Coleman v. District of Columbia

MOTION to Dismiss

D.D.C.October 18, 2013

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Benjamin Coleman, through his ) Conservator Robert Bunn, Esq., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-01457 ) Assigned: Judge Emmet Sullivan ) The District of Columbia, ) ) ) Defendant. ) ) ____________________________________) THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Defendant, the District of Columbia (“District”), by its undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), moves the Court to dismiss this complaint because the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter as Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the principle of comity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and res judicata. Alternatively, the District submits that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff can prove no set of facts to establish an unlawful taking of his property under any constitutional theory. WHEREFORE, the District of Columbia prays that this Court grant its motion and dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, the District requests this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice because he cannot prove any set of facts to establish a Fifth Amendment taking has occurred. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 1 of 49 2 Dated: October 18, 2013 Respectfully submitted, IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia SUSAN LONGSTREET Deputy Attorney General, Commercial Division /s/ WILLIAM D. BURK, D.C. Bar # 464349 Section Chief, Land Acquisition and Bankruptcy Section /s/ EDWARD P. HENNEBERRY, D.C. Bar # 456202 Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 1010 S Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 442-9773 (202) 741-0648 (fax) Email: Edward.Henneberry@dc.gov Counsel for the District of Columbia /s/ ANDREW C. EBERLE, D.C. Bar # 1011542 Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 1010 S Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 442-9779 (202) 741-8571 (fax) Email: Andrew.Eberle@dc.gov Counsel for the District of Columbia Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 2 of 49 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 18, 2013, a copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Authorities in Support of the Motion to Dismiss was served on the following counsel of record via electronic case filing: William A. Isaacson (D.C. Bar #323014) Boise, Schiller & Flexner, LLP 5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20015 Counsel for Plaintiff /s/ Edward P. Henneberry CERTIFICATE OF DUTY TO CONFER; LOCAL RULE 7(m) Counsel for the District of Columbia hereby certifies that he has no duty to confer with opposing counsel under Local Rule 7(m) because the District is filing a dispositive motion. /s/ Edward P. Henneberry SERVICE OF PROPOSED ORDER; LOCAL RULE 7(c) I hereby certify that on October 18, 2013, a copy of a Proposed Order was served on Judge Emmet Sullivan via electronic case filing. /s/ Edward P. Henneberry Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 3 of 49 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Benjamin Coleman, through his ) Conservator Robert Bunn, Esq., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-01457 ) Assigned: Judge Emmet Sullivan ) The District of Columbia, ) ) ) Defendant. ) ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM I. INTRODUCTION If the allegations in Benjamin Coleman Jr.’s (“Mr. Coleman”) complaint are true, the loss of his home is an unfortunate occurrence that should not have happened. However, Mr. Coleman’s conservator and counsel have not attempted to remedy his injury through the D.C. Superior Court procedures available to them. Instead, Mr. Coleman has filed this complaint, in a court without subject-matter jurisdiction, with claims that are barred by comity, the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, and res judicata. 1 Further, Mr. Coleman’s claims are without merit even if they could be brought in this Court. Mr. Coleman’s complaint challenging the constitutionality 1 Mr. Coleman’s Complaint consists of three counts which all involve the alleged wrongful foreclosure and taking of his property: (1) Count I—a Section 1983 Claim for Damages for Violations of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (2) Count II—Claim for Just Compensation Under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and (3) Count III—Declaratory Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. See Compl. at ¶¶ 70-90. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 4 of 49 2 of the District’s tax sale statute should be dismissed to allow Mr. Coleman to file a motion to vacate the default judgment in D.C. Superior Court. As a general principle, the “orderly administration of justice and comity between courts are served by requiring the applicant to seek relief in the court that rendered the judgment.” Threatt v. Winston, 907 A.2d 780, 784 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments, ch. 5, intro. Note, cmt. a (1982)). Mr. Coleman’s complaint alleges that he was non compos mentis at the time the D.C. Superior Court foreclosed his right of redemption in Case No. 2008 CA 1572 L(RP), Embassy Tax Services, LLC, v. Coleman, Jr., Bennie Raymond (the “Tax Sale Suit). 2 Complaint at ¶ 62. The D.C. Superior Court granted a motion for default judgment on June 15, 2010 (“2010 Foreclosure Judgment”). Exhibit A 3 , page 4. D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) provides that “no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or incompetent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other such representative who has appeared therein.” If Mr. Coleman was incompetent at the time of judgment, the judgment is voidable. Mitchell v. Gales, 61 A.3d 678, 685 (D.C. 2013). “[T]he merits of voidable judgments ‘can be corrected only by a direct review and not by bringing another action upon the same cause.’” Id. (citing Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 325 (1927)). Mr. Coleman’s conservator and counsel must seek to vacate the judgment in the Tax Sale Suit; they cannot attack it by filing a new lawsuit in federal court. A motion to vacate a default judgment and set aside a tax deed due to the property owner’s incompetence is not foreign to the D.C. Superior Court and its tax sale calendar. See 2 If Mr. Coleman was competent at the time of the judgment foreclosing his right of redemption, his claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. D.C. Code § 12-302. Whether Mr. Coleman’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations is not at issue for the purposes of this motion to dismiss. 3 The exhibits attached to this motion are all “public records subject to judicial notice on a motion to dismiss.” Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 5 of 49 3 Exhibit B, Capitol Tax Servs. v. Blackburn, 2007 CA 1291 L(RP) (D.C. Superior Court, September 16, 2009) (“Indeed, if it is shown that Ms. Blackburn lacked mental capacity to participate in the case affecting her property rights, sound public policy and justice, as well, requires vacatur of the default judgment.”). In Blackburn, the court granted default judgment on November, 27, 2007, and a tax deed was issued on March 17, 2008. On August 15, 2008, Ms. Blackburn filed a motion to vacate the default judgment and set aside the tax deed based on her alleged incompetence at the time of judgment. On May 26, 2009, the court issued an order holding in abeyance the motion to vacate, until a hearing could be held on Ms. Blackburn’s competence. Capitol Tax Servs. v. Blackburn, 2009 D.C. Super. LEXIS 7 (D.C. Superior Court, May 26, 2009). The case was subsequently settled and the property was returned to Ms. Blackburn’s conservator. Exhibit C. There is nothing preventing Mr. Coleman’s conservator or counsel from seeking to vacate the default judgment against Mr. Coleman pursuant to D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Although Mr. Coleman’s property has been conveyed to a third party, the deed indicates that the title is insured. Exhibit D. Mr. Coleman’s theory that a loss of equity due to a tax sale can constitute a Fifth Amendment taking has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. If the tax sale does not constitute a taking, Mr. Coleman’s § 1983 damages claim, his claim for just compensation, and his claim for declaratory relief are not valid claims. Even if the tax sale constituted a taking, Mr. Coleman cannot bring his claims in a federal court. Mr. Coleman’s claims are barred from federal court because they constitute a challenge to the validity of District’s tax system. Additionally, even if Mr. Coleman had a valid claim for just compensation, Mr. Coleman could not bring Count II in federal court because he has not sought and been denied just compensation in the D.C. Superior Court. All of Mr. Coleman’s claims are barred by the Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 6 of 49 4 Rooker-Feldman doctrine because all of his claims challenge the validity of the D.C. Superior Court’s 2010 Foreclosure Judgment. Finally, all of Mr. Coleman’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Under D.C. law, a subsequent action is barred by res judicata if claims which could have been raised have been adjudicated finally against the same party. In this case, all of Mr. Coleman’s claims could have been raised in the Tax Sale Suit and were adjudicated finally by the 2010 Foreclosure Judgment. