Opposition_to_motion_to_striketax_cost_MotionCal. Super. - 2nd Dist.March 29, 2016Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 02/03/2020 06:46 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by E. Salcido,Deputy Clerk T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O THE HOMAMPOUR LAW FIRM, PLC ARASH HOMAMPOUR (State Bar No. 165407) COREY ARZOUMANIAN (State Bar No. 278035) NAREEN TOULOUMDIJIAN (State Bar No. 311643) 15303 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1450 Sherman Oaks, California 91403 Phone: (323) 658-8077 | Fax: (323) 658-8477 LAW OFFICES OF DAVID H. GREENBERG DAVID H. GREENBERG (State Bar No. 37950) EMILY A. RUBY (State Bar No. 289433) 6100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1170 Los Angeles, California 90048 Phone: (323) 782-0500 | Fax: (323) 782-0543 Attorneys for Plaintiffs SHANISHA COURTNEY, RAYMOND COURTNEY, JR and MARTEL COURTNEY SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH DISTRICT SHANISHA COURTNEY, RAYMOND CASE NO: BC615223 COURTNEY, JR and MARTEL COURTNEY PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS Vs. [Declarations of Arash Homampour and Christopher Corcios, CFS-Group, DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, Concurrently Filed] LLC, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Hearing Date: ~~ February 18, 2020 Hearing Time: 8:30 a.m. Hearing Dept.: S26 Defendants. N r N r ” N r N r N N a N N N N a Complaint filed on March 29, 2016 Case Assigned to Judge Vicencia, Dept. S26 TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: Plaintiffs hereby submit their Opposition to Defendant Daimler Trucks North America, LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion to strike or tax costs. Defendant’s motion should be denied: Plaintiffs’ costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, legitimately incurred, authorized and allowed by statute, and/or recoverable in the Court’s discretion. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page i T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Plaintiffs’ Opposition is based on the Memorandum of Points and Authorities below, the concurrently filed Declarations of Arash Homampour, Esq. and Christopher Corcios of CFS-Group (and the Declarations’ attached Exhibits), the evidence and applicable case law, the pleadings, documents, records, and files in this action, and such evidence and argument which may be presented at the hearing on Defendant’s motion. THE HOMAMPOUR LAW FIRM A Professiggal Law Corporation DATED: February 3, 2020 Corey Arzoumanian Nareen M. Touloumdjian Attorneys for the Courtney Plaintiffs Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page ii J TABLE OF CONTENTS T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Dn B= W B N N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......ccceviviiiiiiiniiiiinennns II. DEFENDANT CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN ON ITS MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS....ccceviiiiininnnnn. A. Item One - Court Filing Fees............coocooiiiiiiiiiiiinnn. B Item Two - Deposition Costs: Lay Witness Depositions........ C. Item Three - Deposition Costs: “Disproportionately High”..... D Item Four - Deposition Costs: Defendant’s Expert Witness PoE cs sss ios sas ans 6 45 50m 05 0 4 3 0 © 0 5 0 5 044 65 0 5 0 4 0 4 © 3 E. Item Five - Witness Fee for Office DeGuzman................... Item Six - The Fact of Plaintiffs’ Request for Expert WINEss Fees. ....uvniiii ii G. Item Seven - The Amount of Plaintiffs’ Request for Expert WILHENE POR: wns sms amas ams ame somms s ome s 02 5 00 5 69 5 6d ¥ id 5 id 3 0 Bi 3 1. Brian Herbst, P.E.... cco 2. Paul Lewis, MS BME. .......cccooiiiiiiiiiiiin, 3. Andreas Vlahinos, Ph.D., David Bosch, Ph.D. David Stopper... coi 4, James W. Jones, Ph.D... 5. Mark Pozzi, MS FAAFS, FACFE........................... H. Item Eight - Court Reporter Costs..........coovviiiiiiiiiinnnn... L Item Nine - Photocopies. ........ovviiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiieeaens J. Item Ten - “Other Costs” ......ccooviiiiiiiiiiiiieieen 1. Video COStS. venti 2. Vehicle Storage Cost.......ccovvvviiiiiiiiiiiiieiieeenn. K. Prejudgment Interest is Mandatory...............cooeviiiiiinn. 1. CONCLUSION A W W Wn 10 11 12 12 12 12 14 14 15 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page iii T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal. APP.Ath 1017 .ve ee, Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp. (2012) 204 Cal AppP.4th 210... eevee eee eee, Bean v. Pacific Coast Elevator Corp. (2013) 234 Cal. App.4th 1423. ....ot oes Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal. APP.Ath 968... eevee eee, Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal. APP.Ath 49... o.oo eee Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2009) 177 Cal APDP.Ath 876... vee, County of Kern v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal. APP.3d 1107... eevee sees, Culbertson v. R. D. Werner Co., Inc. (1987) 190 Cal. APP.3d 704... ..oeeeeee eee eee Deocampo v. Ahn (2002) 101 Cal APDP.Ath 758... eevee ee, Doe v. Dept. of Children and Family Svcs. (2019) 37 Cal. APD. 5th 675. eevee sees Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal. APP.3d 310... vee eeeeeeeee eee Friends of Spring St. v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092... Gonzalez v. Lew (2018) 20 Cal. APP. 5th 155... eves eee Green v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal. APP.Ath 1363. ...eeeeeee ee eee Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro (1996) 50 Cal. APP.4th 1367....e.eeeeeeee sees, Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 613... 14, 15 11,12, 15 13, 14 12, 13 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page iv T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.) CASES (cont.) Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal. App.4th 1258... coi Ladas v. Calif. State Auto. Ass'n (1993) 19 Cal. APP-4th 761... ..vveeeee eee, Lakin v. Watkins Assoc. Industries (1993) 6 Cal.dth 644... ooo eee, Litt v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr. (2015) 237 Cal. App.4th 1217. cee Martinez v. Brownco Constr. Co., Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.dth 1014... oo. ove os, Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (1977) 71 Cal. APP.3d 803+. eeeeeeeee eee, McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal App.4th 1201 .....ccvveeeeiee eee , Melendrez v. Ameron Int’l Corp. (2015) 240 Cal. APP.Ath 632... esses Morin v. ABA Recovery Svc., Inc. (1987) 195 Cal APP.3d 200... ...e eee eee eee Naser v. Lakeridge Athletic Club (2014) 227 Cal APP.Ath ST1....eceeeeeeeeeeeee eee, Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal. APP.3d 256 vv eee eee San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court (3007) 146 Cal. App.Ath 1545... wooo sees, Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal. App.4th 1121... ..eeeei ieee eee eee Science Applications Int’l Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal. APP.4th 1095... vee esos, Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal. APP.Ath 1550... eeeeeeeeee esses Smith v. Premier Alliance Ins. Co. (1995) 41 Cal. ApP.4th 691... eevee eee 2.39 2,13 15 12 6,7 11 15 1,2 2,3 14 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page v T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.) Page CASES (cont.) Soto v. Borgwarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal. App. 4th 165... .coiniiii ie eeee, 7 Stallman v. Bell (1992) 235: Cal. ADDS TO: acs ams sos 5m 5 mma 5 om 55 0m 5 ma 00 35 mw 5 5 6 2 i 6 Stiles v. Estate of Ryan (1985) 173 Cal. App.3d 1057. .eeniiiie eee 6 STATUTES Civil Code section 320]... uur 14, 15 Cade of Civil Procedure Section 37760): «woes srs wm mes ams same s mes ams 515 5 ais 1 na 6 Code of Civil Procedure section 998...........ccooiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii eens passim Cade of Civil Procegure Seetion 1032. ous umes aus ns ames sss s sss ais sie s 5 4 08 55m 1 Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(a)(4)......coveiiiriiiiiiiiiiiiiieaineannn. 