Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. Sharp Corporation et al

REPLY

N.D. Ill.October 9, 2014

SMRH:433228958 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION INTELLECT WIRELESS, INC., Plaintiff, v. SHARP CORPORATION, SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, PALM, INC., DELL INC., AND GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) The Hon. Rebecca R. Pallmeyer Civil Action No. 10 C 6763 DEFENDANTS HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY AND PALM, INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF FEE AND EXPENSE MOTION Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 1 of 22 PageID #:7218 SMRH:433228958 -i- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 II. IW INAPPROPRIATELY RAISES NEW, UNEXPLAINED, AND DUPLICATIVE OBJECTIONS .......................................................................................................................... 2 A. IW Failed to Comply With Local Rule 54.3 ................................................................ 2 B. IW Has Not Cured Its Duplicative Objections ............................................................. 3 C. IW’s Objection to HP’s Costs is Vague and Unsupportable ........................................ 3 III. IW’S SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS DO NOT SUPPORT ITS REQUEST TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF FEES AND COSTS REQUESTED BY HP ........................................... 4 A. HP’s Counsel Did Not Engage In Block Billing, But Block Billing Is Permitted and HP’s Time Entries Are Descriptive of the Tasks Performed ................ 4 B. HP’s Develop Its Invalidity Positions Was Reasonable ............................................... 6 C. IW Admits That Joint Defense Work is Compensable ................................................ 7 D. HP’s Analysis of Henderson’s Non-Confidential Deposition from Other Litigation as Part of Its Defense to This Litigation Was Reasonable .......................... 7 E. HP’s Evaluation of All of Its Litigation Options Was Reasonable .............................. 8 F. HP’s Early Case Assessment Was Necessary and Tailored to Inform HP of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case ................................................................... 8 G. HP’s Summary Judgment Briefing Was Reasonable and Successful .......................... 9 H. Local Counsel Fees Are Compensable ......................................................................... 9 I. Work IW Describes as “Administrative” Was Necessary.......................................... 10 J. HP’s Work from the Period the Case Was Stayed Through 2014 Was Reasonable and Necessary ......................................................................................... 11 K. HP’s Time Entries Are Descriptive and IW Takes Them Out of Context ................. 12 L. HP’s Fees Are Related to This Lawsuit ..................................................................... 13 M. HP’s Hourly Rates Are Reasonable and Intellect Did Not Timely Object to the Rates ..................................................................................................................... 13 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 2 of 22 PageID #:7219 SMRH:433228958 -ii- IV. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 15 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 3 of 22 PageID #:7220 SMRH:433228958 -iii- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Berberena v. Coler 753 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1985) ................................................................................................... 12 Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp. 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................. 6 Crispin v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, Dist. 299 No. 09-CV-3993, 2010 WL 3701328 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2010) ............................................ 11 Cuff v. Trans States Holdings, Inc. No. 10 C 1349, 2013 WL 140607 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2013) .................................................. 4, 9 Duran v. Town of Cicero No. 01 C 6858, 2012 WL 1279903 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2012) ............................................... 4, 5 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc. 264 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D. Ind. 2003) ................................................................................... 6, 8 Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chicago 433 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................................... 9 Firestine v. Parkview Health Sys., Inc. 374 F. Supp. 2d 658 (N.D. Ind. 2005) ..................................................................................... 11 Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc. 42 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1994) ............................................................................................... 4, 10 Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc. 888 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................... 6 Johnson v. GDF, Inc. 668 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 14 Lane v. Piper Jaffray Cos. No. 01-C-925, 2005 WL 1229388 (E.D. Wis. May 24, 2005) .......................................... 