Dondi C. Stevens v. U.S. Bank, National Association et al

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof

C.D. Cal.February 24, 2017

_____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Richard M. Hoefflin, Esq., SBN 061519 E-mail: rmhoefflin@hoefflinlaw.com Jason M. Burrows, Esq., SBN 190159 E-mail: jburrows@hoefflinlaw.com HOEFFLIN · BURROWS, A Law Corporation 2659 Townsgate Road, Suite 232 Westlake Village, CA 91361-2756 Tel: (805) 497-8605; Fax: (805) 497-8625 Attorneys for Defendant PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC, (f/k/a Metrocities Mortgage, LLC) and erroneously sued herein as Metro Cities Mortgage, LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (WESTERN DIVISION) DONDI C. STEVENS, Plaintiff, vs. U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NDEx WEST, LLC & CHASE FINANCE, LLC, METRO CITIES MORTGAGE, LLC; COLDWELL BANKER & BRUCE VENTURELLI, and All Persons Claiming Any Legal or Equitable Right, Title, Estate, Lien, or Interested in the Property Described in the Complaint Adverse to Plaintiff’s Title or Any Cloud on Plaintiff’s Title Thereto and, DOES 1-10, Inclusive Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: CV16-06068 JFW (JCG) [2:16-cv-06068 JFW (JCG)] District Judge John F. Walter, (Magistrate Jay C. Gandhi) DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6) and 12(e) [[Proposed] Order, Declaration of Jason M. Burrows and Request for Judicial Notice submitted concurrently herewith] DATE: March 27, 2017 TIME: 1:30 p.m. CTRM: 7A Complaint Filed: 8/12/16 ) TO THE COURT, TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 27, 2017 at 1:30 p.m., or as Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 1 of 38 Page ID #:1615 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the above-entitled Court, Defendant PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC, (f/k/a Metrocities Mortgage, LLC), erroneously sued herein as Metro Cities Mortgage, LLC, (“Prospect” or “Defendant”) will bring for hearing in Courtroom 7A of the United States District Court located at 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Dondi C. Stevens (“Plaintiff”), but reserving jurisdiction on the issue of sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority regarding same and/or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) and Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1990) (cert. denied), respectively.) Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that (i) it fails to state a claim against Prospect upon which relief may be granted as to each cause of action alleged against it and (ii) fails to contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Among other things, Prospect moves for dismissal of the Complaint on the basis of res judicata. Alternatively, Prospect requests that this Court strike Plaintiff’s Complaint as uncertain and require Plaintiff to file a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Prospect’s Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Request for Judicial Notice, the pleadings, papers and records on file in this case, and such oral argument and evidence as may be presented at the hearing. Dated: February 24, 2017 HOEFFLIN · BURROWS A Law Corporation By: /s/ Jason M. Burrows RICHARD M. HOEFFLIN JASON M. BURROWS Attorneys for Defendant, PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC, (f/k/a Metrocities Mortgage, LLC) and erroneously sued herein as Metro Cities Mtn to Dismiss Mortgage, LLC Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 2 of 38 Page ID #:1616 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………..i-ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………..…………...iii-ix MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES………………………….3 I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………3 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND………………….3 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT………………………………………………….5 A. The Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss………………………..5 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata…………………...…7 1. The Identity of Claims Are the Same for Purposes of Res Judicata…………………………………………7 2. Prospect Has Three (3) Final Judgments on the Merits Against Plaintiff………………………………………….9 3. Privity Exists Between Prospect and Plaintiff………………….10 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Time Barred and Barred by Laches………..10 D. Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing to Raise a Post-Foreclosure Sale Challenge…………………………………………………..…11 1. There Is No Allegation of Tender………………………………12 2. No Exceptions Apply…………………………………………...12 E. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Quiet Title and “Adverse Possession.”…………………………………………..…13 1. Quiet Title………………………………………………………13 2. Adverse Possession……………………………………………..13 F. Plaintiff Fails to State Claims for Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud…………………………………………………………..14 G. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violation of RICO…………….15 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 3 of 38 Page ID #:1617 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT ii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 H. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act…………………………………….16 I. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violations of the Truth In Lending Act…………………………………………........17 J. Plaintiff’s Civil Rights Claims Fail………………………………...17 K. Plaintiff’s Contract-Based Claims Fail…………………………….18 L. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations………………………………………...18 M. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violations of California’s Deceptive Trade Practices Laws……………………...19 1. Plaintiff Lacks Standing………………………………………...19 2. Unlawful, Unfair or Fraudulent Business Practices…………….20 N. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Invasion of Privacy……………21 O. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Trespass……………………….22 P. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Civil Conspiracy………………22 Q. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment…………….23 R. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Cancellation of Instruments…...24 S. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Injunctive or Declaratory Relief……….24 T. Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not Satisfy Rule 8(a)…………………25 U. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Should Provide a More Definite Statement of His Complaint………………………………27 IV. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………..27 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 4 of 38 Page ID #:1618 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT iii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Aaron v. Aguirre, , 2007 WL 959083 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) ...................................................... 26 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) ............................................................................................ 10 Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2012 WL 2838689 (N.D. Cal. 2012) .................................................................. 16 Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen, (1984) 58 Cal.App.3d 575 .................................................................................. 11 Arnolds Management Corp., supra, 158 Cal.App.3d ........................................................................................ 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................. 5, 6, 25, 26 ATSI Comm., Inc. v. The Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................................................................... 6 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................... 5, 6, 25 Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544 ............................................................................. 20 Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd., (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798 ............................................................................... 19 California Maryland Funding, Inc. v. Lowe, (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1798 ............................................................................... 14 California Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc., (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151 ................................................................................. 23 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 5 of 38 Page ID #:1619 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT iv 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Cel-Tech Comms., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163 ......................................................................................... 19 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) .......................................................................................... 2, 27 Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Reece, (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 731 ................................................................................. 18 Corazon v. Aurora Loan Serv., LLC, No. 11-00542, 2011 WL 1740099 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011) ............................. 26 Daro v. Superior Court, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079 ............................................................................. 20 Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824 ............................................................................... 20 Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987) .............................................................................. 6 Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.1985) ............................................................................... 9 Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) ........................................................................................ 7, 10 Fox v. Ethicon Endo Surgery, Inc., (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797 ......................................................................................... 11 Fox v. Pollack, (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 954 ................................................................................ 14 Fuentes v. Deutsche Bank, (S.