IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IN RE THE COMPLAINT AND
PETITION OF TRITON ASSET LEASING
GmbH, TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS LLC,
TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE
DEEPWATER DRILLING INC., AND
TRANSOCEAN DEEPWATER INC., AS
OWNER, MANAGING OWNERS,
OWNERS PRO-HAC VICE, AND/OR
OPERATORS OF THE MODU
DEEPWATER HORIZON, IN A CAUSE
FOR EXONERATION FROM OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
)
)
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Civil No. 10-CV-1721 KPE
IN ADMIRALTY
MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, APPEARING
SPECIALLY AND NOT GENERALLY, IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSED
MOTION TO LIFT OR MODIFY THE COURT’S AMENDED MONITION
AS TO CERTAIN CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTION
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 1 of 32
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................................... 4
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 5
I. CLAIMS UNDER OPA ARE NOT COGNIZABLE UNDER
THE LIMITATION ACT ........................................................................... 5
II. OPA CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONCURSUS UNDER
EITHER THE LIMITATION ACT OR RULE F ....................................... 8
A. OPA Preempts Limitation Act Concursus Because Its Statutory
Provisions Are Inherently Inconsistent in Their Purpose And
Application with the Limitation Act and Rule F ............................. 9
B. Application Of Concursus to OPA Claims Would Debilitate the
United States’ Subrogation Rights ................................................ 10
C. Rules of Statutory Construction Prescribe That OPA Amends
Rule F ............................................................................................ 12
D. Claims of State Governments Are Not Subject to the
Limitation Act ................................................................................ 14
III. THE LIMITATION ACT AND RULE F DO NOT APPLY TO OTHER
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR RESPONSE COSTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS RESULTING FROM THE SPILL ........ 15
A. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Civil Penalty Claims Under
The Clean Water Act and Other Statutes ....................................... 17
B. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable
Under the RHA .............................................................................. 19
C. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable
Under the PSRPA .......................................................................... 20
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 2 of 32
ii
D. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable
Under the NMSA ........................................................................... 21
E. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable
Under CERCLA ............................................................................ 22
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................................................................................... 24
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iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Bouchard Transportation, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, State of Florida,
United States, et al. ("Bouchard"),
147 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1140, and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1171 (1999) ........... 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15
In re Southern Scrap Material Company, LLC, in a Cause of Exoneration from, or
Limitation of Liability,
541 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2008) .............................................................. 3, 7, 13, 16, 19, 21
In re Alex C Corp. (Seaboats, Inc. v. Alex C Corp., et al.),
2003 A.M.C. 256 (D. Mass. 2003) ................................................................................. 7
In re Jahre Spray II K/S,
1997 A.M.C. 845 (D. N.J. 1996) ................................................................................... 7
In re Glacier Bay,
944 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991) ........................................................................................ 16
Hines, Inc. v. United States,
551 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977) .................................................................. 3, 12, 14, 18, 19
In re Hokkaido Fisheries Co.,
506 F. Supp. 631 (D. Alaska 1981) ................................................................................ 6
Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn,
354 U.S. 147, 77 S. Ct. 1269, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1246 (1957) .................................................. 9
In re Lloyd's Leasing, Ltd.,
764 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1990) ............................................................................... 6
In re Metlife Capital Corp. (M/V Emily S) ("Metlife"),
132 F.3d 818 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied,
524 U.S. 952 (1998) .................................................................................. 2, 7, 10, 12, 13
Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp.,
132 F.3d 818 (1st Cir.1997) .......................................................................................... 16
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 4 of 32
iv
In re Oswego Barge Corp.,
664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981) ............................................................................................ 7
The Snug Harbor,
53 F.2d at 411 ............................................................................................................... 19
Transporter Marine,
217 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................... 3, 16
Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States,
273 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2001) ................................................................ 2, 12, 16, 20, 21
United States v. Amoco Oil Co.,
580 F. Supp. 1042 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ............................................................................ 18
United States v. CF Industries, Inc.,
542 F. Supp. 952 (D. Minn. 1982) ...................................................................... 3, 16, 17
United States v. COSCO BUSAN, et al.,
557 F. Supp. 2d 1058 .................................................................................................... 10
United States v. Fisher,
977 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Fla. 1997) .............................................................................. 21
United States v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co.,
259 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 955 (2002) .............................. 21
United States v. M/V Jacqueline L.,
100 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................... 21
United States v. M/V Miss Beholden,
856 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ................................................................................ 21
United States v. Ohio Valley Co.,
510 F.3d 1184 (7th Cir. 1975) ...................................................................................... 18
University of Tex. Medical Branch at Galveston v. United States,
557 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1977) .................................................................................. 16, 19
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 5 of 32
v
FEDERAL STATUTES
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships ("APPS"),
33 U.S.C. §1908 ............................................................................................................ 19
Clean Air Act ("CAA"),
42 U.S.C. §7413(b) ....................................................................................................... 19
Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. ............................................................................... 5, 17, 18, 19
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),
42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq. ........................................................................................... 3, 22
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 101-410, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 ............................................................................... 19
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"),
16 U.S.C. § 1540 (a) ..................................................................................................... 19
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (the "Limitation Act"),
46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et seq. ................................................................................ 1, passim
Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"),
16 U.S.C. § 1375(a)(1) .................................................................................................. 19
National Marine Sanctuaries Act (“NMSA”),
16 U.S.C. § 1431 et seq. ...................................................................................... 3, 19, 21
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"),
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq. .................................................................................. 2, passim
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"),
43 U.S.C. § 1430(b) ...................................................................................................... 19
Ports and Waterways Safety Act ("PWSA"),
33 U.S.C. § 1236 ........................................................................................................... 19
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6978 (civil penalties) ..................................................................... 19
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Rivers and Harbors Act ("RHA"),
33 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. ..................................................................................... 3, 12, 13
Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. ................................................................................................... 15
The National Marine Sanctuaries Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1431, et seq. ............................................................................................... 21
The Park System Resource Protection Act ("PSRPA"),
16 U.S.C. §§ 19jj, et seq. .............................................................................................. 20
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1651, et seq. ............................................................................................. 16
MISCELLANEOUS
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 2 (2d ed. 1994) .......................... 8
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-410 ............................................................................................................. 19
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 103 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781 .......................................................................................... 8
S.Rep. No. 101-94, at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 736 ............................... 8
S. Rep. No. 101-94, at 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 728 ...................... 10
S. Rep. No. 101-94, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 736 .......................................... 14
Senate Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res.,
S. Rep. No. 328, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 ...................................................................... 20
Senate Rep. No. 101-94, 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 726, 732-33 ....................................................................................................... 6
1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 603 (1990) ...................................................... 20
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 7 of 32
1 Solely for the purposes of this motion, the United States shall assume arguendo, and without
prejudice, that each of the Petitioners falls within the class of entities that could in the first instance
seek exoneration or limitation for claims that properly would be within the scope of the Limitation
Act.