10, 11 Mathis v. Spears 857 F.2d 749 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ............................................................................................... 6, 8 Mostly Memories Inc. v. For Your Ease Only, Inc. 594 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ........................................................................................ 5 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 4 of 22 PageID #:7221 SMRH:433228958 -iv- Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp. 477 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................... 14 Nilssen v. Gen. Elec. Co. No. 06 C 04155, 2011 WL 633414, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13615 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2011) .................................................................................................................................... 6, 12 Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc. 776 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................... 4, 10 People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205 90 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................... 14 Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr. 664 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................... 14 Riggins v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. 406 Fed. Appx. 479 ................................................................................................................. 11 Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 175 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................... 11 In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig. 264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................................... 5 Other Authorities Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ............................................................................................. 6, 7 Local Rule 54.3 ......................................................................................................... 1, 2, 12, 13, 14 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 5 of 22 PageID #:7222 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 6 of 22 PageID #:7223 SMRH:433228958 -2- II. IW INAPPROPRIATELY RAISES NEW, UNEXPLAINED, AND DUPLICATIVE OBJECTIONS A. IW Failed to Comply With Local Rule 54.3 First, IW objects that HP failed to comply with LR 54.3 by failing to initially provide detailed invoices to IW. HP has consistently complied with LR 54.3 and provided all relevant information to IW, even when not specifically requested by IW pursuant to the Local Rule. Namely, LR 54.3 requires that “the parties shall, upon request, provide the following information to each other,” e.g., time and work records. HP initially provided IW with a summary of the total hours and amounts each attorney and other person billed in this litigation, including amounts for HP’s expenses. Rather than requesting any additional information, three weeks later IW provided vague objections alleging that HP had not provided IW with enough detailed information to support its fee request. (Ex. 7.) To alleviate IW’s objections, HP treated IW’s objections as a request for more information under the Local Rules. The next business day, HP provided detailed invoices supporting all of its fees and expenses. (Ex. 8.) Thus, HP fully complied with LR 54.3 and provided detailed invoices once they were requested. Second, IW failed to comply with LR 54.3 by refusing to identify all of its objections to HP’s request for fees and expenses in the Joint Statement: “the respondent shall include a similar table giving respondent’s position as to the name, compensable hours, appropriate rates, and totals for each biller listed by movant.” LR 54.3(e)(2). It is undisputed that IW never provided HP with this information. Instead, IW only identified overlapping categories of objections without any indication of the fees for each biller that were not objectionable. (Ex. 1.) Finally, the parties are limited in their briefs to only issues actually raised in the Joint Statement. LR 54.3(f) (“the motion and any supporting or opposing memoranda shall limit their argument and supporting evidentiary matter to disputed issues.”) However, IW raises issues Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 7 of 22 PageID #:7224 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 8 of 22 PageID #:7225 SMRH:433228958 -4- general and conclusory objection. See Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1048 (7th Cir. 1994) (party challenging fees request has a “responsibility to state objections with particularity and clarity”); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 664 (7th Cir. 1985). III. IW’S SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS DO NOT SUPPORT ITS REQUEST TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF FEES AND COSTS REQUESTED BY HP A. HP’s Counsel Did Not Engage In Block Billing, But Block Billing Is Permitted and HP’s Time Entries Are Descriptive of the Tasks Performed IW acknowledges that block billing is not prohibited and that HP’s billing entries cannot be objected to unless they are so vague as to prevent the Court from determining whether they were billed for work on this case. (Dkt. 207 at 4.) In