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 1971610 ................................................................... 16 Gauvin v Tombatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067 (1988) .................................................................................... 26 Gervase v. Sup.Ct., (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1218 ............................................................................... 15 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 6 of 38 Page ID #:1620 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT v 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Gilmore v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., (N.D. Cal. 2014) 75 F.Supp.3d 1255 ............................................................ 14, 15 Globe International Inc. v. Sup. Ct., (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 393 ................................................................................... 16 Hanaway v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2011 WL 672559 (C.D. Cal. 2011) .................................................................... 16 Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272 ......................................................................................... 21 Hernandez v. Lopez, (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932 ............................................................................... 23 Herrera v. Countrywide KB Home Loans, No. 11-03591, 2012 WL 901340 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012) ............................... 8 Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn., (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1 .............................................................................................. 21 In re Sargent Tech., Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 1079 (2003) ................................................................................ 26 Karlsen v. American Savings & Loan Association, (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112 ............................................................................ 11, 12 Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., (9th Cir. 2009) 567 F.3d 1120 ............................................................................ 21 Kidron v Movie Acquisition Corp., (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571 ............................................................................... 22 Krantz v. BT Visual Images, (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 164 ........................................................................... 20, 21 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310 ......................................................................................... 20 L.P. v. City of San Marcos, (S.D. Cal. 2002) 204 F.Supp.2d 1272 ................................................................ 25 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 7 of 38 Page ID #:1621 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT vi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 496 ............................................................................... 20 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. UPA California, (N.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 415656 .............................................................. 24, 25 Los Angeles Equestrian Ctr., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 432 ................................................................................. 18 Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49 ................................................................................. 13 Mangindin v. Wash. Mut. Bank, (N.D. Cal. 2009) 637 F.Supp.2d 700 .................................................................. 25 Marathon Development California, Inc., (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 342 .......................................................................................... 18 Marsu B.V. v. Walt Disney Co., (9th Cir. 1999) 185 F.3d 932 .............................................................................. 18 McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1986) .............................................................................. 7 McRae v. Blakeley, (1906) 3 Cal.App. 171 ........................................................................................ 22 Mix v. Sodd, (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 386 ................................................................................ 13 Multani v. Witkin & Neal, (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428 ............................................................................. 12 Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., (C.D. Cal. 2003) 290 F.Supp.2d 1101 ................................................................ 14 Newman v. Cornelius, (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 279 .................................................................................... 13 Nochez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 12-01982, 2012 WL 4087239 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) ............................. 8 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 8 of 38 Page ID #:1622 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT vii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Okun v. Superior Court, (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442 .......................................................................................... 23 Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................... 7, 9, 10 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118 ........................................................................................ 19 Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583 ............................................................................. 23 Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106 ..................................................................................................... 11 PLS-Pacific Laser Sys. v. TLZ Inc., No. 06-04585, 2007 WL 2022020 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2007) .............................. 26 PPC Advertising Litigation, 2010 WL 3341062 (N.D. Cal. 2010) .................................................................. 21 Pratap v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (N.D. Cal. 2014) 63 F.Supp.3d 1101 .................................................................. 15 Robinson Helicopter Co. Inc. v. Dana Corp., (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979 ......................................................................................... 14 Sanchez v. MortgageIt, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 588178 .................................................................... 24 Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917 ......................................................................... 20, 21 See Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia. Ltd., (2004) 7 Cal.4th 503 ........................................................................................... 23 See Egan v. City of Aurora, (1961) 635 U.S. 514 ............................................................................................ 17 Smith v. Payne, No. 12-01732, 2012 WL 6712041 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2012) ............................. 7 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 9 of 38 Page ID #:1623 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT viii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Solomon v. E-Loan, Inc., No. 10-2565, 2011 WL 1253840 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) ............................... 8 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................ 6 Star Pac. Investments, Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, Inc., (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 447 ................................................................................ 24 Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 9 Surf & Sand, LLC v. City of Capitola, (N.D. Cal. 2008) 2008 WL 2225684, fn. 5 ......................................................... 25 Swartz v. KPMG LLP, (9th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3d 756 .............................................................................. 21 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 7 Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist., (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489 ............................................................................................ 13 Usher v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 2010 WL 4008496 (E.D. Cal. 2010) .................................................................. 16 Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 6 Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, (9th Cir. 2003) 317 F.3d 1097 ............................................................................ 14 Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1990) .................................................................... 2, 4, 27 Whittle v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-0429, 2010 WL 1444532 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010) .................................. 8 Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp., (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 ......................................................................................... 15 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 10 of 38 Page ID #:1624 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT ix 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Statutes 15 USC § 1635(f) ................................................................................................... 10 15 USC § 1640(e) .................................................................................................. 10 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) ......................................................................................... 15, 16 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ................................................................................................ 