Bost et al v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. et al

MOTION for Summary Judgment and motion to dismiss

D. Md.July 11, 2016

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND SHARON BOST, et al. * Plaintiffs * v. * Civil Action No. ELH-15-03278 WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, et al. * Defendants * ...o0o… MOTION TO DISMISS and/or FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Carolyn Atkins, defendant, through her attorneys, Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, and Laura Mullally and Kelly M. Marzullo, Assistant Attornes General moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and/or for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56(a), and states: 1. The Eighth Amendment claim is barred against the custody defendants as a matter of law; 2. The Complaint has failed to state a claim against Ms. Atkins; 3. The State and custody defendants, including Ms. Atkins, enjoy Eleventh Amendment and/or governmental immunity; 4. The notice to the Treasurer of the State of Maryland is legally deficient. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74 Filed 07/11/16 Page 1 of 2 2 Respectfully submitted, BRIAN E. FROSH Attorney General of Maryland /s/ _________________________ LAURA MULLALLY Assistant Attorney General Bar no. 28145 Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 300 East Joppa Road, Suite 1000 Towson, MD 21286 410-339-7339 Attorneys for the State and custody defendants Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74 Filed 07/11/16 Page 2 of 2 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND SHARON BOST, et al. * Plaintiffs * v. * Civil Action No. ELH-15-03278 WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, et al. * Defendants * ...o0o… MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CAROLYN ATKINS’ MOTION TO DISMISS and/or FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Carolyn Atkins, 1 through her attorneys, Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, and Laura Mullally and Kelly M. Marzullo, Assistant Attorneys General, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56 (a), submits this memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment of the First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”), and states: I. SUMMARY OF THE CASE Sharon Bost and the Estate of Fatima Neal have filed a nine-count Amended Complaint against the State, the Baltimore City Detention Center (“BCDC”), Ms. Atkins, Shavella Miles, Valerie Alves, Carol McKnight, Gwendolyn Oliver, and Ricky Foxwell (“the individual custody defendants”), Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), ten of 1 Ms. Atkins was served with a summons and a copy of the First Amended Complaint on June 24, 2016. ECF No. 72. Undersigned counsel entered their appearances on behalf of Ms. Atkins on July 8, 2016. ECF No. 73. Ms. Atkins joins co-defendants Shavella Miles, Valerie Alves, Carol McKnight, Gwendolyn Oliver, and Ricky Foxwell as “individual custody defendants” in this case. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 1 of 15 2 Wexford’s employees (“the health care defendants”), and “DOE Defendants 1-50, 2 ” alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, medical malpractice, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death, and seeking indemnification against Wexford, the State and BCDC for the tortious acts of their employees. Amended Complaint at ¶¶1-250. Count I is brought against Wexford, the health care and the individual custody defendants. Counts II, IV and VIII are brought against Wexford. Count III, VI and VII are brought against all defendants. Count V is brought against the individual custody defendants, the State and BCDC. Count IX is brought against Wexford, the State and BCDC. A. Federal constitutional claims against the custody defendants. Only Count I raises a federal claim, alleging that custody defendants, including Ms. Atkins, Wexford, and the health care defendants violated decedent (“decedent”) Fatima Neal’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Count I alleges that these defendants were objectively unreasonable or deliberately indifferent to the decedent’s serious medical needs by failing to diagnose or provide decedent wit medical care, or transfer her to a facility where emergency care could be provided. Count I further alleges that these defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to deprive the decedent of her constitutional rights and protect one another from liability. Amended Complaint at ¶¶153-168. 2 DOE defendants 26-50 are alleged to be unidentified custody defendants working in the BCDC infirmary from October 31 through November 4, 2012. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 2 of 15 3 B. State law and State constitutional claims against the State, BCDC, and custody defendants. 1. Maryland Declaration of Rights. In addition to the federal claim against the custody defendants in Count I, plaintiff alleges that the State and custody defendants violated Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by establishing and following a policy, practice and custom of ignoring detainees’ medical complaints, failing to train medical providers and subordinates, and failing to supervise subordinates. Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 187-206. 2. Negligence. Plaintiff also alleges that the State defendants and custody defendants, as decedent’s custodians, negligently breached their duty to assess the decedent’s medical condition between October 30 and November 4, 2012, and notify appropriate medical personnel of the decedent’s need for emergency treatment. Amended Complaint at ¶¶218-225. 3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. The third non-federal claim against the State and custody defendants alleges that their actions were “extreme, outrageous and unusually unreasonable,” causing emotional distress to the decedent. This Count also alleges that the State and custody defendants knew of the injuries that could arise from failure to treat a stroke, but nonetheless “intentionally refused to notify emergency medical staff” of decedent’s condition, although they could see that the decedent was in “severe peril,” and “intentionally” caused the death of the decedent. Amended Complaint at ¶¶226-237. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 3 of 15 4 4. Wrongful death. The final State law claim is one of wrongful death, brought by plaintiff’s decedent’s mother, Sharon Bost. Amended Complaint at ¶¶238-243. Plaintiff alleges that decedent’s mother, Sharon Bost, suffered mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, and other damages arising from the death of her daughter, the decedent. The State and custody defendants are alleged to have proximately caused the decedent’s death through their deliberately indifferent acts, omissions, policies, practices, customs and approval of such customs. Id. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Motion to Dismiss A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim should be granted when “it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support its claim and would entitle it to relief.” Sec'y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). This Court should accept “as true all of the well-pleaded allegations and [view] the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Lesueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 2012). This Court, however, may disregard conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions of fact because the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999); Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994). “‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Epps v. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 4 of 15 5 JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that “a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A pleading must allege something more than “an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. B. Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery and documents in the record, and any affidavits, show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element … necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. A court should enter summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322. A federal district court has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 5 of 15 6 proceeding to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987). A “complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of [a plaintiff’s] case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial,” and necessitates summary judgment for the defendant. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. Although the court must “draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995), all inferences must be firmly based upon established facts. Carroll v. United Steel Workers of America, 498 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Md.), aff’d, 639 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1980). III. ARGUMENT A. The Eighth Amendment claim against the custody defendants, including Ms. Atkins, must be dismissed as a matter of law. The Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiff’s decedent “was a detainee” at BCDC at the time of her death. Amended Complaint at ¶2; see also Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. (“CS”) §5-401(b) (2008 Repl. Volume) (BCDC is a “pretrial detention facility for inmates committed or transferred to the custody of the Commissioner [of the Department of Pretrial Detention and Services, or “DPDS”]). Because plaintiff’s decedent was a pretrial detainee at the time of the occurrences alleged in the complaint, her claims are not measured by the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, but by the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979); see also Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 33 (4th Cir. 1990); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988). However, the principles are essentially the same as those that apply to the Eighth Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 6 of 15 7 Amendment claims raised by convicted inmates. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166- 67 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). Here, all of the occurrences of the Amended Complaint arose during plaintiff’s detention at BCDC. Amended Complaint at ¶¶1-250. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim under the Eighth Amendment is barred as a matter of law, and the allegations of Count I should be dismissed with prejudice as against the custody defendants. B. The State and BCDC enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity and must be dismissed with prejudice from Counts III, V, VI and IX. Plaintiff has elected to file this lawsuit in federal court against the State and its sub-unit, the BCDC, alleging violations of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death, and seeking indemnification for the tortious acts of State and BCDC employees. Counts III, V, VI, and IX. The plaintiff’s claims against the State and BCDC are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which states: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. An un-consenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 70 (1989) (“States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment”). Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 7 of 15 8 Neither the State nor BCDC has consented to this lawsuit. Therefore, the State should be dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice, and should not be forced to indemnify the actions of any other defendant. BCDC should also be dismissed with prejudice, because it is a sub-unit of State government. See CS §§2-101, 5-201, 5-401 (the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“the Department”) “is a principal department of State government,” the Division of Pretrial Detention and Services (“DPDS”) is a sub-unit of the Department, and BCDC is a sub-unit of the DPDS). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to sub-units of State government, such as BCDC, that may be properly characterized as ‘arm[s] of the State.’” Harter v. Payne, 101 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). When this Court granted in part and denied in part a prior motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment of the Complaint, the Court’s opinion stated: As plaintiffs appear to implicitly concede, their claims against the State and the custody defendants in their individual capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 28, opinion by Motz, J. This memorandum of dismissal was informal in nature, and appears to have omitted by way of oversight the correct dismissal of all claims against BCDC. This Court should now take the additional step of curing that error by dismissing all claims brought against the BCDC, as it is a sub-unit of the State, and shares the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 8 of 15 9 Additionally, the “official capacity” status noted in the case caption against custody defendants Shavella Miles, Ricky Foxwell, Carol Harmon, Gwendolyn Oliver, Valerie Alves and Carol McKnight must be dismissed. See case caption of Amended Complaint, page 1. A lawsuit against a state official in that person’s official capacity “is a suit against the official’s office,” and enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will, 492 U.S. at 70-71; see also Harter, 101 F.3d at 337 (Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to “state employees acting in their official capacity”). Therefore, any official capacity claim against any custody defendant must be dismissed. C. The custody defendants, including Ms. Atkins, enjoy governmental immunity on Counts III, V, VI and VII. The custody defendants are current or former employees of the State and BCDC, sued for liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of their public duties and was made without malice or gross negligence. See Counts III, V, VI and VII; see also CS §§5-201 (a), (b) (2), 5-202 (c) (1), (4) (the DPDS is a unit of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, and the Commissioner of DPDS is the appointing authority for BCDC employees). As such, the custody defendants are entitled to the protections of the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), and other applicable state law. See Md. Code Ann. State Gov’t (“SG”) §§12-101 - 12-501 (2014 Repl. Volume). Section 12-105 of the MTCA provides that “state personnel shall have the immunity from liability described under §5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”).” That section, in turn, gives State personnel immunity from suit and Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 9 of 15 10 from liability for tortious conduct committed within the scope of their public duties so long as the act or omission “is made without malice or gross negligence,” and the State or its units “have waived immunity under Title 12, subtitle 1 of the State Government Article. . . .” CJP §5-522(b). Count III accuses the custody defendants of committing a State constitutional tort. Amended Complaint, ¶¶187-206. Count V accuses the custody defendants of negligence. Amended Complaint, ¶¶218-225. Count VI accuses the custody defendants of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Amended Complaint ¶¶226-237, and Count VII accuses the custody defendants of wrongful death. Amended Complaint, ¶¶238-243. The custody defendants enjoy governmental immunity because the MTCA applies to negligent, intentional, and constitutional torts. Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 304 (2003). None of these Counts contains any factual allegation of malice or gross negligence against the custody defendants. “Actual malice” is defined as “conduct characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud. Lee, 384 Md. at 268 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Gross negligence” has been defined as “a wanton or reckless disregard for human life or for the rights of others.” Wells v. State, 100 Md. App. 693, 703 (1994) (citations and quotation omitted). Because plaintiffs do not allege malicious or grossly negligent conduct on the part of the custody defendants, and have otherwise failed to provide facts supporting any allegations of gross negligence or malice, the custody defendants are immune from suit Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 10 of 15 11 under Counts III, V, VI and VII under the MTCA. Accordingly, those counts should be dismissed against the custody defendants with prejudice. D. The notice to the Treasurer as to the State constitutional claim of Count III is deficient. On April 26, 2015, plaintiffs notified the State Treasurer of their tort claim. See Notice of Claim, attached hereto as the State and custody defendants’ Exhibit A. The notice complains of a single unnamed employee’s “intentional, negligent or reckless acts on or about November 4, 2012,” and was based upon that employee’s “ignoring” and “negligently and inadequately responding to” plaintiffs’ decedent’s complaints of pain and requests for medical attention. Exhibit A. There were no other facts setting forth the nature of plaintiffs’ claim. Notices to the Treasurer are governed by SG §12-107(a) (1)-(5). A claimant is required to submit a “concise statement of the facts that sets forth the nature of the claim, including date and place of the alleged tort,” and also “state the name and address of each party.” Id., at (a)(1), (3). The purpose of the notice is to give the State “‘requisite and timely notice of the facts and circumstances’ of the incident giving rise to the claim.” Conaway v. State, 90 Md. App. 234, 246 (1992) (quoting Radtke v. City of Milwaukee, 342 N.W.2d 435, 438 (1984)). The notice is deficient in several respects. First, it fails to state the name and address of any of the custody defendants. Exhibit A. The notice also fails to claim that any of the custody