1
MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, APPEARING
SPECIALLY AND NOT GENERALLY, IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSED
MOTION TO LIFT OR MODIFY THE COURT’S AMENDED MONITION
AS TO CERTAIN CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTION
INTRODUCTION
Petitioners are various entities, one foreign, three domestic, associated with the
ownership and operation of the MODU Deepwater Horizon. For ease of reference, we shall
collectively refer to the Petitioners with the single moniker, “Transocean.” On May 13th,
Transocean filed this action under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (the “Limitation
Act”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et seq., and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Cases (“Rule F”). Stated simply, Transocean seeks to absolve
(“exonerate”) itself from liability concerning the Deepwater Horizon explosion, fire, and oil
spill, or, alternatively, limit its liability to approximately $27 million. This it cannot do.1
The same day as its filing, and without notice to the United States, Transocean asked
the Court to issue a monition under Rule F. On May 13th the Court issued its injunction
(“Monition”), which enjoined the prosecution of existing actions or the filing of new ones
outside this Limitation Act proceeding. Transocean requested that the Court issue an ex parte
Monition that applies to the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, and, specifically, that appeared to
encompass claims dealing with pollution response costs, damages, and environmental injuries
caused by the oil spill. (Petition, ¶ 20.) However, Transocean did not advise the Court (by,
for example, providing a citation to any number of governing statutes or cases) that the
Limitation Act and Rule F may not enjoin environmental claims of the United States and the
States, or even private parties suing under environmental statutes passed by Congress or
under state laws that impose “any additional liability or requirements with respect to ... the
discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State ... or ... any removal activities in
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 8 of 32
2 We understand that the distinction regarding “indirect” claims may be intended to refer
solely to potential contribution claims against Transocean by other OPA “responsible parties.”
2
connection with such a discharge ...” OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a).
While Transocean’s Petition (Paragraph 20) did cite to one of the relevant statutes, the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq., Transocean cited OPA for
the inaccurate proposition that the monition should extend to claims within the statute’s
reach. Transocean’s position was contrary to well-established law.
On May 19th, a group of private litigants moved to have their OPA claims dismissed
from the action. On May 24th, the United States sent a letter to Transocean counsel, setting
forth concerns of the United States regarding the Limitation action and OPA claims, among
others. [The letter is attached as Exhibit “A” to counsel’s Declaration, filed herewith.]
On May 25th, Transocean sent a letter to the Court, stating that it had not intended to
encompass “direct” OPA claims within the Limitation Act proceeding. Transocean
accompanied the letter with a proposed Amended Monition which would exclude “direct
[OPA] claims” from the action. We understand that the proposed Amended Monition has
been entered. If it was Transocean’s intent to parse a dichotomy between “indirect” claims
and “direct” claims, the non-existent distinction confused – rather than clarified – matters of
great significance to the United States, the States, Indian Tribes, and other persons and
entities having rights under OPA.2
OPA, its legislative history, and the case law applying OPA make clear that the entire
statute most assuredly is not subject in any way to the Limitation Act and Rule F. See, e.g.,
In re Metlife Capital Corp. (M/V Emily S) (“Metlife”), 132 F.3d 818 (1st Cir.1997), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998), and Bouchard Transportation, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, State of Florida, United States, et al. (“Bouchard”), 147 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1140, and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1171 (1999).
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3
As discussed in detail below, the Limitation Act is also wholly inapplicable to other
causes of action that the United States may assert as a result of the oil spill and environmental
damage. See, e.g., Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2001) (the
Limitation Act of 1851 does not apply to the Park System Resource Protection Act
(“PSRPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 19jj, et seq.; the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (“NMSA”), 16
U.S.C. § 1443(a)(4) (Limitation Act is inapplicable); Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d
717 (6th Cir. 1977) (Limitation Act is inapplicable to the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”),
33 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., and In re Southern Scrap Material Company, LLC, in a Cause of
Exoneration from, or Limitation of Liability, 541 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
CF Industries, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 952 (D. Minn. 1982), and Transporter Marine, 217 F.3d
335, 338 (5th Cir. 2000) (Limitation Act is inapplicable to civil penalties); and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(h) (Limitation Act is inapplicable to CERCLA). Neither the Court’s
original nor its Amended Monition speak directly to these causes of action, nor did
Transocean bring them to the Court’s attention in its May 25th letter.
Furthermore, OPA specifically states that the Limitation Act does not affect “the
authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof .. (1) to impose
additional liability or additional requirements ... or (2) to impose, or to determine the amount
of, any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law ... relating
to the discharge, or substantial threat of discharge of oil.” 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c) (emphasis
added). See also, 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a), quoted above and below, regarding OPA’s express
reservation of rights to states under state law, as well as to persons proceeding under state
law.
In accordance with the Local Rules of Court, counsel for Transocean and the United
States have met and conferred in an attempt to resolve the issues addressed above. Given the
timing of the Court’s briefing schedule, counsel have conferred in good faith. Although the
United States believes that the parties were able to reach tentative agreement on many of the
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 10 of 32
3 The United States’ motion is wholly without prejudice to other potential rights, claims, and
causes of action the United States may have, all such potential rights, claims, and causes of action
against Petitioners or any person or entity expressly being reserved.