2, 27 28 U.S.C. § 2201 .................................................................................................... 25 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ............................................................................................... 17 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 ............................................................................ 19 Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17208 .......................................................... 10 Cal. Civil Code § 3412 .......................................................................................... 24 Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 760.010 ............................................................................... 13 Section 1981 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code ............................................................ 17 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code ............................................................ 17 Section 1985 of Title 45 of the U.S. Code ............................................................ 17 Section 241 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code .............................................................. 17 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................. 3, 5, 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) ...................................................................................... 2, 3, 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B) ................................................................................ 9, 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ............................................................................................. 3, 6, 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) .......................................................................................... 16, 21 Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 11 of 38 Page ID #:1625 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION This is the fifth lawsuit filed by Plaintiff Dondi C. Stevens (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC, (f/k/a Metrocities Mortgage, LLC), erroneously sued herein as Metro Cities Mortgage, LLC, (“Prospect” or “Defendant”) with respect to the subject property and attempting to challenge the trustee’s sale by the then Note holder (U.S. Bank) in September 2011. Prospect moves to dismiss the instant Complaint on several key grounds. First, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata. Prospect has a Judgment against Plaintiff in the first lawsuit he filed in Santa Barbara County Superior Court in 2011 (Case No. 1383241). Plaintiff’s claims are also time barred and barred by laches. Second, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Prospect because he does not sufficiently plead his claims in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Third, each of Plaintiff’s claims fails as a matter of law, warranting dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Since there is no indication that Plaintiff can cure the deficiencies in his Complaint as to Prospect, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety with prejudice. In the alternative, given that the Complaint is so uncertain as to which of the defendants conducted the unlawful acts, it should be stricken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On or about April 12, 2005, Plaintiff obtained a loan from Metrocities Mortgage, LLC (n/k/a Prospect Mortgage, LLC) in the amount of $520,000.00 (the “Loan”) for the real property located at 1248 North San Marcos Road, Santa Barbara, California, 93111 (the “Property”). The Loan was secured by a Deed of Trust signed by Plaintiff on April 12, 2005. (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1.) The Deed of Trust identifies Metrocities Mortgage, LLC as the lender, Fidelity National Loan Portfolio Solutions as the trustee, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary, and Plaintiff Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 12 of 38 Page ID #:1626 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 as the borrower. (Id.) On June 30, 2009, NDEX West, LLC (“NDEX”) as Agent for Beneficiary, recorded a Notice of Default which indicated that Plaintiff was $11,294.16 in arrears as of June 26, 2009. (RJN, Ex. 2.) On July 23, 2009, MERS, the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust, assigned the beneficial interests thereunder to Defendant. (RJN, Ex. 3.) On August 13, 2009, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded, substituting NDEX as trustee. (RJN, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff does not allege that he ever cured his arrears. On October 5, 2009, January 31, 2011, February 8, 2011, and May 18, 2011, NDEX recorded Notices of Trustee’s Sale. (RJN, Exs. 5-8.) A Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on September 29, 2011, indicating that the Property was sold on August 22, 2011. (RJN, Ex.9.) On October 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Santa Barbara County Superior Court against Prospect and others. (Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1383241). Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in that action on January 24, 2012. (RJN, Ex. 101.) Following Prospect’s successful Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, a Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant Prospect on July 24, 2012. (RJN, Ex. 11.) On November 30, 2012, the Superior Court entered costs of suit in favor of Prospect and against Plaintiff. (RJN, Ex. 11.) Therefore, Plaintiff is a judgment debtor as to Prospect (the Judgment against Plaintiff has not been satisfied). On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed an action in U.S. District Court, Central District, against Prospect and others (Stevens v. Metrocities Mortgage, LLC, et al., U.S. Dist. Court Case No. CV 13-0536). (RJN, Ex. 12.) On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff dismissed Prospect (Metrocities) with prejudice from that case. 1 Exhibits to the FAC are omitted because they are voluminous and most of which are part of Prospect’s Request for Judicial Notice herein. Further, the key documents referenced in Plaintiff's FAC are identified by date and recording number. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 13 of 38 Page ID #:1627 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 (RJN, Ex. 13.) On August 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed yet another action in the Central District Prospect and others (Stevens v. Metrocitites Mortgage, LLC, U.S. Dist. Court Case No. 2:15-cv-06514). (RJN, Ex. 14.) On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff dismissed Prospect (Metrocities) from that case. (RJN, Ex. 15.) Since then, it appears Plaintiff has filed a series of bankruptcy actions with respect to the Property. (RJN, Ex. 16.) On May, 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Adversary Proceeding Complaint in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District, Santa Barbara Division, against Prospect and others in another attempt to again challenge the 2011 foreclosure of the Property. (RJN, Ex. 172.) Plaintiffs bankruptcy case was dismissed on June 23, 2016 and, therefore, the bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding. (RJN, Ex. 18.) On August 12, 2016, Plaintiff commenced this (and now fifth) lawsuit against Prospect and other defendants. However, Plaintiff’s claims, inter alia, are barred by res judicata and, furthermore, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim as to Prospect. III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. The Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).) Thus, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court engages in a two-prong inquiry: First, the Court accepts all well-pled allegations as true, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 2 Exhibits to the Adversary Proceeding Complaint are similarly omitted because they are voluminous and most of which are part of Prospect’s Request for Judicial Notice herein. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 14 of 38 Page ID #:1628 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 statements, do not suffice.” (Id. at 678 (citation omitted).) A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” (Id. (citation omitted).) Nor need a court “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” (Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).) Second, the Court determines whether the well-pled factual allegations are sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).) “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” (Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.) Moreover, “Rule 8 … does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” (Id.) A plaintiff must allege facts, not just a “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” that are sufficient to support a plausible claim for relief. (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).) A court is not required to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. (Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.) In addition to the complaint itself, a court may consider on a motion to dismiss any written instrument attached to the complaint, statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and documents possessed by or known to Plaintiff and upon which he relied in bringing suit. (ATSI Comm., Inc. v. The Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).) The court can consider documents and facts subject to judicial notice and should disregard allegations contradicted by exhibits to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference, or by judicially noticed facts. (Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987).) Lastly, a court can dismiss claims without granting leave to amend if amending the complaint would be futile. (Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Granting Vasquez leave to amend would have been futile, and we hold that the district court did not err in preventing such futility.”)) Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 15 of 38 Page ID #:1629 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred By Res Judicata. The doctrine of res judicata (i.e. claim preclusion) “bars litigation in an action if any of the claims were raised or could have been raised in a previous action.” (Smith v. Payne, No. 12-01732, 2012 WL 6712041, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2012) (citing Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001)).) “A plaintiff ‘cannot avoid the bar of res judicata merely by alleging conduct by the defendant not alleged in his prior action or by pleading a new legal theory.’” (Id. (citing McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986)).) Important private and public interests undergird the doctrine. (Id. (collecting authorities).) Further, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear … that there is ‘no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.’” (Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (quoting Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981)).) Res Judicata applies when there is “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotations omitted).) Here, to the extent Plaintiff has viable claims (which he does not), they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because all three (3) requirements recited above are met. 1. The Identity of Claims Are the Same for Purposes of Res Judicata. “Identity of claims exists when two suits arise from ‘the same transactional nucleus of facts. Newly articulated claims based on the same nucleus of facts may still be subject to a res judicata finding if the claims could have been brought in the earlier action.” (Id. at 1077-78 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) First, the four (4) prior actions (state court action, two federal court actions, and adversary proceeding) pertained to the same Loan secured by the same Property. (RJN, Ex. 10 (State Court FAC, see ¶9, 19-22 and 51), Ex. 12 (first Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 16 of 38 Page ID #:1630 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Federal Court Complaint, see ¶¶24-26 and 51-62), Ex. 14 (second Federal Court Complaint, see ¶¶1, 2, 8-11, 35 and 44-46), Ex. 17 (Adversary Complaint, see p. 1, lns. 19-30 and ¶¶32, 40, 41, 54(a)-(c), and 55(a)-(c).)) Plaintiff’s claims in the instant Complaint similarly arise out of the same Loan secured by the same Property. Plaintiff again seeks to challenge foreclosure of the subject Property and includes the same or similar causes of action.3 (See RJN, Exs. 10, 12, 14 and 17.) Indeed, the subject Property was sold in foreclosure prior to Plaintiff’s filing the state court action. (See RJN, Ex. 9.) Therefore, at least as relevant to Prospect, all of Plaintiff’s claims arose before the first State Court action was filed, and the “identity of claims” requirement is therefore met. (See Whittle v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-0429, 2010 WL 1444532, *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, finding identity of claims where “the prior and current complaints ‘attack’ the DOT's ‘validity’ and seek to enjoin property foreclosure,” and stating that “[d]espite its theory or label, any purported claim in the current complaint could have been raised in the prior action”); see also Nochez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 12-01982, 2012 WL 4087239, *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, finding identity of claims where “Plaintiff’s claims in both actions are tied to the validity of the deed of trust and Defendants’ right to conduct a foreclosure sale”); Herrera v. Countrywide KB Home Loans, No. 11-03591, 2012 WL 901340, *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, finding identity of claims where “the two suits involve infringement of the same primary right against wrongful foreclosure and deceptive practices in the origination and servicing of a loan alleged in the previous action”); Solomon v. E-Loan, Inc., No. 3 None of Plaintiff’s Complaints are model pleadings and are in fact largely incoherent. Nevertheless, it’s clear that in each lawsuit Plaintiff seeks to regain ownership of the Property free and clear of the loan he obtained in 2005. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 17 of 38 Page ID #:1631 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 10-2565, 2011 WL 1253840, *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, finding identity of claims where the new suit “involves alleged infringement of the same property and contract rights pertaining to plaintiffs’ residential property loan secured by a deed of trust”).) 2. Prospect Has Three (3) Final Judgments on the Merits Against Plaintiff. Prospect has obtained more than one “final judgment on the merits” against Plaintiff, each of which alone is grounds to support res judicata. First, the Judgment entered in the State Court action (RJN, Ex. 11) bars any subsequent action regarding the loan and subject Property that secured it. Second, the dismissal with prejudice of the first Federal action filed on July 22, 2013 was also a judgment on the merits. (RJN Ex. 13.) A dismissal with prejudice operates as a judgment on the merits. (See Owens, 244 F.3d at 714; see also Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) “The phrase ‘final judgment on the merits’ is often used interchangeably with ‘dismissal with prejudice.’” (internal citation omitted); Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1985). (A voluntary dismissal with prejudice is considered a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.))) Lastly, Prospect obtained yet another judgment on the merits against Plaintiff when he dismissed his second Federal Court action on September 25, 2015. Pursuant to the “two dismissal rule,” Plaintiff’s dismissal operates as a judgment on the merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B) provides, “Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.” (Italics original.) The “two dismissal rule” applies when the action arises out of the same nucleus of facts. “The earlier action need not be identical to the second lawsuit; it is enough that it “included” the same claim. It is Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 18 of 38 Page ID #:1632 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 immaterial that other claims are included in the second suit.” (Wagstaffe, Cal. Prac. Guide Fed. Civ. Pro. Before Trial (Calif. & 9th Cir. Editions) (The Rutter Group 2015) Ch. 16-G, 16:314 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B)). Here, each lawsuit involving Prospect involves the exact same loan, Property and foreclosure. Simply put, Prospect has obtained judgments on the merits against Plaintiff in three (3) lawsuits and he should not be permitted to prosecute this fifth lawsuit against Prospect. 3. Privity Exists Between Prospect and Plaintiff. The third element is similarly met as Plaintiff and Prospect are parties to each of the prior actions and the instant Complaint. (See Plaintiff’s respective Complaints (RJN Exs. 10, 12, 14 and 17, and the Complaint herein.) For these reasons, all three requirements of res judicata are met and the instant Complaint should be dismissed. (See Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (“‘[N]o principle of law or equity … sanctions the rejection … of the salutary principle of res judicata.’”) (quotation omitted); Moitie, 452 U.S. at 401-02 (explaining that there is no “injustice” done by “evenhanded” application of “accepted principles of res judicata.”) C. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Time Barred and Barred by Laches. The longest limitations period applicable to Plaintiff’s Complaint is four (4) years.4 (See Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17208; Cal. Civ. Pro. § 337 (written contracts); RICO - Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).) Using Plaintiff’s RICO claim as an example, when a plaintiff pleads facts showing that more than four (4) years before filing a claim under RICO, it was aware of its injury and who caused it, the complaint 4 Shorter limitation periods include: TILA damages - 1 year (15 USC § 1640(e); TILA rescission - 3 years (15 USC § 1635(f) civil/personal rights and privacy- 2 years (CCP § 335.1); injury to real property - 3 years (CCP § 338(b); fraud/misrepresentation - 3 years (CCP § 338(d); quiet title/cancellation/unjust enrichment/declaratory relief - based on the underlying theory. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 19 of 38 Page ID #:1633 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. In the Ninth Circuit, the statute commences when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, its injury. (Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 110.) The same discovery rule applies to Plaintiff’s other state law causes of action as well. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.) Here, Plaintiff obtained the loan on or about April 12, 2005. Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts justifying his significantly delayed commencement of this lawsuit as to Prospect. In fact, Plaintiff did nothing with respect to Prospect’s involvement with the loan until after foreclosure proceedings began. Moreover, Plaintiff’s tort claims, for example, such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation, are based on his contention that the Deed of Trust, Notice of Default, Assignment, Notice of Default, and foreclosure sale were fraudulent. These documents were recorded in 2005 and 2009, and the foreclosure sale was conducted in 2011. Based on these dates, Plaintiff’s deadline to file his Complaint was in 2015, at the very latest (giving Plaintiff every possible benefit of the doubt). Therefore, each cause of action in the Complaint is barred by the applicable statute limitations and, for the same reasons is also barred by laches. Although Prospect believes that the foregoing arguments (res judicata, statute of limitations/latches) are sufficient grounds to dismiss this case with prejudice as to it, Prospect nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, addresses hereinbelow the lack of merit of Plaintiff’s causes of action. D. Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing to Raise a Post-Foreclosure Sale Challenge. Under California law, the “tender rule” requires that an action to set aside a sale “for irregularities in sale notice or procedure” be “accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was security.” (Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 58 Cal.App.3d 575, 578 (citing Karlsen v. American Savings & Loan Association (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117.)) Thus, Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 20 of 38 Page ID #:1634 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 any “cause of action ‘implicitly integrated’ with the irregular sale fails unless the trustor can allege and establish a valid tender.” (Arnolds Management Corp., supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at 579 (citing Karlsen, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at 121).) “The rationale behind the rule is that if the borrower could not have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in the sale did not result in damages to the borrower.