Douglas v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, Llc

MOTION to dismiss for failure to state a claim

M.D. Fla.August 19, 2016

WPB 383830064v1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MARIE DOUGLAS, Plaintiff, v. CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, a Corporation, Defendants. / DEFENDANT OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE Defendant OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC (“Defendant” or “Ocwen”) pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) moves to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff MARIE DOUGLAS (“Plaintiff”) and as grounds states as follows: I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff filed a one-Count Complaint on June 21, 2016 in the County Court of Pinellas County, Florida1 claiming Defendant violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)2 and Regulation X3 by failing to timely provide a written acknowledgment of Plaintiff’s statutory request for information (the “RFI”) concerning various items related to the subject mortgage loan. Compl. ¶ 24. Defendant timely filed a notice of removal to District Court on July 25, 2016. [DE 1]. As more fully set forth below, an order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice is appropriate, as Plaintiff’s allegations are meritless and fail to state a cognizable claim for relief. The return receipt attached to the Complaint was timely sent to Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff does not allege an injury in fact and, therefore, lacks standing, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege actual damages, and the Complaint is an abuse of RESPA in violation of the Anti-Absurdity 1 See, Marie Douglas v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No. 2016-006891-SC (County Court in and for Pinellas County.) 2 See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k). 3 See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(d)(2)(i)(A). Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 1 of 12 PageID 74 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 2 WPB 383830064v1 Doctrine. In addition, in the event this Court does not dismiss this matter with prejudice, the Court should transfer this matter to the Southern District of Florida, in that the facts as alleged show that as the only appropriate venue of Florida’s three Federal Districts. This lawsuit makes a mockery of statutory consumer protection measures and is an unmitigated sham meant solely to generate attorney's fees. Accordingly, Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("Ocwen") pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) files this motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Ocwen is the servicer of Plaintiff’s loan which is secured by a mortgage on his property. Compl., ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges, through her counsel, she mailed a written request for information to Ocwen, pursuant to Regulation X. Compl., ¶ 14. The RFI is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, however the RFI is undated and contains no identifiable information concerning the borrower’s identity. Plaintiff alleges the RFI was received by Defendant on February 11, 2016 and claims that an acknowledgement was therefore due on or before February 19, 2016. Compl., ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to provide a timely written acknowledgment. Compl., ¶ 17. III. LEGAL STANDARD To state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While a court at this stage of the litigation must consider the allegations contained in a plaintiff’s complaint as true, this rule “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In addition, the Complaint’s allegations must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 2 of 12 PageID 75 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 3 WPB 383830064v1 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss will be granted if the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific undertaking that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. Additionally, when reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court considers only the four corners of the complaint, along with any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). “[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may consider the documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the defendant’s attaching such documents to the motion to dismiss will not require conversion of the motion into a motion for summary judgment.”). Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Davis v. Self, 547 Fed. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2013); Gubanova v. Miami Beach Owner, LLC, 12-22319-CIV, 2013 WL 6229142, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013). IV. ARGUMENT & MEMORANDUM OF LAW A. THE CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT SHOWS DEFENDANT TIMELY ACKNOWLEDGED PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST. Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 3 of 12 PageID 76 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 4 WPB 383830064v1 Plaintiff in the Complaint fails to state a cause of action because it incorporates the very document Plaintiff’s counsel contends they did not receive, Defendant’s timely acknowledgement of receipt. Regulation X does not prescribe the specific form of the acknowledgment of receipt. The statute reads: Acknowledgement of receipt. Within five days (excluding legal public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) of a servicer receiving an information request from a borrower, the servicer shall provide to the borrower a written response acknowledging receipt of the information request. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(c); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(c). Thus, a plain reading of the regulation requires the following: (1) a writing (2) by the servicer (3) provided to the borrower (4) which acknowledges receipt. The Certified Mail Return Receipt attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Complaint meets all four requirements. A certified mail return receipt serves no other purpose than to acknowledge receipt. See O’Shannessy v. Doll, 566 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491 (E.D. Va. 2008) (describing the purpose behind USPS return receipt post cards stating that “it is clear that a return receipt postcard serves no purpose other than to provide an applicant with an acknowledgement that the [addressee] received his or her” correspondence). It is clear from Plaintiff’s own exhibits that Defendant received the RFI on February 11, 2016. The certified mail return receipt provided to Plaintiff’s counsel advises Plaintiff, in writing, signed by Defendant, that Defendant received the RFI. Judge Bloom of the Southern District of Florida recently analyzed this very issue in a very thorough Order of Dismissal in an unrelated RESPA action brought by Plaintiff’s counsel. Meeks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC., No. 16-CV-81003, 2016 WL 3999570, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 25, 2016). The Court noted the plain language of the regulation requires only a “response” informing the borrower that the servicer is in “receipt of the information.” 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(c) and that Congress’s intent is expressed by the plain language of the statute and Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 4 of 12 PageID 77 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 5 WPB 383830064v1 regulation. Id. at *10-11; see also U.S. v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002); Moss v. GreenTree-Al, LLC, 378 B.R. 655, 658 (S.D. Ala. 2007). Judge Bloom concluded: Although RESPA is a remedial statute, the Court need not construe it (or its implementing regulation) so as to create a cause of action where none exists. Plaintiff sent a request for information. Plaintiff received confirmation from Defendant within five days, pursuant to Plaintiff’s own certified mailing, that Defendant had received that request…. Five months later, after having received the response Plaintiff desired, Plaintiff’s attorney sent a factually incorrect letter to Defendant in an effort to create a federal cause of action. Plaintiff’s unsupported argument that the Certified Receipt does not constitute a “written response” within the meaning of § 1024.36(c) is an argument based entirely in semantics that the Court, while forced to entertain, finds unpersuasive. The Certified Receipt conclusively shows that Count I of the Complaint must fail, and it is dismissed with prejudice. Meeks, 2016 WL 3999570, at *11. Since the certified mail return receipt attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint acknowledges receipt, the Court should dismiss this claim with prejudice. B. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE ACTUAL DAMAGES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SUFFERED AN INJURY IN FACT. Plaintiff’s Complaint must also be dismissed because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged actual damages and, therefore, lacks Article III standing. In Federal court, if a plaintiff fails to “clearly allege facts demonstrating” each of the three elements of Article III standing, her complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546-47 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016); I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Failure to satisfy any of these three requirements [of Article III standing] is fatal.” (citation omitted)); Case v. Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., 14-24583-CIV, 2016 WL 1622289 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) because plaintiff lacked Article III standing). One of the three elements of Article III standing is that the plaintiff “suffered an injury in fact.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 5 of 12 PageID 78 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 6 WPB 383830064v1 protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548. Concreteness and particularization are distinct requirements, and failure to establish either requirement necessitates dismissal of the complaint. Id. To satisfy the concreteness requirement, the “injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.” Id. A concrete injury is “‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’” Id. “Congress may elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id. at 1549. However, “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id. Indeed, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. Notably, in Spokeo the Supreme Court considered a situation analogous to the purported violation alleged here in ruling that a plaintiff “cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation [of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (‘FCRA’)]. A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm.” Id. at 1550. The Supreme Court expressly recognized that some inaccuracies, omissions or violations may not cause harm or present any material risk of harm. “An example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.” Id. Here, the sole basis of Plaintiff’s claim is that she was not timely provided an acknowledgment to the RFI. As a result of this alleged “violation,” Plaintiff claims that she incurred the self-imposed costs of notifying Defendant she did not receive the acknowledgment. Id. Post-Spokeo, these allegations are insufficient to satisfy the concrete injury-in-fact requirement. Based on Spokeo, Plaintiff’s self-imposed damages cannot alone satisfy the concreteness requirement because to hold otherwise would mean that every borrower could Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 6 of 12 PageID 79 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 7 WPB 383830064v1 create a cause of action simply by incurring costs to notify a mortgage servicer of an alleged procedural error even if that alleged procedural error did not cause the borrower any real, concrete harm. The Spokeo Court clearly sought to avoid such situations. Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged and did not suffer a concrete injury as a result of the alleged RESPA “violation.” Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed. C. