In the Matter of Baldwin Union Free School District, et al., Respondents,v.County of Nassau, Appellant. (And an Action and Another Proceeding.)BriefN.Y.January 7, 2014APL-2013-00069 To Be Argued By: DAVID N. YAFFE Time Requested: 30 Minutes Court of Appeals j^tate of Sfeui ffiork BALDWIN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Respondents, - against - COUNTY OF NASSAU, Respondent/Defendant-Respondent. (Nassau County Index Nos. 3280-11, 4193-11, and 4381-11) (FULL CAPTIONS ON FOLLOWING PAGES) RESPONDENTS' BRIEF HAMBURGER, MAXSON, YAFFE, KNAUER & McNALLY, LLP Attorneys for Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Respondents in Proceeding No. 1 225 Broadhollow Road, Suite 30IE Melville, New York 11747 631.694.2400 OfCounsel: RICHARD HAMBURGER, ESQ. DAVID N. YAFFE, ESQ. August 7, 2013 APL-2013-00069 X BALDWIN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, BELLMORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, BETHPAGE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, CARLE PLACE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, EAST MEADOW UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, EAST ROCKAWAY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, EAST WILLISTON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ELMONT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, FARMINGDALE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, FLORAL PARK-BELLEROSE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, FRANKLIN SQUARE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, FREEPORT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, GARDEN CITY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, GREAT NECK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, HERRICKS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, HEWLETT-WOODMERE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ISLAND PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ISLAND TREES UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, JERICHO UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, LEVITTOWN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, LYNBROOK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, MANHASSET UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, MASSAPEQUA UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERRICK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, NORTH BELLMORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, NORTH SHORE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, OCEANSIDE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, OYSTER BAY-EAST NORWICH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, PLAINEDGE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, PLAINVIEW-OLD BETHPAGE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, PORT WASHINGTON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROCKVILLE CENTRE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROSLYN UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, SEAFORD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, UNIONDALE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, VALLEY STREAM CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, VALLEY STREAM UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT THIRTEEN, VALLEY STREAM UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT THIRTY, WEST HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, WESTBURY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, RANIER W. MELUCCI, Ed.D., Individually and as Superintendent of the Merrick Union Free School District, and CATHERINE FLANAGAN, Individually and as President of the Board of Education of the Plainedge Union Free School District, Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Respondents, - against - COUNTY OF NASSAU, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant. For Declaratory Judgment and Relief Pursuant to Section 3001 and Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New York. -X Proceeding No. 1 Nassau County Index No.: 3280/11 X BARBARA HAFNER and LINDA WIENER, Plaintiffs-Respondents, -against- COUNTY OF NASSAU, NASSAU COUNTY LEGISLATURE, and EDWARD P. MANGANO, in his capacity as County Executive of the County of Nassau, Defendants-Appellants. X In the Matter ofTHE TOWN OF NORTH HEMPSTEAD, ALBERTSON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, CARLE PLACE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, FLORAL PARK CENTRE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, GLENWOOD FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, GREAT NECK FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, PORT WASHINGTON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, ROSLYN FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, ALBERTSON-SEARINGTOWN-HERRICKS GARBAGE DISTRICT, GREAT NECK GARBAGE DISTRICT, MANHASSET GARBAGE DISTRICT, NEW CASSEL GARBAGE DISTRICT, NEW HYDE PARK-GARDEN CITY PARK GARBAGE DISTRICT, NORTH HEMPSTEAD LIGHTING DISTRICT, HARBOR HILLS PARK DISTRICT, MANHASSET BAY PARK DISTRICT, NEW HYDE PARK-CLINTON G. MARTIN PARK DISTRICT, PORT WASHINGTON PUBLIC PARKING DISTRICT, TOWN OF NORTH HEMPSTEAD SIDEWALK DISTRICT and GREAT NECK WATER DISTRICT, For aJudgment Pursuant to Article 78 and §3001 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules -against- THE COUNTY OF NASSAU, Petitioners-Plaintiffs, Respondent-Defendant. -X Proceeding No. 2 Nassau County Index No.: 4193/11 Proceeding No. 3 Nassau County Index No.: 4381/11 RULE 500.13(A) STATEMENT There is no other litigation pending between the parties related to Nassau County Local Law 18-2010, entitled "The Common Sense Act of 2010," which is the sole subject of these three proceedings/actions. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 JURISDICTIONAL COUNTER-STATEMENT 3 COUNTER-QUESTIONS PRESENTED 5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 A. Governing Constitutional and Municipal Home Rule Law Provisions 6 B. Early Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Regarding Municipal Home Rule and the Power of Local Legislation 12 1. Historic County Powers Of Local Legislation 12 2. The 1894 and 1923 City Home Rule Amendments To The Constitution 14 3. The 1935 County Home Rule Amendment To The Constitution 16 C. The Nassau County Charter 19 1. The 1936 Legislation Establishing The Form Of Charter 19 2. The 1937 Amendment To The Nassau County Charter, And Subsequent Related Amendments 23 D. The 1948 Statutes Enacting The County Guaranty 30 E. Subsequent Statutory Enactments Preserving The County Guaranty Provisions 34 F. The County's Prior Unsuccessful Attempts To Undo The County Guaranty 36 G. The Enactment Of Local Law 18-2010 37 H. Procedural History 39 I. Nassau County Supreme Court Order 41 J. Appellate Division Decision 8c Order 42 POINT I THE NASSAU COUNTY CHARTER DID NOT DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO ENACT LOCAL LAWS THAT SUPERCEDE STATE LAWS RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY TAX REFUND OBLIGATIONS, OR THAT AFFECT THE MAINTENANCE OR SUPPORT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 44 A. A Municipality's Authority To Enact Local Laws Is Derived Only From An Express Grant Of Power From The State To Act With Respect To A Given Specific Subject 45 n 1. The Browne Case - Powers Of Local Lawmaking Are Strictly Construed And Express Delegation Is Required For Local Lawmaking Power That "Departs" From The Range Of "Established And Familiar" Powers 46 2. The Clark Case - "Including But Not Limited To" Powers Of Local Legislation Delegated To A City Are Insufficient To Overcome The Requirement Of Express Delegation For A "Departure" From Ordinary City Functions 49 3. The County Securities Case - Delegation Of Authority To Assess And Collect Taxes Is Insufficient To Authorize City To Change Tax Law Embodied In City Charter 50 4. The Carodix Corporation Case Amendment Providing Express Delegation Of Power To Collect Taxes Through The Sale Of Tax Liens Is Sufficient To Support A City Local Law Providing For Same 52 B. The County Charter Granted No Express Power To Enact Local Laws Inconsistent With State Tax Laws Or Affecting The Maintenance And Support Of Public Education 54 in POINT II LOCAL LAW 18 VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW FORBIDDING THE ENACTMENT OF LOCAL LAWS RELATING TO THE LEVY, COLLECTION, ADMINISTRATION, DISTRIBUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LOCAL TAXES INCONSISTENT WITH STATE SPECIAL LAWS, AND AFFECTING THE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 59 A. Local Law 18 Violates The Constitutional And MHRL Restrictions Governing The Enactment Of Local Laws Relating To The Levy, Collection, Administration, Distribution And Judicial Review of Local Taxes 59 B. Local Law 18 Also Violates The Constitutional And MHRL Restrictions Forbidding The Enactment Of Local Laws Affecting The Maintenance And Support Of Public Education 68 POINT III THE SHIFTING OF MUNICIPAL TAX REFUND OBLIGATIONS ONTO SCHOOL DISTRICTS IS NOT A MATTER OF LOCAL CONCERN 76 POINT IV LOCAL LAW 18 IS IRRATIONAL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AND THE COUNTY'S APPEALS TO ALLEGED FAIRNESS DO NOT OBVIATE THE NECESSITY OF STATE ACTION TO REPEAL THE COUNTY GUARANTY 78 IV POINT V THE ENACTMENT OF LOCAL LAW 18 ALSO VIOLATES THE LAW OF LEGISLATIVE EQUIVALENCY AND THE STATUTE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 85 POINTVI IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LOCAL LAW 18 FAILS TO SPECIFY WHETHER AND WHICH PORTIONS OF L. 2006, CH. 503, IT INTENDED TO SUPERSEDE, IN VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW § 22(1), AND IT TRANSFERS A DUTY WITHOUT A REFERENDUM, IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW § 33-a 88 A. Local Law 18 Violates The Specificity Requirements of MHRL § 22(1) 89 B. Local Law 18 Violates The Duty Transfer Restrictions Set Forth In Article IX, § 1(h)(1) of the Constitution, MHRL § 33(7)(b) and MHRL § 33-a(2) 92 CONCLUSION 96 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES STATE CASES Page Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v. Town of Guilderland. 74 N.Y.2d 372, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989) 42, 96 Board of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y. v. CityofN.Y.. 41 N.Y.2d 535, 542, 394 N.Y.S.2d 148, 154 (1977) 70 Board of Ed. of Middle County Sch. Dist. at Centereach v. Cohalan. 135 Misc.2d 358, 515 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1987) ... 74, 75 Board of Ed. of U.F.S.D. Number Four of the Town of Greece v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Rochester, 23 A.D.2d 805, 258 N.Y.S.2d 194, (4th Dept. 1965) 69, 71, 72, 75 Board of Supervisors of Richmond County v. Ellis. 14 Sickels 620, 59 N.Y. 620 (1875) 12 Bowery Savings Bank v. Bd. ofAssessors of the County of Nassau. 80 N.Y.2d 961, 590 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1992) 78 Browne v. City of New York. 241 N.Y. 96 (1925) passim Bugeja v. City of New York. 24 A.D.2d 151, 266 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dept. 1965), 63 Burke v. Krug. 161 Misc. 687, 291 N.Y.S. 897 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cry.) 20 Carodix Corp. v. Comiskey. 265 A.D. 450, 39 N.Y.S.2d 732 (2d Dept.), affd, 291 N.Y. 737 (1943) 53, 54 vi City of New York v. Village of Lawrence. 250 N.Y. 429 (1929) 77, 78 City of New York v. State. 94 N.Y.2d 577, 709 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2000) 34 Clark v. La Guardia. 245 A.D. 325, 281 N.Y.S. 54 (2d Dept. 1935), affd, 273 N.Y. 639 (1937) 49, 50 Corbin v. County of Nassau. 26 Misc.3d 572, 888 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2009) 36 County Securities. Inc. v. Seacord. 278 N.Y. 34 (1938) 51, 52, 85 Divisich v. Marshall. 281 N.Y. 170 (1939) 68 Eriksen v. City of N.Y.. 167 Misc. 42, 47, 2 N.Y.S.2d 280, 285 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 1937) 72 In re Seeley. 114 Misc. 633, 187 N.Y.S. 130 (Sup. Ct. Seneca Cty. 1921) 16 In Re Wadhams' Estate. 249 A.D. 271, 292 N.Y.S. 102 (4th Dept. 1936) 80, 81 Incorporated Village ofAtlantic Beach v. Town of Hempstead. 47 Misc.2d 29, 262 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cry. 1965), revxd on other grounds, 27 A.D.2d 556, 276 N.Y.S.2d 4 (2d Dept. 1966) 20, 23 Kamhi v. Town ofYorktown. 74 N.Y.2d 423, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989) 89, 90 vn Konz v. Bedell. 273 A.D. 777, 75 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dept. 1947), affd without opinion, 298 N.Y. 585 (1948), 76, 77 Lanza v. Wagner. 11 N.Y.2d 317, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1962) 68 Matter of Gizzo v. Town of Mamaroneck. 36 A.D.3d 162, 824 N.Y.S.2d 366 (2d Dept. 2006) 67 Matter of Haydorn v. Carroll. 225 N.Y. 84 (1918) 4 Matter of Levy. 255 N.Y. 223 (1931) 4 Matter ofThe County of Nassau v. The Nassau County Interim Finance Auth.. 33 Misc.3d 227, 920 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Nassau Co. Sup. Ct. 2011) .... 86, 87 Moran v. La Guardia. 270 N.Y. 450 (1936) 85 New York Telephone Co. v. Supervisor ofTown of North Hempstead. 77 A.D.3d 121, 908 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2nd Dept. 2010), Iv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 711, 923 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2011) 35, 36, 68 People ex rel. Elkind v. Rosenblum. 184 Misc. 914, 54 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. West. Co. 1945), affd, 269 A.D. 859, 56 N.Y.S.2d 526 (2d Dept. 1945), affd, 295 N.Y. 929 (1946) 69, 74 People ex rel. Farnsworth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Orleans County. 65 Hun. 481, 20 N.Y.S. 398 (Sup. Ct. Fifth Dept. 1892) 13, 14 Vlll People ex rel. Town of Scarsdale v. Bd. of Supervisors ofWestchester County. 149 A.D. 319, 133 N.Y.S. 760 (2d Dept. 1912) 12 People v. Westchester County. 282 N.Y. 224 (1940) 45, 58 Queens Park Gardens v. Nassau County. 255 A.D. 625, 8 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dept. 1938), affd 280 N.Y. 789 (1939) 22, 56 RAB Co. v. Tomkins County Board ofAssessment Review. 68 A.D.2d 374, 375, 417 N.Y.S.2d 788 (3d Dept. 1979) 60 Reuss v. Katz. 43 Misc. 2d 921, 252 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1964), affd, 21 A.D.2d 968, 252 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1964) 73 Sonmax. Inc. v. City of New York. 89 Misc.2d 945, 392 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1977) 66 Sonmax. Inc. v. City of New York. 43 N.Y.2d 253, 401 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1977) 60, 65 Steel Los HI / Goya Foods. Inc. v. Bd. ofAssessors of County of Nassau. 10 N.Y.3d 445, 454, 859 N.Y.S.2d 576, 580 (2008) 34, 36, 79 Torre v. County of Nassau. 86 N.Y.2d 421, 633 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1995) 85, 86 Town ofAmherst v. Erie County. 260 N.Y. 361 (1933) 60, 80 IX Town of Black Brook v. State. 41 N.Y.2d 486, 393 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1977) 97 Town of Kirkwood v. Newbury. 77 Sickels 571, 122 N.Y. 571 (1890) 13 Town of Smithtown v. Howell. 31 N.Y.2d 365, 339 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1972) 94 Turnpike Woods v. Town of Stony Point. 70 N.Y.2d 735, 519 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1987) 89, 92 1846 Constitution, 1874 Constitution, 1894 Constitution, 1894 Constitution, 1894 Constitution 1894 Constitution 1894 Constitution 1894 Constitution 1963 Constitution, 1963 Constitution, 1963 Constitution, 1963 Constitution, 1963 Constitution, 1963 Constitution, NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONS Article III § 17 15, 61 Article III § 23 61 Article III § 27 61 Article XII § 2 14 (amended 1923), Article XII § 1 15 (amended 1923), Article XII § 2 15, 55 (amended 1935), Article HI § 26 16, 17, 61 (amended 1938), Article IX § 2 55, 61 Article IX § 1(h)(1) 6, 7 Article IX § 2(c)(ii)(4) 62, 63 Article IX § 2(c)(ii)(8) passim Article IX § 3(a)(1) passim Article IX § 3(d)(1) 61 Article IX § 3(d)(4) 62 STATUTES City Home Rule Law § 21 72 CPLR 602 CPLR 5601(b)(1) 3, 4, 43 x County Law § 379(6) 29 Laws of New York 1936, ch. 879 19, 20 Laws of New York 1937, ch. 617 27 Laws of New York 1937, ch. 618 23 Laws of New York 1939, ch. 272 30 Laws of New York 1937, ch. 700 30 Laws of New York 1945, ch. 42 30 Laws of New York 1948, ch. 98 30 Laws of New York 1948, ch. 851 30, 32 Laws of New York 1996, ch. 503 35 McKinney's Statutes § 94 64 McKinney's Statutes § 240 64 Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(l)(ii)(a)(8) passim Municipal Home Rule Law § 1l(l)(c) passim Municipal Home Rule Law § 22(1) passim Municipal Home Rule Law § 33-a(2) 93 Municipal Home Rule Law § 33(2) 94 Municipal Home Rule Law § 33(7)(b) passim Municipal Home Rule Law § 33-a(l) 10, 11 Municipal Home Rule Law § 33-a(2) 6, 9, 13 Municipal Home Rule Law § 34(3)(a) passim Municipal Home Rule Law § 34(3)(b) and (e) 6, 9, 12, 75 Nassau County Administrative Code § 6-17.3 38, 39 Nassau County Administrative Code § 6-20.0 81 Nassau County Administrative Code § 6-24.0 38 Nassau County Administrative Code § 6-26.0(b)(3)(c) 32, 93 Nassau County Charter § 103(2) 23, 55 Nassau County Charter § 150 28, 45, 55, 97 Nassau County Charter § 151 28, 45, 56, 57 Nassau County Charter § 154 28, 29 Nassau County Charter § 162 57 Nassau County Charter § 602 20, 21 Nassau County Charter § 606(a) 93 Nassau County Charter § 609 20 Nassau County Charter § 2201 21, 22 Nassau County Charter §§ 2601, 2602 20 XI Nassau County Local Law 18-2010 38, 39 Real Property Tax Law § 556 36 Real Property Tax Law § 708[3] 37, 38 Real Property Tax Law § 7l2(2-a) 35, 90 Real Property Tax Law § 726(1) 34, 35 Real Property Tax Law § 726(l)(a), (b) and (c) 35 Real Property Tax Law § 2006 68 Statute of Local Governments §11(2) 11,86 Suffolk County Tax Act 82, 83 Town Law § 274-a 90 TEXTS AND TREATISES New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (1938), Volume XI, Problems Relating to Home Rule and Local Governments 18, 19, 29 OTHER AUTHORITIES Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979), p. 211 93 Department of State, Adopting Local Laws in New York State (May 1998, reprint date 2012) 65 Laws of NewYork 1937, ch. 618, BillJacket passim Laws of New York 1939, ch. 272, BillJacket 95 Laws of New York 1948, ch. 98, BillJacket 31 Laws of New York 1948, ch. 851, BillJacket 33, 34 xn INTRODUCTION The primary issue presented in these three actions1 is whether the County ofNassau ("County") had the legal authority to repeal and supercede provisions placed into its County Charter and Administrative Code by special tax laws enacted by the state Legislature in 1948. These special laws, commonly known as the "County Guaranty," protect the various school districts, special districts and towns located in the County against the County's real property tax assessing errors, by making the County responsible for tax refunds.2 It is undisputed that the County's assessment system is, at best, dysfunctional. Atworst, the assessment system stands as a potential breach of the County's fiduciary and statutory obligations to the taxpayers as well as to the various school districts, towns and special districts on whose behalf it assesses real properties for purposes of taxation and assessment. According 'By "SoOrdered" Stipulationthe Baldwin Union Free School District litigationwasjoined for hearing pursuant to CPLR 602 with the related action Hafner v. County of Nassau (Proceeding No. 2) and the related hybrid proceeding Town ofNorth Hempstead v. County ofNassau (Proceeding No. 3). See, JR. 788-95. Citations preceded by "JR." refer to the Joint Record on Appeal. 