NEWYORK 9223933
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ATLANTICA HOLDINGS, INC., BALTICA
INVESTMENT HOLDING, INC., BLU FUNDS, INC.,
Allan KIBLISKY, Anthony KIBLISKY, and Jacques
GLIKSBERG,
Plaintiffs,
- against -
BTA BANK JSC,
Defendant.
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13 CV 5790 (JMF)
[rel. No. 12 CV 8852 (JMF)]
ECF CASE
DEFENDANT “BTA BANK” JSC’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION
Case 1:13-cv-05790-JMF Document 43 Filed 06/10/14 Page 1 of 47
NEWYORK 9223933 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................3
A. THE 2010 RESTRUCTURING...............................................................................3
B. THE NEW NOTES..................................................................................................4
C. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND………………………………………………..6
D. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS..........................................................................................7
ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................8
I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING..........................................................................8
II. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT PLEAD THE REQUIRED DOMESTIC CONTENT
UNDER MORRISON............................................................................................11
A. Atlantica and Baltica’s Initial Acquisitions Were Not Domestic
Transactions ...............................................................................................12
B. Plaintiffs’ Secondary Market Purchases Were Not Domestic
Transactions ...............................................................................................15
III. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION ..........................17
A. The Parties Agreed to Arbitrate Even Non-Contractual Claims................17
B. The Claims in the Amended Complaint Are Subject to Arbitration
Under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act ...........18
C. The Arbitrators Should Decide Any Questions of Arbitrability................21
D. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Arbitrable...............................................................22
IV. THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER BTA ....................24
V. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A SECTION 10(b) CLAIM ..............................28
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Alleged Reliance ....................................29
1. The Alleged Negative Carry Swap Was Disclosed .......................29
2. Other Alleged Misstatements Also Are Not Actionable................32
3. Plaintiffs Cannot Claim Reliance on Alleged Misstatements
Regarding the Recovery Units .......................................................33
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Alleged Loss Causation..........................35
C. Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Alleged Scienter .....................................36
1. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Scienter with Respect to the Negative
Carry Swap.....................................................................................36
2. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Scienter with Respect to the Other
Alleged Misstatements...................................................................36
3. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Scienter with Respect to the Recovery
Units...............................................................................................37
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CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................38
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012) ...............11, 12, 15
Ameripay, LLC v. Ameripay Payroll, Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 2d 629 (D.N.J. 2004) .............................25
Arco Capital Corp. Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 949 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ..................15
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) ............26, 27
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).......................................................................................10, 28
Ashland Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 652 F.3d 333 (2d Cir. 2011)......................................31
ASTI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) ....................................32, 35
Backhaus v. Streamedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 01 CIV.4889 (LMM/THK), 2002 WL 1870272
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002) ...........................................................................................................30
Bancol Y Cia. S. En C. v. Bancolombia S.A., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ...........................24
Barnum v. Millbrook Care Ltd. P’ship, 850 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ..................................14
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)....................................................................................31
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...........................................................................28
Bell v. Cendant Corp., 293 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 2002).........................................................................21
Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007) ..........................................................25
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).......................................................10
Boca Raton Firefighters & Police Pension Fund v. Bahash, No. 12-1776-cv, 2012 WL 6621391
(2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) ...............................................................................................................36
Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-CV-01381-MSK-CBS,
2011 WL 1211511 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) .............................................................................15
Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 957 F. Supp. 2d 316
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) ..........................................................................................................................20
Cicchetti v. Davis Selected Advisors, No. 02 Civ.10150 RMB, 2003 WL 22723015 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 2003) ............................................................................................................................19
Case 1:13-cv-05790-JMF Document 43 Filed 06/10/14 Page 4 of 47
NEWYORK 9223933 v
City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen's Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, No. 12-4355-CV, --- F.3d ----,
2014 WL 1778041 (2d Cir. May 6, 2014) .......................................................................... passim
Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1995)...................................23
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ...........................................17
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1991)......................................4, 6, 16
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)................................................................................24
Debora v. WPP Grp. PLC
No. 91 CIV. 1775 (KTD), 1994 WL 177291 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1994)......................................35
Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. v. Galadari, No. 84 CIV. 2602 (CBM), 1987 WL 6164
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1987)...............................................................................................................9
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).........................................................................35
Elliot Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holdings, SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ............16
Faulkner v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)..................................36
Gissin v. Endres,739, F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ..................................................................36
Halperin v. eBanker USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002) ..................................................33
Hinerfeld v. United Auto Grp., No. 97 CIV. 3533 (RPP), 1998 WL 397852 (S.D.N.Y. July 15,
1998) ...........................................................................................................................................31
I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991) ............3
In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)................................32
In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 247 F. Supp. 2d 579 (D. Del. 2003) ....................................25
In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ....................31
In re Keryx Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 13 Civ. 755 (KBF), 2014 WL 585658
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014) ............................................................................................................33
In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig.
(“Merrill I”), 704 F. Supp. 2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)...................................................................34
In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig. (“Merrill II”)
765 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)................................................................................. passim
In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Secs. Litig. (“Merrill III”), 851 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) ...........................................................................................................................................36
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NEWYORK 9223933 vi
In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 172 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) ...........................................................................................................................................10
In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) .................17
In re Satyam Computer Servs. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 915 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ...................15
In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) .........................31
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008)....................................25
In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225 (RJS), 2012 WL 4471265 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2012) .....................................................................................................................................36, 37
In re Vivendi Universal S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) .............................17
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ..........................................9
In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2007)..................................................................9
JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004).....................................22, 23, 24
JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 04 CIV. 6069 (RCC), 2005
WL 1863676 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2005), aff'd, 167 F. App’x 266 (2d Cir. 2006) ...........20, 22, 23
Lasker v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 85 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996) ...................................33
Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005)............................................28, 35
Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ................15
Lighthouse Fin. Grp. v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, No. 11 Civ. 398, 2012 WL 4616958
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012)...........................................................................................................37
Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc.
252 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................19, 22
Madaus v. November Hill Farm, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Va. 1986)....................................13
MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Spiegel Holdings, Inc., No. 03 CV 10097 (GEL), 2004 WL 1944452
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) ...........................................................................................................10
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996)...................24, 26, 27, 28
MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 689 (D. Conn. 2003)........................13
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).......................................... passim
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NEWYORK 9223933 vii
MVP Asset Mgmt. (USA) LLC v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2013 WL 1726359
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013) ...........................................................................................................13
Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) ...........................................................................................................................................24
New Avex, Inc. v. Socata Aircraft Inc., No. 02 CIV.6519 DLC, 2002 WL 1998193 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 29, 2002) ............................................................................................................................21
Northrop Grumman Overseas Serv. Corp. v. Banco Wiese Sudameries, No. 03 Civ. 1681(LAP),
2004 WL 2199547 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004)............................................................................27
NovelAire Techs., L.L.C. v. Munters AB, No. 13 CIV. 472 (CM), 2013 WL 6182938 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 2013) ............................................................................................................................27
O & G Carriers, Inc., v. Smith, 799 F. Supp. 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ...............................................33
Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1996) ...............................................30
Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645
(2d Cir. 2004)........................................................................................................................19, 23
Phat Fashions, L.L.C. v. Phat Game Athletic Apparel, Inc., No. 00CIV0201 (JSM), 2001 WL
1041990 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001)..............................................................................................25
Pivot Point Capital Master LP v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 08 CIV. 2788 (AKH), 2010 WL
9452230 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010)...............................................................................................32
Plumbers, Pipefitters & MES Local Union No. 392 Pension Fund v. Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd.,
886 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).........................................................................................35
Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., Ltd., No. 05 Civ. 5621(RPP), 2006 WL 2465819 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 2006) ............................................................................................................................27
Press v. Quick & Reilly
No. 96 CIV 4278 (RPP), 1997 WL 458666 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) .....................................36
Rimac Internacional Cia de Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. Exel Global Logistics, Inc., 2009 WL
1868580 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009).............................................................................................20
RJ Capital, S.A. v. Lexington Capital Funding III, Ltd., No. 10 CIV. 25 (PGG), 2011 WL
3251554 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) .............................................................................................20
Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993) .................................................................23
Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2004).............................................................................33
S.E.C. v. Alexander
No. 00 Civ. 7290 LTS HBP, 2003 WL 21196852 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013)............................27
Case 1:13-cv-05790-JMF Document 43 Filed 06/10/14 Page 7 of 47
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S.E.C. v. Benger, No. 09 C 676, 2013 WL 593952 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2013)............................13, 15
Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) .................29, 30, 34
Scottevest, Inc. v. AyeGear Glasgow Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 851 (PKC), 2012 WL 1372166 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 17, 2012) .............................................................................................................................25
Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Triplefine Int'l Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003) .......................................21, 22
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)......................................................23
Shields v. CityTrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994).....................................................37
Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 1999) ....................................................................................................................................20
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2001).............................19
Starshinova v. Batratchenko, 931 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ..............................................13
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issue & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007)...................................................36
Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2006)............................................................................24
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Int’l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1993) ........................31
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) ....................................................................................17, 26
Wilder v. News Corp., No. 11 Civ. 4947 (PGG), 2014 WL 1315960 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014)....26
STATUTES AND RULES
17 C.F.R. § 230.144A ...................................................................................................................4, 10
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)........................................................................................................................4
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.905............................................................................................2, 4, 25, 30
11 U.S.C. § 1510...............................................................................................................................24
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b) ........................................................................................................................28
9 U.S.C. § 4.......................................................................................................................................19
9 U.S.C. § 201...................................................................................................................................19
9 U.S.C. § 206...................................................................................................................................19
9 U.S.C. § 208...................................................................................................................................19
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MISCELLANEOUS
LCIA Arbitration Rules (effective Jan. 1, 1998), available at
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Rules.aspx ...................22
List of Contracting States to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.......21
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Defendant “BTA Bank” JSC (“BTA”) submits this memorandum of law in support of its
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Atlantica Holdings, Inc.