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1) allows an aggrieved plaintiff to recover two types of damages from a loan servicer for its violation of the Act-“(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and (B) any additional [statutory] damages, as the court may allow, in the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an amount not to exceed $1,000.” A loan servicer who fails to comply with RESPA and Regulation X faces damages in the form of “any actual damages caused by the failure, and up to $[2],000 in statutory damages if there is a pattern or practice of noncompliance with RESPA.” McLean v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 398 F. App’x 467, 471 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to recover under RESPA must show that he or she “suffered actual damages or is entitled to statutory damages.” Jackson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 11-60560-CIV, 2012 WL 882493, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2012) (citing Frazile v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 382 F. App’x 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2010)) (addressing elements of RESPA claim). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations show Defendant did not violate the statute, but instead provided a timely acknowledgement of the Request for Information. Thus, Plaintiff did not allege any actual damages. Plaintiff’s alleged damages must fail where there was no alleged violation of the statute at all, as stated above. Regarding damages in these types of cases, as held in Hopson, “While courts have interpreted this requirement liberally, the loss alleged must be related to the RESPA violation itself.” Hopson v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 14 F. Supp. 3d 774, Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 7 of 12 PageID 80 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 8 WPB 383830064v1 788 (S.D. Miss. 2014). Further, in pursuing this action after receipt of Plaintiff’s acknowledgement of the RESPA Request for Information, Plaintiff’s incurred attorney’s fees are the result of his own actions, not of any omission by Defendant. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action because he has not suffered actual damages. D. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS AN ABUSE OF THE RESPA STATUTE IN VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-ABSURDITY DOCTRINE & SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Counsel for Plaintiff has filed numerous of these frivolous actions and has already been sanctioned for similar practices. See Korte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 64 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (upholding sanctions for filing frivolous TILA defenses in foreclosure actions). The Southern District of Florida has previously dismissed similar lawsuits that are a clear attempt to obtain attorney’s fees through an attempt to fabricate a violation of consumer protection statutes. See Guillaume v Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2013): Instead of being used as a shield, however, plaintiffs’ lawyers have used TILA to spawn a cottage industry of lawsuit farming by sending request for information and, without further inquiry, suing creditors and servicers for technical violations of the statute. … [Counsel’s] advancements in this action are not grounded on genuine failures of disclosure or surreptitious loan practices, but rather as a superfluous attempt to leverage settlement and obtain fees. Such actions, even if supported by a strict interpretation of the text, are contrary to the intent of the statute, and thus fail as a matter of law. (emphasis added) (citing Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). The Middle District of Florida recently issued an Order that cited to Guillaume, in an unrelated RESPA action brought by Plaintiff’s counsel. See Austin v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 8:16-cv-01592-JSM-MAP, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 25, 2016). In that Order, the Court noted how the anti-absurdity canon empowers courts to preserve the legislative integrity of a statute by preventing absurd results in its application. Id. Plaintiff’s counsel has used RESPA as a fee driven tool, and this Honorable Court can prevent further abuse of the statute by dismissing Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 8 of 12 PageID 81 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 9 WPB 383830064v1 this action with prejudice. As the Supreme Court has held, “[i]t is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.” Holy Trinity Church, supra, 143 U.S. at 459. In enacting RESPA, Congress’ intent was “to insure that consumers throughout the Nation are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs of the settlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices.” 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a). Plaintiff’s requests were not sent for the purposes of obtaining information but merely “an effort to create a federal cause of action.” Meeks, 2016 WL 3999570, at *11. Plaintiff’s claims are based on an unequivocally frivolous request and should be dismissed with prejudice. E. IF THE COURT DOES NOT DISMISS THIS MATTER WITH PREJUDICE, THIS COURT SHOULD TRANSFER THIS MATTER TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA. Plaintiff is alleged to be a resident of Bellwood, Illinois. The property secured by Plaintiff’s mortgage is alleged to be located in Bellwood, Illinois. Other than retention of a law firm in Clearwater, the Complaint fails to allege any connection Plaintiff has with the Middle District of Florida. The only possible venue is Florida is the Southern District of Florida, where Defendant is alleged to reside. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff goes to great lengths in attempting to establish venue in the Middle District of Florida. Compl. ¶¶ 4-9. Plaintiff alleges venue is proper in this District merely because Plaintiff’s counsel, Korte & Wortman, allegedly suffered damages in Pinellas County, Florida by having to expend funds to send the Notice of Error to Defendant. Id. Plaintiff identifies no damages that she actually suffered, let alone any in this District. The real property that is the subject of Plaintiff’s mortgage loan is located in Bellwood, Illinois, where Plaintiff presumably resides, and Defendant is located in West Palm Beach, Florida. See Ex. A. Venue is not proper in the Middle District of Florida. Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 9 of 12 PageID 82 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 10 WPB 383830064v1 Venue is determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general Federal venue statute. 12 U.S.C. § 2614, part of RESPA, elaborates on proper venue in RESPA matters. RESPA provides that venue is proper: (1) where the property involved is located; or (2) where the violation is alleged to have occurred. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614; see also Rowe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. 16-cv-80336 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2016) (finding “no indication the violation occurred in this District” because “the property at issue is located in Michigan and Defendant’s office that responds to RESPA inquires is located in Iowa”). 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) provides for venue where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . .” In this regard, the Federal venue statute is similar to RESPA. In construing this statute, courts recognize that Congress intended to protect defendants from being hailed into a district that has no real relationship to the dispute, and “therefore meant to require courts to focus on relevant activities of the defendant, not of the plaintiff.” See Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Mid-S. Capital, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]hile certain kinds of events may be necessary to give rise to the claim, only those actions which were, in and of themselves, ‘wrongful’ or had a ‘close nexus’ to the wrong could form the basis of proper venue.” Id. RESPA’s venue provision is to be interpreted consistently with the Federal venue statute - particularly because “where the violation . . . occurred” focuses even more closely on the defendant’s conduct than “where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege venue in the Middle District of Florida. Again, the real property that is the subject of Plaintiff’s mortgage loan is alleged to be located in Bellwood, Illinois, and Defendant’s office is alleged to be located in West Palm Beach, Florida. Thus, consistent with the Federal venue statute and RESPA’s venue provision, venue in this case lies Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 10 of 12 PageID 83 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 11 WPB 383830064v1 either where the property is located, in Bellwood, Illinois, where Defendant allegedly violated RESPA by not timely mailing out the written acknowledgment of receipt of the RFI or where Defendant is located. As such, venue is clearly improper in the Middle District of Florida. To circumvent this, Plaintiff makes the untenable claim that venue is proper in this District solely because her agent-Korte & Wortman-suffered damages in Pinellas County by having to expend funds to send a NOE to Defendant. However, venue has never turned on the location of the plaintiff’s attorney. Certainly, venue is not proper in this District just because Plaintiff’s attorney practices here. To hold otherwise would allow any plaintiff throughout the United States to venue shop solely by retaining counsel based in a certain location. Plaintiff’s counsel is abusing the RESPA statute for the sole purpose of enriching itself through attorney fee awards. Therefore, should the Court not issue an Order of dismissal for the other reasons cited above, a transfer of venue to the Southern District of Florida is appropriate. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action because of improper venue, the return receipt attached to the Complaint was timely sent to Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff did not suffer an injury in fact and therefore lacks standing, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege actual damages, and the Complaint is an abuse of RESPA in violation of the Anti-Absurdity Doctrine. Plaintiff’s frivolous lawsuit is in clear contravention of the purpose of the RESPA statute and is a clear attempt to obtain attorney’s fees, and nothing more. Therefore, Ocwen respectfully request that its Motion to Dismiss be granted and Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed, with prejudice. In the event dismissal is not with prejudice, this matter should be transferred to the Southern District of Florida. WHEREFORE, Defendant OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting the relief requested herein, dismissing the Complaint, Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 11 of 12 PageID 84 Douglas v. Ocwen CASE NO: 8:16-CV-02134-EAK-JSS Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice Page 12 WPB 383830064v1 entering judgment in favor of Defendant, and granting such other and further relief this Court deems just and appropriate. Respectfully Submitted, By: /s/ C. Wade Bowden C. Wade Bowden, Esq., Florida Bar No. 090735 bowdenw@gtlaw.com chalkleyt@gtlaw.com FLService@gtlaw.com GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A. 777 S. Flagler Drive, Suite 300 East West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Telephone: (561) 650-7915 Facsimile: (561) 655-6222 Tyrone A. Adras, Esq. Florida Bar No. 107294 adrast@gtlaw.com krugerl@gtlaw.com FLService@gtlaw.com GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A. 777 S. Flagler Drive, Suite 300 East West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Telephone: (561) 650-7930 Facsimile: (561) 655-6222 Counsel for OCWEN CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING AND SERVICE WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically, through the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will, in turn, send a notice of electronic filing to Elizabeth Cline, Esq., Korte and Wortman P.A., 2325 Ulmerton Rd, Suite 16, Clearwater, FL 33762; service@kwlawfirm.com this 19th day of August, 2016. /s/ C. Wade Bowden C. Wade Bowden Case 8:16-cv-02134-EAK-JSS Document 12 Filed 08/19/16 Page 12 of 12 PageID 85 • Complete items t. 2, snd 3. • Print your name and address on-the reverse so that we can retum the cArd to you. • Attach this card to the back of the maf(ptecs, or on the front if space permfts. t: Artl~e Adclreased to- P C) ~-~C ~~e~ ~~ ~~► A. 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