Brawner v. City of Atlanta

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support

N.D. Ga.November 3, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION KATHY BRAWNER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:16-cv-03792-ODE- AJB DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT THEREOF Defendant CITY OF ATLANTA (the “City”), by its attorneys and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby files its Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof in the above- captioned action. As discussed more fully below, the City respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff‟s race discrimination and retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Plaintiff‟s race discrimination claims based on alleged conduct other than her termination should be dismissed because the conduct does not rise to the level of adverse employment Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 1 of 21 2 actions. Additionally, Plaintiff‟s Title VII race discrimination claim based on her termination should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to this claim. And even if Plaintiff did exhaust her administrative remedies, her termination claim fails because she has not alleged that any other similarly situated employees were treated differently. Further, Plaintiff‟s Section 1983 claim is subject to dismissal because the Complaint does not contain any factual allegations to support municipal liability. Moreover, Plaintiff‟s retaliation claims under Section 1981, Section 1983, and Title VII should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Section 1981 and/or Title VII because there is no causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the termination of her employment; and (2) Section 1983 retaliation claims are not cognizable, as the Eleventh Circuit has held that there is no clearly established right under the Equal Protection Clause to be free from retaliation. Finally, Plaintiff‟s claim for punitive damages should be dismissed because punitive damages cannot be recovered against a municipality. Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 2 of 21 3 INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Kathy Brawner, a white female, is a former City employee who claims she was discriminated against because of her race. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 39). Plaintiff began her employment with the City‟s Department of Corrections (the “Department”) on February 4, 2013, as the Director of Nursing. (Compl. ¶ 15). Plaintiff‟s direct supervisor was Chief Diane Jones, a black female, who supervised the Department‟s medical staff before Plaintiff joined the City. (Compl. ¶ 17). Plaintiff alleges that for the first couple of years of her employment, her “main issue” with the City was Chief Jones‟ “interference with her ability to supervise her subordinates.” (Compl. ¶ 19). Plaintiff does not allege that Chief Jones or any other employees engaged in other conduct that she perceived to be discriminatory during the first two years of her employment. Plaintiff alleges that in March 2015, Chief Patrick Labat, head of the Department, informed her that the Department would not cover her expenses to attend a conference of the American Correctional Committee. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21). Plaintiff alleges that, while her request was denied, the Department had covered the travel expenses for black employees to attend the conference in the past. (Id.) Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 3 of 21 4 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Chief Jones and Chief Labat engaged in discriminatory conduct toward her for the next several months. (Compl. ¶ 23). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the following conduct was discriminatory: (1) Chief Jones and other staff members undermined Plaintiff‟s authority (Compl. ¶ 18); (2) Chief Labat declined to cover travel expenses for Plaintiff to attend a conference (Compl. ¶¶ 20-22); (3) Plaintiff was required to track and budget medical staff hours using Kronos software although she was not provided access to the software (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 44); (4) Plaintiff‟s decision to discipline an employee was undermined by Chief Jones and Chief Labat (Compl. ¶ 25); (5) Chief Jones hired, promoted, and transferred staff members under Plaintiff‟s supervision without involving Plaintiff in the process (Compl. ¶ 27); and (6) Chief Jones reprimanded Plaintiff for failing to attend meetings for which Plaintiff claims she did not receive sufficient advance notice. (Compl. ¶ 36). On July 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Compl. ¶ 12). Plaintiff also alleges that on October 5, 2015, a fellow employee named Pamela Banks filed an internal EEO complaint of racial discrimination on Plaintiff‟s behalf. (Compl. ¶ 28). Further, Plaintiff alleges that on December 3, 2015, a meeting was held in connection with the City‟s investigation of the internal discrimination complaint Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 4 of 21 5 and that Plaintiff, Chief Jones, and Chief Labat were among the attendees. (Compl. ¶ 32). On June 20, 2016, six (6) months after that meeting, Plaintiff was notified by Chief Labat that her employment was being terminated because the Department was “going in a different direction.” (Compl. ¶ 39). LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff‟s Complaint is plausible on its face if it pleads facts necessary for the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the City is liable for the conduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” FindWhat Inv‟r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). However, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions set forth in Plaintiff‟s Complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 5 of 21 6 ARGUMENT I. Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claims Based On Alleged Conduct That Does Not Constitute An Adverse Employment Action Are Subject To Dismissal. Plaintiff alleges various slights that she claims to be discriminatory although they do not constitute adverse employment actions under Section 1981 and/or Title VII. Specifically, Plaintiff finds the following conduct to be discriminatory: (1) Chief Jones and other staff members undermined Plaintiff‟s authority (Compl. ¶ 18); (2) Chief Labat declined to cover travel expenses for Plaintiff to attend a conference (Compl. ¶¶ 20-22); (3) Plaintiff was required to track and budget medical staff hours using Kronos software although she was not provided access to the software (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 44); (4) Plaintiff‟s decision to discipline an employee was undermined by Chief Jones and Chief Labat (Compl. ¶ 25); (5) Chief Jones hired, promoted, and transferred staff members under Plaintiff‟s supervision without involving Plaintiff in the process (Compl. ¶ 27); and (6) Chief Jones reprimanded Plaintiff for failing to attend meetings for which Plaintiff claims she did not receive sufficient advance notice. (Compl. ¶ 36). None of the alleged conduct rises to the level of an adverse employment action, and as such, Plaintiff‟s race discrimination claims based on this conduct should be dismissed. Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 6 of 21 7 The same prima facie case standards apply to both Section 1981 and Title VII discrimination claims. Nettles v. LSG Sky Chefs, 211 Fed. App‟x 837, 838 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class. Id. (citation omitted). “[T]o prove an adverse employment action in a case under Title VII‟s anti-discrimination clause, an employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that “the employee‟s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer‟s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. The alleged discriminatory acts about which Plaintiff complains here are “merely petty slights or trivial annoyances” that do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions. See Rossi v. Fulton County, Ga., No. 1:10-CV-4254-RWS- AJB, 2013 WL 1213205, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2013). For instance, in Rossi, this Court found that the following conduct alleged by the plaintiff did not Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 7 of 21 8 constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of her discrimination claims: (1) denial of access to a camera, Blackberry communication device, and laptop; (2) denial of out-of-state training and attendance at board meetings; (3) lack of input on staff changes, hiring, and promotion; (4) a written reprimand for violating an attendance requirement; (5) undermining the plaintiff‟s authority with her subordinates; and (6) general allegations of poor treatment by her boss. Id. at *10- 17. While noting that “the Court can certainly see that a reasonable person could find that much of the conduct about which Plaintiff complains was petty and annoying,” this Court concluded that “none of the conduct Plaintiff alleges was sufficiently objectively serious or tangible to constitute an adverse employment action.” Id. at *17. Other courts have reached the same conclusion when presented with the type of trivial workplace annoyances alleged by Plaintiff here. See Nettles, 211 Fed. App‟x at 839 (undermining plaintiff‟s authority, excluding him from meetings, and denying him administrative support for a staff trip did not constitute adverse employment actions); Yates v. Ala. Agricultural & Mech. Univ., No. CV-13-J- 981-NE, 2014 WL 1338103, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 2, 2014) (“The court can find no support for a finding that the undoing of a disciplinary decision is within the realm of materially adverse employment actions…”); Graham v. Wal-Mart Stores, Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 8 of 21 9 Inc., No. 5:04-CV-167-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 2810703, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2005) (undermining plaintiff‟s authority and denying him access to a computer, cash register, and the tire cage did not constitute adverse employment actions). II. Plaintiff’s Discriminatory Termination Claim Under Title VII Is Barred For Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. It is well-settled that “a plaintiff‟s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep‟t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “a plaintiff may not allege new acts of discrimination in a civil action.” Roberson v. Allied Auto. Group, No. 1:06-CV-0896-RWS, 2009 WL 1795824, at *9 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2009) (citation omitted). In this case, “the proper inquiry” is whether Plaintiff‟s “complaint was like or related, or grew out of, the allegations” in her EEOC charge. Id. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that she amended her July 19, 2015, charge of discrimination after her employment was terminated on December 3, 2015. As such, her post-charge discriminatory termination claim is barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff is barred from pursuing a post-charge discrimination claim since it constitutes a “separate instance of alleged discrimination.” Martin v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:12- CV-1623-CAP, 2014 WL 118227578, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2014) (citing Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 9 of 21 10 Haugabrook v. Cason, 518 Fed. App‟x 803, 808-09 (11th Cir. 2013)). For instance, in Duble v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 572 Fed. App‟x 889, 893 (11th Cir. 2014), the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff‟s termination claim was barred because the claim “relate[d] to a discrete act of alleged discrimination that occurred after he filed his initial charge pertaining to FedEx‟s purported failure to accommodate.” In particular, the Court in Duble noted that although Plaintiff‟s EEOC charge was still pending when he was terminated, he chose not to amend or file a new charge, and thus he did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his termination. Id. The facts in this case compel the same result. Plaintiff alleges that she filed an EEOC charge on July 19, 2015, and that the EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue” on July 28, 2016. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13). Although Plaintiff was terminated in December 2015 while her charge was still pending, she does not allege that she amended her EEOC charge. As such, her termination claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Martin, 2014 WL 118227578, at *4 (citations omitted) (“Because termination amounts to a „discrete discriminatory act,‟… and because this court does not have jurisdiction over „new acts of discrimination,‟… Martin is barred from pursuing her ADA disability discrimination claim to the extent she relies on termination as an „adverse Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 10 of 21 11 employment action.