(“Atlantica”), Baltica Investment Holding, Inc. (“Baltica”), Blu Funds Inc. (“Blu Funds”), Allan
Kiblisky, Anthony Kiblisky, and Jacques Gliksberg (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) or to stay this
action in favor of arbitration.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case involves three Panamanian companies (the “Panamanian Plaintiffs”) and three
U.S. residents (the “Individual Plaintiffs”) who allegedly acquired interests in foreign debt
securities (the “Subordinated Notes”) issued by BTA, a Kazakhstan bank, in connection with a
restructuring transaction that was designed to take place, and did take place, wholly outside the
United States. Plaintiffs nevertheless allege BTA violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder based on
alleged misstatements and omissions in an information memorandum (the “Information
Memorandum”) issued by BTA in connection with the restructuring.
After BTA moved to dismiss the original Complaint, this Court provided Plaintiffs with
an opportunity to file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies identified by BTA.
Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint that included only a few new allegations and otherwise
failed to remedy those pleading defects. Plaintiffs added no new allegations addressing BTA’s
arguments that (1) Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims; (2) the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over BTA; or (3) Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for securities fraud under the
Exchange Act. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ single substantive attempt to address their failure to plead a
domestic transaction does not meet the pleading requirements recently articulated by the Second
Circuit.
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As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs do not adequately allege they have standing to assert any
claims against BTA premised on their purported interest in the Subordinated Notes. Interests in
the Subordinated Notes are subject to “Transfer Restrictions” which limited the initial issuance
to (i) a non-U.S. Person (as defined in Regulation S) or (ii) either (1) an Accredited Investor (as
defined in under SEC Regulation D) or (2) a Qualified Institutional Buyer (“QIB”) (as defined in
SEC Rule 144A). Any subsequent transfers were limited to non-U.S. Persons or QIBs. Any
purported acquisition or transfer not in compliance with these restrictions is void ab initio.
Plaintiffs do not allege they were qualified investors or that they complied with the Transfer
Restrictions. Accordingly, they have no standing to assert any claims against BTA. (See infra 8-
10)
The claims also fall outside the scope of Section 10(b) under Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). The Subordinated Notes are foreign securities not
listed on a U.S. exchange and the relevant transactions were designed to and did in fact take
place outside the United States. As recent Second Circuit precedent makes clear, the Exchange
Act does not apply to a foreign transaction simply because an investor elects to place a “buy
order” with a U.S. broker to purchase a foreign security. Thus, Plaintiffs’ attempt now to recast
their placement of a “buy order” with a U.S. broker as a “private, off-exchange transaction”
whereby the “beneficial interest” in the Subordinated Notes was allegedly transferred in the
United States fails to state a claim. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint still does not allege
that the Panamanian Plaintiffs were anywhere other than Panama when they made their orders
such that any purported liability they incurred was never in the United States. (See infra 11-17)
Plaintiffs’ claims should also be dismissed because they are subject to arbitration. The
Subordinated Notes are subject to a broad arbitration agreement and the Information
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Memorandum (upon which Plaintiffs rely) made clear that any claims or disputes related to the
Notes would be subject to binding arbitration in London. (See infra 17-24)
The lack of connection to this forum is further demonstrated by this Court’s lack of
personal jurisdiction over BTA. Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a basis to hale BTA, a
Kazakh bank, into New York federal court where no alleged acts or omissions occurred here, nor
does any Plaintiff claim to have relied on any U.S. act by BTA. (See infra 24-28)
Finally, the Section 10(b) claims suffer from other fatal deficiencies. Plaintiffs do not
and cannot sufficiently allege that they reasonably relied on the allegedly false and misleading
statements. A number of Plaintiffs’ purported purchases occurred before the alleged
misstatements were made and in any event, the allegedly concealed facts were expressly
disclosed. Other alleged misstatements were only expressions of corporate optimism which are
not actionable. Plaintiffs also cannot allege loss causation to the extent they concede that most
of their purchases occurred after the “true facts” were disclosed to the market or fail to allege a
disclosure that resulted in an injury. (See infra 28-37)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. THE 2010 RESTRUCTURING
BTA is a bank organized under the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (Am. Compl. ¶
15) A Kazakhstan government sovereign wealth fund, “Samruk-Kazyna” JSC (“S-K Fund”), is
BTA’s controlling shareholder. (Id. ¶ 1) In 2010, BTA and its creditors agreed on the terms of a
proposed restructuring (the “2010 Restructuring”), the terms of which were set forth in an
Information Memorandum published in May 2010.1 The restructuring was designed to comply
1 The Information Memorandum is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Francis Fitzherbert-Brockholes dated
June 10, 2014 (hereinafter the “FFB Decl.”). The Information Memorandum is referenced and relied upon
throughout the Amended Complaint and is therefore properly considered by the Court on a motion to dismiss. See,
e.g., I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991). Indeed, the
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with Regulation S and Rule 144A, which provide that offers and sales of securities made outside
the United States in “offshore” transactions are not subject to the registration requirements of the
Securities Act so long as they are subject to Transfer Restrictions.2 Accordingly, consistent with
this design, the Information Memorandum related to the restructuring was made available on
BTA’s website, but only to individuals who certified either that they (i) were outside the U.S.
and non-U.S. Persons (as defined in Regulation S); or (ii) were either “Accredited Investors” as
defined in the Regulation D or “Qualified Institutional Buyers” (“QIBs”) as defined in Rule
144A.3 (FFB Decl. ¶ 8) The 2010 Restructuring reduced BTA’s debt by converting existing
debt securities (“Euronotes”) into equity and issuing new debt securities. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 7)
B. THE NEW NOTES
The 2010 Restructuring required holders of Euronotes and all other BTA creditors to
approve the Restructuring Plan, and then the restructuring needed to be approved by a Kazakh
court. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 9, 109-10) Ultimately, the Restructuring Plan was approved at
meetings of Euronoteholders in London and of other creditors in Almaty, Kazakhstan. (FFB
Decl. ¶¶ 18-19) The Plan was then approved by the Kazakh court, after which the existing
Euronotes were cancelled and their holders received “New Notes” (as defined in the Information
documents attached to the FFB Decl. are “documents plaintiffs had either in its possession or had knowledge of and
upon which they relied in bringing suit.” As such, they can be considered on a “motion to dismiss because there was
undisputed notice to plaintiffs of their contents and they were integral to plaintiffs’ claim.” Cortec Indus., Inc. v.
Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991).
2 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.905 (“Regulation S”); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (“Rule 144A”).
3 Regulation D of the Securities Act defines an “Accredited Investor” to include, among other things, “natural
persons whose net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse . . . exceeds $1,000,000.” 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a). Rule 144A defines a “QIB” as an entity that in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis
at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
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NEWYORK 9223933 5
Memorandum). (Id. ¶¶ 20-21) The definition of New Notes includes the Subordinated Notes
allegedly held by Plaintiffs.4
The New Notes at all times only represented interests in global note certificates held in
London by a nominee for the “Designated Clearing Systems.” (FFB Decl. ¶¶ 21-22)5 Pursuant
to the Settlement Instructions, referenced in the Information Memorandum,6 only accountholders
in these Designated Clearing Systems, referred to as “Direct Participants,” could acquire interests
in New Notes. (Id. ¶ 21; Ex. 7) Direct Participants were generally large financial institutions,
like UBS here, which held interests in the New Notes for their own accounts or for the accounts
of eligible investors. (Id. ¶ 21) Any beneficial interest in the New Notes could only be
transferred through accounts held by Direct Participants at the Designated Clearing Systems in a
transaction that complied with the Transfer Restrictions. (FFB Decl. ¶¶ 26-28, Ex. 1 at 311) The
Designated Clearing Systems were Euroclear Bank SA/NV (“Euroclear”) and Clearstream
Banking société anonyme, Luxembourg (“Clearstream”), both of which were located outside the
U.S. (FFB Decl. ¶ 21)7 After issuance, the New Notes were listed on the Kazakhstan Stock
Exchange and the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. (Id. ¶ 24; Ex. 1 at 4, 14; Ex. 8) The New Notes
were never listed on any U.S. exchange. (Id . ¶ 24)
4 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to “dollar–denominated Subordinated Notes” (Am. Compl. ¶ 35) as
well as “Subordinated Notes” (e.g., id. ¶¶ 36-39, 52, 56, 65) and “subordinated debt” (id. ¶¶ 8-14). Accordingly, it
appears that Plaintiffs allege to have acquired interests in Subordinated Notes (as defined in the Information
Memorandum) and such notes will be referred to as “Subordinated Notes” herein.
5 See also FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 316 (summarizing the arrangement with the clearing systems for the issuance and
subsequent transfer of interests in the relevant notes, which included the Subordinated Notes at issue here); id. at
314 (noting that “Non-Tenge New Notes” (which include the Subordinated Notes at issue here) allocated to eligible
investors would be represented by interests in a “Restricted Global Note.”)
6 FFB Decl. Ex. 1 at 108 (providing that the New Notes would be distributed in accordance with the Settlement
Instructions); see also id. at 4 (noting key dates in the 2010 Restructuring, including the “Settlement Instruction
Deadline (for submission of all Settlement Instructions)”).
7 Clearstream and Euroclear are located in Luxembourg and Brussels respectively. See,
https://www.clearstream.com/ci/dispatch/en/kir/ci nav/6 customers/020 contact/010 by location/50 luxembourg?
displayText=footerIMP (last visited June 10, 2014) (reflecting Clearstream is located in Luxembourg);
https://www.euroclear.com/en/about/our-structure/Corporate-details html (last visited June 10, 2014) (reflecting that
Euroclear is located in Brussels).
