Justin Nazario, Respondent,v.222 Broadway, LLC, et al., Respondents.---------------------------------222 Broadway, LLC, et al., Third-Party Respondents, v. Knight Electrical Services Corp., Third-Party Appellant. (And Other Third-Party Actions.)BriefN.Y.November 15, 2016ARYE, LUSTIG & SASSOWER, P. C. ATTORNEYS AT LAW 20 VESEY STREET C. CARL LUSTIG, Ill MITCHELL .J, SASSOWER NEW YORK, NEW YORK 1 Cl007·2947 LEONARD A, ARYE ll'il2S·21Jl3J .JOHN G, KORMAN RACHELE M, VANARSDALE* C~ COUNSEl. State of New York Court of Appeals 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207-1095 Attn: John P. Asiello, Esq. (212) 732·4992 FAX: (212) 385·0875 WWW.ALS•lAWYERS.COM August 29, 2016 Re: Nazario v. 222 Broadway APL- 2016-00135 ROBERT M, FIALA~ .JAY A, WEt::HSLER * Al..$0 ME:MBER NJ 8Af! CAROL A. GORDON PARALEGAL Letter pursuant to section 500.11 of the Court of Appeals Rules of Practice in Opposition to Third-Party Defendant/Appellant Knight Electrical's Appeal Setting Forth the Merits. Dear Mr. Asiello: On behalf of plaintiff/respondent Justin Nazario ("Plaintiff' or "Nazario"), we respectfully submit this letter in response to the letter dated August I 0, 2016 submitted by Amy L. Fenno, Esq. (the "Fenno Letter") on behalf of third-party defendant/appellant Knight Electrical ("Knight"). Contrary to Knight's assertions, the Decision and Order of the Appellate Division, First Department which, inter alia, granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law §240(1), was proper on the law and the facts, and fully in accordance with the precedents established by this Court. Moreover, the First Department's determination in this case is also in accordance with case law handed down by the other Deprutmcnts. This is an action for personal injudes arising from a construction accident that occurred on October 30, 2010 when Plaintiff, an apprentice electrician employed by Knight, was working on a project to upgrade and replace electrical fixtures at the premises owned by defendant/respondent 222Broadway, LLC ("222 Broadway") and managed by defendant/respondent Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. ("Jones Lang"). Jones Lang retained defendant/respondent Lime Energy Co. ("Lime") for this project which, in turn, subcontracted the work to Plaintiff's employer, Knight. Due to the nature of the work and its large scale, the project is fairly characterized as an "alteration" within the meaning of Labor Law §240([ ), as opposed to mere "routine maintenance". This is not a situation where the components of one or two lighting fixtures were being replaced in the course of"normal wear and tear" [ cf. Esposito v. New York City Industrial Development Agency, I NY 3d 526, 528 (2003)]. Instead, this project involved the wholesale replacement of almost all the building's lighting fixtures. Thus, the argument contained in Point V of the Fenno Letter (at pp. 17-21) is without merit. It is respectfully submitted that the court below was conect in finding that the work plaintiff was engaged in qualified for Labor Law §240(1) protection, and that statutory liability was established by the failure of the ladder to provide adequate protection in light of the foreseeable risk plaintiff's work entailed. Accordingly, the Order ofthe Appellate Division, First Department in Nazario v. 222 Broadway, LLC, !35 A.D.3d 506 (I" Dept., 2016) was properly made in all respects, and the question certified to this Court pursuant to CPLR§5713 should be answered in the affirmative. I) The work Plaintiff was engaged in clearly falls within the ambit of Labor Law §240(1) protection as it involved a building-wide lighting renovation/upgrade far exceeding "routine maintenance". Knight's counsel improperly raises an issue that was unpreserved 1 and then proceeds to mischaracterize plaintiffs work to make it appear that he was perfonning mere "routine maintenance". Omitted is the fact that the project Plaintiff was working on at the time ofhis fall involved a building-wide renovation, of over twenty to thirty floors, to upgrade the existing lighting throughout to high-efficiency lighting fixtures [R. 606-607]. As detailed in Plaintiff's reply brief in the court below [Point 1Knight failed to raise the issue of routine maintenance in the initial motion before the Supreme Court which the Appellate Division, therefore, found was unprcserved. Nazario, 135 A.D. 3d at 505. In declining to consider this issue, the Appellate Division was plainly exercising its discretion, thus rendering it beyond this Court's purview. See, Elezaj v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 89 N.Y. 2d 992 al994-995 (1997); Feinberg v. Saks & Co., 56 N.Y. 2d 206 at210-2ll (1982). 