James E. Freligh II, Appellant,v.Government Employees Insurance Company, Respondent.BriefN.Y.December 7, 2017To be argued by Daisy Ford Paglia, Esq. Time requested: 10 minutes APPELLATE DIVISION THIRD DEPARTMENT STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT JAMES E. FRELIGH, II, Plaintiff-Respondent, -against- GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. APPELLANT’S BRIEF Ulster County Index No.: 14-1447 Respectfully submitted, THUILLEZ, FORD, GOLD, BUTLER & MONROE, LLP Attorneys for Defendant - Respondent Government Employees Insurance Company 20 Corporate Woods Boulevard, 3rd Floor Albany, New York 12211 Tel. No.: (518)455-9952 DONALD P. FORD, JR., ESQ. DAISY FORD PAGLIA, ESQ. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page iiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION 1 QUESTION PRESENTED 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 ARGUMENT, .7 POINT I .7 GEICO DEMONSTRATED THAT PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FUTURE EARNINGS WERE NOT “REASONABLY PROJECTED,” AND PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO RAISE A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT. POINT n 11 GEICO WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY OR DENY PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR LOST WAGES BECAUSE THE CLAIM WAS NOT VERIFIED AS REQUIRED BY THE NO-FAULT REGULATIONS. CONCLUSION, 14 i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Faas v. State. 249 A.D.2d 731 (3d Dept. 1998) 9-10 Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.. 49 N.Y.2d 451 (1980) .8 Lodato v. Grevhawk N. Am.. LLC. 39 A.D.3d 494 (2d Dept. 2007), .10 Nvack Hosp. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.. 8 N.Y.3d 294 (2007) .12 “10O’Brien v. Mbugua. 49 A.D.3d 937 (3d Dept. 2008). Sharpe v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 14 A.D.3d 774 (3d Dept. 2005) 8-9, 10 Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 106 A.D.3d 157 (2d Dept. 2013) .12 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Cos, v. Brooks. 78 A.D.2d 456 (4th Dept. 1981) 7-8 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stack. 55 A.D.3d 594 (2d Dept. 2008). .9 Insurance Law § 5102 (a)(2). .8 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.5 (a) 11 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.5(b). 11-12 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.5 (m). 12-13 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.6 (b). .12 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.8 (a)(1) .12 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.8(f) .12 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.16 (b)(3) .8 ii INTRODUCTION Plaintiff James E. Freligh, II, commenced this breach of contract action against defendant Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) to recover No-Fault benefits for lost wages. Plaintiff was not working at the time he was injured in an automobile accident; his claim for lost wages is based on an alleged job offer. GEICO moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs future wages were not “reasonably projected” as required by the No-Fault law. GEICO appeals from an order of Supreme Court, Ulster County (Gilpatric, J.) which denied GEICO’s motion. QUESTION PRESENTED Did Supreme Court err in denying GEICO’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that there were questions of fact as to plaintiffs future wages? Yes. STATEMENT OF FACTS On December 23, 2012, plaintiff sustained injuries in an automobile accident. He was driving a vehicle owned by him and insured by GEICO. R 33-35. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was not working. He had last been employed in May 2012 as the owner of Grahamsville Automotive. Grahamsville Automotive, an auto repair shop specializing in Volkswagen and Audi vehicles, went out of business in May 2012 due to financial problems. R 162-165. Plaintiffs claim for No-Fault lost wage benefits is based on a job offer he allegedly received prior to the automobile accident. Plaintiff has not worked since the accident. R 413. Plaintiffs job offer On or about December 15, 2012, plaintiff allegedly accepted a job as a mechanic (repair specialist) and parts specialist at VW Parts, Inc. in Fleischmanns, New York. R 24-31, 36-37. 