Bagley v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

E.D. Tex.June 21, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION CLAUDE BAGLEY, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CASE NO. 2:17-cv-453-JRG § UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD § COMPANY, § § Defendant. § DEFENDANT UNION PACIFIC’S MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, files this motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The issue to be decided by the Court is whether it has personal jurisdiction over Union Pacific. I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY In order for this Court to have personal jurisdiction over Union Pacific, it must have either specific or general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists if, among other things, the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts. Here, the Court lacks specific jurisdiction because the incident giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action took place in Louisiana. General jurisdiction exists over a corporation in the state where it is essentially at home, which is its state of incorporation or the state where it maintains its principal place of business (absent the exceptional case). Here, the Court lacks general jurisdiction because Union Pacific is incorporated in Delaware, its principal place of business is Nebraska, and there is nothing exceptional about Union Pacific doing business in Texas. These jurisdictional facts are contained in the following documents: the declaration of Maureen Fong Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 1 of 12 PageID #: 16 - 2 - Hinners, the Assistant Secretary of Union Pacific, attached hereto as Exhibit A; the declaration of Reid A. Carlisle, the Senior Risk Management Representative for Union Pacific, attached hereto as Exhibit B; and a Union Pacific Railroad Report of Personal Injury or Occupational Illness that has Plaintiff’s purported signature, attached hereto as Exhibit B-1. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Court should transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana because Union Pacific is subject to personal jurisdiction in that court, not this Court. II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Claude Bagley, worked as a conductor for Union Pacific. (P.’s First Am. Compl., Doc. No. 3, ¶ 6; Ex. B-1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges he was injured while working because a slippery substance caused him to fall. (P.’s First Am. Compl., Doc. No. 3, ¶ 6; Ex. B-1 at 1.) Based on this incident, Plaintiff claims Union Pacific was negligent under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) and violated federal safety laws and regulations. (P.’s First Am. Compl., Doc. No. 3, ¶¶ 5-9.) Plaintiff has filed suit in Texas-even though the incident occurred in Louisiana, Union Pacific’s state of incorporation is Delaware, and Union Pacific’s principal place of business is in Nebraska. III. DISMISSAL STANDARD Federal Rule 12(b)(2) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On such motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). “[W]here the district court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff may bear his burden by presenting a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” Bonner v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 661 F. App’x 820, 821 (5th Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 2 of 12 PageID #: 17 - 3 - Cir. 2016) (alternation in original) (citation omitted). “When the court, however, holds an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence.” Id. “In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a district court may consider ‘affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery.’” Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). IV. ARGUMENT “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(A)). “Because the Texas long-arm statute extends as far as [United States] constitutional due process permits, [a federal court] simply need[s] to determine whether a suit in Texas is consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” to the United States Constitution. Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 212 (5th Cir. 2016). To satisfy due process, the defendant must be subject to one or both types of personal jurisdiction: specific (case-linked) jurisdiction, or general (all-purpose) jurisdiction. Bristol- Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. __, No. (slip op., at 5) (June 18, 2017); Hazim v. Schiel & Denver Book Publishers, 647 F. App’x 455, 458 (5th Cir. 2016). Because specific and general jurisdiction are both lacking here, this Court should grant Union Pacific’s motion to dismiss.1 1 Although Union Pacific denies it subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, Union Pacific admits it is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Louisiana, or to general personal jurisdiction in Delaware or Nebraska. Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 3 of 12 PageID #: 18 - 4 - A. The Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Union Pacific. To establish specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden to prove, among other things, that his “cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754. Here, it is undisputed that the incident giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action occurred in Shreveport, Louisiana. In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges he was injured on March 22, 2017, “when a slippery substance on the platform of the car Plaintiff was working on caused Plaintiff to fall.” (P.’s First Am. Compl., Doc. No. 3, ¶ 6.) The location of this alleged injury is confirmed by an injury report that Union Pacific received containing Plaintiff’s purported signature, wherein it states Plaintiff was injured on March 22, 2017, in “Shreveport, Louisiana.” (Ex. B at ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. B-1 at 1-2.