Motion_for_judgment_on_the_pleadingsMotionCal. Super. - 2nd Dist.February 22, 2018Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 02/14/2019 03:19 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Soto,Deputy Clerk Oo 0 NN A Wn NN 10 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 LAW OFFICES OF HAEWON KIM Haewon Kim (SB# 249606) 3580 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1275 Los Angeles, California 90010 Phone: (213) 387-1386 Fax: (213) 387-1836 Attorneys for Defendant Hye Yun Apparel, Inc. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT S21 ELADIO REYES, an individual, ) Case No.: BC694571 ) Assigned for all purposes to Plaintiff, ) the Hon. Yolanda Orozco ) Dept. 31 VS. ) ) DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND HYE YUN APPAREL, INC., a California ) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE corporation; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, ) PLEADINGS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ) AND AUTHORITIES Defendants. ) ) Date: March 11,2019 Time: 8:30 A.M. _ Dept.: 31 EP RES. ID: 222734942581 __TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 11, 2019, at 8:30 A.M. , or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, in Department 31 of the above referenced court located at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendant Hye Yun Apparel, Inc. shall move the Court - pursuant to the California common law - for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Complaint. This motion is made on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state factually and legally viable causes of action against Defendant Hye Yun Apparel, Inc. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 1 0 NN A N nh A WL Oo This motion shall be based on this notice of motion; the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities and request to take judicial notice; the Court’s records in this matter; and any other oral or documentary evidence as shall be produced at the hearing on this matter. Dated: February 11, 2019 "U7 Haewon Kim Attorney for Defendant Hye Yun Apparel, Inc. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 2 Ww Oo 0 3 OO Table of Contents §E5n To 310751 Vo) 1 1 ET LT LE LE ppp 1 California Courts Continue To Recognize Common Law Motions For Judgment On The Pleadings, And Defendant’s Motion Is Timely... ................oiiiii et 3 Plaintiff's First Cause Of Action For Disability Discrimination Under The FEHA Fails To State A Claim Because Plaintiff Admits He Was Not Physically Disabled, As Defined In The FEHR: vosisessssasassssssmmenmmmsss ss s s nes memsassgessssssddalus dubos ssssss 3 Plaintiffs Admission That He Was Able To Perform His Work During His Employment Also Undermines Each Of His Other FEHA Based Causes Of Action... .................... 6 A. Arteaps 9. BYES, IBC: wovvnmnmn a 15555 5 6d 0oamsms § 6 49 5 5 4 5 5 x soniwimomwmses a 5&9 3 4 6 I Court of Appeal’s Rejection Of The Physical Disability Claim... ............. 7 il. Court of Appeal’s Rejection Of The Record Of Physical Disability Claim.. . . . .. 8 iii. Court of Appeal’s Rejection Of The Perceived Physical Disability Claim.. . . . .. 9 iv. Court of Appeal’s Rejection Of The Failure To Accommodate Claim... . . . ..... 9 Since The Allegations In Plaintiff’s Complaint Establish That He Was Not Physically Disabled, And Since Defendant Had No Duty To Accommodate A Non-Existent Physical Disability, Defendant Cannot Be Held Liable For Failing To Engage In An Teractive PIoeeesi. « « » « » » seasons & 55 x x 8 8 5 Kose ws 84 35 § 55 4 § PUESSEEIDS 11 Defendant Cannot Be Held Liable To Plaintiff For Failing To Prevent Disability Discrimination From Occurring Because Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Defendant Discriminated Against Him Because Of A Physical Disability. .................ooooon. 12 Plaintiff's Inability To Establish His Disability Discrimination Claim Under The FEHA Also Undermines His Cause Of Action For Wrongful Termination In Violation Of Public 100) 1 +; P------ TL LT 13 Plaintiff Also Pleads No Facts Showing That He Was Actually Discharged From His Employment Because Of A Physical Disability, Even If One Existed... ....... Mera OBERT... os «00 commas enim sms EEE EE EF ENE EAP PTRTETA S653 5569 68 6 aan 15 DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 1 +5 ~ N O N W n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 a7 28 Table of Authorities Federal Cases Alamillo v. BNSF Railway Company, BELT RDO IPL DDT umn um 5 50 5 2 5:0 emus « 0 6% § § 8 § EOTRMTEDSEEY KE 5 05 898 wesw 12 Bass v. The County of Butte, 197 Fed. Appx. 655 (9% Cit. 2006), - «+ +s» vss vosmamsss anne snes osmmemess ddd §55 608 iumses 10 Gardner v. Federal Express Corp., 1148. Sapp. 3d B80 (ND), Cal BO15).. 5: isasvummasns i245 54 04 0 POumamppdn 55598 8 #6. wmmmes 11 Gearhart v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 27 F. Supip, 24 1263 (1D. Kan, 1998). « «so oc mvmmonmmns xv 35 3.5 € 5 5 tmmoasionse ss a 5.55 5 5 8 6.6 stn dn 2.8 Jackson v. Kaplan Higher Educ., LLC, 106 FE. Sopp. 3d TITER (ELTA ALT). . . . «commons 0 5% 5 5 6 5 % 5 & stmsapnmerise #4 5 8 § § § § 54 gees 2 Leatherbury v. C & H Sugar Co., Inc., O11 F.Supp. 2d. 872 (ND. Cl. 20012).c ss ssoomunoonns ps E545 0% 8 8 pmureensne s #55 65 5 5 660 we 2.6.8 Penny v. United Parcel Service, 108 Fo wld DR LOPE TD Ths nn on 0s 5 5 0 panna 5 § 5 5 % & ¥ i § ENSAROSHES E K 55 5 & § § 555 ESGHN 2,8 Silver v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 200 FE. Supp: Bd 234 (BY. TOIT). + « oc vmmsumamnssnss 90.05% 555 32 nmonmnb bd 558 HLE E10 ETT 00 11 California Cases Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc., 163 Col Bop: 4° 327 (ZDUBY csc 555 5 50 ssmmmsonnn 5 cows 2850 § commamnms sso bh 556888 2,6-11,14 Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc., So oo 165 Cal. App. WE DIRT DIMOY . - «ov vs on nmomomnn 305 nm 5 5 xa xo ehinessns bd 688 LE LEN 6450980 3,4 Bucur v. Ahmad, 2A Cal Ao A” TIS (POLE . o.oo cos sissndnimiin i $5055 E5405 0 TUBEIEYPTEs Eas oss 5 a Cuma 5 City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (Dillon), 18 Cal. 4% T143 (1998). ....... vo... FE - Co ee eur wl Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42. Cal 