2The County is one of only two countiesin the State that perform real property assessing functions on a county-wide basis (the other being Tompkins County). to its own estimate, the County's assessment system failures result in an annual tax refund obligation of approximately $80 million. JR. 56. Byenactment ofLocal Law 18- 2010, entitled the Common Sense Act of 2010 ("Local Law 18") (JR. 56-59), the County eliminated the County Guaranty. As we demonstrate, the Second Department correctly found and declared that Local Law 18 "violates the New York Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law" (JR. xxi), because it wasenacted in contravention of the provisions of Article IX, § 2(c)(ii)(8) of the Constitution, Municipal Home Rule Law ("MHRL") § 10(l)(ii)(a)(8) and MHRL § 34(3)(a). These provisions forbid a municipality from enacting a local law relating to the levy, collection, administration, distribution and judicial review of local taxes that is inconsistent with a general or special law. The County maintains that it "was delegated [in itsCharter] ample authority over the entire process of levying, collecting, and administering property taxes from start to finish, including tax refunds and who should be obligated to pay them" (Appellants' Brief, p. 40), and that it has "unique" virtually unfettered authority to supercede any special lawenacted by the State Legislature regardless of its subject matter {see, e.g., Appellants' Brief, pp. 4, 7, 35-36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 48, 50). These arguments are premised upon an a historical presentation that radically departs from governing case lawand the limited delegation set forth in the County Charter. Although the Second Department held that "in light of [its] determination," it "need not reach the [petitioners/plaintiffs] remaining contentions" (JR. xxi), we here demonstrate that Local Law 18 also violated: (a) the public education proscriptions set forth in Article IX, § 3(a)(1) of the Constitution and MHRL § 1l(l)(c); (b) the education and actions restrictions set forth in MHRL § 34(3)(b) and (e); (c) the specification requirements of MHRL § 22(1); (d) the duty transfer restrictions set forth in Article IX, § 1(h)(1) of the Constitution, MHRL § 33(7)(b) and MHRL § 33-a(2); and (e) the law of legislative equivalency and the Statute of Local Governments. Finally, and in any event, Local Law 18's repeal of the County Guaranty was also irrational, arbitrary and capricious. JURISDICTIONAL COUNTER-STATEMENT By Notice ofAppeal dated March 11, 2013 (JR. xi-xii), the County took this appeal as of right pursuant to CPLR 5601(b)(1), thereby representing that, in the words of the statute, "there is directly involved the construction of the constitution of the state." However, the Appellants' Brief filed by the County reveals that no such construction is required. To the contrary, the County maintains that the resolution of this case is not dictated by the provisions of the Constitution, but rather is governed by construction of the Nassau County Charter (a statute), which it contends gave it "the absolute right to repeal or supersede the County Guaranty" by local law. See, Appellants' Brief, Point I, p. 39. Because the County, as limited by the its brief, fails to present an appeal that directly involves the construction of the Constitution, no jurisdiction lies pursuant to CPLR § 5601(b)(1), and the appeal should be dismissed. Additionally, because this appeal is readily disposed upon application of various governing provisions of the Municipal Home Rule Law, without the necessityof addressing constitutional issues, the appeal as of right does not lie. See, e.g., Matter of Haydorn v. CarrolL 225 N.Y. 84, 88 ( 1918) ("[a]n appeal, upon the ground asserted here, must present to us directly and primarily an issue determinable only by our construction of the Constitution of the state"); Matter of Levy. 255 N.Y. 223, 225-26(1931). COUNTER-QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. In 1948 the sovereign State ofNewYork enacted the County Guaranty, making Nassau County solely responsible for all real property tax refunds arising from its erroneous real property assessments, and prohibiting the County from charging this obligation back to the local municipalities and districts located within the County. In 2010, the County purported to repeal the County Guaranty by enactment of Local Law 18. Relying upon more than 80 years of precedent from this Court, did the Appellate Division correctly hold that the County had no Charter authority to enact Local Law 18 because the Charter did not delegate enumerated power to enact local laws relating to the levy, collection and administration of taxes inconsistentwith State laws? 2. Did the Appellate Division also correctly hold that Local Law 18violated the local lawmaking restrictions set forth in Article IX, § 2(c)(ii)(8) of the Constitution and the implementing provisions of MHRL § 10(l)(ii)(a)(8) and MHRL § 34(3)(a), because it is inconsistent with the special tax law enacting the County Guaranty? 3. Is Local Law 18 additionally invalid upon the grounds that it: (a) violates the public education proscriptions set forth in Article IX, § 3(a)(1) of the Constitution and MHRL § 1l(l)(c); (b) violates the education and actions restrictions set forth in MHRL § 34(3)(b) and (e); (c) violates the specification requirements of MHRL § 22(1); (d) violates the duty transfer restrictions set forth in Article IX, § 1(h)(1) of the Constitution, MHRL § 33(7)(b) and MHRL § 33-a(2); (e) violates the law of legislative equivalency and the Statute of Local Governments; and (f) is irrational, arbitrary and capricious? STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Governing Constitutional and Municipal Home Rule Law Provisions Article IX, § 2(c)(ii)(8) of the State Constitution provides in pertinent part (emphasis added): (c) In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or any other law, (i) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to its property, affairs or government and, (ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such local government: (8) The levy, collection and administration of local taxes authorized by the legislature and of assessments for local improvements consistent with laws enacted by the legislature. Article IX, § 3(a)(1)ofthe State Constitution provides in pertinent part (emphasis added): (a) Except as expressly provided, nothing in this article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to: (1) The maintenance, support or administration of the public school system, as required or provided by article XI of this constitution .... Article IX, § 1(h)(1) of the State Constitution mandates that: Any . . . amendment [of an alternative form of government] by act of the legislature or by local law, may transfer one or more functions or duties of the county or of the cities, towns, villages, districts or other units of government wholly contained in such county to each other or when authorized by the legislature to the state ... however, that no such form or amendment . . . shall become effective unless approved on a referendum by a majority of the votes cast thereon .... MHRL §10(1 )(ii)(a)(8) and (9) provide: (ii) every local government, as provided in this chapter, shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent with any general law, relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such local government: a. A county, city, town or village: (8) The levy and administration of local taxes authorized by the legislature and of assessments for local improvements, which in case of county, town or village local laws relating to local non-property taxes shall be consistent with laws enacted by the legislature. (9) The collection of local taxes authorized by the legislature and ofassessments for local improvements, which in the case ofcounty, town or village local laws shall be consistent with laws enacted by the legislature. MHRL § ll(l)(c) (emphasis added) provides that, "[notwithstanding any provision of this chapter, the legislative body shallnot be deemed authorized by this chapter to adopt a local law which supersedes a state statute, if such local law: . . . (c) [a]pplies to or affects the maintenance, support or administration of the educational system in such local government MHRL § 22(1) provides in pertinent part that: In adopting a local law changing or superseding any provision of a state statute or of a prior local law or ordinance, the legislative body shall specify the chapter or local law or ordinance, number and year of enactment, section, subsection or subdivision, which it is intended to change or supersede, but the failure so to specify shall not affect the validity of such local law. MHRL § 34(3)(a), (b) and (e) (emphasis added) provide: Except in accordance with provisions of this chapter or with other laws enacted by the legislature, a county charter or charter law shall not supersede any general or special law enacted by the legislature: (a) Which relates to the imposition, judicial review or distribution of the proceeds oftaxes or benefit assessments', (b) Insofar as itrelates to the education system in the county or to school districts therein, except that functions, powers or duties assigned to units of local government or to agencies or officers thereofoutside the educational system may be transferred to other units of local government, agencies or officers as authorized by this article; * * * (e) Insofar as itrelates to the commencement orprosecution ofactions orproceedings against the county. MHRL §33(7) (b)(emphasis added) provides: A charter law.. .proposing an amendment orrepeal ofone or more provisions thereof which would have the effect of transferring afunction or duty of the county, or of a city, town, village, district or other unit of local government wholly contained in the county, shall conform to and be subject to consideration by the board of supervisors in accordance with the provisions of this chapter generally applicable to the form of and action on proposed local laws by the board of supervisors. Ifa county charter, or a charter law as described in this subdivision, is adopted by the board of supervisors, it shall not become operative unless anduntil it is approved ata general election orat a special election, held in the county by receiving a majority of the total votes cast therein .... Such a county charter or charter law shall provide for its submission to the electors of the county at the next general election or at a special election, occurring not less than sixty days after the adoption thereof by the board of supervisors. MHRL § 33-a(l) and (2) (emphasis added) provide: (1) Subject to restrictions in the constitution, in this article or in any other applicable law, the board of supervisors of any county may, by local law, transfer functions or duties of the county or of the cities, towns, villages, districts or other units ofgovernment wholly contained in such county to each other, or for the abolition of one or more offices, departments or 10 agencies of such units of government when all their functions or duties are so transferred. (2) Anysuch local law, or an amendment or repeal of one or more provisions thereofwhich would have the effect of transferring a function or duty of the county or of the cities, towns, villages districts or other units of government wholly contained in the county, shall not become operative unless and until it is approved at a general election or ata special election, held in the county by receiving a majority of the total votes case thereon. . . . Such a local law, amendment or repeal thereof, shall provide for its submission to the electors of the county at the next general election or at a special election, occurring not less than sixty days after the adoption thereof by the board of supervisors. Statute ofLocal Governments § 11 (2) (emphasis added) provides: The legislature hereby excludes from the scope of the grants ofpowers to local governments in this statute and reserves to itself the right and power to enact any law described in this section notwithstanding the fact that it repeals, diminishes, impairs or suspends a power granted to one or more local governments in this statute: (2) Any law enacted as provided by paragraph two of subdivision (b) of section two of article nine of the constitution onrequest ofthe legislative body ofeach affected local government, on request of the chief executive officer ofeach affected local government concurred in by its legislative body or, except in the case of the city of New York on certificate of necessity from the governor. 11 B. Early Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Regarding Municipal Home Rule and the Power of Local Legislation, 1. Historic County Powers Of Local Legislation. With the adoption of the Constitution of 1846, county boards of supervisorswere "classified" for the first time as "legislativebodies," and the Legislature was thereby authorized to confer powers of local legislation upon them. See, People ex rel. Town of Scarsdale v. Bd. of Supervisors of Westchester County. 149 A.D. 319, 133 N.Y.S. 760, 761 (2d Dept. 1912). Article 3, § 17 of the 1846 Constitution provided that, "the Legislature may confer upon the boards ofsupervisors of the several counties of the state such further powers oflocal legislation and administration, as they shall from time to time prescribe" (emphasis added). Described by the Second Department as an "elemental legislative characteristic" (Town of Scarsdale. 133 N.Y.S. at 761 ),3 theconferring authority vested in the Legislature in 1846 was modified by the adoption in 1874 of amendments to the Constitution, which changed 3In Board ofSupervisors of Richmond County v. Ellis. 14Sickels 620, 59 N.Y. 620 (1875), this Court observed that "[County] Boards ofsupervisors are classed as subordinate public agents. They are agents with limited powers which they may not exceed and give any validity to the excess." There, this Court held that the Richmond County Board of Supervisors had no power to allow payment of bills issued by a county supervisor for services other than attendance at board meetings. 12 the words "may confer" to "shall confer." Id.; see also, 1874 Constitution, Article 3, § 23 (corresponding to 1894 Constitution, Article 3, § 27). Following these amendments, from time to time the Legislature enacted laws providing counties withvarious limited and expressly delineated powers of local legislation and administration. See, e.g., Town of Kirkwood v. Newbury. 77 Sickels 571, 122 N.Y. 571, 576-77 (1890) (discussing the legislature's express delegation of the power of laying out highways and building bridges to boards of supervisors); In re Seeley, 114 Misc. 633, 187 N.Y.S. 130 (Sup. Ct. Seneca Cty. 1921) (noting the legislature's express delegation of the power to make "one or more jury districts" upon boards of supervisors, and therefore upholding a local lawabolishing a State special law that had divided Seneca County into twojury districts). In People ex rel. Farnsworth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Orleans County. 65 Hun. 481, 20 N.Y.S. 398, 399 (Sup. Ct. Fifth Dept. 1892), a county board of supervisors purported to act upon the Legislature's delegation of power to authorize town meetings to be held by election districts and to prescribe the manner in which town business should be conducted in such districts. The board of supervisors had enacted a local law which "provided 13 for holding the 'town elections' only, and of officers required to be elected by ballot, in the several districts." Farnsworth. 20 N.Y.S. at 399. Observing that, "the term 'town elections' is not synonymous with 'town meetings" (Id.), the appellate court held that the local law was void: We think this attempt at local legislation by the board of supervisors of Orleans county was nugatory and void, because it was not within the power conferred by the act of the legislature, upon which alone it depended for its validity. The board ofsupervisors is a body of strictly limited powers. It has no power of legislation except as expressly conferred by statute, and any attempt by it to legislate outside the limit prescribed by the legislature is necessarily void. Farnsworth. 20 N.Y.S. at 399 (citations omitted). 2. The 1894 and 1923 City Home Rule Amendments To The Constitution, As a constitutional matter, Home Rule was first developed and expressly delineated for the cities of this State (not the counties). Article XII, § 2 of the 1894 Constitution, provided cities limited power to reject "acceptance" of special laws enacted by the Legislature "relating to the property, affairs or government of cities." Writing for this Court in Browne v. City of New York. 241 N.Y. 96, 104 (1925), Judge Cardozo characterized this provision as, "providing] for a slender measure of home rule, by 14 conferring upon the mayors ofcities, though under conditions closely limited, a power of suspensive veto." In 1923, Article XII was amended to establish a comprehensive system of home rule for the cities of the state. Section 1 required the Legislature to "provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power oftaxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments . . . ." Constitution of 1894 (amended 1923), Article XII, § 1. Section 2 provided that, "[t]he Legislature shall not pass any law relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, which shall be special or local either in its terms or in its effect, but shall act in relation to the property, affairs or government ofany cityonly by general laws which shall in terms and in effect apply alike to all cities except on [emergency] message from the Governor . . . ." Constitution of 1894 (amended 1923), Article XII, § 2. Section 3 expressly secured to cities, "power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the Constitution and lawsof the state, relating to [five enumerated subjects]."4 4The five enumerated local lawmaking subjects related to: (1) powers, duties,qualifications, (continued...) 15 3. The 1935 County Home Rule Amendment To The Constitution. A County Home Rule amendment to the Constitution was first adopted in 1935. Article III, section 26 of the Constitution set forth the provisions of county home rule and local lawmaking: The Legislature shall provide by law for the organization and government of counties and shall provide by law alternative forms of government for counties except counties wholly included in a city * * *. Any such form of government * * * may also provide for the exercise by the board of supervisors or other elective body of powers of local legislation and administration and the transfer ofany or all functions and duties of the county and the cities, towns, villages, districts and other units of government contained in such county to each other or to the state, and for the abolition of offices, departments, agencies or units of government when all of their functions are so transferred without regard to the provisions ofarticle ten5 or any other provision of this constitution inconsistent herewith. Constitution of 1894 (amended 1935), Article III, § 26(2). 