08086) X Louisiana X 38. Villella v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-00512) X Ohio X 39. Wade v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:17-cv-02775) X Arizona X 40. Witherspoon v. Johnson & Johnson, (D.N.J. 3:16-cv-09615) X Texas X Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-2 Filed 05/19/17 Page 12 of 12 PageID: 3163 EXHIBIT B Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-3 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 6 PageID: 3164 Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015) © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 2015 WL 1403148 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, S.D. Illinois. Lynne Cebulske, Plaintiff, v. Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., Imerys Talc America, Inc., f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc., and Personal Care Products Council f/k/a Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (CTFA), Defendants. No. 14-cv-627-DRH-SCW | Signed March 25, 2015 Attorneys and Law Firms Stephanie L. Rados, Onder, Shelton, et al., LLC, St. Louis, MO, Christopher A. Seeger, Seeger Weiss LLP, New York, NY, Robert Allen Smith, Jr., Smith Law Firm, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, Ted G. Meadows, Beasley, Allen et al., Montgomery, AL, Timothy W. Porter, Porter & Malouf PA, Jackson, MS, William W. Blair, Onder, Shelton et al, Webster Groves, MO, for Plaintiff. Madeleine M. McDonough, Shook, Hardy et al., Kansas City, MO, Gene M. Williams, Kathleen Anne Frazier, Scott Alan James, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Houston, TX, Mary Anne Mellow, Mark A. Prost, Sandberg, Phoenix et al., St. Louis, MO, Nancy M. Erfle, Gordon & Rees LLP, Portland, OR, Beth A. Bauer, Heplerbroom LLC, Edwardsville, IL, for Defendants. MEMORANDUM & ORDER HERNDON, District Judge: *1 This matter is before the Court on Personal Care Products Council’s (hereinafter “PCPC”) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(2) (Doc. 24). Plaintiff Lynne Cebulske has filed her response (Doc. 48) to which PCPC replied (Doc. 53). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss. I. Introduction and Background On May 14, 2012 plaintiff Lynne Cebulske was diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Plaintiff alleges the cause of the cancer was the result of her using Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to Shower (hereinafter “J & J products”) to “dust her perineum for feminine hygiene purposes from approximately 1992 to 2014” (Doc. 3-1, ¶ 16). Plaintiff further alleges that her prolonged use of the J & J products caused her ovarian cancer, as she did not possess any of the risk factors commonly associated with the disease. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that women face an increased risk of ovarian cancer due to prolonged use of these talc based products in the genital area. Plaintiff supports her allegations by citing to various national studies dating back to the 1960s, many of which plaintiff contends Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-3 Filed 05/19/17 Page 2 of 6 PageID: 3165 Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015) © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 defendants were aware (Doc. 3-1, ¶ 18-23). On May 14, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint before the Circuit Court of St. Clair County alleging eight counts of tort liability recognized under the laws of Illinois (Doc. 3-1). As to PCPC, Count VI alleges civil conspiracy against all defendants; Count VII alleges concert of action against all defendants; and Count VIII seeks a punitive damages award against all defendants. PCPC is the successor of the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (hereinafter “CTFA”) and is a District of Columbia corporation with its principle place of business also located within the District (Doc 3-1, ¶ 8). Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction is proper in Illinois because PCPC is “legally responsible for all liabilities incurred when it was known as CTFA,” including plaintiff’s injuries that occurred within the state following the actions perpetrated through the Talc Interested Party Task Force (TIPTF) (Id.). CTFA formed the Talc Interested Party Task Force (TIPTF), with the purpose of “pool[ing] financial resources of [member] companies in an effort to collectively defend talc use at all costs and to prevent regulation of any type over this industry” (Doc 3-1, 1122). In doing so, plaintiff alleges Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. (hereinafter collectively “J & J”), Imerys, and PCPC suppressed information about the risks of ovarian cancer posed by these talc based products (Doc. 3-1 1166). On June 3, 2014, defendants J & J removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction (Doc. 3). Thereafter, PCPC filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) arguing this Court lacks personal jurisdiction with a supporting affidavit from Senior Executive Vice President for Strategic Initiatives for PCPC, Mark Pollak (Doc. 24-1). Defendant PCPC maintains that it has no direct continuous ties with Illinois and at no time purposely directed PCPC business at Illinois (Doc. 24). Plaintiffs argue that the ‘conspiracy theory’ provides the basis for personal jurisdiction (Doc. 48). Defendant contests its applicability (Doc. 53) II. Motion to Dismiss *2 A district court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A). In diversity cases, an out-of-state defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state to properly assert personal jurisdiction. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The minimum contacts analysis requires the court to determine whether a nonresident defendant “has purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citation omitted). Illinois’ long-arm statute allows the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent permitted under the Due Process Clause. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.. 5/2-209(c); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-3 Filed 05/19/17 Page 3 of 6 PageID: 3166 Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015) © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 693, 700 (7th Cir.2010). Thus, an Illinois district court must inquire whether the “defendant has certain minimum contact with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011)). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, but where, as here, the issue is raised on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. Purdue Research Found v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir.2003). The Court therefore accepts as true all well-plead facts alleged in the complaint and resolves any factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff. Id. III. Analysis a. Plaintiff Established a Prima Facie Case for Conspiracy In this case, plaintiff asserts personal jurisdiction solely under the the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction (Doc. 48). A plaintiff asserts the “conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction” against a non-resident defendant, who, although did not himself commit a tort in Illinois, did conspire with others to do so. See Cleary v. Phillip Morris Inc., 726 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ill.App.Ct.2000). However, the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction has only been properly asserted if (1) the defendant is part of an actionable conspiracy and (2) a co-conspirator performed a substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Textor v. Bd. of Regents of Northern Illinois Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (7th Cir.1983). The Court noted in its March 17, 2015 order that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of the existence of a conspiracy (Doc. 70). However, PCPC contends that despite that finding, the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction is no longer viable in Illinois, thus dismissal of PCPC is appropriate (Doc. 53). b. Conspiracy Theory of Personal Jurisdiction The conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in a forum where one of his co-conspirators has acted in furtherance of the conspiracy. Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 711 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (7th Cir.1983). The theory has been heavily criticized by a number of courts in Illinois due to concern regarding the viability of the theory as a basis for personal jurisdiction, while still complying with the Due Process Clause. See Ploense v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 882 N.E.2d 653, 666 (Ill.App.2007)(calls into doubt whether the conspiracy theory complies with federal minimum contacts requirements); Knaus v. Guidry, 906 N.E.2d 644, 659-61 (Ill.App.2009); Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 427 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill.1981). *3 More recently, the Seventh Circuit questioned the legitimacy of the theory, in light of Ploense and Knaus, by declaring the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction “may not be valid in Illinois.” See Smith v. Jefferson Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-3 Filed 05/19/17 Page 4 of 6 PageID: 3167 Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015) © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 378 Fed.Appx. 582, 585-86 (7th Cir.2010). The Court went on to declare more than a simple allegation of conspiracy is required to assert jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant. Id. at 586. Recent case law reveals a strong trend that something more than an attenuated link is necessary to establish a defendant’s personal jurisdiction. In Walden v. Fiore, the United States Supreme Court indicated that “a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction ... Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the state. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. In this case, plaintiff must show that PCPC “purposefully directed activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the state” N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir.2014) in order to establish minimum contacts to ensure that defendant is put on notice that PCPC may be required “to submit to the burdens of litigation in the forum.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. at 474-476. Cebulske’s theory of personal jurisdiction rests entirely on the allegation that PCPC “conspired” with J & J and Imerys to suppress undesirable information about the correlation between talc and ovarian cancer (Docs. 3-1, 48). No claims as to PCPC’s individual conduct in Illinois are alleged. Moreover, PCPC does not maintain an office in Illinois, has not purposely directed activities or statements towards the state with regard to the matter at issue (aside from occasional lobbying activities on matters unrelated to the issues set forth in this lawsuit), has no agent for service of process in Illinois, and is not licensed to do business in Illinois (Doc. 24-1). Even applying the World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson stream-of-commerce doctrine to defendant PCPC, its status as a non-profit trade association, similar to the defendant in Ploense, does not satisfy the “minimum contacts” requirements for due process. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, (1980). The stream of commerce doctrine provides that one who “delivers” its products into the stream of commerce, with the expectation that the products will be purchased in a particular state, is subject to personal jurisdiction in that state. Id. at 298. Unlike the defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen, the defendants in Ploense and this case are classified trade associations, and not alleged to be delivering products into Illinois’ stream of commerce. Furthermore, in this case, plaintiff failed to assert that PCPC sold any products to the public, let alone Illinois residents, and failed to assert that PCPC intended for its activities to affect Illinois residents. Despite plaintiff’s presentation of a prima facie showing of a conspiracy involving the named defendants, no allegations were made that PCPC, as a nonresident defendant, was targeting Illinois residents, or that the organization had any ties with the state of Illinois to satisfy the “minimum contacts” due process requirement (Doc. 3-1 ¶ 62b). Ultimately, Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-3 Filed 05/19/17 Page 5 of 6 PageID: 3168 Cebulske v. Johnson & Johnson, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015) © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 plaintiff’s reliance on the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction is misplaced, as courts in Illinois are moving away from the theory as a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction. *4 Because PCPC has insufficient contacts with Illinois to establish “minimum contacts” for Due Process Clause purposes, this Court has no specific personal jurisdiction over the moving defendant. Additionally, plaintiff does not allege general personal jurisdiction, which requires a defendant to have ‘continuous and systematic’ connections with the forum state so as to render the defendant at home in the forum for all intents and purposes. Therefore, because PCPC lacks the minimum contacts with Illinois necessary to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, PCPC must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant Personal Care Products Council’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 24). Defendant Personal Care Products Council is DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. Any attempt to collect a judgment from Personal Care Products Council that may result from this case must take place, if at all, in another jurisdiction. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case. IT IS SO ORDERED. All Citations Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 1403148 End of Document © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-3 Filed 05/19/17 Page 6 of 6 PageID: 3169 EXHIBIT C Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 36 PageID: 3170 39021031v.1 EXHIBIT C Relevant Long-arm Statutes Alabama: Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b): An appropriate basis exists for service of process outside of this state upon a person or entity in any action in this state when the person or entity has such contacts with this state that the prosecution of the action against the person or entity in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States; or, the person or entity is sued in the capacity of guardian of a ward, or executor, administrator, or other personal representative of an estate, for the acts or omissions of a decedent or ward, and the person or entity so sued does not otherwise have sufficient contacts with this state in that capacity, but the decedent or ward would have been deemed to have sufficient contacts with this state if the action could have been maintained against the decedent or ward. Alaska: AS § 09.05.015: (a) A court of this state having jurisdiction over the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action according to the rules of civil procedure (1) in an action, whether arising in or out of this state, against a defendant who, when the action is commenced, (A) is a natural person present in this state when served; (B) is a natural person domiciled in this state; (C) is a domestic corporation; or (D) is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities in this state, whether the activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise; (2) in an action that may be brought under statutes of this state that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction over the defendant; (3) in an action claiming injury to person or property in or out of this state arising out of an act or omission in this state by the defendant; (4) in an action claiming injury to person or property in this state arising out of an act or omission out of this state by the defendant, provided, in addition, that at the time of the injury either (A) solicitation or service activities were carried on in this state by or on behalf of the defendant; or (B) products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed in this state in the ordinary course of trade; Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 2 of 36 PageID: 3171 2 39021031v.1 (5) in an action that (A) arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services in this state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; (B) arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant in this state, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff in this state if the performance in this state was authorized or ratified by the defendant; (C) arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive in this state or to ship from this state goods, documents of title, or other things of value; (D) relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this state by the plaintiff to the defendant on the order or direction of the defendant; or (E) relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually received by the plaintiff in this state from the defendant without regard to where delivery to the carrier occurred; (6) in an action that arises out of (A) a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to create in either party an interest in, or to protect, acquire, dispose of, use, rent, own, control, or possess by either party real property situated in this state; (B) a claim to recover a benefit derived by the defendant through the use, ownership, control, or possession by the defendant of tangible property situated in this state either at the time of the first use, ownership, control, or possession or at the time the action is commenced; or (C) a claim that the defendant return, restore, or account to the plaintiff for an asset or thing of value that was in this state at the time the defendant acquired possession or control over it; (7) in an action to recover a deficiency judgment upon a mortgage note or conditional sales contract or other security agreement executed by the defendant or a predecessor of the defendant to whose obligations the defendant has succeeded and the deficiency is claimed (A) in an action in this state to foreclose upon real property situated in this state; (B) following sale of real property in this state by the plaintiff; or (C) following resale of tangible property in this state by the plaintiff; (8) in an action against a defendant who is or was an officer or director of a domestic corporation where the action arises out of the defendant's conduct as such officer or director or out of the activities of the corporation while the defendant held office as a director or officer; Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 3 of 36 PageID: 3172 3 39021031v.1 (9) in an action for the collection of taxes or assessments levied, assessed, or otherwise imposed by a taxing authority after April 10, 1968; (10) in an action that arises out of a promise made to the plaintiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the happening of an event if (A) the person insured was a resident of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred; (B) the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred in this state; or (C) the promise to insure was made in the state; (11) in an action against a personal representative to enforce a claim against the deceased person represented if one or more of the grounds stated in (2)--(10) of this subsection would have furnished a basis for jurisdiction over the deceased if living, and it is immaterial under this paragraph whether the action was commenced during the lifetime of the deceased; (12) in an action for annulment, divorce, legal separation, or separate maintenance when a personal claim is asserted against the nonresident party if (A) the parties resided in this state in a marital relationship for not less than six consecutive months within the six years preceding the commencement of the action; (B) the party asserting the personal claim has continued to reside in this state; and (C) the nonresident party receives notice as required by law. (b) In an action brought in reliance upon jurisdictional grounds stated in (a)(2) - (10) of this section, there cannot be joined in the same action any other claim or cause against the defendant unless grounds exist under this section for personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to the claim or cause to be joined. (c) The jurisdictional grounds stated in (a)(2) - (10) of this section are cumulative and in addition to any other grounds provided by the common law. Arizona: 16 A.R.S. R. of Civ. Proc., Rule 4.2: (a) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction; Personal Service Outside Arizona. An Arizona state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, whether found within or outside Arizona, to the maximum extent permitted by the Arizona Constitution and the United States Constitution. A party may serve any person located outside Arizona as provided in this rule, and, when service is made, it has the same effect as if personal service were accomplished within Arizona. Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101: A. Definition of “Person”. As used in this section, “person” includes an individual or his or her executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 4 of 36 PageID: 3173 4 39021031v.1 association, or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state and whether or not organized under the laws of this state. B. Personal Jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction of all persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximum extent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. C. Service. When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this section, service may be made either within or outside this state. D. Inconvenient Forum. When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just. California: Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 410.10: Except as so limited, Section 410.10 delegates to each court the power to exercise jurisdiction on any basis or contact not denied it by the state and federal Constitutions. Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-929: (a) The registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state is the corporation's agent for service of process, notice or demand required or permitted by law to be served on the foreign corporation. When the registered agent is other than the Secretary of the State and his successors in office, service may be effected by any proper officer or other person lawfully empowered to make service by leaving a true and attested copy of the process, notice or demand with such agent or, in the case of an agent who is a natural person, by leaving it at such agent's usual place of abode in this state. (b) A foreign corporation may be served by any proper officer or other person lawfully empowered to make service by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the secretary of the foreign corporation at its principal office shown in its application for a certificate of authority or in its most recent annual report if the foreign corporation: (1) Has no registered agent or its registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be served; (2) has withdrawn from transacting business in this state under section 33-932; or (3) has had its certificate of authority revoked under section 33-936. (c) When the Secretary of the State and his successors in office have been appointed a foreign corporation's registered agent, a foreign corporation may be served by any proper officer or other person lawfully empowered to make service by leaving two true and attested copies thereof together with the required fee at the office of the Secretary of the State or depositing the same in the United States mail, by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed to said office. The Secretary of the State shall file one copy of such process and keep a record of the date and hour of such receipt. He shall, within two business days after such service, forward by registered or certified mail the copy of such process to the corporation at the address of its principal office as last shown on his records. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 5 of 36 PageID: 3174 5 39021031v.1 (d) Service is effective under subsection (b) of this section at the earliest of: (1) The date the foreign corporation receives the mail; (2) the date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the foreign corporation; and (3) five days after its deposit in the United States mail, as evidenced by the postmark, if mailed postage prepaid and correctly addressed. In the case of service on the Secretary of the State, service so made shall be effective as of the date and hour received by the Secretary of the State as shown on his records. (e) Every foreign corporation which transacts business in this state in violation of section 33-920 shall be subject to suit in this state upon any cause of action arising out of such business. (f) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: (1) Out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state; (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state; (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers; or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance. (g) In any action brought under subsection (e) or (f) of this section, or in any foreclosure or other action involving real property located in this state in which a foreign corporation, although not transacting business in this state, owns or claims to own an interest, service of process on such corporation may be made as provided in subsection (b) of this section, except that the service shall be addressed to the corporation at its principal office or, if it has no such office or the address of such office is not known, to such corporation's last office as shown in the official registry of the state or country of its incorporation, which address shall be set forth in the writ or other process. (h) This section does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the required means, of serving a foreign corporation. sfeasance or nonfeasance. Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(1): (a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts: 1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. 2. Committing a tortious act within this state. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 6 of 36 PageID: 3175 6 39021031v.1 3. Owning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real property within this state. 4. Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. 5. With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage. 6. Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. 7. Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. 8. With respect to a proceeding for paternity, engaging in the act of sexual intercourse within this state with respect to which a child may have been conceived. 9. Entering into a contract that complies with s. 685.102. Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 9-10-91: A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his or her executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he or she were a resident of this state, if in person or through an agent, he or she: (1) Transacts any business within this state; (2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; (3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 7 of 36 PageID: 3176 7 39021031v.1 (4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state; (5) With respect to proceedings for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, or other domestic relations action or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph shall not change the residency requirement for filing an action for divorce; or (6) Has been subject to the exercise of jurisdiction of a court of this state which has resulted in an order of alimony, child custody, child support, equitable apportionment of debt, or equitable division of property if the action involves modification of such order and the moving party resides in this state or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party. Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. § 5-514: Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, association or corporation, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts: (a) The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation; (b) The commission of a tortious act within this state; (c) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this state; (d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; (e) The maintenance within this state of matrimonial domicile at the time of the commission of any act giving rise to a cause of action for divorce or separate maintenance; (f) The engaging in an act of sexual intercourse within the state, giving rise to a cause of action for paternity under chapter 11, title 7, Idaho Code. The provisions of this subsection shall apply retroactively, and for the benefit of any dependent child, whether born before or after the effective date of this act, and regardless of the past or current marital status of the parents of the child. Illinois: Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 2-209: Act submitting to jurisdiction--Process. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 8 of 36 PageID: 3177 8 39021031v.1 (a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts: (1) The transaction of any business within this State; (2) The commission of a tortious act within this State; (3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State; (4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State at the time of contracting; (5) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage, declaration of invalidity of marriage and legal separation, the maintenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at the time this cause of action arose or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to the cause of action; (6) With respect to actions brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984,1 as now or hereafter amended, or under the Illinois Parentage Act of 20152 on and after the effective date of that Act, the performance of an act of sexual intercourse within this State during the possible period of conception; (7) The making or performance of any contract or promise substantially connected with this State; (8) The performance of sexual intercourse within this State which is claimed to have resulted in the conception of a child who resides in this State; (9) The failure to support a child, spouse or former spouse who has continued to reside in this State since the person either formerly resided with them in this State or directed them to reside in this State; (10) The acquisition of ownership, possession or control of any asset or thing of value present within this State when ownership, possession or control was acquired; (11) The breach of any fiduciary duty within this State; (12) The performance of duties as a director or officer of a corporation organized under the laws of this State or having its principal place of business within this State; (13) The ownership of an interest in any trust administered within this State; or (14) The exercise of powers granted under the authority of this State as a fiduciary. (b) A court may exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within or without this State against any person who: (1) Is a natural person present within this State when served; Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 9 of 36 PageID: 3178 9 39021031v.1 (2) Is a natural person domiciled or resident within this State when the cause of action arose, the action was commenced, or process was served; (3) Is a corporation organized under the laws of this State; or (4) Is a natural person or corporation doing business within this State. (b-5) Foreign defamation judgment. The courts of this State shall have personal jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding outside the United States against any person who is a resident of Illinois or, if not a natural person, has its principal place of business in Illinois, for the purposes of rendering declaratory relief with respect to that resident's liability for the judgment, or for the purpose of determining whether said judgment should be deemed non-recognizable pursuant to this Code, to the fullest extent permitted by the United States Constitution, provided: (1) the publication at issue was published in Illinois, and (2) that resident (i) has assets in Illinois which might be used to satisfy the foreign defamation judgment, or (ii) may have to take actions in Illinois to comply with the foreign defamation judgment. The provisions of this subsection (b-5) shall apply to persons who obtained judgments in defamation proceedings outside the United States prior to, on, or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 95th General Assembly. (c) A court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. (d) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State. (e) Service of process upon any person who resides or whose business address is outside the United States and who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, in any action based upon product liability may be made by serving a copy of the summons with a copy of the complaint attached upon the Secretary of State. The summons shall be accompanied by a $5 fee payable to the Secretary of State. The plaintiff shall forthwith mail a copy of the summons, upon which the date of service upon the Secretary is clearly shown, together with a copy of the complaint to the defendant at his or her last known place of residence or business address. Plaintiff shall file with the circuit clerk an affidavit of the plaintiff or his or her attorney stating the last known place of residence or the last known business address of the defendant and a certificate of mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at such address as required by this subsection (e). The certificate of mailing shall be prima facie evidence that the plaintiff or his or her attorney mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant as required. Service of the summons shall be deemed to have been made upon the defendant on the date it is served upon the Secretary and shall have the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served upon the defendant within this State. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 10 of 36 PageID: 3179 10 39021031v.1 (f) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him or her is based upon subsection (a). (g) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law. Indiana: Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A): Acts Serving as a Basis for Jurisdiction. Any person or organization that is a nonresident of this state, a resident of this state who has left the state, or a person whose residence is unknown, submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising from the following acts committed by him or her or his or her agent: (1) doing any business in this state; (2) causing personal injury or property damage by an act or omission done within this state; (3) causing personal injury or property damage in this state by an occurrence, act or omission done outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue or benefit from goods, materials, or services used, consumed, or rendered in this state; (4) having supplied or contracted to supply services rendered or to be rendered or goods or materials furnished or to be furnished in this state; (5) owning, using, or possessing any real property or an interest in real property within this state; (6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on behalf of any person, property or risk located within this state at the time the contract was made; (7) living in the marital relationship within the state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state, as to all obligations for alimony, custody, child support, or property settlement, if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in the state; or (8) abusing, harassing, or disturbing the peace of, or violating a protective or restraining order for the protection of, any person within the state by an act or omission done in this state, or outside this state if the act or omission is part of a continuing course of conduct having an effect in this state. In addition, a court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of this state or the United States. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 11 of 36 PageID: 3180 11 39021031v.1 Iowa: Iowa Court Rules, Rule 1.306: Every corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association that shall have the necessary minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, and the courts of this state shall hold such corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association amenable to suit in Iowa in every case not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Service may be made on any such corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association as provided in rule 1.305 within or without the state or, if such service cannot be so made, in any manner consistent with due process of law prescribed by order of the court in which the action is brought. Nothing herein shall limit or affect the right to serve an original notice upon any corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association within or without this state in any manner now or hereafter permitted by statute or rule. Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.210: (2)(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's: 1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; 2. Contracting to supply services or goods in this Commonwealth; 3. Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth; 4. Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth, provided that the tortious injury occurring in this Commonwealth arises out of the doing or soliciting of business or a persistent course of conduct or derivation of substantial revenue within the Commonwealth; 5. Causing injury in this Commonwealth to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this Commonwealth when the seller knew such person would use, consume, or be affected by, the goods in this Commonwealth, if he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth; 6. Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this Commonwealth, providing the claim arises from the interest in, use of, or possession of the real property, provided, however, that such in personam jurisdiction shall not be imposed on a nonresident who did not himself voluntarily institute the relationship, and did not knowingly perform, or fail to perform, the act or acts upon which jurisdiction is predicated; Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 12 of 36 PageID: 3181 12 39021031v.1 7. Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this Commonwealth at the time of contracting; 8. Committing sexual intercourse in this state which intercourse causes the birth of a child when: a. The father or mother or both are domiciled in this state; b. There is a repeated pattern of intercourse between the father and mother in this state; or c. Said intercourse is a tort or a crime in this state; or 9. Making a telephone solicitation, as defined in KRS 367.46951, into the Commonwealth. (b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him. Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. 13:3201: A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident: (1) Transacting any business in this state. (2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state. (3) Causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission in this state. (4) Causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state. (5) Having an interest in, using or possessing a real right on immovable property in this state. (6) Non-support of a child, parent, or spouse or a former spouse domiciled in this state to whom an obligation of support is owed and with whom the nonresident formerly resided in this state. (7) Parentage and support of a child who was conceived by the nonresident while he resided in or was in this state. (8) Manufacturing of a product or component thereof which caused damage or injury in this state, if at the time of placing the product into the stream of commerce, the Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 13 of 36 PageID: 3182 13 39021031v.1 manufacturer could have foreseen, realized, expected, or anticipated that the product may eventually be found in this state by reason of its nature and the manufacturer's marketing practices. B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States. Maryland: Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 6-103: (a) If jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of action arising from any act enumerated in this section. (b) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an agent: (1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State; (2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in the State; (3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State; (4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State; (5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the State; or (6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within the State at the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing. Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3: A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's (a) transacting any business in this commonwealth; (b) contracting to supply services or things in this commonwealth; (c) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth; (d) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this commonwealth; (e) having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this commonwealth; Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 14 of 36 PageID: 3183 14 39021031v.1 (f) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this commonwealth at the time of contracting; (g) maintaining a domicile in this commonwealth while a party to a personal or marital relationship out of which arises a claim for divorce, alimony, property settlement, parentage of a child, child support or child custody; or the commission of any act giving rise to such a claim; or (h) having been subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction of a court of the commonwealth which has resulted in an order of alimony, custody, child support or property settlement, notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from the commonwealth, if the action involves modification of such order or orders and the moving party resides in the commonwealth, or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party. Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 600.715: Sec. 715. The existence of any of the following relationships between a corporation or its agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such corporation and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against such corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following relationships: (1) The transaction of any business within the state. (2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort. (3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real or tangible personal property situated within the state. (4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. (5) Entering into a contract for services to be performed or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant. Minnesota: M.S.A. § 543.19: Subdivision 1. Personal jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or any nonresident individual, or the individual's personal representative, in the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a resident of this state. This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the foreign corporation or nonresident individual: (1) owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this state; or Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 15 of 36 PageID: 3184 15 39021031v.1 (2) transacts any business within the state; or (3) commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage; or (4) commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be found: (i) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; or (ii) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under the state's jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice. Subd. 2. Service of process. The service of process on any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this state with the same effect as though the summons had been personally served within this state. Subd. 3. Acts enumerated. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in subdivision 1 may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over the defendant is based upon this section. Subd. 4. No limit right to serve process. Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law or the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Subd. 5. Definition. “Nonresident individual,” as used in this section, means any individual, or the individual's personal representative, who is not domiciled or residing in the state when suit is commenced. Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57: Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. Service of summons and process upon the defendant shall be had or made as is provided by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Any such cause of action against any such nonresident, in the event of death or inability to act for itself or himself, shall survive against the executor, administrator, receiver, trustee, or any other selected or appointed representative of such nonresident. Service of process or summons may be had or made upon such nonresident executor, administrator, receiver, trustee or any other selected or appointed representative of such nonresident as is provided by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, and when such process or summons is served, made or had against the nonresident executor, administrator, receiver, trustee or other selected or appointed Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 16 of 36 PageID: 3185 16 39021031v.1 representative of such nonresident it shall be deemed sufficient service of such summons or process to give any court in this state in which such action may be filed, in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the State of Mississippi or the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction over the cause of action and over such nonresident executor, administrator, receiver, trustee or other selected or appointed representative of such nonresident insofar as such cause of action is involved. The provisions of this section shall likewise apply to any person who is a nonresident at the time any action or proceeding is commenced against him even though said person was a resident at the time any action or proceeding accrued against him. Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 506.500(1): Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts: (1) The transaction of any business within this state; (2) The making of any contract within this state; (3) The commission of a tortious act within this state; (4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state; (5) The contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; (6) Engaging in an act of sexual intercourse within this state with the mother of a child on or near the probable period of conception of that child. Nebraska: Neb. Rev. St. § 25-536: A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person: (1) Who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person: (a) Transacting any business in this state; (b) Contracting to supply services or things in this state; (c) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; (d) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; (e) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state; or Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 17 of 36 PageID: 3186 17 39021031v.1 (f) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; or (2) Who has any other contact with or maintains any other relation to this state to afford a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Constitution of the United States. Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 14.065(1): A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction over a party to a civil action on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16: A. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from: (1) the transaction of any business within this state; (2) the operation of a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state; (3) the commission of a tortious act within this state; (4) the contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; (5) with respect to actions for divorce, separate maintenance or annulment, the circumstance of living in the marital relationship within the state, notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state, as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support or real or personal property settlements under Chapter 40, Article 4 NMSA 1978 if one party to the marital relationship continues to reside in the state. B. Service of process may be made upon any person subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under this section by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this state and such service has the same force and effect as though service had been personally made within this state. C. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction is based upon this section. D. Nothing contained in this section limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law. New York: N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a): As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent: Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 18 of 36 PageID: 3187 18 39021031v.1 1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or 2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or 3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or 4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state. North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-75.4: A court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to Rule 4(j), Rule 4(j1), or Rule 4(j3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure1 under any of the following circumstances: (1) Local Presence or Status.--In any action, whether the claim arises within or without this State, in which a claim is asserted against a party who when service of process is made upon such party: a. Is a natural person present within this State; or b. Is a natural person domiciled within this State; or c. Is a domestic corporation; or d. Is engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise. (2) Special Jurisdiction Statutes.--In any action which may be brought under statutes of this State that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction. (3) Local Act or Omission.--In any action claiming injury to person or property or for wrongful death within or without this State arising out of an act or omission within this State by the defendant. (4) Local Injury; Foreign Act. -- In any action for wrongful death occurring within this State or in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury either: Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 19 of 36 PageID: 3188 19 39021031v.1 a. Solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant; b. Products, materials or thing processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed, within this State in the ordinary course of trade; or c. Unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail was sent into or within this State by the defendant using a computer, computer network, or the computer services of an electronic mail service provider in contravention of the authority granted by or in violation of the policies set by the electronic mail service provider. Transmission of commercial electronic mail from an organization to its members shall not be deemed to be unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail. 5) Local Services, Goods or Contracts.--In any action which: a. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this State or to pay for services to be performed in this State by the plaintiff; or b. Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this State, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this State if such performance within this State was authorized or ratified by the defendant; or c. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this State, or to ship from this State goods, documents of title, or other things of value; or d. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction; or e. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually received by the plaintiff in this State from the defendant through a carrier without regard to where delivery to the carrier occurred. (6) Local Property.--In any action which arises out of: a. A promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to create in either party an interest in, or protect, acquire, dispose of, use, rent, own, control or possess by either party real property situated in this State; or b. A claim to recover for any benefit derived by the defendant through the use, ownership, control or possession by the defendant of tangible property situated within this State either at the time of the first use, ownership, control or possession or at the time the action is commenced; or c. A claim that the defendant return, restore, or account to the plaintiff for any asset or thing of value which was within this State at the time the defendant acquired possession or control over it; or Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 20 of 36 PageID: 3189 20 39021031v.1 d. A claim related to a loan made in this State or deemed to have been made in this State under G.S. 24-2.1, regardless of the situs of the lender, assignee, or other holder of the loan note and regardless of whether the loan payment or fee is received through a loan servicer, provided that: (i) the loan was made to a borrower who is a resident of this State, (ii) the loan is incurred by the borrower primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and (iii) the loan is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real property situated in this State upon which there is located or there is to be located a structure or structures designed principally for occupancy of from one to four families. (7) Deficiency Judgment on Local Foreclosure or Resale.--In any action to recover a deficiency judgment upon an obligation secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale, or other security instrument executed by the defendant or his predecessor to whose obligation the defendant has succeeded and the deficiency is claimed either: a. In an action in this State to foreclose such security instrument upon real property, tangible personal property, or an intangible represented by an indispensable instrument, situated in this State; or b. Following sale of real or tangible personal property or an intangible represented by an indispensable instrument in this State under a power of sale contained in any security instrument. (8) Director or Officer of a Domestic Corporation.--In any action against a defendant who is or was an officer or director of a domestic corporation where the action arises out of the defendant's conduct as such officer or director or out of the activities of such corporation while the defendant held office as a director or officer. (9) Taxes or Assessments.--In any action for the collection of taxes or assessments levied, assessed or otherwise imposed by a taxing authority of this State after the date of ratification of this act. (10) Insurance or Insurers.--In any action which arises out of a contract of insurance as defined in G.S. 58-1-10 made anywhere between the plaintiff or some third party and the defendant and in addition either: a. The plaintiff was a resident of this State when the event occurred out of which the claim arose; or b. The event out of which the claim arose occurred within this State, regardless of where the plaintiff resided. (11) Personal Representative.--In any action against a personal representative to enforce a claim against the deceased person represented, whether or not the action was commenced during the lifetime of the deceased, where one or more of the grounds stated in subdivisions (2) to (10) of this section would have furnished a basis for jurisdiction over the deceased had he been living. (12) Marital Relationship.--In any action under Chapter 50 that arises out of the marital relationship within this State, notwithstanding subsequent departure from the State, if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this State. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 21 of 36 PageID: 3190 21 39021031v.1 Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382: (A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's: (1) Transacting any business in this state; (2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state; (3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; (4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; (5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; (6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state; (7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any element of which takes place in this state, which he commits or in the commission of which he is guilty of complicity. (8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state; (9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. (B) For purposes of this section, a person who enters into an agreement, as a principal, with a sales representative for the solicitation of orders in this state is transacting business in this state. As used in this division, “principal” and “sales representative” have the same meanings as in section 1335.11 of the Revised Code. (C) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him. Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2004(F): A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States. The Committee Comment to § 2004 explains that Oklahoma's long arm statute “authorizes the exercise of judicial power to the limits of the due process clauses of the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 22 of 36 PageID: 3191 22 39021031v.1 Oregon: Or. Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 4: Personal jurisdiction. A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a party served in an action pursuant to Rule 7 under any of the following circumstances: A Local presence or status. In any action, whether arising within or without this state, against a defendant who when the action is commenced: A(1) Is a natural person present within this state when served; or A(2) Is a natural person domiciled within this state; or A(3) Is a corporation created by or under the laws of this state; or A(4) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, whether such activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise; or A(5) Has expressly consented to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over such defendant. B Special jurisdiction statutes. In any action which may be brought under statutes or rules of this state that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction over the defendant. C Local act or omission. In any action claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising out of an act or omission within this state by the defendant. D Local injury; foreign act. In any action claiming injury to person or property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this state by the defendant, provided in addition that at the time of the injury, either: D(1) Solicitation or service activities were carried on within this state by or on behalf of the defendant; or D(2) Products, materials, or things distributed, processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade. E Local services, goods, or contracts. In any action or proceeding which: E(1) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or E(2) Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this state or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this state, if such performance within this state was authorized or ratified by the defendant; or E(3) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this state or to send from this state goods, documents of title, or other things of value; or Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 23 of 36 PageID: 3192 23 39021031v.1 E(4) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value sent from this state by the defendant to the plaintiff or to a third person on the plaintiff's order or direction; or E(5) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually received in this state by the plaintiff from the defendant or by the defendant from the plaintiff, without regard to where delivery to carrier occurred. F Local property. In any action which arises out of the ownership, use, or possession of real property situated in this state or the ownership, use, or possession of other tangible property, assets, or things of value which were within this state at the time of such ownership, use, or possession; including, but not limited to, actions to recover a deficiency judgment upon any mortgage, conditional sale contract, or other security agreement relating to such property, executed by the defendant or predecessor to whose obligation the defendant has succeeded. G Director or officer of a domestic corporation. In any action against a defendant who is or was an officer or director of a domestic corporation where the action arises out of the defendant's conduct as such officer or director or out of the activities of such corporation while the defendant held office as a director or officer. H Taxes or assessments. In any action for the collection of taxes or assessments levied, assessed, or otherwise imposed by a taxing authority of this state. I Insurance or insurers. In any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plaintiff or some third party by the defendant to insure any person, property, or risk and in addition either: I(1) The person, property, or risk insured was located in this state at the time of the promise; or I(2) The person, property, or risk insured was located within this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred; or I(3) The event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred within this state, regardless of where the person, property, or risk insured was located. J Securities. In any action arising under the Oregon Securities Law, including an action brought by the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services, against: J(1) An applicant for registration or registrant, and any person who offers or sells a security in this state, directly or indirectly, unless the security or the sale is exempt from ORS 59.055; or J(2) Any person, a resident or nonresident of this state, who has engaged in conduct prohibited or made actionable under the Oregon Securities Law. K Certain marital and domestic relations actions. K(1) In any action to determine a question of status instituted under ORS chapter 106 or 107 when the plaintiff is a resident of or domiciled in this state. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 24 of 36 PageID: 3193 24 39021031v.1 K(2) In any action to enforce personal obligations arising under ORS chapter 106 or 107, if the parties to a marriage have concurrently maintained the same or separate residences or domiciles within this state for a period of six months, notwithstanding departure from this state and acquisition of a residence or domicile in another state or country before filing of such action; but if an action to enforce personal obligations arising under ORS chapter 106 or 107 is not commenced within one year following the date upon which the party who left the state acquired a residence or domicile in another state or country, no jurisdiction is conferred by this subsection in any such action. K(3) In any proceeding to establish paternity under ORS chapter 109 or 110, or any action for declaration of paternity where the primary purpose of the action is to establish responsibility for child support, when the act of sexual intercourse which resulted in the birth of the child is alleged to have taken place in this state. L Other actions. Notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of sections B through K of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. M Personal representative. In any action against a personal representative to enforce a claim against the deceased person represented where one or more of the grounds stated in sections A through L would have furnished a basis for jurisdiction over the deceased had the deceased been living. It is immaterial whether the action is commenced during the lifetime of the deceased. N Joinder of claims in the same action. In any action brought in reliance upon jurisdictional grounds stated in sections B through L, there cannot be joined in the same action any other claim or cause against the defendant unless grounds exist under this rule, or other rule or statute, for personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to the claim or cause to be joined. O Defendant defined. For purposes of this rule and Rules 5 and 6, “defendant” includes any party subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Pennsylvania: 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(a): A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person (or the personal representative of a deceased individual who would be subject to jurisdiction under this subsection if not deceased) who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such person: (1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts which may constitute transacting business in this Commonwealth, any of the following shall constitute transacting business for the purpose of this paragraph: (i) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 25 of 36 PageID: 3194 25 39021031v.1 (ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with the intention of initiating a series of such acts. (iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this Commonwealth. (iv) The engaging in any business or profession within this Commonwealth, whether or not such business requires license or approval by any government unit of this Commonwealth. (v) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this Commonwealth. (2) Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth. (3) Causing harm or tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth. (4) Causing harm or tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth. (5) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this Commonwealth. (6)(i) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this Commonwealth at the time of contracting. (ii) Being a person who controls, or who is a director, officer, employee or agent of a person who controls, an insurance company incorporated in this Commonwealth or an alien insurer domiciled in this Commonwealth. (iii) Engaging in conduct described in section 504 of the act of May 17, 1921 (P.L. 789, No. 285), known as The Insurance Department Act of 1921.1 (7) Accepting election or appointment or exercising powers under the authority of this Commonwealth as a: (i) Personal representative of a decedent. (ii) Guardian of a minor or incapacitated person. (iii) Trustee or other fiduciary. (iv) Director or officer of a corporation. (8) Executing any bond of any of the persons specified in paragraph. (9) Making application to any government unit for any certificate, license, permit, registration or similar instrument or authorization or exercising any such instrument or authorization. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 26 of 36 PageID: 3195 26 39021031v.1 (10) Committing any violation within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth of any statute, home rule charter, local ordinance or resolution, or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder by any government unit or of any order of court or other government unit. (b) Exercise of full constitutional power over nonresidents.--In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all persons who are not within the scope of section 5301 (relating to persons) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States. South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-802: A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, doing business, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, this State as to any cause of action. And, S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803: (A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's: (1) transacting any business in this State; (2) contracting to supply services or things in the State; (3) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this State; (4) causing tortious injury or death in this State by an act or omission outside this State if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State; (5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State; (6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting; (7) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State; or (8) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed. (B) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 27 of 36 PageID: 3196 27 39021031v.1 South Dakota: S.D.C.L. § 15-7-2: Any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing personally, through any employee, through an agent or through a subsidiary, of any of the following acts: (1) The transaction of any business within the state; (2) The commission of any act which results in accrual within this state of a tort action; (3) The ownership, use, or possession of any property, or of any interest therein, situated within this state; (4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; (5) Entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be furnished in this state by such person; (6) Acting as director, manager, trustee, or other officer of any corporation organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within this state, or as personal representative of any estate within this state; (7) Failure to support a minor child residing in South Dakota; (8) Having sexual intercourse in this state, which act creates a cause of action for the determination of paternity of a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse; (9) With respect to any action for divorce, separate maintenance, or spousal support the maintenance in this state of a matrimonial domicile at the time the claim arose or the commission in this state of an act giving rise to the claim, subject to the provisions of § 25-4-30; (10) Entering into negotiations with any person within the state with the apparent objective of contracting for services to be rendered or materials to be furnished in this state; (11) Commencing or participating in negotiations, mediation, arbitration, or litigation involving subject matter located in whole or in part within the state; (12) Doing any act for the purpose of influencing legislation, administrative rule-making or judicial or administrative decision-making by any local, state, or federal official whose official function is being performed within the state, providing that an appearance to contest personal jurisdiction shall not be within this subsection; (13) The commission of any act which results in the accrual of an action in this state for a violation of the antitrust laws of the United States or chapter 37-1; (14) The commission of any act, the basis of which is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or with the Constitution of the United States. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 28 of 36 PageID: 3197 28 39021031v.1 Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-214: (a) Persons who are nonresidents of this state and residents of this state who are outside the state and cannot be personally served with process within this state are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action or claim for relief arising from: (1) The transaction of any business within this state; (2) Any tortious act or omission within this state; (3) The ownership or possession of any interest in property located within this state; (4) Entering into any contract of insurance, indemnity or guaranty covering any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; (5) Entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be furnished in this state; (6) Any basis not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or of the United States; (7) Any action of divorce, annulment or separate maintenance where the parties lived in the marital relationship within this state, notwithstanding one party's subsequent departure from this state, as to all obligations arising for alimony, custody, child support or marital dissolution agreement, if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state. (b) As used in this section, "person" includes corporations and all other entities that would be subject to service of process if present in this state. (c) Any such person shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of this state who acts in the manner described in subsection (a) through an agent or personal representative. Texas: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042: In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does business in this state if the nonresident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state. Virginia: VA Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1: A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's: Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 29 of 36 PageID: 3198 29 39021031v.1 1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; 2. Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth; 3. Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth; 4. Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this Commonwealth; 5. Causing injury in this Commonwealth to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this Commonwealth when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this Commonwealth, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth; 6. Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this Commonwealth; 7. Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this Commonwealth at the time of contracting; 8. Having (i) executed an agreement in this Commonwealth which obligates the person to pay spousal support or child support to a domiciliary of this Commonwealth, or to a person who has satisfied the residency requirements in suits for annulments or divorce for members of the armed forces or foreign service officers of the United States pursuant to § 20-97 provided proof of service of process on a nonresident party is made by a law-enforcement officer or other person authorized to serve process in the jurisdiction where the nonresident party is located, (ii) been ordered to pay spousal support or child support pursuant to an order entered by any court of competent jurisdiction in this Commonwealth having in personam jurisdiction over such person, or (iii) shown by personal conduct in this Commonwealth, as alleged by affidavit, that the person conceived or fathered a child in this Commonwealth; 9. Having maintained within this Commonwealth a matrimonial domicile at the time of separation of the parties upon which grounds for divorce or separate maintenance is based, or at the time a cause of action arose for divorce or separate maintenance or at the time of commencement of such suit, if the other party to the matrimonial relationship resides herein; or 10. Having incurred a liability for taxes, fines, penalties, interest, or other charges to any political subdivision of the Commonwealth. Jurisdiction in subdivision 9 is valid only upon proof of service of process pursuant to § 8.01-296 on the nonresident party by a person authorized under the provisions of § 8.01-320. Jurisdiction under subdivision 8 (iii) of this subsection is valid only upon proof of personal service on a nonresident pursuant to § 8.01-320. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 30 of 36 PageID: 3199 30 39021031v.1 B. Using a computer or computer network located in the Commonwealth shall constitute an act in the Commonwealth. For purposes of this subsection, “use” and “computer network” shall have the same meanings as those contained in § 18.2-152.2. C. When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him; however, nothing contained in this chapter shall limit, restrict or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of any court of this Commonwealth over foreign corporations which are subject to service of process pursuant to the provisions of any other statute. West Virginia: W. Va. Code, § 56-3-33: (a) The engaging by a nonresident, or by his or her duly authorized agent, in any one or more of the acts specified in subdivisions (1) through (7) of this subsection shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the Secretary of State, or his or her successor in office, to be his or her true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action or proceeding against him or her, in any circuit court in this state, including an action or proceeding brought by a nonresident plaintiff or plaintiffs, for a cause of action arising from or growing out of such act or acts, and the engaging in such act or acts shall be a signification of such nonresident's agreement that any such process against him or her, which is served in the manner hereinafter provided, shall be of the same legal force and validity as though such nonresident were personally served with a summons and complaint within this state: (1) Transacting any business in this state; (2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state; (3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; (4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he or she regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; (5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when he or she might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume or be affected by the goods in this state: Provided, That he or she also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; (6) Having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this state; or (7) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. (b) When jurisdiction over a nonresident is based solely upon the provisions of this section, only a cause of action arising from or growing out of one or more of the acts specified in subdivisions (1) through (7), subsection (a) of this section may be asserted against him or her. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 31 of 36 PageID: 3200 31 39021031v.1 (c) Service shall be made by leaving the original and two copies of both the summons and the complaint, and the fee required by section two, article one, chapter fifty-nine of this code with the Secretary of State, or in his or her office, and such service shall be sufficient upon such nonresident: Provided, That notice of such service and a copy of the summons and complaint shall forthwith be sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, by a means which may include electronic issuance and acceptance of electronic return receipts, by the Secretary of State to the defendant at his or her nonresident address and the defendant's return receipt signed by himself or herself or his or her duly authorized agent or the registered or certified mail so sent by the Secretary of State which is refused by the addressee and which registered or certified mail is returned to the Secretary of State, or to his or her office, showing thereon the stamp of the post-office department that delivery has been refused. After receiving verification from the United States postal service that acceptance of process, notice or demand has been signed, the Secretary of State shall notify the clerk's office of the court from which the process, notice or demand was issued by a means which may include electronic notification. If the process, notice or demand was refused or undeliverable by the United States postal service the Secretary of State shall return refused or undeliverable mail to the clerk's office of the court from which the process, notice or demand was issued. If any defendant served with summons and complaint fails to appear and defend within thirty days of service, judgment by default may be rendered against him or her at any time thereafter. The court may order such continuances as may be reasonable to afford the defendant opportunity to defend the action or proceeding. (d) The fee remitted to the secretary of state at the time of service shall be taxed in the costs of the action or proceeding. The secretary of state shall keep a record in his or her office of all such process and the day and hour of service thereof. (e) The following words and phrases, when used in this section, shall for the purpose of this section and unless a different intent be apparent from the context, have the following meanings: (1) “Duly authorized agent” means and includes among others a person who, at the direction of or with the knowledge or acquiescence of a nonresident, engages in such act or acts and includes among others a member of the family of such nonresident or a person who, at the residence, place of business or post office of such nonresident, usually receives and receipts for mail addressed to such nonresident. (2) “Nonresident” means any person, other than voluntary unincorporated associations, who is not a resident of this state or a resident who has moved from this state subsequent to engaging in such act or acts, and among others includes a nonresident firm, partnership or corporation or a firm, partnership or corporation which has moved from this state subsequent to any of said such act or acts. (3) “Nonresident plaintiff or plaintiffs” means a nonresident of this state who institutes an action or proceeding in a circuit court in this state having jurisdiction against a nonresident of this state pursuant to the provisions of this section. (f) The provision for service of process herein is cumulative and nothing herein contained shall be construed as a bar to the plaintiff in any action or proceeding from having process in such action served in any other mode or manner provided by the law of this state or by the law of the Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 32 of 36 PageID: 3201 32 39021031v.1 place in which the service is made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction. (g) This section shall not be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall not be available to a plaintiff in a cause of action arising from or growing out of any of said acts occurring prior to the effective date of this section. Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. 801.05: A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to s. 801.11 under any of the following circumstances: (1) Local presence or status. In any action whether arising within or without this state, against a defendant who when the action is commenced: (a) Is a natural person present within this state when served; or (b) Is a natural person domiciled within this state; or (c) Is a domestic corporation or limited liability company; or (d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, whether such activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise. (2) Special jurisdiction statutes. In any action which may be brought under statutes of this state that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction over the defendant. (3) Local act or omission. In any action claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising out of an act or omission within this state by the defendant. (4) Local injury; foreign act. In any action claiming injury to person or property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this state by the defendant, provided in addition that at the time of the injury, either: (a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on within this state by or on behalf of the defendant; or (b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade. (5) Local services, goods or contracts. In any action which: (a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or (b) Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant within this state, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff within this state if such performance within this state was authorized or ratified by the defendant; or Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 33 of 36 PageID: 3202 33 39021031v.1 (c) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this state or to ship from this state goods, documents of title, or other things of value; or (d) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this state by the plaintiff to the defendant on the defendant's order or direction; or (e) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually received by the plaintiff in this state from the defendant without regard to where delivery to carrier occurred. (6) Local property. In any action which arises out of: (a) A promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some 3rd party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to create in either party an interest in, or protect, acquire, dispose of, use, rent, own, control or possess by either party real property situated in this state; or (b) A claim to recover any benefit derived by the defendant through the use, ownership, control or possession by the defendant of tangible property situated within this state either at the time of the first use, ownership, control or possession or at the time the action is commenced; or (c) A claim that the defendant return, restore, or account to the plaintiff for any asset or thing of value which was within this state at the time the defendant acquired possession or control over it. (7) Deficiency judgment on local foreclosure or resale. In any action to recover a deficiency judgment upon a mortgage note or conditional sales contract or other security agreement executed by the defendant or predecessor to whose obligation the defendant has succeeded and the deficiency is claimed either: (a) In an action in this state to foreclose upon real property situated in this state; or (b) Following sale of real property in this state by the plaintiff under ch. 846; or (c) Following resale of tangible property in this state by the plaintiff under ch. 409. (8) Director, officer or manager of a domestic corporation or limited liability company. In any action against a