Amir EL v. Louisiana State et al

MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , MOTION to Dismiss Case as Frivolous

E.D. La.April 11, 2017

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA KING SANDI AMIR EL VERSUS LOUISIANA STATE, ET AL * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 2:16-cv-2125 JUDGE BARBIER MAG. JUDGE WILKINSON * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * MOTION TO DISMISS NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes defendant, Govern r John Bel Edwards, who respectfully moves for dismissal of this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) for the reasons delineated below which are more fully explained in the memorandum in support of this motion attached hereto. 1. The plaintiff, King Sandi Amir El, sued a variety of defendants, including the movant. Although it is difficult to decipher his precise claims, he appears to focus primarily on his allegation that his ethnicity and religion exempt him from the law of the United States. 2. Plaintiff’s suit is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) because it “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Plaintiff’s suit should also be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) because it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39 Filed 04/11/17 Page 1 of 3 2 3. In the alternative, plaintiff’s claims against the movant should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 4. Plaintiff’s merger of the doctrines of “Moslem Moorish Americans” and the “paper terrorism” tactics of the “sovereign citizens movement” is neither unprecedented nor procedurally acceptable. 5. Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding Governor John Bel Edwards whatsoever. The plaintiff only includes Governor Edwards among the defendants. 6. To the extent the plaintiff seeks monetary relief from the movant in his official capacity. Said claim is barred by Will v. Michigan and must be dismissed with prejudice. 7. To the extent the plaintiff sues the movant in his individual capacity for monetary damages, he is entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39 Filed 04/11/17 Page 2 of 3 3 WHEREFORE, defendant, Governor John Bel Edwards, prays the instant motion be granted and that all federal and state claims against him be dismissed with prejudice and at the plaintiff’s cost. Respectfully submitted, JEFF LANDRY ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: s/Scott G. Centorino MICHAEL C. KELLER (#20895) SCOTT G. CENTORINO (#36826) (T.A.) ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LITIGATION DIVISION 1450 Poydras Street, Suite 900 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Telephone: (504) 599-1200 Facsimile: (504) 599-1212 Email: KellerM@ag.louisiana.gov CentorinoS@ag.louisiana.gov CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 11, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I further certify that a copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. Mail on the pro se plaintiffs at their most current address of record. s/Scott G. Centorino SCOTT G. CENTORINO Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39 Filed 04/11/17 Page 3 of 3 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA KING SANDI AMIR EL VERSUS LOUISIANA STATE, ET AL * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 2:16-cv-2125 JUDGE BARBIER MAG. JUDGE WILKINSON * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * NOTICE OF SUBMISSION TO: King Sandi Amir El c/o 1804 Family Court Marrero, LA 70072 and ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD VIA CM/ECF PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned hereby submits the foregoing for decision by the Honorable Magistrate Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr., United States District Courthouse for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 500 Poydras Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, on the 26th day of April, 2017, at eleven o’clock in the morning (11:00 A.M.). Respectfully submitted, JEFF LANDRY ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: s/Scott G. Centorino MICHAEL C. KELLER (#20895) SCOTT G. CENTORINO (#36826) (T.A.) ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LITIGATION DIVISION Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-1 Filed 04/11/17 Page 1 of 2 2 1450 Poydras Street, Suite 900 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Telephone: (504) 599-1200 Facsimile: (504) 599-1212 Email: KellerM@ag.louisiana.gov CentorinoS@ag.louisiana.gov CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 11, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I further certify that a copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. Mail on the pro se plaintiffs at their most current address of record. s/Scott G. Centorino SCOTT G. CENTORINO Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-1 Filed 04/11/17 Page 2 of 2 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA KING SANDI AMIR EL VERSUS LOUISIANA STATE, ET AL * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 2:16-cv-2125 JUDGE BARBIER MAG. JUDGE WILKINSON * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: The plaintiff, King Sandi Amir El, sued a variety of defendants, including the movant, Governor John Bel Edwards. Although it is difficult to decipher his precise claims, he appears to focus primarily on his allegation that his ethnicity and religion exempt him from the law of the United States. The movant has filed this motion to dismiss claims against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) because plaintiff’s suit is frivolous in that it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact and it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In the alternative, the movants have filed this motion to dismiss claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 1 of 12 2 I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915 AND FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) A. 28 U.S.C. §1915 “In furtherance of the Court’s continuing