4(.. .continued) mode of selection and removal, terms ofoffice or compensation ofofficers and employees of the city; (2) transaction of business, the incurring of obligations or the presentation and discharge of claims against it; (3) the acquisition, care, management and use of its streets and property; (4) the wages, salaries, hours of labor, etc. of employees of its contractors and subcontractors; and (5)the government and regulation of the conduct ofits inhabitants and the protection of their property, safety and health. See, Constitution of 1894 (amended 1923), Art. XII, § 3; see also, Browne. 241 N.Y. at 119-120. ''Article 10 of the then Constitution concerned, inter alia, the election and appointment of local officers not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. 16 The amended Constitution thus set forth the prospect ofcounties being provided a form of government that may provide for powers of local legislation and that may transfer functions and duties of the various municipalities and districts contained within the county. In addition, the 1935 County Home Rule amendments specified that upon the adoption of sucha form ofgovernment, the Legislaturewould be prohibited from passing any special law in relation to the property, affairs or government of such county except on emergency message from the Governor and the concurrent action of two-thirds of the members of the legislature. See, 1894 Constitution (amended 1935), Art. Ill, § 26(4). Writing in 1938 with respect to the 1935 County Home Rule amendment, the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee observed as follows: The conception of home rule for counties is a relatively new one. Even more than cities, the counties have been bytradition closely connected with the State. They have been, in a sense, the direct regional agents of the State government. Hence, the idea of county home rule was somewhat anomalous, for by very definition counties were from one viewpoint useful only in so far as they did not possess home rule. 17 There are important differences between the city home rule amendment and the county home rule amendment. The city has carte blanche to formulate its own charter, provided it stays within the constitutionally enumerated subject matter reserved to cities. The county, on the other hand, has no constitutionally reserved powers whatever, except perhaps by implication, and in the adoption of a form, the voters must accept one of the optional forms offered by the Legislature, or be content with the old form. In other words, the city has the status ofa grown-up child, entrusted with the management of its own affairs, within more or less clearly defined bounds. Butthe county, still a minor, must choose between alternatives handed it by its legal parent. The city formulates; the county may only choose. New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (1938), Volume XI, Problems Relating to Home Rule and Local Governments ("1938 Constitutional Convention Committee"),6 pp. 10-11 (emphasis added); Respondents' Compendium, pp. 127-28.7 6Acopy ofthe 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee's report isprovided in theJoint Compendium of Sources Cited in Respondents' Briefs ("Respondents' Compendium"), separately filed with this Court. 7The Committee observed that although the amendmentwas adopted in 1935, legislation to give it general effect was not provided until 1937, so "[experience with the County Home Rule Amendment is scanty." 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee, p. 12; Respondents' Compendium, p. 129. It noted that, "Four counties have taken action under this legislation. Westchester and Nassau counties have adopted new forms ofgovernment. The voters ofErie and Schenectady counties rejected new charter proposals in November, 1937. Neither the Nassau nor the Westchester county charter, however, was scheduled to take effect in time for anything to be learned by an examination ofexperience there." Id. 18 As the Constitutional Convention Committee further observed, "[u]nlike its predecessor [i.e., City Home Rule], the County Home Rule Amendment vests no direct constitutional power in the counties to adopt and amend local laws." 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee, p. 86; Respondents' Compendium, p. 187. Instead, it empowered the Legislature to provide for the exercise of powers of local legislation and administration by Counties as it deemed fit. As the Constitutional Convention Committee remarked: This, however, is no innovation. The authorization to the Legislature to confer on boards of supervisors such additional powers of local legislation and administration as it might prescribe or deem expedient has been in the Constitution ever since 1846. It is still there in the mandatory form adopted in 1874. 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee, p. 86; Respondents' Compendium, p. 187. C. The Nassau County Charter. 1. The 1936 Legislation Establishing The Form OfCharter. By Laws of New York 1936, Chapter 879, the Legislature established an "Alternative Form of Government for Certain Counties." The 19 statute provided a complete charter for an eligible county that elected to adopt its form. See, L. 1936, ch. 879, §§ 2601, 2602. Nassau County was the only county eligible to adopt the form set forth in Chapter 879 (in that it was the only county with a population of more than 300,000 and no more than three towns). See, Burkev.Krug. 161 Misc. 687, 690, 291 N.Y.S. 897, 900-01 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty.), affd, 272 N.Y. 575 (1936); Incorporated Village of Atlantic Beach v. Town ofHempstead. 47 Misc.2d 29,30-31,262 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30-31 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 27 A.D.2d 556, 276 N.Y.S.2d 4 (2d Dept. 1966). By virtue ofSection 609 of the Charter, the various offices of the town assessors in the three towns in Nassau County were abolished, and their powers and duties were transferred to the County Board of Assessors.8 See, L. 1936, c. 879, §609; Appellants' Compendium,9 p. 101. Section 602 of the Charter provided that the County Board ofAssessorswould assess all property situated in the county and liable to taxation for state, county, town, schools or ^hat duty was later transferred from the County Board of Assessors to the County Assessor. See, County Charter (current), § 608. ^he term "Appellants' Compendium," refers to the Compendium of Sources Cited in Appellants' Brief, filed by the appellants. 20 special district purposes. See, L. 1936, ch. 879, § 602; Appellants' Compendium, pp. 98-99. In furtherance of the transfer of the assessing and tax collecting function to the County, section 2201 of the County Charter, entitled "Taxation," authorized the County Board ofSupervisors to enact an ordinance setting forth a plan for such assessment and the collection of taxes and associated penalties: The Board of Supervisors may provide by ordinance a plan, not inconsistent with the terms of this act, for the assessment of property for tax purposes, the making of appropriations, the period for which appropriations are made, the levy of taxes, the collection of taxes, the accrual ofpenalties, the sale of tax liens and the foreclosure thereofwith reference to the dates at which each of the steps above set forth shall take place. Until the passage of such an ordinance, the provisions of the laws of this state relating to taxation applicable to the county in force on the date on which this act becomes effective therein and not inconsistentwith this act shall govern. County Charter, § 2201; Appellants' Compendium, pp. 103-104. In each of these aspects, the Legislature exercised its new authority under Art. Ill, §26(2) to provide a form ofcounty government that transferred specific functions and duties (here the assessing duty and function), and it authorized the County to provide by ordinance a plan for its 21 new assessing function to the extent set forth in section 2201.10 The provisions ofsection 2201 do not address the subject of municipal tax refund obligations, nor do they contain an express delegation of power to enact ordinances inconsistent with general or special laws of the State. Section 102 vested the legislative power in the County Board of Supervisors,11 and section 103(2) provided that, "[i]n addition to the powers conferred by the preceding section or by other provisions of this act, the [Board of Supervisors] shall have power to: (2) exercise powers of local legislation as provided in section twenty-six of article three of the constitution of the State of New York." Appellants' Compendium, p. 86. 10In Queens Park Gardens v. Nassau County. 255 A.D. 625, 8 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dept. 1938), affd 280 N.Y. 789 (1939), the Second Department rejected a challenge to the County's authoritytocontractwith acompany furnishing engineersand appraisers toassist in the preparation of taxand land value maps. As theSecondDepartment observed, "[t]he whole system of assessment has been changed and it became necessary after January 1, 1938,when the Nassau County Government Law took effect, to revise entirely the system of taxation which had theretofore prevailed through assessment by the town assessors." 255 A.D. at 626, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 333. The court concluded that the County had power to engage such "experts" in light of related County Charter provisions and "the powers implied therefrom," which"authorized andjustified the making of the contract." 255A.D. at 627-28, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 1'As the County points out, the Board of Supervisors has been replaced by the County Legislature. 22 In 1936, the voters ofNassau County adopted the terms ofthe act, and, as ofJanuary 1, 1938, the County Government Law of Nassau County, referred to as the Nassau County Charter, was to become effective. See, Incorporated Village ofAtlantic Beach. 27 A.D.2d at 556, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 2. The 1937 Amendment To The Nassau County Charter. And Subsequent Related Amendments. After the 1936 adoption of the County Charter, on emergency message of the Governor with the approval of two-thirds of the membership of both houses of the Legislature, the State enacted Laws of New York 1937, ch. 618, to amend several provisions contained in the Charter. See, L. 1937, ch. 618, bill jacket, p. 1; Respondents' Compendium, p. 3. The 1937 legislation was enacted in part to address several budgetary restrictions set forth in the 1936 legislation deemed "so impracticable" as to "prove[] impossible" for the County to act. See, L. 1937, ch. 618, bill jacket, p. 3; Respondents' Compendium, p. 5. In addition, the legislation attempted to address the view that the delegation in Section 103(2) of the 1936 Charter of the "powers of local legislation as provided in section twenty-six article three of the constitution" was actually ineffective to accomplish any such delegation. 23 The bill jacket for the 1937 legislation contains two informative memoranda. One memorandum wasissued by Frank C.Moore. See, L. 1937, ch. 618, bill jacket, pp. 24-36; Respondents' Compendium, pp. 26-38. Mr. Moore indicated that he had been employed by the Nassau County Commission on Governmental Revision to advise on private or local acts deemed inconsistent with the terms of the 1936 Charter, and for the further purpose of preparing bills for submission to the Legislature in order to "eliminate ambiguities, conflictsand uncertainties ofstatutory provisions, and to accomplish the spirit and intent of the alternative form of government." L. 1937, ch. 618, billjacket, 25; Respondents' Compendium, p. 27. With respect to the perceived deficiency in the local lawmaking delegation in the 1936 legislation, Mr. Moore noted: While it is true that Chapter 87 of the Laws of 1936 includes the following provisions: 'Section 103. Specific powers. In addition to all powers conferred by the preceding section or by other provisions of this act, the board of supervisors shall have power to: 24 1. * * * * 2. Exercise powers of local legislation and administration as provided in section twenty-six of article three of the constitution of the state of New York.' it is our opinion that the language employedfailed to vest the board ofsupervisors withpowers oflocal legislation. We believe it is necessary, as in the case of the City Home Rule Amendment, for the Legislature to exercise the power conferred upon it by the Constitution to enact a statute defining the powers of local legislation of the county legislative body. L. 1937, ch. 618, bill jacket, p. 27 (emphasis added); Respondents' Compendium, p. 29. The other instructive memorandum is the cover memorandum to the bill jacket, issued by Nathan R. Sobel, counsel to Governor Herbert H. Lehman. See, L. 1937, ch. 618, bill jacket, pp. 3-5; Respondents' Compendium, pp. 5-7. In commenting upon the inadequacy in the 1936 delegation of local lawmaking powers, Mr. Sobel noted: The bill attempts for the first time to give to the County ofNassau local legislative powers. The Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution provides 'that the Legislature shall provide for the exercise by the Board of Supervisors of powers of local legislation.' This provision, ofcourse, must be made in the county charter. This amendment to the Nassau County Charter, therefore provides that 25 'The Board of Supervisors of the county shall have powers of local legislation under the provisions of Section 26 of Article 3 of the Constitution and shall have power to adopt and amend local laws.' It is peculiar but every alternative form of government heretofore adopted or now before the Governor, contains this same provisions (sic). It is my opinion that these provisions are positively ineffective to grant local legislative powers to counties. I have always contended that a grant of legislative powers must be specific. The Legislature should enumerate in detail what power it wishes to grant to counties. It cannot do so in general terms. Judge Cardozo very clearly made this same point in connection with the City Home Rule Amendment to the constitution. You will recall that Article 12, Section 3, contains a grant of six specific powers to cities. Article 12, Section 5 provides further that the Legislature may by general law grant such additional powers as they may desire from time to time to such cities. The City Home Rule Lawwas originally drawn to give to cities only the six powers specified in the constitution. Later, it was believed that the cities should have power to adopt local laws with respect to the 'property, affairs or government' generally. The City Home Rule Law was therefore amended to provide that the cities shall have power to adopt local laws with respect to its 'property, affairs or government' including but not limited to the six specific powers given. Judge Cardozo in the Brown 26 case12 held that the cities did not receive any additional grants ofpowers through this amendment. He indicated, and other special term decisions have followed him in that respect, that the Legislature may not grant powers oflocal legislation ingeneral terms. The powers must be given specifically. Today, therefore, cities have only the power to enact local laws with respect to the six provisions contained in the constitution. They do not have general power to enact local laws concerning their 'property, affairs or government.' By the same analogy, therefore, I believe that no legislative powers are given to counties by this county charter or by any of the alternative forms ofgovernment theretofore passed, except the new Westchester County charter.13 The drafters of that bill clearly understood this subject and have provided for some fifteen specificgrants of legislative powers to the Board of Supervisors. See, L. 1937, ch. 618, billjacket, pp. 4-5 (emphasis added in italics, emphasis in bold supplied in original); Respondents' Compendium, pp. 6-7. In accordance with the 1937 legislation, the Nassau County Charter was amended, inter alia, by the addition ofArticle 1-A entitled "Local 12Referring to Browne v. City of New York. 241 N.Y. 96 (1925), discussed in detail at Point 1(A)(1), infra. 13'The Westchester County Charter was enacted by Laws of 1937, ch. 617, which immediately preceded in sequence order the enactment of the amendments to the Nassau County Charter in Laws of 1937, ch. 618. According to Mr. Sobel, that Westchester County Charter, in contrast to the amended Nassau County Charter, set forth express enumerated local lawmaking powers with respect to fifteen specific subjects. See, Respondents' Compendium, p. 7. 27 Laws,"containing sections 150-162. The new Section 150, entitled "Power to adopt and amend local laws," provided, "The Board of Supervisors of the county shall have powers of local legislation under the provisions of Section 26 of Article 3 of the constitution and shall have power to adopt and amend local laws." Nassau County Charter, § 150(1). Despite the reservations expressed with respect to the deficiencies of general grants of power, no enumeration of specific subject areas for exercising local lawmaking powers was provided. Section 151, entitled "Effect of local law on acts of State legislature," set forth the procedure and requirements for adopting local laws which change or supercede State special laws. It provides in pertinent part: In adopting a local law changing or superseding any provision of an act of the State Legislature which provision does not in terms and in effect apply alike to all counties, the County Legislature shall specify the chapter number, year of enactment, title of statute, section, subsection or subdivision, which it is intended to change or supersede, but the failure so to specify shall not affect the validity of such local law. Section 154 prohibited the enactment of local laws that purported to supercede State statutes with respect to eight subjects. See, Nassau County 28 Charter, § 154. These same subjects were already detailed in the then- applicable County Law § 379(6). See, 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee, pp. 89-90 (listing the eight restricted subjects, 6[a] through 6[h]); Respondents' Compendium, pp. 190-91. The 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee acknowledged that the 1937 amendments had been made to the Nassau County Charter. See, 1938 Constitutional Convention Committee, p. 88; Respondents' Compendium, p. 189. The committee nowhere indicated that there was any perception or intention by the Legislature to vest in Nassau County, in contradistinction to Westchester County, unbridled or superior powers of local legislation, nor does any such perception or intention appear in the billjacket to the 1937 amendment. To the contrary, the indication in the bill jacket was that the general delegation of local lawmaking power without enumeration might still be insufficient to vest any local lawmaking power in Nassau County. See again, L. 1937, ch. 618, bill jacket, pp. 4-5; Respondents' Compendium, pp. 6-7. 