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 112 (citation omitted).) 1. There Is No Allegation of Tender. Pursuant to the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale of the Property. As a result, the tender requirement applies in this case. The Complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff attempted to tender, has tendered, or has the ability to tender the full amount due on the Loan. Absent a valid tender, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge any aspect of the foreclosure sale. It follows that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for wrongful foreclosure. 2. No Exceptions Apply. California Courts have recognized certain exceptions to the tender rule where: (1) the validity of the underlying debt is in dispute; (2) the plaintiff has a counter-claim or setoff against the foreclosing party; (3) it would be inequitable to apply the tender rule; or (4) the trustee’s deed is void on its face. (See Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1454-55.) However, none of these exceptions apply in this case. As set forth below, there are no valid grounds identified in the Complaint for concluding that the Loan is invalid or that the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (TDUS) is void. Nor are there facts in the Complaint supporting the other recognized exceptions to the tender rule. Therefore, the Complaint should be dismissed on this threshold ground alone. /// /// /// Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 21 of 38 Page ID #:1635 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 E. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Quiet Title and “Adverse Possession.” 1. Quiet Title. The purpose of a quiet title action is to finally settle and determine the parties’ conflicting claims to property and to obtain a declaration of the interest of each party. (See Newman v. Cornelius (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 279, 284.) In an action to quiet title, the quiet title claimant has the burden of proof to show every element of the right claimed. (See Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489, 548.) For a trustor to quiet title against a secured lender, he must first pay the outstanding debt on which the deed of trust is based. (See Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86.) “This rule is based upon the equitable principle that he who seeks equity must do equity.” (Mix v. Sodd (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 386, 390.) Through the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to quiet title despite his inability to establish that the Deed of Trust, Assignment, Notice of Default, and the TDUS were wrongful or improperly cloud his title. None of the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to establish a basis for setting aside the sale. More fundamentally, Plaintiff’s claim is defective due to his failure to repay, or offer to repay, the Loan. Additionally, Prospect, as merely the prior Note holder, makes no claim of title to the property, adverse to Plaintiff or otherwise. 2. Adverse Possession. California does not recognize a stand-alone cause of action for “adverse possession.” A plaintiff seeking to establish property rights by adverse possession must bring an action to quiet title. (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 760.010, et seq.) This so-called cause of action should be dismissed for this reason alone because Plaintiff cannot quiet title as discussed above. Additionally, and without taking anything away from the foregoing, a plaintiff attempting to establish title by adverse possession must prove the following elements: “(1) tax payments, (2) Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 22 of 38 Page ID #:1636 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 actual possession which is (3) open and notorious, (4) continuous and uninterrupted for five years, (5) hostile and adverse to the true owner’s title, and (6) under either color of title or claim of right.” (California Maryland Funding, Inc. v. Lowe (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1798, 1803.) Plaintiff’s claim for “adverse possession” fails because he has not alleged sufficient facts to establish all of the elements of the claim, including but not limited to the first element regarding tax payments. In any event, Prospect, as the prior Note holder, makes no claim of title to the Property, adverse to Plaintiff or otherwise. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for quiet title based on adverse possession. F. Plaintiff Fails to State Claims for Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud. The elements for a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation consist of: (1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact; (2) without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true; (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented; (4) ignorance of the truth and justifiable reliance thereon by the party to whom the misrepresentation was directed; and (5) damages. (See Fox v. Pollack (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 954, 962.) Similarly, the elements of fraud or intentional misrepresentation are: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (See Robinson Helicopter Co. Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 990.) It is well-established that claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraud must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A. (C.D. Cal. 2003) 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1141; Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA (9th Cir. 2003) 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04; Gilmore v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (N.D. Cal. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 23 of 38 Page ID #:1637 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 2014) 75 F.Supp.3d 1255, 1270.) To meet this standard, a plaintiff must specify: (1) “the time, place and specific content of the fraudulent representation;” (2) “the identity of the person engaged in the fraud;” and (3) “the circumstances indicating falseness or the manner in which the representations were false and misleading.” (See Id. at 1270.) Plaintiff’s fraud-based claims should also be dismissed due to his failure to comply with the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Indeed, Plaintiff fails to even differentiate between the defendants, much less clearly allege what employee or agent of each defendant made the purported misrepresentations to him. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claim is based on his contention that the Assignment is void because it was robo-signed, the claim lacks merit because courts have routinely recognized that a borrower lacks standing to challenge an assignment based on allegations of robo-signing, which at best renders the assignment voidable, not void. (Pratap v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (N.D. Cal. 2014) 63 F.Supp.3d 1101, 1109; Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 942-43.) Therefore, Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the Assignment. Lastly, because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a misrepresentation by Prospect, he cannot establish that he justifiably relied on or was damaged by any purported misrepresentation. Ultimately, any claimed damages relating to Plaintiff’s loss of the Property is the result of his failure to make his Loan payments, not any conduct by Prospect. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fraud-based causes of action should be dismissed. G. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violations of RICO. Conduct must be criminal to qualify as racketeering activity within the meaning of RICO. (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); Gervase v. Sup.Ct. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1218.) To allege a civil RICO claim, a party must allege facts sufficient to show a pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to bring the claim Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 24 of 38 Page ID #:1638 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 within the provisions of Section 1961(1), which defines racketeering as certain enumerated state felonies and violations of specific sections of the United States Criminal Code. Plaintiff’s RICO claim fails to meet the strict pleading requirements in that the predicate acts are not alleged with particularity and a pattern of racketeering activity cannot be alleged. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Globe International Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.) Even if construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, his claim under RICO does not even satisfy the plausibility standard of Rule 8. Simply put, the RICO claim against Prospect is wholly inadequate and cannot be cured. H. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. Plaintiff’s claim under the FDCPA fails for various reasons. Courts have regularly recognized that a residential loan is not a debt for the purposes of the FDCPA. (Fuentes v. Deutsche Bank (S.