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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
Robert Carroll, et al., )
) Civil Act. No. : 1:08-cv-00900 (HHK)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
Freemont Investment & Loan , et al, )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs hereby file this opposition to four pending motions to dismiss filed by the
following Defendants: (1) Fremont Investment & Loan (Dkt. #4 ), under Rule 9(b) and 12(b)(6);
(2) Jeffrey Smith (Dkt. # 14), under Rule 12(b)(6); (3) Shannon Ingram (Dkt. #16 ) under Rule
12(b)(6); (4) Frank Okebugwu (Dkt. 19, under Rule 9(b) and 12(b)(6) (2). With respect to the
fifth motion to dismiss, which was filed by Consumer First Title (Dkt. #8), Plaintiffs seek to
dismiss it under a motion to dismiss without prejudice consented to by Plaintiffs and Consumer
Title to be filed tomorrow.
In connection with the four motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs cross-move to strike the
motions to dismiss of Smith, Ingram, Okebugwu for the reasons stated below and reserve the
right to file a motion seeking appropriate relief with regard to the Fremont motion. To perfect the
cross-motions, Plaintiffs will within days promptly file separate motions to strike and to seek
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 1 of 24
appropriate relief regarding the Fremont motion – Plaintiffs reserve all rights with respect
thereto. Joint action is apparent.
The motions to dismiss should be denied. Of note, Ingram, Smith and Okebugwu, who
decry any notion of a conspiracy, have each copied the style and textual references of each other
and borrowed arguments of others to advance their arguments.
Plaintiffs make out powerful claims backed by factual details and evidence that must be
deemed true at this stage, showing Fremont to have actively engaged in unlawful acts in the
District of Columbia, through its functionaries and agent Defendants, through practices known
as predatory lending. The public outcry against these practices and the untold harm such
practices have caused have become everyday news stories. Fremont’s practices have taken an
enormous toll on the DC family the Carrolls, stripping their home of its worth and placing
Robert Carroll, well into his seventies, and Monica Carroll, on the doorstep of being homeless.
Fremont itself is on the verge of bankruptcy, following in the wake of other predatory lenders.
Fremont advances a ludicrous argument in the motion – that the Carrolls entered into a
written agreement to compromise their claims and not bring this lawsuit. That assertion is utterly
false. The evidence advanced to demonstrate the purported agreement is untrue. The assertions
themselves are not evidence under the Federal Rules. The assertions are not well placed and the
assertions are not made under oath. The Fremont assertions are not properly of record under
Rule 12(b)(6).
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Fremont unabashedly makes assertions of a binding agreement to not bring a lawsuit.
That assertions plainly does not hold water. Fremont seeks to fast track a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) when not such route can be taken and certainly not on the record the Carrolls have.
There was no agreement to forebear, which the Fremont corporate officials must
certainly know and apparently have not shared with counsel. Fremont should certainly have
specific knowledge of just what it gave in exchange for the so-called Forebearnce. But Fremont
has not stated what it gave in return. We submit that Fremont has not done so because Fremont
gave nothing. The monthly house payments remained the same and Fremont has knowledge of
the amounts invoiced each month from the date of its alleged forbearance. Fremont has not
shared that information on this record and instead has tendered an exhibit that is unsigned under
a claim that the Carrolls agreed to it – this is the subprime lender Fremont.
Legal Standard Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations and mixed questions of law and fact must be deemed true
for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). All reasonable inferences
from those facts and from mixed questions of law and fact are to be drawn in favor of Plaintiffs.
Under Rule 8, pleadings in a complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of
Plaintiffs’ claims, and provide Defendants with fair notice of the claims and the grounds on
which it rests. See Kingman Park Civic Association v. Williams, 349 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir.