fact, the legal authority IW relies upon allowed block billing and rejected objections to multiple activities in a single entry. Duran v. Town of Cicero, No. 01 C 6858, 2012 WL 1279903, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2012) (reasoning that time spent was reasonable, even if the court could not determine how much time was spent on each task). Further, IW engaged in similar billing practices, such that it would be hypocritical to allow IW to object to HP’s billing. Cuff v. Trans States Holdings, Inc., 10 C 1349, 2013 WL 140607, *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2013), aff’d, 13-1241, 2014 WL 4653010 (7th Cir. Sept. 19, 2014). Moreover, the legal authority IW cites supports HP’s position that the Court should not reduce fees for alleged block billing. For example, Duran stated that a court should reduce fees only when it is “impossible” to determine what was done, whether it was reasonable, and whether the time spent was reasonable. Duran, 2012 WL 1279903, at *4-5. Further, in Duran, the court granted the requesting party the full amount of requested fees for numerous entries that were allegedly block billed, including 6.4 hours for “Telephone call to Lopez, Joseph R.; telephone call to De Leon, John R.; telephone call from De Leon, John R.; meet with clients” and 8 hours for “Review documents and notes and begin drafting Complaint; teleconference calls w/ Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 9 of 22 PageID #:7226 SMRH:433228958 -5- Lopez and De Leon; complete draft of correspondence.” Duran, 2012 WL 1279903, at *4-5. HP has provided far greater detail in its allegedly block billed entries and the Court should not reduce HP’s fees for block billing. IW also argues that HP’s billing requirements are irrelevant to determining whether entries are block billed. HP has detailed billing guidelines that set forth how HP’s counsel are required to bill for time spent working on this case. Rather than block billing, HP’s counsel categorized billing entries using task codes, such as “Post-Trial Motions and Submissions” for post-trial attorneys’ fees briefing. Each of HP’s billing entries falls into one of these categories, which HP’s invoices clearly indicate. (See Ex. 3.) HP accepted these bills, which the Seventh Circuit endorses as evidence of sufficient detail. In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2001); Mostly Memories Inc. v. For Your Ease Only, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 931, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Finally, rather than specifically identifying all of the allegedly objectionable “block billed” entries, IW offers the Court only three examples that IW identifies as the most “egregious.” (Dkt. 207 at 4.) In example #1, Bader describes in detail his work on an “early case assessment” memorandum with specific references to each of the issues within that memorandum that he addressed. (Bader Decl. at ¶ 1.) The billing entry describes work on a single document. (Id.) In example #2, Bader describes in nearly 100 words (not including redactions) his early work on the case. This billing entry is incredibly detailed and demonstrably related to the case. In example #3, S. Korniczky describes work on three different documents in this case: a protective order, a discovery order, and an ESI stipulation. There is nothing vague or confusing about any of these descriptions and IW does not explain why the work performed in any of these entries would not be compensable. Finally, as is the case for most hours objected to Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 10 of 22 PageID #:7227 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 11 of 22 PageID #:7228 SMRH:433228958 -7- the patents-in-suit. Moreover, HP could not know which of its defenses the Court would ultimately find persuasive—or which defenses necessarily would sustain an appellate challenge. However, IW would have the Court apply hindsight to HP’s management of the case, rather than evaluating the necessity of work at the time it was done. The Court should not apply such an approach in this case and should award HP its fees for work on all its defenses. C. IW Admits That Joint Defense Work is Compensable Perhaps now conceding that HP’s work on joint motions actually reduced fees, IW recasts its objection to supposedly eliminate work done on joint projects. (Dkt. 207 at 7.) As with its other objections, IW fails to identify which time entries are in dispute and only provides three “examples” of the allegedly most egregious entries. (Id.) In examples #1 and 3 provided by IW, S. Korniczky describes conversations with co-defendants regarding motions to dismiss and his review and follow up comments on Dell’s May 2014 motion to compel documents. This work directly benefited all Defendants by eliminating claims from the case and obtaining materials implicating Niro’s knowledge of and role in IW’s misconduct. (See Dkt. 207 Ex. 1.) Likewise, in example #2, Buccigross analyzed and provided input on a draft non-infringement motion, which Dell and HP jointly filed. (See Dkt. 123.) Once again, even IW’s best examples show that HP’s work was reasonable, directed to this case, and should be compensable. D. HP’s Analysis of Henderson’s Non-Confidential Deposition from Other Litigation as Part of Its Defense to This Litigation Was Reasonable Henderson is the inventor of the patents-in-suit, the CEO