Geiger et al v. Florida Hospital Memorial Medical Center et al

MOTION for judgment on the pleadings , and, in the Alternative,, MOTION for summary judgment as to Count III

M.D. Fla.December 15, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION RICHARD GEIGER and DENIS TWOMEY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Case No.: 6:16-cv-1477-37GJK v. FLORIDA HOSPITAL MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, ACCELERATED CLAIMS, INC. and HALIFAX HEALTH MEDICAL CENTER OF DAYTONA BEACH Defendants. _________________________________/ DEFENDANT, FLORIDA HOSPITAL MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER’S, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COUNT III COMES NOW the Defendant, FLORIDA HOSPITAL MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER (hereinafter “Defendant” or “Florida Hospital”), by and through its undersigned counsel and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and 56, hereby files its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III of the operative Complaint1, stating: 1 Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc 60-1] on November 28, 2016 to correct the name of Defendant, Halifax Hospital Medical Center. References to the Complaint in this motion refer to the operative Complaint. Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 1 of 15 PageID 319 2 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs initiated this class action lawsuit based on the allegation that the mere filing of a hospital lien pursuant to the Volusia County Lien Law violates Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”) and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Plaintiffs rely entirely on the alleged similarities between the Volusia County Lien Law, 1953 Fla. Laws 29591, and the Alachua County Lien Law, 1988 Fla. Laws 539, which was ruled unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 97 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 2012). To date, no court has ruled upon the constitutionality of the Volusia County Lien Law and the law remains in effect. Nonetheless, Plaintiff Geiger alleges that, by virtue of the Shands ruling invalidating the Alachua County Lien Law, Florida Hospital had actual knowledge that the Volusia County Lien Law was unconstitutional and that, accordingly, it had no legal right to file a hospital lien for the monies incurred in Geiger’s care. § 559.72(9), Fla. Stat. (2010). Florida Hospital asks the Court to rule as a matter of law that it could not have had actual knowledge that it had no legal right to assert a lien under the Volusia County Lien Law where no court has ever declared that law unconstitutional. Florida Hospital further asks the Court to determine that Plaintiff Geiger cannot assert a claim under the FCCPA as a matter of law because the mere filing of a hospital lien does not constitute collection activity but instead, the filing of a lien relates to the enforcement of a security interest. Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 2 of 15 PageID 320 3 II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 1. Plaintiff Geiger received medical care at Florida Hospital for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on or about January 27, 2016. 2. Following Plaintiff Geiger’s medical treatment, at least $1,840.75 in medical care expenses remained unpaid. 3. On February 1, 2016, Defendant Accelerated Claims, Inc., on behalf of Florida Hospital, recorded a lien for these expenses in the amount of at least $1,840.75. The lien named Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) as the party liable for the sum. [Exhibit 1 to Compl. [Doc 1 at 16]]. 4. The lien further stated that it was claimed pursuant to the Volusia County Lien Law, Chapter 53-29591. [Exhibit 1 to Compl. [Doc 1 at 16]]. 5. As of the date of this filing, no court of law has ever declared the Volusia County Lien Law unconstitutional. 6. As of the date of this filing, the Volusia County Lien Law has not been repealed or otherwise invalidated and remains in effect. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute, and judgment may be rendered by considering the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts. See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Florida Residential Property and Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir.1990)); see also Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. “When we review a judgment on the pleadings, therefore, we accept the facts Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 3 of 15 PageID 321 4 in the complaint as true and we view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” See Ortega, 85 F.3d at 1524 (citing Swerdloff v. Miami Nat’l Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir.1978)). The complaint may not be dismissed “ ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Slagle, 102 F.3d at 497 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101–02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) & citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2916–17, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993)). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may simply “[point] out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. After the movant has met its burden under Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the non- moving party to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). Although all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), he “must do more than simply show that there is some Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 4 of 15 PageID 322 5 metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleadings, but instead must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 587 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case on which he has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). IV. MEMORANDUM OF LAW A. Florida Hospital could not have had actual knowledge that the Volusia County Lien Law was unconstitutional because no court has ever declared that law unconstitutional Plaintiff’s theory of liability is insufficient as a matter of law because Florida Hospital cannot be held liable under Section 559.72(9) for filing a lien pursuant to a law that has never been repealed or declared unconstitutional. For this reason, Florida Hospital asks the Court to rule as a matter of law that it could not have had actual knowledge that it had no legal right to assert a lien under the Volusia County Lien Law where no court has ever declared that law unconstitutional. 