David Greenstein v. The Pictsweet Company, et al

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case -- Defendant the Pictsweet Company's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

C.D. Cal.August 12, 2016

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158965.2 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS BRYAN CAVE LLP Robert E. Boone III (California Bar No. 132780) reboone@bryancave.com Nancy Franco (California Bar No. 294856) nancy.franco@bryancave.com 120 Broadway, Suite 300 Santa Monica, CA 90401-2386 Telephone: (310) 576-2100 Facsimile: (310) 576-2200 Attorneys for Defendant THE PICTSWEET COMPANY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DAVID GREENSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. THE PICTSWEET COMPANY, and DOES 1-5 inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 2:16-cv-05839-JFW (MRWx) Assigned To Hon. John F. Walter DEFENDANT THE PICTSWEET COMPANY’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT [Filed Concurrently With Notice of Motion To Dismiss and (Proposed) Order] Date: September 12, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. Place: Courtroom 16 Complaint Filed: June 21, 2016 Complaint Served: July 7, 2016 Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 1 of 21 Page ID #:73 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158965.2 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents Page I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 2 III. LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................... 3 IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED ............................................. 5 A. Plaintiff’s Conclusory Allegations Do Not Satisfy the Plausibility Standard of Rule 8 or the Particularity Requirement of Rule 9(b) ......... 5 B. Section 12606(b) Does Not Apply .......................................................... 6 C. Plaintiff Fails to Properly Allege a Violation of Section 12606.2 .......... 6 D. Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Under The UCL .................................. 9 1. The Complaint Does Not State A Claim Under Section 17200 ............................................................................................ 9 a. The Complaint Does Not Adequately Allege "Unlawful" Conduct ............................................................. 9 b. The Complaint Does Not Adequately Allege “Unfair” Conduct ............................................................................... 10 c. The Complaint Does Not Adequately Allege "Fraudulent" Conduct ......................................................... 11 2. The Complaint Does Not State A Claim Under Section 17500 .......................................................................................... 12 E. Plaintiff's Claims Are Preempted Insofar As He Seeks to Impose Greater Requirements Than 21 C.F.R. 100.100 ................................... 13 V. LEAVE TO AMEND WOULD BE FUTILE ................................................. 15 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 16 Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 2 of 21 Page ID #:74 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158965.2 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Table of Authorities Cases 21 Lam v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2012) .................................................................... 6 Accord Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., No. C-12-02554-RMW, 2013 WL 685372 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) .................. 15 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) .............................................................................. 3 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) ....................................................................... 3 Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544 (2007). ................................................................................ 9 Capcom Co. v. MKR Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 4661479 Oct. 20, 2008) ............................................................................ 4 Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999) ............................................................................................ 10 Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F. 3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................. 9 Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D.Cal.2010) ...................................................................... 15 Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2000) aff’d sub nom. Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................................................ 12 Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 1997) ........................................................................ 4, 6 Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285 (9th Cir.1995) ..................................................................................... 13 In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009) ............................................................................................ 11 Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................ 5, 9, 11 Krantz v. BT Visual Images, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164 (2001) ............................................................................... 9, 10 Lam v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2012 ......................................................... 14 Lazar v. Hertz, Corp., 69 Cal. App. 4th 1494 (1999) ................................................................................... 9 Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 3 of 21 Page ID #:75 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158965.2 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES LT Int’l Ltd. v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1238 (D. Nev. 2014) ...................................................................... 4, 5 Peviani v. Hostess Brands, Inc., 750 F.Supp.2d 1111 (C.D.Cal2010) ....................................................................... 