29 Thereafter, by Laws of New York 1939, ch. 272, the Legislature enacted, "an administrative code for Nassau county in harmony with and supplemental to the county government law of Nassau county." JR. 130. Subsequently, the Constitution was revised in 1938 and the provisions ofArticle III, Section 26, were renumbered to appear at Article IX, Section 2. As a result, at the County's request, legislation was enacted to amend the provisions of the Nassau County Charter that referred to the former provisions of the Constitution. See, L. 1939, ch. 700 (amending Sections 150 and 162 of Article I-A of the Nassau County Charter); L. 1945, ch. 42 (amending Section 103[2]) of the Nassau County Charter); Respondents' Compendium, pp. 66-82. D. The 1948 Statutes Enacting The County Guaranty. By Laws of New York 1948, ch. 98, and Laws of New York 1948, ch. 851, the Legislature enacted two special laws amending the County Charter and the County Administrative Code to add what has now come to be known as the County Guaranty. Laws of New York 1948, ch. 98 amended section 607 (now section 606) of the County Charter, entitled "Correction of roll; extension of taxes," by adding the following language: 30 Any surplus existing or hereafter arising from the extension of taxes in excess of the amounts raised for the adopted budgets shall be credited to the county, and any deficiencies existing or hereafter arising from the extension of taxes for the adopted budgets shall be a county charge. JR. 164; see also, County Charter, § 606. The Bill Jacket for the 1948 Act amending the County Charter contains a February 25, 1948 letter from County Attorney Marcus G. Christ to the Governor's Counsel providing in pertinent part: In view of the establishment of the County Board of Assessors whose members are charged with the duty of preparing the assessment rolls and extending the taxes, it is deemed to be in the best interests of the County of Nassau that section 607 of the Nassau County Government Law be amended to provide that any surplus existing or hereafter arising from taxes in excess of the amounts raised for the adopted budgets shall be credited to the county, and any deficiencies existing or hereafter arising from the extension of taxes for the adopted budgets shall be a county charge. This cannot be accomplished by local law and it is therefore recommended that the Governor give his approval to this bill, which is now pending before him. JR. 610 (emphasis added). 31 By companion bill, Laws of New York 1948, ch. 851, the Legislature amended various provisions of the County Administrative Code pertaining to the same subject matter. Entitled, "An act to amend the Nassau county administrative code, in relation to illegal and erroneous taxes and unequal assessments and proceedings for the correction or review thereof," the bill added the County Guaranty and confirmed that notice of tax certiorari proceedings need not be provided to school districts. See,JR. 612- 19; see also, Laws of New York 1948, ch. 851. Thus, subdivision (b)(3)(c) of section 6-26.0 of the County Administrative Code was added to provide: (c) Notwithstanding any provisions of this chapter, or any other general or special law to the contrary, any deficiency existing or hereafter existing from a decrease in an assessment or tax under subdivisions one, four and seven of section 6-24.0, or sections 6- 12.0 or 5-72.0 of the code or by reason of exemption or reductions ofassessments shall be a county charge. County Administrative Code, § 6-26.0(b)(3)(c); JR. 616-17. Likewise, section 6-17.3 of the County Administrative Code, concerning the service of papers in proceedings to review assessments, was amended to provide that, "[notwithstanding the provisions of any other 32 general or special law to the contrary it shall not be necessary to deliver a copy of said writ [petition or notice for the review of an assessment] to the clerk of any school district." See, County Administrative Code, § 6-17.3; JR. 619. The BillJacket for the Act amending the County Administrative Code contains a March 8, 1948 letter from County Attorney Marcus G. Christ to the Governor's Counsel explaining: By section 609 of the County Government Law of Nassau County, effectiveJanuary 1, 1938, the offices of town assessors in towns were abolished and their powers and duties transferred to the County Board of Assessors. Section 602 of the County Government Law of Nassau County provides that the County Board ofAssessors shall assess all property situated in the county and liable to taxation for state, county, town, school or special district purposes and that there shall be no more equalization of assessed valuations among the towns and cities within the county. The basis upon which the deficits were charged back to the towns and the cities was that they could be attributed to the town or city assessors as shown in the certificates of error issued by them. Inasmuch as the assessment rolls for state, county, town and special districts and school taxes are now and have been since January 1, 1938, made by the County Board of Assessors, it is believed that all deficits arising from illegal or erroneous assessments, reductions in 33 valuations, waivers of interest or penalties should by statute be made a county charge. JR. 182-83, 627-28.14 E. Subsequent Statutory Enactments Preserving The County Guaranty Provisions. RPTL § 726(1), enacted years after the special laws implementing the County Guaranty, provides that refunds obtained in tax certiorari 14In its brief, the County — for the first time in this litigation — presents a theoretical discourseas to why the County may have requested the County Guaranty back in 1948. See, Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-24. Among other things, the County conjectures that the Town officials who controlled the Board of Supervisors wanted to "improve the bottom line for the Towns, and make the Town supervisors appear as though theywere keeping taxes low for their constituents." Appellants' Brief, p. 19. The County also asserts, again without foundation, that the Town officials sought to "legalize their illegalconduct" of previously having the County Treasurer keep"'books ofaccount,' accumulating the amounts owed by the Towns and school districts on the [County's] books." Appellants' Brief, pp. 19, 20. Such conjecture isnot properly presented to this Courton appeal and should be rejected out of hand. There is no factual basis in the Record establishing the speculations here advanced by the County, and acceptance of its contention would require this Court to conclude that the 1948 letters submitted by the County Attorney in support of the legislation containedfalse and disingenuous information. Nonetheless, itbearsnoting that this Court has recently held that the 1948transfer of the tax refund burden to the County was "the sensible view" that "accompanied this shift in [assessing] responsibility [from the towns to the County]." Steel Los HI / Goya Foods. Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of County of Nassau. 10 N.Y.3d 445, 454, 859 N.Y.S.2d 576, 580 (2008) (emphasis added). Moreover and in any event, as the County itselfrecognizes (see, Appellants' Brief, p. 21, n. 10), this Court has cautioned that, "speculation on the 'political' motivation of the Legislature as a judicial construct for statutory analysis in an appropriate area of legislativeactivity would be a slippery and dangerous slope," and "a court sitting as a court of law cannot inquire into the motives by which law was produced." City of New York v. State. 94 N.Y.2d 577, 591, 709 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128 (2000). 34 proceedings are to be charged back to the city, town, or special district which had received the taxes. See, RPTL § 726(1 )(a), (b) and (c). However, it was enacted as a special law, subject to a savings provision preserving the primacy ofother special laws or county charter provisions. See, RPTL § 2006; see also, New York Telephone Co. v. Supervisor of Town of North Hempstead, 77 A.D.3d 121, 131-32, 908 N.Y.S.2d 401, 408-09 (2nd Dept. 2010), Iv. denied, 16 N.Y.3d 711, 923 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2011) (holding, inter alia, that RPTL § 726(1) is a special law that does not apply to Nassau County). By Laws of New York 1996, ch. 503, the Legislature amended several other provisions of the Real Property Tax Law. This enactment removed mandatory party status for local school districts in tax certiorari proceedings (see, RPTL §708[3]), and, instead, provided schooldistrictswith the ability to intervene and submit an answer in such proceedings (see, RPTL § 712[2-a]). However, the State Legislature expressly exempted Nassau County from each and every one of these provisions. Thus, RPTL § 712(2-a) provides that, "any school district, except ... a school district in a special assessing unit as defined in article eighteen of this chapter [i.e., Nassau County] . . . may become a party in the 35 proceeding initiated by petitioner to review its tax assessment..." (emphasis added). According to the Bill Jacket for this legislation, this was done, because "school districts in these counties are not responsible for tax certiorari awards." JR. 314, 315, 319, 323. F. The County's Prior Unsuccessful Attempts To Undo The County Guaranty. During the three years prior to its enactment ofLocal Law 18, the County had been involved in no less than three lawsuits in which it unsuccessfully attempted to limit or undo further application of the County Guaranty. See, e.g., New YorkTelephone Co.v. Supervisor ofTown of North Hempstead, supra (unsuccessfully seeking a holding that the County Guaranty had been superceded byTitle 3 of Article 5 of the RPTL); Steel Los III / Goya Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors of County of Nassau, supra(unsuccessfully seeking a holding that the County Guaranty did not apply to PILOT payments); Corbin v. County of Nassau. 26 Misc.3d 572, 888 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2009 [Lally, J.]) (unsuccessfully seeking a holding that the County Guaranty violated RPTL § 556, which, like RPTL § 726, requires towns, special districts and school districts to remunerate a County for tax 36 refunds paid by the County, but does not supercede special laws in existence at the time of its adoption). Separate and apart from these lawsuits, in 2002 the County prepared a proposal for a Home Rule message to eliminate the County Guaranty. See,JR. 68, Affidavit of Lorraine Deller, lit 5-8. As an alternative, the County prepared a proposal for a Home Rule message to amend the RPTL and sections of the County Administrative Code to provide for a one year extension of time to finalize County assessment rolls. See, JR. 69, Affidavit of Lorraine Deller, HH 9-10; JR. 111. Ultimately, by Laws of 2002, ch. 401, the State Legislature approved the County's request for the one year extension by amending RPTL § 523-b(8) and sections 6-2.1 and 6-13.0 of the County Administrative Code. It does not appear that the County's request to eliminate the County Guaranty ever advanced to the posture of a formal application to the Legislature. See, JR. 46, Verified Petition, 11 95. G. The Enactment Of Local Law 18-2010. Within three months of the Second Department's adverse ruling in New York Telephone, by a vote of 11 in favor and 8 in opposition, the 37 County Legislature approved the enactment of Local Law 18, and on November 3, 2010 it was approved by the County Executive. See, JR. 56-59. Local Law 18 amended Section 606(a) of the County Charter by removing the followingwords, "Any surplus existing or hereafter arising from the extension of taxes in excess of the amounts raised for the adopted budget shall be credited to the county, and any deficiencies existing or hereafter arising from the extension of taxes for the adopted budgets shall be a county charge." Compare, Local Law 18, § 5 (JR. 58-59) with County Code § 606(a). Local Law 18 also "repealed" the provisions of the County Administrative Code containing the County Guaranty (compare, Local Law 18, § 2, with County Administrative Code §6-24.0), and amended theAdministrative Code to include a new section 6-24.0 which provides, "Correction of assessment rolls and tax rolls. The County shall act in accordance with the provisions of the Real Property Tax Law with respect to the correction of assessment rolls and tax rolls" (see, JR. 57, Local Law 18, § 3). Local Law 18 also amended Section 6-17.3 of the County Administrative Code by removing the words,"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other general or special law to the contrary it shall not be necessary to 38 deliver a copy of said petition or notice to the clerk of any school district," and adding language requiring a petitioner in a tax certiorari proceeding to provide notice and a copy of the petition to the superintendent of schools of any school district in which the assessed property is located. Compare, Local Law 18, § 4 (JR. 58) with County Administrative Code § 6-17.3. Nowhere did Local Law 18 set forth the authority pursuant to which the County wasacting. H. Procedural History. In this hybrid Article 78 proceeding/declaratoryjudgment action, 41 school districts in Nassau County,15 togetherwith the superintendentofthe Merrick Union Free School District and the President of the Board of Education of the Plainedge Union Free School District, commenced this lawsuit, challenging the enactment of Local Law 18. See, JR. 20-54. The average school district portion of 2010 real property tax levies in the County was approximately sixty-five percent (65%). See, JR. 61- 62, Melucci Aff. 11 7. Thus, as a result of Local Law 18, approximately $52 million (i.e., 65% of the present annual $80 million refund obligation l5There are a total of 56 school districts in the County. All but two of them (the cities of Glen Cove and Long Beach) have properties within their boundaries assessed by the County, and therefore 54 school districts have been protected by the County Guaranty. See, JR. 61, Melucci Aff., H2. 39 indicated in Local Law 18) would have to be paid by the 54 affected school districts. Id. An even division of these monies would result in an annual additional financial burden of$962,962.96 for each school district,16 which is equivalent to the annual cost of approximately 10 to 12 teacher positions at each school district (or more than 500 teacher positions on a countywide basis). See, JR. 62, Melucci Aff., ITU 9-10. Petitioners maintained, inter alia, that the County had no authority to act in light of various restrictions set forth in the Municipal Home Rule Lawas derived from the State Constitution. See, JR. 49-51. They additionally maintained that the enactment of Local Law 18 was irrational, arbitrary and capricious. See, JR. 51-52. By amended pleading, petitioners added a ground for relief pursuant to the Statute of Local Governments, which codifies the doctrine of legislative equivalency. See, JR. 534-35, 565 (Amended Petition, H112). The County served an Answer to the Petition, but not to the Amended Petition. See, JR. 822-35. By so-ordered stipulation, this proceeding — Baldwin Union Free School District et. al v. County of Nassau (Nassau County Index No. 11- ieThe actual impact upon each school districtwill varybased upon the number and result of annual tax certiorari filings in each such school district and the percentage of affected commercial properties therein. See, JR. 62-63, Melucci Aff., HI1. 40 3280) — wasjoined for joint disposition with the two other proceedings on appeal before this Court, Town ofNorth Hempstead et al. v. The County ofNassau (NassauCounty Index No. 11-4381), and Hafner et al. v. County ofNassau et al. (Nassau County Index No. 11-4193). JR. 788-95. I. Nassau County Supreme Court Order. By Short Form Order entered January 6, 2012, Nassau County Supreme CourtJustice Thomas A. Adams denied all three challenges to Local Law 18 and dismissed the proceedings/complaints. See, JR. 5-11. Justice Adams determined that, since State Law (RPTL §§ 726(1) and 556) "requires a County to charge back the amount of the refund attributable to the town, special district or school district," the repeal of the County Guaranty simply "assures that the County Charter conforms with State [law]." JR. 7. Justice Adams further found that, "while it is true that MHRL 34 contains certain limitations and restrictions on the ability of counties in general to adopt and amend county charters and charter laws, those restrictions do not apply to Nassau County by virtue of Charter 162." JR. 8. Instead, the court held that "[restrictions on the County's power to adopt local laws are contained in [County] Charter 154, and none of the restrictions contained therein would have prevented the County from adopting Local Law 18-2010." Id. 41 J. Appellate Division Decision 8c Order. By Opinion & Order entered February 27, 2013, the Second Department reversed and granted summary judgment declaring that Local LawNo. 18violates the NewYork Constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law. See, JR. xv-xxii. Citing this Court's rulings in People v. County of Westchester. 282 N.Y. 224 (1940) and Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v. Town of Guilderland. 74 N.Y.2d 372, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989), the Second Department observed that "the lawmaking authority of a municipal corporation, whichisa political subdivision of the State, can be exercised only to the extent it has been delegated by the State," and "the authority of a municipality to abrogate State law is never implied or inferred. It is only derived from express grant, never from a general grant of power." JR. xix (citations omitted). The Appellate Division rejected the County's contention "that it had the power to adopt Local Law 18 pursuant to its State-enacted Charter, which power preceded the enactment of the relevant constitutional and Municipal Home Rule Law provisions in 1963." JR. xx. In this regard, the court held: 42 JR. xxi. the Charter provisions cited by the County as the source of this power do not provide the County with the authority to enact local laws relating to the levy, collection and administration of local taxes that are inconsistent with State laws. Charter § 150(1) only provides that the County Legislature shall have powers of local legislation "under the provisions" (emphasis added) of article IX, section 2 of the New York Constitution. As discussed above, article IX, section 2 of the New York Constitution only authorizes local laws relating to the levy, collection, and administration of local taxes that are consistent with State laws, both general and special.17 Further, authority to enact a local law purporting to repeal the County Guaranty is not found in either Charter § 151 or § 154. Charter § 151 merely sets forth the procedure the County Legislature must follow when it adopts a local law which supersedes a special law of the State, and Charter § 154 provides some additional restrictions on the County's ability to adopt local laws that supersede special laws of the State. Neither of these provisions gives the County the authority to adopt laws beyond the authority granted in article IX, section 2 of the New York Constitution. This appeal pursuant to CPLR 5601(b)(1) ensued. JR. xi. ,7The Appellate Division found that, "it is indisputable that Local Law No. 18, which purports to supersede and repeal the CountyGuaranty, is inconsistent with the State law that enacted the County Guaranty." JR. xx. 43 POINT I THE NASSAU COUNTY CHARTER DID NOT DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO ENACT LOCAL LAWS THAT SUPERCEDE STATE LAWS RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY TAX REFUND OBLIGATIONS. OR THAT AFFECT THE MAINTENANCE OR SUPPORT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION Citing to Sections 103, 150 through 162 and 2201 of its Charter, the County contends that it "was delegated ample authority over the entire process of levying, collecting, and administering property taxes from start to finish, including tax refunds and who should be obligated to pay them" (Appellants' Brief, p. 40), and that it has "unique and extremely broad powers of local legislation" (Appellants' Brief, p. 38), which includes virtually unfettered authority to supercede any special law enacted by the State Legislature regardless of its subject matter (see, e.g., Appellants' Brief, pp. 4, 7, 35-36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 48, 50). The Appellate Division correctly rejected these arguments, which are contrary to the express delegation requirements of governing case law and unsupported by the cited Charter provisions. The logic of the County's contention appears to be that the lack of enumeration in the general grant of local lawmaking power in its Charter 44 (Section 150[1]), combined with the detailing of procedures to be followed when the County supercedes "any" special law (Section 151), provided it with a boundless delegation of local lawmaking authority except as specifically limited by the eight enumerated restrictions set forth in Section 154. These contentions are the exact opposite of the considered jurisprudence in place at the time these provisions of the County Charter were enacted. A. A Municipality's Authority To Enact Local Laws Is Derived Only From An Express Grant Of Power From The State To Act With Respect To A Given Specific Subject. This Court has consistently instructed that: The authority of a municipality to abrogate state law is never implied or inferred. It is only derived from express grant, never from a general grant of power. A State policy may not be ignored by a municipality unless it is specifically empowered so to do in terms clear and explicit. People v. Westchester County. 