In the Matter of Roseann Kilduff, Respondent,v.Rochester City School District, et al., Appellants.BriefN.Y.October 16, 2014To be Argued by: CARA M. BRIGGS (Time Requested: 15 Minutes) APL-2013-00296 Appellate Division Docket No. CA 12-02040 Monroe County Clerk’s Index No. 2012-0584 Court of Appeals of the State of New York ROSEANN KILDUFF, Petitioner-Respondent, – against – ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and DR. BOLGEN VARGAS, in his capacity as acting Superintendent of the Rochester City School District, Respondents-Appellants. REPLY BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS EDWIN LOPEZ-SOTO, GENERAL COUNSEL ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT Cara M. Briggs, Esq., of Counsel Attorneys for Respondents-Appellants 131 West Broad Street, 2 nd Floor Rochester, New York 14614 Tel.: (585) 262-8412 Fax: (585) 262-8625 Dated: February 19, 2014 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................ ii POINT I RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY PURSUASIVE ARGUMENTS TO COUNTER APPELLANTS’ INTERPRETATION OF NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW §3020-... 1 POINT II RESPONDENT’S BRIEF FURTHER EMPHASIZES THE CONFUSION WITH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, REQUIRING A THOROUGH CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY .................................................................... 2 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 3 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES McGaffin v. City of Cohoes, 74 N.Y. 387 (1878) ................................................................................. 2 Prof'l Staff Cong.-City Univ. of New York v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 7 N.Y.3d 458 (2006) ................................. 2 STATUTE New York Education Law §3020 ..................................................................... passim 1 ARGUMENT POINT I RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY PURSUASIVE ARGUMENTS TO COUNTER APPELLANTS’ INTERPRETATION OF NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW §3020-a Respondent Kilduff spends several pages citing to case law from 1981 or earlier to establish that Respondent is a tenured teacher subject to the requirements of New York Education Law §3020-a (Response Brief, pp. 4-8). That fact has never been in dispute. Appellants, instead, contend that the collective bargaining agreement between Respondent’s union and the Rochester City School District provides that Respondent is only entitled to the procedures under section 3020-a if the District is terminating Respondent. For all discipline less than termination, such as the suspension Respondent is contesting in this matter, the grievance and arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining agreement are used. Such an agreement between a teachers’ union and school district is permitted by New York Education Law §3020(1), as was done in this case. Respondent has failed to present any persuasive argument to counter Appellants’ arguments in their appeal brief. 2 POINT II RESPONDENT’S BRIEF FURTHER EMPHASIZES THE CONFUSION WITH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, REQUIRING A THOROUGH CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Respondent attempts to explain that the plain meaning of the contested portion of section 3020(1) is apparent through a review of the grammar in the clauses that are unclear. In so doing, Respondent focuses on a few words in isolation, rather than the context of the statute as a whole. Respondent is emphasizing form over substance, and ignoring the best source for interpreting this vague language, the legislative intent. The obvious analytical tool to use when faced with an unclear statute is the legislative history and similar sources of the drafters’ intent. Prof'l Staff Cong.-City Univ. of New York v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 7 N.Y.3d 458, 467 (2006); McGaffin v. City of Cohoes, 74 N.Y. 387 (1878). As Appellants established in their brief, the legislative history indicates a clear intent in support of Appellant’s argument that the statute grandfathers in any alternate discipline process as long as that alternate discipline process remains unchanged throughout subsequent amendments to the collective bargaining agreement in which it is included. (Appellants’ Brief, pp. 14-17, Addendum). That is likely why Respondent failed to provide any analysis of the legislative history of the contested provision that Appellants analyzed in their brief. Since the Fourth Department failed to consider the legislative history, as Respondent does in its response brief, and the legislative history supports Appellants' interpretation of section 3020(1), the Court should reverse the Fourth Department's decision. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully request that the Court reverse the Fourth Department Appellate Division's decision and reinstate the Monroe County Supreme Court's decision. Dated: Rochester, New York February 19, 2014 EDWIN LOPEZ-SOTO, GENERAL COUNSEL Attorneys for Respondents-Appellants Steven G. Carling, Esq., Counsel Rochester City School strict l31 West Broad Street Rochester, New York 14614 Telephone: (585) 262-8412 Email: steven.carling@rcsdkI2.org 3