15 Red v. The Kroger Co., No. 10-1025, 2010 WL 4262037 (C.D. Cal Sept. 2, 2010) ................................... 15 Scripps Clinic v. Sup. Ct., 108 Cal. App. 4th 917 (2003) ................................................................................. 10 Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir.2007) ..................................................................................... 4 Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 4, 15 Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676 (9th Cir.2010) ................................................................................... 15 Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 5, 13 Watson Labs., Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2001) .......................................................... 11 Werbel ex rel. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. C 09-04456 SBA, 2010 WL 2673860, (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2010) .................... 12 Statutes 21 C.F.R. § 100.1(c)(4) .............................................................................................. 14 21 C.F.R. § 100.100 ............................................................................................ passim 21 C.F.R. § 7.1 ............................................................................................................. 6 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 ...................................................................................................... 14 21 U.S.C. §. 343(d) ................................................................................................ 6, 14 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12601 .................................................................................... 10 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606 ...................................................................................... 6 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606(b) ................................................................................. 6 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606(d) ........................................................................... 6, 12 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606.2 ....................................................................... 1, 2, 6, 9 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606.2(a) ............................................................................... 6 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606.2(c) ............................................................... 7, 8, 11, 12 Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 4 of 21 Page ID #:76 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158965.2 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606.2(d) .......................................................................... 7, 8 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 12606.2(f) ....................................................................... 14, 15 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200 ............................................................................. passim Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17209 ...................................................................................... 9 Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17500 ...................................................................... 2, 5, 12, 13 Cal. Civ. Code § 12606.2(c)(4) ................................................................................. 15 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(A) .................................................................................................. 6 Other Authorities Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ....................................................................................... 1, 3, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ........................................................................................................... 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ...................................................................................................... 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) .................................................................................................. 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 ..................................................................................................... 4, 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) .......................................................................................... 1, 11, 13 Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 5 of 21 Page ID #:77 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 1 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff David Greenstein’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint contains a confusing single count against Defendant The Pictsweet Company (“Pictsweet”) based on the conclusory allegation that he purchased a ten ounce bag of Pictsweet frozen Brussel sprouts containing “nonfunctional slack fill.” The Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and does not satisfy the plausibility standard of Rule 8 or the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). Nonfunctional slack fill in packaged food products is governed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulation 21 C.F.R. § 100.100. California enacted its own nonfunctional slack fill statute for food containers, Business and Professions Code § 12606.2. The California statute is virtually identical to the federal regulation and, by its own language, must be construed consistent with the federal regulation. Both contain a detailed definition of what constitutes nonfunctional slack fill. Neither § 12606.2 nor 21 C.F.R. § 100.100 requires the package to have a “window” to view the product inside unless this definition is fully satisfied. The Complaint does not allege facts establishing that Pictsweet violated § 12606.2. Instead, the Complaint alleges - in conclusory fashion - that Pictsweet violated another nonfunctional slack fill statute, California Business and Professions § 12606(b), but that statute applies to commodities, not food containers. Even if the Complaint had identified the correct statute, it still fails to allege facts establishing that Pictsweet’s frozen Brussels sprouts packaging contained nonfunctional slack fill in violation of § 12606.2 or 21 C.F.R. § 100.100. The Complaint does not state facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that all six of the safe harbor provisions enumerated by those statutes, and expressly incorporated in the statutes’ definition of “nonfunctional slack fill,” are inapplicable. For instance, the Complaint fails to allege facts establishing that Pictsweet’s Brussels sprouts package was not intended to cook the food. Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 6 of 21 Page ID #:78 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 2 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff fails to state a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) on the basis of either “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business practices (see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200) or “untrue or misleading advertising” (see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500). Besides failing to establish a violation of any applicable statute, the Complaint also fails to articulate how any labeling on the product was false or misleading. Plaintiff admits the package stated it contained 10 ounces of Brussels sprouts. Plaintiff does not allege his package contained less. Plaintiff’s allegation that he could not see the product through the purported “window” in the packaging is inconsequential unless and until he establishes - with facts - that the empty space in the package actually constitutes “nonfunctional slack fill” as defined by § 12606.2 or 21 C.F.R. § 100.100. Neither statute requires a window to view the product inside if the slack fill is functional. In addition, Plaintiff cannot lump his purported § 17200 and § 17500 claims into one count. Those must be pled as separate claims. Finally, insofar as Plaintiff construes § 12606.2 or his UCL claims to require more than 21 C.F.R. § 100.100, those claims are preempted by federal law. This Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, as leave to amend is futile. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On June 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed this action against Pictsweet, arising from Plaintiff’s alleged purchase of a 10 ounce package of “Steam’ables®” Baby Brussels Sprouts (the “Steam’ables® Brussels Sprouts”), on October 15, 2015. See Complaint, 2. The Complaint alleges that the package he purchased was “filled to substantially less than its capacity” and “[t]his non-functional slack-fill serves no benefit to the product or the purchaser.” Id. at 5. The Complaint further alleges “[t]he actual product could not in any reasonable way be considered as fragile.” Id. Plaintiff alleges Pictsweet “knowingly distributed to the general public, products it knew were made and packaged in violation of California laws against non- Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 7 of 21 Page ID #:79 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 3 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS functional slack fill” and “[o]n information and belief . . . were . . . well aware of the non-functional slack fill in the products listed herein and turn [sic] a blind-eye to the non-functional slack-fill in each product. . . .” Id. at 2-3. The Complaint alleges “to facilitate the false, misleading and deceptive nature of the packaging of the product, defendants intentionally obscured the space above a small window that showed the product, so that plaintiff and other consumers could not see the empty space in the package, which empty space serves no benefit to the product or the ultimate consumer, including plaintiff.” Id. at 3-4. “Plaintiff . . . relied in part on his visual perception of the packaging which gave him a reasonable expectation that the package would hold considerably more product than it actually contained. Had plaintiff known how little product was actually in the containers . . . he would not have bought the products.” Id. at 4. The Complaint alleges the above-referenced representations are “false, misleading and deceptive” and should be enjoined pursuant to California Business and Professions Code. See Complaint at 5. III. LEGAL STANDARD Iqbal and Twombly. A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the complaint and whether it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).). A plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A complaint may Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 8 of 21 Page ID #:80 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 4 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS be dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory.” Capcom Co. v. MKR Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 4661479, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008) (citation omitted). A court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if amendment would be futile. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007). Rules 8(a) and 9(b). “[C]laims grounded in fraud. . . must meet both the ‘plausibility’ standard of Rule 8(a) and the ‘particularity’ standard of Rule 9(b), ensuring they meet ‘Rule 8’s requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity,’ which ‘has among its purposes the avoidance of unnecessary discovery.” LT Int’l Ltd. v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1243 (D. Nev. 2014) (citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) mandates that when “alleging fraud . . . a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9. “To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original). “[T]he plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to why the statement or omission complained of was false or misleading” and plead “the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ that would suggest fraud.” Id. at 625-27. “The absence of even one of these identifiers justifies dismissal.” LT Int’l Ltd., 8 F. Supp. 3d at 1246 (citing Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir.2007).). “Rule 9(b) serves three purposes: (1) to provide defendants with adequate notice to allow them to defend the charge and deter plaintiffs from the filing of complaints as a pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs; (2) to protect those whose reputation would be harmed as a result of being subject to fraud charges; and (3) to prohibit plaintiffs from unilaterally imposing upon the court, the parties and society enormous social and economic costs absent Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 9 of 21 Page ID #:81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 5 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS some factual basis.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit applies Rule 9(b) pleading standards to UCL claims and false advertising claims. See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1125-27 (applying Rule 9(b) to claim for false advertising under California Business and Professions Code section 17200); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102-04 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Rule 9(b) to claim for false advertising under California Business and Professions Code section 17500). IV. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED A. Plaintiff’s Conclusory Allegations Do Not Satisfy the Plausibility Standard of Rule 8 or the Particularity Requirement of Rule 9(b) Here, the Complaint brings claims under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500 on the basis of fraudulent conduct and packaging. See Complaint. Thus, Plaintiff must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 and Rule 9(b). See LT Int’l Ltd., 8 F. Supp. 3d at 1243. The Complaint does neither. Instead, the Complaint sets forth a laundry list of regulations under which Plaintiff’s single count is brought, “regulations including but not limited to: California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, 17203, 17204, 17205, 17206, 17500, 12606(b); 17535 and 17536” (Complaint at 1); states the policy behind enacting California’s nonfunctional slack fill statutes (id. at 2.); and, without any factual support, concludes the “space in the package” he purchased constitutes nonfunctional slack fill (see id. at 3). It is well settled that a complaint requires more than such “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements” to overcome a motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. The Complaint incoherently lumps into a single count alleged violations of no less than nine different statutes, without any explanation, let alone facts demonstrating, how each such statute was Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 10 of 21 Page ID #:82 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 6 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS violated. At a minimum, Plaintiff should have pled separate claims for the purported § 17200 and § 17500 violations. The Complaint also fails to plead particularized facts necessary to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Repeatedly alleging that Pictsweet “engag[ed] in false, misleading and deceptive practices” and had “false, deceptive and misleading packaging” lacks the particularity required by Rule 9(b) (see Complaint, 2-3) because it does not allege the requisite “who, what, when, where, and how.” See Cooper, 137 F.3d at 627. B. Section 12606(b) Does Not Apply Plaintiff’s claims based on a violation of California Business and Professions Code § 12606(b) fail because § 12606 does not apply to food containers subject to Section 403(d) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 343(d), and 21 C.F.R. § 100.100. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2(a) (“Section 12606 does not apply to food containers subject to this section.”). The FDCA and 21 C.F.R. § 100.100 govern Pictsweet’s food containers for its frozen Brussels sprouts. See 21 Lam v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(A) (“The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (‘FDCA’) vests the FDA with the authority to ‘protect the public health by ensuring that ... foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled.’”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 7.1 (The Food and Drug Administration enforces the FDCA and its regulations.) 1 C. Plaintiff Fails to Properly Allege a Violation of Section 12606.2 Even if Plaintiff had correctly identified the applicable statute - § 12606.2 - 1/ Even if § 12606 applies, Plaintiff still fails to allege facts showing that Pictsweet violated the statute because, similar to the reasons articulated in Section III.C, supra, with respect to § 12606.2, the Complaint does not contain facts demonstrating that none of the fifteen enumerated reasons why slack fill is not nonfunctional - in other words, is functional - applies. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606(d). Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 11 of 21 Page ID #:83 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 7 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS the Complaint still fails to state facts establishing a violation of that statute. Section 12606.2 prohibits nonfunctional slack fill in food containers. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2. The statute states: “Slack fill in a package shall not be used as grounds to allege a violation of this section based solely on its presence unless it is nonfunctional slack fill.