2 1], approximately eight hundred (800) lights/lamps and one hundred sixty-five (I 65) ballasts were being installed [R. 923-933] at a cost of $400,947.50 [R. 976]. The project was a four month undertaking [R. 530], performed at night and on weekends [R.552], with approximately twelve to fifteen workers on the job the day ofPlaintiffs fall [R. 627]. Knight was the regular "house" electrical maintenance contractor for the building, responsible for replacing lights and ballasts on an as-needed basis [Knight Service Contract, R. 820, 859]. However, Knight was hired under an entirely separate subcontract with defendant, Lime, the lighting general contractor, to perform the lighting upgrade project which Plaintiff was involved with, which subcontract conspicuously did not include any duties or responsibilities for repair or replacement work due to normal wear and tear [Lime/Knight Contract, R. 976-985]. Before the new lighting fixtures and ballasts could be installed, Plaintiff and his co-workers had to demolish and remove all internal components of the existing fixtures and ballasts that were being replaced [R. 236, 237-238,243, 259]. Indeed, the property manager for defendant Jones Lang, Mr. Robert Bicocchi, described the work as the "demo portion" of the lighting renovation project [R. 447-448]. It is well settled that for an alteration to come within the protection of Labor Law §240(1) there must be a "significant" physical change to a building or structure. Prats v. PortAuth. ofN.Y. & N.J., 100 N.Y. 2d 878 (2003); Jablon v. Solow, 91 N.Y. 2d 457 ( 1998). On the other hand, work which involves mere "routine maintenance" does not quality for Labor Law §240(1) protection. Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 N.Y. 3d 46 (2004); Esposito v. New York City In dust. Dev. Agency, supra. In Jablon v. Solow, supra, this Court found that chiseling a hole and running a wire through a wall to install a clock constituted a "significant physical change to the configuration ... ofthe building or structure" and, therefore, fell within the ambit ofLabor Law §240(1) protection. !d. at465. Given the building-wide, comprehensive lighting renovation involving twenty to thirty f1oors here, with demolition of existing fixtures and ballasts and installation and wiring of the new fixtures and ballasts, the criteria for a "significant alteration" established in Jablon are surely satisfied.2 2 It is significant to note in this regard that the lighting upgrade was projected to reduce building energy consumption by 552,773 kilowatt/hours per year, with a savings of $89,770/year in electrical costs, additional tax incentives and a potential rebate of$82,867 3 What renders work simply "routine maintenance" is that it merely involves the replacement of component parts due to wear and tear to restore the status quo. See, Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Assoc., supra at 53; Esposito v. New York City In dust. Dev. Agency, supra at 528. Or, as stated by this Coutt, "routine maintenance" involves " ... simple tasks, involving minimal work''. See, Saint v. Syracuse Supply Co., 25 N.Y.3d 117 at 126 (2015). In view of the nature of the work (demolition and installation), the size, duration and cost of the project, the manpower utilized, the fact that the project was being performed under a contract that was separate from Knight's in-house maintenance contract, this case plainly satisfies the criteria set forth by this Comt for protection under Labor Law §240(1). See, Prats v. Port Auth. ofN.Y. & N.J., supra at 883. II) The ladder Plaintiff was provided was plainly inadequate to protect him from the foreseeable risl< of receiving an electrical shock and falling in violation of Labor Law §240(1). Since Plaintiff had to work on a ladder to perform his work for this project, he was entitled to the protection of Labor Law §740(1). Contrary to the assertion by Knight's counsel [Fenno Letter at 6], there is a sharp dispute as to whether Plaintiff was provided with a "proper" Labor Law §240(1) safety device. Here, Knight's counsel conflates the separate question of whether the ladder that was provided was intrinsically defect-free, which is not in dispute, with the more impmtant question of whether that ladder provided proper protection. We submit that the adequacy of a safety device cannot be determined in a vacuum. Instead, it is necessary to consider the task that a plaintiff had to perform in order to determine if a safety device provided proper protection for that task. If no devices were provided, orifthe devices that were provided were inadequate to protect the plaintiff from a foreseeable risk, then proper safety devices were not provided. Counsel for Knight takes issue with this. Instead, she argues that the from Con Edison fR.974]. 