2003). This pleading requirement anticipates liberal discovery procedures under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and through that process, opportunity to narrow and define issues and
obtain facts. Plaintiffs are not obligated to plead all elements of a prima facie case at the initial
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pleading stage – the Complaint cannot be judged on that basis. See Swierkiewicz v. Sonoma, NA,
534 U.S. 506, 511-14, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002).
Plaintiffs have met the requirements of pleading sufficient facts under the dictates of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 U.S. 1955, 1964-65, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007) Plaintiffs’s factual allegations establish their right to relief that is above the mere
suspicion level – it is a well pleaded complaint. The Complaint gives Defendants fair notice of
the claims and those claims are plausible. In a conspiracy context, parallel conduct is enough.
Plaintiffs have demonstrated heft to their claims and not just mere possibility.
Argument
I. Defendant Fremont: Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b)
A. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) Based on Purported
Agreement of Settlement and Forbearance Are Without Merit
Fremont dominates its motion with the argument that its Exhibit C is a valid Forebearnce
Agreement. (Fremont. Mem. at 5-7) This assertion is utterly without merit and the document that
Fremont purports to be an agreement on its face shows it is not and upon discovery will be
shown to be an utterly merit less claim.
Fremont proffers a purported settlement agreement. Exhibit C is not one document but
two. The first documents shows signatures under the names of Plaintiffs. The second document
is numbered pages 2, 3 and 4.
The second document does not show a signature for the Carrolls and it does not show
initials for the Carrolls. It only shows the signature of a Fremont functionary.
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Fremont makes the proffer that is not admissible evidence with the inference that the first
document absorbs the second document. Fremont fails to account for the dates being widely
different and it fails to provide an integrated agreement. The reason is that there was never such
an agreement – as Fremont well knows.
Not only are the documents at Exhibit C misleadingly shown to be just one integrated
document but Fremont fails to provide Rule 56 sworn testimony authenticating these purported
legal instruments. The documents are hearsay evidence, yet Fremont fails to accompany them
with sworn statements. And based on Exhibit C, Fremont is telling the court that it should throw
the Carroll case out. There is no evidentiary basis for doing so, as Fremont must know. If
Fremont seeks to set up an affirmative defense of settlement and accord, proof is required and
the Federal Rules of Evidence must be satisfied.
The purported Forebearnce Agreement was not attached to the Complaint. It is not record
evidence. By Fremont introducing these two documents as one is wrong but in any event, an
agreement between private parties on a motion to dismiss, cannot be so introduced; it improperly
seeks an evidentiary ruling at this stage that the Carrolls agreed to not file suit. It may not
introduce these documents because it is not permitted by Rule 12(b)(6).
Fremont’s attempt to put these documents on the record converts its Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to a Rule 56(c) motion for summary judgment. Conversion of the motion to Rule 56(c)
requires Fremont’s compliance with Local Rule 7(h). This local rule mandates that a motion for
summary judgment be accompanied by a conforming statement of material fact not in dispute.
Fremont did not file a statement of material fact and it did not move under Rule 56(c).
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 5 of 24
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The evidence will show specifically that the Carrolls never agreed to a forbearance. Even
the one document at Exhibit C that shows signatures (and that consists of but one page) also
shows the following terms struck: “Borrower acknowledges that Default and the Debt and
further acknowledges Borrower has no defense or legal objection to the Note, the Mortgage, the
Loan, the Default or the Debt.”
On the basis of the record, and the above, Plaintiffs will seek appropriate relief.
B. Plaintiffs Reject Fremont’s Assertion of Three Actions Against Fremont
Fremont, we respectfully assert, incorrectly alleges that the Carrolls sued it three times.
That is inaccurate. This is the second lawsuit against Fremont. The first action was Case No. 06-
cv-01641, which was Carroll v. Fremont, and it was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
The second lawsuit is the above captioned action that is now before the court. Case No. 09-cv-
.00900.
Fremont refers to a third lawsuit, Case No. 07-cv-00018. That action is Carroll v.
Anyloan and it does not name Fremont as Defendant.