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore it is presumed that “a cause lies outside of the [the court’s] limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Because subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the court’s power to hear a plaintiff’s claim, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “. . . imposes on a court an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority.” Thomas Nelson Ha v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 680 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001)). A court may “consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). “At the motion to dismiss stage, counseled complaints, as well as pro se complaints, are to be construed with sufficient liberality to afford all possible inferences favorable to the pleader on allegations of fact.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). It remains plaintiff’s burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Am. Farm Bureau v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000). “Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 7 of 49 5 reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), [a] plaintiff[’s] factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal citations omitted). B. Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979). But, the Court “need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must the court accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Factual allegations, even though assumed to be true, must still “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 545. “A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Simply alleging facts “‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 8 of 49 6 III. Federal Courts Lack Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Address Challenges to the Distict’s Tax Sale Statute A. Count I (§ 1983 Damages) and Count III (Declaratory Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201) are Barred by the Principle of Comity. The Federal Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (FTIA), the District of Columbia Tax Injunction Act, D.C. Code § 47–3307 (“DCTIA”), and by extension the related principle of comity, bar § 1983 damages claims and declaratory relief requests in federal court when they stem from challenges to the validity of the District’s tax sale statute. The Supreme Court has held that “. . . taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court.” Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116, 102 (1981). The Supreme Court also noted that federal courts “may not even render declaratory judgments as to the constitutionality of state tax laws.” Id. at 103 (citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 (1943)). Mr. Coleman’s claims fall within this prohibition and he has a state remedy which is plain, adequate, and complete. The Supreme Court has explained that “a state remedy must ‘provid[e] the taxpayer with a “full hearing and judicial determination” at which she may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax.’” Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 (1981). The D.C. Superior Court provides a full hearing in tax sale cases, in which all constitutional objections can be raised as defenses or cross claims against the District. Mr. Coleman could have raised Fifth Amendment takings claims in the Tax Sale Suit. The FTIA states that: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 9 of 49 7 assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The DCTIA likewise provides that: “No suit shall be filed to enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of Columbia or any of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax.” D.C. Code § 47–3307. This Court, in applying the FTIA, DCTIA, and principle of comity has held that there is no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to the District’s tax sale statute. Dist. Lock & Hardware, Inc. v. D.C., 808 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2011); Miller v. D.C., 2007 WL 1748890 (D.D.C. June 18, 2007). The court acknowledged in Dist. Lock & Hardware, Inc., that “[t]he D.C. Circuit has not yet addressed whether the FTIA, let alone the related principle of comity, bars federal court challenges to District of Columbia taxes in the same manner that it bars federal court challenges to state taxes.” 808 F. Supp 2d at 39. However, the court noted that “comity at a minimum bars damages actions that would otherwise be barred by the FTIA itself[,]” and that the principle of comity bars challenges to District of Columbia taxes in federal court because “the D.C. Circuit has generally ‘treated the District of Columbia courts as state courts’ pursuant to the very same principle of comity in the Younger abstention context.” Id. at 40 (citing JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Comity bars a challenge to the District’s tax sale statute because “a tax sale . . . ‘is a mode of tax collection’” and the FTIA bars challenges to the “collection” of taxes. Id. at 41 (quoting Wright v. Pappas, 256 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, “a challenge to the process of tax collection will always ‘raise the specter of federal courts reducing the flow of money into state coffers.’” Id. (quoting Luessenhop v. Clinton Cnty., New York, 466 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 2006)). Mr. Coleman’s claims raise the same specter. An injunction against the District’s tax sale statute would stop the District from collecting the taxes Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 10 of 49 8 that are raised by the tax sale. The vast majority of courts have determined that challenges to state tax sales statutes are barred in federal court by principles of comity and the FTIA. Wright v. Pappas, 256 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A lien sale is a mode of tax collection; and so an action to enjoin it, or declare it illegal, or rescind it, or perhaps even just obtain damages on the ground of its illegality, would be barred by the Act or, in the case of the damages suit, by the free-standing principle of comity.”); Dixon v. Oisten, 2002 WL 31008840 at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“[T]he language of the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity bar plaintiff's lawsuit involving the tax sale of his properties and his attempts to regain them.”), aff’d, 62 Fed. Appx. 105 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The district court also properly noted that Dixon’s challenge to the tax foreclosure on his real property was barred by the Tax Injunction Act.”); Schulz v. Williamson, No. 1:04-cv-1375 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2004) (Kahn, J.), aff’d, 145 Fed. Appx. 704 (2d Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Boyce, 153 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1996 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (TIA bars challenge to state tax liens); but cf. Luessenhop v. Clinton Cnty., New York, 466 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit in Luessenhop concluded that the FTIA does not bar a suit “challeng[ing] the adequacy of the notice provided” in a tax sale. 466 F.3d at 264. However, this court in Dist. Lock & Hardware, Inc. persuasively explained the problems with the Luessenhop court’s reasoning on the FTIA: The decision in Luessenhop neglects the text of the FTIA; moreover, a challenge to the process of tax collection will always raise the specter of federal courts reducing the flow of money into state coffers. The FTIA plainly bars challenges to state tax “collection,” and Luessenhop never addresses why a challenge to the adequacy of notice in a tax sale is not a challenge to “collection.” Rather, the Second Circuit merely relies on the Congressional purpose of the FTIA. Moreover, even granting Luessenhop its premise that jurisdiction hinges on whether an action seeks to empty state coffers, a damages action plainly seeks money from state coffers. Although Luessenhop makes much of the fact that Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 11 of 49 9 plaintiffs there did not “dispute the assessments or amounts owed,” those plaintiffs still sought damages that effectively would offset the taxes recovered. Dist. Lock & Hardware, Inc. v. D.C., 808 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Mr. Coleman’s suit challenges the District’s collection of taxes. Accordingly, this Court should find his claims barred by comity, the FTIA, and the DCTIA. B. Mr. Coleman’s Count II Claim for Just Compensation is Not Ripe. Count II of Mr. Coleman’s complaint asserts a claim for just compensation. Complaint at ¶ 81. Mr. Coleman cannot bring such a claim because it is premature. In Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, the Supreme Court held that “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.” 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). In Williamson, the property owner could have brought an inverse condemnation action for just compensation under Tennessee law. Id. at 196. The Court explained that because the property owner “has not shown that the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature.” Id. 196-197. Landowners can bring an inverse condemnation action in the District of Columbia. Potomac Dev. Corp. v. D.C., 28 A.3d 531, 550 (D.C. 2011) (explaining that in the District of Columbia, “inverse condemnation cases applied Fifth Amendment principles in deciding whether a taking has occurred and what compensation is just.”). As Mr. Coleman has not pursued an inverse condemnation claim in state court and had his just compensation claim denied, Court II of his complaint is premature and must be dismissed. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 12 of 49 10 IV. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Res Judicata Bar Mr. Coleman’s Claims A. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Mr. Coleman’s Claims Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. In bringing this federal action, Mr. Coleman asks this Court to review a judicial decision of the D.C. Superior Court, and to adjudicate claims that are a direct result of the 2010 Foreclosure Judgment. Mr. Coleman’s complaint falls squarely within the ambit of the Rooker- Feldman doctrine because it is the “functional equivalent of an appeal” from the 2010 Foreclosure Judgment. See Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1980). “‘The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court’ because they are without jurisdiction to do so.” Magritz v. Ozaukee Cnty., 894 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”). “[E]ven a constitutional claim pled as a general attack may be so ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court decision that ‘the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.’” Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16). The doctrine stems in part from the recognition that “a decision by a state court, however erroneous, is not itself a violation of the Constitution actionable in federal court.” Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 13 of 49 11 1995). “In assessing the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in a particular case, ‘the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.’” Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996)). In Long, the Seventh Circuit explained that the “pivotal inquiry is whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Id. (citing Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996)). Federal courts have specifically addressed Fifth Amendment takings claims in the context of tax sale statutes, as alleged by Mr. Coleman, and found them to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Magritz v. Ozaukee Cnty., the plaintiff challenged a judgment of foreclosure on his land for his failure to pay real property taxes. 894 F. Supp. 2d 34, 35 (D.D.C. 2012). The plaintiff in Magritz, as in the instant matter, alleged that his “property was taken for ‘public use without just compensation[.]’” Id. at 39. This Court held that the claim was “barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because it challenges the validity of the 2001 Judgment of Foreclosure.” Id. Mr. Coleman’s claims that his property was taken without just compensation are the same type of challenge to the validity of the D.C. Superior Court’s 2010 Foreclosure Judgment against his property. When faced with challenges to tax sale judgments, federal courts of appeals have held that such challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2012); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1993). In Campbell, the property owner tried to challenge a tax sale statute by alleging that the tax Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 14 of 49 12 foreclosure constituted a Fifth Amendment taking by depriving her of her property without due process or just compensation. 682 F.3d 1278 at 1284. The Tenth Circuit explained that this claim was barred by Rooker-Feldman because “the deprivation of property that was allegedly without just compensation or due process was the deprivation ordered by the state court. Thus, this claim has merit only if the state-court forfeiture order was unlawful on the record before that court.” Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2012). Ritter v. Ross addressed the same constitutional claims brought by Mr. Coleman. 992 F.2d at 753. In Ritter, plaintiffs, having lost their property to a tax lien foreclosure judgment, alleged that the county government violated § 1983 by taking property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. The Seventh Circuit explained that their complaint was seeking to have a federal district court provide appellate review of a state judicial proceeding because “but for the tax lien foreclosure judgment in Rock County Circuit Court they would have no complaint; they would still have their land and would have suffered no injury.” Id. at 754. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims were “inextricably intertwined with the merits of that proceeding” and barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 755. The only cases where federal courts have declined to find that challenges to tax sale statutes are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are cases where the property owner had an independent claim, which could not have been raised in the state court proceeding. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 331 B.R. 107, 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a “claim asserted under the Bankruptcy Code is completely independent from the issues in the forfeiture proceeding and could not have been asserted until debtor filed for bankruptcy protection.”). Unlike claims in bankruptcy court, Mr. Coleman’s claims here are not independent from the issues in the Tax Sale Suit. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 15 of 49 13 In the instant matter, Mr. Coleman’s claims can only succeed if this Court determines that the D.C. Superior Court’s 2010 Foreclosure Judgment was unlawful. As alleged in the Complaint, all of Mr. Coleman’s injuries derive directly from the 2010 Foreclosure Judgment. There is no doubt that but for the entry of final judgment in the Tax Sale Suit, Mr. Coleman would have no grievance. Plaintiff would still own and be in possession of his former property. The Court should reject Mr. Coleman’s invitation to undo the D.C. Superior Court’s 2010 Foreclosure Judgment. B. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Mr. Coleman’s Claims Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata. Even if Mr. Coleman’s claims were not precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, they would be barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata operates to bar claims and matters which could have been raised in an earlier action but were not: [T]he doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case, “[i]t is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1983) (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876) (holding that a judgment “estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented.”). Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a state court judgment is entitled to “the same respect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering State.” Herrion v. Children’s Hosp. Nat. Med. Ctr., 448 F. App’x 71, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996). That rule extends to judgments of the District Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 16 of 49 14 of Columbia courts. Id. (citing Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit has held that federal courts “apply D.C. law in determining the preclusive effect of the Superior Court judgment.” Id. Under D.C. law, whether a subsequent action is barred by res judicata depends on “(1) whether the claim was adjudicated finally in the first action; (2) whether the present claim is the same as the claim which was raised or which might have been raised in the prior proceeding; and (3) whether the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case.” Calomiris v. Calomiris, 3 A.3d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 2010). An examination of the prior Tax Sale Suit indicates that the claims are barred by res judicata. i. Mr. Coleman’s Claims Were Adjudicated Finally in the D.C. Superior Court Tax Sale Suit. On June 15, 2010, the Superior Court rendered a final judgment on the merits relating to the tax sale purchaser’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings which is now binding and conclusive. 4 See Croley v. Winberg, et al., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5850, *6 (D.D.C. 1995) (“Under District of Columbia law, a default judgment is entitled to preclusive effect as much as a judgment on the merits.”) (citing Thomas v. Marvins Credit, Inc., 76 A.2d 773, 776 (D.C. 1950)); Arthur v. District of Columbia, 857 A.2d 473, 483-84 (D.C. 2004) (“An entry of default is simply an interlocutory order, whereas a default judgment ‘is a final judgment on the merits that terminates the litigation and decides the dispute.’”). The 2010 Foreclosure Judgment must be considered to be a final adjudication of Mr. Coleman’s claims. ii. Mr. Coleman’s Claims Could Have Been Raised in the D.C. Superior Court Tax Sale Suit. 4 A default judgment becomes “final” when the clerk of the court enters it on the docket. See Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 58 (2006) (providing that a civil judgment is effective only when it is formally entered on the docket). Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 17 of 49 15 A “claim” or “cause of action,” for purposes of res judicata, comprises “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1)). The doctrine of res judicata “operates to bar in the second action not only claims which were actually raised in the first, but also those arising out of the same transaction which could have been raised.” Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d 866, 870 (D.C. 1999). It is indisputable that the facts comprising the current and prior claims are so interwoven that they constitute a single claim. See Pittston, 199 F.3d at 704 (in determining whether claims constitute a single claim for purposes of res judicata, courts look at “. . . their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether, taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes.”). Moreover, Mr. Coleman had the right to assert that the tax foreclosure of his property would constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment and required just compensation as a defense or a cross claim against the District in the Tax Sale Suit. In the D.C. Superior Court, tax sale foreclosure cases are filed as civil actions and are governed by the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. D.C. Code § 47–1370. Although Mr. Coleman attempts to cast the defenses and counterclaims he could have raised in the Tax Sale Suit under the guise of new legal claims, asserting alleged violations of his constitutional rights, they all arise out of the foreclosure of his property. In the end, but for the tax sale foreclosure of his property, Mr. Coleman would have no grievance. Accordingly, these claims all could have been raised in the Tax Sale Suit. iii. Mr. Coleman Was a Party in the Prior Case. For res judicata to apply to a subsequent action, the first action must have been actually litigated by the parties or their privies. See, e.g., Smalls v. United States, 471 U.S. 186, 192 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 18 of 49 16 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 614 (D.C. App. 1989) (“in addition to the identity of claims, there must generally be some identity of the parties for claim preclusion to apply.”). An examination of the identity and status of Mr. Coleman in this case reveals that he is a direct party to both actions. In the Tax Sale Suit, Mr. Coleman was a named defendant to the action brought by the tax sale purchaser. See Complaint at ¶ 33. As a result, all of Mr. Coleman’s interests herein are substantially, if not completely, identical as his interests as a defendant in asserting defenses and claims in the original Tax Sale Suit. V. Mr. Coleman’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim Because the District’s Tax Sale Statute Does Not Constitute an Unconstitutional Taking Mr. Coleman has failed to state a claim because retaining a taxpayer’s surplus or equity as the result of a tax sale is not a Fifth Amendment taking. Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 109 (1956). In Nelson, the taxpayers alleged that they had suffered a taking without just compensation because New York City retained property and proceeds “far exceeding in value the amounts due.” Id. The Court noted that there had been no timely action to redeem and that New York City had retained one property and the entire proceeds of the other property’s sale. The Court rejected the taxpayers’ takings claim, holding that “nothing in the Federal Constitution prevents this where the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings.” Id. at 110. 5 New York City retained the taxpayers’ equity for itself, but there is no constitutional prohibition against allowing a private tax sale purchaser to retain the equity. Balthazar v. Mari Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1969) aff’d, 396 U.S. 114 (1969). Balthazar involved an 5 In so holding, the Supreme Court also noted that the New York City tax sale statute was a harsh statute, resulting in the loss of properties assessed at $6,000 and $46,000 for unpaid taxes in the amount of $65 and $814.50, respectively. Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 105-06, 110 (1956). Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 19 of 49 17 Illinois tax sale statute that is identical to the District’s in all material respects. In Illinois, as in the District, delinquent real estate tax liens are sold to the public at auction; the tax buyer obtains a certificate of purchase then files a petition in Illinois Circuit Court, and if the property owner fails to redeem the tax buyer receives a tax deed. Id. at 104. 6 The three-judge district court in Balthazar rejected constitutional challenges to Illinois’s tax lien statute, explaining that: the Illinois tax delinquency statutes allow all real estate owners to recover the surplus value of their land. During the two year period of redemption, the owners can simply sell the property to a private purchaser subject to the tax certificate. The Illinois legislation is constitutional since delinquent landowners, including the plaintiffs, are adequately notified of their tax deficiencies and of an [sic] tax sale or foreclosure. Id. at 106. Pursuant to Balthazar, the District’s tax sale statute is constitutional because it provides property owners with the opportunity to recover the surplus value of their land. A tax certificate for Mr. Coleman’s unpaid taxes was sold on July 12, 2007. A default judgment foreclosing Mr. Coleman’s right of redemption was entered on June 16, 2010. Therefore, Mr. Coleman had a redemption period of two years, 11 months, and four days. Mr. Coleman did not lose his equity because of the District’s tax sale statute; he lost his equity because he indicated his desire to redeem his property and then stopped appearing for court hearings. At a more basic level, the court in Balthazar rejected the property owners’ characterization of the loss of property under a tax sale statute as a taking for which just compensation is required. Id. at n.6. The court explained that: 6 Illinois’s tax sale statute at the time of Balthazar differed from the District’s statute in two immaterial ways: first, the bidder is chosen based on who bids the lowest penalty interest rather than the greatest surplus; second, the Illinois redemption period is set at two years from the date of sale, whereas the District allows the right of redemption to continue until a judgment foreclosing the right of redemption becomes final. See Balthazar v. Mari Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103, 104 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (citing 1967 Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 120); D.C. Code § 47-1370 (d). Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 20 of 49 18 Relying upon Supreme Court condemnation cases, plaintiffs also maintain that they were deprived of ‘just compensation’ for their property. These cases are inapplicable. Rather than taking private property for a public purpose, Illinois is here collecting taxes which are admittedly overdue. Id. Mr. Coleman’s assertion that he has suffered a Fifth Amendment taking fails as a matter of law. It is undisputed that the District was collecting taxes which were overdue. The court in Balthazar noted the harshness of the statute, explaining that “the Illinois system severely penalizes all real estate owners who fail to redeem. The total forfeiture seems extremely harsh when overdue taxes amount to only two or three percent of the property's value. But oppressive statutes must be tempered by the legislature, not the courts.” Id. (citing Nelson v. New York City, 352 U.S. 103, 110-111 (1956). Moreover, Balthazar was decided by a three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284, and was directly appealed to the Supreme Court and summarily affirmed. 301 F. Supp. at 104, aff’d, 396 U.S. 114 (1969). The summary affirmance by the Supreme Court is binding “on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176, (1977). Summary actions “should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved.” Id. The Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of the judgment in Balthazar necessarily decided the constitutional question of whether all of a homeowner’s equity could be transferred to a third- party tax sale purchaser. The three-judge panel’s judgment in Balthazar applied the principles of the Supreme Court’s Nelson decision to a case where all of the property owners’ equity was transferred to a private tax sale purchaser. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance makes Balthazar binding precedent on those facts, which are the same as the facts alleged by Mr. Coleman. This Court has also previously rejected attempts by property owners to assert a Fifth Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 21 of 49 19 Amendment takings claim when their property was lost due to a tax sale because a tax sale is pursuant to the state’s taxing powers. In Speed v. Mills, the court found that the property owner had failed to state a takings claim because “[t]he sale took place pursuant to the District's taxing power, not its power of eminent domain, its regulatory power, or any other power enabling it to take or encumber private property for a public purpose.” 919 F. Supp. 2d 122, 129 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Indus. Bank of Washington v. Sheve, 307 F.Supp. 98, 99 (D.D.C. 1969) (“[a] tax sale is not a government taking for which just compensation must be paid under the Constitution after judicial proceedings”)). Other federal courts have rejected attempts to claim that the forfeiture of equity constitutes an illegal taking. In Reinmiller v. Marion Cnty., Oregon, the court rejected a challenge to a tax lien statute where the county retained “excess proceeds” derived from the property tax lien foreclosure sale of real property. 