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NEWYORK 9223933 6
Because the New Notes were not listed on a U.S. exchange and would not be registered
under the Securities Act or with any U.S. regulatory authority, they were subject to Transfer
Restrictions. The initial issuance of New Notes was limited to (i) non-U.S. Persons or (ii) either
Accredited Investors or QIBs. (Id. Ex. 1 at 310-13) Any subsequent transfers were limited to
non-U.S. Persons or QIBs. (Id. at 311-12) Each purchaser or transferee was deemed to have
represented that it was a qualified investor. (Id.) Any purported transfer in violation of the
transfer restrictions would be void ab initio and of no force or effect. (Id. at 311) Qualified
investors acquiring New Notes also agreed to be subject to the Trust Deed.8 (Id. at 588) (the
“Terms and Conditions” for the New Notes stated that “[t]he Noteholders are bound by, and are
deemed to have notice of, all the provisions of the Trust Deed….”)9
In 2012, BTA defaulted on its debts and began proceedings for a second restructuring
(the “2012 Restructuring”). Under the terms of the 2012 Restructuring, the holders of New
Notes exchanged their notes for new debt securities issued by BTA. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56, 57)
C. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The original Complaint was served on March 11, 2014. BTA moved to dismiss on April
22. [Dkt. No. 27] On April 28, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file any amended complaint by
May 13. [Dkt. No. 31] Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint made only limited changes to the
original Complaint.10 [Dkt. No. 32]
8 The Court may properly consider the contents of the Trust Deed, as the Subordinated Notes were expressly subject
to its terms. See Cortec Indus., 949 F.2d at 48 (in securities fraud action court could consider purchase agreement,
offering memorandum and warrant as plaintiff “did not lack notice of those documents; these papers were integral to
complaint” even if not expressly incorporated by reference in the complaint).
9 “Noteholders” is defined by the Information Memorandum as the holders of New Notes.
10 A redline comparing the original Complaint and Amended Complaint is attached to the Declaration of Gergory M.
Startner dated June 10, 2014 (“Starner Decl.”) as Exhibit B.
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NEWYORK 9223933 7
Plaintiffs previously sued Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC (“S-K Fund”) on
substantially similar grounds. See Atlantica Holdings Inc. et al. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund
Samruk-Kazyna JSC, No. 12 CV 8852 (S.D.N.Y.) (the “S-K Action”). On March 10, 2014, the
Court issued an opinion and order denying in part and granting in part S-K Fund’s motion to
dismiss (the “S-K Decision”). S-K Fund has appealed the S-K Decision. See Atlantica Holdings
Inc. et al. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, Nos. 14-917, 14-1608 (2d Cir.).11
D. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
In the Amended Complaint Plaintiffs allege certain misstatements and omissions by BTA
in connection with the sale of the New Notes. The Plaintiffs are three Panamanian companies
(Atlantica, Baltica and Blu Funds) and three U.S. residents (Messrs. Kiblisky, Kiblisky and
Gliksberg). Plaintiffs do not allege they purchased interests in any securities directly from BTA.
Rather, Atlantica and Baltica allege that they acquired their initial interests in the Subordinated
Notes by “sending [their respective] completed ‘Electronic Instruction Form[s]’ to [their] broker
in the Miami, Florida, office of UBS Financial Services.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9) All Plaintiffs
also allege that they purchased interests in the Subordinated Notes on the secondary market
through what Plaintiffs now describe as “off-exchange transfers of beneficial interests on the
books of UBS, which was a ‘Direct Participant’ in the 2010 Restructuring” and that these
purchases were made by “placing orders with [their] brokers in the Miami, Florida office of UBS
Financial Services.” (Id. ¶¶ 8-13) Thereafter, orders were allegedly “transmitted” to UBS’s
“U.S. broker-dealer, where funds from a bank account [each Plaintiff] maintained at the UBS
Miami office were transferred to UBS’s back office in Stamford, Connecticut, where the order
was filled and the transaction completed.” (Id.)
11 S-K Fund appealed the S-K Decision with respect to S-K Fund’s argument that it is immune from suit under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. This Court also certified those portions of the S-K Decision concerning S-K
Fund’s argument that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the existence of a “domestic transaction” under Morrison.
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NEWYORK 9223933 8
Plaintiffs allege three categories of false and misleading statements. First, they allege
that the Information Memorandum failed to disclose information about a so-called “Negative
Carry Swap.” (Id. ¶ 43) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that BTA failed to disclose that it
purchased $4.3 billion in S-K Bonds that paid an effective interest rate of 2%, while at the same
time S-K Fund received interest as high as 10.9% on deposits held at BTA and BTA paid 7%
interest with respect to a repo arrangement with the National Bank of Kazakhstan. (Id.) Second,
that BTA made false and misleading statements in the Information Memorandum about its
“future viability.” (Id. at ¶ 54) Third, that BTA made certain misstatements and omissions
regarding its liability for “Recovery Units” issued in connection with the 2010 Restructuring.
(Id. ¶ 59)
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING
The Subordinated Notes were subject to “Transfer Restrictions” which were set forth in
the Information Memorandum (and in the terms and conditions of the Notes themselves). To
obtain an interest in a Subordinated Note in the initial exchange, an investor had to be (i) a non-
U.S. Person or (ii) either (1) an Accredited Investor or (2) a QIB. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 310-311)
Any subsequent transfers of that interest on the secondary market were limited to non-U.S.
persons or QIBs. (Id. at 312) A purported acquisition or transfer not in compliance with these
restrictions would be void ab initio and of no force or effect. (Id.)
The Subordinated Notes were required to bear a legend reflecting the Transfer
Restrictions, which provided in relevant part:
EACH BENEFICIAL OWNER HEREOF REPRESENTS THAT (A) IT IS
EITHER (I) NOT A U.S. PERSON AND IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES AS DEFINED IN REGULATION S UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT; OR (II) AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR AS DEFINED
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NEWYORK 9223933 9
IN RULE 501(a) OF REGULATION D UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
(“AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR”) OR (III) A QUALIFIED
INSTITUTIONAL BUYER AS DEFINED IN RULE 144A UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT (“QIB”) AND (B) THE SECURITY MAY NOT BE
OFFERED, SOLD, PLEDGED OR OTHERWISE TRANSFERRED EXCEPT (I)
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES TO PERSONS THAT ARE NOT U.S.
PERSONS AS DEFINED IN, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH, REGULATION
S AND (II) WITHIN THE UNITED STATES IN A TRANSACTION MEETING
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 144A TO A PERSON WHOM THE
SELLER REASONABLY BELIEVES IS A QIB THAT IS PURCHASING FOR
ITS OWN ACCOUNT OR FOR THE ACCOUNT OF ANOTHER QIB; AND IN
EACH CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY APPLICABLE SECURITIES
LAWS OF ANY STATE OF THE UNITED STATES. TRANSFER IN
VIOLATION OF THE FOREGOING WILL BE OF NO FORCE OR
EFFECT, WILL BE VOID AB INITIO, AND WILL NOT OPERATE TO
TRANSFER ANY RIGHTS TO THE TRANSFEREE.
(Id. at 311) (emphasis added)
The transfer restrictions are enforceable. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294
F. Supp. 2d 431, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing the validity of transfer restrictions which
limited transfer of notes to QIBs or non-U.S. Persons), vacated and remanded on other grounds
In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2007); Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. v.
Galadari, No. 84 CIV. 2602 (CBM), 1987 WL 6164 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1987) (recognizing that a
transfer restriction on a share certificate is effective against all persons).
Plaintiffs nowhere allege facts showing that they were qualified investors nor that they
acquired interests in the Subordinated Notes in compliance with the Transfer Restrictions.
Specifically, Plaintiffs Atlantica and Baltica allege that they acquired interests in some
Subordinated Notes in the initial exchange of existing BTA debt securities (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9),
but they do not allege they were Accredited Investors or QIBs. As to the remaining purchases of
interests in the Subordinated Notes on the secondary market, none of the Plaintiffs allege that
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NEWYORK 9223933 10
they were QIBs.12 Indeed, the Individual Plaintiffs by definition cannot be QIBs as individuals
cannot be “Qualified Institutional Buyers.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Thus, as recognized in the S-K Decision, “Plaintiffs acquired the Notes even though they were
either not qualified buyers or were United States persons—that is, even though they were not
within the universe of investors eligible to buy the Notes pursuant to the terms of the Information
Memorandum.” (S-K Decision at 6) Thus, any purported interest that Plaintiffs allegedly
acquired in the Subordinated Notes would be void ab initio. Significantly, BTA raised this issue
in its original motion to dismiss but Plaintiffs did not make any attempt to, and presumably
cannot, allege the requisite standing to bring their claims.
Failing to plead facts showing that they are qualified investors leaves Plaintiffs without
standing. It is well established that only qualified purchasers and sellers have standing to bring
claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975); see also MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Spiegel Holdings, Inc., No. 03 CV 10097 (GEL), 2004
WL 1944452, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (recognizing “‘actual purchaser or seller’ standing
limitation [for] claims brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5”); In re Refco Capital Mkts.,
Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[I]n the
absence of any allegation that plaintiffs themselves were ‘actual purchasers [or] sellers of
securities’, plaintiffs lack standing to seek a private remedy [for securities fraud].”). Having
failed to plead facts showing that they were eligible investors in the first place, Plaintiffs’
purported acquisition of Subordinated Notes was void ab initio, and they lack standing to assert
any claims against BTA as to the Notes. See, e.g., MBIA Ins. Corp., 2004 WL 1944452, at *2.
12 While there is a passing reference to the resale of New Notes to “certain qualified purchasers in the United States,
including Plaintiffs” being permitted under Rule 144A (Am. Compl. ¶ 37), this is not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (pleadings offering only “labels and conclusions” or “mere conclusory statements” “do not
suffice”). The Amended Complaint fails to specifically allege that each Plaintiff was eligible to acquire any interest
in the New Notes.
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NEWYORK 9223933 11
II. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT PLEAD THE REQUIRED DOMESTIC CONTENT
UNDER MORRISON
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), the Supreme Court
concluded that there is a presumption against the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act
and adopted a “transactional test” to limit the reach of Section 10(b) to only (i) the purchase or
sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and (ii) the purchase or sale of any other
security in the United States. Id. at 2888.