C. Fremont’s Claim That Plaintiffs Fail to Allege a Claim under the D.C. Consumer
Protection Act must Be Denied.
Plaintiffs assert recognized claims for violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Act
(CPA) against Fremont and the individual Defendants named in the Complaint under decisions
of this federal court and the D.C. Court of Appeals.
The Fremont subprime loan to the Carrolls is a covered transaction under the CPA. Real
estate mortgage finance transactions are covered by D.C. Code § 28-3904(r). And specifically a
consumer can bring an action for damages based on an unconscionable loan. A plaintiff can
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bring an action under the CPA in federal court under its diversity jurisdiction. Fremont
incorrectly asserts that unless a material misrepresentation is alleged, there is no claim under the
CPA.
But Plaintiffs allege that Fremont engaged in deceptive trade practices. Plaintiffs allege
that Fremont violated the unconscionability provisions of the CPA, as the Complaint asserts at ¶
72. The Carrolls allege that the loan violated the unconscionability provisions of the CPA. It
engaged in unlawful trade practice and sought to enforce the unlawful loan having
unconscionable terms (it sought to foreclose on the property). See Ford v. Chartone, Inc., 908
A.2d 72, 78 (D.C. 2006) See also, Johnson v. Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust, 415 F. Supp.2d
16, 35-39 (D.D.C. 2006) Defendants took advantage of The Carrolls, as the Complaint explains,
which results in a violation in these circumstances. See Jackson ex rel. Smith v. Byrd, 2004 WL
3130653.
Count I sets alleges violations with specificity. (See Compl. ¶¶71-92) Plaintiffs
specifically incorporate herein by reference Compl. ¶¶71-92.
The CPA, like the D.C. Human Rights Act, imposes individual liability on individuals,
such as the named individual Defendants. Without facilitators like Okebugwu, Smith and
Ingram, a predatory loan like the Fremont subprime loan of September 2005 would not have
been possible. The individual broker-Defendants are Okebugwu and Smith. The appraiser-
Defendant is Ingram. Each of these Defendants had a role and it is explained with sufficient
particularity in the Complaint to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6).
B. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss Count III Under Rule 9(b) Must Be Denied
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Plaintiffs allege with particularity and attach exhibits that show that their income was
fraudulently represented and fraudulently relied upon in approving a mortgage Fremont knew
the Carrolls could not afford. Count III assert that Fremont knowingly and intentionally
represented and failed to make disclosure of material facts and fraudulently stated his income
(Compl. 98 and 99). Plaintiffs allege in addition that these acts were done with evil motive and
malice, justifying imposition of punitive damages. (Compl. 99 [sic][second ¶99] should
derivative liability against Fremont
Plaintiffs assert in great detail in Compl. ¶¶ 5 to 99 events relating to Fremont’s fraud,
violation of the CPA and DC common law, attaching to the Complaint 16 exhibits, several of
which demonstrate express fraud. Fremont’s practices in making subprime loans has attracted
lawsuits for abusive lending tactics, such as the brutal deprivations Fremont caused the Carrolls
who have been on the brink of losing their home for months due to their inability to pay a
mortgage Fremont and other Defendants they could not afford out of the gates – the day it was
made. Plaintiffs provided verification of their income (Compl. 29) which Fremont and other
defendants knowingly misrepresented and caused the loan to be made despite its
unconscionability. Their income is shown in detail. (Compl. 48)
Mortgage broker Defendants facilitated and caused the fraud and reaped substantial
profits from doing so. (Compl. 51-53) Appraiser Ingram played an essential role, causing a
valuation that was false but necessary window dressing to a loan underwriting system that
insured profits to Fremont and lucrative fees to the mortgage brokers. (See Compl 54-06)
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Fremont colluded and conspired with the broker Defendants. (See Compl. 57-50) To
make it possible, Ingram falsely represented the value and condition of the property. (Compl. 61-
63, making the fictitious loan to value ratio possible. (See Compl. 63)
Together their system was profits at the expense of the borrower, stripping equity from
the home, charging high closing costs and putting the Carroll family on the verge of eviction.