1. The Volusia County Lien Law is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality In support of their claims, Plaintiffs misstate the breadth of the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Mercury Insurance Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 5 of 15 PageID 323 6 Company of Florida, 97 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 2012). The effect of that decision was to strike down the Alachua County Lien Law, 1988 Florida Laws 539 (hereinafter “Alachua County Lien Law”) as “a proscribed ‘special law’ pertaining to ‘liens based on private contracts’ under Article III, Section 11(a)(9) of the Florida Constitution.” Id. at 209. The Shands ruling did not, as Plaintiffs posited in their Response [Doc 57] to the pending motions to dismiss, invalidate all hospital lien laws created by special act. “Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and should be so construed if possible.” Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 441 So. 2d 627, 629 (Fla. 1983). It must be assumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid law. Lewis v. Leon County, 73 So. 3d 151, 153 (Fla. 2011). Therefore, “[s]hould any doubt exist that an act is in violation . . . of any constitutional provision, the presumption is in favor of constitutionality. To overcome the presumption, the invalidity must appear beyond reasonable doubt. . . .” Id. (internal citations omitted). The only direct effect of the Shands ruling upon the Volusia County Lien Law is to raise a possible question regarding its constitutionality. As with all legislative acts, the Volusia County Lien Law is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality until such time as it may be declared unconstitutional by a court of law. The specific question of constitutionality that was presented to the Shands court concerned the Alachua County Lien Law, contained in chapter 88-539, Laws of Florida.2 The Court was not asked to consider the constitutionality of the Volusia County Lien Law, 2 The Shands Court also considered the constitutionality of the Alachua County Hospital Lien Ordinance and a cross-appeal challenging the amount of damages and the award of attorneys’ fees. Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 6 of 15 PageID 324 7 contained in Chapter 53-29491. Indeed, the Volusia County Lien Law was never referenced in the Court’s opinion. It is axiomatic that an appellate court must confine itself to review of those questions presented to the trial court in the pleadings and evidence and properly preserved for appeal. Silver v. State, 188 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. 1966) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the Shands decision cannot possibly address the constitutionality of the Volusia County Lien Law because the only question before the Court concerned the constitutionality of the Alachua County Lien Law. Plaintiffs have improperly expanded the breadth of the Shands ruling by asserting that it was intended to encompass all lien laws created by special act. Plaintiffs rely almost entirely on their expanded interpretation of Shands to argue that the Volusia County Lien Law was unconstitutional at the time Florida Hospital filed the Geiger lien.3 As demonstrated above, however, Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Shands is inaccurate because the holding only addressed the Alachua County Lien Law. Therefore, the right to file a lien under the Volusia County Lien Law still existed at the time the Geiger lien was filed. As such, Florida Hospital did not assert a legal right that did not exist, in violation of Section 559.72(9), by filing the lien. In sum, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Shands did not invalidate the Volusia County Lien Law or declare that law unconstitutional. Its holding was limited to the Alachua County Lien Law. Although the Shands opinion may raise a question concerning the constitutionality of the Volusia County Lien Law, no court has yet declared 3 Plaintiffs have not cited any case directly addressing the constitutionality of the Volusia County Lien Law and undersigned counsel has been unable to locate any such case. Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 7 of 15 PageID 325 8 that law unconstitutional. Until such time as that may occur, the law is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and any legal right asserted thereunder cannot be held to violate Section 559.72(9). 2. Section 559.72(9) requires “actual knowledge” that the legal right asserted by the defendant did not exist In order to prevail under Section 559.72(9), Plaintiff Geiger must establish that Florida Hospital had actual knowledge that the Volusia County Lien Law is unconstitutional and that, accordingly, it had no legal right to assert a lien for Geiger’s medical care. As a matter of law, Plaintiff Geiger cannot meet this burden because the Volusia County Lien Law has never been declared unconstitutional. See Section IV.A.1, supra. It is well established that the FCCPA requires proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the impropriety or overreach of its claim; constructive knowledge is insufficient. McCorriston v. L.W.T., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Lamb, 409 B.R. 534, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2009). The statute does not define “actual knowledge,” however that term is commonly defined as “direct and clear knowledge, as distinguished from constructive knowledge.” Black’s Law Dictionary 403 (3d pocket ed. 1996); see also Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602, 