4
issues, the parties were unable to reach agreement on all issues and on the specific terms and
language of a proposed order that would be mutually satisfactory. The United States remains
willing to continue to work with Transocean to resolve these issues prior to a court ruling.
Accordingly, due to the timing of the briefing schedule, the United States appears
specially and files this protective motion to lift or modify the Court’s Amended Monition so
as to make clear that the United States is entitled to proceed separately and outside this
Limitation Action with respect to any and all claims and actions the Government may pursue
for pollution response costs, environmental damages, and other injuries stemming from the
oil spill, including claims for injunctive relief; claims and actions asserting civil and
administrative penalties under the CWA and other statutes; statutory claims, including, but
not limited to, claims under the PSRPA, the NMSA, the CWA, the RHA; and claims under
OPA – regardless of whether such OPA claims are cast as “direct” or “indirect” claims. This
protective motion also seeks to lift or modify the Court’s Amended Monition so as to make
clear that the States, political subdivisions of the States, Indian Tribes, and private parties
may also proceed outside this Limitation action pursuant to their rights under OPA and other
applicable law.3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We shall dispense with any lengthy description of the facts of the case as the Court,
and indeed the country, is fully aware of the April 20th explosion, fire, and oil spill involving
the Deepwater Horizon. Suffice it to say, eleven crewmembers lost their lives in the
immediate disaster stemming from the explosion and fire aboard the vessel. As for the oil
spill, we shall forego a cascade of words like “catastrophic” and “cataclysmic” as they simply
do not do justice to the magnitude of economic, health, and environmental devastation
wrought upon the nation’s waters, across a swath of States, and upon entire communities,
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 11 of 32
5
economies, and ecosystems as a result of the disaster.
Transocean initially invoked the Limitation Act as a way of zeroing out its liability
to the Deepwater Horizon’s deceased and surviving crewmen, as well as to others harmed
by the spill. By way of introduction to the 19th century Limitation Act, it can best be
understood in the dim light of its most infamous use. Following the sinking of RMS Titanic
in 1912, the ship’s owners invoked the Limitation Act in an attempt to avoid paying as little
as a farthing to the survivors of the sinking, as well as to the estates of the more than 1,500
passengers who lost their lives. Though the Titanic’s owners failed in their goal of
exoneration, they wildly succeeded in their second undertaking. After lengthy, drawn-out
litigation, the ship’s owners paid the paltry sum of approximately $95,000 – to be shared by
all of the survivors and each of the estates of the deceased.
Now, nearly one hundred years after the sinking of the Titanic, Transocean has
followed in its predecessors’ footsteps and sought refuge under the Limitation Act, but with
an added Dickensian twist. Within days of filing its Petition in this Court, Transocean
publicly announced (from Switzerland) that it would be issuing approximately $1 billion in
dividends to its shareholders. That announcement was in rough tandem with another
announcement dealing with the fact Transocean has so far made a profit, of sorts, as a result
of the tragedy. Thus, due to the good fortune of having insured the hull value of the MODU
for a handy sum, Transocean announced that it actually booked a $270 million "accounting
gain" on the difference between the real value of the Deepwater Horizon and the amount
received in hull insurance following the vessel’s sinking.
DISCUSSION
I. CLAIMS UNDER OPA ARE NOT COGNIZABLE UNDER
THE LIMITATION ACT
Transocean may not invoke the Limitation Act to limit liability for OPA claims, or its
liability for other claims and causes of action discussed below. OPA’s explicit statutory
language, governing case law, legislative history, and even secondary sources make that fact
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 12 of 32
4 British Petroleum (“BP”), as the holder of the relevant permit and lease for oil exploration
and production, is also a responsible party under OPA. Liability of responsible parties under OPA
is joint and several. See, e.g., Senate Rep. No. 101-94, 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
726, 732-33.
5 “Damages” are broadly defined in OPA and include, inter alia, “.. damages for injury to,
destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
the damage, which shall be recoverable by a United States trustee, a State trustee, an Indian tribe
trustee, or a foreign trustee.” OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A). The term “natural resources”
includes “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such
resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the
United States (including the resources of the exclusive economic zone), any State or local
government or Indian tribe, or any foreign government.” OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20).
6
exceedingly clear.
Focusing first on OPA, it is a successor statute to the cost recovery provisions of the
Clean Water Act. Enacted following the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, OPA establishes strict
liability against “responsible parties,” a term which includes the owners and operators of
MODUs. OPA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2702, 2704.4
In the case of Deepwater Horizon, the responsible parties for the MODU are subject
to strict liability for all pollution removal costs, plus an initial liability limit of $75,000,000
for “damages”. OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) and (b).5 The initial liability limit for damages
can be breached, however, pursuant to the provisions set out at 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c).
At the outset, the standard of strict liability and the amount of liability under OPA are
fundamentally irreconcilable with the fault-based standard of liability under the Limitation
Act, as well as Transocean’s $27 million limitation fund.
OPA’s liability section states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the
provisions of this chapter, each responsible party for a vessel or facility from
which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of
oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages specified in
subsection (b) that result from such incident.
OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (emphasis added). Prior to OPA’s enactment, the CWA governed
liability limitations for federal removal costs and environmental damages associated with oil
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 13 of 32
7
spills. See, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f), (g), and (h). Well-settled CWA case law provided that the
Limitation Act could not limit a shipowners’s liability for certain costs and damages from
oil spills in navigable waters of the United States. See, e.g., In re Lloyd’s Leasing, Ltd., 764
F. Supp. 1114, 1137 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (claims to recover oil pollution costs by United States
under the CWA are not subject to Limitation Act); In re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., 506 F. Supp
631, 634 (D. Alaska 1981) (“notwithstanding” clause in CWA means that no other laws limit
a polluter’s liability for the discharge of oil); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 340
(2d Cir. 1981) (the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . . means that the
remedies established by the [CWA] are not to be modified by any preexisting law.”).