1 Plaintiffs employment was to commence on January 1, 2013. R 46, 134. VW Parts, Inc. was in the business of dismantling cars and selling the parts. Customers ordered parts over the phone, * -- and the parts were mailed out via UPS. R 12-13. VW Parts had never operated a business for car repairs. R135. VW Parts was owned by William Hrazanek. R 105. Mr. Hrazanek allegedly offered plaintiff a salary of $104,000 per year ($2,000 per week) as a parts specialist . R 135. Mr. Hrazanek offered this salary because VW Parts “needed to expand the business and get back on track after the flood [caused by Hurricane Irene].” R 131. Mr. Hrazanek “had plans to open up [a] repair shop, as well as [plaintiff] had worked at numerous Audi dealers and had been to all of schools and so forth, so we were basing our future on [plaintiff] actually.” R 135. Mr. Hrazanek had not chosen a location for the repair shop. He was considering the Wagner Avenue building as well as another garage down the street. R 375-376. Between November 2012 and January 2013, Mr. Hrazanek did not apply to the Town of Middletown for any certificate of occupancy, business license or other document related to the operation of an automobile repair business at 717 Wagner Avenue. R 395-396. VW Parts conducted its business from three locations in Delaware County: 717 Wagner Avenue, 102 Depot Street and Maxim Lane. The 717 Wagner Avenue location contained VW Parts’ operating offices, as well as a building with 19 bays where cars would be dismantled. Parts were stored at 717 Wagner Avenue and in a warehouse located at 102 Depot Street. R 102- > 104. The Maxim Lane property was a junkyard. R 113. VW Parts leased the Wagner Avenue and Depot Street properties from VWP, Inc., a real estate holding company owned by Mr. Hrazanek. R 98-103. 2 In August 2011, Hurricane Irene struck Delaware County. R 100. VW Parts’ warehouse at 102 Depot Street was severely flooded. The entire inventory at that location was destroyed. At 717 Wagner Avenue, the shop was flooded, but the office and inventory inside the office were spared. Some of the vehicles stored outside the building were destroyed or washed away. R 111- 112. After Hurricane Irene, VW Parts continued its operations from the Wagner Avenue and Maxim Lane locations. However, it never resumed business at the Depot Street location. R 112- 113. VW Parts stopped making its monthly rent payments to Kenneth Pasternak, who held mortgages on the Wagner Avenue and Depot Street Properties. R 109, 121-122. VW Parts’ monthly payment to Kenneth Pasternak was between $8,000 and $10,000. R 109. VWP, Inc. applied for a FEMA flood buyout program. R 117-118. Meanwhile, VWP, Inc. filed for bankruptcy in order to forestall a foreclosure action commenced by Mr. Pasternak. R 115-116, 121-122. On December 14, 2012 - around the same time that he offered plaintiff a salary of $104,000 per year -Mr. Hrazanek signed an affidavit in connection with VWP, Inc.’s bankruptcy proceeding. R 380-382. The eighth paragraph of the affidavit states: “The debtors [sic] real properties are currently unoccupied due to the flood following Hurricane Katrina [sic].”1 R 233. Mr. Hrazanek described the bankruptcy proceeding as “a ruse” and testified that the Wagner Avenue property was in fact occupied in December 2012. R 381-383. VW Parts paid three employees through the end of December 2012. Larissa Guselnikova (Mr. Hrazanek’s wife) was paid $1,442.31 per week although she did not work for the business. Shop foreman Bruce Hoorbeek was paid $14.00 per hour. Eric Preisendorfer, who answered the phones and prepared invoices, was paid $1,325 per week. R 217-229, 378. 1The storm was Hurricane Irene. 3 VW Parts never opened a repair shop. R 351. In the month of January 2013, VW Parts paid $6,625 in wages to one employee, Eric J. Preisendorfer. R 230-232. VW Parts did not pay any additional wages to employees in 2013. In 2014, William Hrazanek sold VW Parts for $40,000. R 126. Plaintiffs No-Fault application On January 14, 2013, plaintiff submitted to GEICO an application for no-fault benefits. With respect to lost wages, the application indicated that plaintiff “was due to start a new job” but had not worked since the date of the accident. Plaintiff did not provide the name and address of the employer, nor did he provide information about his average weekly earnings or his days and hours of work. The application indicated that such information would be provided at a later time. R 32-35. On January 17, 2013, plaintiff submitted a copy of his resume to GEICO. The resume indicated that plaintiff was currently employed at Hurley Motorsports. R 36-37. By letter dated January 25, 2013, GEICO informed plaintiff that it needed additional information in order to consider his claim for lost wages. Among other things, GEICO required the name, address and phone number of the employer; a completed and signed NF-6 form (employer’s wage verification report) received directly from the employer; and the salary and pay period. R 38. On January 28, 