of IW, and the person who lied to the patent office in order to obtain the patents-in-suit. Although not from this case, Henderson’s prior depositions are not entirely confidential and HP’s outside counsel obtained a copy of the deposition. (Ex. 9.) As is evidenced by the billing entries themselves, HP’s attorneys analyzed the deposition for HP and discussed the deposition with co-defendants in Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 12 of 22 PageID #:7229 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 13 of 22 PageID #:7230 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 14 of 22 PageID #:7231 SMRH:433228958 -10- HP utilized local counsel P. Korniczky at Leydig as part of its core litigation team and, as with all of HP’s fees requests, HP actually paid Leydig’s invoices in question. “The presence of local counsel can be of assistance to out-of-town counsel. For example, local counsel can acquaint out-of-town counsel with the known (but not formally announced) practices of various judges and court personnel.” Lane v. Piper Jaffray Cos., No. 01-C-925, 2005 WL 1229388, at *8 (E.D. Wis. May 24, 2005). In Lane, which IW cited, the court allowed fees for local counsel and only disallowed fees for local counsel unnecessarily attending trial without participating. Id. Here, IW does not dispute P. Korniczky’s trial participation, but argues that P. Korniczky’s work on motions was duplicative of unidentified other billing entries. Not only should such general objections be dismissed (see Hutchison, 42 F.3d at 1048 (party challenging fees request has a “responsibility to state objections with particularity and clarity”); Ohio-Sealy, 776 F.2d at 664), a simple reading of the objected to time entries disproves IW’s position. P. Korniczky prepared for and argued HP’s motion to dismiss IW’s complaint, worked on summary judgment issues, and worked on briefing for HP’s successful motion for fees against IW. (Ex. 2 at 16-17.) All of his work enhanced HP’s motions rather than duplicated efforts, including when he took the lead on oral argument. As such, P. Korniczky played a vital role in this litigation and did not duplicate the efforts of others, meaning the Court should award HP its reasonable fees for his work. I. Work IW Describes as “Administrative” Was Necessary HP is not seeking fees for administrative work, but for work that was necessary to the case, including communicating to the client about the status of the litigation and upcoming events. Each reconciliation report, status update, or monthly estimate about which IW complains is a communication between HP’s outside and inside counsel about the current progress of the case and upcoming events. The fact that these communications were delivered through a Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 15 of 22 PageID #:7232 SMRH:433228958 -11- specific software program other than email or by phone does not make them administrative. Finally, this is not a case, like those IW cited, in which HP knew it would automatically receive its attorneys’ fees if it prevailed and had no reason to scrutinize invoices. See Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999) (FLSA case requiring fees to a prevailing plaintiff); Firestine v. Parkview Health Sys., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 658, 661-62 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (Title VII Civil Rights case requiring same); Lane, 2005 WL 1229388, at *1 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e case allowing fees to a prevailing plaintiff). Nor is it a case in which the fees requested greatly exceeds the damages request in the case. See Spegon, 175 F.3d at 548 (noting attorneys’ fees seven times the amount of damages). Rather, HP incurred and paid these fees in defense of IW’s frivolous action with no expectation that HP would ever be repaid. HP’s work on this case was not administrative and the Court should award HP its full fees. J. HP’s Work from the Period the Case Was Stayed Through 2014 Was Reasonable and Necessary HP performed reasonable and necessary work during the stay, including attending Court status conferences, briefing the Court on developments in the HTC litigation, briefing its motion to reconsider the Court’s original Order dismissing the case (which the Court modified after briefing), and briefing the motion to declare the case exceptional and award fees (which the Court granted). (Dkts. 142, 144-145, 148-151, 154-157, 159.) IW spent time on many of these same activities. (Ex. 4 at 23-24.) IW now argues that it was unnecessary and unreasonable to do any work during the period of the stay without any explanation for why the work itself was inappropriate. According to IW’s theory, HP should not have even prepared for and attended the Court Ordered status conference during the stay. Notably, IW’s legal authority does not support the proposition that parties should not do work during a stay. See Riggins v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 406 Fed. Appx. 479, 481 (not discussing a stay at all); Crispin v. Bd. of Educ. of Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 16 of 22 PageID #:7233 SMRH:433228958 -12- the City of Chicago, Dist. 299, No. 09-CV-3993, 2010 WL 3701328, *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2010) (same). Moreover, courts in this District have granted fees in similar situations, where a party incurs fees