Plaintiffs Atlantica and Baltica allege that they acquired a small amount of Subordinated
Notes in the initial exchange of existing BTA debt securities, (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9), while their
remaining purchases and those of all other Plaintiffs were in the secondary market. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-
13) Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, allege that any of these purchases occurred on a U.S.
exchange: the Subordinated Notes were only listed on exchanges in Kazakhstan and
Luxembourg. (FFB Decl. ¶ 24; Ex. 1 at 4, 14; Ex. 8; see also S-K Decision at 4) Accordingly,
under Morrison, “the exclusive focus” is on whether there is a “domestic transaction.” 130 S. Ct.
at 2885. While Morrison did not define a “domestic transaction,” the Second Circuit has
interpreted Morrison to require a showing that “irrevocable liability was incurred or that title was
transferred within the United States.” Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677
F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs concede that no title was ever transferred here, and rely
solely on the theory that they somehow became irrevocably liable in the U.S. by routing their
orders through a U.S. broker. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-13)
Importantly, the Second Circuit recently clarified that simply placing an order with a
broker in the U.S. to purchase a foreign security is not sufficient to domesticate a foreign
transaction for purposes of a Section 10(b) claim. City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen's Ret.
Sys. v. UBS AG, No. 12-4355-CV, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 1778041, at *4 (2d Cir. May 6, 2014).
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In City of Pontiac, plaintiffs were both foreign and domestic investors who purchased UBS
shares that were listed on foreign exchanges and cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
In affirming dismissal as to all plaintiffs who purchased the UBS shares on the foreign
exchanges, the Second Circuit concluded that the “mere placement of a buy order in the United
States for the purchase of foreign securities on a foreign exchange” cannot establish that a
purchaser incurred irrevocable liability in the United States sufficient to support a claim under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act. Id. at *4. The court also clarified its prior rulings and noted
it had never held that the placement of a purchase order, without more, is sufficient to incur
irrevocable liability. Id. at *4 n. 33.
Here, Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to show that the relevant transactions
occurred here, and Plaintiffs cannot rely on conclusory allegations of a “domestic” transaction to
state a claim. Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 62; City of Pontiac, 2014 WL 1778041, at *4.
A. Atlantica and Baltica’s Initial Acquisitions Were Not Domestic Transactions
Atlantica and Baltica’s initial acquisitions of Subordinated Notes are exactly the type of
“foreign-cubed” transaction that Morrison places outside the ambit of Section 10(b). Atlantica
and Baltica are foreign plaintiffs, who purchased foreign securities that were listed on foreign
exchanges. There is a presumption against the application of the Exchange Act to this kind of
transaction, even where there may be some U.S. connection. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2884-86 (noting that virtually any transaction can have U.S. connections).
First, in attempting to avoid Morrison, Plaintiffs parrot the “irrevocable liability”
language in Absolute Activist. Atlantica and Baltica allege they “unconditionally communicated
[their] commitment” to participate in the 2010 Restructuring by “sending [their] completed
‘Electronic Instruction Form’ [(“EIF”)] to a UBS broker in Florida, and “thereby incurred
irrevocable liability” in the United States to accept the New Notes. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9)
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NEWYORK 9223933 13
However, under City of Pontiac, Atlantica and Baltica simply choosing to route their EIFs
through a U.S. broker does not domesticate what were otherwise foreign securities issued and
listed abroad. City of Pontiac, 2014 WL 1778041, at *4. Atlantica and Baltica plead no other
domestic connection as to these transactions and as such they have failed to meet the pleading
standards under Morrison and City of Pontiac.
Second, to the extent the EIFs created any binding agreement, that agreement would have
occurred (and any attendant liability would have been incurred) at the time and place Atlantica
and Baltica completed and transmitted the EIFs to their broker. Thus, the relevant inquiry is
where Atlantica and Baltica were located when they made their decision, completed their EIFs
and sent them to their broker. See S.E.C. v. Benger, No. 09 C 676, 2013 WL 593952, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2013) (irrevocable liability occurred either where seller accepted the offer or
where investor put its acceptance in the mail).13 There are no allegations in the Amended
Complaint that Atlantica and Baltica were located anywhere other than Panama when they
transmitted the EIFs, and accordingly the allegations do not plead irrevocable liability incurred in
the U.S. See Starshinova v. Batratchenko, 931 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (allegations
insufficient to support a plausible inference that plaintiffs incurred irrevocable U.S. liability
where complaint did not specify where purported agreements were entered into); MVP Asset
Mgmt. (USA) LLC v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2013 WL 1726359, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. Mar. 22, 2013) (dismissing claims where plaintiff failed to allege where defendants were
13 Under Plaintiffs’ construct, the EIFs represented Atlantica and Baltica’s acceptance of an offer to exchange their
old debt securities for interests in Subordinated Notes. Here, the “seller” was located abroad. As for the
“purchaser,” under the “mailbox rule,” a contract becomes binding at the time and place of acceptance. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 64 (1981) (contract becomes binding at time and place where acceptor speaks
or manifests consent); MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699 (D. Conn. 2003)
(contract became binding in Singapore where accepting party send letters confirming acceptance from Singapore);
Madaus v. November Hill Farm, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (W.D. Va. 1986) (place of contracting was West
Germany where acceptance was sent from West Germany to Virginia).
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NEWYORK 9223933 14
located when they accepted the agreement that set forth “the point at which (and where) [the
parties] would have made a ‘valid, binding and enforceable agreement’”).
Finally, the EIF by itself could not create “irrevocable liability” because it could not, and
did not, create any binding agreement to issue Subordinated Notes to Atlantica and Baltica. To
the contrary, the EIFs were only a way for Euronoteholders like Atlantica and Baltica to register
their votes for the Euronoteholders’ Meeting in London with respect to the proposed 2010
Restructuring. (FFB Decl. ¶ 15; Ex. 1 at 22, 86) EIFs were used by Direct Participants to
instruct the Registered Holder of the Euronotes at the Euronoteholders’ Meetings and, in turn,
appoint a trustee to vote during a subsequent creditor meeting in Kazakhstan. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1
at 22, 86-92) Thus, when the EIFs were submitted, the 2010 Restructuring had yet to be
approved and there was no binding agreement or transaction for the issuance of any
Subordinated Notes.14 See Barnum v. Millbrook Care Ltd. P’ship, 850 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[I]f the allegations of a complaint are contradicted by documents made a part
thereof, the document controls and the court need not accept as true the allegations of the
complaint.”).
Accordingly, when Atlantica and Baltica submitted their EIFs, any agreement for the
issuance of Subordinated Notes was far from certain, and the parties were not bound to effectuate
any transaction. Rather, there were real conditions (all occurring outside the United States) that
had to be met before the Direct Participants could exchange Atlantica and Baltica’s interests in
the prior debt for an interest in Subordinated Notes through the Designated Clearing Systems
located in Europe. (FFB Decl. ¶ 16; Ex. 1 at 9, 109-10) Where, as here, non-U.S. actions are
conditions precedent to consummating the transaction at issue, there cannot be a domestic
14 The designated process for submitting EIFs and their role in the 2010 Restructuring is detailed in the Information
Memorandum. See, e.g., FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 90-93, 373-375.
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NEWYORK 9223933 15
transaction. See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt. Holdings Ltd., No. 08-CV-
01381-MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (transaction did not occur
here where it “was not completed until [defendant] finally accepted an application—presumably
in its Cayman Islands offices.”).15
B. Plaintiffs’ Secondary Market Purchases Were Not Domestic Transactions
Plaintiffs allege that they “plac[ed] orders with [their] broker in Miami, Florida”, which
in turn transmitted the orders to its U.S. broker-dealer to be “filled and the transaction
completed” at UBS’s back office in Stamford, Connecticut. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-13) The
Plaintiffs characterize this as an “off-exchange transfer[] of beneficial interest on the books of
UBS.” Id. This amended characterization does not plead a domestic transaction.
First, Plaintiff’s allegations that they placed buy orders with their U.S. brokers to
purchase beneficial interests in foreign securities fail to satisfy City of Pontiac. That Plaintiffs’
allege they acquired interests in the Subordinated Notes in an “off-exchange” transaction (via a
transaction with a third-party “Direct Participant,” not the issuer BTA), as opposed to on a
foreign exchange directly, makes no difference. Direct Participants like UBS only held interests
in the Subordinated Notes through accounts with the Designated Clearing Systems. (FFB Decl.
15 The Court previously considered this argument in the S-K Action and concluded that (i) conditions precedent do
not render a transaction non-domestic and (ii) for all practical purposes Atlantica and Baltica were committed to the
transaction when they submitted the EIF. (S-K Decision at 17-18) However, the S-K Decision did not consider the
question of where acceptance occurred, nor had the Second Circuit issued its decision in City of Pontiac. Read in
conjunction with City of Pontiac, Morrison requires more than a plaintiff’s unilateral commitment to acquire a
foreign security from a foreign defendant. Absolute Activist, 677 F.3d at 67 (noting that any “purchase” or “sale”
only takes place when both parties become bound to effectuate the transaction); Benger, 2013 WL 593952, at *9-10
(no irrevocable liability when intervening events must occur before a party is irrevocably bound). Indeed, the
importance of foreign conditions precedent takes on added significance after City of Pontiac's clarification of
Absolute Activist. City of Pontiac, 2014 WL 1778041, at *4. Nor, in any event, are the cases following Absolute
Activist and cited by the Court to the contrary, as those cases indicate that plaintiffs must allege a contract binding
on all the parties that was consummated in the U.S. See, e.g., Arco Capital Corp. Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 949 F.
Supp. 2d 532, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (receipt of funds in U.S. consummated the transaction in the U.S. by making the
contract irrevocably binding on all the parties); Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 2d
262, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying on the fact that the operative agreement which bound both parties to “irrevocable
liability” was executed in the U.S.); see also Satyam, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (allegedly committing to buy orders in
the U.S. is not sufficient under Morrison).