2013, GEICO sent an employer’s wage verification report to Hurley Motorsports. R 39-40. On March 19, 2013, plaintiff submitted to GEICO copy of the application for employment he had completed on December 15, 2012. The portion of the application entitled “For Interviewer’s Use Only” had been signed by William Hrazanek and dated December 15, 2012. This form indicated that the applicant had been interviewed by William Hrazanek, the 4 president of VW Parts, Inc., for an open position for a parts specialist and warehouse manager. In addition, the form stated that the applicant would start work on January 1, 2013 at a salary of $2,000 per week. The employment application provided to GEICO did not list an address or phone number for VW Parts and/or William Hrazanek. R 41-47. By letter dated April 18, 2013, GEICO informed plaintiff that it still had not received a completed and signed NF-6 form directly from his employer. GECIO acknowledged receipt of the employment application indicating that plaintiff was to start work in January 2013. However, GEICO needed the signed NF-6 form in order to consider the claim for lost wages. R 48. On October 25, 2013, GEICO again wrote to plaintiff to inform him that the NF-6 form was outstanding. R 49. Meanwhile in October 2013, GEICO investigated plaintiff’s claim for lost wages. Investigator Rick Biglin prepared a Special Investigation Unit (SIU) report for plaintiffs claim. R 50-60. The SIU report indicates that the investigator, Rick Biglin, visited the VW Parts location at 717 Wagner Avenue in Fleischmanns, Delaware County, New York. Mr. Biglin observed that the office was padlocked and no employees were present. R 50. The SIU report further indicates that Mr. Biglin conducted several interviews. William Hrazanek confirmed that he had offered plaintiff a position, but he could not recall the salary. Mr. Hrazanek also confirmed that his business was damaged in Hurricane Irene and he had been out of business for the past six months. He was hoping to reopen in the summer of 2014, pending a settlement with FEMA. R 57. In addition, two employees of Mr. Hrazanek told Mr. Biglin that VW Parts, Inc. was being liquidated due to Hurricane Irene. R 50. 5 Based on the interviews, Mr. Biglin recommended an Examination Under Oath (EUO) of plaintiff. However, the-EUO would have to be handled by outside counsel because GEICO staff counsel had represented plaintiff in the past. R 51. It appears that the EUO did not take place. By letter dated November 27, 2013, plaintiff informed GEICO that William Hrazanek would be calling GEICO. The letter further advised that Mr. Hrazanek said he never received the NF-6 form. Plaintiff asked GEICO to send him the form so he could forward it to Mr. Hrazanek. R 88. On December 5, 2013, GEICO wrote to plaintiff and acknowledged receipt of his November 27 letter. GEICO informed plaintiff that it needed the following information in order to process his lost wage claim: the complete name, address and phone number of the employer; a letter of offered employment to plaintiff from the employer addressed on the company’s letterhead; a completed and signed NF-6 form received directly from the employer; and the salary and pay period offered. R 90. In May 2014, plaintiff commenced this action against GEICO. He alleged that GEICO had refused to pay No-Fault benefits for lost wages to which he was entitled. R 24-27. GEICO’s answer denied liability and asserted the affirmative defense of plaintiff’s failure to provide proper verification. R 28-31. GEICO moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. R 8. The evidence submitted in support of the motion included the correspondence between GEICO and plaintiff; the deposition testimony of plaintiff, William Hrazanek and a GEICO representative; GEICO’s SIU case report; and certified employee earnings records for YW Parts. 6 In opposition to GEICO’s motion, plaintiff submitted his own affidavit. R 411-414. He asserted that in December 2012, VW Parts “was one of the largest dealers of Volkswagen and Audi parts in the country.” R 411. Plaintiff explained that he had many years of experience with Volkswagen and Audi parts. In his opinion, his “expertise . . . would likely have helped [VW Parts] to remain profitable.” R 412. Plaintiff also asserted that he would have obtained other employment if VW Parts became insolvent after he started working there. However, the injuries he sustained in the automobile accident prevented him from working anywhere. R 412-413. Plaintiff asserted that he likely would have been employed by VW Parts from January 2013 until sometime in 2014 when Mr. Hrazanek sold the business. Plaintiff