defendants committed a State constitutional tort by violating plaintiffs’ decedent’s rights under Article 24. Exhibit A. There is also no allegation that an alleged Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 11 of 15 12 “policy, practice and custom” existed, whereby BCDC staff assumed that detainees “were faking their illness[es],” and where the custody defendants and supervisors “actively encouraged” others to “operate under that assumption.” Amended Complaint at ¶¶190- 191. There is no allegation that the State defendants were aware of the alleged “policies, practices and customs” of Wexford through “detainee complaints, lawsuits and reports of deficiencies.” Amended Complaint, ¶192. There are no allegations that the State and custody defendants failed to comply with a Memorandum of Agreement between the State defendants and the Department of Justice. Amended Complaint, ¶194. In summary, plaintiff’s notice to the Treasurer neither complied nor substantially complied with the requirements of SG §12-107 as to Count III. By omitting such basic information, plaintiff failed to accomplish the purpose of the statute: allowing the Treasurer to “investigate, determine [] possible liability, and prepare a defense to the claim” regarding all of the allegations of Count III. Conaway, 90 Md. App. at 245 (quoting Indiana Dept. of Public Welfare v. Clark, 478 N.E.2d 699, 702-03 (1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1170 (1986)). Count III should be dismissed as to the State and custody defendants with prejudice. E. Plaintiff has failed to state a deliberate indifference claim under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments against Ms. Atkins and the custody defendants. The Amended Complaint makes no allegations of any personal actions whatsoever by any of the custody defendants that would state a claim for a violation of plaintiff’s decedent’s rights under the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendments. First, there are no allegations of any personal wrongdoing made against any of the custody defendants. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 12 of 15 13 The Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and the Fourth Circuit in Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 271 (4th Cir. 1994), articulated the legal principles governing a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. 3 In order to succeed on such a claim, a prisoner must prove that the defendant (i) had knowledge of a substantial and pervasive risk of serious harm and (ii) acted with deliberate indifference, a criminal recklessness standard, to the prisoner’s safety. The Supreme Court expressly rejected application of an objective test that would hold a defendant liable if he or she should have known of a risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court explained that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. Thus, for liability to attach, “the official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. See Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 339-40 (4th Cir. 1997) (“actual knowledge of facts from which a reasonable person might have inferred the existence of the substantial and unique risk to Rich . . . not enough to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment . . . [because] . . . the defendant official . . . must actually have drawn the inference”). 3As previously stated in this memorandum, pretrial detainees are protected from cruel and unusual punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Eighth Amendment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n. 16; Belcher, 898 F.2d at 33; Martin, 849 F.2d at 871. The principles are essentially the same as those that apply to the Eighth Amendment claims raised by convicted inmates. Riley, 115 F. 3d at 1166-67, abrogated on other grounds, Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 13 of 15 14 It follows that mere negligence alone is insufficient to constitute a violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments’ prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1987). The defendants’ conduct must involve more than lack of due care for the prisoner’s safety in order to violate the Eighth Amendment, because “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith that characterize the prohibited conduct.” Whitley v. Albers, 417 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Plaintiffs’ allegations against the custody defendants fall far short of this standard. There are no allegations within the Amended Complaint that even hint that of the awareness of any substantial and pervasive risk of serious harm to plaintiffs’ decedent, let alone that any of the custody defendants acted with deliberate indifference to such risk. The Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiffs’ decedent complained about her physical condition to the custody defendants, or made a request of the custody defendants to receive emergency or non-emergency medical care. Therefore, Count I of the Amended Complaint should be dismissed as to all of the custody defendants, because plaintiffs’ decedent has failed to state any facts alleging personal wrongdoing or deliberate indifference on the part of the custody defendants that satisfied the high legal burden of deliberate indifference. III. Conclusion For all of the reasons given, the State and custody defendants, including Ms. Atkins, respectfully request that their motion be granted, and that judgment be entered in their favor on all claims asserted by plaintiff in this action. Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 14 of 15 15 Respectfully submitted, BRIAN E. FROSH Attorney General of Maryland /s/ _________________________ LAURA MULLALLY Assistant Attorney General Bar no. 28145 Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services 300 East Joppa Road, Suite 1000 Towson, MD 21286 410-339-7339 Attorneys for the State and custody defendants Case 1:15-cv-03278-ELH Document 74-1 Filed 07/11/16 Page 15 of 15