Griggs v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company (Usaa) et al

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support

N.D. Ga.March 6, 2017

1 ATL:1006335/01603:544378v1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION TAWANA L. CARTER, TAWANA L. CARTER,JOYCE M. GRIGGS, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY (USAA) & OCWEN LOAN SERVICING COMPANY, LLC (OCWEN), Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § § § § CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:17-CV-0064-WSD v. v. MOTION TO DISMISS Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby moves this Court for an order dismissing this action with prejudice, including all claims and causes of action therein. In support of this Motion, Ocwen relies upon the pleadings and documents filed by Plaintiff, the Court’s record in this action, and the Memorandum of Law with supporting exhibits, filed contemporaneously herewith. Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8 Filed 03/06/17 Page 1 of 4 2 ATL:1006335/01603:544378v1 DATED: March 6, 2017. Respectfully submitted, LOCKE LORD LLP /s/ John Michael Kearns Elizabeth J. Campbell Georgia Bar No. 349249 ecampbell@lockelord.com John Michael Kearns Georgia Bar No. 142438 john.kearns@lockelord.com 3333 Piedmont Road NE Terminus 200, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30305 Phone: 404-870-4600 Fax: 404-872-5547 Attorneys for Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8 Filed 03/06/17 Page 2 of 4 3 ATL:1006335/01603:544378v1 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D), I hereby certify that the foregoing motion has been prepared in compliance with Local Rule 5.1 (B) and (C), using 14-point Times New Roman font. /s/ John Michael Kearns John Michael Kearns Georgia Bar No. 142438 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8 Filed 03/06/17 Page 3 of 4 4 ATL:1006335/01603:544378v1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 6th day of March, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document by first-class mail to the following: Joyce M. Griggs 1 BaySprings Ct. Savannah, GA 31405 /s/ John Michael Kearns John Michael Kearns Georgia Bar No. 142438 One of the Attorneys for Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8 Filed 03/06/17 Page 4 of 4 1 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION TAWANA L. CARTER, TAWANA L. CARTER,JOYCE M. GRIGGS, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY (USAA) & OCWEN LOAN SERVICING COMPANY, LLC (OCWEN), Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § § § CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:17-CV-0064-WSD v. v.MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”), hereby files its Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, and respectfully shows the Court as follows: INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Joyce M. Griggs (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Ocwen and her insurer USAA Casualty Insurance Company (“USAA”) because, prior to an alleged January 2015 fire at her residence, she alleges her homeowners’ insurance was reduced from $395,000 to $291,000 without her consent. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the foregoing allegation is true, however, Plaintiff has Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 1 of 14 2 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 not plausibly alleged any claim against Ocwen that entitles her to relief. As shown below, Plaintiff’s homeowners’ insurance contract is with her insurer (USAA), not Ocwen, her loan servicing company. Additionally, Ocwen owes Plaintiff no independent duty, and she has not specifically pleaded a fraud claim under Rule 9(b). In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege, and cannot allege, any facts to plausibly suggest she has a valid claim against Ocwen. Accordingly, this case should be dismissed as against Ocwen. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND On January 20, 2005, Plaintiff obtained a loan (the “Loan”) in the principal amount of $382,500.00 from Ameriquest Mortgage Company (“Ameriquest”). To secure repayment of the Loan, Plaintiff executed a Security Deed (the “Security Deed”) to real property located at 1 Baysprings Court, Savannah, Georgia (the “Property”) in favor of Ameriquest, which Security Deed was recorded in Deed Book 283E, Page 452, Chatham County, Georgia records. (Ex. A.)1 The Security Deed was subsequently assigned to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through 1 “A district court may take judicial notice of certain facts without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment....Public records are among the permissible facts that a district court may consider.” Univ. Express, Inc. v. S.E.C., 177 F. App’x. 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006). Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 2 of 14 3 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 Certificates, Series 2005-R1 (“Trustee”), as evidenced by an Assignment of Mortgage/Deed (the “Assignment”) recorded on February 12, 2009, in Deed Book 348K, Page 552, Chatham County, Georgia records. (Ex. B.) Ocwen services the Loan. (Doc. 1, ¶ 11.) According to the Complaint, on January 8, 2015, Plaintiff “experienced a fire” at the Property. (Doc. 1, Statement of the Case.) The Property was insured by USAA and the Loan was serviced by Ocwen. (Doc. 1, Statement of the Case.) Plaintiff alleges that before the fire, “USAA and Ocwen” suppodesly “reduced Plaintiff’s homeowners’ insurance coverage from $395,000 to $291,000 without her knowledge or consent.” (Doc. 1, Statement of the Case.) USAA “refused to honor the policy that Plaintiff has for $395,000 and instead used the reduced policy.” (Doc. 1, Statement of the Case.) Based on these facts, Plaintiff seeks relief against Ocwen and USAA for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligence/unfair and deceptive trade practices, and emotional distress. (Doc. 1, Statement of the Case.) None of these claims have any merit as against Ocwen, and this lawsuit should be dismissed in its entirety as to Ocwen. Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 3 of 14 4 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES I. Legal Standard Applicable to Motion to Dismiss. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While the factual allegations need not be overly detailed, a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions,” and the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to assert a cognizable legal theory or if the facts asserted are insufficient to support relief under a cognizable legal theory. Id.; Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993); Morrison v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13–cv–1052–WSD, 2013 WL 6587657, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2013). Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 4 of 14 5 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 II. Plaintiff fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. A. Plaintiff does not state a claim against Ocwen for breach of contract. Plaintiff claims that Ocwen somehow breached her homeowner’s insurance contract, but axiomatically such a contract is between the homeowner (Plaintiff) and the insurer (USAA). Plaintiff alleges only that “Ocwen . . . set up an escrow account to pay Plaintiff’s homeowners’ insurance and taxes.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 16.) In Georgia, the elements of a breach of contract claim are the (1) breach of a contact and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being broken.” Norton v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 307 Ga. App. 501, 502, 705 S.E.2d 305, 306 (2010). See also Eastview Healthcare, LLC v. Synertx, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 393, 674 S.E.2d 641, 646 (2009) (advising that the “plaintiff in a breach of contract action has the burden of pleading and proving the existence of a valid contract”); O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1 (“To constitute a valid contract, there must be parties able to contract, a consideration moving to the contract, the assent of the parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject matter upon which the contract can operate.”) To establish the existence of a contract under Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must “either attach a copy of an alleged contract to the complaint or plead it according to its legal effect.” Gladstein v. Aurora Loan Serv., LLC, 1:11- CV-02784-TWT, 2012 WL 3758160, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2012), adopted at Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 5 of 14 6 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 2012 WL 3758157 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2012) (quoting McClelland v. First Ga. Cmty. Bank, No. 5:09–CV–256 (CAR), 2010 WL 3199349, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 12, 2010)). Here, Plaintiff has done neither. Plaintiff has not plausibly identified the existence of any valid contract between Ocwen and Plaintiff for insurance or otherwise. No contract has been attached to, or identified in, the Complaint, nor has Plaintiff identified the terms that were allegedly breached. Without alleging the proper existence of a contract or identifying the alleged breach, there can be no claim for breach of contract. Id. B. Plaintiff does not state a claim against Ocwen for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff alleges that Ocwen has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 21-22.) While every contract implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the covenant merely modifies and becomes a part of the provisions of the contract. Gladstein, 2012 WL 3758160 at *3. Thus, the covenant cannot be breached apart from the contract provision it modifies and cannot provide an independent basis for liability. Id.; Myung Sung Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. North Am. Ass’n of Slavic Churches, 662 S.E.2d 745, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). As there is no contract between Ocwen and Plaintiff, there can be no breach of this implied covenant. The claim must be dismissed. Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 6 of 14 7 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 C. Plaintiff cannot state a claim for fraud against Ocwen. As to any alleged claim of fraud, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to adequately state a fraud claim against Ocwen. Plaintiff does not plead fraud with any specificity, nor does she otherwise allege the required elements for fraud. To state a fraud claim in Georgia, a plaintiff must allege five elements: “a false representation by a defendant, scienter, intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action, justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and damage to plaintiff.” Baxter v. Fairfield Fin. Servs., 704 S.E.2d 423, 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” The Eleventh Circuit has explained: To comply with Rule 9(b), a complaint must set forth: (1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral representations or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and place of each such statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making) same, and (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud. Thomas v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 Fed. App'x 635, 638 (11th Cir. 2010) (cit. omitted). Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 7 of 14 8 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 In the fraud count of her Complaint, Plaintiff generally and vaguely alleges that Ocwen somehow lowered the amount of coverage in her homeowners’ insurance contract with USAA. (Doc. 1, ¶ 30.) But, she has not specified the person responsible for making any alleged misrepresentations, how this happened, when the communications with Ocwen occurred, who was involved, or what Ocwen received as a result of each alleged misrepresentation. This Court has previously held that similarly deficient allegations, without more, are insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and Georgia law. Haygood v. Cmty. & S. Bank, No. 1:12–cv–295–WSD, 2012 WL 6681732, at *10 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (dismissing fraud claim where plaintiffs failed to specify the person responsible for making each alleged misrepresentation, time and place of the purported misrepresentation, how each misled them, or what was obtained by the misrepresentation). The same is true in this case. Plaintiff has not adequately or plausibly alleged how Ocwen defrauded her, so dismissal of this claim is proper. D. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Ocwen for negligence.2 The vast majority of Plaintiff’s allegations concern the conduct of USAA, but Plaintiff alleges in her claim for negligence that Ocwen was the “servicing 2 Plaintiff also lists “unfair and deceptive trade practices” as part of the heading of this count of the Complaint. However, she makes no specific or substantive allegations relating to business or trade practices. Therefore, Ocwen does not construe it as such. (Doc. 1, p. 7.) Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 8 of 14 9 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 agent” for the Loan. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 34, 36.) In that capacity, Plaintiff alleges that Ocwen “established an escrow to pay” USAA homeowners’ insurance premiums. (Doc. 1, ¶ 36.) Again, she alleges that USAA and Ocwen acted to “lower[]” her homeowners’ insurance before the January 2015 fire. (Doc. 1, ¶ 37.) She further alleges that Ocwen, in its role as loan servicer, knew or “should have known that Plaintiff’s home was underinsured since [it] served the loan and could have placed additional coverage” to protect its interest in the Property. (Doc. 1, ¶ 43.) To the extent Plaintiff is alleging Ocwen owed her some duty to procure coverage for her home, she is wrong. As a threshold matter, Georgia does not recognize an independent cause of action for negligent mortgage servicing. See Anderson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 1:11-CV-4091-TWT-ECS, 2012 WL 3756512, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2012) adopted at 2012 WL 3756435 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2012) (acknowledging the “undersigned has been unable to find any authority recognizing a tort action for negligent mortgage servicing under Georgia law”). Second, even to state a simple negligence claim, Plaintiff must first identify an independent duty that Ocwen owed to her, which she cannot do. McMann v. Mockler, 503 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). Georgia does not recognize any special duty in the mortgagor- mortgagee context. Anderson, 2012 WL 3756512, at *9 (citing Jenkins v. Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 9 of 14 10 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 Wachovia Bank, N.A., 724 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2012)) (“[I]n the absence of any special duty due and owing by Defendants to Plaintiff, other than any duties arising out of a contract, there would not be any basis for a claim of negligence.”); Baker v. Campbell, 565 S.E.2d 855, 859 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Pardue v. Bankers First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 334 S.E.2d 926, 926-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). Here, Plaintiff has no contract with Ocwen. Furthermore, the Security Deed states that it is the Plaintiff’s responsibility, not Ocwen’s, to keep “the Property insured against loss by fire . . . .” (Ex. A, p. 6.) Only if Plaintiff fails to maintain coverage may Ocwen “obtain insurance coverage, at Lender’s option and Borrower’s expense.” (Ex. A, p. 6.) The Security Deed makes clear, though, that Ocwen is “under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount of coverage.” (Ex. A, p. 6.) In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to plead any plausible facts showing that Ocwen owes her any duty. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence fails as a matter of law. E. Plaintiff fails to state an emotional distress claim against Ocwen. Finally, Plaintiff does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ocwen. She generally alleges that “Defendants’ actions” have caused her emotional distress and that she suffers sleep deprivation and anxiety, among other things, as a result of “Defendants’ actions.