Cruz et al v. Robins & Morton, Llc

MOTION to dismiss for failure to state a claim

M.D. Fla.April 26, 2017

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION ALEXIS CRUZ, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. ROBINS & MORTON, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 8:17-cv-00799- JDW-TBM DEFENDANT ROBINS & MORTON’S MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant Robins & Morton (“Defendant”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully requests an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The grounds for this motion are set forth below. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs filed this action in the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, on or about March 6, 2016. On April 4, 2017, this case was removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs’ six- count Complaint purports to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (“Section 1981”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Action of 1992, as amended (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. Section 760.01 et seq. Other than a formulaic recitation of the legal elements for each claim, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is completely devoid of any factual details that would put Defendant on notice Case 8:17-cv-00799-JDW-TBM Document 10 Filed 04/26/17 Page 1 of 7 PageID 73 2 as to the nature of Plaintiffs’ purported claims or that would allow this Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. As such, Plaintiffs’ claims are far too cursory to withstand a motion to dismiss. MEMORANDUM OF LAW I. Legal Standard Pursuant to Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the pleading standard under Rule 8(a). Notably, the Twombly Court expressly overruled the frequently-quoted language from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) providing “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief” and adopted a “plausibility” standard. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-63. Although a detailed recitation of facts is not necessary, the complaint must give fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds for that claim. See id. at 555. Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a pleading that does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must set forth factual content from which this Court may draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] Case 8:17-cv-00799-JDW-TBM Document 10 Filed 04/26/17 Page 2 of 7 PageID 74 3 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”). Although complaints drafted by pro se litigants “are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by an attorney,” a pro se complaint nevertheless “must provide sufficient notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that a ‘largely groundless claim’ does not proceed through discovery and ‘take up the time of a number of other people.’” Rajasekhar v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 4:14cv149- MW/CAS, 2014 WL 6804482, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2014) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). In considering a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and evaluate all inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). Although this Court must accept all facts as alleged, the same is not true of bald assertions, subjective characterizations, or legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (reversing denial of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon finding that, after conclusory allegations were disregarded, the remaining allegations failed to plausibly establish a claim of discrimination). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. II. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Is Devoid Of Any Factual Allegations And Does Not State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted. Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains a rendition of the dates of employment for each Plaintiff, their respective job titles, two conclusory statements that all of the Plaintiffs were subjected to disparate treatment and retaliation, and finally, a recitation of the legal Case 8:17-cv-00799-JDW-TBM Document 10 Filed 04/26/17 Page 3 of 7 PageID 75 4 elements for each of the counts set forth therein. This does not come close to meeting the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, especially in light of the fact that the Complaint is on behalf of six different Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes no effort to make any individualized factual assertions to support the claims of any of the six Plaintiffs. Instead, Plaintiffs’ allegations of disparate treatment and retaliation are nothing more than a bald legal conclusion with no supporting facts. For instance, the “Facts” section of Plaintiffs’ Complaint simply alleges that Plaintiffs were “subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of their race and national origin” and after complaining about Defendant’s alleged discrimination “Defendant retaliated against Plaintiffs by terminating their employment.” [D.E. 2, p. 4]. Rather than allege any plausible facts that could potentially support an inference that Defendant discriminated or retaliated against each Plaintiff, Plaintiffs merely state the legal conclusion that Defendant did. As such, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not meet the plausibility standard with respect to any of the causes of action being asserted on behalf of any of the six Plaintiffs. Moreover, the lack of any factual support for the multiple claims being asserted by six different Plaintiffs is particularly egregious here because Plaintiffs’ bare-bones Complaint makes it impossible for this Court or Defendant to determine whether Plaintiffs are properly joined as parties in this matter. Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines who may be permissively joined as Plaintiffs. Joinder of Plaintiffs is appropriate only if: Case 8:17-cv-00799-JDW-TBM Document 10 Filed 04/26/17 Page 4 of 7 PageID 76 5 (A) they any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action. See F.R.C.P. 20(a)(1)(A) and (B). Here, based on the four corners of the Complaint, it is impossible for this Court or Defendant to determine whether some or all of the Plaintiffs were properly joined in this case.1 Plaintiffs’ Complaint must address this issue with respect to each Plaintiff and further remedy the litany of other deficiencies mentioned above before the Complaint can withstand a motion to dismiss. In short, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that could plausibly support any of the claims being asserted by all six Plaintiffs. As a result, the Complaint does not “provide sufficient notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they rests.” Rajasekhar, 2014 WL 6804482, at *2. Based on the foregoing, this Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. III. CONCLUSION As demonstrated above, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not state a facially plausible claim for relief whatsoever. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests entry of an 1 Rule 21, regarding misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, provides that “on motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against any party.” Case 8:17-cv-00799-JDW-TBM Document 10 Filed 04/26/17 Page 5 of 7 PageID 77 6 order dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dated this 26th day of April, 2017. Respectfully submitted, LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 111 North Magnolia Avenue Suite 1250 Orlando, FL 32801 Phone: 407.393.2944 Fax: 407.641.9234 /s/ Gregory R. Schmitz Gregory R. Schmitz, Esq. Florida Bar No.: 0094694 Primary Email: gschmitz@littler.com Secondary Email: vking@littler.com ssarber@littler.com Jay St. Clair, Esq. (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) (AL Bar No. 4989-C64J) Primary Email: jstclair@littler.com Secondary Email: smathews@littler.com LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C Wachovia Tower 420 Twentieth Street North Suite 2730 Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: 205.421.4700 Facsimile: 205.421.4699 Attorneys for Defendant Robins & Morton Case 8:17-cv-00799-JDW-TBM Document 10 Filed 04/26/17 Page 6 of 7 PageID 78 7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 26, 2017 I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the E-File system and a correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by the court via electronic mail to: Brandon J. Hill Wenzel Fenton Cabassa, P.A. 1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300 Tampa, FL 33602 Phone: 813-224-0431 Facsimile: 813-229-8712 Email: bhill@wfclaw.com Email: mk@wfclaw.com and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-participants. None. s/Gregory Schmitz Gregory R.Schmitz, Esq. Case 8:17-cv-00799-JDW-TBM Document 10 Filed 04/26/17 Page 7 of 7 PageID 79