282 N.Y. 224, 232 (1940) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is particularly instructive to review the cases on the subject that closely book-ended the 1936 enactment and 1937 amendment of the Nassau County Charter. These cases confirm the understanding — set forth in the bill jacket to the 1937 amendment that added the Charter provisions here 45 relied upon by the County — that general grants "are positively ineffective to grant local legislative powers" because "[t]he Legislature should enumerate in detail what power it wishes to grant" and "[i]t cannot do so in general terms." L. 1937, ch. 618, bill jacket, p. 4; Respondents' Compendium, p. 6. These legal precepts were explained largely within the context of judicial examination ofthe then newly-enacted City Home Rule provisions authorized by the Constitution (as amended in 1923) whichset forth specific delegations of enumerated local lawmaking powers to cities. 1. The Browne Case - Powers Of Local Lawmaking Are Strictly Construed And Express Delegation Is Required For Local Lawmaking Power That "Departs" From The Range Of "Established And Familiar" Powers. The extent and limitation of these new Home Rule powers was addressed for the first time by this Court in the Browne case in 1925, as a result of the City of New York'senactment of four local laws designed to make bus transportation a municipal enterprise. This Court concluded that the newly adopted City Home Rule Law provisions did not provide authority for the enactment of these local laws. Starting with a finding that the charter of the City of New York did not expressly provide the city with the "power to 46 enter for itself upon the business of municipal transportation" (Browne. 241 N.Y. at 117),18 this Court instructed: We start, then, with the premise that, at the time of the adoption of the City Home Rule Law, the city of New York was without power under its charter to lay out a route for busses and thereafter engage in the business of a common carrier of passengers; and the question is whether, by anything contained in that law, the privilege is given it to confer that power upon itself. The title ofthe act must be classed as a misnomer, if it has given currency to the belief that cities have been emancipatedfrom the power ofthe Legislature in respect of every legitimate subject oflocal interest or concern. Nothing ofthe kind has been accomplished or attempted. There are Constitutions in some of the states whereby cities are empowered in general terms to frame their own governments. When that authority isconferred, there is no restriction upon the power of the local legislative body, except the implied one that what is embodied in the charter must have some appropriate relations to cities and their government. But neither the Constitution ofNew York nor the City Home Rule Law confers these blanket powers upon the cities of this state. The local laws much touch a 18This Court noted that the City Charter contemplated the grant of a franchise to a private entity to operate a municipal transportation business, "subjectto regulation at all timesby the power of the state." Id. However, even though the City could "when the franchise should expire, [] take possession of the plant and thereafter run the business as its own," this Court stressed that there was a meaningful difference between the "power of recaption" and the "power to engage as an original project." Browne. 241 N.Y. at 117-18. 47 city in its property, affairs, or government, but this alone will not support them. There is yet another restriction. They must touch the city's property, affairs, or government in one or more of certain enumerated ways [citing to the five enumerated subjects of power set forth in the Constitution]. Browne. 241 N.Y. at 119 (emphasis added). Continuing, this Court instructed that, "[i]f [the City Home Rule Law] was framed in the belief that cities would have the power thereafter to become common carriers ofpassengers, it provisions are more significant for what they omit than for what they contain." Browne. 241 N.Y. at 123. It held that, had such been intended, the Legislature either would have passed special laws providing for such power, or appropriately framed the resolutions for the amendment of the Constitution. This Court reasoned that the Legislature "would have said in so many words that the city might establish its own public utilities and operate them itself (Browne. 241 N.Y. at 122), and cautioned, "The colorless words chosen were singularly inept, if they were intended to express approval of a departure so momentous. We cannot reasonably invest them with this meaning when they may be given a legitimate function within the range of established and familiar powers" (Browne. 241 N.Y. at 124). 48 2. The Clark Case • "Including But Not Limited To" Powers OfLocal Legislation Delegated To A City Are Insufficient To Overcome The Requirement Of Express Delegation For A "Departure" From Ordinary City Functions. Following this Court's ruling in Browne, the enumerated powers provision ofArticle 2, § 11 of the City Home Rule Lawwas amended to read in part as follows (emphasis added): Unless hereafter restricted by the legislature under the provisions of section one of article twelve of the constitution, the local legislative body of a city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws in relation to the property, affairs or government of a city including but not limited to [and then follow the five enumerated classes set forth in the original law]. Citing to this amendment, the City of New York deemed itself now authorized to operate municipal buses on its streets. This position, was rejected. See, Clark v. La Guardia. 245 A.D. 325, 281 N.Y.S. 54 (2d Dept. 1935), affd273 N.Y. 639 (1937). There, the Cityasserted that, "the inclusion of the words 'including but not limited to' gave to the city a general and unlimited power of local government, including the right to own or lease and operate municipal busses." Clark. 245 A.D. at 326, 281 N.Y.S. at 56. In its 1935 determination rejecting the city's contentions, the Second Department held, in a ruling affirmed by this Court without opinion: 49 My understanding of this declaration of the Court of Appeals [in Browne] is that a city in this state is without power to do what the defendants have threatened, i.e., to establish and operate municipal bus lines, unless there is an express delegation ofsuch power by the state Legislature in language that clearly and unmistakably shows that such was the intention of the Legislature. The amendment ofarticle 2, § 11, of the City Home Rule Law, by chapter 670 of the Laws of 1928 as amended by chapter 646 of the Laws of 1929 (section 1), upon which the defendants now depend, does not authorize the city to engage in the transportation business by the use of busses, nor can such authority be implied therefrom. Such a 'departure' from the ordinary functions of city government, characterized byJudge Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals in the Browne Case, supra, as a 'notable innovation' and as 'momentous,' requires an enactment plainly saying in so many words 'that the city might establish its own public utilities and operate them itself The amendments of 1928 and 1929 do not do that. Clark. 245 A.D. at 328, 281 N.Y.S. at 57-58. 3. The County Securities Case - Delegation Of Authority To Assess And Collect Taxes Is Insufficient To Authorize City To Change Tax Law Embodied In City Charter. In 1938, this Court nullified a City of New Rochelle local law insofar as it purported to amend the city's charter, to provide that liens for unpaid taxes might be sold and foreclosed upon by the purchaser in a 50 Supreme Court action. County Securities. Inc. v. Seacord. 278 N.Y. 34 (1938). The "question presented," was identified as "whether the Legislature, by the 'City Home Rule Law,' conferred upon the city authority by local law to change the tax law as embodied in the city charter granted by the Legislature" (emphasis added), and this Court noted, "[i]f it has such jurisdiction it must be found in the amendment to the Constitution and the 'City Home Rule Law' adopted pursuant to such constitutional amendment." County Securities. 278 N.Y. at 36 (citation omitted). This Court observed that, "[m]any statutes have been enacted by the Legislature conferring upon cities and counties special methods for the assessment and collection of taxes," but it also stressed, "[t]he power of taxation, being a State function, the delegation of any part of that power to a subdivision of the State must be made in express terms. It cannot be inferred." County Securities. 278 N.Y. at 37 (citations omitted). After noting its ruling in Browne, as well as the subsequent "including but not limited to" language of the 1928/1929 amendment to the City Home Rule Law of the Constitution, this Court concluded, "[n]owhere in this or any other statute can be found an express grant ofpower to cities to enact local lawswhich have the 51 effect of changing the method of collection of taxes provided for in the original charter and the general Tax Law." County Securities. 278 N.Y. at 38. In expounding upon its conclusion, this Court noted: No local lawshall supercede any provision ofan act of the legislature relating to the property, affairs or government ofcities which provision in terms and in effect applies alike to all cities, nor any provision of an act of the legislature which provision relates to matters other than the property, affairs or government of cities, whether in terms and in affect applying alike to all cities or not, nor any provision of an act of the legislature enacted pursuant to article twelve of the constitution on an emergency message from the governor and by the concurrent action of two-thirds of the members of the legislature [i.e., special laws]. County Securities. 278 N.Y. at 38-39. 4. The Carodix Corporation Case - Amendment Providing Express Delegation Of Power To Collect Taxes Through The Sale Of Tax Liens Is Sufficient To Support A City Local Law Providing For Same. Following the 1938 ruling in County Securities, the Legislature, by Laws of 1939, chapter 855, granted express enumerated authority to cities to provide by local law for the sale of tax liens. The City of New Rochelle thereupon adopted a local law authorizing the sale and transfer of tax liens. 52 In Carodix Corp. v. Comiskey. 265 A.D. 450, 453, 39 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (2d Dept.), affd. 291 N.Y. 737 (1943), the local law was upheld upon the ground that the Legislature had nowexpressly "authorized] cities to adopt local laws respecting the method of collection of taxes." In resolving the issue, the Second Department held, in a ruling affirmed by this Court without opinion: Subsequent to the decision in the County Securities case, supra, the statute in question (Laws of 1939, chap. 855) was enacted. It expressly conferred upon cities the optional right to assume, by local law, the power to collect taxes through the medium of selling tax liens. It makes no reference to the right of a purchaser to foreclose his lien. But even if the validity of the statute [] and Local Law No. 3 of the New Rochelle Local Laws of 1939 be doubtful under the Home Rule Amendment and City Home Rule Law as they read at the time the County Securities case, supra, was decided, in my opinion they may be sustained under the present Constitution, effective January 1, 1939, and the present City Home Rule Law, Consol. Laws, ch. 76, as amd. L. 1939, ch. 867, effectiveJune 14, 1939. The Constitution (Art. IX, § 12) provides: 'Every city shall also have the power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with this constitution and laws of the state, and whether or not such local laws relate to its property, affairs or government, in respect to the following subjects: * * * the collection and administration of local taxes authorized by the legislature. * * *.' 53 In accordance with the above provision of the Constitution, section 11 of the City Home Rule Law was amended. It provides: '* * * the local legislative body ofa city shall have power to adopt and amend * * * local laws in relation to * * * the levy, collection and administration of city taxes on real property, other city taxes authorized by the legislature, * * * liens on local property in connection therewith and charges thereon, * * *.' Thereafter, on August 21, 1939, Local Law No. 3 of 1939, providing for the sale by the city of tax liens, was enacted. These provisions of the Constitution and the statute expressly confer upon cities the authority to adopt local laws relating to the collection and administration of local taxes. In other words, they supply the omission in the Home Rule Amendment and the City Home Rule Law which was emphasized in the County Securities case, supra. Nor is Local Law No. 3 of 1939 inconsistent with the general Tax Law, which was the situation with regard to Local Law No. 5 of 1932, considered in the County Securities case, supra. Carodix Corp.. 265 A.D. at 453-54, 39 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (emphasis added). B. The County Charter Granted No Express Power To Enact Local Laws Inconsistent With State Tax Laws Or Affecting The Maintenance And Support Of Public Education. As demonstrated, at the time of the enactment of the 1935 amendments to the County Home Rule provisions of the Constitution, and the 1936 and 1937 legislation creating the County Charter, it was well-settled 54 that: (1) express delegation was required to authorize the adoption of local laws relating to administration of local taxes; (2)delegations of"including but not limited to" powers were not sufficiently express so as to authorize a municipality to enact local laws in subject areas not expressly enumerated; and (3) municipalities did not have power to undo special laws affecting them thatwere enacted by the emergency message provision of the Constitution.19 The County Charter only contained a general grant of local lawmaking power in Section 150(1) and Section 103(2). It did not delegate express enumerated authority to the County to enact local laws with respect to any specific subject, and certainly not with respect to education and the allocation or transfer of tax refund duties and obligations amongst municipalities and districts within the County. The County argues otherwise, pointing to Section 2201 of the County Charter, which was contained in the 1936 Charter (before the 1937 amendment deemed necessary to give the County any local lawmaking power) l9The provision of the Constitution authorizing the Legislature to enact special laws affecting a municipality on emergency message and concurrent action of two-thirds of the members of each house of the Legislature {see, Constitution of 1894 [amended 1923], Article XII, §2) was expanded in 1938 to also allow the Legislature to enact special laws affecting a municipality on a home rule message from the municipality (see, Constitution of 1894 [amended 1938], Article IX, §2). 55 and authorized the County to "provide by ordinance a plan . . . for the assessment of property for tax purposes, the making of appropriations, the period for which appropriations are made, the levy of taxes, the collection of taxes, the accrual ofpenalties, the sale of tax liens and the foreclosure thereof with reference to the dates at which each of the steps above set forth shall take place." This grant ofordinance power, was made at the time the County took over the assessing function from Towns and necessarily had to prepare a plan for this function. See, Queens Park Gardens, supra, 255 A.D. 625, 8 N.Y.S.2d 332. Section 2201 nowhere addresses the issue of tax refunds for overassessments or allocating refund obligations amongst municipalities and districts — matters which are uniquely under the plenary control of the Legislature. Moreover, it nowhere expressly delegated authority to supercede state law with respect to the identified subjects (let alone with respect to the unidentified subject of refund obligations). The County's citation to Section 151 of the Charter, setting forth the procedures for "changing or superseding any provision of an act of the State Legislature" suffers from the same limitations, in that, as the Appellate Division correctly held, this provision only addresses procedures. See, JR. xxi. 56 In any event, Section 151 does not delegate express enumerated authority to supercede special laws related to local taxes and education. The County would nonetheless have this Court conclude that, by employing the word "any," the Legislature delegated boundless supersession power to the County. See, Appellants' Brief, pp. 4, 39, 42-43. However, the use of the word "any" simply confirms that the supersession procedures apply to all (as opposed to select) special acts of the State Legislature. Moreover, as the case law instructs, a general grant of authority to supersede state laws is patently insufficient to accomplish such a "momentous departure" from "ordinary functions of [local] government." Clark. 245 A.D. at 328, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 58, citing Browne. 