The People, Appellant,v.Rebecca Guthrie, Respondent.BriefN.Y.February 19, 2015 To Be Argued: JAMES S. KERNAN, ESQ. Wayne County Public Defender By ANDREW D. CORREIA, ESQ. Assistant Public Defender Estimated Time: 10 Minutes State of New York Court of Appeals ___________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -vs- REBECCA GUTHRIE, Appellant. ___________________________________________________ BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT APL-2014-00043 JAMES S. KERNAN, ESQ. WAYNE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER By RICHARD W. YOUNGMAN, ESQ. Assistant Public Defender Attorney for Appellant 26 Church Street Lyons, New York 14489 Tel: (315) 946-7472 ORIGINAL i Table of Contents Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................ ii Questions Presented....................................................................................................... 1 Statement of Facts .......................................................................................................... 2 Point 1 ................................................................................................................................ 4 THE TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE STOP OF THE DEFENDANT WAS CORRECT. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 10 ii Table of Authorities Cases Byer v Jackson, 241 A D2d 943 (4th Dept 1997) ........................................................... 8 Malcomson v Scott, 23 NW 166 (Mich 1885) ................................................................. 6 Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961) ....................................................................................... 9 People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 (1985) ......................................................................... 5, 9 People v Estrella, 48 AD3d 1283 (4th Dept 2008) ................................................... 5, 6 People v Gonzalez, 88 NY2d 289 (1996) .......................................................................... 8 People v Reynolds, 185 Misc 2d 674 (Monroe County Court) ................................. 8 People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 (2001) ...................................................................... 4, 6 People v Rose, 67 AD3d 1447 (4th Dept 2009) ............................................................. 8 People v Smith, 67 AD3d 1392 (4th Dept 2009) ............................................................ 8 People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749 (1995) ............................................................................. 5 People v Weaver, 16 NY3d 123 (2011) ................................................................................ 6 United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984) ......................................................................... 5 United States v Twilley, 222 F3d 1092 (9th Cir 2000) ................................................. 8 United States. v Whren, 517 US 806 (1996) ...................................................................... 4 Statutes Newark Village Code § 146.46 ....................................................................................... 7 Newark Village Code. § 140-17. Stop intersections ................................................. 7 Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1100 (b) ............................................................................... 6 Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) ........................................................................... 2, 3 Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192 (2) ............................................................................ 2, 3 Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 1172 (a) .......................................................................... 2, 7 1 Questions Presented 1. WHETHER THE STOP OF THE DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT’S PERSON WERE LEGAL WHERE THE STOP WAS PREDICATED ON DEFENDANT FAILING TO STOP AT AN UNAUTHORIZED ILLEGALLY PLACED STOP SIGN. ANSWER BELOW: NO 2 Statement of Facts Rebecca Guthrie was arrested on September 27, 2009, at approximately 12:15 AM by an officer of the Newark Village Police Department for Failure to Stop at a Stop Sign in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172 (a) and Driving While Intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §§1192 (2) and (3). (People’s Appendix, A12-A14.) Ms. Guthrie was traveling northbound in a parking lot when first observed by the arresting officer. The stop sign in question is located at the edge of a parking lot that exits where Finch Street and Miller Street intersect. (People’s Appendix, A8.) Following the filing of a defense motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to certain facts including that the basis for the officer’s stop of defendant’s vehicle was defendant’s failure to stop at the stop sign. (People’s Appendix, A7 – A8.) Additionally, the trial court took judicial notice of the Newark Village Code and the location of the stop sign in question. On December 31, 2009, the trial court issued a written decision dismissing the simplified traffic information alleging Failure to Stop at a Stop Sign in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172 (a) because the stop sign in question was, under the law, not a stop sign. (People’s Appendix, A5.) The trial court also suppressed the evidence seized in reference to the Driving 3 While Intoxicated charges for lack of probable cause to stop the vehicle and dismissed the simplified traffic informations alleging Driving While Intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §§1192 (2) and (3). (People’s Appendix, A5.) The People appealed the trial court decision to Wayne County Court and Hon. John B. Nesbitt affirmed the trial court decision suppressing the evidence and dismissing the case finding that the officer’s good faith cannot override the irregularities in the law and that apart from the failure to stop at the unauthorized stop sign no issues of public safety were implicated or other legal violations were observed warranting further inquiry. 