obligation to screen lawsuits like plaintiff’s that were filed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and to dismiss those claims that are frivolous or malicious or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” this Honorable Court should screen the amended complaints filed by the plaintiff, King Sandi Amir El.1 A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”2 The law “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless l gal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”3 In this case, plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) or under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a cognizable §1983 claim. B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, theplaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”4 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relif’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”5 “Factual allegations 1 McSmith v. White, 07-cv-1179, 2007 WL 1521438 (E.D.La. 5/21/07) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). 2 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir.1998); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir.1994). 3 Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). 4 Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 5 Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-1965. Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 2 of 12 3 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”6 It is well-established that “pro se complaints areheld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”7 However, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a lay person proceeding pro se, a licensed attorney, or represented by counsel, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” 8 In the context of 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims, it is well established that the claimant must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations t survive a motion to dismiss.9 In cases such as this, where civil rights complaints are lodged against public officials for actions undertaken in their official capacities, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that “liberal notions of notice pleading must ultimately give way to immunity doctrines that protect us from having the work of our public officials chilled or disrupted by participation in the trial or the pretrial development of civil lawsuits.” 10 As such, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has “consistently held that plaintiffs who invoke §1983 must plead specific facts that, if proved, would overcome the individual defendant’s immunity defense; complaints containing conclusory allegations, absent reference to material facts, will not survive motions to dismiss.”11 6 Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (internal citations omitted). 7 Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981)). 8 Id (quoting S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284)). 9 Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F.Supp.2d 898, 903-04 (E.D.La.,2001) (citations mitted). 10 Id (quoting Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir.1985)). 11 Causey, 167 F.Supp. 2d at 904 (citing Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1553 (5th Cir.1988)). Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 3 of 12 4 A plaintiff is not required to anticipate the defens of qualified immunity in his original complaint.12 Accordingly, the district courts routinely order plaintiffs to file a reply, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), tailored to the qualified immunity defense raised by the defendants.13 “The requirement under Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995)], that a plaintiff must plead with particular facts when confronted with a defense of qualified immunity is significant.”14 The burden under Schultea, accordingly, operates to compel the plaintiff to make out coherent factual allegations to support a finding that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.15 Plaintiffs, however, are not entitled to amend in perpetuity. “[I]f the protections afforded public officials are not to ring hollow, plaintiffs cannot be allowed to continue to amend or supplement their pleadings until they stumble upon a formula th t carries them over the threshold .... At some point a court must decide that a plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to make his case.”16 The heightened pleading requirement in civil rights cases against those asserting immunity is necessary because to allow traditional discovery to commence based on broadly worded complaints “effectively eviscerates important functions and protections of official immunity.”17 12 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004). 13 See Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 14 Scott v. Farris, 2005 WL 517500 at * 3, Civil Action No. 04-2663 (E.D. La. 2005). 15 Id. 16 Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir.1986). 17 Causey, 167 F.Supp. 2d at 904. Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 4 of 12 5 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS PATENTLY FRIVOLOUS The plaintiff appears to allege that as a “Moslem Moorish American,” he is a “non- resident of the State of Louisiana,” nor subject to the laws of the United States because his status is one of “free national Citizenship of the Dejure U.S.A.” Rec. Doc. 32, p. 113. The Seventh Circuit explained the Moorish movement as such: [The Moorish Science Temple of America is a] black Islamic sect . . . . [T]hree-fourths of its temples (congregations) are inside prisons. The Moors, as adherents to the Moorish Science Temple are called, have their own version of the Koran and list of prophets that includes, in addition to the prophets r cognized by orthodox Islam, Buddha, Confucius, and the founder . . . of the Moorish Science Temple . . . . Two groups vie for leadership of the sect: one in Mt. Clemens, Michigan, headed by [someone referred to as] Grand Sheik/Moderator Brother R. Love-El, and o e in St. Louis headed by [someone referred to as] Grand Sheik J rry Lewis-Bey. (The suffixes "El" and "Bey" refer to the African tribes from which the Moors believe black people are descended.)18 To support his claim of immunity, the plaintiff cites various documents such as a treaty with Morocco, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the “Zodiac Constitution” and “Clock of Destiny” of the specific sect with which he allegedly associates. The legal basis of plaintiff’s claim appears closely related to the “sovereign citizens movement,” which federal courts across the country have repeatedly discredited as frivolous.19 20 21 Furthermore, the tactics of this suit mirror that movement’s strategy of “paper terrorism.”22 The plaintiff’s merger of the doctrines of “Moslem Moorish Americans” and the tactics of the 18 Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1309 (7th Cir. 1998). 