If anything, OPA made even clearer than the CWA that the Limitation Act was
repealed as to oil spills. See, Metlife, supra, 132 F.3d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1997) (“a plain
reading of the subsection suggests that OPA repealed the Limitation Act with respect to
removal cost and damages claims against responsible parties. . . . Accordingly, the
procedural rules incorporated into the Limitation Act are inapplicable as well to such
claims.”) (citations omitted). As the First Circuit summarized in Metlife, id. at 821-22
(citations omitted):
In addition to the ‘notwithstanding’ clause, at least four other provisions in the
statute explicitly repeal the Limitation Act with respect to certain types of
claims. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702(d)(1)(A) (repealing the Limitation Act as to
third parties solely responsible for a spill; 2718(a) (repealing the Limitation
Act as to state and local statutory remedies); 2718(c)(1) repealing the
Limitation Act as to additional liability imposed by the United States, any
state, or political subdivision); 2718(c)(2) (repealing the Limitation Act as to
fines or penalties). . . .
When we consider these five OPA provisions which explicitly repeal the
Limitation Act as well as others that are irreconcilably in conflict . . . we find
that the OPA has repealed the Limitation Act as to oil spill pollution claims
arising under the OPA in the instant case. ‘[W]here provisions in the two acts
are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. . . .’
See also, Bouchard, supra, 147 F.3d 1344; In re Jahre Spray II K/S, 1997 A.M.C. 845 (D.
N.J. 1996) (Limitation Act inapplicable); In re Alex C Corp. (Seaboats, Inc. v. Alex C Corp.,
et al.), 2003 A.M.C. 256 (D. Mass. 2003) (“At the hearing ... [petitioners] reversed their
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 14 of 32
6 The Fifth Circuit has cited and relied upon Metlife’s holding that the Limitation Act does not
apply to claims brought under OPA. In re Southern Scrap, supra, 541 F.3d at 594 fn. 16.
8
initial position and acknowledged that the 1851 Limitation Act does not apply to ... claims
for recovery .. under the OPA ..”).6
Congress also left no doubt as to its intentions regarding the Limitation Act, as set
forth in OPA’s legislative history. As quoted in MetLife, id. at 822:
In considering the OPA's liability provision, Congress stated:
‘Liability under this Act is established notwithstanding any other provision or
rule of the law. This means that the liability provisions of this Act would
govern limitations compensation for removal costs and damages
notwithstanding any limitations under existing statutes such as the act of
March 3, 1851..’
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 103 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
779, 781 (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee
explaining § 2702(a)). Furthermore, the Senate Report on the OPA bill asserts
that the OPA ‘completely supersedes the 1851 statute with respect to oil
pollution.’ S.Rep. No. 101-94, at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 736.
The leading modern treatise on admiralty and maritime law is in accord with OPA’s
statutory language, its legislative history, and case law:
OPA broadly supersedes the Limitation of Liability Act with respect to
damages and removal costs under both federal and state law, including
common law. Thus the Act should no longer apply to limit any action for
damages or removal costs in connection with any pollution incident.
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 2 (2d ed. 1994) at 376. In sum, the
statute’s literal language, its legislative history, the case law, and even the primary maritime
law treatise all make it abundantly clear that OPA rendered the Limitation Act inapplicable
to oil spills and their consequences. Transocean’s attempt to draw a distinction between
“direct” and “indirect” claims fails since OPA effected a repeal of the Limitation Act as it
applied to all OPA claims – with no arbitrary distinction for claims being “direct” or
“indirect.”
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7 While we believe that Transocean may agree to modify the Amended Monition to address
some of these concerns, we are filing this protective motion to make clear our position with respect
to all of these issues in the absence of a final stipulation.
9
II. OPA CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONCURSUS UNDER EITHER THE
LIMITATION ACT OR RULE F
The Amended Monition directs claimants to file their claims in this action. However,
the Amended Monition, prepared for the Court’s signature by Transocean, cannot serve to
create a concursus for the United States’ oil spill claims – or even those of the various States
and/or private parties who would sue under OPA or state-based remedies expressly allowed
by OPA. (See discussion infra regarding state claims expressly allowed by OPA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2718.) Neither the Amended Monition, the Limitation Act, nor Rule F can bar the United
States’ rights of recovery for OPA claims paid, and yet payable, by the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund (“Fund”) for which Transocean is liable under OPA. As evidenced by the literal
language and legislative history of OPA, the Limitation Act and Rule F simply do not apply,
as is also true of pre-OPA law under the CWA regarding oil spills.7
Indeed, OPA’s “notwithstanding” clause is even more specific in scope than the
CWA’s. Whereas the CWA clause reads “notwithstanding any other provisions of law,” 33
U.S.C. § 1321(f), the OPA clause reads “notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law.”
OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (emphasis added). Thus, where another statute or rule, such as
the Limitation Act and Rule F, are inconsistent with OPA, OPA’s liability and compensation
scheme governs.
In both Metlife and Bouchard, the vessel owners argued that Rule F could be invoked
even if the Limitation Act itself had been repealed by OPA. Both courts unequivocally
rejected the shipowners’ attempts. Before analyzing the issue in great detail, the Eleventh
Circuit in Bouchard provided the short and simple answer:
[OPA] is not subject to Rule F for two reasons: (1) [OPA] claimants do not
face a limited fund necessitating a pro rata distribution; and (2) Congress has
specifically set forth procedures to implement the strictures of [OPA].
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10
* * * * * *
... [N]either Rule F not the Limitation Act grants the Owners a right to a
concursus. Rule F merely provides a procedure for distributing a limited fund
among competing claimants where the real possibility exists that some claims
will not be paid in full.
Bouchard, supra, 147 F.3d at 1350, and 1351-52, the latter section citing Lake Tankers Corp.
v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 152-53, 77 S.Ct. 1269, 1272, 1 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1957).