after the court issues a stay. Nilssen v. Gen. Elec. Co, No. 06 C 04155, 2011 WL 633414, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13615, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2011). Thus, because HP’s work was reasonable and related to important activities in this case, the Court should award HP all of its fees for work done during the stay. K. HP’s Time Entries Are Descriptive and IW Takes Them Out of Context HP’s billing entries adequately describe the activities HP’s attorneys performed throughout the case, especially when placed in the context of other billing entries. See Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 1985). As previously described, HP’s attorneys used task codes to describe each billing entry. (See Section III.A.) These descriptive categories appear throughout HP’s invoices and add context to the individual billing entries. Using one of IW’s objections as an example, the Bader 1/25/2011 entry is categorized under the “Settlement” category in HP’s billing. While this entry was redacted to remove an attorney-client communication, it is clear from the billing code that the discussion was related generally to settlement. Yet, IW takes this entry entirely out of context by failing to analyze it in the context of the ongoing settlement discussions between the parties. (Compare Ex. 2 at 33 with Dkt. 202, Ex. 3, Invoice 222843442 at p. 8.) Similarly, IW takes the redacted time entry that it uses as example #1 out of the context of the “Joint Defense” billing code under HP’s billing requirements. (Compare Dkt. 207 Ex. 1 at 3 with Dkt. 202, Ex. 3, Invoice 222898593 at p. 12.) LR 54.3(d)(1) specifically allows redaction of information that the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine protects. These privileges protect communications between attorneys and clients, experts, or members of a joint defense group. Such redactions do not provide a valid basis for objection. Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 17 of 22 PageID #:7234 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 18 of 22 PageID #:7235 SMRH:433228958 -14- IW’s untimely objection to HP’s billing rates is an affront to LR 54.3 and an ambush on HP’s reasonable request for attorneys’ fees. LR 54.3(f) requires a fee motion to be limited to the disputed issues raised in the Joint Statement: FEE MOTION. The movant shall attach the joint statement to the fee motion. Unless otherwise allowed by the court, the motion and any supporting or opposing memoranda shall limit their argument and supporting evidentiary matter to disputed issues. The Joint Statement does not contain any objection to the hourly rates for HP’s attorneys. (See Ex. 1.) Neither does the Joint Statement contain information on IW’s proposed rates for each of HP’s attorneys, as LR 54.3(e)(2) requires: … the respondent shall include a similar table giving respondent’s position as to the name, compensable hours, appropriate rates, and totals for each biller listed by movant. As such, the Court should reject IW’s belated objection. If the Court considers the hourly rate objection, “[t]he best evidence of an attorney’s market rate is his or her actual billing rate for similar work.” Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2012). This rate is “presumptively appropriate to use as the market rate.” People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule is “well established.” Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 477 F.3d 899, 909 (7th Cir. 2007). Once the fee applicant establishes that the requested rate is reasonable, “the burden shifts to the other party to offer evidence that sets forth a good reason why a lower rate is essential.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the rates HP seeks are the actual billing rates for HP’s attorneys, making them presumptively the market rate. In addition, the hourly rates for HP’s attorneys are in line with the rates other defendants paid for attorneys in this case. (See Dkt. 194 at Ex. 5 (showing Dell’s rates).) Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 19 of 22 PageID #:7236 Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 20 of 22 PageID #:7237 SMRH:433228958 -16- Dated: October 9, 2014 Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Martin R. Bader Stephen S. Korniczky Martin R. Bader Gray M. Buccigross Matthew M. Mueller SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 12275 El Camino Real, Suite 200 San Diego, CA 92130 Tel: (858) 720-8900 Fax: (858) 509-3691 skorniczky@sheppardmullin.com mbader@sheppardmullin.com gbuccigross@sheppardmullin.com mmueller@sheppardmullin.com Paul J. Korniczky LEYDIG, VOIT & MAYER, LTD. Two Prudential Plaza, Suite 4900 180 N. Stetson Avenue Chicago, IL 60601-6731 Tel: (312) 616-5600 Fax: (312) 616-5700 pkorniczky@leydig.com Attorneys for Defendants HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY and PALM, INC. Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 21 of 22 PageID #:7238 SMRH:433228958 -17- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served through the Court’s ECF filing system on the following: Raymond P. Niro Paul K. Vickrey David J. Mahalek NIRO, HALLER & NIRO, LTD. 181 West Madison Street, Suite 4600 Chicago, IL 60602 Attorneys for Plaintiff INTELLECT WIRELESS, INC. Date: October 9, 2014 /s/ Martin R. Bader Case: 1:10-cv-06763 Document #: 218 Filed: 10/09/14 Page 22 of 22 PageID #:7239