2006 WL 2987707 (D. Or. Oct. 16, 2006). The court explained that: Courts construing state tax laws have generally found no constitutional violations in the excess proceeds provisions. This court declines Reinmiller’s invitation to overturn settled Oregon tax law. As courts have stated in response to similar challenges to disbursement of excess proceeds based on state law after foreclosure sales, the appropriate forum to raise these concerns is the state legislature. Id. Federal and state courts have consistently rejected Fifth Amendment takings claims and just compensation claims relating to tax sale statutes because those claims do not apply to a state’s taxing power. 7 Moreover, other courts have also specifically rejected these claims when 7 Golden v. Mercer Cty. Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden), 190 B.R. 52, 57 (W.D.Penn.Bankr.1995) ( “In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry.”); Dommel Properties, LLC v. Jonestown Bank & Trust Co., 2013 WL 1149265 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013) (“A tax sale, however, is not a taking for a public purpose pursuant to a state's power of eminent domain, but is instead an exercise of the state's taxing power.”); Epice Corp. v. Land Reutilization Auth. of City of St. Louis, 4:07 CV 00206 HEA, 2010 WL 3270114 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 17, 2010) aff’d sub nom., 416 F. App’x 595 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiff is attempting to characterize the foreclosure of a tax lien as an eminent domain proceeding through its Fifth Amendment challenge. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 22 of 49 20 raised in regard to the retention of excess proceeds. 8 The only cases in which courts have required a taxing entity to return the surplus from a foreclosure sale to the taxpayer are those where either the state constitution or the tax statutes create such an interest. See Ritter v. Ross, 207 Wis. 2d 476, 485 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Spurgias v. Morrissette, 109 N.H. 275, 249 A.2d 685, 687 (1969). New Hampshire has interpreted its state constitution’s takings clause as prohibiting the retention of excess proceeds. See Thomas Tool Servs., Inc. v. Town of Croydon, 145 N.H. 218, 221 (2000) (acknowledging that “[m]ost courts holding that no taking occurs do so under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and their opinions are not controlling on this court”). Vermont’s Supreme Court has also held that a taxing authority may not keep any surplus on other state law grounds. Bogie v. Town of Barnet, 129 Vt. 46, 270 A.2d 898 (1970). These exceptions are irrelevant in this case. The District has no state constitution and the District’s tax sale statute allows for the retention of all of the equity. VI. CONCLUSION Mr. Coleman’s complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As explained above, his claims are barred by the principle of comity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and res judicata. Mr. Coleman has also failed to state a claim as his constitutional challenges to the District’s tax sale statute have been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court. Mr. Coleman’s Plaintiff has presented no authority in this Circuit or any other circuit for this position. The Court’s own research has been unavailing as to any authority in this Circuit which would establish that Plaintiff is entitled to bring this claim.”); Richardson v. Brunner, 356 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Ky. 1962) (“The third ground of attack is based upon the premise that a sale of land for delinquent taxes constitutes a taking for a public purpose. This premise obviously is fallacious. The sale is nothing more than a step in the foreclosure of a lien imposed under the taxing power.”); In re Murphy, 331 B.R. 107, 128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Sol–G Const. Corp. v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 846 (1982); Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 256 (1858). 8 Ritter v. Ross, 207 Wis. 2d 476, 486, 558 N.W.2d 909, 912 (Ct. App. 1996)(“when a state’s constitution and tax codes are silent as to the distribution of excess proceeds received in a tax sale, the municipality may constitutionally retain them as long as notice of the action meets due process requirements.”); City of Auburn v. Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22, 32 (Me. 1974)(“In the absence of contrary provision by statute or constitution, a municipality's title to property acquired under the tax-lien-mortgage-foreclosure statute is absolute, and the city or town has no power to part with, nor duty to account for, any surplus value on any theory of ‘equity and good conscience.’”). Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 23 of 49 21 counsel and conservator should abandon their barred and rejected claims, and attempt to remedy Mr. Coleman’s unfortunate situation through the remedies that are available to them in D.C. Superior Court. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 24 of 49 22 Dated: October 18, 2013 Respectfully submitted, IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia SUSAN LONGSTREET Deputy Attorney General, Commercial Division /s/ WILLIAM D. BURK, D.C. Bar # 464349 Section Chief, Land Acquisition and Bankruptcy Section /s/ EDWARD P. HENNEBERRY, D.C. Bar # 456202 Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 1010 S Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 442-9773 (202) 741-0648 (fax) Email: Edward.Henneberry@dc.gov Counsel for the District of Columbia /s/ ANDREW C. EBERLE, D.C. Bar # 1011542 Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 1010 S Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 442-9779 (202) 741-8571 (fax) Email: Andrew.Eberle@dc.gov Counsel for the District of Columbia Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 25 of 49 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Benjamin Coleman, through his ) Conservator Robert Bunn, Esq., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-01457 ) Assigned: Judge Emmet Sullivan ) The District of Columbia, ) ) ) Defendant. ) ) ____________________________________) ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Upon consideration of the District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, for Failure to State A Claim (“Motion”), and Plaintiff’s Opposition thereto, it is this _______ day of _______________, ORDERED, that the Court grants the District’s Motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) finding that it does not have jurisdiction over this proceeding, and Plaintiff’s claims under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for Just Compensation, and declaratory relief are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 26 of 49 2 AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s claims require dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because he has not pleaded factual allegations which demonstrate that a Fifth Amendment taking has occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for Just Compensation, and declaratory relief are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. ___________________________ The Honorable Emmet Sullivan Copies to: William A. Isaacson Boise, Schiller & Flexner, LLP 5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20015 Counsel for Plaintiff William D. Burk Edward P. Henneberry Andrew C. Eberle Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia 441 4th Street, NW, Suite, 1010 South Washington, D.C. 20001 Counsel for Defendant District of Columbia Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 27 of 49 Exhibit A Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 28 of 49 Court Cases Online Click here to view search criteria Case Search for: 2008 CA 1572 Search retrieved 1 case in less than a second. Click here to view search results Selected 1 cases to view Viewing single case; Details retrieved in less than a second. Click here to view case summary 2008 CA 001572 L(RP): EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC Vs. COLEMAN JR., BENNIE RAYMOND, et al. Case Type: Title 47 File Date: 02/28/2008 Status: Closed Status Date: 02/28/2008 Disposition: Judgment-Summary Judgment Disposition Date: 06/15/2010 Party Name Party Alias(es) Party Type Attorney(s) EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC PLAINTIFF AUTHEMENT, KAREN M KENNY, HEIDI S COLEMAN JR., BENNIE RAYMOND Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Defendant AMATO, Mr RICHARD WILSON Sr, Mr R M THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Amicus Curia (Friend Of The Court) ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS OF PROPERTY Unknown Heirs SQUARE 5136, LOT 0013 Square/Lot Docket Date Description Messages 10/27/2011 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Witdrawing Plaintiff's Petitions for Writs of Possesion Entered on the Docket submitted 10/27/2011 09:29. ms. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters on October 26, 2011. 10/27/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Witdrawing Plaintiff's Petitions for Writs of Possesion Entered on the Docket submitted 10/27/2011 09:29. ms. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters on October 26, 2011. 10/27/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Motion Hearing scheduled for 11/30/2011 at 2:30 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Motion Hearing Vacated Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 10/27/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Withdrawing Writ of Possession and Cancelling Hearing Entered on Docket 10/27/11. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters 10/26/11. E-filed, e-served and mailed 10/27/11. lm 10/24/2011 Praecipe to Withdraw Filed Praecipe Withdrawing Plaintiff's Petitions ofr Writs of Possession Pursuant to D.C. Code 47-1383 as Moot Filed. submitted 10/24/2011 10:47. TDS Attorney: AUTHEMENT, KAREN M (496294) 10/20/2011 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of service to NOTICE to Parties. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters 10/20/2011. Submitted 10/20/2011 12:35. cms. 10/20/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket NOTICE to Parties. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters 10/20/2011. Submitted 10/20/2011 12:35. cms. 10/17/2011 Miscellaneous Docket Notice to Parties Docket 10/17/11. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters 10/17/11. E-filed, e-served and mailed 10/17/11. lm 10/07/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Motion Hearing Date: 11/30/2011 Time: 2:30 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 10/07/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 09/30/2011 at 3:00 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Event Cancelled Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced D.C. Courts Home Court Cases Online https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf 1 of 7 10/17/2013 4:44 PM Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 29 of 49 Docket Date Description Messages 10/07/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Denying as Moot Motion To Direct Issuance of Writ of Possession Entered on the Docket. Order signed by Judge Duncan-Peters on October 7, 2011. Order docketed, efiled, eserved, and mailed on October 7, 2011. ORDERED, that Rimelon DC, LLC's Post-Judgment Motion to Direct Issuance of Writ of Possession is DENIED AS MOOT. It is FURTHER ORDERED, that this matter is set for a motion hearing before the undersigned judge on November 30, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom 200. THE IMAGE OF THIS ORDER IS IN CASE NUMBER 2008 CA 529 08/23/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 09/30/2011 Time: 3:00 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 08/23/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 08/26/2011 at 3:00 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Hearing Continued Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 08/23/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order continuing control status date signed by Judge Duncan-Peters on August 23, 2011. Order docketed, e-filed, e-served, and sent by interoffice mail on August 23, 2011. ORDERED, that the control status date set for August 26, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. is CONTINUED to September 30, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. THE IMAGE FOR THIS ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN CASE NUMBER 2008 CA 529 08/04/2011 Returned Mail: Returned Status Hearing notice issued on: July 28, 2011 Mailed to: Bennie Raymond Coleman Jr Address: 221 44th Street NE Washington, DC 20019 Returned to Court on: August 3 2011 Reason: Return to sender Wrong Address 07/27/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 08/26/2011 Time: 3:00 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 07/27/2011 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 07/27/2011 16:55:49.27 07/27/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket ORDERED that the control status date set for July 29, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. is CONTINUED to August 26, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. SO ORDERED this 27th day July, 2011 by the Honorable Stephanie Duncan-Peters, entered on the docket, efiled, eserved and or mailed. rm 06/27/2011 Returned Mail: Notice for Status Hearing entered on: Mailed to: Lot 0013, Square 5136 Address: 221 44th Street NE, WDC 20019 Returned to Court on: 6/27/2011 Reason: Return to Sender 06/27/2011 Returned Mail: RETURNED: NOTICE for Status Hearing issued on: 6/17/2011 Mailed to: All Unknowno Owners of Property Address: 221 44th Street NE WDC 20019 Returned to Court on: 6/27/2011 Reason: Not Deliverable as Addresed, Unable to Forward 06/27/2011 Returned Mail: Notice to Bring With You When You Appear: entered on: 06/17/11 Mailed to: Bennie Raymond Coleman, Jr. Address: 22 44th Street, NE., Washington, DC., 20019 Returned to Court on: 06/27/11 Reason: Attempted - Not Known 06/16/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 07/29/2011 Time: 3:00 pm Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 06/16/2011 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 06/16/2011 11:23:10.40 06/16/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 06/17/2011 at 3:00 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Hearing Continued Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 06/16/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket ORDERED that the control status date set for June 17, 2011 at 3 p.m. is CONTINUED to July 29, 2011 AT 3 P.M. SO ORDERED this 16th day of June, 2011 by the Honorable Stephanie Duncan-Peters, entered on the docket, efiled, eserved and or mailed. rm 05/13/2011 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of service to ORDER SUA SPONTE that the control status date set for May 16, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. is CONTINUED to June 17, 2011 at 3:00 p.m.. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters 05/13/2011. Submitted 05/13/2011 17:36. cms. 05/13/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket ORDER SUA SPONTE that the control status date set for May 16, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. is CONTINUED to June 17, 2011 at 3:00 p.m.. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters 05/13/2011. Submitted 05/13/2011 17:36. cms. 05/13/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 06/17/2011 Time: 3:00 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 05/13/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 05/16/2011 at 3:00 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Hearing Continued Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced Court Cases Online https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf 2 of 7 10/17/2013 4:44 PM Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 30 of 49 Docket Date Description Messages 05/13/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Sua Sponte to/for: Order continuing control status date signed by Judge Duncan-Peters on May 13, 2011. Entered on Docket, efiled, eserved, and copy by interoffice mail on May 13, 2011. 05/02/2011 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Sua Sponte to/for: Order Setting Control Status Date for May 16, 2011 Entered on Docket Filed. Signed by Judge S. Duncan-Peters on 5/2/2011. submitted 05/02/2011 10:00. atm 05/02/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Sua Sponte to/for: Order Setting Control Status Date for May 16, 2011 Entered on Docket Filed. Signed by Judge S. Duncan-Peters on 5/2/2011. submitted 05/02/2011 10:00. atm 05/02/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 05/16/2011 Time: 3:00 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 05/02/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 04/21/2011 at 2:30 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Hearing Continued Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 05/02/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket ORDERED that the control status date set for April 21, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. is CONTINUED to May 16, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. Entered on Docket 5/2/11. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters 5/2/11. E-filed and E-served 5/2/11. lm 04/04/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 04/21/2011 Time: 2:30 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 04/04/2011 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 04/04/2011 11:13:32 04/04/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 04/01/2011 at 2:30 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Hearing Continued to 4/21/11 @ 2:30 PM Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 04/01/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket ORDERED that the control status date set for April 1, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. is CONTINUED to April 21, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. SO ORDERED this 1st day of April, 2011 bu Judge Stephanie Duncan-Peters, entered on the docket, efiled, eserved and or mailed. rm 03/21/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 04/01/2011 Time: 2:30 pm Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 03/21/2011 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 03/21/2011 15:58:41 03/21/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 03/22/2011 at 2:30 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Hearing Continued Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 03/21/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket ORDERED that the control status date set for March 22, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. is CONTINUED to April 1, 2011 at 2:30 p.m. SO ORDERED this 21st day of March 2011 by the Honorable Stephanie Duncan-Peters, entered on the docket, efiled, eserved and or mailed. rm 03/08/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 03/22/2011 Time: 2:30 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 03/08/2011 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 03/08/2011 16:04:27 03/08/2011 Matter Under Advisement by Judge S. Duncan-Peters Matter Under Advisement by Judge S. Duncan-Peters 03/08/2011 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Motion Hearing scheduled for 03/08/2011 at 2:00 pm has been resulted as follows: Result: Motion Hearing Held. CourtSmart(516). OCR-Susan Walker. Case called. All parties present. The court heard arguments from both sides. The post judgment issue is taken under advisement. Control date set for 3/22/11 @ 2:30 PM. td/jdp Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced KAREN M AUTHEMENT (Attorney) on behalf of EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF) Participant(s): Judge STEPHANIE DUNCAN-PETERS on behalf of Judge JOSEPH E BESHOURI 02/22/2011 Supplemental Memorandum of Law Brief Amicus Curiae of the Legal Aid Society of The District of Columbia Filed. Submitted 02/22/2011 14:52. ts. Attorney: BECKER, Ms JULIE H (471080) 01/26/2011 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Appointing the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae submitted 01/26/2011 13:38. ajm. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters on January 25, 2011. 01/26/2011 Order Filed Order Appointing the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae submitted 01/26/2011 13:38. ajm. Signed by Judge Duncan-Peters on January 25, 2011. 01/26/2011 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Motion Hearing Date: 03/08/2011 Time: 2:00 pm Judge: DUNCAN-PETERS, STEPHANIE Location: To Be Announced 01/26/2011 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 01/26/2011 12:35:54 01/26/2011 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket ORDERED that the Legal Aid society may file a written brief addressing the issues highlighted in this Order on or before February 18, 2011. It is FURTHER ORDERED that any party wishing to do so may file a response to the Legal Aid Society's brief within (10 days of the Legal Aid society's brief being filed. It Is FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is set for a motion hearing before the undersigned judge on March 8, 2011 at 2:00 p.m. The parties may Court Cases Online https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf 3 of 7 10/17/2013 4:44 PM Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 31 of 49 Docket Date Description Messages contact chambers (202)879-1882) on or before the hearing for the courtroom location, which will also be listed on the electronic board in the main lobby of the Moultrie Courthouse on the day of the hearing. SO ORDERED this 26th day of January, 2011 by the Honorable Stephanie Duncan-Peters, Civil Presiding Judge, entered on the docket, efiled, eserved and or mailed. rm 12/16/2010 Motion Filed: Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Possession Pursuant to D. C. Code 47-1383 Filed. submitted 12/16/2010 10:22. atm Attorney: AUTHEMENT, KAREN M (496294) EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF); Receipt: 183106 Date: 12/17/2010 06/16/2010 Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment Entered on the Docket Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment Entered on the Docket 6/16/10. Esigned in chambers 6/11/10 by MJ Beshouri, eserved & efiled 6/16/10, mailed 6/17/10. crn 06/16/2010 Judgment by Court Entered on Docket Judgment by Court Entered on Docket 6/16/10. Esigned in chambers 6/11/10 by MJ Beshouri, eserved & efiled 6/16/10, mailed 6/17/10. crn 06/15/2010 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings Signed by Magistrate Judge Beshouri on 06/11/2010. Submitted 06/15/2010 13:34 jhc. 06/15/2010 Order Filed Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings Signed by Magistrate Judge Beshouri on 06/11/2010. Submitted 06/15/2010 13:34 jhc. 06/15/2010 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Sua Sponte for Judgment Entered on Docket. Signed by Judge J. Beshouri on 6/11/2010. Submitted 06/15/2010 13:36. atm 06/15/2010 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Sua Sponte for Judgment Entered on Docket. Signed by Judge J. Beshouri on 6/11/2010. Submitted 06/15/2010 13:36. atm 05/05/2010 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 07/07/2010 Time: 10:00 am Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 05/05/2010 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 05/05/2010 14:07:57 05/05/2010 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 05/05/2010 at 10:00 am has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Hearing Held. Ctrm 200 (Courtsmart). Plaintiff present only. Court will rule on the motion. No taxes are due on property. Legal fees have not been paid. Property has not redeemed. Status hearing set for 7/7/10 at 10:00 am. JUDGE BESHOURI/tdh Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Courtroom 200 KAREN M AUTHEMENT (Attorney) on behalf of EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF) Participant(s): Judge JOSEPH E BESHOURI 05/05/2010 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 05/05/2010 Time: 10:00 am Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 03/31/2010 Motion for Default Judgment Filed Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant, Bennie R Coleman, Jr., and Judgment on the Pleadings as to Defendant District of Columbia Filed. submitted 03/31/2010 18:44. nk Attorney: AUTHEMENT, KAREN M (496294) EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF); Receipt: 161230 Date: 04/01/2010 12/29/2009 Returned Mail: Order for: Status Hearing entered on: 12/10/2009 Mailed to: Bennie Raymond Coleman Jr. Address: 221 44th Street, NE Washington, DC 20019 Returned to Court on: 12/29/2009 Reason: Return to Sender, Does not live at address. 12/10/2009 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 05/05/2010 Time: 10:00 am Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 12/10/2009 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 12/10/2009 08:52:37 12/09/2009 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 12/09/2009 at 10:00 am has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Conference Held. HR-205 (Courtsmart). Plaintiff present only. Taxes paid. Defendant made one payment towards the attorney fee payment agreement but no others have been made. Status hearing set for 5/5/10 at 10:00 am. JUDGE BESHOURI/tdh Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 KAREN M AUTHEMENT (Attorney) on behalf of EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF) Participant(s): Judge JOSEPH E BESHOURI 07/07/2009 Returned Mail: RETURNED NOTICE for: Status Hearing entered on: July,07,2009 NOTICE Mailed to: Bennie Raymond Coleman Jr. NOTICE Returned to Court on: June,25,2009 Reason: Does Not Live Here 07/07/2009 Returned Mail: RETURNED NOTICE for: Status Hearing entered on: July,07,2009 NOTICE Mailed to: 221 44th Street NE NOTICE Returned to Court on: June,25,2009 Reason: Wrong Address 06/24/2009 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 12/09/2009 Time: 10:00 am Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 06/24/2009 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 06/24/2009 15:52:23 06/24/2009 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 06/24/2009 at 10:00 am has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Conference Held. HR-205 (Courtsmart). Plaintiff and Bennie Coleman, Jr. present. Parties reached an agreement on attorney fees. Status hearing set for 12/9/09 at 10:00 am. JUDGE BESHOURI/tdh Court Cases Online https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf 4 of 7 10/17/2013 4:44 PM Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 32 of 49 Docket Date Description Messages Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 BENNIE RAYMOND COLEMAN JR. (Defendant); ; KAREN M AUTHEMENT (Attorney) on behalf of EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF); Judge JOSEPH E BESHOURI 06/02/2009 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Sua Sponte to/for: Order Setting a Status Hearing. Entered on Docket. Signed by Judge J. Beshouri on 06/01/09. Submitted. 06/02/2009 09:18. ncv. 06/02/2009 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Sua Sponte to/for: Order Setting a Status Hearing. Entered on Docket. Signed by Judge J. Beshouri on 06/01/09. Submitted. 06/02/2009 09:18. ncv. 06/02/2009 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Setting Redemption Date Entered on Docket 6/2/09. Signed by Magistrate Judge Beshouri 6/1/09. Efiled, eserved and mailed 6/2/09. lm 05/27/2009 Miscellaneous Docket Miscellaneous Docket: Letter from Bennie Coleman, III. 05/27/2009 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 06/24/2009 Time: 10:00 am Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 05/27/2009 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 05/27/2009 14:42:35 05/27/2009 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 05/27/2009 at 10:00 am has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Conference Held. HR-205 (Courtsmart). Plaintiff and Resource Center present. Letter from Bennie Coleman, III given to Plaintiff and Resource Center. Taxes current. Court stays redemption date. Court accepts letter for filing. Court will issue order directing Colemans to appear. Status hearing set for 6/24/09 at 10:00 am. JUDGE BESHOURI/tdh Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 KAREN M AUTHEMENT (Attorney) on behalf of EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF) Participant(s): Judge JOSEPH E BESHOURI 04/11/2009 Judge Caseload Transfer Judge Caseload Transfer The judge was changed from IRVING Jr, ALFRED S to BESHOURI, JOSEPH . 