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s causes of action arise out of conditions and events in Louisiana-not Texas. Accordingly, only courts in Louisiana have specific jurisdiction over this suit. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (explaining there was no dispute that a railroad was not subject to specific jurisdiction in the forum state because the plaintiffs, who were employees of the railroad, did not “allege[ ] any injury from work in or related to” the forum state). B. The Court lacks general jurisdiction over Union Pacific. 1. The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction to those states in which a corporation is “essentially at home.” In the absence of specific jurisdiction over Union Pacific, Plaintiff must establish general jurisdiction over Union Pacific. Recently, the United States Supreme Court dramatically narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction. In Daimler, the Court made clear that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only when the corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” 134 S. Ct. Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 4 of 12 PageID #: 19 - 5 - at 751, 754, 758 n.11, 761 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). The “paradigm” states in which a corporation is essentially at home are (1) its state of incorporation and (2) the state where it maintains its principal place of business. Id. at 760. “Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique-that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place-as well as easily ascertainable.” Id. A corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction in a state other than where it is incorporated or maintains its principal place of business only in an “exceptional case” if the corporation’s operations in another state are “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Id. at 761 n.19. However, an “exceptional case” does not exist merely because the corporation conducts substantial business in the forum state, especially if the corporation also conducts business in other states. Id. at 762 n.20. The Court specifically rejected the notion that general jurisdiction lies “in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business,’” finding such a notion “unacceptably grasping.” Id. at 760-61 (citation omitted). After all, “[a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Id. at 762 n.20. Consequently, the Court held the defendant company was not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum state because it was not incorporated and did not maintain its principal place of business in that state-even though the company maintained its regional headquarters in that state, operated multiple offices and facilities in that state, supplied the largest amount of a certain product in that state, and generated billions of dollars in sales in that state in one year alone. See id. at 752, 760-61; id. at 766-67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In the wake of Daimler, the Fifth Circuit has consistently recognized that it is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 5 of 12 PageID #: 20 - 6 - principal place of business.” E.g., Monkton Ins. Servs., 768 F.3d at 432.2 Indeed, after the United State Supreme Court’s opinion in BNSF Railway that was issued last month, it may be “virtually inconceivable” to do so. BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The BNSF case is extremely similar to this case. In that case, employees of BNSF Railway Company sued BNSF for on-the-job injuries under FELA. Id. at 1553-54. They brought suit in Montana, even though their injuries did not occur in Montana, BNSF was not incorporated in Montana, and BNSF did not maintain its principal place of business in Montana. Id. Thus, the Court turned to whether BNSF was subject to general jurisdiction in Montana under the “exceptional case” standard from Daimler. Id. at 1558-59. The Court held it was not. Id. at 1559. In so holding, the Court found that BNSF was not “essentially at home” in Montana, despite having “2,061 miles of railroad track in Montana (about 6% of its total track mileage of 32,500), employ[ing] some 2,100 workers there (less than 5% of its total work force of 43,000), generat[ing] less than 10% of its total revenue in the State, and maintain[ing] only one of its 24 automotive facilities in Montana (4%).” Id. at 1554. The Court reasoned that such “in-state business, [as] clarified in Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction.” Id. at 1559. Justice Sotomayor was the only dissenting justice in BNSF. She explained that under the majority’s opinion, “it is virtually inconceivable” that “large multistate or multinational corporations that operate across many jurisdictions” can “ever be subject to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business or of incorporation.” Id. at 1560 2 Accord, e.g., Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205, 223 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monkton, 768 F.3d at 432); Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Monkton, 768 F.3d at 432); Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015); Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204-06 (11th Cir. 2015); Kipp v. SKI Entm’t Corp. of Wis., 783 F.3d 695, 698-700 (7th Cir. 2015). Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 6 of 12 PageID #: 21 - 7 - (Sotomajor, J., dissenting). The opinion, she said, is “so narrow” that it takes the “exceptional case” standard of general jurisdiction “out of existence entirely.” Id. at 1561. “[C]ertainly a defendant with significant contacts with more than one State falls outside its ambit” of the exception. Id. at 1561-62. In other words, “the exceptional-circumstances inquiry is all form, no substance.” Id. at 1562. Instead, general-jurisdiction analysis can be viewed now as “rote identification of a corporation’s principal place of business or place of incorporation” Id. at 1560. 2. Union Pacific is not “essentially at home” in Texas. Union Pacific is incorporated in Delaware-not Texas. (Exhibit A, ¶ 10.) Union Pacific maintains its principal place of business and headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska-not Texas. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.)3 Thus, Union Pacific is not “essentially at home” in Texas unless Plaintiff proves this is an “exceptional case.” See BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 761 n.19). This case is not even close to being exceptional. Union Pacific is large, multistate company that conducts the vast majority of its total business outside Texas. Specifically, Union Pacific’s railroad system extends across 23 states. (Id. ¶ 3.) It serves many United States population centers, operates from all major West Coast and Gulf Coast ports to eastern gateways, connects with Canada’s rail system, and serves all six major Mexico gateways, as depicted below: 3 See also Alumbaugh v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Union Pacific is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Omaha, Nebraska.”); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. 174 Acres of Land Located in Crittenden Cnty., Ark., 193 F.3d 944, 944 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Petersen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., Nos. 04-C-5718, 5949, 6032, 6263, 2006 WL 1049715, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Union Pacific is a national company incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in Omaha, Nebraska.”). Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 7 of 12 PageID #: 22 - 8 - (Id.) This interstate rail system has various lane densities, as depicted below (line thickness depicts traffic density based on carloadings): Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 8 of 12 PageID #: 23 - 9 - (Id. ¶ 4.) United Pacific’s operating revenues were $19.9 billion in 2016. (Id. ¶ 9.) All of the highest levels of control and coordination of this 23-state system occur from Omaha, Nebraska. For example, Union Pacific is organized into various departments that manage the company, all of which are headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska. (Id. ¶ 13.) Union Pacific’s highest level executive officers are also located in Omaha. (Id. ¶ 12.) Its board meetings are primarily held in Omaha, and all of its corporate books and records are maintained in Omaha. (Id. ¶ 16.) Further, its primary dispatching facility and central operations center for train dispatching and network operations monitoring system-wide is located in Omaha. (Id. ¶ 15.) As of 2016, United Pacific’s rail network included 32,070 route miles, of which only 6,307 miles of track were in Texas (19.7%). (Id. ¶ 5.) In addition to its track structure, Union Pacific operates numerous facilities, including terminals, rail yards, switching, storage-in-transit, offices, dispatching centers, and crew quarters. (Id. ¶ 6.) Of its 20 major classification yards and intermodal terminals, only 4 are in Texas (20%). (Id.) To run such an expansive interstate system, Union Pacific had 42,919 full-time-equivalent employees in 2016, of which only 7,356 were in Texas (17.1%). (Id. ¶ 8.) Just as BNSF was not subject to general jurisdiction in Montana when the vast majority of its track, facilities, and employees were outside Montana, Union Pacific should not be subject to general jurisdiction in Texas when the vast majority of its track, facilities, and employees are outside Texas. Subjecting Union Pacific to general jurisdiction in Texas merely because it does some business in Texas-or likely any of the other 19 states in which it does business (besides Delaware and Nebraska)-is expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in BNSF and Daimler. See BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1599 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20). Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 9 of 12 PageID #: 24 - 10 - For these reasons, Union Pacific is not essentially at home in Texas and thus is not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas. V. CONCLUSION This Court does not have specific or general jurisdiction over Union Pacific. Accordingly, Union Pacific respectfully requests the Court to grant this motion and dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. Alternatively, if the Court does not dismiss, Union Pacific respectfully requests the Court to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana because Union Pacific is subject to personal jurisdiction in that court, not this Court. Union Pacific also requests all further relief to which it may be justly entitled. Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 10 of 12 PageID #: 25 - 11 - Respectfully submitted, MCLEOD, ALEXANDER, POWELL & APFFEL, PC /s/ Douglas W. Poole Douglas W. Poole State Bar No. 16115600 Bryan R. Lasswell State Bar No. 00784450 802 Rosenberg - P.O. Box 629 Galveston, Texas 77553 Telephone: (409) 763-2481 Telecopier: (409) 762-1155 dwpoole@mapalaw.com brlasswell@mapalaw.com HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP Kent Rutter State Bar No. 00797364 1221 McKinney, Suite 2100 Houston, Texas 77010-2007 Telephone: (713) 547-2000 Telecopier: (713) 547-2600 kent.rutter@haynesboone.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 11 of 12 PageID #: 26 - 12 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a copy of Defendant Union Pacific’s Motion to Dismiss has been served on the following counsel using the CM/ECF system on the 21st day of June, 2017. Counsel for Plaintiff Claude Bagley: Sara Youngdahl THE YOUNGDAHL LAW FIRM, P.C. 4203 Montrose Blvd., Suite 280 Houston, Texas 77034-4906 syoungdahl@youngdahl.com /s/ Kent Rutter Kent Rutter Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5 Filed 06/21/17 Page 12 of 12 PageID #: 27 EXHIBIT A Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-1 Filed 06/21/17 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: 28 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION CLAUDE BAGLEY, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CASE NO. 2:17-cv-453-JRG § UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD § COMPANY, § § Defendant. § DECLARATION OF MAUREEN FONG HINNERS The undersigned states and declares as follows: 1. My name is Maureen Fong Hinners. I am over the age of 18 and fully competent to make this declaration. The facts stated herein are true and correct and based on my personal knowledge. 2. I am a duly appointed and acting Assistant Secretary of Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”). In my position, I have knowledge of the corporate activities of Union Pacific and its corporate parent, Union Pacific Corporation. As a result of my employment and my review of Union Pacific’s corporate records, I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and could competently testify thereto if called to do so. Unless stated otherwise, the numerical figures contained herein are based on Union Pacific’s operations in 2016 and continue to approximately reflect Union Pacific’s current operations. 3. Union Pacific provides freight transportation on an interstate rail system. Union Pacific connects 23 states in the western two-thirds of the country by rail. The railroad’s freight includes agricultural products, automotive, chemicals, coal, industrial products, and intermodal. Union Pacific serves many U.S. population centers, operates from all major West Coast and Gulf - 1 - Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-1 Filed 06/21/17 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: 29 Coast ports to eastern gateways, connects with Canada’s rail systems, and is the only railroad serving all six major Mexico gateways. I am familiar with the Form 10-K filed by Union Pacific Corporation with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission for 2016, and the map below is an accurate copy of the rail network map contained in the 10-K. - 2 - Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-1 Filed 06/21/17 Page 3 of 6 PageID #: 30 4. I am familiar with Union Pacific Corporation’s 2016 Investor Fact Book that is publically available, and the map below is an accurate copy of the lane density map (with line thickness depicting traffic density based on carloadings) contained in the Investor Fact Book. 5. As of 2016, United Pacific’s rail network included 32,070 route miles, of which 6,307 miles of track were in Texas. 6. In addition to Union Pacific’s track structure, it operates numerous facilities, including terminals, rail yards, switching, storage-in-transit, offices, dispatching centers, and crew quarters. The following table includes the major yards and terminals on Union Pacific’s system: - 3 - Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-1 Filed 06/21/17 Page 4 of 6 PageID #: 31 Major Classification Yards: Major Intermodal Terminals: 1. North Platte, Nebraska 1. Joliet (Global 4), Illinois 2. North Little Rock, Arkansas 2. East Los Angeles, California 3. Englewood (Houston), Texas 3. ICTF (Los Angeles), California 4. Fort Worth, Texas 4. Global I (Chicago), Illinois 5. Livonia, Louisiana 5. DIT (Dallas), Texas 6. Proviso (Chicago), Illinois 6. Mesquite, Texas 7. Roseville, California 7. City of Industry, California 8. West Colton, California 8. Global II (Chicago), Illinois 9. Pine Bluff, Arkansas 9. Marion (Memphis), Tennessee 10. Neff (Kansas City), Missouri 10. Lathrop, California 7. Union Pacific is divided into three regions, each of which covers multiple states: the Northern, Western, and Southern Regions. Texas is a part of the Southern Region. 8. As of 2016, Union Pacific had 42,919 full-time-equivalent employees, of which 7,356 were in Texas. 9. In 2016, United Pacific’s operating revenues were $19.9 billion. 10. Union Pacific is incorporated in Delaware, and Union Pacific’s principal place of business is in Omaha, Nebraska. At no time during my career at Union Pacific has Union Pacific had a principal place of business in Texas. 11. Union Pacific’s corporate headquarters is located in Omaha, Nebraska. 