4 foreseeable risk that Nazario would receive an electric shock (or "electrocution1') in the course of his work on the ladder-- which she does not dispute-- is "not decisive" ofLabor Law §240)(l)liability [see, Fenno Letter at 8]. The precedents established by this Court make it clear that the detennination of whether a safety device is proper depends on more than simply being defect-free. To be proper or adequate, the safety device must be appropriate for the task at hand. Thus, in Felker v. Corning, Inc., 90 NY 2d 219 (1997), this Court affirmed the lower couJis [Supreme Court, Steuben County and Appellate Division, Fourth Depmiment] which granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. In Felker, no allegations were raised that the ladder itself was defective, that it slipped, tipped, was placed improperly or otherwise failed to support the plaintiff when he was elevated above an alcove wall to a height of 8 feet above the ground. !d. at 224. However, the fact that the ladder was defect-free did not end this Court's inquiry. The record indicated that the plaintiff fell as he reached from the ladder over an elevated, open area in order to paint an area of an alcove. I d. This Court in Felker held that although the defect-fi·ee ladder was adequate for the initial risk of safely elevating the plaintiff, it was inadequate to protect him from the second foreseeable risk created by his need to reach over the 8-foot alcove wall and work over an elevated, open area. This Court held that the contractor's complete failure to provide any safety device to protect him from this second risk of falling over the alcove wall to the floor below resulted in liability under Labor Law §240(1). !d. The issues presented by Nazario are very much on point with Felker. Here, the ladder that was furnished to Nazario was adequate for the task of safely elevating him to the level of the lighting fixture that he had to replace. However, it was manifestly inadequate to protect him fi·01n the foreseeable risk of an electric shock and falling from the ladder as a result. As in Felker, the complete failure of the defendants to provide the Plaintiff with any safety device to protect him fi·om the second foreseeable risk (of electric shock) and consequential fall, leads to liability under Labor Law §240(1). In Klein v. City ofNew York, 89 NY 2d 833 (1996), affg 222 AD 2d 351 (!'' Dept. 1995), this Court affirmed summary judgment for a plaintiff who fell from a ladder that slipped due to a film (or "gunk") on the floor. As in Felker and the case 5 at bar, the ladder in Klein was not shown to be faulty [222 A.D. 2d at 351]; but it failed to provide proper protection from the foreseeable risk presented by the slippery floor. In Gordon v. Eastern Railway Supply, Inc., 82 NY 2d 555 (1993), this Court affirmed summary judgment for a plaintiff who fell from a ladder while cleaning the exterior of a railroad car with a hand-held sandblaster. Apparently, the ladder tipped when the plaintiff activated the trigger ofthe sandblaster he was holding. There was no claim that the ladder itself was defective; however, it did not prevent the plaintiff from falling and so the "core" objective of Labor Law §240(1) was not met. Id. at 560-561. On the issue offoreseeability, this Court stated [id. at 562]: Defendants are liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of their acts. To establish a prima facie case plaintiff need not demonstrate that the precise manner in which the accident happened or the injuries occurred was foreseeable; it is sufficient that he demonstrate that the risk of some injury from defendants' conduct was foreseeable. This Coutt's longstanding case law holding that Labor Law §240(1) is violated as a matter oflaw where there is a failure to provide protection for foreseeable risks bas been followed by all ofthe Departments. In Cruz v. Turner Construction Co., 279 A.D. 2d 322 (!"Dept. 2001), the First Department reversed and granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law §240(1) where an electrician slipped on a ladder and fell due to the presence of lubricating compound which was expected to be used during the process of pulling wire through piping and which was expected to fall from wires and coat anything with which it came into contact. The court held [id. at 322-324]: Where tl1e furnished protective devices fail to prevent a foreseeable external force from causing a worker to fall from an elevation, that worker is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the statute. In Nimirovski v. Varnado Really Trust Co., 29 A.D. 3d 762 (2"" Dept. 2006), the Second Department affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff pursuant to Labor Law §240( I) where it was foreseeable that pieces of metal being dropped to 6 he floor could strike the scaffold and cause it to shake, which caused the plaintiff to fall from the scaffold. In Quinlan v. Eastern Refractories Co., Inc., 217 A.D. 2d 819 (3'' Dept. 1995), the Third Department affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff pursuant to Labor Law §?40(1) where a stepladder was placed in the midst of the defendants' warehouse operation without any protection i!