Barry v. Soash et alMOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and Memorandum of Law in SupportM.D. Ga.January 11, 2017 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBANY DIVISION TIMOTHY SCOTT BARRY, Plaintiff, v. BARI SOASH, JIM WILCOX, and RAYCOM MEDIA, INC. D/B/A WALB- TV, Defendants. Case No.: 1-17-cv-00002-LJA DEFENDANTSâ MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT COME NOW, Defendants Bari Soash, Jim Wilcox, and WALB, LLC (improperly named as âRaycom Media, Inc. d/b/a WALB-TVâ), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 81(c)(2), and move this Court to dismiss Plaintiffâs Complaint with prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. I. INTRODUCTION Pro se Plaintiff Timothy Scott Barry (âPlaintiffâ) filed his Complaint against the Defendants on or about December 2, 2016, in the State Court of Dougherty County. (Dkt. 1, Ex. A.) Defendants removed this case to this Court on January 4, 2017. (Id.) Defendant WALB, LLC (âWALBâ) was Plaintiffâs âemployer.â (See generally Compl.) The individually named Defendants, Bari Soash and Jim Wilcox, (herein âIndividual Defendantsâ) are identified in Plaintiffâs Complaint as the News Director and Vice-President/General Manager of WALB, respectively. (Id.) Plaintiffâs Complaint purportedly asserts the following causes of action against all three Defendants: (1) failure-to-accommodate under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 1 of 14 2 Act of 1990 (âADAâ); (2) retaliation under the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (âTitle VIIâ); (3) hostile work environment under the ADA; and (4) breach of contract. As shown below, Plaintiffâs claims fail as a matter of law. An individual is not an âemployerâ under Title VII or the ADA. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants cannot be held personally liable under either statute. Furthermore, none of the Defendants can be held liable for Plaintiffâs failure-to-accommodate claim because the factual allegations show that Plaintiff refused to engage in the interactive process. To the extent Plaintiffâs Complaint asserts claims under Title VII, Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust those claims. As such, any and all claims under Title VII are procedurally barred. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants because the factual allegations in his Complaint are insufficient to meet the pleading standards under Iqbal and Twombly. For these reasons, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffâs Complaint, in its entirety, with prejudice. II. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY A. Legal Standard. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the plaintiffâs complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Sessom v. Wellstar Hosp., No. 08-cv-2057, 2009 WL 1562876, *1 (N.D. Ga. May 29, 2009) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)); Brown v. Crawford Cnty., 960 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (11th Cir.1992). A complaint ârequires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.â Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 2 of 14 3 To state a claim with sufficient specificity requires that the complaint have enough factual matter taken as true to suggest required elements of the claim. Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed but âmust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative levelâŠon the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).â Sessom, 2009 WL 1562876, *1 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (internal cites omitted); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)) (internal citations omitted). A Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on claims that fail to allege facts supporting each element of the particular claim. See Twombly at 682-86; see also Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiffsâ allegation in their Title VII complaint that they were âdenied promotions . . . and treated differently than similarly situated white employees solely because of [] raceâ was too speculative to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)). â[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to âstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.ââ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). However, âthe tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.â Id. To be plausible, the complaint must contain âwell-pleaded factsâ that âpermit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.â Id. at 679. B. The Individual Defendants Cannot Be Held Liable Under Title VII or the ADA. Plaintiffâs claims (1) through (3), as outlined above, arise under either Title VII or the ADA. However, the law in the Eleventh Circuit is clear that no individual liability exists under either statute. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991)(âThe relief granted Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 3 of 14 4 under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.â); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n. 4 (11th Cir.1995) (â[Individuals] cannot be held liable under the ADEA or Title VII.â). Watts v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., No. 5:12-CV-09 MTT, 2012 WL 1903430, at *3 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2012)(âThere is generally no personal liability for employees under the ADA.