1 Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b)........ccoviiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiianan, 2 Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(b)(5)..ccvvieriiiiiiiiiiiiiiiienns 12 Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(c)(4)....oviviieniiiiiiieiiieannn, 13 OTHER CAT L208 nc: wns ns 5 ii ws 5000 15 550 £5 000 550065 650 6 Bi Bd 5 3 5 4 5 500 £5 08 £5 039 11 Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1)....covuiiiieiiiiiiii ieee eae 1 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page vi T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 30, 2019, Plaintiffs served on Defendant a statutory offer to compromise under C.C.P. § 998 in the amount of $5,100,000, inclusive of costs and liens. Defendant did not accept Plaintiffs’ statutory offer. (Homampour Decl., § 3.) On November 12, 2019, Plaintiffs obtained a net judgment of $12,000,000 - an amount greater than Plaintiffs’ $5,100,000 § 998 offer. (/d., § 4.) On December 5, 2019, the Court executed and filed the Judgment on Special Verdict, and the Court clerk served the Notice of Entry of Judgment on that same date.” On December 20, 2019, Plaintiffs timely filed and personally served their Memorandum of Costs.? Rules of Ct. Rule 3.1700(a)(1). Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Costs as filed and personally served on December 20, 2019, included: (a) the court form Memorandum of Costs (summary) verified by Arash Homampour, Esq.; (b) a four-page attachment to the court form Memorandum of Costs - Cost Bill Worksheet outlining recoverable costs (costs categories: filing and motion costs; jury fees; depositions; ordinary witness fees; expert fees; court reporter fees; models, enlargements and exhibit photocopies; video clips; vehicle storage; prejudgment interest); and (c) over 200 pages of back-up proof for all legitimately incurred costs. (/bid.) II. DEFENDANT CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN ON ITS MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS Preliminarily, Plaintiffs, as the prevailing party, are entitled to recover costs as a matter of law. C.C.P. § 1032; Friends of Spring St. v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal. App.5th 1092, 1103-1104. Section 1032(a)(4) defines “prevailing party” as including “the party with a net monetary recovery.” Section 1032(b) states: “[A] prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” Naser v. Lakeridge Athletic Club (2014) 1 See, concurrently filed Declaration of Arash Homampour, Esq. (“Homampour Decl.”), q 2; Exhibit A, Plaintiffs’ § 998 offer to Defendant. 2 1d., 9 5; Exhibit B, Judgment on Special Verdict. Id., § 6; Exhibit C, Clerk’s Notice of Entry of Judgment. 2 1d., 9 7; Exhibit D, proof of personal service. /d., | 8; Exhibit E, conformed electronically filed Memorandum of Costs. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 1 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O 227 Cal.App.4th 571, 575. A verified Memorandum of Costs is prima facie evidence of the costs’ propriety, and the burden is on the party objecting to the costs to establish that they were not reasonable or necessary. Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266. “Initial verification will suffice to establish the reasonable necessity of the costs claimed. There is no requirement that copies of bills, invoices, statements, or any other such documents be attached to the memorandum.” Id. at 1267. It is only after the costs are put in issue (by e.g., a motion to tax costs) that “supporting documentation must be submitted.” /bid. Nevertheless, when Plaintiffs timely filed their memorandum of costs, Plaintiffs submitted proof of all costs claimed - as a courtesy to opposing counsel and to facilitate this Court’s ruling on the request for costs. (Homampour Decl., q 8.) Thus, where the cost items on their face appear to be proper charges, the verified Cost Memorandum is prima facie evidence of the costs’ propriety and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that the costs were not reasonable or necessary. Ladas v. Calif. State Auto. Ass’n (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 761, 774-776; Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal. App.4th 1550, 1557; Jones, supra, 63 Cal. App.4th at 1266. The Court in Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1128 provided the following “General Rules Regarding Costs”: “Citing numerous cases, we set forth the general principles in Ladas v. Calif. State Auto. Ass'n (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774: ‘Section 1033.5, enacted in 1986, codified existing case law and set forth the items of costs which may or may not be recoverable in a civil action. An item not specifically allowable under subdivision (a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.’ (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).)’ ‘If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or 9299 necessary. Once the cost items are objected to, the prevailing party then establishes the reasonable and necessary costs via back-up proof - which Plaintiffs have already submitted. The burden returns to Defendant to convince the court the cost item was not reasonable or necessary to the litigation, presenting a question of fact for the trial court. /d. at 1128-1129. Defendant’s motion does not meet its requisite burden: “[M]ere statements in the points and authorities Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 2 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O accompanying its notice of motion . . . and the declaration of its counsel are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing (that the costs were necessarily incurred.)” /bid., citing to Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 256, 266. Detailed factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required for Defendant to challenge Plaintiffs’ costs. For example, where “reasonableness” of a particular item is challenged, conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy Defendant’s burden. County of Kern v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 1107, 1113- 1114; Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at 1266. Defendant’s motion is based on incorrect and unsupported legal arguments, devoid of the indispensable factual showing that Plaintiffs’ costs were unnecessary and/or not reasonable. Plaintiffs address each cost item as objected to in the order Defendant presents: A. Item One - Court Filing Fees Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ filing fees should be taxed in the amount of $120.00 based on Plaintiffs’ September 12, 2019 and October 1, 2019 ex parte applications. Because of litigation issues, including Defendant’s position that its experts’ depositions would proceed only after all of Plaintiffs’ experts’ depositions were completed, and to avoid prejudice to Plaintiffs, it was necessary for Plaintiffs to seek (through proper procedures) a continued trial date. The ex parte applications were necessary to the litigation. (Homampour Decl., 4 9-11.) B. Item Two - Deposition Costs: Lay Witness Depositions Defendant contends that Plaintiffs did not need to take the depositions of the following third party lay witnesses: Remigio Bembi ($1,998.12); Timothy Burks ($2,821.10); James Golondzinier ($2,365.00); Brittany Helmer ($2,603.95); Victor Malchesky ($1,529.60); Horacio McComb ($396.50)*; Kristy McCracken ($207.10)°; Oscar Pleitez ($3,547.30); Jessi Sanchez ($165.80)%; Myra Sanchez ($1,695.27); Mark Schuchardt ($3,096.25); Irene 4 Defendant took McComb’s deposition. Homampour Decl., 9 15-16, Exhibit F. > Defendant took McCracken’s deposition. /d., Exhibit G. ® Defendant took J. Sanchez’s deposition. /d., Exhibit H. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 3 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Villareal ($1,212.10); Eric Beltran ($130.50)". Total: $21,768.59. To properly prepare this case including for trial, these lay witnesses needed to be deposed. (Homampour Decl., § 12.) It should be noted that Defendant took four of the objected to depositions. Total cost for those four: $899.90. (/d., 9 16.) The depositions and costs incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (/d., § 17.) For example: Plaintiffs had to take the depositions of witnesses Helmer, Pleitez, and Schuchardt, the L.A. Dept. of Forensic Lab examiners who tested decedent’s blood, in the event Defendant disputed foundation. Ms. Helmer conducted the ELISA testing for 5 different classes of drugs - all “ND” - not detected. Mr. Pleitez performed the CO2 testing (54% saturation). When Plaintiffs took Mr. Pleitez’s deposition, Plaintiffs still had their theory that a CO2 cab leak may have been the cause of the truck veering off the road. (/bid.) Mr. Schuchardt tested for ethanol (negative), important to rebut any claim of intoxication. Additionally, witness and coroner Kristy McCracken was the medical examiner investigator who was on scene during the removal of the decedent’s body.® The Court in Culbertson v. R. D. Werner Co., Inc. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 704, 711- 712 rejected the argument that the numerous depositions taken were not merited, stating “it is obvious that such discovery was mandated by the nature of plaintiff’s complaint.” C. Item Three - Deposition Costs: “Disproportionately High” This objected to cost item (Motion, 3:24-5:17) is described as “disproportionately high” deposition costs; but, Defendant cites no real facts in support - only conclusory statements. The little support cited is a comparison of costs Defendant incurred “for deposing plaintiffs experts.” The depositions were necessary, the costs incurred are reasonable and typical based on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s experience, and these are the actual, incurred costs charged by the third party vendors. (/d., § 22.) Expedited transcripts were necessary where Defendant offered its experts for depositions on the brink of trial, or where depositions preceded the imminent taking of another expert’s deposition. (/d., § 21.) 7 Defendant took Beltran’s deposition. /d., Exhibit I. 8 Set forth at Appendix 1 to this Opposition, and incorporated herein, is a chart summary setting forth the information these lay witnesses, whom Plaintiffs deposed, had to offer. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 4 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O The courts hold that “expedited transcripts costs” for “expert witnesses deposed close to trial” are “justified.” Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal. App.4th 49, 55. D. Item Four - Deposition Costs: Defendant’s Expert Witness Fees 9 Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ “more favorable judgment” and § 998(d), the Court in its discretion may order Defendant to pay reasonable expert witness fees and costs - including reimbursement for expert deposition fees paid to the opposing, non-settling party’s expert. Chaaban, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 54-55, where the Court acknowledged that “[w]e have not found any published opinions directly addressing this issue. The policy behind section 998, however, supports the principle that a non-settling [party] is at least potentially liable for all expert fees. The policy is plain. It is to encourage settlement. . . . The ‘stick’ portion of section 998’s carrot-and-stick incentive is better served by including all experts within its purview. We therefore hold that section 998 . . . gives the trial court the discretion to award . .. expert fees, regardless of whose witness the expert is.” Ibid. ; italics added. Just as the prevailing party is allowed all expert costs, whether for Plaintiffs’ or Defendant’s experts, the same is true regarding expert deposition fees. Section 998(d) expressly does not demarcate or distinguish between party fees. See, e.g., Martinez v. Brownco Constr. Co., Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014, 1026-1027. The fees and costs to take Defendant’s expert witnesses’ depositions were actually incurred; it was necessary for Plaintiffs to take these depositions to properly prepare litigation strategy and for trial. (Homampour Decl., 423.) E. Item Five - Witness Fee for Officer DeGuzman Defendant took the deposition of Officer DeGuzman. (Homampour Decl., 9 24; Exhibit J.) This is not a proper subject for Defendant’s motion to strike/tax costs. F. Item Six - The Fact of Plaintiffs’ Request for Expert Witness Fees Plaintiffs’ § 998 offer to Defendant was valid. Defendant disputes Plaintiffs’ expert witness fees contending Plaintiffs’ was an invalid statutory offer. A comparison of Plaintiffs’ judgment $12,000,000 to their $5,100,000 joint section 998 offer makes it clear that Plaintiffs prevailed and recovered more than their statutory offer. Furthermore, this is a Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 5 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O wrongful death case and Plaintiffs pursued a single joint cause of action. Plaintiffs had a “unity of interest such that there was a single, indivisible injury” - the death of their mother. C.C.P. § 377.60; Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 803. We know there was a “unity of interest” and an “indivisible injury” because if any of the Plaintiffs separately filed their own action, such separate and independent action could not be maintained. /d. at 806; Smith v. Premier Alliance Ins. Co. (1995) 41 Cal. App.4th 691, 696; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal. App.4th 1545, 1551. Heirs cannot bring a series of suits against the tortfeasor for their individual damages. Multiple plaintiffs making a single § 998 offer to a single defendant in a wrongful death action does not pose the uncertainties that cause the courts to find a § 998 offer invalid. “Where a single joint cause of action is given to all heirs, who must bring one action, and where the judgment must be for a single lump sum even though the heirs share the damages in proportion to their loss, there would appear to be little, if any, justification for invalidating a joint offer.” Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal. App.4th 613, 630 (emphasis added). In the end, there is but a single judgment “to be compared to a single offer, and from this comparison it can be clearly determined whether or not the (plaintiffs) received a more favorable judgment.” McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1207. Merely because the “single lump sum” is concurrently allocated by the jury (when the verdict is rendered), or is later allocated by the Court, does not alter the indivisible nature of a wrongful death claim, and the single judgment damages awarded thereon. Johnson, 28 Cal. App.4th at 630. The courts or the jury allocate the wrongful death judgment, the Plaintiffs do not. Thus, the Court in Johnson reasoned, based on Stallman v. Bell (1992) 235 Cal.App.3d 740, “Where a single joint cause of action is given to all heirs, who must bring one action . . . and where the judgment must be for a single lump sum even though the heirs share the damages in proportion to their loss . . . there would appear to be little, if any, justification for invalidating a joint offer.” Johnson, 28 Cal. App.4th at 630 (italics in original). Multiple plaintiffs’ joint section 998 offer to a single defendant in a wrongful death action is valid. It is up to the court or the jury, not the parties, to apportion the award. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 6 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Accordingly, the reasons for requiring multiple plaintiffs to apportion a section 998 offer do not apply. McDaniel, 214 Cal. App.4th at 1208. The concern about the defendant not having the opportunity to evaluate the distinct loss suffered by each plaintiff as a result of the wrongful death does not exist. It is up to the court, or the jury - not the plaintiffs - to apportion the award. McDaniel, 214 Cal. App.4th at 1207; Soto v. Borgwarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165, 198-199 - the jury allocated $2 million in damages to each plaintiff. Furthermore, where there are multiple plaintiffs making a single § 998 offer to a single wrongful death defendant - the “overriding purpose of § 998 - to encourage pretrial settlement of litigation” - remains intact. Gonzalez v. Lew (2018) 20 Cal. App.5th 155, 160. This is because multiple plaintiffs making an unallocated § 998 offer to a single defendant does not require: (1) an agreement amongst the party members receiving the offer (offeree) to settle the case (there is only one defendant); (2) an allocation between multiple offerees as to which offeree is liable in what amount; and (3) a concern about a hold-out offeree who is unwilling to settle, holding the other offerees hostage. A judgment in a wrongful death action - which is later apportioned by the court, or concurrently apportioned by the jury - is a “lump sum.” Comparing the $12,000,000 “lump sum” judgment here with Plaintiffs’ statutory $5,100,000 “lump sum” offer, makes it clear that Plaintiffs prevailed. Plaintiffs’ request for expert witness fees is proper. G. Item Seven - The Amount of Plaintiffs’ Request for Expert Witness Fees 1. Brian Herbst, P.E. Plaintiffs retained Brian Herbst as a consultant. (Homampour Decl., 4 26.) Mr. Herbst is a Professional Mechanical Engineer, and a senior engineer in the automotive engineering firm SAFE Laboratories, LLC and SAFE, LP - independent automotive safety research facility and testing laboratory. (/bid.) Plaintiffs retained Mr. Herbst to evaluate the crashworthiness of the subject 2009 Freightliner Columbia truck. Mr. Herbst was instrumental in the course of this litigation, and Plaintiffs’ preparation for trial. (/d., 4 27.) On March 13, 2017, Mr. Herbst personally inspected the remains of the subject truck. Mr. Herbst additionally reviewed most of the 4,581 documents Defendant had produced as of early Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 7 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O January 2018. By early January 2018, Mr. Herbst ascertained additional materials needed from Defendant so that he could supplement or complete his engineering analyses of the subject truck. Ultimately, it was necessary for Plaintiffs to file a Motion to Compel to obtain those critical materials from Defendant. Working with counsel, Mr. Herbst prepared a Supplemental Confidential, detailed Declaration, which was filed under Seal pursuant to Protective Order, in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. That Declaration set forth Mr. Herbst’s “General Opinions,” as well as “Specific Opinions.” (Id., 4 28.) Mr. Herbst’s Supplemental Declaration filed in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel manifests the significant amount of Mr. Herbst’s analyses, work, testing, and investigatory work, backed by years of experience and education, and underscores the propriety of Plaintiffs’ fee and cost request for this expert/consultant. (/bid.) It is now well-established that the discretionary allowance for expert witnesses includes fees and costs for retained consultants who are never designated. The Court in Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp. (2012) 204 Cal. App.4th 210, 222 stated: “Although the statute refers to expert witnesses, courts have recognized that ‘section 998 . . . covers the cost of experts who aid in the preparation of the case for trial, even if they do not actually 299 testify” - which includes an expert “retained as a consultant only and never designated as a witness.” Ibid. This cost request is proper. 2 Paul Lewis, MS BME Defendant contends that because the Court granted its motion in limine with respect to expert Paul Lewis, his fee was “not necessary.” Motion in limine exclusion of an expert’s trial testimony does not establish that the expert’s opinions, assistance, deposition testimony, and trial testimony preparations were not “reasonably necessary to prepare for trial” - or were not “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.” Chaaban, 203 Cal. App.4th at 54; Stiles v. Estate of Ryan (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1066 (fees for experts who testified on a conceded issue properly awarded as costs); Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 310, 317-318 (fee of potential expert witness is a recoverable cost item even if that expert does not actually testify at trial). Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page § T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Plaintiffs designated Mr. Lewis as an expert witness.” “The reasonableness of the expert costs is readily ascertainable from counsel’s expert disclosure declaration. . . .” Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at 1268. Mr. Lewis was essential to issues of liability and causation. This case involved thousands of pages of documents; Mr. Lewis reviewed voluminous records and depositions. (Homampour Decl., § 30.) Mr. Lewis prepared for and testified at deposition. Mr. Lewis expected and was prepared to testify at trial. On October 28, 2019, the Court granted Defendant’s motion in limine to preclude Mr. Lewis from testifying in Plaintiffs’ case in chief - but left open rebuttal testimony. Significantly, Mr. Lewis was necessary to counter any contention that the decedent died before the fire, and to establish she passed as a result of the fire. Mr. Lewis’ opinions, guidance, and assistance during litigation and pre-trial were important Plaintiffs to conduct a focused litigation strategy and prepare for trial in this case. Mr. Lewis provided consulting and rebuttal analyses and collaborative support. Mr. Lewis’ fees and costs were actually incurred, reasonable, and standard for a witness with his expertise, in this type of litigation (and he is in Roswell, GA). (/bid.) 3. Andreas Vlahinos, Ph.D., David Bosch, Ph.D., David Stopper Plaintiffs designated Dr. Andreas Vlahinos to testify regarding the various alternative designs for, and a “safety hierarchy analysis” of, the subject truck. (Homampour Decl., 4 31.) His testimony was to include opinions regarding defective conditions of the subject fuel system, and structural connections as related to occupant safety.!? Dr. Vlahinos was to provide an opinion/drawings regarding bumper support for the subject truck. Dr. Vlahinos additionally had knowledge about the Actros truck, including in relation to Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative designs. (/bid.) Dr. Bosch’s work and expected testimony related to how fuel tanks and their delivery systems operate on Commercial Motor Vehicles (CMV), and matters related to Plaintiffs’ A true and correct copy of Plaintiffs’ September 3, 2019 C. Civ. Proc. § 2034.210(a)(b)(c) expert witness disclosure and supporting Declaration of Corey Arzoumanian (“Arzoumanian Decl.” - without Exhibits) is attached to the concurrently filed Homampour Decl. as Exhibit K. Expert Paul Lewis’ designation is at Exhibit K, disclosure, q 1; Arzoumanian Decl., q 2. 