·om the reasonably foreseeable risk that it could be struck or knocked over by machinery or material involved in the warehouse operation. In Miles v. Great Lakes Cheese ofNew York, Inc., 103 A.D. 3d 1165 (4'" Dept. 2013), the Fom1h Department held that the lower court erred in denying the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law §240( l) where the safety device [i.e., scaffold frame] failed to protect him from the foreseeable risk that his co-worker might drop planks onto him. In her discussion and analysis ofNicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 NY 3d 90 (2015) [Fenno Letter at 9, 11-12], Knight's counsel argues that: • "[E]lectrocution is not an elevation created hazard of the type contemplated by the statute [Labor Law §240(1)]"; • "Foreseeability of electrocution while performing electrical work from a ladder* * ~ is not the proper inquiry"; • "Rather, the proper analysis is whether an inadequate safety device was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury". However, the foreseeability of the risk of"electrocution" (or electric shock) is very much the proper inquiry because the adequacy (or inadequacy) of a safety device necessarily requires consideration of the risks associated with the task at hand. See, Felker v. Corning, Inc., supra. There are at least two significant differences between Nicometi and the case at bar. The work being performed by the plaintiff in Nicometi that required the use of stilts involved the installation of insulation in the ceiling; and when he slipped on a patch of ice on the floor while working on the stilts, the hazard presented by the ice was "a separate hazard 'wholly unrelated to the hazard which brought about [the] 7 need [for a safety device] in the first instance"' !d. at 98. However, the work being performed by Nazario that required the use of a ladder involved the replacement of lighting fixtures which necessarily required him to work with the electric wires that created the clearly foreseeable risk of receiving an electric shock. Thus, the hazard presented by the electric shock was a foreseeable risk that was directly related to the task which brought about the need for the ladder in the first instance. The second obvious difference between Nicometi and the case at bar is that the plaintiff in Nicometi was working on stilts while Nazario was working on a ladder. That is the difference that this Cowt relied on in distinguishing the holding in Nicometi from its prior holding in Klein v. City of New York, supra. As this Court explained in Nicometi [25 NY 3d at I 01]: Unlike ladders, stilts are not "placed" in a stationary position and expected to remain still to ensure their proper and safe use. Rather, stilts are intended to function as extensions of, and move with, the worker duting performance of the designated task. Thus, the imposition ofliability under section ?40(1) where a ladder slips due to an unsafe condition on the floor in the area where it is placed is distinguishable from the circumstances of plaintiff's accident here (see generally Melber 91 NY 2d at 762). The observation by Knight's counsel that the plaintiff in Nicometi was not injured because of a problem with "bad" stilts, and that Nazario likewise was not injured because of a "bad" ladder, misses the point. The proper inquiry is not whether a safety device is ''good" or ''bad"; the proper inquiry is whether or not the safety device provided proper protection. When this Court in Felker and in Klein found that proper protection was not provided and that the plaintiffs in those cases were entitled to summary judgment under Labor Law §240(1), the safety devices were not "bad"; and, indeed, the ladders in those cases were described by the courts as not being "defective" or "faulty". However, as in the case at bar, they failed to provide proper protection. Counsel for Knight suggests that the Appellate Division, First Depmtment has lost its way in handling cases in which workers have fallen from safety devices after receiving electric shocks [see, Fenno Letter at 8-9]. She argues that the First 8 Department's case law is "inconsistent with that of every other appellate department" on this issue [Fenno Letter at 8]. However, Knight's counsel offers no justification for treating workers receiving electric shocks any differently than workers who are subject to other foreseeable risks. The foregoing case law, which has well established precedents in this Court and which has been followed by every Department, clearly demonstrates that the requirement of owners, contractors and their agents to furnish proper protection under Labor Law §240(1) includes, as a matter of law, the requirement to provide proper protection for reasonably foreseeable risks. Workers, such as Nazario, who were caused to fall from safety devices after receiving electric shocks were entitled to proper protection from all foreseeable risks, including the risk of such electric shocks. Notably, the risk of an electrical shock addressed in the New York Industrial Code §23-1.13 (b)( 4) and (5), which requires that the electrical circuit be de- energized and the circuit locked-out