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NEWYORK 9223933 16
¶¶ 21-22, Exs. 7-8) Plaintiffs fail to even acknowledge the role of the clearing systems, much
less allege where or how UBS acquired the interests in the Subordinated Notes to fill Plaintiffs’
orders. Plaintiffs have failed in two attempts to plead facts to domesticate the acquisition of
interests in securities issued abroad and listed only on foreign exchanges, and have ignored the
Information Memorandum which makes clear where and how their broker obtained interests in
the Subordinated Notes on their behalf. See, e.g., Elliot Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holdings,
SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (purchaser located in the U.S. failed to allege a
domestic transaction where the counterparty to the transaction was not identified). That UBS
may have chosen to record book orders concerning interests in the Subordinated Notes in its
records somewhere else does not create a domestic transaction, particularly where the
Subordinated Notes at issue were issued, located and held abroad. (FFB Decl. ¶¶ 21-22, Exs. 7-
8)16
Second, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in City of Pontiac must be read in the
context of Morrison’s clear intention to limit the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b), and neither
Morrison nor City of Pontiac can be read to allow a simple book entry transfer by a third party
bank (that is not the issuer) of an interest in a foreign security to create a basis for a Section 10(b)
claim. Indeed, to hold that a Section 10(b) suit could be brought by any plaintiff anywhere who
acquired an interest in a foreign security in an “off-exchange transaction” would effectively open
16 The Court concluded that it could not consider a similar argument raised by S-K because it was premised on facts
not found in the Complaint or the Information Memorandum. (S-K Decision at 16, n. 6) Respectfully, the Second
Circuit has made clear that the Court may properly consider documents that are integral to Plaintiffs’ claims and as
to which Plaintiffs had notice or knowledge. Cortec Indus., Inc., 949 F.2d at 48. Here, Plaintiffs rely upon UBS’
role as a Direct Participant in processing their orders to allege they incurred irrevocable liability in the U.S. (Am.
Compl. at ¶¶ 8-13) Having done so, they cannot ignore that as a Direct Participant UBS could only obtain interests
in the Subordinated Notes through the Designated Clearing Systems. The Information Memorandum specifically
references the “Notice of Settlement Instructions” (FFB Decl., Ex. 7) which make clear that Euroclear and
Clearstream were the “Designated Clearing Systems” for the Subordinated Notes. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 108)
(discussing deadline for distribution of New Notes as provided for in the Settlement Instructions); (id. at 4)
(referring to the deadline for submission of Settlement Instructions). At a minimum, Plaintiffs’ failure to allege how
their broker UBS acquired interest in the Subordinated Notes leaves their claims deficient.
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the door to claims related to the purchase of an interest in any security listed on any foreign
exchange against any issuer, so long as the plaintiff routed the purchase through a U.S. broker.
Such a result would effectively turn the reasoning of Morrison and City of Pontiac on its head by
extending Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial coverage to all foreign securities and foreign
exchanges.17 If anything, City of Pontiac puts a finer point on those post-Morrison cases that did
not bring foreign securities transactions, like those here, within the ambit of Section 10(b). See,
e.g., In re Vivendi Universal S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(recognizing that the purpose of Morrison cannot be accomplished if every foreign security listed
on a foreign exchange were subject to Section 10(b) whenever an investor places a U.S. buy
order); In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (concluding that it is not enough for plaintiffs to merely allege they are U.S. residents who
were here when they decided to purchase foreign securities listed on foreign exchanges);
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (concluding that
Morrison indicates that Section 10(b) does not extend to foreign securities trades of foreign
securities traded on foreign exchanges even if purchased by American investors and even if some
aspects of the transaction occurred in the U.S.).
III. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION
A. The Parties Agreed to Arbitrate Even Non-Contractual Claims
Any claims Plaintiffs may have against BTA are subject to arbitration. Investors
acquiring the Subordinated Notes agreed to be bound by all the provisions of the Trust Deed.
(See, FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 510 (“The Noteholders are bound by, and are deemed to have notice of,
17 The Supreme Court also recently reiterated that a plaintiff’s unilateral actions cannot be the basis for establishing
personal jurisdiction, further confirming that Morrison should not be read to allow plaintiffs to create jurisdiction by
simply routing through a U.S. broker an order to purchase foreign securities that are listed on a foreign exchange.
See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (holding that to establish specific jurisdiction “the relationship
must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State” and not those of plaintiff).
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NEWYORK 9223933 18
all the provisions of the Trust Deed….”); see also FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 26 (“The Notes are subject
to the provisions contained in this Trust Deed, all of which shall be binding on the Bank and the
Noteholders.”)) The Trust Deed includes a broad arbitration clause:
Any claim, dispute or difference of whatever nature arising under, out of or in
connection with the Notes or the Trust Deed (including a claim, dispute or
difference regarding its existence, termination or validity or any non contractual
obligations arising out of or in connection with this Trust Deed) (a “Dispute”),
shall be referred to and finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules
of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) (the “Rules”) as at
present in force and as modified by this Clause, which Rules shall be deemed
incorporated into this Clause.18
(FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 75) (the “Arbitration Clause”) (emphasis added).
The Information Memorandum upon which Plaintiffs claim to have relied echoes this
broad agreement to arbitrate any (even “non contractual”) dispute:
The Non-Tenge New Notes and the New Notes Trust Deed will be governed by
English law and will provide that any claims, disputes or differences regarding
their existence, termination or validity or any non contractual obligations arising
out of or in connection with such documents shall be referred to and finally settled
by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the London Court of International
Arbitration.19
(FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 118)20
B. The Claims in the Amended Complaint Are Subject to Arbitration Under the
New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act
Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
dated June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; 21 U.S.T. 2517; 7 I.L.M. 1046 (1968) (“New York
18 The Trust Deed defines “Notes” to include the Subordinated Notes at issue here. FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 1 (defining
“Notes” to include “Subordinated Notes”).
19 The Information Memorandum similarly defines “Non-Tenge New Notes” to include the Subordinated Notes
here. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 22, 23, 30 (defining “Non-Tenge New Notes” to include “Dollar Subordinated Notes”
and “Euro Subordinated Notes”))
20 The “Terms and Conditions” of the Subordinated Notes likewise states that “any claim, dispute or difference of
whatever nature arising under, out of or in connection with the Notes or the Trust Deed (including a claim, dispute
or difference regarding its existence, termination or validity or any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in
connection with the Trust Deed)” be referred to arbitration. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 600) The Terms and Conditions
are summaries of the Trust Deed and subject to the Trust Deed’s terms. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 588)
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NEWYORK 9223933 19
Convention”), as enforced by Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 201
et seq., parties to an international arbitration agreement must abide by those agreements.
Section 206 of the FAA provides that “[a] court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct
that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for,
whether that place is within or without the United States.” 9 U.S.C. § 206.21
Similarly, Section 4 of the FAA (applicable to international arbitration under 9 U.S.C. §
208) provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court.... [U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4; see also Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 29 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“As is evident from both 9 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 206, a strong presumption of
arbitrability is established by the FAA.”); Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE
Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 653 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming an order to compel
arbitration where the arbitration clause was broad and covered the asserted dispute).
The FAA expresses “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” and that
“any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir.
2001); Cicchetti v. Davis Selected Advisors, No. 02 Civ. 10150 RMB, 2003 WL 22723015, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003). Arbitration is especially favored in resolving disputes involving
international commerce, as is the case here. See Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 654 (“[t]he federal
21 See New York Convention art II.3 (“The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of
the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.”).
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NEWYORK 9223933 20
policy favoring the liberal enforcement of arbitration clauses … applies with particular force in
international disputes”); see also Rimac Internacional Cia de Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. Exel
Global Logistics, Inc., 2009 WL 1868580, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (“In the case of
international transactions, the ‘bias in favor of arbitration . . . is even stronger.’”).
The New York Convention and implementing provisions of the FAA set forth four
requirements for enforcing arbitration agreements: (1) there must be a written agreement; (2) it
must provide for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3) the subject
matter must be commercial; and (4) it cannot be entirely domestic in scope. Smith/Enron
Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1999).
Here, all the requirements are readily satisfied. First, the Trust Deed is a written
agreement, binding BTA and Plaintiffs. In allegedly acquiring the Subordinated Notes, Plaintiffs
agreed to be bound by the Trust Deed. (See FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 588 (“The Noteholders are
bound by, and are deemed to have notice of, all the provisions of the Trust Deed….”); see also
FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 26 (“The Notes are subject to the provisions contained in this Trust Deed, all
of which shall be binding on the Bank and the Noteholders.”)) Courts regularly recognize that
investors like Plaintiffs acquire securities subject to the terms of the operative agreements. See,
e.g., Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 957 F. Supp. 2d
316, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (acknowledging that indenture agreement was enforceable with
respect to the debt securities); RJ Capital, S.A. v. Lexington Capital Funding III, Ltd., No. 10
CIV. 25 (PGG), 2011 WL 3251554, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) (concluding that
noteholders were bound by provisions of indenture agreement setting forth prerequisites to bring
suit and dismissing claims against issuer); JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard
Coll., No. 04 CIV. 6069 (RCC), 2005 WL 1863676, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2005) (recognizing
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NEWYORK 9223933 21
that holders of securities were subject to terms of deposit agreement), aff'd, 167 F. App’x 266
(2d Cir. 2006).
Second, the Trust Deed provides for arbitration in London, and the United Kingdom is a
signatory to the New York Convention.22 Third, the subject matter of the Trust Deed is
commercial as it involves the issuance of subordinated debt securities. Fourth, the Trust Deed
involves foreign parties (BTA is a Kazakh bank) and international transactions and thus is not
entirely domestic in scope.
C. The Arbitrators Should Decide Any Questions of Arbitrability
Any questions of arbitrability are properly addressed in the arbitration. Courts should
defer any questions regarding arbitrability to the arbitrators. Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Triplefine Int'l
Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, the arbitration clause in the Trust Deed is
broad in scope, providing that “[a]ny claim, dispute or difference of whatever nature arising
under, out of or in connection with the Notes or the Trust Deed … shall be referred to and finally
settled by arbitration….” FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 75 (emphasis added). Courts regularly interpret
this broad language to include an agreement to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators.
