Friend v. First Premier Bank

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

M.D. Pa.May 25, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA HARRISBURG DIVISION RONALD FRIEND, Plaintiff, v. FIRST PREMIER BANK, Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : : : : CIVIL ACTION LAW NO. 1:17-CV-00889 The Honorable John E. Jones, III Electronically Filed MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT Defendant First Premier Bank hereby moves to dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff Ronald Friend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In support of this Motion, First Premier Bank relies on the accompanying Brief, which is incorporated herein by reference. Dated: May 25, 2017 /s/ Daniel JT McKenna Daniel JT McKenna (PA 93930) mckennad@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.865.8500 Facsimile: 215.864.8999 Attorneys for Defendant First Premier Bank Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 1 of 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA HARRISBURG DIVISION RONALD FRIEND, Plaintiff, v. FIRST PREMIER BANK, Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : : : : CIVIL ACTION LAW NO. 1:17-CV-00889 The Honorable John E. Jones, III ORDER AND NOW, this ___ day of __________, 2017, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and any response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. ____________________________ The Honorable John E. Jones, III United States District Judge Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-1 Filed 05/25/17 Page 1 of 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA HARRISBURG DIVISION RONALD FRIEND, Plaintiff, v. FIRST PREMIER BANK, Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : : : : CIVIL ACTION LAW NO. 1:17-CV-00889 The Honorable John E. Jones, III Electronically Filed BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT Dated: May 25, 2017 /s/ Daniel JT McKenna Daniel JT McKenna (PA 93930) mckennad@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.865.8500 Facsimile: 215.864.8999 Attorneys for Defendant First Premier Bank Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 1 of 11 i Table of Contents Page I. INTRODUCTION. .......................................................................................... 2 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS. ..................... 2 III. STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED. ............................................. 3 IV. ARGUMENT. .................................................................................................. 4 A. Standard Of Review. ............................................................................. 4 B. The FDCPA Does Not Apply To First Premier. ................................... 4 C. Plaintiff’s FDCPA Claims Also Fail As Insufficient. ........................... 7 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 7 Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 2 of 11 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) FEDERAL CASES Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (U.S. 2009) .................................................................................. 4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................. 4 Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 2004) ................................................................................. 6 F.T.C. v. Check Enforcement, 2005 WL 1677480 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005) ........................................................... 5 Levy-Tatum v. Navient & Sallie Mae Bank, No. 15-3794, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2016) .................... 6 Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997) ................................................................................. 4 Nobile v. United States Bank Nat'l Ass’n, No. 1:15-CV-01102, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1110 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2016) ..................................................................................................................... 7 Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3rd Cir. 2000) ........................................................................ 4, 5, 6 Prince v NCO Financial Services, Inc., 346 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ...................................................................... 5 Souders v. Bank of Am., No. 1:12-CV-10742013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157753 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013) ..................................................................................................................... 7 United States v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 823 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................ 5 Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 3 of 11 iii STATE CASES CitiBank v. Bennett, No. CV106002153S, 2011 WL 3427224 (Conn. Super. July 13, 2011) .............. 6 FEDERAL STATUTES 15 U.S.C. § 1692a ...................................................................................................... 5 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) ................................................................................................. 6 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) ................................................................................................. 3 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) ................................................................................................. 3 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) ................................................................................................. 5 RULES Rule 12(b)(6) .............................................................................................................. 4 Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 4 of 11 2 Defendant First Premier Bank (“First Premier”), through its undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Ronald Friend (“Plaintiff”). I. INTRODUCTION. Plaintiff has filed a meritless Complaint against First Premier devoid of any merit or factual support. Plaintiff’s cookie cutter Complaint claims First Premier violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) as a result of its purported communications to credit reporting agencies. Via these claims, Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages, attorney’s fees and injunctive relief. However, the FDCPA does not apply to First Premier. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS. In June of 2014, Plaintiff obtained a credit card account from First Premier.1 Compl. at Ex. 1. Via use of this credit card, Plaintiff incurred a debt owed to First Premier. Id. On or about April 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against First Premier in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, 1 For purposes of this Motion only, First Premier accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true. Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 5 of 11 3 which was captioned Ronald Friend v. First Premier Bank, Docket No. 2017-SU- 001047. The Complaint alleges two violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) as a result of First Premier’s alleged communications to Credit Reporting Agencies (“CRAs”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that First Premier violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) for failure to “issue the notifications required by the statute” and (2) that First Premier violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) “[b]y continuing collection activity, including by not limited to the placing of derogatory information on Plaintiff’s consumer credit report, without verifying the debt in question to the consumer. . . .” Compl. at ¶¶ 33, 38. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees and injunctive relief. Compl. at Wherefore clause. First Premier removed the State Court Action to this Court on May 19, 2017 by filing its Notice of Removal. Dkt. at Doc. No. 1. First Premier now moves to dismiss the Complaint. III. STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED. 1) Whether Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fails as a matter of law because the FDCPA does not apply to First Premier? Suggested Answer: Yes. Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 6 of 11 4 IV. ARGUMENT. A. Standard Of Review. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (U.S. 2009). Under Rule 12(b)(6), “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.” Id. A plaintiff cannot rely upon unsupported legal conclusions, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“on a motion to dismiss, courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’”). B. The FDCPA Does Not Apply To First Premier. The FDCPA regulates the collection practices of debt collectors and applies only to debt collectors. Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3rd Cir. 2000). The FDCPA does not apply to original creditors seeking Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 7 of 11 5 reimbursement of their own debt. Id. Whether a defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA is a question of law that is appropriate for determination at the motion to dismiss stage. Id.; F.T.C. v. Check Enforcement, 2005 WL 1677480, *6 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005); Prince v NCO Financial Services, Inc., 346 F.Supp.2d 744, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2004). Thus, whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against First Premier depends initially on whether First Premier is a debt collector under the FDCPA. The FDCPA defines a debt collector as: Any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. As the terms “principal purpose” and “regularly” imply, the FDCPA was designed to target a certain class and type of debt collectors—namely, independent debt collectors. The purpose of the FDCPA is “to prevent abusive collection practices and Congress identified independent debt collectors as the ‘prime source of egregious collection practices.’” United States v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 823 F.2d 880, 880-81 (5th Cir. 1987). It is well settled that a creditor collecting its own debt is not a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Pollice, 225 F.3d at Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 8 of 11 6 403. Here, Plaintiff concedes that he obtained a credit card account from First Premier. Compl. First Premier is, therefore, not a debt collector under the FDCPA.2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). Accordingly, First Premier cannot be liable under the FDCPA and Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against First Premier fails as a matter of law.3 See Pollice, 225 F.3d at 405; see also Levy-Tatum v. Navient & Sallie Mae Bank, No. 15-3794, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2016) (dismissing FDCPA claim with prejudice because complaint failed to include factual matter supporting its legal assertion that defendant was a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA). 2 The Court should reject Plaintiff’s allegation that First Premier is a debt collector because it is an unsubstantiated legal conclusion. See Pollice, 225 F.3d at 403 (whether a defendant is a debt collector under the FDCPA is a conclusion of law); Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729, 733 (3d Cir. 2004) (A court “should reject … ‘sweeping legal conclusions in the form of factual allegations’”). 3 The prohibition against applying the FDCPA to entities other than debt collectors is so strict that to be vicariously liable under the FDCPA a defendant must still be a debt collector. Pollice, 225 F.3d at 405; see also Rogers, 2011 WL 873312, at *4 (party must be a debt collector to be vicariously liable for FDCPA violations of debt collector); CitiBank v. Bennett, No. CV106002153S, 2011 WL 3427224, at *2 (Conn. Super. July 13, 2011) (same). Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 9 of 11 7 C. Plaintiff’s FDCPA Claims Also Fail As Insufficient. Plaintiff's FDCPA claim also fails because it is grounded in bare- boned legal conclusions that are insufficient to state a cognizable claim under the FDCPA. See Nobile v. United States Bank Nat'l Ass’n, No. 1:15-CV-01102, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1110, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2016) (dismissing FDCPA claim where plaintiff “merely offers a formulaic recitation of acts prohibited by the FDCPA and concludes, without specifying the content or nature of Defendants’ abusive debt collection practices, that Defendants violated the FDCPA”); Souders v. Bank of Am., No. 1:12-CV-10742013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157753, at *16-17 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013) (dismissing FDCPA claim that was based on a conclusory allegation that the debt was being validated). Here, Plaintiff fails to specify the factual basis of his claims and instead offers vagaries apparently designed to fit his claim within the purview of the statute. That is improper, and Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations should be rejected. V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, First Premier respectfully requests that this Honorable Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Respectfully submitted, Dated: May 25, 2017 /s/ Daniel JT McKenna Daniel JT McKenna (PA 93930) mckennad@ballardspahr.com Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 10 of 11 8 BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.865.8500 Facsimile: 215.864.8999 Attorneys for Defendant First Premier Bank Certification Pursuant to Local Rule 7.8 I certify that Defendant’s Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss complies with Local Rule 7.8(b)(2) because the word count of the brief does not exceed 5,000 words. The brief contains 1,645 words. Dated: May 25, 2017 /s/ Daniel JT McKenna Daniel JT McKenna (PA 93930) mckennad@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.865.8500 Facsimile: 215.864.8999 Attorneys for Defendant First Premier Bank Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-2 Filed 05/25/17 Page 11 of 11 DMEAST #29561192 v3 Certification Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 In compliance with Local Rule 7.1, counsel for Defendant First Premier Bank met and conferred with Plaintiff to inquire whether he concurs to the relief requested in the Motion to Dismiss. By email dated May 25, 2017, Plaintiff stated that he does not concur with the relief requested in the Motion to Dismiss. Dated: May 25, 2017 /s/ Daniel JT McKenna Daniel JT McKenna (PA 93930) mckennad@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.865.8500 Facsimile: 215.864.8999 Attorneys for Defendant First Premier Bank Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-3 Filed 05/25/17 Page 1 of 1 DMEAST #29561192 v3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this date I caused to be served a copy of Defendant First Premier Bank’s Motion to Dismiss upon Plaintiff via U.S. Mail at the address listed below and Email: Joseph T. Sucec, Esq. 325 Peach Glen-Idaville Road Gardners, PA 17324 joesucec@comcast.net Counsel for Plaintiff Date: May 25, 2017 /s/ Daniel JT McKenna Daniel JT McKenna (PA 93930) Case 1:17-cv-00889-JEJ Document 2-4 Filed 05/25/17 Page 1 of 1