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 1971610, at *3.) Because the Loan is a residential mortgage loan, it is not a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA. Further, the “[f]oreclosure on a property based on a deed of trust does not constitute collection of a debt within the meaning of the FDCPA.” (Usher v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 2010 WL 4008496, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citation omitted); accord Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2012 WL 2838689, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Hanaway v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2011 WL 672559 *4 (C.D. Cal. 2011).) Because Plaintiff’s Complaint challenges foreclosure activities, the FDCPA is inapplicable. Even if Plaintiff could establish that the FDCPA applied to Prospect (which he cannot), he does not and cannot demonstrate that Prospect has violated its provisions. In fact, at the time of the foreclosure proceedings, Prospect had no interest in the loan or Property and Plaintiff does not even identify a specific provision of the FDCPA that Prospect is alleged to have violated. /// Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 25 of 38 Page ID #:1639 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 I. Plaintiff fails to State a Claim for Violations of the Truth In Lending Act. Plaintiff generally alleges in the Complaint that “defendants” violated the TILA by failing to provide the required disclosures under the statute. (See Compl., ¶¶ 100-02). However, Plaintiff does not make any charging allegations against Prospect and in fact does not mention Prospect (Metrocities) by name (see ¶¶ 99-102.) Furthermore, as discussed above, any possible claims Plaintiff could have made with respect to the origination of the Loan are time barred. J. Plaintiff’s Civil Rights Claims Fail. Section 1981 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code also prohibits discrimination by persons acting under “color of law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only “persons” may be sued for deprivation of civil rights under Section 1983. (See Egan v. City of Aurora (1961) 635 U.S. 514.) Section 1985 of Title 45 of the U.S. Code creates a right of action against private citizens who conspired to deprive others of their civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Similarly, Section 241 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code prohibits conspiracy to interfere with any citizen’s exercise of his rights under the U.S. Constitution or laws of the United States. (See 18 U.S.C. § 241.) Plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1981 and 1983 fail because the Complaint does not allege that Prospect engaged in discrimination. His claim under Section 1983 fails for the additional reason that Prospect is not a “person” and was not acting under “color of law” when it initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Property. His claim under Sections 241 and 1985 should also be dismissed because pursuant to the Deed of Trust, U.S. Bank, as the then current Note holder, was entitled to pursue a non-judicial foreclosure in the event that Plaintiff defaulted under the Loan. It therefore follows that Plaintiff’s civil rights causes of action should be dismissed. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 26 of 38 Page ID #:1640 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 K. Plaintiff’s Contract-Based Claims Fail. In California, the elements of a claim for breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff or excuse for nonperformance; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) damages. (See First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Reece (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 731, 745.) “Facts alleging a breach, like all essential elements of a breach of contract cause of action, must be pleaded with specificity.” (Levy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) California law also implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract. (See Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 342, 371.) The covenant is implied “to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenant) frustrates the other party’s rights [to] the benefits of the contract.” (Marsu B.V. v. Walt Disney Co. (9th Cir. 1999) 185 F.3d 932, 938 (citing Los Angeles Equestrian Ctr., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 432, 447). Even if construed liberally, Plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant claims are woefully deficient. Indeed, the Complaint does not identify a contract he had with Prospect and does not identify a specific provision of any of any contract that Prospect is alleged to have violated, either directly or indirectly. Importantly, Plaintiff fails to establish that he has performed his obligations under the Loan or that he was excused from performing under the Loan. This defect is incurable as Plaintiff indisputably fell behind on his mortgage payments, which ultimately resulted in the loss of his Property to foreclosure. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant should be dismissed. L. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations. “The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 27 of 38 Page ID #:1641 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126.) The allegations in the Complaint are impermissibly vague and uncertain with respect to nearly all of Plaintiff’s claims. This is especially true with respect to his tortious interference with contractual relations claim. In fact, the Complaint fails to allege a specific contract between Plaintiff and a third party that Prospect purportedly interfered with or how Prospect disrupted the contractual relationship between Plaintiff and a third party. For this reason, this claim should be dismissed. M. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violations of California’s Deceptive Trade Practices Laws. Laws governing deceptive trade practices in California are codified at California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. Generally, California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. When analyzing a UCL claim, courts consider each of the three prongs to determine whether a practice is unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. (See Cel-Tech Comms., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) While the scope of the conduct covered by the UCL is broad, the remedies are limited. (See Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798, 812.) Damages cannot be recovered, and a plaintiff is generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution. (Id.) 1. Plaintiff Lacks Standing. A claim for unfair competition under the UCL may only be brought “by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.) To establish Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 28 of 38 Page ID #:1642 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 standing under the UCL, a plaintiff must: (1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact (i.e., economic injury); and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of (i.e., caused by) the unfair business practice that is the gravamen of the claim. (See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 337.) There is no causation “when a complaining party would suffer the same harm whether or not a defendant complied with the law.” (Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1099.) Here, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim under the UCL because he has not suffered any economic injury caused by Prospect’s alleged unfair competition. In fact, Plaintiff fails altogether to specify his alleged economic injury. For this reason alone, this claim should be dismissed. 2. Unlawful, Unfair or Fraudulent Business Practices. A violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL’s “unlawful” prong. (See Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1554.) A claim for violation of the UCL stands or falls depending on the fate of antecedent substantive causes of action. (See Krantz v. BT Visual Images (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 164, 178.) “Unfair” conduct has been defined as conduct that “offends an established public policy or…is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” (Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917, 939 (citation and internal quotations omitted).) A UCL claim based on public policy must be “tethered” to a specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision to provide an objective basis for determining whether the alleged conduct is unfair. (See Id. at 940.) To establish liability under the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the offending conduct is likely to deceive members of the public (i.e., a reasonable consumer). (Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 838; Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 29 of 38 Page ID #:1643 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 496, 507.) Claims under the fraudulent prong of the UCL must be pleaded with particularity under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 9(b). (See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2009) 567 F.3d 1120, 1127.) Therefore, a plaintiff “must include a description of the ‘time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the parties to the misrepresentations.’” (In re Facebook PPC Advertising Litigation, 2010 WL 3341062, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Swartz v. KPMG LLP (9th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3d 756, 764.)) Plaintiff’s claim for a violation of the UCL fails because, inter alia, he has not pled a viable antecedent claim. (Krantz v. BT Visual Images, LLC, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at 178 (Claims for relief under the unfair competition law stand or fall depending on the fate of the antecedent substantive causes of action.)) As discussed herein, every one of Plaintiff’s claims is legally deficient and fails to constitute a cause of action against Prospect. Absent a viable antecedent claim, Plaintiff cannot state a separate claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL. Nor can he identify any “constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision” to which to relate a claim under the “unfair” prong. (See Scripps Clinic, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at 940.) Plaintiff has similarly not adequately pled any misrepresentations that Prospect is alleged to have made or its purported misconduct that was likely to deceive members of the public. It follows that Plaintiff’s Complaint contains insufficient facts to state a claim under the UCL. N. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Invasion of Privacy. To state a claim for invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a legally protected private interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) a serious invasion of a privacy interest. (See Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35-37.) Moreover, a plaintiff’s voluntary consent to the defendant’s invasive actions can negate a plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations of privacy, as well as the element of offensiveness, for purposes of the tort of intrusion. (Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272, 293 (“consent to Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 30 of 38 Page ID #:1644 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 an impending intrusion can ‘inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy’”).) Initially, there are no specific charging allegations against Prospect in this claim. Secondly, Plaintiff expressly consented to U.S. Bank’s (the then Note holder) entry onto the Property following his default under the Loan. Specifically, Section 9 of the Deed of Trust authorized U.S. Bank to enter the Property in the event that Plaintiff defaulted under the Loan. (See RJN, Exhibit 1, § 9). Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy is, therefore, barred by the defense of consent. O. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Trespass. Under California law, the elements of a cause of action for trespass are: “(1) the plaintiff’s lawful possession or right to possession, as the owner or otherwise, of described property; (2) the defendant’s wrongful act of trespass on the property; and (3) damage to plaintiff proximately cause by the trespass.” (See McRae v. Blakeley (1906) 3 Cal.App. 171, 174.) Plaintiff fails to allege a viable trespass claim for several reasons. First, he no longer owns nor rightfully possesses the Property. On the contrary, the non-judicial foreclosure sale terminated Plaintiff’s interest in the Property and, further, terminated whatever possible connection Prospect could have had to the Property. Second, Plaintiff consented to U.S. Bank’s entry onto the Property because Section 9 of the Deed of Trust authorized U.S. Bank to enter the Property in the event of Plaintiff’s default. (See RJN, Exhibit 1, § 9). Third, Plaintiff has failed to allege any entry by U.S. Bank, let alone an “unreasonable” one. For all three reasons, the trespass claim should be dismissed. P. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Civil Conspiracy. The elements of a claim for civil conspiracy under California law are: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct. (See Kidron v Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581.) Further, civil conspiracy, unlike criminal conspiracy, “is not an Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 31 of 38 Page ID #:1645 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 independent tort.” (See Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia. Ltd. (2004) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-11.) Civil “conspiracy itself is not actionable without a wrong.” (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 454; Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at 510 (“Conspiracy is not a cause of action”).) In Okun, the California Supreme Court dismissed a claim for civil conspiracy where the plaintiff failed to state a claim for any underlying tort. (See Okun, supra, 29 Cal.3d at 454.) Just like the plaintiff in Okun, Plaintiff has failed to allege a viable underlying tort. The alleged conspiracy appears to be based entirely on the preceding causes of action, none of which is a valid claim or would support a conspiracy claim in any event. Absent a viable underlying tort claim, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for civil conspiracy. Q. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment. The elements of a claim for unjust enrichment (i.e., quasi contract) are: (1) a defendant’s receipt of a benefit; and (2) unjust retention of that benefit at the plaintiff’s expense. (See Peterson v. Cellco P’ship (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593.) The doctrine applies where a plaintiff who has no enforceable contract confers a benefit on a defendant which the defendant knowingly accepts under circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value. (See Hernandez v. Lopez (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 932, 938.) A claim for unjust enrichment does not lie when an enforceable, binding agreement exists defining the rights of the parties. (See California Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172.) Here, there is an enforceable, binding agreement between Plaintiff and Prospect; to wit, the Note and Deed of Trust. Because a cause for unjust enrichment cannot exist when a binding agreement governs the rights of the parties, Plaintiff’s cause of action necessarily fails. (See California Med. Ass’n, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at 172.) Additionally, Plaintiff does not deny that he accepted the Loan funds and that he was required to make mortgage payments. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 32 of 38 Page ID #:1646 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Therefore, there cannot be any unjust enrichment. R. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Cancellation of Instruments. Under California law, “[a] written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled.” (Cal. Civil Code § 3412.) “[T]o state a claim pursuant to Civil Code § 3412, [a] plaintiff must allege that he has restored everything of value received from the loan transaction.” (Sanchez v. MortgageIt, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 588178, at *2 (citing Star Pac. Investments, Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, Inc. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 447, 457.)) Plaintiff’s nineteenth cause of action appears to seek the cancellation of the Notice of Default, Assignment and TDUS and, in this regard, does not pertain to Prospect. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to indirectly cancel Prospect’s interest in the Loan/Property (Deed of Trust) at this late date (assuming, arguendo, such a remedy even available, which is not), his claim fails as he does not allege that he is able to return the Loan proceeds as a condition of his rescission request. Indeed, the Complaint does not allege that he has tendered or has the ability to tender the full amount of the Loan proceeds or state facts any of the challenged instruments will cause him harm as they each relate to the Loan that Plaintiff has not repaid. Moreover, the Complaint fails to establish that any of the documents (as relevant to Prospect, the Deed of Trust) at issue are invalid. On the contrary, as set forth in detail above, the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show that any of these documents are fraudulent. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for cancellation of instruments. S. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Injunctive or Declaratory Relief. “An action for declaratory judgment is procedural in nature and purpose.” (Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. UPA California (N.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 33 of 38 Page ID #:1647 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 415656, at *3.) Because a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction follows federal procedural rules, “federal law determines the rules to apply to a request for declaratory judgment relief in a given case.” (Id. (citations omitted).) The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, provides that “any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” Declaratory relief, however, may be unnecessary where an adequate remedy exists under some other cause of action. (See Mangindin v. Wash. Mut. Bank (N.D. Cal. 2009) 637 F.Supp.2d 700, 707.) A claim for declaratory relief “rises or falls with [the] other claims.” (Surf & Sand, LLC v. City of Capitola (N.D. Cal. 2008) 2008 WL 2225684, at * 2, fn. 5.) Similarly, injunctive relief is not a cause of action. (See Cox Commc'ns PCS, L.P. v. City of San Marcos (S.D. Cal. 2002) 204 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1283.) Instead, it is a remedy that must be tethered to some independent legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. (See Id.) Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive mirror his other claims. But, none of those enumerated claims have merit. In the absence of a viable antecedent claim, Plaintiff is not entitled to any injunctive or declaratory relief. T. Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not Satisfy Rule 8(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant unlawfully- harmed-me accusation.” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009).) A complaint cannot simply “le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of undisclosed facts’ to support recovery.” (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (2007).) To avoid dismissal under Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts “to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief,’ [which] requires more than labels and conclusions, and [for which] a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (Id. at 555 (citations omitted).) “[A] complaint must contain enough factual Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 34 of 38 Page ID #:1648 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 26 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” (Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).) Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint fall far short of alleging facts to state any claim that is plausible against Prospect. Among other things, Plaintiff does not clearly designate what claims he is in fact bringing in his Complaint against Prospect. Instead, the Complaint asserts several unintelligible theories and allegations, but none of these theories are actually tied to any actual claim against Prospect. Allegations that fail to specify which individual defendants are responsible for what allegedly wrongful conduct are insufficient to state a claim under even the basic notice requirement of Rule 8. (PLS-Pacific Laser Sys. v. TLZ Inc., No. 06-04585, 2007 WL 2022020, *11 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2007) (alleging “defendants have violated” fails to provide each of the defendants with proper notice of the grounds for the claims against them); Aaron v. Aguirre, No. 06-1451, 2007 WL 959083, *16 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (undifferentiated pleading against multiple defendants is improper); In re Sargent Tech., Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1094 (2003) (lumping fails to give defendants fair notice); Gauvin v Tombatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (1988) (defendants may not be “lumped together in a single, broad allegation”).) Plaintiff’s failure to give Prospect fair notice of what wrongful acts it allegedly committed requires dismissal of his claims. (See Corazon v. Aurora Loan Serv., LLC, No. 11-00542, 2011 WL 1740099, *3-5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011) (“Aurora contends that this ‘improper lumping of defendants’ is alone sufficient grounds for dismissal of the Complaint. … The Court agrees with Aurora. … Accordingly, the Court … DISMISSES THE COMPLAINT….”) (internal citations omitted) (collecting authority).) Therefore, the Complaint should be also dismissed pursuant to Rule 8(a) as an independent ground. /// /// Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 35 of 38 Page ID #:1649 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 U. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Should Provide a More Definite Statement of His Complaint. This Court would be well within its authority to (and should) grant the Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as well as pursuant to 8(a). However, should the Court deny that Motion, Prospect requests, in the alternative, that this Court require Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement of the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) so Prospect can intelligently formulate a responsive pleading. IV. CONCLUSION. For the foregoing reasons, Prospect respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Prospect with prejudice, but reserve jurisdiction on the issue of sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority regarding same and/or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) and Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1990), respectively.) Dated: February 24, 2017 HOEFFLIN · BURROWS A Law Corporation By: /s/ Jason M. Burrows RICHARD M. HOEFFLIN JASON M. BURROWS Attorneys for Defendant PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC, (f/k/a Metrocities Mortgage, LLC) and erroneously sued herein as Metro Cities Mortgage, LLC Mtn to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 36 of 38 Page ID #:1650 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Dondi C. Stevens v. U.S. Bank, et al. Case No. 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG I, the undersigned, certify and declare that I am over the age of 18 years, employed in the County of Ventura, State of California, and not a party to the above-entitled action. My business address is 2659 Townsgate Road, Suite 232, Westlake Village, CA 91361-2756. On February 24, 2017, I served a true copy of the following document(s) described as follows: DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT [ ] By personally delivering it to the person(s) indicated below in the manner as provided in FRCiv P5(B); [X] By depositing it in the United States Mail in a sealed envelope with the postage thereon fully prepaid to the following; Dondi C. Stevens, In Pro Pro Plaintiff In Pro Per 1248 N. San Marcos Road Santa Barbara, CA 93111 Tel: (805) 452-9641 Emails: iotrucking@cox.net and indianorchardtrucking@gmail.com [X ] By ECF: On this date, I electronically filed the following document(s) with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF system, which sent electronic notification of such filing to all other parties appearing on the docket sheet. I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct (and that I am employed in or by the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made). Executed this 24th day of February, 2017, in Westlake Village, California. By: /s/ Jason M. Burrows Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 37 of 38 Page ID #:1651 _____________________________________________________________________ DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 29 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 SERVICE LIST Dondi C. Stevens v. U.S. Bank, et al. Case No. 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Updated 2/2/17 Dondi C. Stevens, In Pro Pro Plaintiff In Pro Per 1248 N. San Marcos Road Santa Barbara, CA 93111 Tel: (805) 452-9641 Emails: iotrucking@cox.net and indianorchardtrucking@gmail.com Allison Ocampo Chua Defendant McGlinchey Stafford LLP U.S. Bank, National 18201 Von Karman Avenue Suite 350 Association Irvine, CA 92612 949-381-5900 Fax: 949-271-4040 Email: achua@mcglinchey.com James T Lee Defendant, Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder and NDEx West, LLC Weiss LLP 20955 Pathfinder Road Suite 300 Diamond Bar, CA 91765 626-915-5714 Fax: 626-595-7640 Email: jamesl@bdfgroup.com Carlos V Yguico Defendants, Gemmill Baldridge and Yguico LLP Coldwell Banker 6380 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 909 Bruce Venturelli Los Angeles, CA 90048 323-931-1093 Fax: 323-931-1095 Email: cvy@gbylaw.com Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67 Filed 02/24/17 Page 38 of 38 Page ID #:1652 _____________________________________________________________________ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 Richard M. Hoefflin, Esq., SBN 061519 E-mail: rmhoefflin@hoefflinlaw.com Jason M. Burrows, Esq., SBN 190159 E-mail: jburrows@hoefflinlaw.com HOEFFLIN · BURROWS, A Law Corporation 2659 Townsgate Road, Suite 232 Westlake Village, CA 91361-2756 Tel: (805) 497-8605; Fax: (805) 497-8625 Attorneys for Defendant PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC, (f/k/a Metrocities Mortgage, LLC) and erroneously sued herein as Metro Cities Mortgage, LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (WESTERN DIVISION) DONDI C. STEVENS, Plaintiff, vs. U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NDEx WEST, LLC & CHASE FINANCE, LLC, METRO CITIES MORTGAGE, LLC; COLDWELL BANKER & BRUCE VENTURELLI, and All Persons Claiming Any Legal or Equitable Right, Title, Estate, Lien, or Interested in the Property Described in the Complaint Adverse to Plaintiff’s Title or Any Cloud on Plaintiff’s Title Thereto and, DOES 1-10, Inclusive Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: CV16-06068 JFW (JCG) [2:16-cv-06068 JFW (JCG)] District Judge John F. Walter, (Magistrate Jay C. Gandhi) [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT [Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Request for Judicial Notice and Declaration of Jason M. Burrows concurrently submitted herewith] DATE: March 27, 2017 TIME: 1:30 p.m. CTRM: 7A Complaint Filed: 8/12/16 ) The motion of Defendant Prospect Mortgage LLC (“Prospect”) to dismiss Plaintiff Dondi Stevens’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”) came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable John F. Walter at the date and time set forth above. Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67-1 Filed 02/24/17 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:1653 _____________________________________________________________________ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 After having considered the moving papers, opposition papers, reply papers, and oral argument, if any, and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING THEREFOR, IT IS ORDERED THAT the Motion is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. The Court reserves jurisdiction on the issue of sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority and/or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: ________________ _________________________________ HON. JOHN F. WALTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Proposed Order-Mtn to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67-1 Filed 02/24/17 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:1654 _____________________________________________________________________ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Dondi C. Stevens v. U.S. Bank, et al. Case No. 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG I, the undersigned, certify and declare that I am over the age of 18 years, employed in the County of Ventura, State of California, and not a party to the above-entitled action. My business address is 2659 Townsgate Road, Suite 232, Westlake Village, CA 91361-2756. On February 24, 2017, I served a true copy of the following document(s) described as follows: [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT [ ] By personally delivering it to the person(s) indicated below in the manner as provided in FRCiv P5(B); [X] By depositing it in the United States Mail in a sealed envelope with the postage thereon fully prepaid to the following; Dondi C. Stevens, In Pro Pro Plaintiff In Pro Per 1248 N. San Marcos Road Santa Barbara, CA 93111 Tel: (805) 452-9641 Emails: iotrucking@cox.net and indianorchardtrucking@gmail.com [X ] By ECF: On this date, I electronically filed the following document(s) with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF system, which sent electronic notification of such filing to all other parties appearing on the docket sheet. I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct (and that I am employed in or by the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made). Executed this 24th day of February, 2017, in Westlake Village, California. By: /s/ Jason M. Burrows Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67-1 Filed 02/24/17 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:1655 _____________________________________________________________________ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 H oe ff lin · Bu rr ow s, A L aw C or po ra tio n 26 59 T ow ns ga te R oa d, S ui te 2 32 W es tla ke V ill ag e, C al ifo rn ia 91 36 1 80 5- 49 7- 86 05 SERVICE LIST Dondi C. Stevens v. U.S. Bank, et al. Case No. 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Updated 2/2/17 Dondi C. Stevens, In Pro Pro Plaintiff In Pro Per 1248 N. San Marcos Road Santa Barbara, CA 93111 Tel: (805) 452-9641 Emails: iotrucking@cox.net and indianorchardtrucking@gmail.com Allison Ocampo Chua Defendant McGlinchey Stafford LLP U.S. Bank, National 18201 Von Karman Avenue Suite 350 Association Irvine, CA 92612 949-381-5900 Fax: 949-271-4040 Email: achua@mcglinchey.com James T Lee Defendant, Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder and NDEx West, LLC Weiss LLP 20955 Pathfinder Road Suite 300 Diamond Bar, CA 91765 626-915-5714 Fax: 626-595-7640 Email: jamesl@bdfgroup.com Carlos V Yguico Defendants, Gemmill Baldridge and Yguico LLP Coldwell Banker 6380 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 909 Bruce Venturelli Los Angeles, CA 90048 323-931-1093 Fax: 323-931-1095 Email: cvy@gbylaw.com Case 2:16-cv-06068-JFW-JCG Document 67-1 Filed 02/24/17 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:1656