04/11/2009 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 05/27/2009 Time: 10:00 am Judge: BESHOURI, JOSEPH E Location: Hearing Room 205 03/13/2009 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Setting Redemption Date Signed by Magistrat Judge Irving on 03/13/09. Submitted 03/13/2009 13:37 jhc. 03/13/2009 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Setting Redemption Date Signed by Magistrat Judge Irving on 03/13/09. Submitted 03/13/2009 13:37 jhc. 03/13/2009 Order Sua Sponte to/for: Entered on Docket Order Setting Redemption Date for May 27, 2009 Entered on Docket 3/13/09. SIgned by Judge Irving 3/13/09. Efiled, eserved and mailed 3/13/09. lm 03/12/2009 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 05/27/2009 Time: 10:00 am Judge: IRVING Jr, ALFRED S Location: Hearing Room 205 03/12/2009 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 03/12/2009 08:30:11 03/11/2009 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 03/11/2009 at 10:00 am has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Conference Held. HR-205 (Courtsmart). Plaintiff present only. All parties served. The Court will issue and order setting a redemption date for May 27, 2009. Order to issue. Status hearing set for 5/27/09 at 10:00 am. JUDGE IRVING/tdh Judge: IRVING Jr, ALFRED S Location: Hearing Room 205 KAREN M AUTHEMENT (Attorney) on behalf of EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF) Participant(s): Judge ALFRED S IRVING Jr 11/13/2008 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 03/11/2009 Time: 10:00 am Judge: IRVING Jr, ALFRED S Location: Hearing Room 205 11/13/2008 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 11/13/2008 09:43:09 11/12/2008 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Status Hearing scheduled for 11/12/2008 at 10:00 am has been resulted as follows: Result: Status Conference Held. HR-205 (Courtsmart). Plaintiff, Mr. Coleman and Resource Center present. Defendant wishes to redeem. Case stayed. Status hearing set for 3/11/09 at 10:00 am. JUDGE IRVING/tdh Judge: IRVING Jr, ALFRED S Location: Hearing Room 205 BENNIE RAYMOND COLEMAN JR. (Defendant); ; KAREN M AUTHEMENT (Attorney) on behalf of EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF); Judge ALFRED S IRVING Jr 11/12/2008 Consent to Have Case Heard by Magistrate Judge Filed Consent to Have Case Heard by Magistrate Judge Filed. BENNIE RAYMOND COLEMAN JR. (Defendant); 10/06/2008 Miscellaneous Docket Miscellaneous Docket Letter dated 9/24/08 from Bennie Coleman, III (son) and Sabrina Whittle (Daughter in Law) Entered on Docket 10/6/08. Faxed to Counsel for Plaintiff 10/6/08. lm 10/02/2008 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Status Hearing Date: 11/12/2008 Time: 10:00 am Judge: IRVING Jr, ALFRED S Location: Hearing Room 205 Court Cases Online https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf 5 of 7 10/17/2013 4:44 PM Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 33 of 49 Docket Date Description Messages Result: Status Conference Held 10/02/2008 Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice of Hearing Mailed Next Business Day Notice Of Hearing Sent on: 10/02/2008 13:30:20 10/01/2008 Event Resulted: Event Resulted: The following event: Initial Scheduling Conference-180 scheduled for 10/01/2008 at 10:00 am has been resulted as follows: Result: Scheduling Conference Hearing Held (Courtsmart) Pltf present only for hearing. Pltf is attempting to obtain service by process server. Case set for further status on 11/12/08 @ 10:00 am in Hrg Rm #205 before Judge Irving. JUDGE IRVING DL Judge: IRVING Jr, ALFRED S Location: Hearing Room 205 09/18/2008 Additional eFiling Document to Proof of Service to Order Granting Motion to Extend Time for Service Signed by Judge Irving, Jr. on September 11, 2008. Submitted 09/18/2008 11:09. sams. 09/18/2008 Order Filed Order Granting Motion to Extend Time for Service Signed by Judge Irving, Jr. on September 11, 2008. Submitted 09/18/2008 11:09. sams. 08/22/2008 Motion to Extend Filed Motion to Extend Time for Service. Filed. Submitted. 08/22/2008 11:34. ars. Attorney: AMATO, Mr RICHARD (021618) Receipt: 113055 Date: 08/25/2008 08/21/2008 Proof of Publication Filed Proof of Publication Filed Attorney: AUTHEMENT, KAREN M (496294) EMBASSY TAX SERVICES, LLC (PLAINTIFF); 07/29/2008 Answer to Complaint Filed Answer of The District of Columbia Filed. Submitted 07/29/2008 17:01 jhc. Attorney: WILSON Sr, Mr R M (364084) Attorney: AMATO, Mr RICHARD (021618) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Defendant); 07/09/2008 Proof of Service Proof of Service Method : Service Issued Issued : 03/12/2008 Service : Summons Issued Served : 05/22/2008 Return : 07/09/2008 On : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Signed By : Tabatha Braxton Reason : Proof of Service Comment : Tracking #: 5000044361 07/09/2008 Affidavit of Service of Summons & Complaint on Affidavit of Service of Summons & Complaint on DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Defendant); 07/09/2008 Proof of Service Proof of Service Method : Service Issued Issued : 03/12/2008 Service : Summons Issued Served : 05/22/2008 Return : 07/09/2008 On : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Signed By : Darlene Fields Reason : Proof of Service Comment : Tracking #: 5000044360 07/09/2008 Affidavit of Service of Summons & Complaint on Affidavit of Service of Summons & Complaint on DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Defendant); 07/07/2008 Affidavit of Posting Filed: Affidavit of Posting Filed on LOT 0013 SQUARE 5136 (Square/Lot); at 221 44th Street, NE., Washington, DC., on 05/11/08 06/13/2008 Proof of Service Proof of Service Method : Service Issued Issued : 03/12/2008 Service : Summons Issued Served : 05/24/2008 Return : 06/13/2008 On : COLEMAN JR., BENNIE RAYMOND Signed By : Reason : Proof of Service Comment : Tracking #: 5000044359 06/13/2008 Affidavit of Service of Summons & Complaint on Affidavit of Service of Summons & Complaint by certified mail on BENNIE RAYMOND COLEMAN JR. (Defendant); 03/12/2008 Service Issued Issue Date: 03/12/2008 Service: Summons Issued Method: Service Issued Cost Per: $ COLEMAN JR., BENNIE RAYMOND 221 44TH STREET NE WASHINGTON, DC 20019 Tracking No: 5000044359 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4TH STREET NW Court Cases Online https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf 6 of 7 10/17/2013 4:44 PM Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 34 of 49 Docket Date Description Messages 11TH FL WASHINGTON, DC 20001 Tracking No: 5000044360 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4TH STREET NW 6TH FL WASHINGTON, DC 20001 Tracking No: 5000044361 02/28/2008 Order of Publication Entered on the Docket Ordered by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, that notice be given by the insertion of a copy of this order in The Legal Times, having a general circulation in the District of Columbia, once a week for 3 successive weeks, notifying all persons interested in the real property described to appear in the court by the 1st day of October, 2008, and redeem the real property by payment of $317.35, together with interest from the date the real property tax certificate was purchased, court costs and attorney's fees; expenses incurred in the publication and service of process by publication and for reasonable fees for the title search; all other amounts paid by the petitioner in accordance with the provision of DC Code 47-1361 and all outstanding municipal lien amounts due and owing on the aforementioned real property or answer the complaint or, thereafter, a final judgment will be entered foreclosing the right of redemption in the real property and vesting in the plaintiff a title in fee simple. 02/28/2008 Event Scheduled Event Scheduled Event: Initial Scheduling Conference-180 Date: 10/01/2008 Time: 10:00 am Judge: IRVING Jr, ALFRED S Location: Hearing Room 205 Result: Scheduling Conference Hearing Held 02/28/2008 Complaint for Tax Lien (Consent Granted) Filed Complaint for Tax Lien (Consent Granted) Filed Receipt: 98103 Date: 03/11/2008 02/25/2008 Complaint for Tax Lien Spreadsheet Received Only Complaint for Tax Lien Spreadsheet Received Only Receipt # Date From Payments Fee Amount Paid 183106 12/17/2010 AUTHEMENT, KAREN M Recdec $20.00 Cost $20.00 $20.00 161230 04/01/2010 AUTHEMENT, KAREN M Receipt Depositor $20.00 Cost $20.00 $20.00 113055 08/25/2008 AUTHEMENT, KAREN M Receipt Depositor $20.00 Cost $20.00 $20.00 98103 03/11/2008 HEIDI s. kENNY LLC Check $130.00 Cost $130.00 $130.00 Court Cases Online https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf 7 of 7 10/17/2013 4:44 PM Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 35 of 49 Exhibit B Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 36 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 37 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 38 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 39 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 40 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 41 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 42 of 49 Exhibit C Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 43 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 44 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 45 of 49 Exhibit D Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 46 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 47 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 48 of 49 Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 49 of 49