45 FAT LOTT. oe imcesn so 505 5 5 50 5 55 momismmmmsmmsnat 2 a «8 0 58 8 3 5 LASEEERHDER TI FEFIEERR RET 14 Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, CHL Kon 5 LIS0 QULTY «cossosissoreonssmmmes 358880551 FOEmwontmuauss sss sss sve es 13 Furtado v. State Personnel Bd., SID Cal Pn 47 JH CIOL 5 su 0 550 womans 5 55% 858 3 § 1% PUAN FEE SE EE YS 11 Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4% 34 (2006). . «+ + «cctv eornermmemsessasssanasssnssassssssssssssesnes 2,4,5 DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS il No O O 00 3 a hn Ah WwW 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 =i] 19 20 cad ff 22 23 24 25 26 x 28 Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 18208] App: 4% 1189 BOLT); cosermmsns sn 55655 vv smemvotnns «5% #58 8 5 once 38 «558 5s 5 ows 14 Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Community College District, 22.Cal. APD. 5" 1IBT [ZOLRBY. + cncvommn mo msn wwe ns 5 vs woasmammsnne 0 0 0 8 5 8 5 §ESTREHERE 48 0 BEL #8 HHA 10 Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 166Cal, Atl, 4" 952 (2008); cnsenms ss 558555 506 LEPRIRMBEE BERS 3 HF § FPPCSTRESR BE USL Y £8 F BEd 12 Payne v. Anaheim Memorial Medical Center, Inc., E00 al, mals TOD IOUR common 5 6 5 0 62.5 8 8 5 0 & mein 558 5 8 8 8% Soba FE SESE BRIS 3 Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc., Sal. AD AERE LYIVT YL connamioinis c 5 55 55 6 5 4 5 ws ssn 24445665 § § CAOSEREERFE S138 EERE DEBE 7 Scotch v. Art Institute of California, P30] App. 4080 (OUD scasnrss 5 55 5150 555 FoBEBESS 5835596205 8 ormavrmess ob & 558 45s 00s 12 Smiley v. Citibank, 11 Calo A™ ISB C1000. ; soamsomvmsnn seus sew 0&6 no smesmmns 55d % 8% %% 5 5 RENIGAANDH BSS 05S 5 FEL IEE 3 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4™ 1234 (2006). . « «oc «eee vee eeante tinea esataaaaaane eae 2:58 Stoops v. Abbassi, 100 Cal. Abi." 648 (2000). ..ccc 0 rss essen sisi §EELEREPISAIAEISE HER SUETIIMPYR SEI Barnes rEos 3 Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. , 63 Cal APD A TBO (1998 Youu 5 555 5855506600 romamss scans uesss sommmmmmss 43585 XA 88S 13 Vita Planning & Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc., DAD Cal Bp BYTE LIDTT Neco iw ier m 00 0 45 msm # 8 4 8 8 5 5 5 6 endOAREDERE $54 EF ERA 8 58 3 Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home, LEA LEE TE TI bere rere FETT SR pasa ssl California Statutes Bode Cie Time Ball. ovo sos 50 5 6 50 5 bo 00 oases 5 ¥ 4 68006 8x wuss clas E58 EEE BETTE 3 Gov’t Code § 12900... ...... ee aera wu x A 52821 8 LSA GEER EATEER 1] Gov't Code § 12926... o\vvvevren... RRR 1,4 GOVE COE § 12940... «oo vv vee eee eee eee ee i312 California Code of Regulations Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11065... . cco vvvnnrenernnrrosnnrescssoossasnssssstsonssossssinss 4 DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS iii OO 00 3 a OU» pb» W W N N = 1 N o No No N o no N o N o ~N N o - - - - -_ - -_ p - -_ - o o J aN wn BH Ww No [p t & \O 0 2 aN wn A Ww Ne ] pt = Treatises Weil. & Brown, Cal. Pract; Guide: Civ: Pro. Before Trial (TRET20T8).. .cccomva v2 5 50 5 5 5% nscemmamcnnis DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 1v No ~N O N hh A W 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1s Introduction. This Court should grant Defendant Hye Yun Apparel, Inc.’s (“Hye Yun”) motion for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action in Plaintiff Eladio Reyes’s (“Reyes”) Complaint, without leave to amend, because his own allegations conclusively establish Defendant’s entitlement to judgment. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that he experienced pain resulting from his work, he was therefore “physically disabled,” and he was wrongfully terminated because of his disability: Beginning on or around November 3,2015, Plaintiff began feeling pain in his neck, and back due to the repetitive work/movements associated with machine operation and lifting heavy boxes. ... On or about October 24, 2016, Plaintiff was fired from his position. ...[BJecause of his work related injury, Defendants perceived his (sic) to be disabled and as a result terminated his employment. . . . The above-described conduct by Defendants . . . was against fundamental public policies of the State of California as evidenced by the enactment of the FEHA . .. . Complaint at qf 12, 14-16, 19, 47-48. Defendant Hye Yun, however, is entitled to judgment on each of Plaintiff’s five causes of action because Plaintiff’s Complaint conclusively establishes that Plaintiff was not physically disabled, as defined under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov’t Code § 12900, et seq. (“FEHA”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: “Plaintiff performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants.” Complaint at § 11. Since Plaintiff admits that he was able to perform his work duties “satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants,” Plaintiff did not suffer from a physical disability, as a matter of law. Gov't Code § 12940(a) states “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an employer, because of . . . physical disability . . . , to discharge the person from employment or . . . to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Emphasis added). The term “physical disability” is defined under the FEHA as a: “[P]hysiological disease, disorder, condition, . . . that does both of the following: (A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: . . . musculoskeletal . . . . (B) Limits a major life activity.” Gov’t Code § 12926(m)(1)(A) & (B)(emphasis added). Thus, “[a]t the core of the concept of . . . physical disability under FEHA is the requirement that there must be some ‘limitation’ that makes the ‘achievement of a major life activity DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 1 OO 0 NN Oa Wn pH difficult.” Jackson v. Kaplan Higher Educ., LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2015). It is well established that an employee who experiences pain is not “physically disabled,” as defined in the FEHA, if he or she is capable of performing his or her work duties. Penny v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6™ Cir. 1997)(“[M]oderate . . . pain . . . does not rise to the level of a disability.”); Leatherbury v. C & H Sugar Co., Inc.,911 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Although pain can be a disability under FEHA, it must actually limit the employee’s ability to work.”) Gearhart v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1273 (D. Kan. 1998)(“Although she generally alleges that she suffers pain as a result of the condition, pain alone without some corresponding limitation on activity is insufficient to establish a disabling impairment.”); Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4" 34, 47 (2006)(“To proceed as a physically disabled person . .makes “difficult” the achievement of work or some other major life activity.”); Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4" 327, 346-47 (2008)(“We conclude that Arteaga did not have an actual disability while employed by Brink’s . . . because his symptoms did not make the performance of his job duties difficult as compared to his unimpaired state or to a normal or average baseline.”)(emphasis in the original). Since Plaintiff alleges that he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants,” (Complaint at § 11), he has conclusively established he could perform his work assignments, notwithstanding his alleged pain, and he was not, therefore, physically disabled. Indeed, this allegation is a judicial admission which not only binds Plaintiff, it may not be binding on that party as ‘judicial admissions.” They are conclusive concessions of the truth of those matters, are effectively removed as issues from the litigation, and may not be contradicted by the party whose pleadings are used against him or her.” Sz. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4™ 1234, 1248 (2006)(emphasis in the original; citations omitted). This Court should therefore grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint, without leave to amend. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 2 3 under the first prong of the statutory definition, Gelfo must demonstrate his injury or physical condition . Nn ~ N O N W n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 98 2. California Courts Continue To Recognize Common Law Motions For Judgment On The Pleadings, And Defendant’s Motion Is Timely. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on the California common law, only. Common law motions for judgment on the pleadings continue to be recognized in California after the enactment of Code Civ. Proc. § 438, which established statutory motions for judgment on the pleadings. E.g. Smiley v. Citibank, 11 Cal. 4" 138, 145 (1995)(“In ruling on a common law motion for judgment on the pleadings made by a defendant, a trial court determines . . . a mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly legal.”); Payne v. Anaheim Memorial Medical Center, Inc., 130 Cal. App. 4™ 729, 746 (2005)(“““A common law motion for judgment on the pleadings “ha[s] the purpose and effect of a general 939% demurrer.”’”)(citations omitted). A common law “‘motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself,” because “a contention the complaint fails to state a cause of action is never waived and could . . . be[] raised at a later stage in the proceedings such as by a motion for judgment on the pleadings . .. .” Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home, 42 Cal. App. 4" 1124, 1132 (1996). See also Weil & Brown, Cal. Pract. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial (TRG 2018) at § 7:285 (“The non-statutory motion could be made at any time during the lawsuit, even during trial, since the grounds for general demurrer are never waived.”)(emphasis in the original). This motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore timely. ~~ ieee ins 3. Plaintiffs First Cause Of Action For Disability Discrimination Under The FEHA Fails To Je a Claim Because Plaintiff Admits He Was Not Physically Disabled, As Defined In The __ Under the FEHA, ““[n]ot every illness qualifies a [a] disability” . . . ” Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4™ 1237, 1249 (2008)(citations omitted). The first cause of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint for disability discrimination under the FEHA fails to state a claim because Plaintiff admits he was not “physically disabled,” as statutorily defined. Gov’t Code § 12940(a) states, in relevant part, that: It is an unlawful employment practice . . . [flor an employer, because of . . ! Stoops v. Abbassi, 100 Cal. App. 4™ 644, 650 (2000)(citations omitted). DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 3 NN A A W N 0 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 5 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 . physical disability . . . , to discharge the person from employment or . . . to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Emphasis added). The phrase “physical disability” is defined under the FEHA as a: “[P]hysiological disease, disorder, condition, . . . that does both of the following: (A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: . . . musculoskeletal . . . . (B) Limits a major life activity.” Gov’t Code § 12926(m)(1)(A) & (B)(emphasis added). Thus, “‘“[t]he touchstone of a qualifying [physical] disability is an actual . . . physiological disorder which affects a major body system and limits the individual's ability to participate in one or more major life activities.” Avila, supra 165 Cal. App. 4" at 1248 (emphasis added; citations omitted). Indeed, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11065(d)(9) expressly states that “[d]isability’ does not include . . . conditions that are mild, which do not limit a major life activity . . . .” (Emphasis added). To explain Plaintiff’s admission that he was not “physically disabled” requires an examination of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4" 34 (2006). In Gelfo, the appellant “Charles Gelfo sued his former employer, respondent Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, . . . alleging disability discrimination in violation of the . . . FEHA ... Id. at 39. During trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for directed verdict as to Gelfo’s disability discrimination claim because “the trial court found Gelfo did not have an ‘actual’ disability.” Id. at 44. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s directed verdict because of judicial admissions made by Gelfo during trial which conclusively established that he was not physically disabled. Id. at 46- 48. The Court of Appeal first noted that Gelfo failed to establish that his alleged impairment “limited a major life activity:” To qualify as a member of the protected class under FEHA, Gelfo must demonstrate his impairment constitutes a disability according to the statutory definition. . . . It is insufficient for Gelfo simply to allege a disability or to identify an injury or physical condition. To proceed as a physically disabled person under the first prong of the statutory definition, Gelfo must demonstrate his injury or physical condition (in this instance, a low back injury, whose existence is undisputed) makes “difficult” the achievement of work or some other major life activity. Gelfo failed to make this showing. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 4 0 3 Oa Wn pb \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Court of Appeal explained that Gelfo testified at trial that he could adequately perform his work, notwithstanding his alleged disability, and the testimony constituted a judicial admission establishing that he was not “physically disabled,” as defined under the FEHA: With respect to his ability to engage in the major life activity of working, the trial court correctly observed Gelfo was firmly convinced and unwavering in his belief he could have performed the job Lockheed denied him. . . . The trial court properly precluded him from claiming he had a qualifying actual physical disability, based on his “clear, unequivocal, uncontroverted testimony . . . that he does not have a disability.” Gelfo’s testimony has the conclusive effect of a judicial admission that his physical condition did not render difficult the achievement of any major life activity. 4 judicial admission is a party's unequivocal concession of the truth of a matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case. ... This principle has particular force when the admission hurts the conceder’s case. Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added). Plaintiff Reyes, likewise, conceded in his Complaint that he was able to satisfactorily perform his work during his employment by Defendant: “Plaintiff performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants.” Complaint at § 11. Moreover, like the trial testimony in Gelfo, Plaintiff's factual statement that he “performed his job satisfactorily through his employment” is also a judicial admission, which binds Plaintiff, and may not be contradicted by him. ““The admission of fact in a pleading is a ‘judicial admission.” . . . ‘It is a waiver of proof of a fact by conceding its truth, and it has the effect of removing the matter from the issues. Under the doctrine of “conclusiveness of pleadings,” a pleader is bound by well pleaded material allegations. . . .””” Vita Planning & Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc., 240 Cal. App. | 4" 763, 772 (2015)(emphasis in the original; citations omitted). See also Bucur v. Ahmad, 244 Cal. App. 4" 175, 187 (2016)(““ The admission of fact in a pleading is a ‘judicial admission.” . . . A judicial admission in a pleading is not merely evidence of a fact; it is a conclusive concession of the truth of the matter. . . . ‘The trial court may not ignore a judicial admission in a pleading, but must conclusively deem it true as against the pleader.’”)(citations omitted); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., supra 111 Cal. App. 4™ at 1248 (““Admissions of material facts made in an opposing party’s pleadings are binding on that party as ‘judicial admissions.” They are conclusive concessions of the truth of those matters, are effectively removed as issues from the litigation, and may not be contradicted by the party whose DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 5 Oo 0 9 aA On BA 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | 19 20 21) 22 235 24 25 26 27 28 pleadings are used against him or her.’”)(emphasis in the original; citations omitted). The judicial admission in Plaintiff's Complaint that he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants,” conclusively establishes that he was capable of performing his work related tasks, and, like the plaintiff’s trial testimony in Gelfo, it conclusively establishes that Plaintiff Reyes did not suffer from an “actual” physical disability, as defined under the FEHA. This Court should therefore grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs first cause of action, without leave to amend. 4. Plaintiff’s Admission That He Was Able To Perform His Work During His Employment Also Undermines Each Of His Other FEHA Based Causes Of Action. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he “has a physical disability, a record of physical disability and/or was perceived as or treated as having a physical disability by Defendants. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that because of his work related injury, Defendants perceived his (sic) to be disabled and as a result terminated his employment.” Complaint at § 19. He further avers that “he asked Defendant for reasonable accommodation of his physical disability. However, Defendants never reasonably accommodated his physical disability or possible restrictions. . . . Although Plaintiff provided notice pertaining to his physical disability, Defendants failed to engage in a good-faith interactive process with Plaintiff or provide his (sic) with insurance information to enable him to seek medical care.” Complaint at 128 & 34 (emphasis added). Finally, Plaintiff avers that “[i]n engaging in the conduct described above, the Defendants failed to engage in any reasonable steps fo prevent discrimination against Plaintiff.” Complaint at § 41 (emphasis added). By conceding that he was not physically disabled, because he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants” (Complaint at § 11), Plaintiff vitiated each of his other FEHA cased causes of action. A. Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc. “Although pain can be a disability under FEHA, it must actually limit the employee’s ability to work.” Leatherbury, supra 911 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Thus, in Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4" 327 (2008), the Court of Appeal held that an employee was not physically disabled, as defined in the FEHA, where the employee experienced pain, but was still able to perform his work DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 6 OO 00 NN a Oh WwW ND 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 related duties: “We conclude that the disability discrimination claim fails because the employee's symptoms did not constitute a “physical disability” under the FEHA. Specifically, the employee's pain and numbness did not make it difficult for him to achieve the life activity of working.” Id. at 334. Plaintiff Reyes’s concession that he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants” (Complaint at 11), coupled with the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Arteaga, establishes Defendant’s entitlement to judgement on the first and second causes of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint. In Arteaga, the plaintiff, Carlos Arteaga (“Arteaga”), was employed by the defendant, Brink’s, Inc. (“Brink’s”) as an armored car driver, guard, and messenger. Id. at 335-6. Arteaga “was the subject of an internal investigation into missing cash . . . . During the investigation, he notified his employer for the first time that he was suffering from pain and numbness in his arms, fingers, shoulders, and feet; he stated he had been experiencing those symptoms for a year or two; he expressed his belief that they were work related; and he filed claims for workers’ compensation. Days later, he was terminated based on the results of the investigation.” Id. at 334. Arteaga “then filed this suit, alleging a claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act . . . . for physical disability discrimination,” and “[t]he trial court granted summary judgment for the employer.” Id. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant the Brink’s motion for summary judgment. Id. i Court of Appeal’s Rejection Of The Physical Disability Claim. ~The Court of Appeal held that Arteaga did not suffer from a “physical disability” because the pain he supposedly experienced did not interfere with his ability to perform his work related duties: We conclude that Arteaga did not have an actual disability while employed by Brink’s . . . because his symptoms did not make the performance of his job duties difficult as compared to his unimpaired state or to a normal or average baseline. ... We do not mean to belittle the pain or numbness Arteaga experienced. But those types of symptoms are often subjective, as they were here, and they did not create a problem for Arteaga in performing his job duties. Id. at 346-47. “Inasmuch as the FEHA and the interpretative regulations in California Code of Regulations were modeled on . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, decisions interpreting th[is] law[] may be useful in deciding cases under the FEHA.” Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4" 935, 948 (1997). The Court of Appeal in Arteaga cited numerous federal decisions in which the courts DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 1 © 0 0 NN Oo nh A WLW O N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 held that pain is not a physical disability under the ADA unless it interferes with the employee’s ability to work. Penny, supra 128 F.3d 408 at 415 (“[M]oderate . . . pain . . . does not rise to the level of a disability.”); Gearhart, supra 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (“Although she generally alleges that she suffers pain as a result of the condition, pain alone without some corresponding limitation on activity is insufficient to establish a disabling impairment.”). In Leatherbury v. C & H Sugar Co., Inc., cited above, the District Court likewise held that the plaintiff “fails to show that his condition caused him to be disabled under the FEHA requirements. The fact that he did suffer from osteoarthric knees, among other medical conditions, is not enough. He must also show that his disability actually interfered with his employment . . . .” Leatherbury, supra 911 F. Supp. 2d at 880. As noted in the previous section of this brief, even though Plaintiff alleges that he experienced pain, he admits in his Complaint that he was able to perform his work duties during his employment: “Plaintiff performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants.” Complaint at 9 11. As also explained in the prior section, this allegation is a judicial admission that binds Plaintiff, and which Plaintiff may not refute. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4™ at 1248. Since Plaintiff’s alleged pain did not prevent him from “perform[ing] his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants,” Plaintiff was not physically disabled pursuant to the | FEHA, and this Court should grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action, without leave to amend. ii. Court of Appeal’s Rejection Of The Record Of Physical Disability Claim. In addition, to his claim that he suffered from a physical disability, Plaintiff alleges that he had “a record of physical disability.” Complaint at § 19. In Arteaga, the Court of Appeal held that, since Arteaga’s pain did not prevent him from performing his work duties, and since Arteaga was not therefore physically disabled, Arteaga could not have had a record or history of a physical disability: Given that Arteaga did not have a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment constituting a physical disability - before or during his employment at Brink’s - he could not have been the victim of discrimination for having a known record or history of that sort. Arteaga, supra 163 Cal. App. 4™ at 350. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 8 No O O ©0 0 39 Oa Wn hb» WwW 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Likewise, since Plaintiff admits in paragraph 11 of this Complaint that he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants,” and since he was not therefore physically disabled, as defined in the FEHA, “he could not have been the victim of discrimination for having a known record or history of that sort.” Arteaga, supra 163 Cal. App. 4" at 350. Again, this Court should grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff's first cause of action, without leave to amend. Iii. Court of Appeal’s Rejection Of The Perceived Physical Disability Claim. Plaintiff Reyes avers in his Complaint that he “was perceived as or treated as having a physical disability by Defendants.” Complaint at § 19. The Court of Appeal in Arteaga rebuffed a similar allegation in Arteaga’s complaint because Arteaga was not physically disabled: The company did not mistakenly conclude that Arteaga had, or previously had, a condition that made working difficult, nor did it mistakenly believe that any nonlimiting condition made it difficult for him to work. ... As far as Brink’s was concerned, Arteaga was simply complaining about pain and numbness that had been coming and going for a year or more, but which did not affect the achievement of his job duties. Arteaga, supra 163 Cal. App. 4™ at 350. Defendant’s management also could not have perceived Plaintiff Reyes as suffering from a physical disability because none existed. By his own admission, Reyes “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants.” Complaint at § 11. Once more, this Court should grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint, without leave to amend. ____# Cowvofippedls Rejection Gf The Failure To Aocommodate Claim. Plaintiff’s second causes of action alleges that Defendant failed to accommodate his physical disability: After sustaining work related injuries, Plaintiff had a qualified physical disability, which was known to Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that despite his injury, he could have performed the essential functions of his job. Plaintiff alleges that he asked Defendant for reasonable accommodation of his physical disability. However, Defendants never reasonably accommodated his physical disability or possible restrictions. Complaint at 28. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 9 00 NN O N n n A W N \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant could not have failed to accommodate Plaintiffs physical disability because Plaintiff, by his own admission, was not physically disabled. As the Court of Appeal explained in Arteaga: “I An employer [is not] ordinarily liable for failing to accommodate a disability of which it had no knowledge.” . . . Brink’s had no knowledge of a disability because, as we have explained, Arteaga did not have one. The company eventually learned that Arteaga had pain and numbness, but those symptoms did not interfere with the performance of his job. Nor did Arteaga have an alleged disability that was obvious or visible, such as blindness or paralysis. Arteaga, supra 163 Cal. App. 4" at 349 (citations omitted). Like Brink’s in the Arteaga case, even if Defendant Hye Yun had been informed that Plaintiff was experiencing pain, it still had no notice that Reyes was suffering from a physical disability, as defined in the FEHA, requiring accommodation because, as Plaintiff states, he continued to perform his work satisfactorily. Complaintatq 11. The existence of a physical disability, as defined in the FEHA, is one of the required legal elements for a failure to accommodate cause of action. “There are three elements to a failure to accommodate action: ‘(1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions of the position); and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability.” Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Community College District, 22 Cal. App. 5" 1187, 1193-94 (2018)(emphasis added; citations omitted). If the employee does not have a physical disability that is covered by the FEHA, such as where the employee is capable of performing his or her duties, then there is no duty to accommodate. Bass v. The County of Butte, 197 Fed. Appx. 655, 657 (9" Cir. 2006)(“To qualify for accommodation, a claimant must meet the statutory definition of “disabled”. . . . ... Plaintiffs Parks and Muldown concede that neither has an impairment that substantially limits his activities.”)(emphasis added). The judicial admission in Plaintiff's Complaint that he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants” established the he did not have a physical disability covered by the FEHA, and Defendant cannot, therefore, be liable to Plaintiff on his second cause of action for failure to accommodate, as a matter of law. This Court should therefore grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first and second causes of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint, without leave to amend. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 10 OO XX 9 A UN Bh WwW N N - N R ND DN ND N N N N = ee a em p m p a e m pe 0 NN AN Lh A W N = O O WV N N DN W N = © 5. Since The Allegations In Plaintiff’s Complaint Establish That He Was Not Physically Disabled, And Since Defendant Had No Duty To Accommodate A Non-Existent Physical Disability, Defendant Cannot Be Held Liable For Failing To Engage In An Interactive Process. The third cause of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “[a]lthough Plaintiff provided notice pertaining to his physical disability, Defendants failed to engage in a good-faith interactive process with Plaintiff. . . .” Complaint at § 36. As explained above, Plaintiff was not physically disabled, as defined under the FEHA, because he admits that he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants.” Since Plaintiff was not physically disabled, Defendant had no duty to accommodate, or to engage in an interactive process related to, a non-existent physical disability. As discussed above, “[t]he essential elements of a claim of failure to accommodate are: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability.” Furtado v. State Personnel Bd., 212 Cal. App. 4" 729, 744 (2013)(emphasis added). As also explained in the preceding sections, Plaintiff concedes in paragraph 11 that he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants,” and Plaintiff was not physically disabled, as defined in the FEHA. Arteaga, supra 163 Cal. App. 4" at 346-47. Since Plaintiff did not have “a disability covered by FEHA,” Defendant had no obligation to accommodate an illusory physical disability. Furtado, supra 212 Cal. App. 4" at 744. See also Silver v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 234, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)(““Employers do not need to reasonably accommodate individuals who do not have an actual disability.””)