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (noting that courts may determine the plain and ordinary meaning of a term not defined by the legislature by looking to case law, related statutory provisions which define the term, and the dictionary). Florida Hospital could not have had “direct and clear knowledge” that it had no legal rights under the Volusia County Lien Law because at the time it filed the lien that law Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 8 of 15 PageID 326 9 remained in effect and had never been declared unconstitutional. Presumably, Plaintiffs might oppose this point by citing the same theories mentioned in their Response [Doc 57] to the pending Motions to Dismiss. However, both of these theories fail. First, even if Plaintiff Geiger can establish that Florida Hospital had actual knowledge of the Shands decision, that ruling does not address the Volusia County Lien Law. That law is separate and distinct from the Alachua County Lien Law. As such, it is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality until a court of law determines otherwise. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 441 So. 2d 627, 629 (Fla. 1983). Second, the advisory opinion of the Volusia County Attorney General that the Volusia County Lien Law was probably unconstitutional is irrelevant to whether that law is, indeed, unconstitutional. The only body with the authority to declare unconstitutional an act of the Florida legislature is a court of law and no court has invalidated the Volusia County Lien Law. See State ex rel. Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 94 So. 681, 682 (Fla. 1922) (noting that the power to declare an act unconstitutional is lodged solely with the courts). Knowledge that the Volusia County Lien Law may be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge following Shands does not equate to actual knowledge that there is no right to assert a lien under that law. The law has never been repealed or invalidated. Therefore, there is no basis under which Plaintiff Geiger could prove that Florida Hospital had actual knowledge that it was not legally entitled to file a lien pursuant to that law. Accordingly, Plaintiff Geiger’s theory of liability is insufficient to state a claim under Section 559.72(9) as a matter of law. Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 9 of 15 PageID 327 10 B. The mere filing of a hospital lien does not constitute “collection activity” under the FCCPA but rather relates to the enforcement of a security interest The mere filing of a hospital lien does not fall within the purview of the FCCPA because it does not constitute collection activity. Florida Hospital supports and adopts the arguments raised on this issue by co-defendants Halifax Hospital Medical Center and Accelerated Claims, Inc. in their motions to dismiss. [Doc 51 at 6-9 & Doc 53 at 4-5]. As with the FDCPA, the FCCPA only regulates the collection of consumer debts. § 559.72(9), Fla. Stat. (“In collecting consumer debts, no person shall. . . .” (emphasis added)). Insofar as the filing of a hospital lien is not collection activity, it does not fall within the scope of the FCCPA. Florida Hospital further suggests that the filing of a hospital lien without a demand for payment from the debtor constitutes enforcement of a security interest and therefore is not subject to the FCCPA. There is extensive case law acknowledging that the purpose of a hospital lien is to preserve a creditor’s right and secure the underlying debt. See, e.g., Palm Springs Gen. Hosp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 793, 797-98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (noting that the logical interpretation of the purpose of a hospital lien law is “to assure a hospital of its rights to proceeds which are held by an insurance company whose insured is liable for the injuries suffered by the hospital’s patient.”). The filing of a hospital lien does not request or compel payment from the debtor. This fact was expressly relied upon by Florida’s First District Court of Appeal in Baker v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 115 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) when it concluded that the filing of a hospital lien did not constitute “debt collection.” The court determined that, instead, the filing of the lien was Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 10 of 15 PageID 328 11 part of the exercise of a legal remedy and served to notify the parties of the lienor’s secured interest.4 Florida Hospital would also point out that the lien filed against Plaintiff Geiger names GEICO insurance company, not Geiger, as the party liable for payment. Compl. [Doc 1] at Ex. 1, ¶ 3. This fact further strengthens Florida Hospital’s argument that the filing of the lien did not constitute collection activity directed at Plaintiff Geiger. The fact that the lien does not contain a demand for payment and names a third- party and not the plaintiff-debtor as the party liable for damages places the facts of this case directly on par with Hamilton v. Avectus Health Care Sols., LLC, 5:13-CV-01967- SGC, 2015 WL 5693610, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2015). In that case, the plaintiff asserted that the recording of a hospital lien constituted debt collection activity in violation of the FDCPA. The court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to classify the filing of the lien as a collection attempt for purposes of the FDCPA. Id. This conclusion rested on the fact that the lien did not include a demand for payment and named third-party insurers as the entities liable for the damages. Id. These facts are identical to the instant case and should compel the same conclusion regarding whether the filing of the Geiger lien constituted debt collection activity. 