12. Union Pacific’s highest level executive officers are located in Omaha, Nebraska. These executive officers include the Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer, Executive Vice President & Chief Administrative Officer, Executive Vice President & Chief Marketing Officer, Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer, Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, and Executive Vice President & Chief Legal Officer. - 4 - Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-1 Filed 06/21/17 Page 5 of 6 PageID #: 32 13. Union Pacific is organized into various departments that manage the company, all of which are headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska. This includes Union Pacific's Operating Department, Law Department, Claims Department, Human Resources Department, Marketing Department, Engineering Department, Finance Department, Labor Relations Department, Corporate Relations Department, and Mechanical Department. 14. The highest ranking Union Pacific employee in Texas reports to a higher ranking officer and executive in Omaha, Nebraska. 15. Union Pacific operates the Harriman Dispatching Center, located in Omaha, Nebraska, which is its primary dispatching facility and is a central operations center for train dispatching and network operations monitoring system wide. 16. The corporate board meetings of Union Pacific are primarily held in Omaha, Nebraska. All of the corporate books and records of Union Pacific are maintained in Omaha, Nebraska. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June Z. / , 2017. - 5 - Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-1 Filed 06/21/17 Page 6 of 6 PageID #: 33 EXHIBIT B Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-2 Filed 06/21/17 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 34 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION CLAUDE BAGLEY, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CASE NO. 2:17-cv-453-JRG § UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD § COMPANY, § § Defendant. § DECLARATION OF REID A. CARLISLE The undersigned states and declares as follows: 1. My name is Reid A. Carlisle. I am over the age of 18 and fully competent to make this declaration. The facts stated herein are true and correct and based on my personal knowledge. 2. I am a duly appointed and acting Senior Risk Management Representative for Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”). In my position, I oversee injury claims by employees of Union Pacific for the area that includes Shreveport, Louisiana. As a result of my employment and my review of Union Pacific’s corporate records, I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and could competently testify thereto if called to do so. 3. In addition, I am the custodian of records of Union Pacific and am familiar with the manner in which its records are created and maintained by virtue of my duties and responsibilities. 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B-1 are two pages of records from Union Pacific; namely, a Union Pacific Railroad Report of Personal Injury or Occupational Illness with Claude Bagley’s purported signature. - 1 - Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-2 Filed 06/21/17 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 35 5. Exhibit B-1 was received by Union Pacific near the time of Claude Bagley's March 22, 20 17 alleged injury; is purported to be signed by Claude Bagley, who is someone with knowledge of the facts; was kept by Union Pacific in the course of a regularl y conducted activity of Union Pacific; and was received as part of the regular practice of that acti vity. Exhibit 8-1 is an exact dupl icate of the original records. I declare under penalty of pe1jury that the fo regoing is true and correct. Executed on June .r.1.L 20 17. Reid A. Carlisle - 2 - Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-2 Filed 06/21/17 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 36 EXHBIT B-1 Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-3 Filed 06/21/17 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 37 W ' O 0 r-" . U U C:: I U U 4 + (3)011) ~OFACCIOENTllNClDENi: + Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-3 Filed 06/21/17 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 38 U4 /:.:! 1 /:c! U1 I 1 /::.:14 # I b b t-' . U 0 :.:1 / U U 4 + + (9) M!DICA~ IH8'11WOTlON8 .:.=:;~~~~~=-.!:=-=.~::.:_:::::=.:;:!!=====:;:===::::;::~c·~;==;--:-. DOISAG!!~__.;~--.- {IOl~S: hR~ lnlormatlon Ts doo~.· • I = + + ..... . · ~' . Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-3 Filed 06/21/17 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 39 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION CLAUDE BAGLEY, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CASE NO. 2:17-cv-453-JRG § UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD § COMPANY, § § Defendant. § ORDER Having considered Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company’s Motion to Dismiss; the response and reply, if any; the evidence; the pleadings; and the arguments of counsel, if any; the Court hereby ORDERS that Union Pacific’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and FURTHER ORDERS that all claims against Union Pacific are hereby dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. SIGNED this _____ day of _______________, 2017. ____________________________________ RODNEY GILSTRAP UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Case 2:17-cv-00453-JRG Document 5-4 Filed 06/21/17 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 40