A. OPA Preempts Limitation Act Concursus Because Its Statutory
Provisions Are Inherently Inconsistent in Their Purpose And Application
with the Limitation Act and Rule F
The premature joining and resolution of OPA claims undermines OPA’s remedial
provisions, thereby shifting the cost of an oil discharge in navigable waters to innocent
parties. By its nature, concursus cuts off claims not filed by the court imposed deadline. As
set out in great detail in Metlife and Bouchard, applying the Limitation Act concursus would
effectively nullify or modify a significant number of OPA provisions, including, but not
limited to: 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (elements of liability); 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (rights of subrogation);
33 U.S.C. § 2713(c) (claims procedure, election); 33 U.S.C. § 2715 (subrogation); 33 U.S.C.
§ 2717(b) (jurisdiction/venue); and 33 U.S.C. § 27117(f) (period of limitations).
OPA provides an elaborate scheme for resolving claims. OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2713.
Concursus would completely disrupt that elaborate claims procedure. Metlife, supra, 132
F.3d at 824; Bouchard, supra, 147 F.3d at 1350-51. Congress specifically intended that the
OPA claims mechanism supersede the Limitation Act. See S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 6 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 728. In summary, because OPA, the Limitation Act, and
Rule F are inherently inconsistent in their purpose, application, and language, OPA’s explicit
“notwithstanding” clause preempts application of the Limitation Act and its concursus
procedure.
B. Application Of Concursus To OPA Claims Would Debilitate the United
States’ Subrogation Rights
The United States also retains subrogation rights for claims paid by the Fund for
removal costs and damages. See, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2715 and 2712(f). Before presenting a claim
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11
to the Fund, a non-government claimant must first present its claim to the responsible party.
See, 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a); cf., United States v. COSCO BUSAN, et al., 557 F.Supp.2d 1058,
1063-64, 2008 A.M.C. 1360 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (OPA claims procedure is not applicable to
claims of the United States). If the responsible party denies the claim or does not settle it
within 90 days, the claimant may then maintain a cause of action against the responsible
party or present the claim to the Fund for payment. See 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c).
If a court were to conclude that claims respecting OPA liability are subject to
concursus, the financial burden of the spill could fall squarely upon the Federal Government
instead of upon the responsible parties. For example, assume the Amended Monition stands
and the deadline for filing OPA claims remains November 2010. Thereafter, assume a
claimant presents a damage claim to Transocean, as a responsible party, which then denies
the claim as time-barred under the deadline for filing claims in the Limitation proceeding.
Next assume that the claimant presents the claim to the Fund established by OPA. If the Fund
were to pay on a properly presented claim, the United States would acquire the right of
subrogation and have a statutory OPA-based right to proceed against the responsible party.
See, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2712(f), 2713, and 2715(a).
If the Amended Monition bars the claimant from recovering against the responsible
party, the United States, as a subrogee, may also be prejudiced in recovering against the
responsible party. Consequently, if the Amended Monition allows the Limitation Petitioner
to default the OPA claimants who did not file by the Court’s deadline, the Fund could be
forced to absorb the cost of all claims presented to the Fund thereafter.
That absorption would continue until the limitation periods for presenting claims
against the Fund expire. OPA provides that a claimant has six years from the time removal
actions are completed to present a claim to the Fund for removal costs. OPA, 33 U.S.C. §
2712(h)(1). A claimant has three years from the date the injury should reasonably have been
discovered or, when a natural resource damage assessment is performed, three years from the
completion date of the assessment, whichever is later, to present a claim to the Fund for
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12
damages. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(h). The only prerequisite to filing a claim against the Fund is
that the claimant first present the claim to a responsible party.
Except as provided in 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(3) and (4), OPA imposes a three-year
statute of limitation for filing actions against a responsible party to recover costs and
damages as set forth in OPA. See, 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(1) and (2). OPA extends the
limitations period for contribution actions by three years from the judgment date. 33 U.S.C.
§ 2717(f)(3). OPA also extends the limitations period for subrogation actions by three years
from the date the Fund pays a subrogated claim. See, 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(4). By
implication, therefore, the United States’ statutory subrogated rights against a responsible
party may exist for nine or more years under OPA – compared to the November 2010
deadline for filing claims in the Limitation proceeding.
When it enacted OPA, Congress did not envision that a Rule F concursus would
forever bar all OPA claims against the responsible parties that are not filed under the time
constraints of a limitation action and Rule F. Any interpretation of the Amended Monition
and Rule F whereby OPA claims are subject to concursus would eviscerate, wholesale, the
United States’ subrogation rights, and also the rights of third-party claimants to determine
if they have been injured. Both the Metlife and Bouchard courts examined each of the
foregoing factors in detail and held Rule F to be inapplicable. As aptly summed up in
Metlife, supra, 132 F.3d at 824:
Moreover, even if the courts consistently enlarge the monition period for
subrogation claims, in many instances, the limited fund established by the
concursus procedure will already have been exhausted.
* * * * * *
... In contrast to the OPA's claims procedure, Rule F forces all claimants into
litigation against the vessel owner. If a claimant fails to appear in the limitation
action within the monition period, he or she is enjoined from raising any
claims. See Rule F(3). In view of these inconsistencies, we conclude that Rule
F concursus even if independent of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to OPA
claims.
The same result is compelled here.
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8 The Wreck Act is comprised of certain provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401, et seq.
13
C. Rules of Statutory Construction Prescribe That OPA Amends Rule F
Even if Rule F applied to claims subject to limitation under statutes other than the
Limitation Act, rules of statutory construction prescribe that OPA amends Rule F to the
extent the two statutes are inconsistent. In Hines, Inc. v. United States, the court held that
the Limitation Act did not limit a shipowner’s strict liability under the Rivers and Harbors
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 411, for damage to river improvements built by the United States.
See, Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 717, 729-30 (6th Cir. 1977); Bouchard, supra, 147
F.3d at 1351; Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.3d at 941-42 (addressing the PSRPA
and the Limitation Act). Specifically, the Fifth Circuit applied this principle to the Wreck
Act, holding that Wreck Act superseded the Limitation Act:
First, Congress made a clear policy choice in the 1986 amendments to
supersede with unlimited personal liability the in rem liability limitation that
vessel owners had enjoyed under the previous versions of §§ 414 and 415 of
the Wreck Act. Thus, it is very unlikely that Congress intended for vessel
owners to be able to cancel out this legislative decision by relying on the
similar in rem protection of the 1851 Limitation Act. Permitting Southern
Scrap to invoke the Limitation Act in this case would nullify the effect of the
new §§ 414(b) and 415(c), which we have determined impose unlimited
personal liability upon a vessel owner for governmental removal costs, when
the owner fails to comply with its obligation to remove its sunken vessel from
a navigable waterway. [Citations omitted.]