(Compl. 64-67). Monica and Robert Carroll are D.C. citizens who have been subjected to
extreme deprivation of rights, as the Complaint alleges. (See Compl. 68-70)
D. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss Count I and III for Failure to Satisfy Rule 9(b) must
Be Denied
Fremont argues that Counts I and III do not satisfy Rule 9(b). Defendants means just that
– all Defendants. The “Wherefore” clause differentiates Defendants where needed. Count IV in
the “Wherefore” clause singles out Fremont and its designees on the basis of the threatened
foreclosure, which Fremont could seek at any time. This lawsuit is not a bar to foreclosure. The
relief is not asserted against the other Defendants, which is clear.
Plaintiffs attached documents to the Complaint that demonstrate fraud. Plaintiffs are
entitled to reasonable inferences from its factual allegations and those documents. Plaintiffs
show (and are entitled to presumption that these facts are true) that their income was grossly
distorted by Defendants despite the income verifications, that daily living expenses could not be
met and also pay a monthly mortgage of more than $2,700. The fraud is specifically shown.
There can be no mistake about the allegations and the standard of Rule 9(b) has been met.
Fremont’s admonitions that Plaintiffs have not identified the specific wrongdoers inside
Fremont are not required by the rule. We are at the pleading stage. There has been no discovery.
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E. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss Count II Under Derivative Liability Must be
Denied
Count II asserting derivative liability is a viable under the CPA. See Johnson v. Long
Beach Mortgage Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp.2d 16, 55 (D.D.C. 2006). Fremont’s arguments
(Fremont Mem. at 10) must be denied.
F. Fremont’s Motion to Declare the Motion for Injunctive Relief as Moot must Be
Denied
Fremont’s argument must be rejected. Count IV asserts a valid claim for relief. Fremont
is not barred from seeking foreclosure and it is not barred from assigning the Carroll mortgage
and the assignee seeking foreclosure. Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunctive to bar the
enforcement of rights under the unlawful loan agreements.
G. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss the Common Law Tort Claims Must Be Denied
Fremont used the Broker-Defendants. The nature of the brokerage agreement and the true
relationship between these interests is not known. The nature and extent of the premiums paid
the Broker-Defendants to place loans with Fremont is not known. Under the facts as alleged, a
fiduciary duty existed between Fremont and the Carrolls, between the Broker-Defendants and
the Carrolls and by extension under common law, by reason of agency, it extended to Ingram. At
this stage the claims may not be dismissed.
H. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss the Conspiracy Claims must Be Denied
Plaintiffs do not allege conspiracy under Count VI as a cause of action but only as a
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means of attaching liability to each of the co-conspirators. It is asserted to impose joint and
several liability on the co-conspirators. There is no separate cause of action for civil conspiracy
under D.C. common law and Plaintiffs do not attempt to assert one.
I. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss the Negligent Supervision Claims must Be Denied
Plaintiffs’ “Wherefore” clause seeks damages in Count IX for negligence (and Count X
for gross negligence) against Fremont, Premier Mortgage, Smith who is a principal of the
mortgage company and Smith’s enterprises for failure to supervise Okebugwu and Lock. Those
are valid claims under the alleged facts, involving Okebugwu as the loan officer.
J. Fremont’s Motion to Dismiss Grossly Negligent Supervision Claims must Be
Denied
Plaintiffs’ “Wherefore” clause seeks damages in Count X for gross negligence against
Fremont, Premier Mortgage, Smith who is a principal of the mortgage company and Smith’s
enterprises for failure to supervise Okebugwu and Lock. Those are valid claims under the
alleged facts, involving Okebugwu as the loan officer.
II. Defendant Okebugwu: Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b)
Defendants Okebugwu, who is pro se, engages in practices not permitted on a Rule
12(b0(6) motion. Defendant purports to proffer several pages of facts not properly of record on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and these assertions have no evidentiary value because, among other
things, they are not sworn.