See, e.g., New Avex, Inc. v. Socata Aircraft Inc., No. 02 CIV.6519 DLC, 2002 WL 1998193, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (“The broadly worded, inclusive terms of the arbitration provision
of the Agreement constitute unambiguous evidence that the parties clearly and unmistakably
intended to arbitrate questions of arbitrability.”); Bell v. Cendant Corp., 293 F.3d 563, 569 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“broad language in an arbitration clause … can be sufficient to send the issue of
arbitrability to the arbitrator.”).
22 See List of Contracting States to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.
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NEWYORK 9223933 22
The parties’ intent to arbitrate any questions of arbitrability also is reflected in the
incorporation of the rules of the LCIA in the Arbitration Clause. See FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 75.
The rules of the LCIA provide in relevant part that “[t]he Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power
to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objection to the initial or continuing existence,
validity or effectiveness of the Arbitration Agreement.” See LCIA Rules, Article 23.1;23 Shaw
Grp. Inc., 322 F.3d at 124-25 (“In sum, because the parties’ arbitration agreement is broadly
worded to require the submission of “all disputes” concerning the Representation Agreement to
arbitration, and because it provides for arbitration to be conducted under the rules of the ICC,
which assign the arbitrator initial responsibility to determine issues of arbitrability, we conclude
that the agreement clearly and unmistakably evidences the parties’ intent to arbitrate questions of
arbitrability.”); JSC Surgutneftegaz, 2005 WL 1863676, at *1 (enforcing broad arbitration clause
in securities deposit agreement providing that “[a]ny controversy, claim or cause of action . . .
arising out of or relating to” to securities at issue “shall be finally settled by arbitration”).
D. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Arbitrable
Although this Court need not reach the issue, where, as here, the parties agreed to a broad
arbitration clause, there is a presumption that the claims are arbitratable. JLM Indus., Inc. v.
Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2004); Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A., 252 F.3d at
224.
Here, the Arbitration Clause is a broad arbitration provision specifically referring to non-
contractual claims. The clause provides that “[a]ny claim, dispute or difference of whatever
nature arising under, out of or in connection with the Notes or the Trust Deed (including a claim,
dispute or difference regarding its existence, termination or validity or any non contractual
23 LCIA Arbitration Rules (effective Jan. 1, 1998), available at
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Rules.aspx
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NEWYORK 9223933 23
obligations arising out of or in connection with this Trust Deed) . . . shall be referred to and
finally settled by arbitration. . . .” (FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 75 (emphasis added)) Courts have
broadly interpreted similarly expansive language. See, e.g., Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v.
Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1995) (interpreting a similar arbitration clause providing
that “[a]ny claim or controversy arising out of or relating to the agreement” were subject to
arbitration); JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 172 ( “[a]ny and all differences and disputes of whatsoever
nature arising out of this Charter”); Paramedics, 369 F.3d at 649 ( “any controversy, claim or
dispute between the Parties arising out of or relating in any way to this Agreement”).
Plaintiffs allege that they acquired the Subordinated Notes in reliance on alleged
misrepresentations and omissions in the Information Memorandum issued in connection with the
Subordinated Notes. As such, these claims by necessity “arise under, out of or in connection
with the Notes…” and are therefore subject to arbitration. See, e.g., JSC Surgutneftegaz, 2005
WL 1863676, at *1. Furthermore, the Information Memorandum upon which Plaintiffs claim to
have relied expressly put them on notice that any claims or disputes concerning the Notes would
be subject to arbitration. See FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 118. Plaintiffs cannot rely on the Information
Memorandum for some purposes and not others.
Finally, it is well-established that securities fraud claims are arbitrable. See, e.g.,
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (agreements to arbitrate
Exchange Act claims are enforceable). For example, in Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d
1353, 1361 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit rejected arguments that U.S. securities laws were
beyond the scope of arbitration, where the arbitration clause dictated London arbitration under
English law. Id. at 1360 (“It defies reason to suggest that a plaintiff may circumvent forum
selection and arbitration clauses merely by stating claims under laws not recognized by the
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NEWYORK 9223933 24
forum selected in the agreement.”); see Bancol Y Cia. S. En C. v. Bancolombia S.A., 61 F. Supp.
2d 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (requiring plaintiffs to submit their securities claims to arbitration in
Colombia under Colombian law). Similarly, fraudulent inducement or concealment claims are
also arbitrable. Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d
514, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (collecting cases where arbitration clauses where found to
encompasses various fraud based claims); JLM Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d at 170 (collecting cases
and holding that claims of fraudulent inducement and unconscionability are all subject to
arbitration).
IV. THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER BTA
Plaintiffs also have failed to plead personal jurisdiction over BTA. Plaintiffs are required
to plead sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction, and they bear the burden of making a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction over BTA. Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2006);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiffs’
conclusory allegations do not establish a prima facie basis for specific jurisdiction over BTA.24
Plaintiffs had the opportunity to address these deficiencies in the Amended Complaint but did
not.
Plaintiffs allege that BTA made public statements directed at Plaintiffs and unnamed
agents in New York and “directed misstatements and omissions” towards U.S. investors. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 22) Significantly, there are no particularized allegations as to how BTA directed any
24 Because BTA is a Kazakh bank headquartered in Kazakhstan, there is no basis for general jurisdiction. Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). Plaintiffs also have acknowledged that BTA has no U.S. office or agent
for service of process. See Plaintiffs Memo in Support of Motion for Alternative Service at 2 [Dkt. No. 9]; see also
FFB Decl. ¶ 4. While Plaintiffs note that BTA filed a petition under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Am.
Compl. ¶ 16), a Chapter 15 proceeding does not subject a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction in any
subsequent litigation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1510 ((“The sole fact that a foreign representative files a petition under
section 1515 does not subject the foreign representative to the jurisdiction of any court in the United States for any
other purpose.”).
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NEWYORK 9223933 25
statements at investors here. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations do not meet their burden and this
Court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” In re
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 93 (2d Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the alleged U.S. dissemination of the Information
Memorandum are likewise insufficient. Plaintiffs allege that BTA “knew that its public
representations in the Information Memorandum would be disseminated throughout the United
States” (Am. Compl. ¶ 21), but the only specific allegation is that BTA made the Information
Memorandum available on a website. (Id. at ¶ 30)25 In this Circuit, “the mere existence of a
website that is visible in a forum and that gives information about a company and its products is
not enough, by itself, to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in that forum.” Scottevest,
Inc. v. AyeGear Glasgow Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 851 (PKC), 2012 WL 1372166, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
17, 2012) (quoting Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 253 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Specifically, there is no nexus between BTA’s website and Plaintiffs’ claims, because access to
the website was expressly limited to certain eligible investors, a group that does not include any
of the Plaintiffs.26 See, e.g., In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 247 F. Supp. 2d 579, 584 (D.
Del. 2003) (plaintiffs failed to show requisite nexus between their claims and defendant’s alleged
conduct within forum); Ameripay, LLC v. Ameripay Payroll, Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 2d 629, 635
(D.N.J. 2004) (defendant’s website did not warrant exercise of specific jurisdiction where
website functions required software “key” that defendant distributed only to certain clients and
25 Plaintiffs also allege that the Information Memorandum “was mailed directly to Plaintiffs’ brokers at the UBS
Miami Office.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 30) However, Plaintiffs do not allege that BTA mailed it or caused it to be mailed.
In any event, “[m]ere telephone, mail, or email contacts will normally not suffice to support [specific] jurisdiction.”
Phat Fashions, L.L.C. v. Phat Game Athletic Apparel, Inc., No. 00CIV0201 (JSM), 2001 WL 1041990, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001). This is particularly the case here, where there is no allegation that BTA contacted these
Plaintiffs who were not even eligible investors.
26 Pursuant to Regulation S and Rule 144A, the Information Memorandum was only available to individuals who
certified that they were either (i) non-U.S. residents or (ii) Accredited Investors or QIBs. (FFB Decl. ¶ 8) As
discussed supra at 8-10, there are no allegations that Plaintiffs met these conditions.
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NEWYORK 9223933 26
not plaintiff). Plaintiffs also do not allege they ever accessed BTA’s website to obtain the
Information Memorandum, much less that they accessed the website from within the U.S.
Plaintiffs’ allegations that BTA made certain misrepresentations in presentations (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 50, 63, 64) and on a conference call with investors (id. ¶ 51) are equally deficient,
because Plaintiffs do not allege those acts happened here (or were directed at U.S. investors that
included Plaintiffs). Non-U.S. acts only constitute “minimum contacts” “(1) if those acts caused
effects in the United States (2) that were the direct and foreseeable result of the actions abroad
and (3) if the defendant knew or had good reason to know that the actions would have effects in
the United States.” Wilder v. News Corp., No. 11 Civ. 4947 (PGG), 2014 WL 1315960, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). Here, the 2010 Restructuring was structured to take place abroad.
Even if Plaintiffs’ choice to use a U.S. broker could constitute a U.S. effect, which it cannot,27
that choice was not a direct and foreseeable result of BTA’s actions. Rather, the Panamanian
Plaintiffs’ claims relate to alleged effects in Panama, not here. Similarly, because the Individual
Plaintiffs were not eligible investors, their claims cannot directly and foreseeably arise from
BTA’s actions, nor did BTA have reason to believe its actions would affect ineligible investors.
Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84
F.3d at 568; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S.
102, 115 (1987) (“Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of
personal jurisdiction into the international field.”) The Court must consider several factors in
assessing whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable: “(1) the burden that the
exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in
27 The Supreme Court has made clear that Plaintiffs’ (and their agents’) contacts with the forum do not create
specific jurisdiction over a defendant. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (“[H]owever significant the plaintiff's contacts
with the forum may be, those contacts cannot be ‘decisive in determining whether the defendant' s due process rights
are violated’ [through the exercise of personal jurisdiction].”). Thus, allegations that Plaintiffs and their brokers
may have acted here are not enough to establish jurisdiction over BTA.
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NEWYORK 9223933 27
adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4)
the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the
controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.”
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 568 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 113-116); see
also S.E.C. v. Alexander, No. 00 Civ. 7290 LTS HBP, 2003 WL 21196852, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May
20, 2013). Here, all of the factors militate against the exercise of jurisdiction.