10 See, Exhibit K, Arzoumanian Decl., § 8, appended to Plaintiffs’ Expert Designation. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 9 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O alternative design.!! (Id., J 32.) Dr. Bosch worked with expert Mark Pozzi to collaboratively design and fabricate a fuel tank/system. The experts established that a CMV can be driven with a behind-the-cab fuel tank/system. David Stopper is a Freightliner truck owner/operator and was expected to testify about Plaintiffs’ alternative design feasibility from a trucker’s perspective, e.g., that the behind-the- cab fuel tank would not interfere with the truck’s operations, maneuverability, and safety management controls. (/d., § 33.)!? This was a complex case, involving a CMV, accident reconstruction, testing, vehicle design issues, component design issues, alternative designs, regulations, and a myriad of other multi-faceted considerations and concerns. All three experts assisted Plaintiffs in innumerable ways, including with analyses, strategies, litigation and pre-trial preparation. The three experts were essential to issues of liability and causation. (/d., 9 34.) These experts expected and were prepared to testify at trial. It was not until the October 28, 2019 pre-trial events and discussions regarding motions in limine that Plaintiffs decided to withdraw Dr. Vlahinos, and reserve Dr. Bosch and Mr. Stopper for rebuttal. (/bid.) These experts’ opinions and assistance during litigation and pre-trial were reasonably necessary for the Plaintiffs to prepare for trial in this case. They worked collaboratively, and provided consulting, analyses and support. The three experts’ fees and costs were actually incurred, as well as reasonable (Dr. Vlahinos is in Castle Rock, CO, Dr. Bosch is in Phoenix, AZ, and Mr. Stopper is in Southlake, TX), and standard for these types of experts, given their locations, and in this type of litigation. (/bid.) 4. James W. Jones, Ph.D. Dr. Jones prepared for and testified in deposition and at trial about the subject truck’s front steering axle having been dislodged from its moorings. !* The truck’s axle travelled backwards, punctured the fuel tank, and caused it to rupture. Dr. Jones designed an energy- 1 1d., Arzoumanian Decl., § 10, appended to Plaintiffs’ Expert Designation. 12 1d., Arzoumanian Decl., § 9, appended to Plaintiffs’ Expert Designation. 13 1d., Arzoumanian Decl., § 7, appended to Plaintiffs’ Expert Designation. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 10 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O absorbing device that would prevent the truck’s axle, in a similar collision, from travelling backwards. All of the fees and costs pertaining to Dr. Jones’ work were actually incurred and were reasonably necessary for the conduct of the litigation. (Homampour Decl., 9 35.) 5. Mark Pozzi, MS FAAFS, FACFE Mr. Pozzi was designated to and did testify regarding the hazards the subject truck’s fuel tank/system presented in its side-saddle configuration, and its exposure to puncture and rupture, with a consequent high risk of ignition and fuel-fed fire. (Homampour Decl., 36.) Mr. Pozzi explained the advantages of a behind-the-cab fuel tank, from a safety standpoint - and that such design does not adversely affect the maneuverability and function of the truck. Mr. Pozzi testified that any disadvantages of this alternative design would “absolutely not” override his opinion that the behind-the-cab tank is a safer alternative to the vulnerable side- saddle tank. Mr. Pozzi presented and talked/walked the jury through an explanatory, comprehensive power point. (/bid.) Given his involvement in the alternative design, and extensive testimony pertinent to the CACI 1204 risk/benefit analysis, Mr. Pozzi was a critical, central expert in Plaintiffs’ case. The fees and costs pertaining to Mr. Pozzi’s work were actually incurred, reasonable (Mr. Pozzi is in Edgewood, New Mexico), and standard for this type of litigation. Mr. Pozzi’s involvement, and fees/costs were necessary. (Id., q 37.) Witness fees for experts who do not testify at trial are a proper discretionary cost item pursuant to § 998. Doe v. Dept. of Children and Family Svcs. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 694-695: Discretionary expert fee is properly allowed where the deposed expert did not ultimately testify at trial - the party moving to tax costs “failed to meet her burden to show” why “his expertise was not reasonably necessary to prepare for trial.” Melendrez v. Ameron Int’l Corp. (2015) 240 Cal. App.4th 632, 652: “Although the statute refers to expert witnesses, courts have recognized that ‘section 998 covers the cost of experts who aid in the preparation of the case for trial, even if they do not actually testify.” Further, the fee and cost amounts on their own are not indicative of whether the expert fees and costs are reasonable. There must be proof that the work performed by the experts was not reasonably necessary for litigation Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 11 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O and trial prep. Doe, 37 Cal. App.5th at 694-695; Litt v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1217,1224. Defendant has not met that burden. H. Item Eight - Court Reporter Costs Plaintiffs do not dispute that pursuant to C.C.P. § 1033.5(b)(5): “Transcripts of court proceedings not ordered by the court” are not allowable as costs. However, charges for court reporter fees, as distinguished from transcripts, are allowed. Plaintiffs’ cost request for trial court reporter fees should be allowed. (Homampour Decl., § 38.) | Item Nine - Photocopies Defendant’s Motion, 12:21-15 seeks to tax Plaintiffs’ photocopying costs (and copy placement in binders). The parties produced/exchanged literally thousands of documents in this case. Plaintiffs’ incurred copying costs are at a standard and reasonable rate in a case where there are color, odd-sized, various-sized, efc. photographs to be copied, collated, etc. Additionally, the vendor placed the copies in trial binders - for the Court, the witnesses, and all counsel. Thus, the photocopies were of documents that were expected to assist the trier of fact in this case. (/d., 4 39.) The copying costs are allowed in the Court’s discretion. Chaaban, 203 Cal.App.4th at 59, rejecting the argument that the photocopies were not a proper cost item because the evidence was presented to the jury through audiovisual equipment, not paper - the copies and Exhibit binders had to be prepared in any event. Similarly, the Court in Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1397 upheld the Court’s discretionary allowance for copying costs and exhibit tabs. J. Item Ten - “Other Costs” 1. Video Costs The CFS-Group is a valid startup trial technology company, and provided the logistical technical planning and support, trial technology consulting, and on-site trial tech services. CFS-Group built and maintained a Courtney trial presentation database, downloaded/created all of the video clips, consisting of videotaped depositions, and for possible and actual trial presentation. (Homampour Decl., § 40.) See also, the concurrently filed Declaration of Christopher Corcios and Exhibits attached thereto. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 12 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Additionally, videotaping deposition costs are properly recoverable pursuant to the Court’s discretion. C.C.P. § 1033.5(c)(4); Chaaban, 203 Cal.App.4th at 57, fn. 8; Heller, 50 Cal.App.4th 1395-1396; Ladas, 19 Cal.App.4th at 774-774. The courts recognize that it is common today for attorneys to show video during trial to help the jury understand the issues and for impeachment purposes. Editing videotaped depositions is a necessary and unavoidable task - counsel cannot simply press “play” - much work goes into the preparation. In Green v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal. App.4th 1363, 1373-1374, defendants submitted over $40,000 in “paralegal” costs incurred for preparation and presentation at trial of electronic evidence, including videos of deposition testimony, exhibits and excerpts from audio recordings. The Court held these were allowable discretionary costs because “use of such technology, including a technician to monitor the equipment and quickly resolve any glitches, has become commonplace, if not expected by jurors.” Id. at 1374. The Court in Green stated: “Green contends that the court should not have awarded $40,610.68 in ‘paralegal’ costs because there was no basis for awarding attorney fees as costs. However, these costs reflected amounts defendants incurred for preparation and presentation of electronic evidence, including videos of deposition testimony, exhibits and excerpts from audio recordings, at trial. . . . These [costs] may be awarded provided they are ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. . . . The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these costs as reasonably helpful to aid the jury.” Id. at 1373-1374. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1057, the trial court awarded the prevailing party its costs for imaging documents and deposition transcripts, and for document display at trial. These methods were “found to be highly effective, efficient, and commensurate with the nature of the case.” As the Court stated in Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal. App.4th 968, 990: “It would be inconceivable for plaintiff's counsel to forego the use of technology to display the videotapes of plaintiff’s interviews . . . and key parts of other witnesses’ depositions.” The Court knows this case raised serious and complicated issues, including regarding credibility. The use of video clips provides jurors with a “bird’s eye view” of the witness’s demeanor at the time of deposition and is helpful for the jury in assessing credibility. The video costs were standard, reasonable, and necessarily incurred. (Homampour Decl., q 41.) Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 13 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Defendant cites to Science Applications Int'l Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1104 in support of its motion. In Science Applications, the Court was understandably “troubled” by the $2 million in expenses, when the plaintiff obtained a $1 million recovery. Id. at 1105. The Court nevertheless acknowledged that the “case presents an unusual issue: how the court should deal with technological advances as costs. Considering the speed of technological evolution, it would be futile for the Legislature to try to keep pace in the compilation of statutory lists.” Ibid. Thus, the Green Court upheld the trial court’s allowance for the “$57,969 charge for graphic exhibit boards and another for $101,908 for a video to help the jury appreciate the difference between the manual and computer-assisted dispatch system for the CHP.” What the Court objected to in large part was the $402,462 cost (id. at 1099) for off-site “document control and database.” Id. at 1104. That cost item “represents the State’s expenditure for an outside firm to keep track of the voluminous records in the case. . . .” Ibid. (Italics added). There is no such cost item here. Defendant’s motion relative to video and photocopies should be denied; these items should not be taxed. 2 Vehicle Storage Cost In a serious collision case involving death, the parties must preserve evidence (including vehicles involved in the collision). Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 876, 885, 893-894. Plaintiffs here did just that. (Homampour Decl., § 42.) K. Prejudgment Interest is Mandatory The $12,000,000 judgment entered in Plaintiffs’ favor exceeds their $5,100,000 section 998 offer to Defendant. Defendant rejected Plaintiffs’ statutory offer. Plaintiffs therefore are entitled to 10% interest on the judgment, calculated from the date of Plaintiffs’ offer - May 30, 2019. (Homampour Decl., 9 2.) The prejudgment interest award is mandatory pursuant to Civ. C. § 3291, which provides that in personal injury actions “the judgment shall bear interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per annum calculated from the date of plaintiff’s first offer pursuant to section 998 . . . and interest shall accrue until the satisfaction of judgment.” Deocampo v. Ahn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 758, 768, fn. 9. “Civil Code section 3291 has a two-fold purpose. One, it is meant to encourage settlements. Two, it compensates Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 14 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O personal injury plaintiffs for their loss of the use of their compensatory award during the prejudgment period; the interest makes the plaintiff whole with respect to the loss of use of funds.” Ibid.; Morin v. ABA Recovery Svc., Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 200, 206-207, disapproved on other grounds in Lakin v. Watkins Assoc. Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664. Here, Plaintiffs properly calculated prejudgment interest only on the judgment, not on the judgment plus costs. Bean v. Pacific Coast Elevator Corp. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1423, 1430. Thus: Verdict for Plaintiffs: $12,000,000.00 C.C.P. § 998 Offer: $5,100,000.00 C.C.P. § 998 Offer Date: May 30, 2019 Daily Interest: $3,287.67 Interest through Dec. 5, 2019: $621,369.86 Ten percent (10%) interest on the $12,000,000.00 judgment from the May 30, 2019 statutory offer date through the judgment date of December 5, 2019 is $621,369.86. (Homampour Decl., 9 43, 44.) Interest accrues “until satisfaction of judgment.” Deocampo, 101 Cal.App.4th at 768, fn. 9. III. CONCLUSION The costs incurred in this complex case were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. Plaintiffs’ statutory offer to resolve this case in the amount of $5,100,000 was reasonable and valid. The cost amount Plaintiffs should be awarded is a question of fact for the trial court. Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence to support their costs request, and Defendant failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the costs are unreasonable or unnecessary. Doe v. Dept. of Children and Family Svcs., supra, 37 Cal.App. 5th 675 at 693. Based on the above, Plaintiffs request that the Court deny Defendant’s motion to strike/tax costs. DATED: February 3, 2020 THE HOMAMPOUR LAW FIRM A Profegsapnal Law Corporation omampour Corey Arzoumanian Nareen M. Touloumdjian Attorneys for the Courtney Plaintiffs Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 15 CRRGPF KZ'3" T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O APPENDIX 1 TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE/TAX COSTS LAY WITNESS DEPOSITIONS (In Response to Defendant’s Motion, 3:1-9) Identification of Witness; Depo Cost Deposition Necessary to the Litigation: Proof Remigio Bembi, Jr. 1. Supervisor and manager of the collision site CHP Officer investigation. (Dep. Tr. 10:11-14.) $1,998.12 2. Took the 54 photographs attached to the Traffic Collision Report. (14:3-16:7.) 3. Inspected the crash site immediately after the crash; decedent Cornelia Marie Wilson was still in the subject truck when he arrived. (26:18-22.) 4. On the Joint Witness List. Timothy Burks 1. PMK re the subject 2009 Freightliner Columbia Swift PMK tractor: Purchase of the truck (Dep. Tr. 10:1-4; 13:5 et $2,821.10 seq.); repairs (20:15 et seq.); the truck’s electronic control module (21:2 et seq.); the truck’s Qualcomm over-the-wire device that allows data tracking (21:12 et seq.); the truck’s container details and contents (29:13 et seq.) 2. PMK re Swift modifications of trucks it purchases. (16:6-25.) 3. Testified regarding what constitutes a “safe truck” and “alternative design” issues. (35:4 ef seq.) 4. Testified regarding fuel tank placement issues. (36:1 et seq.) James Golondzinier L.A. County Fire Captain $340.00 for non-appearance $2,025.00 Re non-appearance: 1. Mr. Golondzinier is an independent third party witness, not within Plaintiffs’ control. 2. Ifit becomes necessary, in order to obtain monetary sanctions for “misuse of the discovery process” pursuant to C. Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(d), Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 1 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Identification of Witness: Depo Cost Deposition Necessary to the Litigation: Proof James Golondzinier (cont.) 2023.030(a), the deposing counsel obtains a notice of non-appearance. 3. C. Civ. Proc. §§ 2020.240 and 1992 also provide for forfeiture and payment of damages in the event a non-party deponent disobeys a deposition subpoena in any manner described in C. Civ. Proc. § 2020.220(c). Substantive testimony: 1. As Fire Captain, he was dispatched to the subject site to extinguish the flames and manage the on-site firefighters. (Dep. Tr. 12:19-18:2 et seq.) 2. The Freightliner tractor was still on fire when he arrived. (19:8 ef seq.) 3. Personally involved with extinguishing the fire and extricating the decedent’s body; worked with the coroner on extrication. (25:2 et seq.) 4. Personally involved with making sure the fire crew was okay “mentally; it was a pretty hard situation.” (28:24-29:15; 44:9-14.) 5. Provided testimony regarding the L.A. County Fire Dept. history and detailed timeline. (31:17 ef seq.) 6. Testified regarding the dispatch call, which he listened to during the deposition. (39:20 et seq.) 7. In response to questioning by Defendant’s counsel, discussed the fire - “one orange ball . . . truck is on fire in this big fire ball . . . big fire burning.” (47:13-23.) 8. On the Joint Witness List. Brittany Helmer Criminalist, L.A. Dept. of Medical Examiner Forensic Science Laboratories $2,603.95 1. Personally conducted the toxicology testing of decedent’s blood. (Dep. Tr. 9:14 ef seq.) 2. Helmer performed the ELISA testing for 5 different classes of drugs using a different ELISA kit for each class. All results were “ND” - “not detected.” No drugs were detected in the decedent’s system. 3. The toxicology report references testing, “kits,” acronyms, presence or absence of drugs or classes of drugs in nanogram concentrations per milliliter of decedent’s blood, metabolites, etc. The toxicology report is virtually indecipherable without explanation Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs” Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 2 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Identification of Witness: Depo Cost Deposition Necessary to the Litigation: Proof Brittany Helmer (cont.) from the Criminalist who conducted the tests. (10:8 et seq.) 4. For example, without the Criminalist’s interpretation, a lay person cannot determine the subject drugs involved in the single test of opiates. (20:19-25. Victor Malchesky Swift’s Vice President Safety $1,529.60 of 1. Testified regarding decedent Cornelia Wilson, including relative to any performance write-ups, whether Ms. Wilson had ever fallen asleep while driving for Swift. (Dep. Tr. 10:1-12:3.) 2. Testified regarding Ms. Wilson’s DOT medical card, her medical condition and clearance to drive for Swift, past employment verifications, drug and alcohol test results based on Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. (12:7 et seq.) 3. Explained the Swift “Personnel Action Form,” the meaning of the “dedicated” designation, significance of “change of status” (“driver shows hard work and has a good record” “driver is a good worker,” etc. (16:11 et seq.) 4. As Vice President of Safety, he testified relative to all third parties he communicated with after and regarding the incident. (20:23 ef seq.) 5. Testified regarding the subject truck’s data recording devices. (23:2 ef seq.) 6. Testified regarding the load the subject truck transported, points of inception and destination, efc. (27:17 et seq.) Horacio McComb CHP Officer $396.50 Defendant took this deposition. See, page 1 of the Horacio McComb Dep. Tr. stating: “Taken on behalf of the Defendant.” Homampour Decl., q 15, Exhibit F. Kristy McCracken Coroner $207.10 Defendant took this deposition. See, page 1 of the Kristy McCracken Dep. Tr. stating: “Taken on behalf of the Defendant.” Id., Exhibit G. 1. Also - Ms. McCracken was the medical examiner and investigator who was on scene during the removal of the decedent. Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs” Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 3 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Identification of Witness: Depo Cost Deposition Necessary to the Litigation: Proof Oscar Pleitez Senior Criminalist, L.A. Dept. of Medical Examiner Forensic Science Laboratories $3,547.30 1. Performed the CO2 testing on decedent’s heart blood using CO-Oximeter. The result was 54% saturation. At this time, Plaintiffs still had the CO2 leak in the cab theory. Mr. Pleitez was deposed as a PMK re CO2 and as a percipient lab blood work witness. 2. Testified regarding the Forensic Laboratories’ Summary Report for this case, which includes the carboxyhemoglobin testing he conducted. Criminalist Brittany Helmer was not asked about the carbon monoxide testing given that Mr. Pleitez conducted that test. (Dep. Tr. 15:11 et seq.) 3. Discussed chain of custody details, explanations regarding the carboxy-hemoglobin testing. (39:8 et seq.), and explained the charting for that test, the meaning of the values from the CO-Oximeter, and the carbon monoxide test result ranges. (43:20 ef seq.) 4. On the Joint Witness List. Jessi Sanchez Defendant took this deposition. See, page 1 of the CHP Officer Jessi Sanchez Dep. Tr. stating: “Taken on behalf of the $165.80 Defendant.” Id., Exhibit H. Myra Sanchez 1. Worked with Officer Calder the night of August 1, CHP Officer 2014 and went to the crash site; Officer Calder wrote $1,695.27 the Traffic Collision Report (TCR). (Dep. Tr. 10:17- 12:10.) 