Defendant purports to proffer hearsay evidence in the form of documents attached to the
motion, which is improper under Rule 12(b)(6), because they are outside the record. By doing
so, however, Defendant also converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 11 of 24
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The converted motion, however, fails to comply with the Local Rule 7(h), requiring a statement
of material fact not in dispute to accompany any motion for summary judgment. For those
reasons, the motion to dismiss is itself subject to a motion by Plaintiffs to strike for failure to
comply with the Local Rules and Plaintiffs so cross-move and reserve the right to file a separate
motion to strike.
Defendant seeks to incorporate by reference in the motions to dismiss the motions to
dismiss of other Defendants. In so doing, however, Defendant seeks to bootstrap from improper
motions to dismiss of other Defendants. Defendant seeks to include in the motion the improperly
proffered assertions of the other identified Defendants, including assertions of fact that are not
record evidence under Rule 12(b)(6) and failure to comply with Local Rule 7(h). For those
reasons, all references by Okebugwu to the motions of other Defendants must be rejected.
III Defendant Ingram: Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b)
Defendants Ingram, who is pro se, engages in practices not permitted on a Rule 12(b0(6)
motion. Defendant purports to proffer several pages of facts not properly of record on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, and these assertions have no evidentiary value because, among other things,
they are not sworn.
Defendant purports to proffer hearsay evidence in the form of documents attached to the
motion, which is improper under Rule 12(b)(6), because they are outside the record. By doing
so, however, Defendant also converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
The converted motion, however, fails to comply with the Local Rule 7(h), requiring a statement
of material fact not in dispute to accompany any motion for summary judgment. For those
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reasons, the motion to dismiss is itself subject to a motion by Plaintiffs to strike for failure to
comply with the Local Rules and Plaintiffs so cross-move and reserve the right to file a separate
motion to strike.
Defendant seeks to incorporate by reference in the motions to dismiss the motions to
dismiss of other Defendants. In so doing, however, Defendant seeks to bootstrap from improper
motions to dismiss of other Defendants. Defendant seeks to include in the motion the improperly
proffered assertions of the other identified Defendants, including assertions of fact that are not
record evidence under Rule 12(b)(6) and failure to comply with Local Rule 7(h). For those
reasons, all references by Ingram to the motions of other Defendants must be rejected.
IV.. Defendant Smith: Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b)
Defendants Smith, who is pro se, engages in practices not permitted on a Rule 12(b0(6)
motion. Defendant purports to proffer several pages of facts not properly of record on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, and these assertions have no evidentiary value because, among other things,
they are not sworn.
Defendant purports to proffer hearsay evidence in the form of documents attached to the
motion, which is improper under Rule 12(b)(6), because they are outside the record. By doing
so, however, Defendant also converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
The converted motion, however, fails to comply with the Local Rule 7(h), requiring a statement
of material fact not in dispute to accompany any motion for summary judgment. For those
reasons, the motion to dismiss is itself subject to a motion by Plaintiffs to strike for failure to
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 13 of 24
Plaintiffs preserve their objections and right to argue in opposition to this motion based1
on the applicable law and local rules.
Page 14 of 24
comply with the Local Rules and Plaintiffs so cross-move and reserve the right to file a separate
motion to strike.
Defendant seeks to incorporate by reference in the motions to dismiss the motions to
dismiss of other Defendants. In so doing, however, Defendant seeks to bootstrap from improper
motions to dismiss of other Defendants. Defendant seeks to include in the motion the improperly
proffered assertions of the other identified Defendants, including assertions of fact that are not
record evidence under Rule 12(b)(6) and failure to comply with Local Rule 7(h). For those
reasons, all references by Smith to the motions of other Defendants must be rejected.
