Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc. et al

REPLY BRIEF to Opposition to Motion

D.N.J.November 23, 2016

Beth S. Rose Vincent Lodato SILLS CUMMIS & GROSS P.C. The Legal Center One Riverfront Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07102 (973) 643-7000 Attorneys for Defendants Roxane Laboratories, Inc., West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp., Eurohealth (USA), Inc., and Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. Plaintiff, v. ROXANE LABORATORIES, INC., WEST- WARD PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., EUROHEALTH (USA), INC., and HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC, Defendants. C.A. No. 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD DEFENDANTS’ REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ALL COUNTS OF THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 16 PageID: 620 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction........................................................................................................................ 1 I. The Claims are Directed to a Patent-Ineligible Abstract Idea that Uses an Ordinary Database ............................................................................................................. 1 II. The ’963 Patent Preempts the Abstract Idea of Centralization to Reduce Illicit Distribution of a Prescription Drug.................................................................................... 7 III. Jazz Conflates Subject Matter Eligibility with Novelty and Non-Obviousness......... 8 IV. The ’963 Patent Is Ripe for Dismissal...................................................................... 10 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 11 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 16 PageID: 621 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).............................................................................................1, 5, 7, 9, 10 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................7 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................................7 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................11 Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................7, 11 Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................10 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980)...................................................................................................................6 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................2, 4, 6 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................1, 2, 5 FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................5, 6, 7 Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................10 Mayo Collaborative Svcs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)...........................................................................................................5, 8 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................1, 4, 5 Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc., 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................9 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 3 of 16 PageID: 622 iii OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................7, 11 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................9 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................8 In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)....................................................................................................4 Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo Inc., _ F. App’x _, No. 2015-1907, 2016 WL 6775967 (Fed. Cir., November 16, 2016) ......................................................................................................................................5, 6 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................................7 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................................9 Statutes and Rules 35 U.S.C. § 101..............................................................................................................6, 7, 8, 9, 10 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103............................................................................................................8, 9 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ...........................................................................................................................9 Rule 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................................................10 Other Authorities Final Written Decision, IPR2015-00554, Ex. K..............................................................................9 Patent Office’s post-Alice ..............................................................................................................10 U.S. Patent No. 7,668,730......................................................................................................8, 9, 10 U.S. Patent No. 8,731,963........................................................................1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 U.S. Patent Nos. 7,668,730, 7,765,106, 7,765,107, and 7,895,059 ...............................................11 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 4 of 16 PageID: 623 1 Introduction No matter how much Jazz tries to exalt the claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,731,963 (the ’963 patent), Jazz cannot escape the basic truth—the claims are directed to ineligible subject matter requiring dismissal of all counts of Jazz’s complaint. Roxane’s moving brief explained that Jazz’s patent claims an abstract idea—the idea of centralization to reduce illicit distribution of a prescription drug—and that the claims fail to add any inventive concepts. The claims are not directed to any improvement to a computer, but instead claim nothing more than an ordinary database—one that can be used with any generic computer—containing various conventional fields for keeping track of data. The claims merely accomplish with a computer the type of quotidian record-keeping and data correlation that a human can do with pen and paper. Calling the claimed database “specialized” does not make it so—it’s simply an ordinary database operating with an ordinary computer, just as the ’963 patent teaches. Jazz’s opposition brief rests on three misleading arguments: (1) the claimed invention is patent-eligible because it recites a “specially configured” database; (2) the Patent Office has twice acknowledged the claims of the ’963 patent are directed to inventive concepts; and (3) Roxane’s motion to dismiss is not ripe. As we explain below, each argument fails. I. The Claims are Directed to a Patent-Ineligible Abstract Idea that Uses an Ordinary Database For the first prong of the analysis under Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), Jazz relies on the characterization of the claims at issue in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But the claims at issue in those cases are not parallel or similar to the claims of the ’963 patent. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 5 of 16 PageID: 624 2 In Enfish, the claims were “directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate,” rather than an abstract idea implemented on a computer. 822 F.3d at 1336. The claims of the ’963 patent are the reverse: they are directed to an abstract idea implemented on a computer, not a specific improvement in the way computers operate. As Jazz admits, “the problem solved by the single computer database is that of illicit drug distribution of a sensitive prescription drug.” (D.I. 16 at 15.) Thus, by Jazz’s own reckoning, “the focus of the claims is not on . . . an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). And contrary to Jazz’s assertions, the ‘963 patent does not endeavor to provide a technological solution to a technological problem—rather, it sets forth the solution of querying differing record fields regarding a drug (not a technological solution) to address the problem of inventory reconciliation and preventing illicit distribution of the drug (neither a technological problem). Not only are there stark differences between the claims of the ’963 patent (generically reciting a database with fields and schema) and the claims at issue in Enfish (specifically claiming cells with attribute sets, object identification numbers, and address segments, and describing how those features interact in order to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory), 822 F.3d 1336-39, Jazz’s claim that the “single computer database” is “specially configured” is a misleading attempt to elevate the claimed subject matter into something it is not. Tellingly, Jazz never indicates how the computer database is “specially” configured, nor do the phrases “specially configured” or “specially programmed,” on which Jazz so heavily relies, appear anywhere inside or outside the claims of the ’963 patent. The terms Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 6 of 16 PageID: 625 3 “specially configured” and “specially programmed” aren’t in the ’963 patent at all. Nor does the phrase “single” computer database appear anywhere in the ’963 patent specification. For all the ’963 patent reveals, the computer database is nothing more than an ordinary database. At best, there are only two instances in the specification of the ’963 patent where a teaching of the claimed “database” is set forth. In the first instance, “storage 140” (a database) is described merely as a component of a “personal computer for implementing at least a portion of the methods described herein”. (D.I. 1, Ex. A, ’963 patent at 3:56 to 4:16.) Nothing special or innovative about the claimed “database” is found in an ordinary “personal computer.” In the second instance, the ’963 patent explicitly states: The central database described above is a relational database running on the system of FIG. 1, or a server based system having a similar architecture coupled to workstations via a network, as represented by communications 160. The database is likely stored in storage 140, and contains multiple fields of information as indicated at 700 in FIG. 7. (Id. at 7:40-45.) This simply teaches that the database is a relational database that could be server-based. The ’963 patent then goes on to state that differing data groupings or schemas may be used in the relational database. (Id. at 7:45-54.) Both Fig. 1 (storage 140) and Fig. 7 depict the database and fields as nothing more than blocks with no further description. There is nothing innovative (and certainly no improvement to computer technology) regarding storing differing data groupings or schemas in a relational database. Having different data reside in different areas of a database is no different than having information contained in different files in a file drawer—it is purely conventional. And there is not one instance in the ’963 patent where an improvement to computer technology is found or mentioned. If Jazz’s “single database” were as unique as Jazz proclaims, one would expect a description in the ’963 patent specification of how to build and configure the database. Instead, the ’963 patent provides no more description than to use a generic personal computer and block diagrams. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 7 of 16 PageID: 626 4 In McRO, the other case Jazz principally relies on, the claims were directed to “a specific asserted improvement in computer animation.” 837 F.3d at 1314. “The claimed improvement [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.” Id. at 1313. These claims include specifics such as “unconventional rules that relate subsequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets.” Id. at 1303. The ’963 patent contains no such specifics, let alone the technological improvement to a computer to improve computer animation in McRO. To the contrary, the steps recited in Claim 1, such as “storing”, “process[ing] a database query”, and “identifying” based on the database query, are nothing more than steps that are commonly performed every day on conventional computers. Finally, Jazz contends that “[d]istributing a drug in and of itself is not abstract; instead, it is a concrete, physical activity.” (D.I. 16 at 19-20.) But the abstract idea embodied by the ’963 patent is not the physical distribution of the drug, but rather the abstract concept of centralization to reduce illicit distribution of a prescription drug using a generic computer system. (D.I. 12 at 10.) Jazz fails to identify any inclusion of tangible elements that save the claims of the ’963 patent from being abstract. Even if it had, the Federal Circuit has made clear that claims involving tangible components can be abstract. See, e.g., In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 610-11 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims abstract because “the recited physical components merely provide a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea”); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1351-52 (finding that “the claims’ invocation of computers, networks, and displays does not transform the claimed subject matter into patent-eligible applications”). The claims of the ’963 patent do not require any nonconventional computer, network, or display components. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 8 of 16 PageID: 627 5 In contrast to Enfish and McRO, the computer system claim limitations in the ’963 patent claim are akin to the claim elements of the patents held invalid as patent ineligible in two recent Federal Circuit cases, FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo Inc., _ F. App’x _, No. 2015-1907, 2016 WL 6775967 (Fed. Cir., November 16, 2016). Similar to FairWarning and Tranxition, under the second prong of Alice, whether considered element-by-element or as an ordered combination, the ’963 patent claims fail to include an inventive concept such that “the patent in practice amounts to [significantly more] than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354– 55 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Svcs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In FairWarning, the claims were directed to collecting “information regarding [access] of a patient's personal health information, analyz[ing] the information according to one of several rules to determine if the activity indicates improper access, and provid[ing] notification if it determines that improper access has occurred.” 839 F.3d at 1093. The Federal Circuit held that these claims “failed to add something more to transform the claimed abstract idea of collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 1095 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354, 2357) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ’963 patent claims, whether considered element-by-element or as an ordered combination, are remarkably similar to those in FairWarning, just with slightly different terminology (e.g. instead of applying a rule to data, the ’963 patent recites processing a query over data; and instead of determining if an event has occurred and providing notification of the event, the claims of the ’963 patent recite identifying a certain situation and then providing a notification of the situation). Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 9 of 16 PageID: 628 6 Jazz touts the ’963 patent claims and specification as “an ‘interrelated’ or ‘relational database’” that “executes queries that may be used to determine relationships between the fields that indicate potential abuse, misuse, or diversion of prescription drugs.” (D.I. 16 at 26-27.) Jazz’s argument fails. The Federal Circuit very recently made clear in FairWarning that “[t]he mere combination of data sources does not make the claims patent eligible. As we have explained, ‘merely selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and [announcement] does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes, whose implicit exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based category of abstract ideas.’” 839 F.3d at 1097 (citing Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355). In Tranxition, another very recent case supporting Roxane’s position, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed steps “to (1) provide configuration information, (2) generate an extraction plan, (3) extract the configuration settings, (4) generate a transition plan, and (5) transition those settings to a new computer . . . both individually, and as an ordered combination, do not disclose an inventive concept. They merely describe a generic computer implementation, using “routine, conventional activities,” of the abstract idea, “which is insufficient to transform the patent ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.” 2016 WL 6775967, at *3. The claims of the ’963 patent, whether considered element-by-element or as an ordered combination, are similar to those in Tranxition in that the system of Claim 1 of the ’963 patent describes generic computer components with data fields and a generic data processor that runs queries over the data fields—a routine conventional activity for a data processor. Jazz’s reliance on older case law also is unavailing. The claims in all these cases were drawn to solving technological computer problems as opposed to using a conventional computer database to handle record-keeping functions. In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980), the Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 10 of 16 PageID: 629 7 claims “were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process, not because they were implemented on a computer.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. In In re Alappat, the claims were directed to an anti-aliasing algorithm for “creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope.” 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). And in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., the “claimed solution [was] necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The ’963 patent is not directed to any such technological improvements to computer hardware or otherwise. There is no technological process, computer algorithm, or computer problem. Instead, the ’963 patent claims are directed to a patent-ineligible business method for controlling inventory on a computer. II. The ’963 Patent Preempts the Abstract Idea of Centralization to Reduce Illicit Distribution of a Prescription Drug. Jazz’s emphasis on the concept of preemption is mistaken. “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098; OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In fact, the word preemption does not appear once in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), or Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cases in which the Federal Circuit invalidated patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101. That said, if Jazz alone can apply, to an ordinary computer, the idea of centralization to reduce illicit distribution of a prescription drug by detecting whether a patient uses cash for Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 11 of 16 PageID: 630 8 purchase of a prescription drug, that would result in clear preemption preventing anyone else from using an ordinary computer to practice this most basic recordkeeping procedure. The Court should not be distracted by Jazz’s argument that other pharmaceutical companies’ risk-management systems can coexist with Jazz’s system. (D.I. 16 at 24, n.7.) There is no basis to conclude that the systems referred to in Jazz’s footnote use a single computer database for centralized distribution to reduce illicit use of a prescription drug, and Jazz provides no explanation to permit such a conclusion.. III. Jazz Conflates Subject Matter Eligibility with Novelty and Non-Obviousness Jazz should get no traction from the fact that, in related U.S. Patent No. 7,668,730 (the ’730 patent), the Patent Office found that processing all prescriptions for a drug in an “exclusive central pharmacy using only the exclusive computer database” was patentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 in view of certain cited prior-art references. (D.I. 16 at 33.) “It is true that ‘the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap.’ But, a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101 inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1304). Here, the stated reasons for allowing the ’730 patent focused on the novelty of those specific claims over the cited prior-art references (35 U.S.C. §§ 102 & 103), not subject-matter eligibility under § 101. In fact, the Patent Office explicitly qualified its allowance by stating “the closest prior art of record does not teach or fairly suggest that all prescriptions for the prescription drug are processed only by the exclusive central pharmacy using only the exclusive computer database.” (D.I. 16, Ex. 11 at 10, emphasis added.) And, similarly, “the closest prior art of record does not teach or fairly suggest that all prescriptions for GHB are processed only by the exclusive central pharmacy using only the exclusive computer database.” (D.I. 16, Ex. 11 at Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 12 of 16 PageID: 631 9 11, emphasis added.) The irrelevance of Jazz’s arguments in this regard is made further apparent because nowhere in the ’963 patent claims is there a mention of an exclusive central pharmacy. Moreover, assuming arguendo that novelty or non-obviousness over the cited prior-art references in the ’730 patent were relevant to eligibility under § 101, a recent ruling in an Inter Partes Review (IPR) overturned the allowance on which Jazz relies by stating “the subject matter of claims 1-11 of the ’730 [patent] would have been obvious” and declaring all claims of the ’730 patent unpatentable. (Final Written Decision, IPR2015-00554, Ex. K1 at 3 and 54.) Also irrelevant to eligibility under § 101 is the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) ruling in IPR for the ’963 patent. (D.I. 16 at 34.) Jazz’s argument overlooks a pretty important fact—that the PTAB does not have jurisdiction regarding patent eligibility under § 101 in an IPR proceeding; it has jurisdiction only under §§ 102 and 103. As the IPR decision itself says, “Petitioner challenges claims 1-28 of the ’963 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” (D.I. 16, Ex. 12 at 2, emphasis added.) Thus, the subject IPR had nothing to do with patent eligibility under § 101. While the related proceedings that Jazz relies on are thus irrelevant, the related proceedings that Roxane relies on are most relevant—and significant because they show that, after Alice, claims like those in the ’963 patent are no longer patent-eligible. As Roxane explained, the file histories in the related continuation applications are properly considered here as they are matters of public record and part of the intrinsic record of the ’963 patent. (D.I. 12 at 26-27.) Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, 1 Unless otherwise stated, the exhibits referenced in this brief are to the declaration of Beth S. Rose in support of defendants’ reply to plaintiff’s memorandum of law in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss all counts of the complaint filed concurrently with this brief. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 13 of 16 PageID: 632 10 Inc., 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (considering the prosecution history of a later-filed application in limiting an earlier issued related patent); Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the prosecution of a continuation application is relevant to the parent application). Jazz must agree that applications in the same patent family are part of the intrinsic record, hence, Jazz’s reliance on the ’730 patent. Simply put, a continuation application is just that, a continuation of a prior application. In this instance, the prior application (the ’963 patent), and the continuation applications share the exact specification of the ’963 patent (with small immaterial differences in the claims). Thus, it is meaningful that the Patent Office rejected the highly similar claims in these continuation applications under § 101 after Alice issued (in contrast to the ’963 patent examined well before Alice issued). Jazz ultimately abandoned each continuation application after each was finally rejected under § 101. Jazz tries to distract the Court by implying that the Patent Office’s post-Alice rejections issued under outdated Patent Office guidelines. (D.I. 16 at 36.) But this argument overlooks that any modifications to Patent Office guidance cannot and do not change the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 101 under Alice and the Federal Circuit cases that followed. Jazz cannot escape the fact that the same type of patent claims that the Patent Office allowed before Alice may no longer be allowed after Alice. IV. The ’963 Patent Is Ripe for Dismissal Jazz does not identify any compelling reason for the Court to delay ruling on the validity of the ’963 patent. The Federal Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that in many cases it is possible and proper to determine patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 14 of 16 PageID: 633 11 OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362; Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1351; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). This is definitely one of those cases, and Jazz’s argument regarding claim construction is nothing more than a red herring. As the Court knows, the ’963 patent is in the same family as the other four distribution patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,668,730, 7,765,106, 7,765,107, and 7,895,059) and all the patents have many duplicative and overlapping claim terms. Of the 26 claim terms originally proposed for construction with respect to the four distribution patents, Jazz argued “No construction necessary” for 25 of the terms, including “database,” “a separate database,” “exclusive,” and “computer system.” (Ex. L, Jazz Pharmaceuticals’ Proposed Claim Constructions at 5-10.) Jazz now focuses on the term “single computer database” but fails to explain how potentially conflicting interpretations of this term would affect the Court’s ability to determine subject matter eligibility or the basic nature of the claimed invention. (D.I. 16 at 38.) Conclusion For the above reasons, and those in Roxane’s previous brief, the Court should dismiss Jazz’s complaint—which asserts infringement of only the ’963 patent claims—in its entirety. Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of November, 2016. s/ Beth S. Rose Beth S. Rose Vincent Lodato SILLS CUMMIS & GROSS P.C. The Legal Center One Riverfront Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07102 (973) 643-7000 Of Counsel: Alan B. Clement LOCKE LORD LLP Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 15 of 16 PageID: 634 12 3 World Financial Center New York, New York 10281 (212) 415-8600 Myoka Kim Goodin Locke Lord LLP 111 South Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 443-0700 Attorneys for Defendants Roxane Laboratories, Inc. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp., Eurohealth (USA), Inc., and Hikma Pharmaceuticals, PLC Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21 Filed 11/23/16 Page 16 of 16 PageID: 635 Beth S. Rose SILLS CUMMIS & GROSS P.C. The Legal Center One Riverfront Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07102 (973) 643-7000 Attorney for Defendants Roxane Laboratories, Inc., West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp., Eurohealth (USA), Inc., and Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. Plaintiff, v. ROXANE LABORATORIES, INC., WEST- WARD PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., EUROHEALTH (USA), INC., and HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS, PLC, Defendants. C.A. No. 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD DECLARATION OF BETH S. ROSE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ALL COUNTS OF THE COMPLAINT I, Beth S. Rose, under penalty of perjury, declare as follows: 1. I am a member of the law firm of Sills Cummis & Gross P.C., attorneys for Defendants in this action. I submit this declaration, based on my personal knowledge, in support of Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss All Counts of the Complaint. If called to testify, I could and would testify competently to the following facts. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 636 2. Attached as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of a Final Written Decision issued in Inter Partes Review No. IPR2015-00554 for U.S. Patent No. 7,668,730, available from the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) website at http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair. 3. Attached as Exhibit L is a true and correct copy of Jazz Pharmaceuticals’ Proposed Claim Constructions, from related Case No. 2:10-cv-06108-ES-JAD, dated September 21, 2011. 4. Attached as Exhibit M for the Court’s convenience is a true and correct copy of Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo Inc., _ F. App’x _, No. 2015-1907, 2016 WL 6775967 (Fed. Cir., November 16, 2016). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: November 23, 2016 s/ Beth S. Rose BETH S. ROSE Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-1 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 637 EXHIBIT K Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 64 PageID: 638 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 64 PageID: 639 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 3 of 64 PageID: 640 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 4 of 64 PageID: 641 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 5 of 64 PageID: 642 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 6 of 64 PageID: 643 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 7 of 64 PageID: 644 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 8 of 64 PageID: 645 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 9 of 64 PageID: 646 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 10 of 64 PageID: 647 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 11 of 64 PageID: 648 Case 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Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 61 of 64 PageID: 698 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 62 of 64 PageID: 699 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 63 of 64 PageID: 700 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-2 Filed 11/23/16 Page 64 of 64 PageID: 701 EXHIBIT L Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 12 PageID: 702 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Plaintiff, v. ROXANE LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant. Civil Action No. 10-6108 (ES)(CLW) Civil Action No. 11-660 (ES)(CLW) Civil Action No. 11-2523 (ES)(CLW) JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS’ PROPOSED CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 12 PageID: 703 - 2 - Pursuant to Local Patent Rule 4.2, Jazz Pharmaceuticals submits that, based on the evidence available to it at this time, the following claim terms from U.S. Patent Nos. 6,472,431 (the “’431 patent”), 6,780,889 (the “’889 patent”), 7,262,219 (the “’219 patent”), 7,851,506 (the “’506 patent”), 7,668,730 (the “’730 patent”), 7,765,106 (the “’106 patent”), 7,765,107 (the “’107 patent”) 7,895,059 (the “’059 patent”) proposed by Jazz Pharmaceuticals and by Roxane should be construed as reflected in the chart below. Jazz Pharmaceuticals reserves the right to supplement or change its proposed constructions based on Roxane’s proposed constructions or based on any additional evidence that it may discover in this action. This is especially true with respect to terms in the ’730, ’106, ’107, and ’059 patents, as Roxane has yet to produce documents evidencing any details of the proposed restricted distribution program for its ANDA Product. To the extent that any of the terms defined below remain in dispute, Jazz Pharmaceuticals reserves the right to support its proposed constructions with expert opinion and/or testimony. To the extent that claim terms are used repeatedly throughout a patent or family of patents, any constructions of such terms carry the same meaning throughout a patent or family of patents unless otherwise set forth below. ’431 PATENT FAMILY Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “resistant to microbial growth” (’431 patent, claim 1; ’889 patent, claim 1; ’219 patent, claims 1, 4) The formulations meet the criteria set by the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Pharmacopoeia for products made with aqueous bases or vehicles. United States Patent No. 6,472,431; File Histories of United States Patent Nos. 6,472,431, 6,780,889, 7,262,219. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 3 of 12 PageID: 704 - 3 - Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “salt” (’431 patent, claims 1- 2) A compound formed by the interaction of an acid and a base. United States Patent No. 6,472,431; File History of United States Patent No. 6,472,431. “adding the gamma- hydroxybutyrate salt to the aqueous medium” (’431 patent, claim 1) Including gamma- hydroxybutyrate in a liquid comprising more than 50% water. United States Patent No. 6,472,431; File History of United States Patent No. 6,472,431; Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.). “adjusting the concentration of the gamma- hydroxybutyrate salt” (’431 patent, claim 1) No construction necessary. “about” (’431 patent, claims 1, 3, 5; ’889 patent, claim 1; ’219 patent, claims 1, 2, 4; ’506 patent claim 1) Reasonably close to. United States Patent No. 6,472,431; File Histories of United States Patent Nos. 6,472,431, 6,780,889, 7,262,219; 7,851,506; Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.). “chemically stable” (’431 patent, claim 1; ’889 patent, claim 1; ’219 patent, claims 1, 4) Resistant to degradation of GHB into its known or unknown decomposition elements. United States Patent No. 6,472,431; File Histories of United States Patent Nos. 6,472,431, 6,780,889, 7,262,219. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 4 of 12 PageID: 705 - 4 - Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “does not contain a preservative”; “free of preservatives” (’431 patent, claim 4; ’889 patent, claim 1; ’219 patent, claims 1, 4) Free of conventional exogenous substances that are added in addition to the gamma- hydroxybutyrate salt to inhibit chemical change or microbial action. United States Patent No. 6,472,431; File Histories of United States Patent Nos. 6,472,431, 6,780,889, 7,262,219. “pH-adjusting agent” (’431 patent, claim 6; ’889 patent, claim 1; ’219 patent, claims 1, 3, 4) No construction necessary. “organic acid” (’431 patent, claim 6) A substance containing one or more carbon atoms that is capable of yielding a proton (hydrogen ion) in aqueous solution, turning blue litmus paper red in aqueous solutions, ionizing in solution to yield the positive ion of the solvent, reacting with bases to form salts, or accepting electrons in an acid-base reaction. United States Patent No. 6,472,431; File History of United States Patent No. 6,472,431; Remington’s Pharmaceutical Sciences (19th ed.); McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (5th ed.) “wherein .. is …” (’219 patent, claims 1, 3, 4) No construction necessary. “dose” (’506 patent, claim 1) No construction necessary. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 5 of 12 PageID: 706 - 5 - ’730 PATENT FAMILY Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “prescription drug” (’730 patent, claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 2, 3; ’059 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16) An FDA approved finished dosage form that may be dispensed only upon a prescription. United States Patent No. 7,668,730; File Histories of United States Patent Nos. 7,668,730, 7,765,106, 7,765,107, 7,895,059; 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2002). “exclusive” (’730 patent, claims 1- 3, 7-11; ’106 patent, claims 1-8; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 1- 2, 6, 7, 9-10, 12-15) No construction necessary. “pharmacy” (’730 patent, claims 1- 3, 7-11; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 2, 4- 5; ’059 patent, claims 1, 2, 6-16) No construction necessary. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 6 of 12 PageID: 707 - 6 - Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “only” (’730 patent, claims 1- 2, 7-11; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 1, 6, 9, 12-14) No construction necessary. “at” (’730 patent, claims 1- 2, 7-11; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 1, 6, 9, 12-14) No construction necessary. “prescription requests” (’730 patent, claims 1- 2, 7-11; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 1, 6, 9, 12-14) No construction necessary. “all” (’730 patent, claims 1, 2, 7-11; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 1, 6, 9, 13-14) No construction necessary. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 7 of 12 PageID: 708 - 7 - Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “database” (’730 patent, claims 1- 3, 7-11; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5-7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 1, 2, 6, 9, 12-14) No construction necessary. “associated” (’730 patent, claims 1- 2; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 7; ’059 patent, claim 1) No construction necessary. “control” (’730 patent, claims 7- 11; ’059 patent, claims 6, 9, 12-14) No construction necessary. “prescriptions . . . are processed”; “processing . . . prescriptions” (’730 patent, claims 1, 2, 7-11; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 1, 6, 9, 12-14) No construction necessary. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 8 of 12 PageID: 709 - 8 - Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “confirming . . . patient” (’730 patent, claims 1, 2, 7-19; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 2, 4, 5; ’059 patent, claims 1, 6, 8-14, 16) No construction necessary. “verifying” (’106 patent, claims 1- 8; ’107 patent claims 1-2, 4-5) No construction necessary. “. . . to . . . patient” (’730 patent, claims 1, 2, 9-10; ’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’059 patent, claims 1, 6, 7, 9-10, 12-15) No construction necessary. “dispensed” (’059 patent, claims 7, 10, 15) No construction necessary. “another pharmacy” (’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4; ’059 patent, claims 7-8, 10- 11, 15-16) No construction necessary. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 9 of 12 PageID: 710 - 9 - Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “therapeutic” (’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7) No construction necessary. “computer system” (’106 patent, claims 1- 5, 7-8) No construction necessary. “prescriptions . . . processed for authorization” (’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7) No construction necessary. “selecting . . . multiple controls”; “places controls” (‘106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 2, 4-5; ’059 patent, claims 8, 11, 16) No construction necessary. “controls selected from the group consisting of” (’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’059 patent, claims 8, 11, 16) No construction necessary. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 10 of 12 PageID: 711 - 10 - Term (Patent Claims) Proposed Definition Support/Evidence “shipping”; “shipment” (’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent, claims 1, 4) No construction necessary. “maintains” (’107 patent, claims 1, 4) No construction necessary. “the controls comprising” (’107 patent, claim 1, 4) No construction necessary. “a separate database” (’107 patent, claims 3, 6) No construction necessary. “making the database available to the DEA for checking . . . for cash payments and for inappropriate questions” (’106 patent, claims 1, 3, 5, 7; ’107 patent claims 1, 4) No construction necessary. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 11 of 12 PageID: 712 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-3 Filed 11/23/16 Page 12 of 12 PageID: 713 EXHIBIT M Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-4 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 5 PageID: 714 Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2016) © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 2016 WL 6775967 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. This case was not selected for publication in West's Federal Reporter. See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also U.S.Ct. of App. Fed. Cir. Rule 32.1. United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. Tranxition, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Micro Focus Software, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants–Appellees 2015–1907, 2015–1941, 2015–1958 | Decided: November 16, 2016 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon in Nos. 3:12–cv–01065–HZ, 3:12–cv– 01404–HZ, Judge Marco A. Hernandez. Attorneys and Law Firms ARTHUR STEVEN BEEMAN, Arent Fox LLP, San Francisco, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JOEL MUCHMORE; DAYNA JEAN CHRISTIAN, Immix Law Group PC, Portland, OR. TODD ERIC LANDIS, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Dallas, TX, argued for all defendants-appellees. Lenovo (United States) Inc. also represented by ERIC JOSEPH KLEIN; FRED WILLIAMS, Austin, TX. STERLING A. BRENNAN, Maschoff Brennan Laycock Gilmore Israelsen & Wright, Irvine, CA, for defendant- appellee Micro Focus Software, Inc. Also represented by LANNIE REX SEARS, Salt Lake City, UT. Before Prost, Chief Judge, Reyna and Chen, Circuit Judges. Opinion Prost, Chief Judge. *1 Tranxition, Inc. (“Tranxition”) appeals from a final decision of the United States Court for the District of Oregon finding that all claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,728,877 (“ '877 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 7,346,766 (“ '766 patent”) are invalid because they are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. BACKGROUND The '877 patent and the '766 patent, which is a continuation from the '877 patent, concern computer system upgrades. Typically, a person's computer system contains many individualized settings, such as email addresses, desktop settings, and stored passwords. '877 patent col. 1 ll. 36–47. When a computer is replaced, those settings do not appear on the new computer by default. See id. at cols. 48–50. In order for a replacement computer to behave like its predecessor, consumers must manually “migrate” the settings on the old computer to the new computer, which is a time-consuming process, resulting in user frustration and lost productivity. Id. at col. 2 ll. 6– 38. The '877 patent and the '766 patent propose to solve these problems by “automatic [ally] transitioning” these settings between computers. Id. at col. 1 ll. 19–21. This would provide an advantage over the prior art because “[i]t is ... desirable to provide an automatic migration of configuration settings from an old computing system to a new computing system without using a time consuming manual migration process.” Id. at col. 2 ll. 41–44. On June 15, 2012, Tranxition filed a complaint against Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo”), asserting claims of both the '877 patent and the '766 patent. Shortly thereafter, Tranxition also asserted the patents against Novell, Inc. now known as Micro Focus Software, Inc. (“Micro Focus”) in a separate action. Lenovo subsequently moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that all the patented claims were invalid because they were targeted to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court agreed with Lenovo. First, it determined that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of “migrating” a user's configuration settings from one computer to another computer. J.A. 11. The district court then found that none of the claims contain an inventive Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-4 Filed 11/23/16 Page 2 of 5 PageID: 715 Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2016) © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 concept sufficient to render the claims patent-eligible. Consequently, the district court granted Lenovo's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in its favor. After the summary judgment order became final, Micro Focus moved for judgment on the pleadings based on the summary judgment order. Finding that the order had preclusive effect over Tranxition, the court granted Micro Focus's motion and entered judgment in its favor. Tranxition now appeals both orders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). DISCUSSION I We review the grant of summary judgment under the same standard as the regional circuit, here the Ninth Circuit. See Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). Whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter is a question of law, which we also review de novo. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 2015–1769, 2016 WL 5539870, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2016). *2 Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” However, § 101 contains an implicit exception—“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine whether a claim is patent-eligible, the Supreme Court has laid out a two-step framework. “First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014); see McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., No. 2015– 1080, 2016 WL 4896481, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2016). Second, if the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, we must determine if they contain an “inventive concept” “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). II We consider claim 1 of the '877 patent representative of all claims for purposes of our analysis. Claim 1 of the '877 patent reads: 1. A method in a computer system for preparing configuration settings for transfer from a source computing system to a target computing system, the method comprising: providing configuration information about configuration settings on the source computing system, the configuration information including a name and location of each configuration setting; generating an extraction plan that identifies configuration settings to be extracted from the source computing system, the generating including providing a list of configuration settings known to the source computing system and including identifying active configuration settings out of the provided list of configuration settings to be extracted from the source computing system; extracting the active configuration settings of the extraction plan from the source computing system, the extracted