251 N.Y. at 124. Finally, the County is in no manner aided by the "Legislative intent" provision set forth in Section 162 of the Charter, which provides that, "[i]t is the intention of the legislature by this article to provide for the full and complete exercise by the County Legislature of powers of local legislation pursuant to the provisions of section two of article nine of the constitution," and "[t]he powers granted by this article shall be in addition to and not in substitution for all the powers, rights, privileges and functions conferred or 57 imposed upon the county by any other provision of this act or of any other law." These provisions are actually weaker than those Westchester County Charter provisions considered by this Court in People v. Westchester County, where this Court rejected Westchester County's enactment of a local law providing for the collection of tolls on the Hutchinson River Parkway. Those Westchester County Charter provisions stated that, "[t]he enumeration of particular powers by this act shall not be deemed to be exclusive, but in addition to the powers enumerated or implied herein or appropriate to the exercise of such powers, the county shall have and may exercise all powers which under the constitution of the state of New York it would be competent for this act specifically to enumerate, and all powers necessarily incident or fairly to be implied." People v. Westchester County. 282 N.Y. at 231-32. Nonetheless, this Court held that such was "a general grant of local administrative power" (Id.), and was thus necessarily circumscribed by the express delegation proscriptions set forth in other cases, and ineffective to authorize the imposition of a tax, fee or license to use a public highway. 58 POINT II LOCAL LAW 18 VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW FORBIDDING THE ENACTMENT OF LOCAL LAWS RELATING TO THE LEVY. COLLECTION. ADMINISTRATION. DISTRIBUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LOCAL TAXES INCONSISTENT WITH STATE SPECIAL LAWS. AND AFFECTING THE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION. Weestablished in Point I that the County Charter did not delegate authority to enact local laws inconsistent with State tax laws or affecting the maintenance and support of public education. Here, we demonstrate that Local Law 18 isprohibited by the local taxand education restrictions set forth in the Constitution and the MHRL. A. Local Law 18 Violates The Constitutional And MHRL Restrictions Governing The Enactment OfLocal Laws Relating To The Levy. Collection. Administration. Distribution And Judicial Review of Local Taxes. It iswell-settled that, "[t]he power of the Legislature in reference to the imposition and collection of taxes is plenary, only limited by constitutional provisions," and "[t]he various local agencies employed in the imposition, collection, and distribution of taxes are governmental agencies, 59 engaged in performing governmental functions delegated to them by the Legislature." Town of Amherst v. Erie County. 260 N.Y. 361, 370 (1933).20 The Legislature's plenary authority with regard to local taxation is preserved in the home rule provisions of the Constitution, which provide: (c) In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or any other law ... (ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such local government: (8) The levy, collection and administration of local taxes authorized by the legislature and of assessments for local improvements consistent with laws enacted by the legislature. 21NY Const, art IX, § 2(c)(ii)(8) (emphasis added). 20Indeed, all taxing power in thisState isvested in the legislature pursuant to section 1of Article III and section 1 ofArticle XVI of the state constitution. See, RAB Co. v. Tomkins County Board of Assessment Review. 68 A.D.2d 374, 375, 417 N.Y.S.2d 788 (3rd Dept. 1979), citing, Sonmax. Inc. v. Citv of New York. 43 N.Y.2d 253, 257, 401 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175-76 (1977). 21It was here for the first time that the Constitution (as amended in 1963) enumerated a (continued...) 60 Thus, local governments generally have authority under § 2(c)(ii) to enact and amend local laws where the amendments are consistent with "general laws." However, when it comes to local laws "relating to . . . levy, collection and administration of local taxes," the restrictions contained in § 2(c)(ii)(8) mandate that such local laws must be "consistent with laws enacted by the legislature" (emphasis added). The utilization of the term "general laws" in one place of the constitutional provision (§ 2[c][ii]), and the term "laws" in another (§ 2[c][ii][8]), is of manifest significance. The definitional provisions of the constitution confirm that the term "laws" necessarily includes both a "general law" (defined as, "A law which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties . . ." [Art. IX, § 3(d)(1)] [emphasis added]) and a "special law" (defined as, "A law which in terms and in effect applies to one or more, but 2'(...continued) delegation of local lawmaking power relating to local taxes. The prior constitutional provisions insofar as they pertained tocounties (see, 1846 Constitution, Article 3, §17; 1874 Constitution, Article 3, § 23; 1894 Constitution, Article 3, § 27; 1894 Constitution [amended 1935], Article 3, §26; 1894 Constitution [amended 1938], Article 9, § 2), delegated no suchauthority. Thus, because the Legislaturedid not separately delegate an enumerated power to the County to enact local laws with respect to taxation that were inconsistent with State laws (see, Point I), compliance with these provisions of the 1963 Constitution is, as the Second Department correctly held, required. 61 not all, counties . . ." [Art. IX, § 3(d)(4)] [emphasis added]). In other words, local laws relating to the levy, collection and administration of local taxes must be consistent with all "laws enacted by the legislature" (i.e., both general laws and special laws). Referring to the fact that the opening provision ofSection 2(c)(ii) grants local governments authority to enact laws relating to ten enumerated subjects provided they are not inconsistent with "general laws," the County contends that, "[t]he only way to harmonize this with the final clause of Section 2(c)(ii)(8) referring to 'laws,' is to find that the word 'laws' was referring to 'general laws,' consistent with the beginning language of this same section." Appellants' Brief, p. 59. This is incorrect. The "consistent with laws" provision has not only been set forth with respect to the subject of local taxes, but also with respect to the subject of local financing. See, Art. IX, § 2(c)(ii)(4).22 The same restrictive language does not appear in connection with the eight other enumerated subjects for 22This subsection authorizes adoption of local laws relating to, "[t]he incurring of its obligations, except that local laws relating to financing by the issuance of evidences of indebtedness by such local government shallbe consistent with laws enacted by the legislature." Art. IX, § 2(c)(ii)(4) (emphasis added). 62 local lawmaking set forth in the Constitution. Compare, Art. IX, § 2(c)(ii)(l), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10). Thus, the County is arguing that the term "consistentwith laws" —which expressly applies to twoofthe ten enumerated subjects — is, nonetheless, mere surplusage with no effective meaning or purpose. This contention is meritless. The Second Department held, in a decision affirmed by this Court, that the "consistent with laws" provisions of Article IX, § 2(c)(ii)(4), means that "the Constitution contemplates enactment by the Legislature of special laws affecting the power of local governments to finance by issuance of evidences of indebtedness" (emphasis added). Bugeja v. City of New York, 24A.D.2d 151,152, 266 N.Y.S.2d 80,82 (2d Dept. 1965),affd 17 N.Y.2d 606, 268 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1966). In other words, this Court has already decided that the term "consistent with laws" necessarily includes "special laws." Bydint of the County's argument, this aspect of the Bugeja ruling would have to be overruled, and § 2(c)(ii)(4), as well as § 2(c)(ii)(8), would have to be accorded an entirely different meaning than that imparted by their plain language. The County's proposed interpretation violates rules of statutory construction. In this regard, the County would have this Court add the word 63 "general" before the word "laws" in Section 2(c)(ii)(8) (and before the word "laws" in Section 2[c][ii][4]). Stated differently, the County is seeking to have this Court sterilize the "consistent with laws" expression in this subsection of the Constitution. "In the construction of statutes, each word in the statute must be given its appropriate meaning, and sense must be brought out of the words used." McKinney's Statutes, § 94. Likewise, "It is the universal principle in the interpretation ofstatutes that expressio unius est exclusio alterius. That is, to say, the specific mention of one person or thing implies the exclusion of other persons or thing. As otherwise expressed, where a law expressly describesa particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted and excluded." McKinney's Statutes, § 240. Notably, the all "laws" requirement of the Article IX, § 2(c)(ii)(8), has been carried into MHRL § §10(l)(ii)(a)(8) and (9), and into MHRL § 34(3)(a) which requires compliance with "any general or special law" when enacting a local charter law "which relates to the imposition, judicial review or distribution of the proceeds of taxes or benefit assessments" (emphasis added). In other words, through its implementing enactments, the 64 Legislature has already confirmed that the "consistent with laws" provision means general and special laws. A publication issued by the Department of State concerning the adoption of local laws concurs: The fourth and eighth enumerated powers, relating to the incurring ofobligations and the levy, collection and administration of local taxes and assessments for local improvements, in addition to being limited grants, contain a further restriction to the effect that local laws relating to the issuance of evidences of indebtedness and the levy, collection and administration oflocal taxes and assessments for local improvements must be consistent with laws enacted by the Legislature. In other words, local laws enacted pursuant to these provisions must be consistent with any law enacted by the legislature, whether general or special. Department of State,Adopting Local Laws inNew York State (May 1998, reprint date 2012), p. 4; Respondents' Compendium, p. 214 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, purporting to rely upon this Court's decision in Sonmax. Inc. v. City of New York. 43 N.Y.2d 253, 401 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1977), the County argues that this Court has already held that a local law "concerning property tax refunds is proper and validly enacted pursuant to . . . Article IX, § 2(c)(ii)(8)." Appellants' Brief, pp. 7-8, 65. This, too, is 65 incorrect. Sonmax actually supports our position that the County had no authority to enact a local law inconsistent with a special tax law. Sonmax involved a special law establishing a three year time period before an in rem action for foreclosure of a tax lien could be commenced in New York City. See, Sonmax. 89 Misc.2d 945, 946, 392 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1977). New York City enacted local laws amending the special law by, inter alia, reducing from three years to one year the period after which an in rem action could be commenced. In ruling that the City had the authority to enact the subject local laws, this Court held as follows: Pursuant to article IX of the Constitution, the new article on local governments added by amendment approved by the electorate in 1963, every local government was granted 'power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law * * * except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law (relating to) (t)he levy, (collection) and administration of local taxes authorized by the legislature * * * consistent with laws enacted by the legislature.'' (Art. IX, s 2, subd. (c), par. (8).) Thereafter the Legislature in 1964 adopted the Municipal Home Rule Law (L. 1963, ch. 843). The provisions of this statute authorizing local legislation very largely track the constitutional terminology, 66 except that the requirement that local laws relating to the levy and administration of local taxes authorized by the Legislature be consistent with laws enacted by the Legislature is imposed only on counties towns and villages, not on cities (Municipal Home Rule Law, s 10, subd. (1), par. (ii), cl. (A), subcl. (8)). Sonmax. 43 N.Y.2d at 257, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 175-76 (emphasis added). In other words, this Court acknowledged that the constitutional provisionsofArticle IX, § 2(c)(8) require consistency"with laws enacted by the Legislature," and that such includes special laws enacted by the legislature. Nonetheless, because the "consistent with laws" requirement of MHRL § 10(l)(ii)(A)(8) "is imposed only on counties" and "not on cities," (Sonmax. 43 N.Y.2d at 257,401 N.Y.S.2d at 176), this Court concluded that the special law restriction did not apply to New York City.23 The County's additional contention, that Local Law 18's removal of the County Guaranty made the County "consistent with the provisions of Real Property Tax Law § 726(1)" (see, Appellants' Brief, p. 63; see also, 23The County's citation to Matter of Gizzo v. Town of Mamaroneck. 36 A.D.3d 162, 824 N.Y.S.2d 366 (2d Dept. 2006), for the proposition that "a 'special law' may thus be superseded by a . .. local law" (Appellants' Brief, pp. 43-44) is inapt. Matter of Gizzo did not involve a special law enacted pursuant to a home rule message; nor did it involve the unique requirements of the levy, collection and administration of local taxes provision of the Constitution applicable in this case. 67 Appellants' Brief, pp. 2, 3, 26), is likewise unavailing. First, it ignores the constitutional restriction requiring consistency with special laws (such as the County Guaranty), and the County does not dispute the Appellate Division's finding that, "it is indisputable that Local Law 18 ... is inconsistent with the State law that enacted the County Guaranty." JR. xx. Second, and in any event, the cited provision of RPTL § 726(1), is not, as the County represents, a law of general application. To the contrary, it is a special law of limited application. See, RPTL § 2006; see also, New York Telephone Co., 77 A.D.3d at 131-32, 908 N.Y.S.2d at 408-09. Thus, the County's alignment argument fails as a matter of fact and law. For all of these reasons, the Second Department correctly held that Local Law 18 violates the local tax proscriptions set forth in the Constitution and the MHRL. B. Local Law 18 Also Violates The Constitutional And MHRL Restrictions Forbidding The Enactment Of Local Laws Affecting The Maintenance And Support Of Public Education. As this Court observed in Lanza v. Wagner. 11 N.Y.2d 317, 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380, 387 (1962), citing, Divisich v. Marshall 281 N.Y. 170, 173 (1939), "If there be one public policy well-established in this State it is that public education shall be beyond control by municipalities and politics." 68 Indeed, "[i]t is well established that education is a state function not within the scope of local legislation" (emphasis added). Board of Educ. of U.F.S.D. Number Four of the Town ofGreece v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Rochester. 23 A.D.2d 805, 806, 258 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (4th Dept. 1965), citing, People ex rel. Elkindv. Rosenblum. 184 Misc. 914, 54 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. West. Co. 1945), affd, 269 A.D. 859, 56 N.Y.S.2d 526 (2d Dept. 1945), affd, 295 N.Y. 929(1946). As with local taxation, the home rule provisions of the Constitution also restrict home rule and local lawmaking with respect to the Legislature's plenary authority over education. Thus, Article IX, § 3(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: (a) Except as expressly provided, nothing in this article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to: (1) The maintenance, support or administration of the public school system, as required or provided by article XI of this constitution .... The "nothing-in-this-article" language in Article IX, § 3(a)(1) necessarily means that it is incorporated into the Article IX, § 2 limitations 69 setting forth enumerated local lawmaking powers. These § 3 provisions have been carried forward into MHRL § ll(l)(c), which provides that, "the legislative body shall not be deemed authorized by this chapter to adopt a local law which supersedes a state statute, if such local law . .. [a]pplies to or affects the maintenance, support or administration of the educational system in such local government. . . ." The County's brief, does not address any of these restrictions. Any notion that the education restrictions contained in Article IX, § 3 and MHRL § 1l(l)(c) are somehow obviated by unenumerated inferred provisions of the County Charter would constitute a radical departure from ordered jurisprudence. Indeed, "[e]ducation is expressly made a State responsibility under the State Constitution (art XI, § 1), and is explicitly exempted in the Constitution from home rule restriction (art IX, § 3[a][l])." Board of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y. v. City of N.Y.. 41 N.Y.2d 535, 542, 394 N.Y.S.2d 148, 154 (1977). The Supreme Court recognized that the County's repeal of the County Guaranty necessarily impacted the petitioner school districts, but it attempted to sidestep this constitutional infirmity by referring to RPTL § 726 70 and holding that, "It is not the County that is affecting the maintenance ofthe educational system, but rather the operation of State law." JR. 8. To the contrary, it is the County's removal of the County Guaranty (which protected school districts), not RPTL § 726, that affects the maintenance ofeducational systems in the County. Indeed, RPTL § 726 is not a general law of the State and does not apply to the County. See, New York Telephone Co.. 77 A.D.3d at 131-32, 908 N.Y.S.2d at 408-09. To any extent that the County in reply now attempts to argue that Local Law 18 does not affect the maintenance of school districts in the County, such argument must be rejected. The prohibitions contained in MHRL § ll(l)(c), derived from Article XI, § 1 and Article IX, § 3 of the Constitution, are clear and all-encompassing in their protection of school districts against local control. This is perhaps why we have not found any reported case analyzing the validity of a local law under the "maintenance" and "support" restrictions of the MHRL. We have, however, found authority focusing on similar restrictions that had been contained in the prior City Home Rule Law. In Board of Ed. of U.F.S.D. Number Four of the Town of Greece v. Bd. of Ed. Of the City of Rochester. 