and tagged-out to prevent accidental re- energization, ipso facto, establishes that the State of New York officially recognizes the foreseeability of that risk3 Knight's counsel also errs in arguing that it is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to demonstrate that another safety device would have prevented him from falling after receiving the electric shock [see Fenno Letter at 8-9]. We submit that is not Nazario's responsibility under Labor Law §240(1 ), as that would represent an improper attempt to shift the responsibility for furnishing proper protection from the owners, contractors and their agents, to the workers themselves. As this Court held in Gordon v. Eastern Railway Supply, Inc., supra at 559: The purpose of the section [Labor Law §240(1 )] is to protect workers by placing the "ultimate responsibility" for worksite safety on the owner and general contractor, 3Parenthetically, in addition to entitlement to summary judgment under Labor Law §240( 1 ), Plaintiff respectlully submits that he is entitled to summary judgment under Labor Law §241(6)1 which claims are not mutually exclusive. See,~' Jablon v. Solow, supra, at 466. However, we recognize that the award of summary judgment below under Labor Law §240(1) effectively rendered the additional claim upon Labor Law §241(6) moot. See Nazario v. 222 Broadway, LLC, supra at 508; see also, Panek v. County of Albany, 99 N.Y. 2d 452 at 458 (2003). 9 instead of the workers themselves [citation omitted]. Thus, section 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners, contractors and their agents for any breach of the statutory duty which has proximately caused injury [citation omitted]. We submit that all that the law requires is for Plaintiff to show that there was a violation of the statute, and that the violation was a proximate cause ofhis injuries. See, Blake v. Neighborhood Housing Services ofNew York City, Inc., l NY 3d 280, 289 (2003). Thus, having demonstrated that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk (namely, of electric shock) for which proper protection was not furnished, and that he was thereby caused to fall from the ladder upon receiving the electric shock and sustained injuries as a result, Plaintiff has established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment under Labor Law §240(1 ). We submitthatPlaintiffis not required to identify the safety devices that would have protected him from the electric shock; and it is sufficient that the defendants failed to provide any such devices. Just as in Felker, the ladder that Nazario was provided served only the purpose of elevating him to the level ofthe light fixture that he was attempting to replace; it did not provide any protection to Nazario after he received the electric shock that Knight's counsel tacitly admits was foreseeable. Not only is Plaintiff not required to figure out what type of safety device would have protected him from falling after he received the foreseeable electric shock, Nazario is entitled to summary judgment even if no such safety device existed. As this Court held in Zimmer v. Chemung County Perfonning Arts, Inc., 65 NY 2d 513, 523-524 (1985): To determine an owner or contractor's liabiljty for a violation of section 240( 1) by reference to whether safety devices customarily are used~ and, if so, which ones give "proper protection" would allow owners and contractors to diminish their obligations under that statute and to set their own standard of care for the protection of workers at the worksite. This would clearly contravene the legislative purpose of placing "ultimate responsibility for safety*** on the owner and general contractor" ( 1969 NY Legis Ann, at 407). As observed by Justice Mikol!, in her dissent in 10 Zimmer, "[i]f the state of the building art is such that no devices have yet been devised to protect workers operating at such heights in dangerous work, it is illogical to conclude, given the purpose of the statute, that the responsibility of owners and contractors is then negated" (Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, I 02 AD 2d 993,995,477 N.Y.S. 2d 873). As pointed out above, it is not plaintiffs obligation to posit what safety devices might have prevented his fall. However, contrary to the mging of Knight's counsel and the concurring opinion in the Appellate Division in the decision at issue, such evidence was presented. Plaintiffs co-worker, Ariel Vargas, averred that the Knight workers were. not provided with safety belts on this job [R. 733-734]. This fact was confirmed by Plaintiff, who had previously been provided with safety belts by Knight when working on lifts [R. 316], although he had not seen them used while working on A-frame ladders [R. 317]. Plaintiff testified that had he been given a safety belt on this job, he would have hooked it onto the black iron in the drop ceiling [R. 317]. Neither Knight nor the concurring opinion below addressed this evidence