â (citing Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996))); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007)(holding that, as a matter of first impression, individual liability is precluded under the ADAâs anti-retaliation provision). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that the Individual Defendants were âhis employerâ as defined by statute. (See generally Compl.) Even if he did so, Plaintiff still fails to assert a claim against them. As shown in the above-cited cases, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that individual liability is precluded under both Title VII and the ADA. While the Individual Defendantsâ conduct may provide grounds for respondeat superior liability with respect to Defendant WALB, neither Soash nor Wilcox can be sued in their individual capacity. Therefore, this Court should dismiss any and all claims under Title VII and the ADA to the extent they are asserted against the Individual Defendants. C. Plaintiffâs Failure-to-Accommodate Claim against WALB is Barred by His Refusal to Engage in Interactive Process. If an employeeâs actions cause a breakdown in the interactive process, an employer is not subject to liability under the ADA. See Anderson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 418 F. App'x 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir.1997)). âCourts have held that a party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not acting in good faith.â Wilf v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, No. 109CV01877RLVGGB, 2012 WL 12888680, at *21 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2012)(citing Crabill v. Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 4 of 14 5 Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 423 Fed.Appx. 314, 323 (4th Cir. 2011))., subsequently aff'd, 544 F. App'x 906 (11th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff obstructs the interactive process under the ADA when he or she fails to comply with an employerâs request for medical documentation showing the need for accommodations. See Gilliard v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 500 F. App'x 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2012). In Gilliard, a pro se plaintiff alleged that she made several requests for reasonable accommodations to her employer, but was denied. See id. However, the Court in Gilliard held that defendantâs denial of accommodations did not violate the ADA because plaintiff had âcaused a breakdown in [the interactive] process where she failed to provide any medical documentation outlining her work limitations.â Id. Although such an argument would typically be made at the summary judgment phase, Plaintiffâs admissions in his Complaint are clear. See Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1986)(acknowledging that the general rule is that âa party is bound by the admissions in his pleadingsâ). Like the pro se plaintiff in Gilliard, Plaintiff admits that he refused to further engage in the interactive process after he notified WALB of his alleged disability. Plaintiff alleges that WALB provided him with a health questionnaire, which was to be completed by his treating physician. (Compl., pp. 1-2.) However, Plaintiff admits that he refused to complete this questionnaire and that he repeatedly refused to comply. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffâs own allegations in his Complaint show that he obstructed the interactive process. Therefore, Plaintiffâs failure-to- accommodate claim should be dismissed as a matter of law. D. Plaintiff Failed to Administratively Exhaust Title VII claims against Defendants. âPrior to filing a Title VII action ... a plaintiff first must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.â Gregory v. Georgia Depât of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 5 of 14 6 2004). Administrative exhaustion is required to give the EEOC âthe first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices to permit it to perform its role in obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliation efforts.â Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals âhas noted that judicial claims are allowed if they âamplify, clarify, or more clearly focusâ the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but has cautioned that allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.â Id. (quoting Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir.1989)). As a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot assert a discrimination claim where the plaintiffâs EEOC Charge and related filings are devoid of allegations related to that form of discrimination. Mason v. George, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1262-63 (M.D. Ga. 2014). For example, in Mason, a pro se plaintiff asserted claims of race, age, and gender discrimination. Id. However, the plaintiffâs EEOC Charge and subsequent investigation documents only referenced allegations of race discrimination. Id. at 1263. This Court held that the plaintiffâs âage and gender discrimination claims [had] not been exhausted,â and thus, were procedurally barred. Id. See also Marshall v. Nichiha USA, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-411 MTT, 2015 WL 3465957, at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 1, 2015)(granting defendantâs motion to dismiss age discrimination claim where plaintiff checked the box for race but not age in his EEOC charge.). Under the holdings in Mason and Marshall, this Court should dismiss any and all claims under Title VII. Although Plaintiffâs Complaint refers to his Charge of Discrimination, Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the Charge to the Complaint. A copy of the EEOC Charge is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 1 Similar to the circumstances in Mason, Plaintiffâs EEOC Charge includes 1 A document central to the complaint that the defense appends to its motion to dismiss is also properly considered without converting it to a motion for summary judgment, provided that its contents are not in dispute. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 (11th Cir. 1999) Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 6 of 14 7 only allegations of disability discrimination. (See Ex. A.) Plaintiff checked the box for disability and also stated that he believed he was discriminated âin violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.â (Id.) The Charge fails to mention any other form of discrimination based on a protected characteristic. Plaintiff also attached copies of his correspondence with the EEOC to his Complaint. (See Compl., Exs. 18-20.) However, none of these documents refer to any instances or allegations of Title VII violations. Because Plaintiffâs Title VII claims are outside the scope of the EEOCâs investigation, these claims are procedurally barred. E. Plaintiffâs Claims Do Not Satisfy the Pleading Standard Under Twombly and Iqbal. 2 Even though pro se plaintiffs are subject to more lenient pleading standards than represented parties, â[t]his leniencyâŠdoes not require or allow courts to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.â Thomas v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 393 Fed. Appx. 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010). A pro se litigant is still required to include allegations respecting all material elements of the claims asserted and bare legal conclusions attached to facts will not suffice. Watts, 2012 WL 1903430, at *2 (citing Davilla v. Delta Air Lines, 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir.2003)). In determining whether a pro se Complaint satisfies the pleading standards under Twombly and Iqbal, a court âwill not, and cannot, rewrite the complaint to include facts that are not alleged and claims that are not articulated.â Id. (citing Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.2006)). A court also is not required to sift 2 The first page of Plaintiffâs Complaint also contains a âClaim 5â against Defendants for reimbursement of his shirt costs. However, he has not alleged any elements of a claim, nor provided any facts showing he legally is entitled to such relief. Therefore, this alleged claim must be dismissed. See Watts v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., No. 5:12-CV-09 MTT, 2012 WL 1903430, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2012)(dismissing pro se plaintiffâs claim for âfalsification of documents.â) Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 7 of 14 8 through pages of exhibits to try to find support for a plaintiffâs claim. See, e.g., Osahar v. United States Postal Serv., 297 Fed. Appx. 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008). Requiring a court to decipher a pro se plaintiffâs claims by reviewing numerous exhibits frustrates the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)). Id. Plaintiffâs Complaint contains a litany of conclusory allegations and includes over 40 pages of exhibits. Even when considering Plaintiffâs pro se status, his claims against Defendants fall short of the pleading standards articulated in Twombly and Iqbal. 1. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts showing that he has a disability and that he was a âqualified individualâ within the meaning of the ADA. To state a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled; (2) he was a âqualified individualâ at the relevant time, meaning he could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) he was denied reasonable accommodations. See Palmer v. McDonald, 624 F. App'x 699, 705-06 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffâs Complaint is factually deficient under the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standards in two respects. First, Plaintiffâs Complaint contains only mere conclusory allegations that he is disabled. (See generally Compl.) He fails to allege any facts disclosing or demonstrating the nature of his alleged disability. Second, Plaintiffâs Complaint fails to state any facts showing that he was a âqualified individualâ within the meaning of the ADA. Specifically, he does not identify the accommodations he requested and how such accommodations would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of his job. Plaintiffâs Complaint is nothing more than â[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.â See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffâs Complaint fails to state a failure- to-accommodate claim under the ADA. Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 8 of 14 9 2. Plaintiffâs retaliation claims must fail as he has not alleged sufficient facts showing he engaged in protected activity. Regardless of whether Plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim under the ADA or Title VII, federal courts âassess ADA retaliation claims under the same framework [they] employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.â Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997)(citing McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1075-77 (11th Cir.1996)). To state a claim for retaliation, âa plaintiff must allege that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the two events exists.â Palmer v. McDonald, 624 F. App'x 699, 702 (11th Cir. 2015). In Palmer, the Court stated that the second prong may be satisfied by a request for reasonable accommodation âas long as the plaintiff has a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that he was entitled to those accommodations.â Id.(affirming the trial courtâs Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiffâs Title VII retaliation claim where the plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting each element of the claim). In this case, Plaintiffâs Complaint has not alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the first element of a retaliation claim. Rather, Plaintiffâs Complaint repeats the conclusory allegation that he requested âreasonable accommodations,â but it fails to provide any facts demonstrating the specific accommodations he requested from Defendants. Without these facts, Plaintiff cannot plausibly show that he had a good faith and reasonable belief that he was entitled to the requested accommodations. For this reason, Plaintiffâs Complaint fails to state a claim for retaliation. Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 9 of 14 10 3. Plaintiffâs Complaint is devoid of facts showing that the alleged harassment was based on a protected characteristic. Similar to a harassment claim under Title VII, the elements of a hostile work environment claim under the ADA 3 are as follows: (1) the employee must be a member of a protected class, (2) the employee must have been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment must be based on the protected characteristic, (4) the harassment must have affected a term or condition of employment. See Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1107. See also Usry v. Markets, No. CV 112-163, 2012 WL 6184465, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012)(recommending the district court to dismiss a hostile work environment claim under Rule 12(b)(6)), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 112-163, 2012 WL 6184447 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2012). As noted above, Plaintiff failed to adequately demonstrate that he has a disability. Plaintiffâs Complaint only contains conclusory allegations that he is âdisabled,â but it lacks any facts supporting this conclusion. Nor does the Plaintiffâs Complaint include other allegations that he is a member of a protected class. Thus, he has not properly pled the first prong of a hostile work environment claim. Further, the allegations of âharassmentâ in Plaintiffâs Complaint do not adequately show that this harassment was based on any protected characteristic, such as his disability. Here, Plaintiffâs allegations of harassment pertain only to a disagreement with Soash over his wardrobe choices. (See Compl., p. 2.) Plaintiffâs Complaint even undercuts the allegation that any harassment experienced by Plaintiff was based on his alleged disability. Plaintiff contends that the harassment began as early as April 9, 2015. (Id. at 3.) However, he simultaneously alleges that he did not provide Defendants with proof of his disability until June 19, 2015. (Id.) 3 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals impliedly acknowledged that a harassment claim is actionable under the ADA. See Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Ga., 177 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1999)(citing Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1107 (S.D. Ga. 1995)). Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 10 of 14 11 Therefore, the alleged harassment over his âbrightly-coloredâ shirts began prior to Defendants having any notice of his alleged disability. Because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support the first two prongs of a hostile work environment claim, this claim must be dismissed. 4. Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that Defendants breached a term of the Employment Agreement. âUnder Georgia contract law, â[t]he essential elements of a breach of contract claim are (1) a valid contract; (2) material breach of its terms; and (3) damages arising therefrom.ââ Jones v. F.D.I.C., No. 5:12-CV-176 MTT, 2012 WL 6115374, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2012)(citing Kabir v. Statebridge Co., LLC, 2011 WL 4500050 at *7 (N.D.Ga.)) âIn order to sustain a breach of contract claim and survive [a] 12(b)(6) motion, [a plaintiff] must allege facts showing that [the defendant] breached the Contract and that [plaintiff] suffered damages as a result of such breach. Med S. Health Plans, LLC v. Life of S. Ins. Co., No. 4:07-CV-134(CDL), 2008 WL 2119915, at *3 (M.D. Ga. May 19, 2008). âThe construction of a contract is a question of law for the court.â O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1; see also Foshee v. Harris, 170 Ga. App. 394, 395, 317 S.E.2d 548, 549 (1984). âIn Georgia, the starting point in contract construction is âto look to the four corners of the instrument to determine the intention of the parties from the language employed.