4 Plaintiffs have suggested that this ruling is immaterial to the court’s holding. [Doc 57 at 19]. To the contrary, the determination that the hospital lien did not constitute debt collection is germane to the ultimate holding that the filing of the lien falls outside the definition of “trade or commerce” subject to Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”). This is because the court considered the argument that debt collection was subject to FDUTPA. Although this decision was not reached within the context of the FCCPA, there is little case law addressing whether the filing of a hospital lien constitutes debt collection activity. Therefore, Florida Hospital urges the Court to consider the Baker ruling as highly persuasive. Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 11 of 15 PageID 329 12 The filing of a hospital lien can also be viewed as the enforcement of a security interest, thereby placing the activity outside the regulatory scope of the FCCPA so long as it is not accompanied by a collection effort. See Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A security interest is not a promise to pay a debt; it is an interest in some collateral that a lender can take if a debtor does not fulfill a payment obligation.”); Pub. Health Trust of Dade County v. Carroll, 509 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (noting that a lienor or creditor is unsecured until such time as the hospital lien is filed). This Circuit has distinguished between the collection of a debt and the enforcement of a security interest for purposes of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 Fed. Appx. 458, 460 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that enforcer of security interest is not subject to FDCPA with limited exception under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f) (unpublished). That distinction also applies to preclude an FCCPA claim based on activity that solely relates to the enforcement of a security interest. See Trent v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that rationale espoused under FDCPA precedent should apply with equal force to FCCPA cases); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Siefker, 201 So. 3d 811, 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that whether a mortgage foreclosure suit amounts to debt collection under the FCCPA depends on factual circumstances outlined by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Warren v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 342 Fed. Appx. 458, 460 (11th Cir. 2009)). Although this exception is generally applied to mortgage foreclosures, a comparison can be drawn to the filing of a hospital lien to the extent both are secured interests. As property serves as collateral to a mortgage, a hospital lien secures the right to Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 12 of 15 PageID 330 13 payment by prioritizing it against any future payments by the tortfeasor. This analogy is supported by the Baker court ruling that, under Florida law, the filing of a hospital lien is part of the exercise of a legal remedy and not a debt collection effort. Baker v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 115 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Insofar as the lien did not contain and was not accompanied by any demand to Plaintiff Geiger for payment, it is better categorized as the enforcement of a security interest rather than a collection effort. Cf. Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (discussing circumstances where a communication can serve dual purposes of enforcing a security interest and collecting a debt). It thus falls outside the scope of the FCCPA. V. CONCLUSION Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count III of the operative Complaint asserting a violation of Section 559.72(9). The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 97 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 2012) did not rule upon the constitutionality of the Volusia County Lien Law. Insofar as that law has not been repealed or declared unconstitutional by any court, Florida Hospital could not have had actual knowledge, as required under Section 559.72(9), that it had no legal right to assert a lien under that law. Moreover, the mere filing of a hospital lien does not constitute collection activity under the FCCPA. Therefore, the filing of the lien is not subject to that statute even if Plaintiff Geiger could establish a question of material fact as to the constitutionality of the lien law or Florida Hospital’s actual knowledge regarding the right to assert the lien. Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 13 of 15 PageID 331 14 WHEREFORE, Defendant, FLORIDA HOSPITAL MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, respectfully requests that the Court GRANT its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III of the operative Complaint with prejudice. Dated this 15th day of December, 2016. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Ernest H. Kohlmyer, III Ernest H. Kohlmyer, III Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 14 of 15 PageID 332 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been electronically filed on December 15, 2016, via the Court Clerk’s CM/ECF system which will provide notice to the following attorneys of record: Jordan M. Lewis, Esquire at Jordan@jml-lawfirm.com, Michael D. Walrath, Esquire at MWalrath@medicalbillclinic.com, and Steve Sands, Esquire at steve@sandswhitesands.com (Attorneys for Plaintiff); Suzanne Y. Labrit, Esq. at slabrit@shutts.com, Ella Shenhav, Esq. at eshenhav@shutts.com, and Kathleen M. Krak, Esq. at kkrak@shutts.com (Attorneys for Defendant, Accelerated Claims, Inc.); and Judith M. Mercier, Esq. at judy.mercier@hklaw.com, and Suzanne E. Gilbert, Esq. at suzanne.gilbert@hklaw.com (Attorneys for Defendant, Halifax Hospital Medical Center). /s/ Ernest H. Kohlmyer, III Ernest H. Kohlmyer, III Florida Bar No.: 110108 kohlmyer@urbanthier.com Rachel M. Ortiz, Esq. Florida Bar No.: 0083842 ortiz@urbanthier.com Urban, Thier & Federer, P.A. 200 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 2000 Orlando, FL 32801 Telephone: (407) 245-8352 Facsimile: (407) 245-8361 Attorneys for Defendant, Florida Hospital Memorial Medical Center Case 6:16-cv-01477-RBD-GJK Document 62 Filed 12/15/16 Page 15 of 15 PageID 333