which identifies a safety belt as a device that could have prevented Plaintiffs fall. It does not avail Knight or the defendants that safety belts were not generally used by workers on A-frame ladders. As this Court explained in Zimmer, id. at 523: * * * where an owner or contractor fails to provide any safety devices, liability is mandated by the statute without regard to external considerations such as rules and regulations, contracts, or custom and usage [emphasis added]. Therefore, the fact that Nazario, an apprentice, did not see safety belts being used by Knight for work done on A-frame ladder does not provide a defense where the defendants failed to provide any safety devices to protect him from the foreseeable risk of receiving an electric shock that cause him to fall while working on the ladder. In view of the foregoing, the conclusory assertion by Knight's counsel that there was "no proof the ladder was a proximate cause of [Nazario's] fall" [Fenno Letter at 6] rings hollow. To the contrary, Knight does not dispute that the use of the ladder for the task at hand presented the foreseeable risk that Nazario would receive 11 an electric shock; and there is no dispute that there was a fai lure to provide him with safety devices that provided proper protection from falling due to that foreseeable risk. The unnecessary and unduly harsh assertion by Knight's counsel that I have "disto1ted the record" or "blatantly" mischaracterized Nazario' s testimony [Fenno Letter at 6] adds nothing to this discussion. The record regarding Nazario's testimony, which she quotes at length in her letter at pages 4-5, clearly demonstrates that he was holding onto the second to the top rung ofthe ladder with his left hand while he was holding the electrical wires in his right hand; that he continued to hold onto the ladder with h is left hand while he was shocked; and that he continued to hold onto the ladder with his left hand after he was shocked and while he fell with the ladder coming down with him. So, whether I was to refer to Nazario as having "hung onto the ladder"4 or, more colloquially, "grabbing hold of' the ladder, or simply "grabbing" or "holding" the ladder, the bottom line is that the ladder failed to provide proper protection to prevent Nazario from falling from a hejght after he received the electric shock, which Knight does not deny was a foreseeable risk of his task. CONCLUSION It is respectfully submitted that, for the reasons stated above, the Decision and Order of the Appellate Division, First Department which, inter alia, granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law §240(1) was proper on the law and the facts; and the certified question presented on the issue of the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff should be answered in the affirmative. Respectfully Submitted, ARYE, LUSTIG & SASSOWER, P.C. 4As characterized by the court below. Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 12 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE The foregoing Letter Submission was prepared on a computer. A proportionally spaced typeface was used as follows: Name of Typeface: Times New Roman Point Size: 14 The totaJ number of words, inclusive of point heading and footnotes and exclusive of pages containing the Corporate Disclosure Statement, Certificate of Compliance and Affidavit of Service, is 4,421 words. D. CARL LUSTIG, III AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) ss. : Antoinette Bellantuono, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I . I am not a party to the action. r am over the age of eighteen (18) years of age and resides in Kings County in the State of New York . 2. That o n the 29th day of August, 20 16, 1 served the within LETTER PURSUANT TO SECTION 500.11 IN OPPOSITION TO KNIGHT ELECTRICAL'S APPEAL SETTING FORTH THE MERITS and by depos iting a true copy thereof in a properly sea led, fi rs t-class postpaid envelope, in a post office box regularly maintained by the Post Office of the United States addressed as follows: LAWRENCE, WORDEN, RAINIS & BARD, P.C. Attorneys for Defcndants/Third-Pa1iy Plaintiffs 222 BROADWAY, LLC AND JONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC. 225 Broadhollow Road, Suite #1 05e Melville, New York, 11747 CERUSSI & SP RING Attorneys for Defendant LIME ENERGY One North Broadway, 1 JLh Floor Wh ite Plains, NY 10601 FILENO.: 100.8196-4 O'CONNOR REDD LLP Attorneys for Th ird Party Defendants KNIGHT ELECTRICAL SERV ICES CORP. P.O. Box 1000 242 King Street Port C heste r, NY I 0573 WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER Attorneys for Third Party Defendants KNI GHT ELECTRICA L SERVICES CORP. 150 East 42"d Street New York, NY 1001 7-5639 (212) 490-3000 that be ing the address designated on the latest papers served by them in this action. "' Sworn to before me this 29th day of August, 201 6 Cbtthtft,_ c r.A0r NOTARY PUBLIC ' t.._ k -11: ' & ((!{);.,y!t£)1 0 Anto inette Bellantuono