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 51-52.) A Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 10 of 14 11 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law has four elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct (2) which is extreme and outrageous and (3) caused the severe emotional distress.3 Carroll v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:12-CV-02506-RWS, 2013 WL 1320755, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2013). (citations omitted). See also Fennelly v. Lyons, 333 Ga. App. 96, 107, 775 S.E.2d 587, 597 (2015) (granting judgment as a matter of law to landlord on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Discovery Point Franchising v. Miller, 234 Ga. App. 68, 73, 505 S.E.2d 822 (1998) (explaining repeated inspections of plaintiff's business, even if excessive, were not sufficiently outrageous); Sanders v. Brown, 178 Ga. App. 447, 449–450, 343 S.E.2d 722 (1986) (cutting off water to foreclosed property for several hours when former owners still lived there was not sufficiently outrageous). Plaintiff’s burden is a high one. The allegations in the Complaint simply do not rise to the level needed to maintain such a claim against Ocwen as a matter of law. See, e.g., Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828, 829, 412 S.E.2d 826, 827 3 In order to satisfy the intentional conduct requirement, the alleged conduct must be so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 409 S.E.2d 835, 837-38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). In other words, the conduct must be regarded as “atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Blue View Corp. v. Bell, 679 S.E.2d 739, 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness is a question of law for the Court to decide. Yarbray, 409 S.E.2d at 838. Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 11 of 14 12 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 (1992) (noting that “even malicious, wilful or wanton conduct will not warrant a recovery for the infliction of emotional distress if the conduct was not directed toward the plaintiff”). Even if the allegations are true (which is denied), what is described in the Complaint is not “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” See Yarbray, 409 S.E.2d at 838; Bell, 679 S.E.2d 739, 741. In other words, the allegations do not rise to the level required to maintain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law. Instead, the allegations merely suggest a commonplace business dispute between the parties, which does not give rise to such a claim. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. Moore, 238 Ga. App. 376, 378, 519 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1999) (“Sharp or sloppy business practices…are not generally considered as going beyond all reasonable bounds of decency as to be utterly intolerable in civilized society.”). As such, the fifth and final count of the Complaint should be dismissed. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Ocwen respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case against it with prejudice. Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 12 of 14 13 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 Dated: March 6, 2017. LOCKE LORD LLP /s/ John Michael Kearns Elizabeth J. Campbell Georgia Bar No. 349249 Email: ecampbell@lockelord.com John Michael Kearns Georgia Bar No. 142438 Email: john.kearns@lockelord.com Terminus 200, Suite 1200 3333 Piedmont Road NE Atlanta, GA 30305 (404) 870-4600 (404) 872-5547 (fax) Attorneys for Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 13 of 14 14 ATL:1006335/01603:544379v2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 6th day of March, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document by first-class mail to the following: Joyce M. Griggs 1 BaySprings Ct. Savannah, GA 31405 /s/ John Michael Kearns John Michael Kearns Georgia Bar No. 142438 One of the Attorneys for Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-1 Filed 03/06/17 Page 14 of 14 Redact Exhibit A - 1 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 1 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 2 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 2 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 3 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 3 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 4 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 4 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 5 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 5 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 6 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 6 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 7 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 7 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 8 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 8 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 9 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 9 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 10 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 10 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 11 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 11 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 12 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 12 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 13 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 13 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 14 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 14 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 15 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 15 of 20 Exhibit A - 16 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 16 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 17 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 17 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 18 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 18 of 20 Redact Redact Exhibit A - 19 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 19 of 20 Redact Exhibit A - 20 Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-2 Filed 03/06/17 Page 20 of 20 Redact Redact Redact Exhibit B Case 1:17-cv-00064-WSD Document 8-3 Filed 03/06/17 Page 1 of 1