19 United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) 20 Shabazz v. Dzurenda, No. 16-CV-62, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104649, 2016 WL 4203395 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2016) 21 United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 752 (5th Cir. 2016) 22 El Ameen Bey v. Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 2011) Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 5 of 12 6 “sovereign citizens movement” is neither unprecedented or procedurally acceptable.23 24 25 26 In Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v. New Jersey, the District Court for New Jersey explained the interplay: It does not appear that one's Moorish ethnic roots ( r Moorish religious convictions, or both) have any reason to go hand-in-hand with one's adhesion to the sovereign citizenship movement (or with one's professing the theory of redemptionism, or with one's practice of "paper terrorism," claims of self- granted "diplomatic immunity," etc.). However, and unfortunately enough, certain groups of individuals began merging these concepts by building on their alleged ancestry in ancient Moors (and/or on their alleged or actual adhesion to Moorish religious convictions) for the purposes of committing criminal offenses and/or initiating frivolous legal actions on the grounds of their self-granted "diplomatic immunity," which these individuals deduce either from their self-granted "Moorish citizenship" and from their correspondingly-produced homemade "Moorish" documents (or from correspondingly- obtained "world passports") or from a multitude of other, equally non-cognizable under the law, bases, which these individuals keep creating in order to support their allegations of "diplomatic immunity."27 Finally, although the plaintiff’s complaint is difficult to decipher, it also appears that his claim constitutes an impermissible collateral attack under the Parratt-Hudson Doctrine,28 the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,29 and Heck v. Humphrey.30 As such, his claims should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). 23 Id. 24 Marrakush Soc. v. New Jersey State Police, No. 09CV2518 et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, 2009 WL 2366132 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009) 25 McLaughlin v. CitiFinancial Auto Credit, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57898, 2010 WL 2377089, (D.Conn. June 11, 2010) 26 Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1309 (7th Cir. 1998). 27 Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v. New Jersey, 790 F. Supp. 2d 241, 242-45 28 Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1995) 29 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 6 of 12 7 III. THE MOVANT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, CANNOT BE SUE D FOR MONETARY DAMAGES UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 The plaintiff appears to have asserted a monetary cl im against the movant in his official capacity. To the extent the plaintiff seeks monetary relief from the movant in his official capacity, said claim is barred by Will v. Michigan and must be dismissed with prejudice. 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims may be asserted only against “persons” as the statute and case law define that term. It is well-established that the State, its agencies, and its officers in their official capacity are not considered “persons” for purposes f 42 U.S.C. §1983.31 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Fairley v. Stalder, “We begin an analysis of [plaintiff’s claim for] damages under §1983 by quoting long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent on the matter: ‘[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under §1983.’ As §1983 only provides a remedy against a ‘person,’ the dismissal of Fairley’s §1983 claims was indisputably proper.”32 Therefore, all monetary claims against the movant in his official capacity should be dismissed with prejudice. 30 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) 31 Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) 32 Fairley v. Stalder, 294 Fed.Appx. 805, 808-809, 2008 WL 3244022, 3 (5th Cir. 2008), quoting Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 7 of 12 8 IV. TO THE EXTENT PLAINTIFF SEEKS MONETARY DAMAGES FROM THE MOVANT IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, HE IS ENTITL ED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Thus, qualified immunity protects an official not nly against standing trial, but also against incurring “the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’” McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Indeed, we have made clear that the “driving force” behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that “ ‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32, 129 S. Ct. 808 (quoting A derson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The qualified immunity analysis is a two-pronged lgal inquiry. This Honorable Court may consider either prong of the qualified immunity test to begin its analysis. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. at 818. Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 8 of 12 9 First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly establi hed” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. at 815-16 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). If either prong is re olved in favor of the defendant, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The ultimate conclusion that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity “mandates a full Saucier inquiry.” Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2009). Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity “if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727). When considering a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity, we must ask whether the law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited his conduct that “every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [the law].’ ” 25 To answer that question in the affirmative, we must be able to point to controlling authority-or a “robust ‘consensus of persuasive authority’ ”26-that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity. FN 25 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting A derson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). FN 26 Id. at 2084 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). […] Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 9 of 12 10 Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2740, 183 L. Ed. 2d 614 (2012) and cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2740, 183 L. Ed. 2d 614 (2012). “If the law at the time of a constitutional violation does not give the officer ‘fair notice’ that his conduct is unlawful, the officer is immune from suit.” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 845-46 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004)). “That means a court can often avoid ruling on the plaintiff's claim that a particular right exists. If prior case law has not clearly settled the right, and so given officials fair notice of it, the court can simply dismiss the claim for money damages.” Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1118 (2011). The sine qua non of the clearly-established inquiry is fair warning. Thus, we must ask not only whether courts have recognized the existence of a particular constitutional right, but also wheth r that right has been defined with sufficient clarity to enable a reasonable official to assess the lawfulness of his conduct. Morgan, 659 F.3d at 372 (internal quotations and citations mitted). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts […] not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al- Kidd, --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. at 2084, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (internal citations omitted). The inquiry into whether the law is clearly established “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition; and it too serves to advance understanding of the law and to allow officers to av id the burden of trial if qualified immunity is applicable.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 10 of 12 11 Because the movant, Governor John Bel Edwards, is not addressed in the complaint, besides his inclusion as a defendant, it is difficult to apply these legal tests. He is not specifically alleged to have been present, to have had knowledge of any of the situations alleged at the time of their occurrence, or otherwise to have been personally involved in any alleged constitutional violations. Thus, the plaintiff does not even approach overcoming the movant’s qualified immunity. Even assuming that the plaintiff alleges facts asserting that the movant was responsible because of the nature of his position, no defendant c be held liable under any theory of vicarious liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). (“In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action-where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants-the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Plaintiffs cannot recover monetary relief under §1983 from any person who wasnot personally involved or causally connected to the alleged constitutional violation. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. The plaintiff fails to plead the movant knew of any of the events alleged. He fails to show the movant violated the Constitution or acted unreasonably in light of clearly established law. Instead, he su s Governor Edwards presumably because, as the Governor, he is purportedly vicariously liable for the actions of any law enforcement and court officers in Louisiana. This claim cannot stand. For these reasons, the movant is entitled to qualified immunity and to dismissal from this suit w h prejudice. Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 11 of 12 12 V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, defendants are entitled o dismissal of plaintiff’s suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) because it is frivolous in that it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In the alternative, the movant is entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s federal and state claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted. Respectfully submitted, JEFF LANDRY ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: s/Scott G. Centorino MICHAEL C. KELLER (#20895) SCOTT G. CENTORINO (#36826) (T.A.) ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LITIGATION DIVISION 1450 Poydras Street, Suite 900 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Telephone: (504) 599-1200 Facsimile: (504) 599-1212 Email: KellerM@ag.louisiana.gov CentorinoS@ag.louisiana.gov CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on April 11, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I further certify that a copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. Mail on the pro se plaintiff at his most current address of record. s/Scott G. Centorino SCOTT G. CENTORINO Case 2:16-cv-02125-CJB-JCW Document 39-2 Filed 04/11/17 Page 12 of 12