configuration settings being located using the provided configuration information; generating a transition plan that identifies configuration settings to be transferred from the source computing system to the target computing system, the generating including providing active configuration settings of the extraction plan and including identifying from the active configuration settings of the extraction plan active configuration settings to be transferred from the source computing system to the target computing; and for each active configuration setting of the transition plan, Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-4 Filed 11/23/16 Page 3 of 5 PageID: 716 Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2016) © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 retrieving the extracted configuration settings identified as active configuration settings of the transition plan; and transitioning one or more of the retrieved configuration settings from a format used on the source computing system to a format used on the target computing system. '877 patent col. 17 ll. 28–62. Under step one of Alice, we must first determine whether a claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims solely implemented on a computer, we have previously found it “relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea.” Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). *3 Here, it is undisputed that manual migration is an abstract idea. However, Tranxition argues that the district court erred when it determined that the claim is directed to the abstract idea of “migration” of computer settings. According to Tranxition, the claim is directed to “transitioning” settings from one computer to another, which is a specific software-based solution to a computer- based problem and “exceeds the abstract concept of migration.” Appellant's Br. 36–37. This argument is unconvincing. According to the specification, the patent is directed to solving problems arising out “migration,” which was performed manually. '877 patent col. 2 ll. 6–38. To solve these problems, the patent proposes “automatic transitioning of configuration settings” as a solution, and explains “[i]t is ... desirable to provide an automatic migration of configuration settings from an old computing system to a new computing system.” Id. at col. 1 ll. 19–20, col. 2 ll. 41–43 (emphasis added). Put another way, the stated aim of the patent is to automate the migration of data between two computers. This is not sufficient under step one of Alice. Contrary to Tranxition's argument, the claim is not directed to an improvement to computer functionality. There is nothing in the claim to suggest that, once settings have been transitioned, the target computer will be any more efficient. Cf. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1338. The claim merely “transitions” data from one computer to another and thus automate the migration process. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 258 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Therefore, the claim is directed to the abstract idea of migration, or transitioning, of settings. Having determined that the claim is directed to an abstract idea, we must next determine whether it contains “an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. We hold that it does not. Tranxition argues that the claims contain an inventive concept because a manual process would not necessarily capture all the configuration settings in a computer and that there is no record evidence showing that the automated transition process operates in the same way as a manual process. These arguments miss the mark. Though a computer could potentially have dozens, if not hundreds of settings across numerous applications, the claim language only requires one or more configuration settings. It does not provide a maximum number of settings. Further, it is not relevant that a human may perform a task differently from a computer. It is necessarily true that a human might apply an abstract idea in a different manner from a computer. What matters is the application. “Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ ” will not render an abstract idea non-abstract. See id. at 2359. There must be more. Here, the claim instructs a practitioner to (1) provide configuration information, (2) generate an extraction plan, (3) extract the configuration settings, (4) generate a transition plan, and (5) transition those settings to a new computer. These steps, both individually, and as an ordered combination, do not disclose an inventive concept. They merely describe a generic computer implementation, using “routine, conventional activities,” of the abstract idea, “which is insufficient to transform the patent-ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014). *4 Because they are directed to an abstract idea, and there is no inventive concept present, the claims of the '877 patent and the '766 patent are drawn to patent-ineligible subject matter and are therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 1 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-4 Filed 11/23/16 Page 4 of 5 PageID: 717 Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo (United States) Inc., --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2016) © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's conclusion that all of the claims of the '877 patent and the '766 patent are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and are therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. AFFIRMED All Citations --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2016 WL 6775967 Footnotes 1 Tranxition also argues that the district court erred in holding that the presumption of validity does not apply to challenges brought under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and failed to apply the clear and convincing evidentiary standard. In holding that the presumption of validity does not apply to challenges under § 101, the district court relied on a concurring opinion. See J.A. 8 (citing Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 720) (Mayer, J., concurring). We are not persuaded that the district court was correct that a presumption of validity does not apply. We also do not address the proper evidentiary standard in this case as there do not appear to be any material facts in dispute. Moreover, under any applicable evidentiary standard, and regardless of the appropriate burden, the district court did not err in holding that the claims are patent-ineligible under § 101. End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-4 Filed 11/23/16 Page 5 of 5 PageID: 718 Case 2:16-cv-04971-ES-JAD Document 21-5 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 719