4 Point 1 THE TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE STOP OF THE DEFENDANT WAS CORRECT. In this case, the District Attorney argues that because the officer acted in good faith in stopping the defendant’s vehicle, that the stop was lawful, that the subsequent arrest of the defendant for Driving While Intoxicated was valid and that the evidence seized should not have been suppressed. He argues that the officer in this case had a reasonable suspicion that the Vehicle and Traffic Law had been violated and thus the officer was justified in stopping Ms. Guthrie’s vehicle. United States. v Whren, 517 US 806 (1996) and People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 (2001), cited by the District Attorney as authority, are pretextual stop cases dealing with situations where the officer stopped a vehicle for a valid violation of the traffic laws of the jurisdiction, but in reality intended to investigate matters other than the traffic violation. This is not the situation in this case. The officer here stopped the vehicle solely because the officer believed that Ms. Guthrie failed to stop at a validly place stop sign. As stipulated by the District Attorney, the stop sign was not a legally valid stop sign. What the District Attorney is actually arguing is not that the stop was justified by the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the Vehicle and 5 Traffic Law had been violated, but that the stop was made in the good faith belief that the Vehicle and Traffic Law had been violated. This Court has rejected the good faith exception promulgated in the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984), on state constitutional grounds. In People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 (1985), the court stated that if the good faith exception was adopted, "the exclusionary rule's purpose would be completely frustrated, a premium [would be] placed on the illegal police action and a positive incentive [would be] provided to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future." The court, therefore, rejected police stops of automobiles except in the cases of routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce valid traffic regulations …” (see, People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749 [1995].) (Emphasis added.) The District Attorney argues that the officer was reasonable in believing that the defendant violated the law by failing to stop at a stop sign. The District Attorney cites People v Estrella, 48 AD3d 1283 (4th Dept 2008); affirmed 10 NY3d 945 (2008); lv denied 555 US 1032 (2008) in support of their position. In that case, this Court affirmed the Appellate Division decision that upheld the denial of a suppression motion based on lack of reasonable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had occurred. In that case, the Court determined that a New York police officer “was not chargeable with 6 knowledge that the tinting was legal in Georgia, where the car was registered.” (Estrella at 946.) In this case, the officer was a Village of Newark Police officer and the purported stop sign in question was located within the Village of Newark. While it may not be reasonable to expect a New York police officer to know the law in another state, it is certainly reason able to expect that the office know the law in the jurisdiction which he patrols. This Court has characterized the Village of Newark as a “small village.” (People v Weaver, 16 NY3d 123 [2011].) A Village police officer should be fully familiar with the traffic control devices placed in his small village. As the Michigan Supreme Court observed in 1885: “An officer of justice is bound to know what the law is, and if the facts on which he proceeds, if true, would not justify action under the law, he is a wrong-doer.” (Malcomson v Scott, 23 NW 166, 168 (Mich 1885.) In making a determination of probable cause, neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant.” (Robinson, 97 NY2d 341.) The sole question is whether the defendant did, in fact, violate the Vehicle and Traffic Law. In this case, she did not. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1100 (b) provides that: 7 “The provisions of this title relating to obedience to stop signs, flashing signals, yield signs, traffic-control signals and other traffic-control devices, and to one-way, stopping, standing, parking and turning regulations shall apply to a parking lot only when the legislative body of any city, village or town has adopted a local law, ordinance, rule or regulation ordering such signs, signals, devices, or regulations.” (Emphasis added). It is stipulated that the stop sign is not validly registered under the Newark Village Code in contravention of the above statute. Newark Village Code § 140-17 Stop intersections states that “[T]he intersections described in Schedule IX (§ 140-46), attached to and made a part of this chapter, are hereby designated as stop intersections. Stop signs shall be installed as provided therein.” Newark Village Code § 146.46 lists the authorized stop signs for village streets. The stop sign passed at the intersection is question is not listed. Therefore, by law, it is not a stop sign subject to the provisions of § 1172 (a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. In this case, the officer made a mistake of law, not of fact. Police mistakes of law have been deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. While police are forgiven for their reasonable mistakes of fact, they are not forgiven for their mistakes of substantive law — even if reasonable. A seizure based on a “belief that a law has been broken,” as the Seventh Circuit has noted, “when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable,” triggering application of the exclusionary rule. (See, 8 eg, United States v Twilley, 222 F3d 1092 (9th Cir 2000).) “[An officer’s] belief based on a mistaken understanding of the law cannot constitute the reasonable suspicion required for a constitutional traffic stop.” (Twilley at 1096; see also, People v Gonzalez, 88 NY2d 289 [1996].) This is exactly the type of case covered by People v Rose, 67 AD3d 1447 (4th Dept 2009), Byer v Jackson, 241 AD2d 943 (4th Dept 1997) and People v Smith, 67 AD3d 1392 (4th Dept 2009). In each of the cases cited, the officer was found to have misinterpreted the law. This case is no different. In this case, the officer misinterpreted the law by acting on his belief that every stop sign is a legally posted stop sign. The fact in this case is that the defendant failed to stop at a stop sign. The mistake of law is that it was not a stop sign, but a legal nullity. A good faith belief by the officer that there was a violation of the vehicle and traffic law, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. (Byers, 241 AD2d 943; People v Reynolds, 185 Misc 2d 674 [Monroe County Court]]). Under the District Attorney’s interpretation, any business owner could place a stop sign or any other traffic control device in the lanes of his private parking lot and the police would then be justified in stopping any vehicle that disobeyed such illegal, non-authorized traffic control device. 9 Likewise, any local jurisdiction could place speed limit signs on State highways because they wished to regulate the speed through their village, town or county and the police would then be justified in stopping any vehicle that disobeyed such illegal, non-authorized traffic control device. Such stops are mistakes of law, not of fact and are thus unreasonable seizures, and any and all evidence resulting should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. (Mapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417) 10 Conclusion This Court should affirm the decision of the Newark Village Court and the Wayne County Court. Dated: July 30, 2014 JAMES S. KERNAN, ESQ. WAYNE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER By Richard W. Youngman, Esq. Assistant Public Defender Attorney for Appellant 26 Church Street Lyons, New York 14489 Tel: (315) 946-7472