23 A.D.2d 805, 806, 258 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (4th Dept.), app. denied, 71 15 N.Y.2d 487, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1965), the Fourth Department analyzed the validity ofa local lawunder the restrictions contained in then-City Home Rule Law §21. That statute prohibited cities from adopting local laws superceding State statutes if such local laws applied to or affected the maintenance, support or administration of the educational system in such city. See, Eriksen v. City of N.Y.. 167 Misc. 42, 47, 2 N.Y.S.2d 280, 285 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 1937). In this regard, the prohibition contained in City Home Rule Law § 21 was virtually identical to the prohibition contained in MHRL §ll(l)(c). In City of Rochester, the Fourth Department struck down a local law which had terminated the right, granted by the State Legislature, for children in unannexed areas to attend Rochester public schools without payment of tuition. In confirming the invalidity of this local law, the Fourth Department held that it superceded a State statute and it "affect[ed] the education system in a city" in violation of City Home Rule Law §21. Certainly, if a local law removing free tuition for certain students constitutes a law affecting the financial maintenance and support of a school district, than a local law requiring school districts themselves to make real 72 property tax refunds (i.e., Local Law 18) affects such maintenance and support as well. There are, in addition, a handful of instructive cases directly addressing the prohibitions contained in MHRL § 1l(l)(c). Although they are each focused upon the prohibition against affecting the "administration" of an educational system in the municipality (as opposed to the "maintenance" or "support" of the educational system), they are worthy of review. Thus, in Reuss v. Katz. 43 Misc. 2d 921, 922, 252 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547-58 (Sup. Ct. 1964), affd, 21 A.D.2d 968, 252 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1964), the NewYork County Supreme Court struck down a proposed local law which had amended the City Charter to forbid the City Board ofEducation from making recommendations in its annual reports to the Mayor, "contrary to the traditional concept of the neighborhood school." Finding that the proposed local law violated MHRL § ll(l)(c), the court observed that it superceded State statutes related to the selection of new school locations and the determination ofwhich schools pupils would attend, and thereby affected the administration of public schools, all in violation of MHRL §1 l(l)(c). 73 InElkindv.Rosenblum. 184 Misc. 914, 54 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. West. Co. 1945), affd, 269 A.D. 859, 56 N.Y.S.2d 526 (2d Dept. 1945), affd, 295 N.Y. 929 (1946), the Westchester County Supreme Court struck down a proposed local law to restrict the power of appointment vested in the Mayor of the City of Yonkers by the State law. The court observed that neither the Constitution nor the City Home Rule Law gave the cities of the State any express power to legislate with respect to matters affecting the public school systems or boards of education, and concluded: [T]he Constitution expressly excluded from the power granted to cities to adopt local laws ... any enactment which might apply to or affect the administration of the public school systems in such cites. Administration is generally understood to mean management, direction or supervision. It may be conceded that one who appoints a public officer does not join in the administration of the public office, by the act of appointment alone. The act of appointment, however, is one which has application to, and affects the administration of the duties or functions of such office, since without an appointment, the office cannot be administered. Elkind. 184 Misc. at 921, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 300. In contrast, in Board of Ed. of Middle County Sch. Dist. at Centereach v. Cohalan. 135 Misc.2d 358, 359-60, 515 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692-93 74 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1987), the Supreme Court held that a Suffolk County local law restricting smoking by the public in a meeting place (e.g. a school building) did not violate MHRL § ll(l)(c), because it did not affect the "administration" of education or schooling. Each of these cases, together with the City of Rochester case, confirm that courts must look closely at local laws that have any affect upon school districts, and that in any circumstance where a local law supercedes a State statute and affects the administration, support or finance of a school district — even tangentially as in Elkind. and even where it offers to improve the finances of a school district as in City of Rochester — it must necessarily be struck down as unauthorized. Because Local Law 18 directly, let alone tangentially, affects the support and maintenance of school districts in the County by requiring them to pay tax refunds, and clearly supercedes the State statutes imposing the County Guaranty upon the County, it violates the education provisions of the Constitution as implemented by the MHRL.24 24Inasmuch as Local Law 18 transfers tax refund duties to school districts and requires them to be noticed with respect to tax certiorari proceedings against the County in supersession of special laws providing the contrary, it also relates to the education system and school districts in the County and relates to the commencement or prosecution of proceedings against the County, in violation of MHRL § 34(3)(b) and (e). 75 POINT III THE SHIFTING OF MUNICIPAL TAX REFUND OBLIGATIONS ONTO SCHOOL DISTRICTS IS NOT A MATTER OF LOCAL CONCERN. The County nowhere contends that the transfer and shifting oftax refund duties and responsibilities from itself to the school districts involved matter of local concern. Indeed, matters affecting the support or administration of public schools, and matters involving the collection and administration of local taxes, are not matters of local concern under the Constitution (see, Point II, supra). Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court had held that "It is the determination of this Court that the subject matter of Local Law 2011 (sic) is purely local in nature and not in conflict with the State Constitution or State Legislation" (JR. 11), a response is appropriate. This "determination" bythe Supreme Court was unaccompanied by any supporting explanation or analysis. Instead, it simply concluded with a citation to Konz v. Bedell, 273 A.D. 777, 778, 75 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (2nd Dept. 1947), affd without opinion, 298 N.Y. 585(1948). However, Konz v. Bedell actually supports our position, as it recognized that the County's power under its Charter was limited solely to 76 local matters. There, the Second Department held that a County local law which struck salary limitations contained in the Nassau Charter for the county executive, comptroller, clerk and sheriff, wasa valid exercise, stating, "We are of opinion (1) that the Board of Supervisors may by local law amend the County Government Law with respect to local matters; and (2) that the salaries of county officers payable from the county treasury are matters of local concern." To any extent that this decision indicates that the Charter tacitly included authority for the County to make Charter amendments by local law, such authority was clearly limited to "matters of local concern." See also, 25 N.Y.Jur.2d § 368 ("The board of supervisors may by local law amend the County Law with respect to the salariesofcounty officerspayable from the county treasury, since that is a matter of local legislation"). The Konz ruling is consistent with the view expressed by this Court in City of New Yorkv. Village of Lawrence. 250 N.Y. 429 (1929), which concerned the enactment of a special law that altered the boundary line between New York City and the Town of Hempstead (in Nassau County). The city maintained that the special law related to the property, affairs or government of the city and that, because it was not enacted on special message of the Governor, it violated the Home Rule provisions of the 77 Constitution. City of New York. 250 N.Y. at 434-45. In rejecting the city's argument, this Court instructed, "[i]n this state we have found no case where the words 'relating to the property, affairs or government ofcities' have been held to include legislation which does not deal directly with the internal affairs of a city or the functions of its officers, and which affects the welfare of the general public as well as the residents of a city or cities." City of New York. 250 N.Y. at 443 (emphasis added). Stated differently, "local matters" are those that peculiarly relate to the internal workings of the local government in question. Matters affecting public education and the shifting of tax refund liabilities amongst municipal offices are not "internal" matters subject to local legislation inconsistent with the laws of this State. POINT IV LOCAL LAW 18 IS IRRATIONAL. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. AND THE COUNTY'S APPEALS TO ALLEGED FAIRNESS DO NOT OBVIATE THE NECESSITY OF STATE ACTION TO REPEAL THE COUNTY GUARANTY. In Bowery Savings Bank v. Bd. of Assessors of the County of Nassau. 80 N.Y.2d 961, 964, 590 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1992) (emphasis added), this Court found that the County Guaranty was "consistent with the statutory taxing scheme existing in Nassau County" and the County's "exclusive[] 78 responsibilities with respect to the preparation ofassessment rolls." Likewise, in Steel Los HI. this Court stressed that, the enactment of the County Guaranty conformed with, "[t]he sensible view [that] local districts were to be held harmless from the County's own assessment mistakes, and a concomitant amendment to section 6-17.3 of the NCAC eliminated the need for districts to be notified ofproceeding challenging assessments — precisely because they would not be made to suffer the loss of their expectancy interests by surrendering tax revenue in the form of refunds to properties they had no role in assessing." Steel Los III. 10 N.Y.2d at 454, 859 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (emphasis added). Thus, the removal of the County Guaranty results in an "inconsistency" with the taxing scheme in the County and undermines the rationale of protecting the expectancy interests of local school and other districts against errors made by the County. It is therefore irrational, arbitrary and capricious. Nonetheless, the County argues that the County Guaranty places an unfair burden upon the County. See, e.g., Appellants' Brief, pp. 1-3, 20-21, 23, 30-33. These appeals are irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal, which is governed by the provisions of the Constitution and the MHRL. They 79 are also the types of arguments which have been previously rejected by this Court. See, Town of Amherst v. Erie County, supra, 260 N.Y. at 368 (where Erie County challenged its obligation under State law to make up a deficit in unpaid taxes to a Town, arguing that "it would be unjust and inequitable to compel the county to make up the deficit caused by the unwise action of the town." Rejecting this argument, this Court instructed that these are "political questions," and held that the policy of the State required the county to reimburse the towns for the amount of unpaid taxes. 260 N.Y. at 374-77. Three years later, the Fourth Department rejected a similar argument that because, "[Erie County] has no power to charge back against the school district a tax which it has refunded as erroneous, the taxpayers of the entire county as a whole would be compelled to contribute to the support and maintenance of [a] school district [] by such refund, which would bring about an unjust and inequitable result." In Re Wadhams' Estate. 249 A.D. 271, 277, 292 N.Y.S. 102, 109 (4th Dept. 1936). As the court held: Asimilar argument wasadvanced in Town ofAmherst v. County of Erie (citation omitted), where the county was required to raise and pay over to the town the amount of the town budget, irrespective of the fact that the collector of the town had been unable to 80 collect sufficient taxes to pay the same, and also in County ofOswego v. Foster (citations omitted), where the city of Fulton was held legally bound to pay over to the county of Oswego the amount of the state and county taxes in full, although the city had not collected the same. It was held in these cases that the power of the Legislature in reference to the imposition and collection of taxes is complete and absolute, and is limited only by constitutional provisions. It is a question of clear legal duty as declared by the statute, andnot one ofequities between the different tax districts. The Legislature alone has the right to determine, within its legitimate discretion, all questions respecting the imposition and collection of taxes. In Re Wadhams'Estate. 249 A.D. 271, 277-78, 292 N.Y.S. 102, 109 (4th Dept. 1936) (emphasis added). In any event, the reality is that the various districts and towns do not receive a single penny more in total tax monies than they are entitled to pursuant to their approved operating budgets. They rely upon the County to properly assess taxable real property within each such district for purposes ofequitably spreading such budgets amongst taxpayers;20 ajob in which the County has abysmally failed. The problem is not the County Guaranty per se. The problem is the County's assessment system, which results in enormous refund obligations not seen anywhere else in the State. 2r,In accordance with Nassau County Administrative Code § 6-20.0, each school district forwards to the county its certified budget fixing the amount of taxes to be raised therefrom through the assessment and levy of taxes upon the owners of taxable real property located within each such district. 81 It is here that certain legislative actions regarding the tax refund liability of school districts in Suffolk County provide appropriate example. The assessing function in Suffolk County is not performed on a county-wide basis (as in Nassau County), but is rather performed by the towns. It had apparently been the practice in Suffolk County for towns to pay refunds arising out of tax certiorari proceedings and to refrain from charging back school districts for the costs of such refunds. In 1979, the State Comptroller issued an opinion determining that school districts were responsible for the costs of such refunds because, "Unlike the provisions of the Nassau County Administrative Code, the SuffolkCountyTax Actdoes not provide that school tax refunds in tax certiorari cases are county charges which may not be charged back against school districts." JR. 210. In response, Suffolk County brought the issue before the State Legislature in the form of a proposed bill to amend the Suffolk County Tax Act (Assembly Bill 9020-A) to provide that school districts would not be responsible for tax refunds arising out of tax certiorari proceedings. The proposed billwas supported byaJune 20,1980 letter from Assemblyman Paul Harenberg which provided as follows in pertinent part (JR. 201): 82 The [Suffolk County Tax Act] empowers the individual town governments in Suffolk County with the responsibility to prepare the property tax assessment roll. The role of the local school district is to fulfill the community s educational needs. They are not in the business ofassessing homes orroutinely participating in court cases to review assessments, norshould they be. The school districts rely onthe accuracy ofthe Town's tax rolls in order to plan their budgets. We cannot now allow this entire procedure to change andhold a school district liable for errors in a tax roll over which they have had no control. Those responsibleformaking the assessment error should in all fairness be held liable for its correction and for the consequent refunds. This legislation is not unique. In Nassau County, the county prepares the local assessment roll. The Nassau County Administrative Code protects school districts by providing that such refunds are a county charge. The Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislationprovided, "The Nassau County Administrative Code provides that such refunds are a County charge. In Nassau, the County is the assessing jurisdiction, not the individual towns. Requiring local school districts to pay such refunds after their annual school budgets have been approved by the voters is unjust and can seriously disrupt their capacity to provide essential school services" (emphasis added). JR. 203. 83 The BillJacket included aJune 25,1980 letter ofopposition from the State Comptroller's office, providing (JR. 208): The [1979 Comptroller] opinion pointed out that in Nassau County, by virtue of its Administrative Code (L 1939, ch 272, as amd), the county is responsible for refunds of all taxes in certiorari cases without any chargebacks against the towns or school districts. The reasonfor that, however, is because the county rather than the towns, performs the assessingfunction. Thus, the County's asserted concept of equity and fairness here is the polar opposite of the concept expressed by State legislators and the State Comptroller. In sum, it is solely within the province of the State Legislature (as opposed to local governments) to act upon issues relating to the imposition, collection and refund of real property taxes, and the shifting of refund obligations as between school districts and other units of government (which necessarily affects the support and maintenanceofschool districts). Moreover, contrary to the County's assertion that equity and fairness dictate removal of the County Guaranty, the exact opposite argument of equity and fairness was made when the "town guaranty" was enacted into law for Suffolk County by the State Legislature. 84 POINT V THE ENACTMENT OF LOCAL LAW 18 ALSO VIOLATES THE LAW OF LEGISLATIVE EQUIVALENCY AND THE STATUTE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. When the County requested action by the State Legislature in 1948 to add the County Guaranty, it expressly confirmed to the Governor that "ftjhis cannot be accomplished by local law and it is therefore recommended that the Governor give his approval to this bill, which is now pending before him." JR. 610 (emphasis added). Nowhere does the County explain why it can now undo by local law under its alleged Charter powers what it previously confirmed it could not adopt by local law. Moreover, the County's local undoing of the statute creating the County Guaranty conflictswith the doctrine of legislative equivalency, which was well-established at the time that the County asked the state legislature to enact the County Guaranty, and which requires an equal act to rescind the enactment. See, Moran v. La Guardia. 270 N.Y. 450, 452 (1936) (internal citations omitted) ("Aconcurrent resolution of the Legislature is not effective to modify or repeal a statutory enactment. To repeal or modify a statute requires a legislative act of equal dignity and import. Nothing less than another statute will suffice"); accord, Torre v. County of Nassau, 86 N.Y.2d 85 421, 426-27, 633 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467-68 (1995) (internal citations omitted) ("By formally creating and continuing the position by County ordinance, the Board circumscribed its own authority to abolish the position by a legislative act of less dignity and import. Nothing less than another County ordinance would suffice to strike this job from the rolls"). By formally requesting and having the County Guaranty created by twospecial laws enacted by the State Legislature, the County circumscribed whatever authority it might otherwise have had (it had none) to abolish the County Guaranty by a legislative act of less dignity and import, such as Local Law 18. Notably, in its 1938 ruling in County Securities, this Court had instructed that any special law enacted on emergency message of the Governor (which was then the only manner by which the Legislature could enact special laws related to the property, affairs or government of cities) could not be superceded by local law. See, County Securities. 