Benedek et al v. Adams et al

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM with Brief In Support

N.D. Ga.July 18, 2016

Page 1 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION DEZSO BENEDEK and ANN BENEDEK, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: MICHAEL F. ADAMS, NOEL FALLOWS, ) JUDITH SHAW, JANE GATEWOOD, KASEE ) 1:16-cv-01803-ELR LASTER, JOHN DOES, THE BOARD OF ) REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM ) OF GEORGIA, SUSAN E. EDLEIN, and ) SAM OLENS in his individual ) Capacity and as THE ATTORNEY ) GENERAL OF GEORGIA, ) ) Defendants. ) _____________________________________) DEFENDANT JUDGE SUSAN EDLEIN’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT COMES NOW, Defendant Fulton County State Court Judge Susan Edlein (“Judge Edlein”), by and through her undersigned counsel, and files this Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In support of her Motion, Judge Edlein relies upon the Brief filed contemporaneously herewith. Respectfully submitted this 18th day of July, 2016. OFFICE OF THE FULTON COUNTY ATTORNEY Kaye Woodard Burwell Georgia Bar No. 775060 kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov /s/ Kristen B. Williams Kristen B. Williams Georgia Bar No. 515324 Kristen.williams@fultoncountyga.gov Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8 Filed 07/18/16 Page 1 of 3 Page 2 of 3 OFFICE OF THE FULTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 141 Pryor Street, Suite 4038 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 612-0246 (office) (404) 730-6324 (fax) Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8 Filed 07/18/16 Page 2 of 3 Page 3 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION DEZSO BENEDEK and ANN BENEDEK, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: MICHAEL F. ADAMS, NOEL FALLOWS, ) JUDITH SHAW, JANE GATEWOOD, KASEE ) 1:16-cv-01803-ELR LASTER, JOHN DOES, THE BOARD OF ) REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM ) OF GEORGIA, SUSAN E. EDLEIN, and ) SAM OLENS in his individual ) Capacity and as THE ATTORNEY ) GENERAL OF GEORGIA, ) ) Defendants. ) _____________________________________) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on this day, the undersigned presented this document in Courier New, 12 point type in accordance with L.R. 5.1(C) and electronically filed the foregoing DEFENDANT JUDGE SUSAN EDLEIN’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send email notification of such filing to all attorneys of record. /s/ Kristen B. Williams Kristen B. Williams Georgia Bar No. 515324 Kristen.williams@fultoncountyga.gov P:\CALitigation\StCt\Benedek, Dezso & Ann v. Michael F. Adams; et al. - 1.16-CV- 1803-ELR - (KW)\Pleadings\07.18.16 Motion Dismiss.doc Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8 Filed 07/18/16 Page 3 of 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION DEZSO BENEDEK and ANN BENEDEK, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: MICHAEL F. ADAMS, NOEL FALLOWS, ) JUDITH SHAW, JANE GATEWOOD, KASEE ) 1:16-cv-01803-ELR LASTER, JOHN DOES, THE BOARD OF ) REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM ) OF GEORGIA, SUSAN E. EDLEIN, and ) SAM OLENS in his individual ) Capacity and as THE ATTORNEY ) GENERAL OF GEORGIA, ) ) Defendants. ) _____________________________________) DEFENDANT JUDGE SUSAN EDLEIN’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT COMES NOW, Defendant Fulton County State Court Judge Susan Edlein (“Judge Edlein”), by and through her undersigned counsel, and hereby files this Memorandum of Law in Support of her Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Judge Edlein in its entirety for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs’ Complaint purports to assert causes of action pursuant to 18 USC § 1961 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., O.C.G.A. § 51-6-1, O.C.G.A. § 51-6-2, and Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 1 of 15 2 O.C.G.A § 13-6-11. (Doc. 1, p.1). The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ Complaint relates to Mr. Benedek’s employment as a professor at the University of Georgia, and barely makes any mention of Judge Edlein at all. Indeed, the Complaint is a quintessential example of a shotgun pleading and fails to specifically identify the actions Judge Edlein has taken with respect to any of the claims raised in the Complaint. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to include any facts that would overcome Judge Edlein’s entitlement to judicial immunity. STATEMENT OF FACTS AS ALLEGED IN COMPLAINT While the Complaint filed with the Court is 168 pages long and contains approximately 596 paragraphs of allegations, only a tenth of those allegations pertain to Judge Edlein. The Complaint alleges that Judge Edlein presided over the lawsuit Mr. Benedek filed against the other named defendants in Fulton County State Court. (Complaint, ¶434). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Edlein deprived Benedek of his constitutional due process right to have his cause heard by an unbiased decisionmaker in a fair and impartial forum, while at the same time aiding and abetting Georgia Attorney General Samuel Olens in his knowing misrepresentations and obstruction.” (Complaint, ¶436). Plaintiffs also allege that “Edlein made Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 2 of 15 3 numerous highly irregular rulings benefitting Olens.” (Complaint, ¶422). In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Benedek filed a mandamus action against Judge Edlein based on actions taken during the rulings she made during the above- referenced State Court action. (Complaint, ¶467). Plaintiffs allege that Judge Edlein filed a “meritless claim” for costs and attorney fees against Mr. Benedek under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-15, and also made misrepresentations to the Court in response to his Complaint. (Complaint, ¶¶ 428-429, 464-465). STANDARD OF REVIEW For purposes of a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint's factual allegations are assumed true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hardy v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 449 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006); M.T.V. v. DeKalb County School Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir. 2006). "However, conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Instead, a complaint must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 3 of 15 4 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Accordingly, a district court may “insist upon some specificity in [the] pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,. . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65; accord Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “while notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a ‘specific fact’ to cover every element or allege ‘with precision’ each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a complaint ‘contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory’”) (citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” i.e., they must do more than Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 4 of 15 5 merely create a “‘suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action,’ on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). “Stated differently, the factual allegations in a complaint must ‘possess enough heft’ to set forth ‘a plausible entitlement to relief[.]’” Stephens, 500 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67). The court's inquiry at this stage of the proceedings focuses on whether the challenged pleadings "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Regardless of the alleged facts, however, a court may dismiss a complaint on a dispositive issue of law." Bernard v. Calejo, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (citing Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11 th Cir. 1993) ("Dismissal is appropriate . . . when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.")); see also Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Ague v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F. Supp. Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 5 of 15 6 2d 1336, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2009). ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY I. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is a Shotgun Pleading That Should Be Dismissed. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is a quintessential “shotgun” pleading which the Eleventh Circuit admonishes litigants for filing. See Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 Fed. App’x. 597, 602- 03 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing, e.g., Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, each one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors. . . .”); Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[The complaint] was framed in complete disregard of the principle that separate, discrete causes of action should be plead [sic] in separate counts. . . .")); United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006) (Noting that the complaint was "a typical shotgun pleading,” the court stated, "We have condemned this sort of pleading on several occasions."). Furthermore, “shotgun complaints” are those in which “any allegations that are material are buried beneath innumerable pages of rambling irrelevancies.” Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 6 of 15 7 Cir. 2001). “The defining characteristic of a shotgun complaint is that it fails to identify claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant to frame a responsive pleading.” Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2)requires a complaint to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 does not require that Plaintiffs provide detailed factual allegations, "but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1949. "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. "[A] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 7 of 15 8 Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes general allegations regarding Judge Edlein’s conduct as it relates to her handling of Mr. Benedek’s State Court action lawsuit and her response to the mandamus action, it fails to tie any of these allegations to the actual claims raised in the Complaint. Plaintiffs go to great lengths to identify the alleged conduct that supports the following claims: federal RICO, Section 1983, Georgia RICO, breach of contract, violations of the Georgia Open Records Act, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and conspiracy. However, not a single fact used to support these claims mentions Judge Edlein. Plaintiffs merely state that all eight Defendants, as a whole, are liable under all causes of action, without distinguishing the role each Defendant played. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires that “‘the defendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted against him and the grounds on which it rests.’” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 964 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1997). Because Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to identify the claims being asserted against Judge Edlein with sufficient clarity to enable Judge Edlein to frame a responsive pleading, it must be dismissed. See Beckwith, 146 F. App’x at 371. Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 8 of 15 9 II. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Judge Edlein are Barred by Law. A. Judge Edlein is entitled to judicial immunity. Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled any plausible claims against Judge Edlein, Plaintiffs claims are barred by judicial immunity. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). “This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his or her judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity. Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1265 (11th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Judge Edlein primarily focus on Plaintiff’s opinion that in the State Court action Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 9 of 15 10 presided over by Judge Edlein, that “Edlein made numerous highly irregular rulings benefitting Olens.” (Complaint, ¶422). It is therefore clear from the face of the Complaint that Judge Edlein is entitled to judicial immunity, as her alleged actions meet all four prongs of the test outlined in Scott. Plaintiffs’ only recourse to seek relief from said rulings is to file an appeal to the Georgia appellate courts because Judge Edlein is immune from suit. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are barred by judicial immunity. B. Plaintiff’s Claims Must Be Dismissed Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to review the final judgments of state courts." Shapiro v. Ingram, 207 F. App'x 938, 940 (11th Cir. 2006)(citing Amos v. Glynn Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n. 11 (11th Cir. 2003)). As the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: Rooker-Feldman applies when the following four criteria are met: (1) the party in federal court is the same as in the state court; (2) the state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits; (3) the plaintiff in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in the state court proceeding; and (4) the issue before the federal court was either adjudicated by the state court or inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment. [Citing Amos, 347 F.3d, 1265.] .... Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 10 of 15 11 "A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment 'if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.' " Shapiro, 207 F. App'x, 940(citing Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)(quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1533, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987)(Marshall, J., concurring)). Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint shows 1) that Mr. Benedek was a party in the state court case which forms the basis of his Complaint against Judge Edlein, 2) that the state court ruling was a final judgment in that case, 3) that Mr. Benedek had the opportunity to raise his claims in the state court proceeding through an appeal, and 4) that his claims in the instant case are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment as they succeed only if the state court judgment was erroneous. Because the claims Plaintiffs assert against Judge Edlein meet all four of the Rooker-Feldman criteria, abstention by this Court in the instant case is appropriate. See Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988)-18 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to consider a party's section 1983 claim that “in essence sought to Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 11 of 15 12 reverse a state court's child custody determination.”). It should also be noted that, in general, Plaintiffs’ claims are also barred by res judicata. 1 “Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a claim will be barred by prior litigation if all four of the following elements are present: (1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both cases.” Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc. 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11 th Cir. 1999). Not only does res judicata bar claims that were actually brought in the prior proceeding, but it also bars any claim that may have been brought at the time the previous complaint was filed. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296 (stating that the court must determine whether the claim in the new suit “could have been raised in the prior action; if the answer is yes, res judicata applies.”). Plaintiffs’ claims have been dismissed on 1 In addition, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation: five years for Georgia RICO, see O.C.G.A. § 16-14-8; four years for federal RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961; 2 years for 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003); six years for breach of contract, see O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24; other state law claims deriving from injuries to person are barred at four years or less, see O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33). Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 12 of 15 13 three separate occasions 2 and must be dismissed once again. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Respectfully submitted this 18th day of July, 2016. OFFICE OF THE FULTON COUNTY ATTORNEY Kaye Woodard Burwell Georgia Bar No. 775060 kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov /s/ Kristen B. Williams Kristen B. Williams Georgia Bar No. 515324 Kristen.williams@fultoncountyga.gov OFFICE OF THE FULTON COUNTY ATTORNEY 141 Pryor Street, Suite 4038 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 612-0246 (office) (404) 730-6324 (fax) 2 Dezso Benedek v. Sam Olens, Jane Gatewood, Judith Shaw, Kasee Laster and Noel Fallows, Superior Court of Fulton County, CAFN 2014cv246185; Dezso Benedek v. The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, Michael F. Adams, and the University of Georgia, United States District Court Northern District of Georgia, CAFN 1:13-cv-00939; Dezso Benedek v. The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, Michael F. Adams, and the University of Georgia, State Court of Fulton County, CAFN 13ev016714D. Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 13 of 15 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION DEZSO BENEDEK and ANN BENEDEK, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: MICHAEL F. ADAMS, NOEL FALLOWS, ) JUDITH SHAW, JANE GATEWOOD, KASEE ) 1:16-cv-01803-ELR LASTER, JOHN DOES, THE BOARD OF ) REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM ) OF GEORGIA, SUSAN E. EDLEIN, and ) SAM OLENS in his individual ) Capacity and as THE ATTORNEY ) GENERAL OF GEORGIA, ) ) Defendants. ) _____________________________________) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on this day, the undersigned presented this document in Courier New, 12 point type in accordance with L.R. 5.1(C) and electronically filed the foregoing DEFENDANT JUDGE SUSAN EDLEIN’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send email notification of such filing to all attorneys of record. [signature on the following page] Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 14 of 15 15 /s/ Kristen B. Williams Kristen B. Williams Georgia Bar No. 515324 Kristen.williams@fultoncountyga.gov P:\CALitigation\StCt\Benedek, Dezso & Ann v. Michael F. Adams; et al. - 1.16-CV-1803-ELR - (KW)\Pleadings\MTD Complaint Brief.doc Case 1:16-cv-01803-ELR Document 8-1 Filed 07/18/16 Page 15 of 15