(citations omitted); Gardner v. Federal Express Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 889, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2015)(“To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show . . . that he suffers from a disability covered by FEHA . .. .”). The absence of a physical disability suffered by Plaintiff because he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants” not only relieves Defendant of any obligation to accommodate Plaintiff’s fanciful physical disability because no accommodation was necessary, it obviates any need for Defendant to engage in an interactive process. “To prevail on a claim under section 12940, subdivision (n) for failure to engage in the DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 11 NN O N na DN oo 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the time the interactive process should have occurred.” Scotch v. Art Institute of California, 173 Cal. App. 4" 986, 1019 (2009). An employer has no duty to engage in an interactive process when there is no possibility of accommodation. As the Court of Appeal explained in Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4" 952 (2008): Federal courts applying the ADA have held that an employer may be held liable for failing to engage in the good faith interactive process only if a reasonable accommodation was available, and that the employee bears the burden of proof on this issue. . . . In light of the remedial goals of the FEHA, which coincide with the remedial goals of the ADA, and the Legislature’s express indication that the interactive process should be understood as it has been articulated by the EEOC, we conclude that section 12940(n) imposes liability only if a reasonable accommodation was possible. Id. at 979-981. See also Alamillo v. BNSF Railway Company, 869 F.3d 916, 923 (9* Cir. 2017)(“The FEHA does not impose liability for failure to engage in the interactive process when no reasonable accommodation is possible.”). In this case, no accommodation was possible or necessary because Plaintiff did not suffer from a physical disability since he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants.” Complaint at § 11. Accordingly, Defendant was not required to engage in an interactive process with Plaintiff, as a matter of law, and this Court should grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint, without leave to amend. 6. Defendant Cannot Be Held Liable To Plaintiff For Failing To Prevent Disability Discrimination From Occurring Because Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Defendant Discriminated Against Him Because Of A Physical Disability. The fourth cause of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to prevent disability discrimination, pursuant to Gov’t Code § 12940(k), alleges that “[i]n engaging in the conduct described above, the Defendants failed to engage in any reasonable steps to prevent discrimination against Plaintiff.” Complaint at § 41. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action fails to state a claim because Plaintiff was not physically disabled, and he was not subjected to discrimination because of a physical disability, as defined in the FEHA. Moreover, as explained in more detail in Section 8 of this brief, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no facts showing that Plaintiff was actually terminated from his employment because of a supposed physical disability, even if Plaintiff was physically disabled. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 12 c o NN O N wn» BN oO 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “Where, as here, a plaintiff cannot establish a claim for discrimination, the employer as a matter of law cannot be held responsible for failing to prevent same . . . .” Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 10 Cal. App. 5" 1150, 1166 (2017). See also Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4" 280, 289 (1998)(“‘[T]here’s no logic that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an employer for not preventing discrimination that didn’t happen, for Hit having a policy to prevent discrimination when no discrimination occurred.””). Plaintiff's inability to establish his claim for disability discrimination under the FEHA because he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants,” and he was not, therefore, physically disabled, precludes Defendant’s liability for failing to prevent such imaginary discrimination, as a matter of law. This Court should thus grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint, without leave to amend. Ts Plaintiff’s Inability To Establish His Disability Discrimination Claim Under The FEHA Also Undermines His Cause Of Action For Wrongful Termination In Violation Of Public Policy. The fifth cause of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is predicated on the alleged FEHA violations described in Plaintiff's pleading. Complaint at 9 46-52. Plaintiff's inability to establish his FEHA based claims, as explained in this brief, vitiates the fifth cause of action, as a matter of law. "In City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (Dillon), 18 Cal. 4" 1143, 1149 (1998), the California Supreme Court held that “when the . . . statute articulating a public policy also includes certain substantive limitations in scope or remedy, these limitations also circumscribe the common law wrongful discharge cause of action. Stated another way, the common law cause of action cannot be broader than the constitutional provision or statute on which it depends . .. .” (Emphasis added). Thus, in Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, supra, the Court of Appeal held that judgement for a defendant was appropriate on a wrongful termination cause of action, based on alleged FEHA violations, where the plaintiff could not prevail on her FEHA claims: “Under California law, if an employer did not violate FEHA, the employee’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy necessarily fails.” Featherstone, supra 10 Cal. App. 5" at 1169. In this case, since Plaintiff cannot prevail on his FEHA causes of action because he was not DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 13 No O O 00 NN OO nn AM Ww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 physically disabled, and, therefore, his fifth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy must also fail. This Court should thus grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action, without leave to amend. 