ââ Med S. Health Plans, LLC, 2008 WL 2119915 at *3 (citing Livoti v. Aycock, 263 Ga. App. 897, 901-02, 590 S.E.2d 159, 164 (2003)). In Med South, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiffâs breach of contract claim because the plaintiffâs complaint did not sufficiently show that a material breach had occurred. Med S. Health Plans, LLC, 2008 WL 2119915 at *4. Although the plaintiffâs complaint identified the provisions of the contract that were allegedly breached, the Court determined that - - upon reviewing the âfour cornersâ of the contract -- the alleged breach was an exercise of a Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 11 of 14 12 defendantâs contractual rights. Id. For this reason, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract based on its express terms. Here, Plaintiff purports to state a claim for breach of contract based on the express terms of his employment contract. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff attaches a copy of the Employment Agreement to his Complaint. 4 (Compl., Ex. 20(d).) Namely, he alleges that the âEmployer WALB-TV did not uphold the terms of their 2-year signed employment contract withâŠplaintiff, on Page 4 of the contract under 7(b)., Termination by Employer, where itâs required for employer to pay 60-days of base salary, in lieu of 60 daysâ notice of termination by employer. (Id.) However, Plaintiffâs Complaint does not state whether Defendants, in fact, failed to pay him or provide him with advance notice. Moreover, the four corners of the Employment Agreement show that WALB is required to provide 60 daysâ notice or pay Plaintiffâs base salary for such notice period only when Plaintiffâs employment termination was âwithout cause.â (Ex. B, p. 4.) But Plaintiffâs Complaint is also devoid of any allegation that his employment termination was without cause. Even if Plaintiffâs Complaint alleged that Plaintiff was fired without cause, this allegation contradicts other allegations in the Complaint that Defendants âprovok[ed] [him]âŠto the point it caused him to be fired by employerâŠâ (Compl., p. 1.) If Plaintiffâs employment termination was âwith cause,â WALB was within its contractual right not to provide advance notice or payment to Plaintiff. Like the plaintiff in Med South, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of contract against Defendants. 5 4 The copy of the Employment Contract attached to the Complaint served on Defendants was illegible. A legible copy of the Employment Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit B. A court may consider documents outside of the pleadings if central to the Complaint and its authenticity is not in dispute. See footnote 1. 5 Plaintiffâs breach of contract claim against the Individual Defendants also fails because they are not parties to the Employment Agreement. (See Ex. B.) â[A]bsent a special relationship, no Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 12 of 14 13 III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Defendantsâ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffâs claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be granted and Plaintiffâs Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. Respectfully submitted on January 11, 2017. s/ Amelia M. Willis Amelia M. Willis, Esq. Georgia Bar No. 055872 Ana C. Dowell, Esq. Georgia Bar No. 343780 OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. One Ninety One Peachtree Tower 191 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 4800 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: (404) 881-1300 Facsimile: (404) 870-1732 amie.willis@ogletreedeakins.com ana.dowell@ogletreedeakins.com Attorneys for Defendants breach of contract claim exists without an actual contractual relationship.â Watts, 2012 WL 1903430, at *3 (citing Bulmer v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 170 Ga. App. 659, 317 S.E.2d 893 (1984)). Accordingly, Plaintiffâs breach of contract claim with respect to the Individual Defendants should be dismissed. Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 13 of 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBANY DIVISION TIMOTHY SCOTT BARRY, Plaintiff, v. BARI SOASH, JIM WILCOX, and RAYCOM MEDIA, INC. D/B/A WALB- TV, Defendants. CASE NO.: 1-17-cv-00002-LJA CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on January 11, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and by First Class mail to the Pro Se Plaintiff: Timothy Scott Barry 2716 Dawson Road, Apt. 19 Albany, GA 31707 /s/ Amelia M. Willis Amelia M. Willis 28200647.1 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6 Filed 01/11/17 Page 14 of 14 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 1 of 2 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-1 Filed 01/11/17 Page 2 of 2 EXHIBIT B Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 1 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 2 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 3 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 4 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 5 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 6 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 7 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 8 of 9 Case 1:17-cv-00002-LJA Document 6-2 Filed 01/11/17 Page 9 of 9