* * * * * *
Second, in concluding that the Wreck Act ‘implicitly limits the scope of the
Limitation Act,’ 557 F.2d at 452, the University of Texas Court applied the
longstanding principle that when two statutes irreconcilably conflict, the more
recent statute controls. Id. at 455 (‘This is not to say that the Limitation Act no
longer has any vitality. It is rather to say that its force succumbs to that of a
later statutory enactment which, when still later construed by the Supreme
Court in a manner that wars with the policies of the Limitation Act, must
prevail over the earlier Act.’) ... .
In re Southern Scrap Material Company, supra, 541 F.3d at 593-94.8 The same point was
re-affirmed in Bouchard, supra, 147 F.3d at 1351:
Subjecting OPA 90 claims to Rule F effectively would allow ship owners to
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14
opt out of the Congressionally mandated procedures for resolving OPA 90
claims. Additionally, the venue provisions of OPA 90 permit claimants to
proceed ‘in any district in which the discharge or injury or damages occurred,
or in which the defendant resides, may be found, has its principal office, or has
appointed an agent for service of process.’ 33 U.S.C. § 2717(b). The injunction
issued by the district court in a Rule F proceeding would require OPA 90
claimants to proceed only in the district court chosen by the vessel owners, and
the process envisioned by OPA 90's jurisdiction and venue provisions would
be rendered meaningless. Similarly, OPA 90 grants jurisdiction to state courts
to hear claims arising thereunder. 33 U.S.C. § 2717(c). This grant of
concurrent jurisdiction would be rendered meaningless if OPA 90 claims were
subject to Rule F because Rule F complaints must be filed in federal court.
MetLife, 132 F.3d at 822.
As discussed above, OPA’s “notwithstanding” clause preempts “any other provision
or rule of law.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). As well, the “notwithstanding” clause stipulates that
each responsible party is liable for removal costs and damages “subject to the provisions of
this chapter.” Id. Under OPA, the United States is entitled to commence an action against
a responsible party, at a time of its own choosing, in a venue prescribed by OPA, and within
the limitation periods set forth in the statute. See, 33 U.S.C. § 2718. OPA specifically
provides that “an action may be commenced under this subchapter for recovery of removal
costs at any time after such costs have been incurred.” 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(2) (emphasis
added). Conversely, an injunction under the Limitation Act or Rule F, if applicable, would
foreclose a contemporaneous action against a shipowner under OPA.
Consequently, OPA and the Limitation Act conflict, as do OPA and Rule F(3). For
claims cognizable under OPA, the “notwithstanding” clause preempts the injunction that
otherwise would arise under the Limitation Act and Rule F. OPA, as a subsequent act of
Congress, overtakes the Limitation Act because the two are inherently inconsistent. See, e.g.,
Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.3d at 729-730. See also, Bouchard, supra, 147 F.3d at
1350 (“In resolving the conflict between the Rule F procedures and the OPA 90 procedures,
a fundamental principle of statutory construction requires that we apply the more specific
procedures.”). As to OPA, its legislative history is hardly silent on the conflict between the
two statutes – indeed, it clearly states that the Limitation Act is “explicitly made inoperative
by this bill for claims arising under this legislation.” S. REP. NO. 101-94, reprinted in 1990
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15
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 736.
D. Claims of State Governments Are Not Subject to the Limitation Act
As a courtesy to the Court, as well as to the various States and private parties which
have sustained damages as a result of the Deepwater Horizon spill, we also point out that
OPA expressly permits states to impose additional liability and requirements for oil spills
above the liability limits established by OPA 90 and the Limitation Act. OPA states:
(a) Preservation of State authorities; ...
Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 [the Limitation
Act] shall–
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any
State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional
liability or requirements with respect to--
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge; or
(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any person under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42
U.S.C. 6901 et seq.) or State law, including common law. ...
OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a). In Bouchard, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with Florida’s oil spill
law and applied OPA’s savings provision in the specific context of the Limitation Act and
Rule F, holding the latter to be inapplicable:
OPA 90 authorizes states to adopt liability laws for oil spills and
exempts those laws from the provisions of the Liability Act. 33 U.S.C. § 2718.
Accordingly, the Florida Act is neither subject to the Limitation Act's
provisions nor otherwise preempted. We will not impose Rule F on the Florida
Act because, like OPA 90 claimants, Florida Act claimants do not face a
limited fund. The Florida Act establishes the Florida Coastal Protection Trust
Fund (Florida Fund) to ensure that all claims are paid in full despite the
limitation of liability enjoyed by responsible parties. Fla. Ch. 376.11.
Moreover, as discussed in the previous section of this opinion, the Owners do
not have a general entitlement to a concursus; Rule F is not designed to make
litigation more convenient for vessel owners.
Bouchard, id., 147 F.3d at 1352. Accordingly, claims of the various States, as well as private
parties proceeding under state law, are free from the Limitation Act and Rule F and must be
excluded from this action.
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16
III. THE LIMITATION ACT AND RULE F DO NOT APPLY TO OTHER
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR RESPONSE COSTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS RESULTING FROM THE SPILL
When Congress enacted OPA, it spoke directly and unambiguously to the right of the
United States, the States, and any political subdivisions of the various States to impose
additional liabilities, requirements, fines, and penalties free of the constraints of the
Limitation Act. OPA therefore provides:
(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties
Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (the Limitation Act), or
section 9509 of title 26, shall in any way affect, or be construed to
affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof –
(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty
(whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law;
relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.
33 U.S.C. § 2718(c) (emphasis added). Even before OPA expressly preempted application
of the Limitation Act, the courts consistently held that remedial and enforcement provisions
in other federal environmental statutes are not subject to the Limitation Act’s limits of
liability. See, United States v. CF Industries, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 952, 956-57 (D. Minn. 1982)
(claim for statutory civil penalty under the CWA for discharge of hazardous material not
subject to limitation); In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
even without express language referring to the Limitation Act, the comprehensive liability
scheme of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651, et seq.,
implicitly repealed the Limitation Act); University of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v.