Based on the Amended Complaint and the Information Memorandum that Plaintiffs rely
upon and have incorporated into their pleading, it is clear that BTA is a Kazakh bank with no
U.S. offices or business operations. It would also impose a substantial burden on BTA, a Kazakh
bank, to litigate this dispute in this Court. See Northrop Grumman Overseas Serv. Corp. v.
Banco Wiese Sudameries, No. 03 Civ. 1681(LAP), 2004 WL 2199547, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2004) (“There can be little doubt that BWS, a Peruvian bank, would bear a heavy burden if it
were required to defend this action in New York”); Porina v. Marward Shipping Co., Ltd., No.
05 Civ. 5621(RPP), 2006 WL 2465819, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2006) (requiring defendant
Cypriot corporation to defend suit in New York would impose a “substantial” burden on
defendant, where defendant’s business was in Cyprus and the relevant evidence was located
abroad).
In addition, there is not a strong U.S. interest in adjudicating claims related to a
transaction involving foreign securities issued by a foreign bank and not listed on any U.S.
exchange. See, e.g., NovelAire Techs., L.L.C. v. Munters AB, No. 13 CIV. 472 (CM), 2013 WL
6182938, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction where
forum had little interest in adjudicating suit because neither party was resident of forum and
events at issue did not take place in forum). Even if there were a U.S. interest, the Amended
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NEWYORK 9223933 28
Complaint’s few conclusory statements regarding BTA’s U.S. connections would not make the
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable, as the a restructuring took place abroad. Metro. Life Ins., 84
F.3d at 574.
V. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A SECTION 10(b) CLAIM
To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to
“nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, though the court must accept factual allegations as true, it
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
To state a claim under Section 10(b), a plaintiff must plead that defendants (1) made
misstatements or omissions of material fact; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities; (4) upon which plaintiffs relied; and (5) that plaintiffs’ reliance proximately caused their
injury. See, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs’
claims are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule 9(b) and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b).
Here, Plaintiffs allege three categories of false and misleading statements. First,
Plaintiffs allege that the Information Memorandum did not disclose information concerning the
so-called “Negative Carry Swap.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-46) Second, Plaintiffs allege that the
Information Memorandum contained material misstatements concerning BTA’s post-
Restructuring prospects. (Id. ¶ 54) Third, Plaintiffs allege that BTA failed to disclose its
liability for the so-called Recovery Units. (Id. ¶¶ 59-64) Again, despite the opportunity to
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address the arguments made in BTA’s initial motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs left their allegations
unchanged in the Amended Complaint.
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Alleged Reliance
1. The Alleged Negative Carry Swap Was Disclosed.
A plaintiff cannot allege reliance where the allegedly concealed facts were disclosed.
Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., 819 F. Supp. 324, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“The naked
assertion of concealment of material facts which is contradicted by published documents which
expressly set forth the very facts allegedly concealed is insufficient to constitute actionable
fraud.”) Here, the Information Memorandum disclosed the relevant facts relating to the so-called
Negative Carry Swap.
Plaintiffs allege that, in connection with the 2010 Restructuring the Information
Memorandum did not disclose, (i) BTA was directed to purchase $4.3 billion of S-K Bonds
paying interest of 4% per year; (ii) but that BTA paid S-K Fund a 2% fee in exchange for a
guarantee on this sum from S-K Fund so that the effective interest rate on the S-K Bonds was
only 2%; (iii) at the same time, S-K Fund received interest rates as high as 10.9% on “current
account” S-K Fund deposits with BTA; and, (iv) in addition, BTA entered into a “repo
transaction” on $2.7 billion requiring BTA to pay 7% interest to the National Bank of
Kazakhstan (“NBK”), resulting in a “Negative Carry Swap” which “siphon[ed] hundreds of
millions of dollars from BTA Bank at the expense” of other BTA creditors. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43)
However, each of the relevant details of the alleged “Negative Carry Swap” were in fact
expressly disclosed in the Information Memorandum, which detailed:
S-K Fund’s agreement to accept $4.3 billion of BTA Bonds in exchange for an equal
face amount of S-K Bonds (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 175-76, 178);
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NEWYORK 9223933 30
BTA’s use of the S-K Bonds as collateral to obtain additional financing from NBK
and S-K Fund’s guarantee of BTA’s obligations under that loan for a fee of up to 2%
of the face value of the S-K Bonds (id. at 8);
S-K Fund’s payment to BTA of 4% on the S-K Bonds, and a list of the interest S-K
Fund paid to BTA on these bonds (id. at 41, 189);
S-K Fund’s sizeable deposits with BTA that consisted of both current and term
accounts, which were on the same terms as the accounts of BTA’s other depositors,
and that term accounts paid interest rates ranging from 4% to 10.6%, 11.1% and
12.5% (id. at. 175-78, 233);28 and
BTA’s receiving refinancing loans from NBK through repo transactions (id. at 8, 15,
42, 121, 155, 178)29
Thus, it was fully disclosed that BTA had purchased $4.3 billion in S-K Bonds at the
interest rates noted in the Amended Complaint. It also was disclosed that S-K Fund had very
large deposits at BTA and that those deposits carried an interest rate well above what BTA was
receiving on its S-K Bonds (and, indeed, the Information Memorandum revealed higher interest
rates than cited in the Amended Complaint). Thus, the information allegedly missing about the
so-called “Negative Carry” was disclosed in multiple places. In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate
Sec. Litig. (“Merrill II”), 765 F. Supp. 2d 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Sable, 819 F. Supp. at
339.30
28 Nor must the Court accept that these were “exorbitant above-market rate[s].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 4). To the contrary,
the rates were comparable to the interest rate of the New Notes issued in the 2010 Restructuring. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1
at 512 (“The Notes shall bear interest on their outstanding principal amount from 1 July 2010 to 1 January 2013 at
the rate of 10.75 per cent. per annum, and 12.5 per cent per annum thereafter[.]”); 616 (“The terms and conditions of
the Subordinated Tenge A Notes . . . will bear interest at the rate of 11.20 per cent. per annum. . . . The terms and
conditions of the Senior Tenge Notes . . . will bear interest at the rate of 14.75 per cent. per annum till 1 January
2012 and 16.50 per cent thereafter.”)
29 Significantly, Plaintiffs allege that interest payments on the repo transaction was paid to NBK and not S-K Fund.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 43)
30 That the relevant disclosures were included in a lengthy information memorandum does not render those
disclosures ineffective. See Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1996) (“It is undisputed
that the prospectuses must be read ‘as a whole.’”); see also Backhaus v. Streamedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 01
CIV.4889 (LMM/THK), 2002 WL 1870272, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002) (“Examining the entire Prospectus in
context, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case because the alleged misstatements
are forward-looking and investment risks are disclosed in the Prospectus.”). That is especially true where, as here,
the disclosures were not intended to meet the more rigorous standards of the Securities Act of 1933, and instead
were aimed at sophisticated investors under Regulation S and Rule 144A.
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More importantly, Plaintiffs hold themselves out as sophisticated investors (which they
must be to be eligible investors) and so cannot plead reliance where their claims of
misstatements or omissions are contradicted by explicit disclosures. Ashland Inc. v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc., 652 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of Section 10(b)
claims where plaintiffs, as sophisticated investors, were not justified in relying on alleged
misrepresentations regarding liquidity risks where defendant explicitly disclosed those risks);
Hinerfeld v. United Auto Grp., No. 97 CIV. 3533 (RPP), 1998 WL 397852, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July
15, 1998) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims where alleged omissions were contradicted by
disclosures made on the face of the prospectus). The express disclosures here are also
distinguishable from those cases where the disclosures were not readily available to investors.31
Plaintiffs also cannot adequately allege reliance after information regarding the Negative
Carry Swap became public. Plaintiffs acknowledge that in May 2011, “information about the
Negative Carry Swap began to be leaked to the marketplace” and allege that this information
affected the price of the Notes. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-52) Accordingly, Plaintiffs could not have
reasonably relied on any alleged misstatement or omission regarding the Negative Carry Swap
in any transaction after these disclosures. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988)
(“[T]hose who traded [defendant’s] shares after the corrective statements would have no direct or
indirect connection with the fraud.”); see also Merrill II, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.9 (“[I]f
31 Cf. In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 2d 311, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (defendants cannot
rely on scattered disclosures in various amendments, annexes and exhibits to the prospectus and registration
statement) (emphasis added); United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Int’l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1199-200 (2d Cir.
1993) (concluding that regulatory filings that have not been distributed to shareholders should rarely be considered
part of the total mix of information reasonably available) (emphasis added); In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc.
Litig., 858 F. Supp. 2d 277, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that defendants’ contention that “some of the complained
of omissions had already been disclosed in [defendant’s] various public disclosures” would not defeat claims)
(emphasis added).
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[plaintiff] allegedly relied on earlier misstatements or omissions when making later purchases, its
claims were ‘negated’ once it receive the PPM.”).32
2. Other Alleged Misstatements Also Are Not Actionable.
“It is well settled that a complaint alleging violations of the securities laws may not rely
upon statements that are true, or constitute puffery or ordinary expressions of corporate
optimism.” In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Here, Plaintiffs claim to have relied on the following portions of the Information Memorandum:
“The Bank believes that the Restructuring will allow the Bank to continue as a going
concern;”
“The Bank expects that the necessary levels of capital ratios will be achieved
following the successful completion of the Restructuring by virtue of the economic
gain it will achieve from the reduction of the principal amount of the Bank’s
indebtedness, conversion of certain debt into Shares and liquidity support to be
provided by [S-K Fund]”
“[S-K Fund’s] primary objective is to manage [BTA Bank] with a goal of maximizing
long term value and increasing competitiveness of such legal entities in world
markets.”
(Am. Compl. ¶ 54).