2. Personally ran a break on the freeway, and then assisted with the measurements for the TCR. Testified regarding the condition of the site, the subject truck, the TCR preparation processes, the meaning of TCR entries, the TCR site diagram, the investigation conducted. (16:1 et seq.) 3. The decedent was still in the cab of the subject truck when Officer Sanchez arrived on scene. (28:19 et seq.) 4. Two days after the crash, Officer Sanchez personally called “the son and daughter of the deceased” “to establish the 24-hour profile” which is in the TCR. Officer Sanchez testified to that process, her discussion with Ms. Wilson’s children, and her impression that the children were grieving. (33:3 et seq.) Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 4 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Identification of Witness: Depo Cost Deposition Necessary to the Litigation: Proof Myra Sanchez (cont.) 5. On the Joint Witness List. Mark Schuchardt Senior Criminalist/Analyst, L.A. Dept. of Medical Examiner Forensic Science Laboratories $3,096.25 1. Performed the ethanol testing on decedent’s heart blood using “head space” instrument. Result for ethanol: negative. 2. Mr. Schuchardt is listed on the Laboratory Analysis Summary Report as the “Analyst,” and he provided specific testimony regarding the specimen and tissue analyses. (Dep. Tr. 11:15 et seq.) 3. Mr. Schuchardt additionally testified in detail relative to a “headspace instrument,” which is a headspace gas chromatograph used to essentially robotically analyze blood, efc. vials. (13:17 et seq.) 4. Provided interpretative testimony regarding the meanings of the words “negative,” “ND - not detected,” which can mean “different things in different laboratories.” This impacts the conclusions to be drawn from the Laboratory Analysis Summary Report - including with respect to the negative ethanol results. (20:2-22; 20:23 et seq.) 5. Testified regarding the Alcohol Internal Service Report, and the t-butanol internal standard used for Ms. Wilson’s Report. (23:10 et seq.) 6. Explained that the different examiners collect different specimens and conduct their tests, and “each person get dealt their own service report with a particular request for analysis,” and the Summary Report is generated from those internal service reports. (26:8 et seq.) 7. Testified regarding the collaborative compilation process for the Laboratory Analysis Summary Report. (44:7 et seq.) 8. Testified regarding quality controls pertinent to the Summary Report. (45:20 et seq.) 9. Testified regarding calibration of the machinery conducting the samples testing. (51:14 et seq.) 10. Confirmed the timeline: Aug. 10, 2014: Autopsy; Aug. 15, 2014: Testing; Aug. 19, 2014: his Report. (56:13 et seq.) 11. On the Joint Witness List. Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 5 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W FI RM , PL C | 5 30 3 VE NT UR A B O U L E V A R D - SU IT E | 4 50 | S H E R M A N OA KS , CA 9 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 | FA X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 © 0 9 O N Wn B= W o N D = N N N N N N N N N M mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m Co O NN OA nm kA W I N D = O VO N N N A W D = O Identification of Witness: Depo Cost Deposition Necessary to the Litigation: Proof Irene Villareal CHP Officer $1,212.10 1. Officer Villareal arrived on scene the evening of the August 1, 2014 incident, and has an independent recollection of taking measurements referenced in the Traffic Collision Report. (Dep. Tr. 10:2-11.) 2. Testified regarding the factual diagram that Officer DeGuzman prepared; she assisted relative to the LiDAR. (10:12 ef seq.) 3. Interpreted the CHP Call Logs pertinent to the events of the subject incident. (13:14 et seq.) 4. Testified as to her independent recollections of factual aspects of the site, “the victim had died from burning.” (18:20-25.) 5. On the Joint Witness List. Eric Beltran CHP Officer $130.50 Defendant took this deposition. See, page 1 of the Eric Beltran Dep. Tr. stating: “Taken on behalf of the Defendant.” Id., Exhibit I. Appendix 1 to Plaintiffs” Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs - Page 6 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W F I R M A PR OF ES SI ON AL LA W CO RP OR AT IO N 1 5 3 0 3 V E N T U R A B O U L E V A R D - S U I T E 1 4 5 0 S H E R M A N O A K S C A L I F O R N I A © 1 4 0 3 * F A X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 Oo 0 9 O N n n Rk W N N N N N N N N N N = e m e m e m e m e m p m e m p m co J a N wn RA W I N D = O O N N R A W ND = O PROOF OF SERVICE I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 15303 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1450, Sherman Oaks, California 91403. On February 3, 2020, I served the following document(s) described as PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS the interested parties in said action, by placing the OJ original to the propoundin party/ a true copy thereof to all other parties enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST: 0 BY MAIL: I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed or collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully paid. BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons at the addresses on Februa 3 2020. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regular utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier. 0 BY FAX TRANSMISSION: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed the documents to the persons at the fax numbers listed on February 3, 2020. No error was reported by the fax machine that I Sec A copy of the record of the fax transmission, which I printed out, 1S attached. O BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I delivered such envelope(s) by hand to be delivered to the address(s) indicated below by Ninja Delivery. O BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE (EMAIL): Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses listed on February 3, 2020. STATE: I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 3, 2020 at Sherman Oaks, California. Proof of Service - Page 1 T H E H O M A M P O U R L A W F I R M A PR OF ES SI ON AL LA W CO RP OR AT IO N 1 5 3 0 3 V E N T U R A B O U L E V A R D - S U I T E 1 4 5 0 S H E R M A N O A K S C A L I F O R N I A © 1 4 0 3 P H O N E ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 0 7 7 * F A X ( 3 2 3 ) 6 5 8 - 8 4 7 7 Oo 0 9 O N n n Rk W N N N N N N N N N N = e m e m e m e m e m p m e m p m co J a N wn RA W I N D = O O N N R A W ND = O SERVICE LIST Courtney v. Daimler Trucks America, et al. LASC Case No. BC615223 (as of February 3, 2020) Philip R. Cosgrove, Esq. Nelson Mullins 19191 South Vermont Ave., Suite 900 Torrance, CA 90502 Fax: (424) 221-7499 Email: phil.cosgrove@nelsonmullins.com David H. Greenberg, Esq. O Emily Ruby, Esq. Law Offices of David H. Greenberg 6100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1170 Los Angeles, California 90048 Fax: (323) 782-0543 Attorneys for Defendant Daimler Trucks North America LLC Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs Proof of Service - Page 2