V. Defendant Consumer First: Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b)
This Defendants has consented to a motion filed today under an agreement to do so. 1
Having said that, Plaintiffs reserve the right to move to strike the motion for the same reasons
stated above regarding the other motions in order to preserve the record on the pending motions.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: August 4, 2008 ________/s/___________
C. Michael Tarone, Esquire
Tarone & McLaughlin
1010 Vermont Avenue, NW
Suite 810
Washington, DC. 20005\
Tel. 202-347-9526
Fax 202-783-9103
E-mail “cmtarone@bcounsel.com
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 14 of 24
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Counsel for Plaintiffs
ROBERT CARROLL
MONICA CARROLL
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 15 of 24
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Certificate of Service
I, C. Michael Tarone, hereby certify that on August 4, 2008, I served a copy of the
foregoing on parties herein electronically as follows:
Consumer First Title, LLC
Serve
Craig L. Sarner
Bonner Kiernan Treback & Crociata
1233 20 Street, NW, Suite 800th
Washington, DC 20036
Frank Okebugwu
Serve
Frank Okebugwu
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Premier Mortgage Solutions Services, Inc.
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Smith-Myers Corporation
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
JG Enterprises, LLC
Serve
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 16 of 24
Page 17 of 24
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Jeffrey Smith
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Fremont Investment & Loan
Serve:
Harold G. Belkowitz, Esquire
Ober Kaler Grimes & Shriver
1401 H Street, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 209005
Mortgage Electronic Registration, Inc.
Serve [not served at this time]
Shannon Ingram
Serve [not served at this time]
JMJ Appraisal Services, LLC
Serve [not served at this time]
______/s/____________
C. Michael Tarone
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 17 of 24
Page 18 of 24
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
Robert Carroll, et al., )
) Civil Act. No. : 1:08-cv-00900 (HHK)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
Freemont Investment & Loan , et al, )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motions to Dismiss of Defendants, the opposition
thereto and the entire record herein, it is this __ day of August 2008
ORDERED that the motions are denied.
_________________________
Henry H. Kennedy
District Court Judge
Copies to: See next page
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 18 of 24
Consumer First Title, LLC
Serve
Craig L. Sarner
Bonner Kiernan Treback & Crociata
1233 20 Street, NW, Suite 800th
Washington, DC 20036
Frank Okebugwu
Serve
Frank Okebugwu
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
JG Enterprises, LLC
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Jeffrey Smith
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Fremont Investment & Loan
Serve:
Harold G. Belkowitz, Esquire
Ober Kaler Grimes & Shriver
1401 H Street, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 209005
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 19 of 24
Page 20 of 24
Certificate of Service
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 20 of 24
Page 21 of 24
I, C. Michael Tarone, hereby certify that on July 1, 2008, I served a copy of the foregoing
on parties of record having filed herein as follows:
Consumer First Title, LLC
Serve
Craig L. Sarner
Bonner Kiernan Treback & Crociata
1233 20 Street, NW, Suite 800th
Washington, DC 20036
Frank Okebugwu
Serve
Frank Okebugwu
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Premier Mortgage Solutions Services, Inc.
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 21 of 24
Page 22 of 24
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Smith-Myers Corporation
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
JG Enterprises, LLC
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 22 of 24
Page 23 of 24
Jeffrey Smith
Serve
Jeffrey Smith
c/o Smith-Myers Corporation
9200 Basil Court, Suite 100
Upper Marlboro, MD 20774
Fremont Investment & Loan
Serve:
Harold G. Belkowitz, Esquire
Ober Kaler Grimes & Shriver
1401 H Street, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 209005
Mortgage Electronic Registration, Inc.
Serve [not served at this time]
Shannon Ingram
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 23 of 24
Page 24 of 24
Serve [not served at this time]
JMJ Appraisal Services, LLC
Serve [not served at this time]
______/s/____________
C. Michael Tarone
Case 1:08-cv-00900-HHK Document 20 Filed 08/04/2008 Page 24 of 24