‟”); Garcia v. Baptist Health South Fla., Inc., No. 12-23765- CIV, 2013 WL 632963, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff‟s termination claim as barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the claim pertained to a discrete act of discrimination that occurred after the EEOC charge was filed). III. Plaintiff’s Termination Claims Fail Because She Has Not Alleged That Similarly Situated Employees Were Treated Differently. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class. Nettles, 211 Fed. App‟x at 838 (citation omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged that she was replaced by someone outside the protected class, nor has she alleged that similarly situated employees of another race were treated differently. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Section 1981 and Title VII based on her termination, and this claim should be dismissed. Here, Plaintiff does not allege she was terminated while similarly situated black employees were not. While Plaintiff alleges she was one of only four white employees, she does not contend she was treated less favorably than any black Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 11 of 21 12 employees with respect to her termination. (See Compl. ¶ 44). Indeed, Plaintiff alleges less favorable treatment with regards to all alleged conduct except for her termination, specifically: (1) “Chief Jones did not interfere and/or undermine the authority of other black employees of Defendant.” (Compl. ¶ 18); (2) “Defendant sent several other black employees to the ACA conference and covered most of their expenses, including travel and lodging.” (Compl. ¶ 20); (3) “All other black employees in the department tasked with these responsibilities were provided access to Kronos.” (Compl. ¶ 24); (4) “Other black employees were afforded the opportunity to be involved in the screening, interviewing, hiring, promotion and transfer process of their subordinates.” (Compl. ¶ 27); and (5) “Other black employees of Defendant were provided sufficient notice of meetings where their attendance was required.” (Compl. ¶ 36). Because Plaintiff‟s Complaint is devoid of allegations that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees with respect to her termination, her termination claims should be dismissed because she has not set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. See Norwood v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 1:13- CV-1231-WSD, 2014 WL 988863, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 13, 2014) (finding that plaintiff‟s complaint did not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” because it contained no allegations he was treated less Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 12 of 21 13 favorably than similarly situated employees); Solorzano v. Univ. of Miami, No. 12-22852-Civ, 2014 WL 12498004, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss where the plaintiff did not “reference a single other employee, nor any similar incident, that demonstrates an employee outside her classification was treated more favorably.”); Veale v. Fla. Dep‟t of Health, No. 2:13-CV-77- FtM-38UAM, 2013 WL 5703577, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 29, 2013) (“[P]laintiff has simply stated that there were other employees that were similarly situated, outside her protected class, who received more favorable treatment…Such a recitation, without any allegations of specific facts to explain how the disparate treatment occurred to even give rise to an inference of discrimination, is insufficient.”). IV. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claims Should Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Has Not Shown A Causal Connection Between Her Protected Conduct And The Termination Of Her Employment. Plaintiff asserts retaliation claims under Section 1981, Section 1983, and Title VII. (Compl. ¶ 1). At the outset, Plaintiff‟s Section 1983 retaliation claim, which is based on the alleged violation of her right to equal protection, cannot withstand dismissal because the Eleventh Circuit has held that such a claim is not cognizable. See Gardner v. City of Camilla, Ga., 186 Fed. App‟x 860, 864 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (“The right to be free from retaliation is clearly established as a first amendment right and as a statutory right Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 13 of 21 14 under Title VII; but no clearly established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation.”); Ratliff v. DeKalb County, Ga., 62 F.3d 338, 341 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (“[E]ach of these cases holds that a constitutional claim for retaliation may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the first amendment, not the equal protection clause.”). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Section 1981 and Title VII, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two events. Flores v. DeVry Univ., 573 Fed. App‟x 833, 835 (11th Cir. 2014); Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2002). To establish a causal connection, mere temporal proximity between knowledge of the protected activity and an adverse action must be “very close.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). “The [Supreme] Court has cited with approval decisions in which a three to four month disparity was found to be insufficient to show causal connection.” Id. (citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)). Plaintiff‟s retaliation claims should be dismissed because the alleged facts do not establish a “very close” temporal proximity between Plaintiff‟s protected conduct and the termination of her employment. As alleged in the Complaint, Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 14 of 21 15 Plaintiff filed her own EEOC charge on July 19, 2015, and an internal EEO complaint was submitted on her behalf on October 6, 2015. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 28). Plaintiff‟s employment was not terminated until June 10, 2016, which was eight (8) months after the filing of the internal EEO complaint. (Compl. ¶ 39). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a causal connection has not been established where eight months had passed between the plaintiff‟s protected activity and the adverse employment action at issue. See Jiles v. United Parcel Serv., 360 Fed. App‟x 61, 67 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district court did not err when it reasoned that the time-frame of eight months does not sufficiently proximate to establish a causal connection.”); Grier v. Snow, 206 Fed. App‟x 866, 869 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[P]ursuant to our controlling precedent, an eight-month time period between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is insufficient, alone to satisfy the „causal connection‟ element of Grier‟s prima facie case.”); DeLong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 211 Fed. App‟x 856, 858 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We note that the temporal proximity between these two events-some eight months-is not „very close.‟”). Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s claims should be dismissed for her failure to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 15 of 21 16 V. Plaintiff’s Allegations Against The City Fail To State A Claim For Municipal Liability Under Section 1983. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant‟s discriminatory and retaliatory conduct described herein was accomplished pursuant to unofficial policy, practice and custom of the City of Atlanta.” (Compl. ¶ 5). Plaintiff does not set forth any facts in support of this conclusory allegation, and as such, she has not stated a claim for municipal liability under Section 1983. The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the “Supreme Court has placed strict limitations on municipal liability under § 1983.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability must show that the deprivation of her federal right was attributable to the enforcement of a municipal custom or policy. Barrett v. City of Monroe, No. 3:15-CV-86-CAR, 2016 WL 6069997, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2016). While an official government policy will support municipal liability, “conclusory or „naked allegations‟ are insufficient.” Cunningham v. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cnty., No. 5:15-cv-480-Oc-30PRL, 2016 WL 1755612, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2016). Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to allege facts in support of a liability theory “that is plausible on its face,” the plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief. See id. (dismissing municipal liability claim in amended complaint where there were no factual allegations to support that the school board “condoned” or Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 16 of 21 17 “ratified” retaliation against employee); Flowers v. Patrick, 869 F. Supp.2d 1331, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (“Simply stating that the Town of Newton failed to train and supervise Officer Patrick is insufficient to hold the municipality liable. Courts in this district have time and again called for something more than a barebones, passing reference to a policy or custom to state a claim against a municipality.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s Section 1983 claim against the City should be dismissed. VI. Plaintiff’s Punitive Damages Claim Fails Because Punitive Damages Cannot Be Recovered Against A Municipality. In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for punitive damages against the City. (Compl. ¶ 59). Plaintiff‟s claim is subject to dismissal because it is well settled that punitive damages are not available against municipalities for Section 1983 claims. Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 247, 271 (1981). Moreover, Section 1981 and Title VII preclude recovery of punitive damages against municipalities. Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1148 (11th Cir. 1986); Young v. City of Mobile, No. 13-0586-KD-B, 2014 WL 2739422, at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 17, 2014). As such, Plaintiff‟s punitive damages claim should be dismissed. See Hajhossein v. City of Statesboro, No. 609CV048, 2010 WL 538209, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2010) (“As properly argued by the City, §§ 1981 and 1983, and Title VII do not authorize the recovery of punitive damages against municipalities.”). Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 17 of 21 18 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion and dismiss Plaintiff‟s Complaint in its entirety. Respectfully submitted, By s/ Anissa D. Floyd Robert N. Godfrey Georgia Bar No. 298550 Anissa D. Floyd Georgia Bar No. 141747 55 Trinity Avenue, S.W. Suite 5000 Atlanta, GA 30303-3520 Telephone: (404) 546-4100 Facsimile: (404) 546-9379 Date: November 3, 2016 Attorneys for Defendant Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 18 of 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION KATHY BRAWNER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:16-cv-03792-ODE- AJB CERTIFICATE OF FONT I hereby certify that the foregoing DEFENDANT‟S MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT THEREOF was prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font in conformance with Local Rule 5.1C. s/ Anissa D. Floyd Anissa D. Floyd Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 19 of 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION KATHY BRAWNER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:16-cv-03792-ODE- AJB CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on November 3, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of DEFENDANT‟S MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT THEREOF with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send notification to counsel of record. (signature on the following page) Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 20 of 21 Respectfully submitted, By s/ Anissa D. Floyd Robert N. Godfrey Georgia Bar No. 298550 Anissa D. Floyd Georgia Bar No. 141747 55 Trinity Avenue, S.W. Suite 5000 Atlanta, GA 30303-3520 Telephone: (404) 546-4100 Facsimile: (404) 546-9379 Attorneys for Defendant Case 1:16-cv-03792-ELR-AJB Document 6 Filed 11/03/16 Page 21 of 21