further noted that he was acquainted with the purchaser of VW Parts, and that individual might have retained plaintiff as an employee. R 412. Supreme Court, Ulster County (Gilpatric, J.), denied GEICO’s motion for summary judgment. The Court concluded “that based upon the conflicting testimonies produced by the parties there remains questions of fact as to whether or not the plaintiff would have been able to begin work in January 2013 for the salary of $2,000 per week at VW Parts if not for the collision that caused his injuries.” R 6. ARGUMENT POINT I GEICO DEMONSTRATED THAT PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FUTURE EARNINGS WERE NOT “REASONABLY PROJECTED,” AND PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO RAISE A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT. The Legislature enacted the No-Fault Law “primarily to assure ‘that every auto accident victim will be compensated for substantially all of his economic loss, promptly and without 7 regard to fault.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Cos, v. Brooks, 78 A.D.2d 456, 458 (4th Dept. 1981), quoting Governor's Memorandum, NY Legis Ann, 1973, p 298. With respect to compensation for lost earnings, the Legislature intended “to prevent both windfall recovery to injured persons and financial hardship to insurance carriers.” Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.. 49 N.Y.2d 451, 457 (1980). Rather, the goal is “to compensate the accident victim for the earnings he or she would have, in fact realized, while, at the same time, ensuring that an unjustified financial burden is not thrust upon the insurance companies which would eventually be reflected in higher insurance premiums.” Id. (emphasis added). Insurance Law § 5102 (a)(2) provides that “basic economic” loss includes “[l]oss of earnings from work which the person would have performed had he not been injured.” The regulations regarding measurement of no-fault benefits state: “Toss of earnings from work’ shall be determined by adjusting the actual earnings at the time of the accident to account for certain variables such as seasonal employment, demonstrated future earnings and discharge from employment. The regulations are a rational interpretation of the statutory requirement that an injured party be reimbursed for wages he would have earned had he not been injured. Under the regulations, the amount of earnings a person was receiving at the time of an accident is to be modified to reflect the actual situation. Both upward and downward modifications are allowed. The legislative intent is to determine as accurately as possible the claimant's actual loss.” Brooks. 78 A.D.2d at 459 (emphasis added). With respect to future earnings, the no-fault regulations provide that “[ljoss of earnings . from work shall not necessarily be limited to the applicant’s actual level of earnings at the time of the accident, but may also include demonstrated future earnings reasonably projected.” 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.16 (b)(3) (emphasis added). The Third Department has concluded that “the language of both the statute and the regulation contemplates a degree of certainty in the calculation of lost wages.” Sharpe v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 14 A.D.3d 774, 775 (3d Dept. 2005). 8 In Sharpe, the Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s order granting Allstate’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs claim for lost wages on the ground that it was too speculative. The plaintiff was unemployed and was not receiving unemployment insurance benefits when he sustained a knee injury in an automobile accident. Seven months after the accident, the plaintiff took and passed an examination for entry into the State Police. He entered the State Police Academy about two years later, after obtaining a deferment for knee surgery and rehabilitation so that he could pass the physical exam. The plaintiff sought $24,000 in lost wages, alleging that his injury delayed his employment as a State Police trooper and that he took a lower paying job during the period of delay. However, the court concluded that his claim was “entirely speculative” and lacked the degree of certainty required to obtain an award of lost wages under the No-Fault law. 14 A.D.3d at 775. Similarly, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stack, the Second Department concluded that the plaintiffs claim for lost earnings under the No-Fault law lacked “reasonable certainty.” 55 A.D.3d 594, 595 (2d Dept. 2008). The plaintiff was self-employed and testified at a non-jury trial that “after the accident he was unable to maintain his real estate business and stock market portfolio in the manner to which he was accustomed.” Id. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s judgment dismissing the claim for lost wages because the plaintiffs testimony “was insufficient in the absence of financial records, such as tax returns, to establish his alleged lost earnings with reasonable certainty.” Id. The rule in the no-fault context is consistent with the general principle that “loss of earnings must be established with reasonable certainty and the initial burden of proving lost wages is on the claimant.” Faas v. State. 249 A.D.2d 731, 732-733 (3d Dept. 1998) (internal 9 citations omitted) (the claimant’s request for an award of lost wages was properly denied because “the only evidence submitted in support of this claim was claimant's testimony regarding the limitations caused by his injury and the number of days missed from work; such testimony, unaccompanied as it was by any documentation such as pay stubs or tax returns, lacked sufficient detail to support an award for lost wages.”); see O’Brien v. Mbugua. 49 A.D.3d 937, 937 (3d Dept. 2008); Lodato v. Greyhawk N. Am.. LLC. 39 A.D.3d 494, 496 (2d Dept. 2007) (“Unsubstantiated testimony, without documentation, is insufficient to establish lost earnings.”). Here, GEICO established that plaintiffs alleged future earnings from VW Parts were not “reasonably projected.” In August 2011, VW Parts sustained damage in Hurricane Irene. Mr. Hrazanek offered plaintiff a job at a salary of $2,000 per week in December 2012 because he “needed to expand the business and get back on track after the flood.” Mr. Hrazanek “had plans to open up [a] repair shop.” However, Mr. Hrazanek had not even made a final decision about the location of the repair shop. Because plaintiff had experience working at Audi dealers, VW Parts was “basing [its] future” on plaintiff. VW Parts did not pay wages to any employees after January 2013, the month that plaintiff was scheduled to begin work. This evidence establishes that plaintiffs alleged future earnings of $2,000 per week were not reasonably certain, as required by the No-Fault regulations and case law. See Sharpe, 14 A.D.3d at 775. Mr. Hrazanek merely had a hope that plaintiff would help VW Parts to establish a more successful business. The Record further establishes that there was no actual employment available to plaintiff. The parts business was a defunct business as established by payroll records and bankruptcy filings. Mr. Hrazanke had taken no steps to establish a new car repair business as he had not even picked a location for such business or obtained Town approval to establish such a business. 10 Plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to GEICO’s motion failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff offered only his opinion that his “expertise in Audi and Volkswagen parts would likely have helped the business to remain profitable.” This was a business that did not pay any wages to employees after January 2013. Plaintiff was due to start working at VW Parts on January 1, 2013. He can only speculate that he would have helped VW Parts remain profitable and that the business would have been able to pay him $2,000 per week starting in January 2013. Notably, plaintiff’s closed his automobile repair shop in Grahamsville in May 2012 due to financial problems. This shop specialized in Audi and Volkswagen parts, but was not successful in spite of plaintiff’s expertise with such parts. Thus, there is no basis for plaintiff’s assertion that his expertise would have likely helped VW Parts to remain profitable. Moreover, plaintiff did not offer any evidence as to where he would have obtained employment and the salary he would have earned in the event that VW Parts became insolvent. He had been unemployed since May 2012. Plaintiffs affidavit did not raise a triable issue of fact whether his claimed future earnings were reasonably projected. Therefore, GEICO is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. POINT II GEICO WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY OR DENY PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR LOST WAGES BECAUSE THE CLAIM WAS NOT VERIFIED AS REQUIRED BY THE NO-FAULT REGULATIONS. The Insurance Department has promulgated detailed regulations regarding the procedure for no-fault claims. “Within 10 business days after receipt of the completed application for motor vehicle no-fault benefits . . . the insurer shall forward, to the parties required to complete them, those prescribed verification forms it will require prior to payment of the initial claim.” 