United States, 557 F.2d 438, 448 (5th Cir. 1977) (civil actions to recover wreck removal
costs under the RHA not subject to Limitation Act); see also, Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United
States, 273 F.3d 936 (strict liability action to recover damage to a unit of the National Park
system). Accordingly, the right of the United States to proceed outside the Limitation Act
for penalties, injunctive relief, and other applicable relief and actions under remedial statutes
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 23 of 32
17
expressly preserved and allowed by OPA is unquestioned.
In the Fifth Circuit, the non-application of the Limitation Act to federal remedies is
well established. As stated in In re Southern Scrap, supra, 541 F.3d at 594 fn. 16:
In addition to the Wreck Act, courts have found that other later-enacted
statutes impliedly repealed the Limitation Act for cases arising under those
statutes. See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (holding that the Limitation Act
does not apply to claims brought under the Park System Resource Protection
Act); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir.1997)
(holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the Oil
Pollution Act); In re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th Cir.1991)
(holding that the Limitation Act does not apply to claims brought under the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); United States v. CF Indus., Inc.,
542 F.Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.Minn.1982) (holding that the Limitation Act does
not apply to claims brought under the Clean Water Act); cf. Transporter
Marine, 217 F.3d at 339-40 (holding that Coast Guard alcohol and drug
regulations are not subject to the Limitation Act).
We now turn to the other potential causes of action, some already referred to in
Southern Scrap, that are not affected by the Limitation Act and Rule F.
A. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Civil Penalty Claims Under the
Clean Water Act and Other Statutes
Simply stated, fines and penalty claims of the United States (and the States) are not
subject to limitation. See, 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c). Going beyond OPA, we also draw the
Court’s attention to pre and post-OPA case law. For example, the limitation plaintiffs in
United States v. CF Industries, Inc., supra, 542 F. Supp. at 956, complained that the United
States improperly filed suit in a separate proceeding from the limitation action, and that the
injunction issued by the limitation court applied to all proceedings. CF Industries concerned
an unpermitted discharge of anhydrous ammonia from a barge into the Mississippi River.
The putative violators there sued under the Limitation Act, seeking to limit liability to the
value of the vessels involved. Id. at 953-54. Subsequently, the United States sought judicial
assessment of a civil penalty in a separate action. Id. at 954. The court stated that although
the Limitation Act’s language is broad,
[i]t does not specifically cover suits for statutory penalties. On the other hand,
the language of section 309 of the CWA is clear and direct with respect to a
shipowner’s liability for a statutory penalty. . . . This section imposes strict
liability for persons who pollute the nation’s waters.
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18
Id. at 955. The court also noted that “if the government’s claim for a civil penalty must be
brought in the limitation action, it will have no deterrent effect.” Id. at 956. The court held
that because the civil penalty assessment under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d),
was not subject to limitation under the Limitation Act, the limitation court had no jurisdiction
whatsoever over the United States’ civil penalty claim. Id. at 956-57. Without jurisdiction,
the injunction was meaningless. Similarly here, the Amended Monition does not preclude
the United States from filing a separate action to recover civil penalty claims under the CWA
and other statutes.
In addition, the statutory construction argument discussed above in Section “II.C”
applies with equal vigor here. See, Hines, Inc. v. United States, supra, 551 F.2d at 729-30
(dealing with the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Limitation Act). No legislative history
exists which could resolve the conflicts between the 159 year old Limitation Act and the
CWA and other statutes. The passage of more than a century and half between enactment
of the Limitation Act and subsequent statutes like the CWA, coupled with the dearth of
legislative history concerning the inherent conflicts between these statutes, lead to the
conclusion that where these laws are inconsistent, the CWA and other penalty claims
perforce trump the Limitation Act.
The Limitation Act and environmental laws cannot be reconciled in establishing the
extent of a shipowner’s liability for polluting the United States’ navigable waters. For
example, the CWA’s judicial civil penalty provisions, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d) and 1321(b)(7),
create strict liability that mandates penalties for unpermitted discharges of pollutants, oil and
hazardous substances into the United States’ navigable waters. The Limitation Act, on the
other hand, relies upon the shipowner’s privity or knowledge of negligence to establish
liability. Neither fault nor intent is relevant to strict liability under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d) and
1321(b)(7), “except in connection with the amount of penalty imposed.” United States v.
Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The court in United States v.
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9 These amounts are stated here as originally enacted. Many of the amounts have been
increased at various times under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990,
Pub.L. 101-410, and the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. 101-410, 28 U.S.C. §
2461.
19
Ohio Valley Co., held that:
[s]ince the triggering mechanism for 183(a) limitation of liability is tied to an
awareness of negligence, and because negligence is not significant in actions
under sections 14 and 16 [of the RHA], it follows that the limitation of liability
provisions are inapplicable to those sections.
United States v. Ohio Valley Co., 510 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 1975). Similarly here,
negligence is irrelevant to the strict liability provisions of the CWA at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d)
and 1321(b)(7). The same strict liability standard applies to other penalty claims of the
United States. As in the Ohio Valley case, supra, it follows that the Limitation Act is
inapplicable to such claims.
The following civil penalty regimes, while not an exclusive list, are subject to OPA’s
express statutory exclusion of the Limitation Act as applied to fines, penalties, and other
relief: the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d), 1321(b)(7); the NMSA, 16 U.S.C. § 1437(c) (civil
penalties up to $100,000 for each violation, with each day of a continuing violation
constituting a separate violation); Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), 16 U.S.C. §
1375(a)(1) (civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each such violation); Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (a) (civil penalty of $25,000 for each violation); 46
U.S.C. § 2302(a) (civil penalty for negligent operations and interfering with safe operation
of a vessel); Ports and Waterways Safety Act (“PWSA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1236 (civil penalty for
violations of regulations); the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships ("APPS"), 33 U.S.C. §
1908 (civil penalty for violations of MARPOL); the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. §
7413(b) (civil penalties up to $25,000 for each violation); the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6978 (civil penalties); and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1430(b) (civil penalty of $20,000 for
each day of continuance of a violation).9
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 26 of 32
10 The PSRPA was amended in 1996 to extend its scope to all resources within any unit of the
National Park System.