As the Second Circuit recently reaffirmed in City of Pontiac, these types of general
statements of corporate optimism are not actionable. See, e.g., 2014 WL 1778041, at *6-7
(concluding that the alleged misrepresentations were too open-ended and subjective to constitute
32 In the S-K Decision, the Court suggested that the publication of the J.P. Morgan report would only be relevant if
Plaintiffs’ failure to act on such disclosure was “reckless.” (S-K Decision at 19) Respectfully, BTA submits that
Plaintiffs’ allegations here fall short of the required diligence and any purported reliance after the disclosures would
have been reckless. Plaintiffs cannot plead reasonable reliance if, “through minimal diligence, [they] should have
discovered the truth.” Pivot Point Capital Master LP v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 08 CIV. 2788 (AKH), 2010 WL
9452230, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010) (dismissing complaint for failure to sufficiently plead reasonable reliance
where plaintiff would have understood risks of transaction through minimal diligence of reviewing defendants’
disclosures). Here, Plaintiffs allege that disclosures by BTA and J.P. Morgan related to the so-called Negative Carry
Swap resulted in a significant drop in the price of the Subordinated Notes. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-52) As sophisticated
investors, Plaintiffs cannot simply ignore this supposedly watershed event. Absent well-pled facts showing that they
could not have discovered the truth through minimal diligence, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to plead reliance.
ASTI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 106 (2d Cir. 2007).
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a guarantee of some concrete fact of outcome, and accordingly the statements were not
materially misleading); Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2004) (“expressions of
puffery and corporate optimism” are not actionable); In re Keryx Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., Sec.
Litig., No. 13 Civ. 755 (KBF), 2014 WL 585658, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014) (“rosy
predictions,” or statements that are loosely optimistic regarding a company's well-being have
been found to be too vague and general to be actionable). In an analogous case, the Second
Circuit held similar statements by a defendant that it (1) would not “compromise its financial
integrity;” (2) had a “commitment to create earnings opportunities;” or (3) that “business
strategies [would] lead to continued prosperity” were not actionable. Lasker v. New York State
Electric & Gas Corp., 85 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1996). Moreover, the Information Memorandum
explicitly cautioned that these general statements necessarily involved uncertainty and that “no
assurance can be given that such expectations will prove to be correct.” (FFB Decl. Ex. 1 at ii;
114 (“Forward-Looking Statements”)); see also Halperin v. eBanker USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d
352, 357 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A]lleged misrepresentations in a stock offering are immaterial as a
matter of law because it cannot be said that any reasonable investor could consider them
important in light of adequate cautionary language set out in the same offering.”).
3. Plaintiffs Cannot Claim Reliance on Alleged Misstatements Regarding
the Recovery Units.
Plaintiffs allege that BTA failed to disclose the bank’s potential liability for Recovery
Units in investor presentations BTA made in early 2012. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-65) However, only
Atlantica and Blu Funds allegedly bought Subordinated Notes after the dates of these
presentations, and thus all other Plaintiffs could not have relied on the presentations. See, e.g.,
Merrill II, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.9; O & G Carriers, Inc., v. Smith, 799 F. Supp. 1528, 1539
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[s]ince the alleged fraud [ ] took place after [plaintiffs] had invested, the
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alleged fraud was not ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a security”). Indeed, this
Court already concluded in the S-K Action that to the extent any claim is premised on purchases
of Subordinated Notes that occurred before an alleged misstatement was made, those claims
cannot be premised on such misstatements. See S-K Decision at 20. The conclusion should
apply equally here.
As for Atlantica and Blu Funds, neither of them (nor any Plaintiff) allege that it reviewed
any presentations in connection with any purchases. They only allege that the presentations were
“made in connection with the 2012 Restructuring” and that BTA made certain representations
“in a PowerPoint presentation to the Steering Committee for the 2012 Restructuring.” (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 63, 64) These allegations cannot suffice. In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec.
Litig. (“Merrill I”), 704 F. Supp. 2d 378, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Plaintiffs do not allege that
they read the research reports cited in the Complaint and therefore cannot use the reports to
establish direct reliance.”). Where, as here, a plaintiff cannot plead that they were aware of,
much less relied on, an alleged misstatement, there can be no reliance. Merrill I, 704 F. Supp. 2d
at 399.
Moreover, once again, the terms of the Recovery Units were in fact set forth in the
Information Memorandum (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 564-87), and plaintiff cannot allege reliance
where the allegedly concealed facts were actually disclosed. Sable, 819 F. Supp. at 333; see also
Merrill I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 400. Plaintiffs were also aware that BTA defaulted on its debt
obligations in January 2012, and any prudent sophisticated investor exercising minimal diligence
would have been on notice of the terms of the Recovery Units set forth in the Trust Deed
governing the Subordinated Notes. (FFB Decl., Ex. 9 at 251-74)
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B. Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Alleged Loss Causation
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a “causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the [plaintiff’s] loss,” otherwise known as “loss causation.” Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005); see also ASTI Commc’ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at
106. Plaintiffs have not pled facts to support an inference that their losses were caused by BTA’s
alleged non-disclosures and not other factors including BTA’s default in January 2012 (Am
Compl. ¶ 57), the announcement of a second restructuring (id.), or the various negative factors
affecting BTA listed in the Information Memorandum (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 119-44 (“Risk
Factors”)). See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173-74 (requiring a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to
support an inference that it was the defendant’s alleged fraud and not other market factors that
caused the plaintiff’s loss to avoid dismissal). As to those purchases by Atlantica and Blu Funds
after the alleged “disclosures” referred to in the Amended Complaint (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50, 51)
and after the drop in the price of BTA’s debt (id. at ¶ 52), no loss causation has been or could be
alleged. See Debora v. WPP Grp. PLC, 91 CIV. 1775 (KTD), 1994 WL 177291 (S.D.N.Y. May
5, 1994) (plaintiff failed to allege causation where purchases made after disclosures).33 Nor have
Plaintiffs alleged any “particular disclosure” as to the Recovery Units that resulted in any injury
or loss. See Plumbers, Pipefitters & MES Local Union No. 392 Pension Fund v. Fairfax Fin.
Holdings Ltd., 886 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] particular disclosure constitutes
a sufficient foundation for loss causation allegations only if it possesses a sufficient nexus to a
prior misstatement such that it reveals at least part of the falsity of that misstatement.”).34
33 Significantly, Blu Funds allegedly acquired all of its Subordinated Notes, and Atlantica 86% of its Subordinated
Notes, after the relevant disclosures and alleged precipitous drop in trading price. (Am. Compl. Ex. A)
34 As the Court noted in the S-K Decision, Plaintiffs are required to allege a disclosure of the purportedly false or
misleading statement followed by a decrease in the price of the Notes. (S-K Decision at 20) Here, Plaintiffs do not
allege any particularized disclosure regarding the allegedly misleading statements regarding the Recovery Units nor
any resulting decrease in the price of the Subordinated Noted.
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C. Plaintiffs Have Not Adequately Alleged Scienter
Plaintiffs must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraudulent
intent or “scienter.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issue & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
1. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Scienter with Respect to the Negative Carry
Swap.
Where, as here, defendants have disclosed the very information that plaintiffs claim was
omitted, plaintiffs cannot establish a strong inference of scienter. See Merrill II, 765 F. Supp. 2d
at 387; In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Secs. Litig. (“Merrill III”), 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 529
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“When adequate disclosures are made, it cannot be said that a defendant’s
conduct is highly unreasonable and represents an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care.”)
As discussed above, the Information Memorandum disclosed the components of the
Negative Carry Swap that Plaintiffs allege were concealed, making it impossible for Plaintiffs to
plead a strong inference of scienter. See Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 CIV 4278 (RPP), 1997
WL 458666, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997); see also In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ.
11225 (RJS), 2012 WL 4471265, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012).
2. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Scienter with Respect to the Other Alleged
Misstatements.
Statements of corporate optimism and predictions of future performance do not support a
strong inference of scienter. See Boca Raton Firefighters & Police Pension Fund v. Bahash, No.
12-1776-cv, 2012 WL 6621391, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012); Gissin v. Endres, 739 F. Supp.
2d 488, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Faulkner v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 161, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). As discussed above, statements that (i) “the Bank believes the Restructuring
will allow the Bank to continue as a going concern”, (ii) “the Bank expects that the necessary
levels of capital ratios will be achieved following the successful completion of the
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Restructuring” or (iii) S-K Fund’s “primary objective is to manage [BTA] with a goal of
maximizing long term value” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 54) are nothing more than expressions of
corporate optimism and predictions of future performance that do not support any inference of
fraudulent intent. In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., 2012 WL 4471265, at *36 (“simple economic
projections and expressions of optimism are [mere puffery]”); see also Shields v. CityTrust
Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994) (“misguided optimism is not a cause of action,
and does not support an inference of fraud”); Lighthouse Fin. Grp. v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp.,
PLC, No. 11 Civ. 398, 2012 WL 4616958, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (optimistic statements
were insufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter).
3. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Scienter with Respect to the Recovery Units.
Finally, Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing that BTA acted with fraudulent intent with
respect to the Recovery Units. Again, as shown above, that BTA may have made two
presentations to unidentified investors (not Plaintiffs) in connection with the 2012 Restructuring
that allegedly failed to disclose information on the Recovery Units does not help Plaintiffs.
Moreover, as shown above, BTA’s potential liability on the Recovery Units was in fact
specifically disclosed in the Information Memorandum. (FFB Decl., Ex. 1 at 564-88) Indeed,
the alleged presentation expressly cautioned that BTA could potentially become liable for the
full reference amount of the Recovery Units of $5.2 billion. (Starner Decl., Ex. A at 42, 45)
Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs cannot plead a strong inference of scienter. See Merrill II,
765 F. Supp. 2d at 387; In re UBS AG Secs. Litig., 2012 WL 4471265, at *15.
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NEWYORK 9223933 38
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, BTA respectfully requests that an order be made dismissing
the Amended Complaint in its entirety or staying this action and compelling Plaintiffs to arbitrate
their claims.
Dated: New York, New York
June 10, 2014
WHITE & CASE LLP
By: /s/ Gregory M. Starner
Gregory M. Starner (GS1719)
Owen C. Pell (OP0118)
1155 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
(212) 819-8200
Attorneys for Defendant
“BTA Bank” JSC
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