defendant who is or was an officer, director or manager of a domestic corporation or domestic limited liability company where the action arises out of the defendant's conduct as such officer, director or manager or out of the activities of such corporation or limited liability company while the defendant held office as a director, officer or manager. (9) Taxes or assessments. In any action for the collection of taxes or assessments levied, assessed or otherwise imposed by a taxing authority of this state after July 1, 1960. (10) Insurance or insurers. In any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plaintiff or some 3rd party by the defendant to insure upon or against the happening of an event and in addition either: Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 34 of 36 PageID: 3203 34 39021031v.1 (a) The person insured was a resident of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred; or (b) The event out of which the cause of action is claimed to arise occurred within this state, regardless of where the person insured resided. (11) Certain marital actions. In addition to personal jurisdiction under sub. (1) and s. 801.06, in any action affecting the family, except for actions under ch. 769, in which a personal claim is asserted against the respondent commenced in the county in which the petitioner resides at the commencement of the action when the respondent resided in this state in marital relationship with the petitioner for not less than 6 consecutive months within the 6 years next preceding the commencement of the action and the respondent is served personally under s. 801.11. The effect of any determination of a child's custody shall not be binding personally against any parent or guardian unless the parent or guardian has been made personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court in the action as provided under this chapter or has been notified under s. 822.08 as provided in s. 822.06. (11m) Certain restraining orders or injunctions. (a) Subject to subch. II of ch. 822, and in addition to personal jurisdiction under sub. (1) and s. 801.06, in any action filed pursuant to s. 813.12, 813.122, 813.123, or 813.125, if any of the following apply: 1. Subject to par. (b), an act or threat of the respondent giving rise to the petition occurred outside the state and is part of an ongoing pattern of harassment that has an adverse effect on the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household, and the petitioner resides in this state. 2. Subject to par. (b), the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household has sought safety or protection in this state as a result of an act or threat of the respondent giving rise to the petition. 3. Personal jurisdiction is permissible under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Wisconsin. (b) Paragraph (a)1. or 2. applies if, while the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household resides or is temporarily living in this state, the respondent has had direct or indirect communication with the petitioner or a member of the petitioner's family or household or if the respondent has indicated a threat to the physical health or safety of the petitioner or of a member of the petitioner's family or household. A communication or indication for the purpose of this paragraph includes communication through mail, telephone, electronic message or transmittal, and posting on an electronic communication site, web page, or other electronic medium. Communication on any electronic medium that is generally available to any individual residing in this state is sufficient to exercise jurisdiction under par. (a)1. or 2. (c) If a court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to par. (a) and a respondent has been served but does not appear or does not file a response or motion asserting the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, the court shall hear the action. This paragraph does not limit the respondent's right to challenge personal jurisdiction on appeal. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 35 of 36 PageID: 3204 35 39021031v.1 (12) Personal representative. In any action against a personal representative to enforce a claim against the deceased person represented where one or more of the grounds stated in subs. (2) to (11) would have furnished a basis for jurisdiction over the deceased had the deceased been living and it is immaterial under this subsection whether the action had been commenced during the lifetime of the deceased. (13) Joinder of claims in the same action. In any action brought in reliance upon jurisdictional grounds stated in subs. (2) to (11) there cannot be joined in the same action any other claim or cause against the defendant unless grounds exist under this section for personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to the claim or cause to be joined. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-4 Filed 05/19/17 Page 36 of 36 PageID: 3205 EXHIBIT D Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-5 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 5 PageID: 3206 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS MDL No. 2738 MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Case No. 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG DECLARATION OF MARK A. POLLAK IN SUPPORT OF PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS COUNCIL’S OMNIBUS MOTION TO DISMISS I, Mark A. Pollak, hereby declare, under penalty of perjury, as follows: 1. 1 am Senior Executive Vice President for Strategic Initiatives of the Personal Care Products Council (“PCPC”). I am over the age of twenty-one years, of sound mind, suffer no legal disabilities, and am fully competent in all respects to make this declaration. The statements below are based on my personal knowledge, investigation, and review of PCPC business records. 2. As Senior Executive Vice President for Strategic Initiatives, I am responsible for supervising a wide variety of PCPC’s activities. 3. I have worked for PCPC for thirty-four years, and I have been continuously employed here since February 1983. Based on the positions I hold and have held, I am familiar with the general activities and day-to-day operations at PCPC, both at present and during my tenure at PCPC. 4. PCPC is a Washington, D.C.-incorporated and Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit trade association for the cosmetic and personal care products industry. PCPC’s only office is located in Washington, D.C. PCPC was formerly known as the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (“CTFA”). 39020987v. I Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-5 Filed 05/19/17 Page 2 of 5 PageID: 3207 5. PCPC has never manufactured, marketed, distributed, promoted, tested, sold nor otherwise placed into the stream of commerce any product containing talc, or any other cosmetic or persona) care product. 6. PCPC is not licensed to do business in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi. Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia or Wisconsin (the “Relevant States”). 7. PCPC has no agent for service of process in any of the Relevant States. 8. PCPC neither owns nor Leases, nor holds liens or mortgages on, any real property in any of the Relevant States. 9. PCPC has no address, phone number, bank account, or office in any of the Relevant States. 10. None of PCPC’s employees are based in any of the Relevant States nor regularly travels to or conducts business there on PCPCs behalf. I 1. PCPC has never brought a lawsuit in any court of the Relevant States. 12. PCPC maintains no records or any other property in any of the Relevant States. 13. PCPC holds an annual meeting in California and may hold or attend other meetings there periodically. The meetings, however, do not relate to talc. 14. PCPC holds an annual meeting in Florida. However, no part of that meeting relates to talc. 7 39020987v.I Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-5 Filed 05/19/17 Page 3 of 5 PageID: 3208 15. Over the years, PCPC employees have occasionally attended conferences in Illinois. Such conferences have been infrequent and have not related to talc or any of the issues raised in this lawsuit. 16. PCPC has held a meeting in Louisiana three times in the past twenty-five years, but none of these meetings related to talc. 17. PCPC contracts with a Maryland-based publisher and a Maryland-based publication-fulfillment warehouse for the publishing and shipment of print materials created by PCPC. Members and others may purchase publications from PCPC’s online bookstore, which is located and administered in Washington, DC. Publications are manufactured and shipped from third parties in Maryland. 18. PCPC held a conference in South Carolina four times in the past twenty years. No part of the conferences related to talc. 19. Like many other national trade associations located in Washington, D.C., in the regular course of its business, PCPC monitors state-level legislative and regulatory developments of interest to its members. Occasionally, PCPC lobbyists or others acting on PCPC’s behalf may have communicated with or testified before state legislators from California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania; and other government officials from California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New York. and Pennsylvania on issues of interest to PCPCs members. Any such communications have not related to talc or the issues raised in this lawsuit. PCPC lobbyists or others acting on PCPC’s behalf have not communicated with or testified before legislators or any other government officials from and in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, 3 39020987v. I Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-5 Filed 05/19/17 Page 4 of 5 PageID: 3209 Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia or ‘Wisconsin. 20. Members of PCPC pay dues that are based on the amount of the member company’s total personal care product sales. Any change in the sales of talc products by Johnson & Johnson and Imerys would have only a tie mininils effect on their member dues and, in turn, only a tie znininiis effect on the total dues collected by PCPC. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: May 18, 2017 ( Mark A. PolLak 4 39020987v. I Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-5 Filed 05/19/17 Page 5 of 5 PageID: 3210 39161436v.1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION MDL No. 2738 MOTION DATE: June 19, 2017 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS COUNCIL’S MOTION TO DISMISS This matter having come before the Court by motion of counsel for Defendant Personal Care Products Council (“PCPC”) for the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaints; It is on this ________ day of __________________________, 2017, 1. ORDERED that PCPC’s motion to dismiss is granted; and it is further 2. ORDERED that PCPC is dismissed with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction in those cases identified in PCPC’s Exhibit A; and it is further 3. ORDERED that PCPC is dismissed with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction in any other case that, following the completion of pretrial proceedings in this Multi- District Litigation, will be transferred for trial to a jurisdiction other than Washington DC or New Jersey; and it is further 4. ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be served on the parties of record. SO ORDERED __________________________________ Honorable Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J. Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-6 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 3211 39161747v.1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY IN RE: JOHNSON & JOHNSON TALCUM POWDER PRODUCTS MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION MDL No. 2738 NOTICE OF DEFENDANT PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS COUNCIL’S MOTION TO DISMISS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on May 19, 2017, a true copy of Defendant Personal Care Products Council’s Motion to Dismiss, accompanying Memorandum of Law, accompanying Exhibits, and Proposed Order was sent via electronic filing via the Court’s ECF system to the attorneys of record. /s/ Thomas T. Locke, Esq. Thomas T. Locke (DC Bar No. 454144) Case 3:16-md-02738-FLW-LHG Document 256-7 Filed 05/19/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 3212