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2(d) . Section 12606.2(c) defines nonfunctional slack fill. “A container that does not allow the consumer to fully view its contents shall be considered to be filled as to be misleading if it contains nonfunctional slack fill.” Id., § 12606.2(c) (emphasis added.) “Slack fill is the difference between the actual capacity of a container and the volume of product contained therein.” Id. Pursuant to §12606.2(c), if any one or more of the following reasons apply to a package that is filled to substantially less than its capacity, then the empty space in the package is not considered nonfunctional and is therefore permitted: (1) Protection of the contents of the package. (2) The requirements of the machines used for enclosing the contents in the package. (3) Unavoidable product settling during shipping and handling. (4) The need for the package to perform a specific function, such as where packaging plays a role in the preparation or consumption of a food, if that function is inherent to the nature of the food and is clearly communicated to consumers. (5) The fact that the product consists of a food packaged in a reusable container where the container is part of the presentation of the food and has value that is both significant in proportion to the value of the product and independent of its function to hold the food . . . Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 12 of 21 Page ID #:84 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 8 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS (6) Inability to increase the level of fill or to further reduce the size of the package. . . . Id. The Complaint does not contain any factual allegations for the Court to reasonably infer that Pictsweet packages its Brussel sprouts with nonfunctional slack fill in violation of § 12606.2. Plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating that none of the six safe harbors enumerated in the statute for the empty space in the Brussels sprouts package applies. By definition, if any of those safe harbors applies, any alleged extra space in the package does not meet the definition of “nonfunctional slack fill” - and, instead, would be considered functional slack fill, and is therefore permissible under the statute. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2(c) . Merely stating the “presence” of “nonfunctional slack fill” is insufficient to state a claim. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2(d). Without citation, Plaintiff vaguely alludes to the first enumerated reason provided by § 12606.2(c) regarding the “[p]rotection of the contents of the package” by alleging “[t]he actual product could not in any reasonable way be considered as fragile.” Complaint at 5. However, Plaintiff does not offer factual support for this conclusion and further does not provide support for his theory that only packages with “fragile” contents are entitled to “[p]rotection of the contents of the package” under the statute. In fact, any such notion flies in the face of the plain language of the statute, which recognizes six safe harbors. Protection of contents is only one of them. Plaintiff makes no attempt to address the remaining five safe harbors. All Plaintiff alleges is that the empty space serves no benefit to the consumer. Not only is that just another conclusory allegation, but it also fails to specifically address the six safe harbors included in the definition of “nonfunctional slack fill.” Without sufficient factual allegations that each of those does not apply, Plaintiff does not state a claim that the alleged extra space in Steam’ables® Brussels Sprouts is nonfunctional slack fill. To the extent that Plaintiff’s nonfunctional slack fill claim is brought pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 100.100, rather than Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2, Plaintiff’s Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 13 of 21 Page ID #:85 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 9 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS claim still fails for the same reasons. Section 100.100 defines nonfunctional slack fill the same way. See 21 C.F.R. § 100.100. D. Plaintiff Fails To State A Claim Under The UCL “The UCL prohibits ‘unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s]’ and ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1125 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). A claim for violation of the UCL “stand[s] or fall[s] depending on the fate of antecedent substantive causes of action.” Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 178, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (2001), as modified (May 22, 2001). A plaintiff cannot “plead around an absolute bar to relief simply by recasting the cause of action as one for unfair competition.” Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F. 3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000). A cause of action under the UCL cannot be maintained if the conduct complained of is permitted by another provision. See id. 1. The Complaint Does Not State A Claim Under Section 17200 “Section 17200 is part of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17209, and provides, in relevant part, that ‘unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” Id. a. The Complaint Does Not Adequately Allege “Unlawful” Conduct The “unlawful” category of the UCL “borrows violations of other laws . . . and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL.” Lazar v. Hertz, Corp., 69 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1505 (1999). To state a claim under the “unlawful” prong, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege the violation of some other law. See Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1554 (2007). Plaintiff fails to plead any facts in support of a claim under the UCL’s “unlawful” prong for the simple reason he fails to establish Pictsweet’s packaging violated any statute. Section 12606 does not apply. Section 12606.2 and 21 C.F.R. § 100.100 expressly provide that slack fill is permissible under certain Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 14 of 21 Page ID #:86 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 10 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS circumstances. If any of the six enumerated safe harbors applies to the food container, the empty space in the container is considered functional and is therefore lawful. As discussed above, Plaintiff does not allege facts establishing that none of the safe harbors applies. If the conduct is permissible, it does not violate a statute and, therefore, cannot violate the UCL. See Chabner, 225 F. 3d at 1048. As a result, his UCL “unlawful” claim fails. See Krantz, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 178 (a claim for violation of the UCL “stand[s] or fall[s] depending on the fate of antecedent substantive causes of action.”). b. The Complaint Does Not Adequately Allege “Unfair” Conduct “Unfair” conduct under § 17200 has been defined as conduct that “offends an established public policy or . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 4th 917, 939 (2003). “In determining whether the challenged conduct is unfair within the meaning of the unfair competition law, courts may not apply purely subjective notions of fairness.” Id. at 941. (internal quotation omitted). Rather, a plaintiff’s claim under the UCL, if based on some public policy, “must be ‘tethered’ to a specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision” to find an objective basis for determining whether the alleged conduct is unfair. Id. at 940 (citing Cel- Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999).). Plaintiff does not plead any facts establishing unfair conduct in violation of the UCL. Plaintiff does not establish - with factual allegations - that Pictsweet committed a tort, violated a statute, offended an established public policy, acted in an immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous manner substantially injurious to consumers, or violated some other recognized legal duty. Plaintiff’s citation to the purpose behind the enactment of California’s slack fill statutes (see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12601), coupled merely with vague and conclusory allegations of wrongdoing are insufficient to state a claim against Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 15 of 21 Page ID #:87 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 11 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Pictsweet. See Complaint at 2. As explained above, the Complaint does not establish that Pictsweet’s Brussels sprouts package contained nonfunctional slack fill as defined by § 12606.2(c) or 21 C.F.R. § 100.100. c. The Complaint Does Not Adequately Allege “Fraudulent” Conduct The “fraudulent” prong requires a plaintiff “to show deception to some members of the public, or harm to the public interest. . . .” Watson Labs., Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2001). There is “an actual reliance requirement” under which a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s actions were an “immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct.” In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326 (2009). Pursuant to Rule 9(b), when “alleging fraud . . . a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9. The Complaint alleges Pictsweet “knowingly distributed to the general public, products it knew were made and packaged in violation of California laws against non-functional slack fill” and “[o]n information and belief . . . were . . . well aware of the non-functional slack fill in the products listed herein and turn [sic] a blind- eye to the non-functional slack-fill in each product. . . .” Complaint at 2-3. Pictsweet’s packaging is repeatedly referred to as “false, misleading and deceptive” throughout the Complaint. See Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim sounds in fraud and must therefore meet the heightened pleading requirements under Rule 9(b). See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1127. Plaintiff does not plead fraud with the specificity required by law. The Complaint alleges “to facilitate the false, misleading and deceptive nature of the packaging of the product, defendants intentionally obscured the space above a small window that showed the product, so that plaintiff and other consumers could not see the empty space in the package, which empty space serves no benefit to the product or the ultimate consumer, including plaintiff.” Complaint at 3-4. At best, Plaintiff Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 16 of 21 Page ID #:88 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 12 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS merely pleads the existence of “empty space” in the Brussels sprouts package. Merely pleading the existence of “empty space” in the package does not mean the slack fill is nonfunctional. Plaintiff has to plead more - that is, facts establishing that none of the safe harbors applies so that the empty space meets the definition of nonfunctional slack fill under § 12606.2(c). As explained above, Plaintiff does not satisfy this requirement. Functional slack fill is not, by itself, deceptive under § 12606.2(c). Under § 12606.2(d), the mere presence of slack fill in a package cannot be used as grounds to assert a violation of the statute - the purpose of which is to avoid misleading packaging - unless the slack fill is in fact nonfunctional. Thus, by itself functional slack fill cannot be considered misleading or fraudulent under the UCL. Here, the sole basis for Plaintiff’s lawsuit is his factually unsupported conclusion that the empty space in the package constituted nonfunctional slack fill. This prong of Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails. 2. The Complaint Does Not State A Claim Under Section 17500 The UCL prohibits “untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Section 17500 forbids the dissemination of advertising which is “untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500; see also Werbel ex rel. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. C 09-04456 SBA, 2010 WL 2673860, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2010) (false advertising law “makes it unlawful to make or disseminate any statement concerning property or services that is ‘untrue or misleading’”). False advertising under § 17500 “requires proof that defendant knew its advertising was false.” Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004). “A reasonable consumer standard applies to a false advertising claim Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 17 of 21 Page ID #:89 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 13 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS under the UCL.” Id. at 1131 (citing Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir.1995).). “In order to state a claim under the. . . [False Advertising Law], [the plaintiff] must allege that the [product’s] labels are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.” Id. at 1103. The Ninth Circuit applies Rule 9(b) pleading standards to Unfair Competition Law claims and false advertising claims. See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1125-27 (applying Rule 9(b) to claim for false advertising under California Business and Professions Code section 17200); see also Vess, 317 F.3d at 1102-04 (applying Rule 9(b) to claim for false advertising under California Business and Professions Code § 17500). Plaintiff fails to state a claim for false advertising pursuant to § 17500. Without factual support, the Complaint repeatedly alleges the slack fill complained of constitutes “acts of unfair competition, and misleading advertising” and packaging “advertised in manners that are violative of laws.” See Complaint 4-6. Again, these bare allegations are insufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pleading standards for UCL fraud and false advertising claims. Plaintiff fails to identify any statement contained on the package he claims is false or misleading. He does not (and cannot) allege that the stated quantity of product - 10 ounces - was misstated or deceptive. Unless and until Plaintiff can establish - with facts - that the empty space meets all the requirements of nonfunctional slack fill as defined by § 12606.2(c), his allegation that the package had a window that was obscured is immaterial. Section 12606.2 does not require a window if the slack fill is functional. Therefore, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the UCL. E. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Preempted Insofar As He Seeks to Impose Greater Requirements Than 21 C.F.R. § 100.100 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose different or additional obligations on Pictsweet based on state law rather than the FDCA, such claims are preempted Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 18 of 21 Page ID #:90 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 14 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS under the FDCA’s express preemption provision, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1. See Lam v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 “expressly preempts state laws addressing certain subjects that are ‘not identical to’ various standards set forth by the FDA” and “[u]nder FDA regulations, the term ‘not identical to ... means that the State requirement directly or indirectly imposes obligations or contains provisions concerning the composition of labeling’ that are ‘not imposed or contained in the applicable provision[s].’” Lam, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 100.1(c)(4)). Indeed, the California legislature acknowledged FDCA preemption when it enacted its slack fill law. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2(f). Section 12606.2(f) states: If the requirements of this section do not impose the same requirements as are imposed by Section 403(d) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. Sec. 343(d)), or any regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, then this section is not operative to the extent that it is not identical to the federal requirements, and for this purpose those federal requirements are incorporated into this section and shall apply as if they were set forth in this section. Here, Plaintiff seeks to impose restrictions greater than those imposed by 21 C.F.R. § 100.100. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Pictsweet’s package should have had a window that provided him a full view of the contents. See Complaint at 2-3. But Plaintiff cannot make that contention without first alleging facts establishing that Pictsweet was in fact required by the federal regulation to include a window on its package for the purpose of viewing its contents. Section 100.100 does not require a window if the slack fill is functional. Only if the slack fill is nonfunctional as defined by § 100.100 - which Plaintiff has not factually established for the reasons stated above, is there a window requirement. By seeking to impose a window requirement without first alleging facts establishing there was any such Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 19 of 21 Page ID #:91 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 15 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS requirement, Plaintiff seeks to impose a greater restriction than federal law imposes. His claim is thus preempted. Accord Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., No. C-12- 02554-RMW, 2013 WL 685372, at *8-*11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (finding slack fill claims were not preempted by the FDCA “[b]ecause plaintiff does not ask the court to require anything different than the FDCA requirements, specifically 21 C.F.R. § 100.100”) (citing Lam, 859 F.Supp.2d at 1102-03 (“finding express preemption where the defendant’s uses of the terms ‘fruit flavored’ and ‘naturally flavored’ on fruit snacks were in compliance with FDA regulations”). See also Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1118-23 (N.D.Cal.2010) (“finding express preemption where the defendant’s uses of the terms ‘cholesterol free’ and ‘0g Trans Fat’ were in compliance with FDA regulations”); Peviani v. Hostess Brands, Inc., 750 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1119-20 (C.D.Cal.2010) (“finding express preemption where plaintiff’s state law claims imposed an obligation for trans fat disclosure that was not required by federal law”); Red v. The Kroger Co., No. 10-1025, 2010 WL 4262037, at *4-7 (C.D. Cal Sept. 2, 2010) (“finding express preemption where defendant’s products were FDA regulations-compliant”). Plaintiff’s claim also is prohibited by § 12606.2(f). V. LEAVE TO AMEND WOULD BE FUTILE Leave to amend should be denied because it would be futile. A court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if amendment would be futile. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007). “Where a district court dismisses a claim, leave to amend generally should be granted unless amendment would be futile or when it is sought in bad faith.” Werbel ex rel, No. C 09-04456 SBA, 2010 WL 2673860, at *5 (finding leave to amend not warranted on both grounds) (citing Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir.2010).). Here, leave to amend is futile because Plaintiff cannot in good faith allege facts establishing that the food preparation safe harbor under § 12606.2(c)(4) does Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 20 of 21 Page ID #:92 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U I T E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 - 2 3 8 6 16 MEMO OF P’S & A’S IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS not apply. Pictsweet’s Steam’ables® Brussels sprouts package clearly demonstrates that the package is intended to be used to prepare the sprouts for eating. Indeed, the front of the package says, “Steams in the bag in minutes,” and contains a diagram showing the entire package inside a microwave oven. See Doc. 5, Declaration of Kevin Schwab in Support of Removal, Exhibit A. 2/ The back of the package contains detailed directions how to cook the sprouts in the bag, unopened, using a microwave oven. Id. Plaintiff cannot allege in good faith, in compliance with FRCP 11, that the Pictsweet Brussels sprouts package he purchased was not intended to be used to prepare the food. Leave to amend should be denied. VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Pictsweet respectfully requests the Court to grant the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. Dated: August 12, 2016 BRYAN CAVE LLP Robert E. Boone III Nancy Franco By: /s/ Robert E. Boone III Robert E. Boone III Attorneys for Defendant The Pictsweet Company 2/ The Court may consider Pictsweet’s packaging in deciding this Motion because it is referenced in the Complaint. See, e.g., Haskell v. Time, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1392, 1396-98 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (court considered alleged false advertisements referenced in complaint but not attached to it on 12(b)(6) motion); see also Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). Even if the Court could not consider Pictsweet’s packaging in deciding whether the current allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim, the Court can still consider the packaging in determining whether leave to amend would be futile because that determination does not involve adjudicating the sufficiency of the allegations of the current pleading. See Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“A court may consider factual allegations outside of the complaint in determining whether to grant leave to amend.”). Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12 Filed 08/12/16 Page 21 of 21 Page ID #:93 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158075.1 [PROPOSED] ORDER BRYAN CAVE LLP Robert E. Boone III (California Bar No. 132780) reboone@bryancave.com Nancy Franco (California Bar No. 294856) nancy.franco@bryancave.com 120 Broadway, Suite 300 Santa Monica, CA 90401-2386 Telephone: (310) 576-2100 Facsimile: (310) 576-2200 Attorneys for Defendant THE PICTSWEET COMPANY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DAVID GREENSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. THE PICTSWEET COMPANY, and DOES 1-5 inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 2:16-cv-05839-JFW (MRWx) Assigned To Hon. John F. Walter [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT THE PICTSWEET COMPANY’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT [Filed Concurrently With Notice of Motion To Dismiss and Motion To Dismiss] Date: September 12, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. Place: Courtroom 16 Complaint Filed: June 21, 2016 Complaint Served: July 7, 2016 Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12-1 Filed 08/12/16 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:94 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158075.1 [PROPOSED] ORDER The Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant The Pictsweet Company came for hearing before this Court on September 12, 2016, at 1:30 p.m., the Honorable John F. Walter presiding. Appearances were as stated on the record. Having read and considered the Motion to Dismiss and all pleadings and papers submitted by the parties in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and having heard and considered the argument of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The Motion to Dismiss is granted in its entirety without leave to amend on the following grounds: (i) the Complaint of Plaintiff David Greenstein (“Plaintiff”) fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for violation of California Business and Professions Code § 12606.2 or 21 C.F.R. § 100.100; (ii) California Business and Professions Code § 12606 does not apply to Pictsweet’s food container at issue; (iii) the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) on the basis of either “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.) or “untrue or misleading advertising” (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.); (iv) the Complaint does not satisfy the plausibility standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”); (v) the Complaint fails to satisfy the particularity requirement of FRCP 9(b); (vi) Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 and 21 C.F.R. §100.100; and (vii) dismissal should be with prejudice and without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12-1 Filed 08/12/16 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:95 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B R Y A N C A V E L L P 1 2 0 B R O A D W A Y , S U IT E 3 0 0 S A N T A M O N I C A , C A 9 0 4 0 1 -2 3 8 6 SM01DOCS\1158075.1 [PROPOSED] ORDER 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: ______________ Honorable John F. Walter United States District Judge Case 2:16-cv-05839-JFW-MRW Document 12-1 Filed 08/12/16 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:96