20
B. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable Under the RHA
The Limitation Act also does not apply to violations of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
Case law has consistently held the Limitation Act inapplicable to the RHA. See, In re
Southern Scrap, supra, 541 F.3d 584; Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d at 729-30; The
Snug Harbor, 53 F.2d at 411; University of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d at 447.
Also, as discussed above for OPA and claims dealing with fines and penalties, rules of
statutory construction compel the conclusion that the RHA, enacted 48 years later than the
Limitation Act, supersedes the Limitation Act.
C. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable
Under the PSRPA
The Park System Resource Protection Act (“PSRPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 19jj, et seq., was
enacted in 1990 by the same Congress that passed OPA, and was put into law to protect and
preserve the resources of the National Park system. As stated by Congress, the purpose of
the PSRPA was to authorize the United States:
... to initiate legal action against individuals who destroy or injure living or
non-living marine or ... aquatic resources within units of the National Park
System, and to allow the Secretary to use funds recovered as a result of
damage to living or non-living resources . . . for restoration of such resources.
Senate Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., S. Rep. No. 328, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, as
reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 603 (1990).10 As with OPA, the NMSA,
and other statutes, the standard of liability under the PSRPA is strict liability. Tug Allie-B,
Inc. v. United States, supra, 273 F.3d 936, 942-43, fn.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (comparing the
provisions of the PSRPA with the nearly identical strict liability provisions of the NMSA).
Like the NMSA, the PSRPA provides that “any person” or vessel that “destroys, causes the
loss of, or injures” any park system resource is liable to the United States for response costs
and damages resulting from such destruction, loss or injury.” 16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1(a) and (b).
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 27 of 32
21
In Tug Allie-B, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit directly addressed and analyzed the non-
applicability of the Limitation Act to the PSRPA, summing up in holding:
Obviously, the PSRPA is the most recent in time, enacted almost 140 years
after the Limitation Act. Thus, on this basis alone, we can conclude that the
PSRPA controls. [Footnote omitted.] We also conclude that the PSRPA is the
more specific statute. The PSRPA's provisions are narrowly tailored to address
incidents involving destruction, loss, or injury only to ‘park system resources’
(a term defined by the PSRPA), and allows the government to recover only for
response costs and damages associated with such incidents. In contrast, the
Limitation Act applies to ‘embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of
any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel,
or ... any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or ... any act, matter, or thing,
loss, damage or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred.’ 46 U.S.C. app. §
183(a). Although the Limitation Act's reference to ‘any loss, damage, or injury
by collision’ may be read to include loss or damage to park system resources,
when a conflicting statute-the PSRPA-specifically defines, and is tailored to
address, ‘park system resources’, we must find that the more specific statute
governs.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court holding that
the Limitation Act does not apply to claims under the PSRPA is AFFIRMED.
Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States, supra, 273 F.3d at 949. Significantly, Tug Allie-B was
cited and relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in Southern Scrap, supra, 541 F.3d at 594 fn. 16.
D. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable
Under the NMSA
The National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1431, et seq., governs the
designation and management of federally protected marine areas of specific interest.
Congress enacted the NMSA in response to the increasing degradation of marine habitats and
in recognition of the need to protect marine ecosystems. United States v. Great Lakes
Dredge and Dock Co., 259 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 955
(2002). The purpose of the NMSA is to preserve sensitive areas for their conservation,
recreational, ecological, or aesthetic value. United States v. Fisher, 977 F.Supp 1193, 1999
(S.D. Fla. 1997).
Under the NMSA, any “person” or vessel that “destroys, causes the loss of, or injures
any marine sanctuary resource” is strictly liable for an amount equal to response costs and
damages resulting from this injury. 16 U.S.C. § 1443; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 28 of 32
11 Many provisions of OPA, including OPA’s exclusion of the Limitation Act, were
modeled after CERCLA. Cf., OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2702, with CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607.
22
supra, 259 F.3d at 1304-05; United States v. M/V Jacqueline L., 100 F.3d 1520, 1521 (11th
Cir. 1996); United States v. M/V Miss Beholden, 856 F.Supp. 668 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
The NMSA directly addresses the Limitation Act and states that is does not apply to
cases within the scope of the statute:
(4) Limits to liability
Nothing in sections 30501 to 30512 of Title 46 [the Limitation Act] or section
30706 of Title 46 shall limit the liability of any person under this chapter.
NMSA, 16 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(4).
E. The Limitation Act Does Not Apply to Claims Cognizable
Under CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., is a strict liability statute prohibiting the discharge
or substantial threat of discharge of “hazardous substances”. See, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
CERCLA specifically precludes the application of the Limitation Act to cases falling within
CERCLA’s broad scope. In passing CERCLA, Congress enacted the following:
(h) Owner or operator of vessel
The owner or operator of a vessel shall be liable in accordance with this
section, under maritime tort law, and as provided under section 9614 of this
title notwithstanding any provision of the Act of March 3, 1851 (the Limitation
Act) or the absence of any physical damage to the proprietary interest of the
claimant.
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(h).11
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the United States requests that the Court modify or lift its
Amended Monition in order to clarify that the Limitation Act and Rule F shall: (1) neither
apply to nor affect any claim under OPA (whether called a “direct” or “indirect” claim), or
any claim within the scope of actions and claims reserved by OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) and
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 29 of 32
Case 2:10-cv-02771-CJB-SS Document 89 Filed 06/01/10 Page 30 of 32
24
IGNACIA MORENO
Assistant Attorney General
Environment and Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice
STEVEN O’ROURKE, Senior Attorney
Environmental Enforcement Section
Environment and Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 7611
Washington, D.C. 20044
Telephone: (202) 514-4080
e-mail: steve.o’rourke@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, Appearing Specially and
Not Generally
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