8. Plaintiff Also Pleads No Facts Showing That He Was Actually Discharged From His Employment Because Of A Physical Disability, Even If One Existed. Finally, even if Plaintiff was physically disabled, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that he was discharged because of the alleged disability. Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hen Plaintiff would ask to be sent to a doctor for his worsening pain, Hye Yun management/ownership would tell him, ‘[i]f you’re going to the doctor, don’t come back.”” Complaint at § 15. He then alleges that “[o]n or about October 24, 2016, Plaintiff was fired from his position.” Complaint at 9 16. Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts indicating that he was actually terminated for seeing a physician. Instead, he merely states that he was “fired from his position.” Plaintiff further alleges that he “is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that because of his work related injury, Defendants perceived his (sic) to be disabled and as a result terminated his employment.” Complaint at § 19 (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, fails to describe any facts which led him to be “informed and believe” that Defendant “perceived [Plaintiff] to be disabled,” or that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated because of this perception. “[A] pleading made on information and belief is insufficient if it ‘merely assert[s] the facts so alleged without alleging such information that “lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true.” Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4" 1149, 1159 (2011)(citations omitted). See also Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. # 531, 551 & n. 5 (2007)(“[A] pleading that did no more than assert . . . boilerplate allegations . . . would not be sufficient nor would allegations of information and belief that merely asserted the facts so alleged without alleging such information that ‘lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true.””)(citations omitted). Indeed, as explained above, Defendant could not have perceived Plaintiff to be “disabled” because he “performed his job satisfactorily throughout his employment with Defendants.” Complaint at 9 11; Arteaga, supra 163 Cal. App. 4" at 350(“‘As far as Brink’s was concerned, Arteaga was simply complaining about pain and numbness that had been coming and going for a year or more, but which did DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 14 No ~N O N L h A W 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 not affect the achievement of his job duties.”). In sum, even if Plaintiff had been physically disabled, there are no facts in Plaintiff’s Complaint which show that Plaintiff was actually terminated because of a supposed physical disability. This Court should therefore grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint, without leave to amend. 9. Conclusion. For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should therefore grant this motion for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action of Plaintiff's Complaint, without leave to amend. LAW OFFICES OF HAEWON KIM Dated: February 11, 2019 fog (Xf -~- _~ Haewon Kim Attorney for Defendant Hye Yun Apparel, Inc. DEFENDANT HYE YUN APPAREL, INC.’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 15 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA: I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 3580 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1275, Los Angeles, CA 90010. On February 14, 2019 I served the following document(s) described as: DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES On the interested parties in this action: [x ] BY U.S. MAIL:I placed said envelope in the United States mail, with first class postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California, addressed to the following addressee(s): [ ] VIA PERSONAL SERVICE: I delivered such envelope by hand to the office of the addressee(s) listed as above: [ x] VIA EMAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the person at the e-mail address listed below. Armand Antonyan, Esq. Jack Bazerkanian, Esq C &B Law Group LLP 714 W. Olympic Blvd, Suite 714 Los Angeles, CA 90015-1439 armand@cblawgroup.com, jack@cblawgroup.com Executed on February 14, 2019, at Los Angeles, California. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Chm Christine Kim | , 1 PROOF OF SERVICE REeSCrieuule ad meservauorn | Joullidl 1ecinivivyies LudiL ruta : 2 Journal Technologies Court Portal Reschedule a Reservation Reservation : Reservation ID: 222734942581 Reservation Type: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Case Number: BC694571 Case Title: ELADIO REYES VS HYE YUN APPAREL INC Filing Party: Hye Yun Apparel, Inc (Defendant) Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 31 Date/Time: March 5th 2019, 8:30AM Status: RESERVED Number of Motions: Motions to Reschedule Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Reschedule To: Date: 03/11/2019 8:30 AM Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 31 Fees Description Fee: Qty ; : Reschedule Fee 20.00 1 : 20.00 Credit Card Percentage Fee (2.75%) 0.55 1 Description - Fee Qty Amount $20.55 Amount: $20.55 Account Number: XXXX4699 | = Print Receipt ||