278 N.Y. at 39. These precepts of law have effectively been codified and set forth in the Statute of Local Governments ("SLG") § 11(2). As the Nassau County Supreme Court held in Matter of The County of Nassau v. The Nassau County Interim Finance Auth. 33 Misc.3d 227, 242, 920 N.Y.S.2d 873, 884 (Nassau Co. Sup. Ct. 2011): 86 any special law enacted pursuant to the home rule message of section 2(b)(2) of Article IX of the NYS Constitution becomes power reserved to the state legislature under section 11, subdivision two of the Statute of Local Governments. Therefore, because the NIFA Act was enacted at Nassau County's request pursuant to section 2(b)(2) of Article IX of the New York State Constitution, the NIFA Act's mandates upon the County are specifically excluded from the powers granted to the County by the Statute of Local Governments. Likewise, because the County Guaranty was enacted by the Legislature at the County's request, its mandates are specifically excluded from the powers subsequently granted to the County by the Statute of Local Governments. In any event, pursuant to the doctrine of legislative equivalency, the statutes enacting the County Guaranty cannot be undone by local law. We anticipate that the County may respond, as it did before the Second Department, by arguing that if the doctrine of legislative equivalency and the SLG applied, then the County could never amend any provision of the Administrative Code since it was adopted pursuant to a home rule message. This logic does not follow. Provided the amendment is a local matter and therefore within its enumerated powers (see, Point I), and does not 87 conflict with governing Constitutional and MHRL restrictions (see, Point II), the County can certainly amend its Administrative Code. The statute enacting the Administrative Code was "merely a codification of the existing special statutes applying to Nassau County and [did] not embody new matter or revision." JR. 134. Bycontrast, the enactment of the County Guaranty was adopted pursuant to home rule message and provided specific tax refund obligations from which the County could not waiver. Thus the doctrine of legislative equivalency and the provisions of the SLG apply. POINT VI IN THE ALTERNATIVE. LOCAL LAW 18 FAILS TO SPECIFY WHETHER AND WHICH PORTIONS OF L. 2006. CH. 503. IT INTENDED TO SUPERSEDE. IN VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW § 22(1). AND IT TRANSFERS A DUTY WITHOUT A REFERENDUM. IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW § 33-a. Assuming arguendo that this Court were to conclude that the County had, in fact, been delegated vast authority in its charter to supercede State laws relating to local taxation, and to shift and determine refund obligations amongst municipalities and districts within its midst in a manner that also effects public education, Local Law 18would still have to be stricken 88 for failure to comply with other governing provisions in the Constitution and the MHRL. A. Local Law 18 Violates The Specificity Requirements of MHRL § 33(1). This Court has repeatedly cautioned that: A [municipality's] authority to amend or supersede can be exercised only upon substantial adherence to the procedures set forth in Municipal Home Rule Law § 22(1). That provision requires a municipality invoking its supersession authority to state its intention with defmiteness and explicitness - hardly an insignificant matter, in that there is otherwise no way of knowing what the locality intends, or what law governs. A clear statement avoids the confusion that would result if one could not discern whether the local legislature intended to supersede an entire State statute, or only part of one — and, if only a part, which part. Kamhi v. Town ofYorktown. 74 N.Y.2d 423, 434-35, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144, 150 (1989), citing Turnpike Woods v. Town of Stony Point. 70 N.Y.2d 735, 519 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1987) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In Kamhi. this Court instructed that, "While section 22 provides that failure to comply punctiliously with every specification requirement will not invalidate a local law, [where] the local law reveals nothing of the [municipality's] intention to amend or supersede [it] consequently must be declared invalid." Kamhi. 74 N.Y.2d at 435, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 150. 89 There, the Town ofYorktown had enacted a local law which was "inconsistent with Town Law § 274-a." Kamhi. 74 N.Y.2d at 429, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147. Even though the Court of Appeals found that the Town had the authority to enact the local law in question, it sustained the invalidation of the local law because it "does not comply with the formal requirements of MHRL § 22(1)," in that it "does not expressly amend or supersede Town Law § 274-a, nor does it contain any declaration of intent to do so." Kamhi. 74 N.Y.2d at 435, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 150. Local Law 18 suffers from the same deficiency, in that it is inconsistent with Laws of New York 1996, ch. 503, but it nowhere expressly amends or supersedes this statute, nor does it contain any declaration of intent to do so. Specifically, pursuant to Laws of New York 1996, ch. 503, as codified in RPTL § 708(3) and § 7l2(2-a), school districts in Nassau County have no mandatory party status in tax certiorari proceedings and no procedural ability to intervene and submit an answer in such proceedings. Thus, RPTL § 7l2(2-a) provides that, "any school district, except... a school district in a special assessing unit as defined in article eighteen of this chapter [i.e., Nassau County] . . . may become a party in the proceeding initiated by 90 petitioner to review its tax assessment, by serving a verified answer upon the petitioner and respondent or by serving a copy of the 'notice of appearance,'. . . upon the petitioner and respondent. . . ." The County's enactment of Local Law 18, contains no mention whatsoever ofeither Laws of New York 1996, ch. 503 or the various provisions of the RPTL amended by that statute. By comparison, Local Law 18 does detail other statutory enactments which it did expressly intend to supersede/repeal. See, JR. 57-59, Local Law 18, §§ 2-5. Because of the comparative failure of expression with respect to Laws of New York 1996,ch. 503, Local Law 18 reveals nothing of the County's intention with respect to the supersession of that statute. To make things more confusing, Local Law 18amends the County Administrative Code to provide for mailservice of tax certiorari proceedings upon school districts (see, Local Law 18, §4), yet it does not expressly provide school districts with the ability to intervene and submit answers in such proceedings. As a result, by lack of formal expression of the County's intention in enacting this local law, school districts in the County may be left with the untenable distinction of being the only school districts in the state 91 that are responsible for tax certiorari refunds yet are precluded from participating in the proceedings where such refund obligations are established. Surely such a confused and unfair result cannot be reached by implication, particularly in light ofthis Court's teachings in Turnpike Woods. warning against "supplying] the necessary legislative indications by implication." Turnpike Woods. 70 N.Y.2d at 738, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 962 ("repeal of statute by implication not favored"). B. Local Law 18Violates The Duty Transfer Restrictions Set Forth In Article IX. § 1(h)(1) of the Constitution. MHRL $ 33(7)(b) and MHRL § 33-a(2). The State Constitution at Article IX, § 1(h)(1) mandates that, although a local law may transfer "one or more functions or duties of the county," "no such form or amendment . . . shall become effective unless approved on a referendum by a majority of the votes cast thereon . . . ." Implementing this Constitutional requirement, MHRL § 33(7)(b) mandates that, "[a] charter law ... proposing an amendment or repeal of one or more provisions thereof which would have the effect of transferring a function or duty of the county . . . shall not become operative unless and until it is approved at a general election or at a special election." Likewise, MHRL 92 § 33-a(2) mandates that, "[a]ny such local law ... which would have the effect of transferring a function or duty of the county ... shall not become operative unless and until it is approved at a general election or at a special election. . . . Such a local law . . . shall provide for its submission to the electors of the county at the next general election or at a special election." The Supreme Court concluded without explanation that the repeal of the County Guaranty "does [not] transfer a function or duty" and that the County Guaranty is "not located in the County Charter." JR. 8. These aspects of its ruling are erroneous. With regard to the first issue — the "duty" question — there can be little genuine dispute about the fact that the County Guaranty is a "duty" and that its removal from the Charter transfers that duty to school districts, towns and special districts. Indeed, the County Charter § 606(a) and the County Administrative Code § 6-26.0(b)(3)(c) refer to the refund obligation as "a county charge." A "charge" is defined as, "[a]n incumbrance, lien, or claim; a burden or load; an obligation or duty." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979), p. 211 (emphasis added). Moreover, the duty transfer provisions of MHRL § 33(7)(b) and § 33-a(2) both restrict local laws which "would have the effect of transferring a function or duty of the county." 93 With regard to the second finding — that any transfer of the duty was effected in the County's Administrative Code, as opposed to its Charter — we have three comments. First, this Court has observed and recognized that the definition of a Charter Law includes local actions which transfer duties, regardless ofwhether or not those duties are contained in the municipality's administrative code or charter. Thus: A 1970 amendment to article 4 of the Municipal Home Rule Law expanded the definition of'Charter law' to include local laws 'transferring a function' pursuant to a new section 33-a, enacted by the same chapter (L. 1970, ch. 708). Previously, the definition embraced only a 'local law providing, amending or repealing a county charter.' Section 33-a contains the same language as section 33 for transferring functions and has the same referendum requirements. The difference now is that function may be transferred by local laws not actually part of the county charter but enacted with the same formality. It is essential that the same formality be required under this new section for transfer of function, because they are required under the constitutional provision, required above. Town of Smithtown v. Howell. 31 N.Y.2d 365, 373, 339 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (1972). Second, MHRL § 33(2) defines "Charter law" as, "A local law providing, amending or repealing a county charter, or transferring afunction 94 or a duty pursuant to section thirty-three-a ofthis chapter" (emphasis added). In other words, an amendment to any law (including an administrative code) which transfers a duty or function, constitutes a "charter law" for purposes of MHRL review, and thus requires a referendum. Third, it is important to note that the legislative history confirms that the County's Administrative Code does not merely compile local laws enacted by the County. Rather, it was enacted by the legislature in comprehensiveform to complement, supplement and represent an extension of the County Charter, and to govern various aspects of the County's government and operation. See, JR. 139, Bill Jacket for Laws 1939, c. 272, entitled, "An act to provide an administrative code for Nassau County in harmony with and supplemental to the County Government Law of Nassau County." For all of these reasons, Local Law 18 does indeed transfer a duty to School Districts, and is subject to the mandatory referendum requirements ofMHRL33and33-a. 95 CONCLUSION When the County Charter was enacted in 1936 (and amended in 1937), the case law was clear that a State law delegating local law making power to municipalities must specificallyenumerate the subject areas for such local law making. In the absence of enumeration, at best the municipalities only had authority to enact local laws with respect to internal (i.e., local) matters, and, where enumeration was made, it was strictly construed. See, Point I. General grants of local lawmaking power were (and are) insufficient to authorize a municipality to abrogate State law and policy, and the County's argument that a lack of enumeration translates into vast local lawmaking authority, is the polar opposite of the teachingsand principles set forth in the decisional law of this Court. See, Point I. These principles are consistent with the fact that all local governments are but political subdivisions of the sovereign State, and therefore derive any and all of their power only by virtue of express delegation. See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Assoc, v. Town of Guilderland. 74 N.Y.2d 372, 376, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (1989) ("It is a familiar principle that the lawmaking authority of a municipal corporation, which is a political 96 subdivision of the State, can be exercised only to the extent it has been delegated by the State"); Town of Black Brook v. State. 41 N.Y.2d 486, 488, 393 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (1977) ("A local government is merely a political subdivision created by the sovereign State. As such, it exercises its powers subject to the direction and control of the State, and impairment of those powers raises no constitutional issues"). In short, without an express grant of specific power, a municipality has no authority to over-rule the sovereign. These teachings are complemented bythe doctrine ofLegislative Equivalency (as subsequently codified in the Statute of Local Governments). See, Point V. The County Charter adopted in 1936 did not set forth an enumeration of local lawmaking power with respect to specific subject areas. Rather, the grant was general. The amendments to the Charter in 1937 did not change this lack of enumeration (see, Charter § 150[1]); a limitation that was highlighted in the comments and observations set forth in the billjacket to L. 1937, c. 618, pp. 4-5; Respondents' Compendium, pp. 6-7. In contrast, WestchesterCounty Charter, alsoadopted in 1937,contained 15enumerated subject area powers. See, discussion at sections C(l) and (2) of the Statement of the Case. 97 The Constitution in effect in 1936 and 1937 provided five enumerated powers to cities, and provided no powers to counties. Although the County complains that, in analyzing the lawfulness of Local Law 18, the Appellate Division should not have applied the Constitution in effect in 1963 (but rather should have applied the Constitution in effect in 1936 and 1937), it nowhere demonstrates how the earlier Constitution gave it more power than the 1963 Constitution. Indeed, it did not. See, discussion at sections B(l), (2) and (3) of the Statement of the Case. Instead, in light of the failure to receive a Charter vesting it with enumerated subject areas for local lawmaking, the County's only hope offinding authority to enact Local Law 18 relating to local taxes (and, particularly, tax refund duties and obligations) and the maintenance and support ofpublic schools,rested in the Constitution as amended in 1963. As we have demonstrated, the applicable provisions of that Constitution, and their incorporation into the MHRL, annihilate any notion that Local Law 18 was lawful. While the amended Constitution enumerated ten areas of local lawmaking, with respect to local laws affecting two areas - debt and local taxes - local laws had to be "consistent with laws enacted by the legislature" (i.e., general and special). It is undisputed that Local Law 18 does 98 not comply with this requirement. See, Point 11(A). Moreover, Local Law 18 violates the prohibitions against interference with the maintenance and support of public schools. See, Point 11(B). Applying all of these precepts of lawand the restrictions set forth in the Constitution and the MHRL, only the State Legislature can repeal the special tax law enacted in 1948 that created the County Guaranty, and its actions or inactions present "political questions" outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The Legislature's exclusive control can hardly be feigned as a surprise to the County. Indeed, the County has alternatively sought, by home rule message, to have the Legislature enact a repeal of the County Guaranty (see, JR. 68), and, by successive litigations, to have the County Guaranty deemed repealed or circumscribed by subsequent enactments of the Legislature. See, section F of the Statement of the Case. Through these repeated efforts, the County has expressly and implicitly acknowledged that any repeal of the County Guaranty rests solely within the control and discretion of the Legislature. Even Guaranty — without enumeration in its Charter, and despite the restrictions l , if the County had power to repeal the County 99 set forth in the Constitution, the MHRL and the doctrine of legislative equivalency — Local Law 18wasstill properly voided because: (a) the County failed to comply with the MHRL requirement to specify the provisions of the various special laws that were to be superceded (see, Point VI[A]); (b) the County failed to comply with the referendum requirements of the Constitution and MHRL (see, Point VI[B]; and (c) Local Law 18 is irrational, arbitrary and capricious (see, Point IV). For all the foregoing reasons, the Decision and Order of the Appellate Division, Second Department should be affirmed, with costs. Dated: Melville, New York August 7, 2013 By: OF COUNSEL: RICHARD HAMBURGER, ESQ. DAVID N. YAFFE, ESQ. Respectfully submitted, HAMBURGER, MAXSON, YAFFE, KNAUER & McNALLY, LLP AttorneysforPetitioners/Plaintiffs-Respondents in Proceeding No. I David N, 225 Broaahollow Road, Suite 30IE Melville, New York 11747 631.694.2400 100 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE STATE OF NEW YORK ) )SS. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK ) LISSA CURRERI, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I am not a party to the action, am over 18 years of age and reside in Holtsville, New York. On August 7, 2013, I served three copies of the within Brief for Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Respondents in Proceeding No. 1 by depositing true copies thereof enclosed in a post-paid wrapper, in an official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the U.S. PostalService withinNew York State addressed to each of the attorneys at the last known address set forth after each name as indicated on the attached service list. Sworn to before me this 7th day ofAugust, 2013. '