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.5 (a). Then, “any additional verification required by the insurer to establish 11 proof of claim shall be requested within 15 business days of receipt of the prescribed verification forms.” 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.5 (b). The insurer is “entitled to receive proper proof of claim.” 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.8(f). The regulations require the insurer to follow up with a party who has not supplied requested verification. If the insurer has not received the verification within 30 calendar days of the original request, the insurer shall follow up with the party by telephone call or mail. See 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.6 (b). Simultaneously, the insurer shall inform the no-fault applicant and the applicant’s attorney of the missing verification and the party from whom it was requested. Id. In • the context of medical providers seeking payment from a no-fault insurer, courts have held that the insurer’s time to pay or deny the claim may be “indefinitely tolled” when there is no response to a second or follow-up request for verification. Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v. New York Cent. Mut Fire Ins. Co.. 106 A.D.3d 157, 163 (2d Dept. 2013). The regulations further provide that “[n]o-[f]ault benefits are overdue if not paid within 30 calendar days after the insurer received proof of claim, which shall include verification of all the relevant information requested pursuant to.section 65-3.5.” 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.8 (a)(1). The Court of Appeals has interpreted this regulatory language as follows: “an insurer must pay or deny only a verified claim - that is, a claim that has been verified to the extent compliance with section 63-3.5 dictates in the particular case - within 30 calendar days of receipt; and, conversely, is not obligated to pay any claim until it has been so verified.” Nvack Host), v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.. 8 N.Y.3d 294, 299 (2007). The regulations also provide that the “failure of an employer, or other third party, to provide information necessary to establish proof of claim for lost wages on behalf of an applicant shall not be utilized as a basis for denial of claim based upon late submission of proof of claim.” 12 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.5 (m). This regulation excuses a late submission of proof of lost wages; it does not alter the rule that the insurer’s duty to pay or deny a lost wage claim does not arise until verification is received. Here, GEICO was not obligated to pay or deny plaintiffs claim for lost wages because the claim was never verified. Plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the accident in December 2012. His claim for lost wages was based on income he allegedly would have earned when he began working at VW Parts in January 2013. Pursuant to the no-fault regulations, GEICO was entitled to written verification of the future lost wages. GEICO required sufficient information to evaluate whether the future lost wages were “reasonably projected.” The no-fault application submitted by plaintiff in January 2013 stated that plaintiff “was due to start a new job” but did not identify the employer or provide any other details. GEICO sent plaintiff a prompt follow up letter at the end of January, but it was not until March 2013 that plaintiff furnished the job application which identified William Hrazanek as the employer. As GEICO informed plaintiff in its April and October letters, the job application was not sufficient proof of claim; GEICO required the prescribed NF-6 form to verify plaintiff’s alleged employment and wages. The investigation conducted by GEICO in October 2013 raised doubts about plaintiffs wage claim; the investigator observed that the Wagner Avenue location was padlocked with no employees present, and William Hrazanek could not recall the salary he had offered plaintiff. Again in December 2013, GEICO wrote to plaintiff and identified the written proof it required in order to process his lost wage claim (including a letter of offered employment on company letterhead and a signed NF-6 form). GEICO had not received such written proof when plaintiff commenced this lawsuit in May 2014. 13 CONCLUSION It is respectfully submitted that the court should reverse Supreme Court’s order, grant GEICO’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss the complaint, together with such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper. DATED: January 26, 2017 Respectfully submitted, THUILLEZ, FORD, GOLD, BUTLER & MONROE, LLP Donald P. Ford, Jr., Esq. 14