80001.0019/3984599.1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 14-cv-20484-BB
SARAH ALHASSID and SARAH
DRENNAN, on her their behalf and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; NATIONSTAR
MORTGAGE, LLC (D/B/A CHAMPION
MORTGAGE); and JOHN DOE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
NATIONSTAR’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS TO PROVIDE AMENDED
RESPONSES TO NATIONSTAR’S FIRST SETS OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, TO PRODUCE FURTHER RESPONSIVE
DOCUMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE VERIFIED RESPONSES TO NATIONSTAR’S
INTERROGATORIES
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1
Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, for itself and its division Champion Mortgage
(collectively “Nationstar”), respectfully submits this motion to compel plaintiffs to serve
amended objection-free responses to Nationstar’s first sets of interrogatories and requests for
production, to produce further documents consistent with their amended responses, and to
provide verified responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories.
Plaintiffs served their discovery responses late. Accordingly, they waived any objections.
Nevertheless plaintiffs’ responses assert a slew of general boilerplate objections in their
responses, which would have been improper even if they were timely. Plaintiffs have refused to
provide responsive information and documents based on their waived boilerplate objections.
Furthermore, in responding to Nationstar’s interrogatories, plaintiffs improperly invoke
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d), which permits a party responding to an interrogatory in
certain instances to refer to a document in lieu of providing a narrative response. A party
invoking Rule 33(d) must specifically identify the document that contains information
responsive to an interrogatory and confirm that the document provides a complete response to
the interrogatory. Plaintiffs did neither. Instead, in response to each of Nationstar’s
interrogatories, plaintiffs refer to every document that they have produced in this case and
vaguely aver that some (but not necessarily all) information responsive to an interrogatory may
be found somewhere among the hundreds of pages plaintiffs have produced.
These tactics are abusive and wasteful. The Court should order plaintiffs to provide
amended responses that remove all objections and provide complete, straightforward verified
narrative responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories. The Court should further order plaintiffs to
produce any documents that they may have withheld based on their waived objections.
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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs contend that Nationstar charged them “excessive” and “unauthorized” fees in
connection with servicing their home loans. Ms. Alhassid alleges that co-defendant Bank of
America, which previously serviced her loan, improperly charged her for lender-placed
insurance, which pushed her loan into default after servicing was transferred to Champion. See
Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), D.E. 148., ¶¶ 26-36. Once in “default status,” Champion
charged Ms. Alhassid fees she believes were “unnecessary” and “unauthorized.” See id., ¶ 35.
Ms. Drennen alleges that Nationstar charged her “excessive” and “unauthorized” fees after she
obtained a loan modification from Nationstar. See id., ¶¶ 45, 47. Plaintiffs seek to represent a
putative nationwide class of borrowers who were charged “unauthorized and excessive” fees. See
id,, ¶ 54.
On November 14, 2014, Nationstar served interrogatories and requests for production.
See Exs. A, B, C, D. Upon plaintiffs’ request, Nationstar agreed to extend the due date for
plaintiffs’ responses to January 16, 2015. See Ex. E. Without seeking an extension from
Nationstar’s counsel or the Court, Plaintiffs served their responses on January 20, four days
late.See Exs. F, G, H, I. Plaintiffs’ responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories were unverified, in
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 33(d)(3).
Because the responses were late, plaintiffs waived any objections. See infra at 3-4.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs interjected numerous boilerplate objections in their responses, including
that every interrogatory and document request was “overbroad and unduly burdensome” and “not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” See Exs. F, G, H, I. In
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many instances, plaintiffs refused to provide any response or to produce documents.
1
In other
instances, plaintiffs’ responses and production of documents were made “subject to” their
objections, and “without waiver thereof.” See Exs. F, G, H, I.
In addition, plaintiffs’ responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories improperly invoke
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d), which in certain instances permits a party to refer to
business records that contains the response to an interrogatory in lieu of providing a narrative
response. Plaintiffs’ responses do not refer to specific documents that purportedly contain the
information Nationstar requested. Instead, in response to each interrogatory, plaintiffs refer
Nationstar to every document they have produced with the vague assertion that some (but not
necessarily all) requested information is somewhere in those documents. See Exs. F, H.
Nationstar requested that plaintiffs serve amended objection-free responses and providing
narrative responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories. See Exs. J ,K. Plaintiffs eventually responded
by requesting a phone conference, which the parties held on February 18. However, plaintiffs
would not commit to providing amended responses or documents as Nationstar requested.
Furthermore, though plaintiffs served their unverified interrogatory responses on January 20, as
of the date of this motion, plaintiffs had not yet served verifications.
1
See Ex. F, responses 14, 15, 16, and 21; Ex. G, responses 14, 15; Ex. H, responses 12,
13, 14, 18, Ex. I, responses 13, 14.
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II. ARGUMENT
A. The Court Should Order Plaintiffs to Serve Amended Objection-Free Responses to
Nationstar’s Discovery Requests.
2
By failing to serve timely responses to interrogatories or document requests, a party
waives any objections he or she may have asserted. Pursuant to local rule 26.1(g)(3)(A), “Any
ground not stated in an objection within the time provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or any extensions thereof, shall be waived.” L.R. 26.1(g)(3)(A); see also Chen v.
Cayman Arts, Inc., No. 10-80236-CIV, 2011 WL 2491009, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011)
(finding objections to discovery waived when responses were not filed within the time limits
imposed by the Federal Rules). To allow untimely objections to be asserted “would ...
completely frustrate the time limits contained in the Federal Rules and give a license to litigants
to ignore the time limits for discovery without any adverse consequences.” Krewson v. City of
Quincy, 120 F.R.D. 6, 7 (D. Mass. 1988) quoting Slauenwhite v. Bekum Maschinenfabriken,
GMBH, 35 F.R.Serv.2d 975 (D.Mass., 1983) (quotation marks omitted).
3
2
Local Rule 26.1(h)(2) requires a party moving to compel to state for each specific
request at issue the item sought to be compelled, the specific objections, and other information.
However, this requirement does not apply where the motion is “grounded upon complete failure
to respond to the discovery sought to be compelled or upon assertion of general or blanket
objections to discovery[.]” Local Rule 26.1(h)(2). This motion is based on plaintiffs blanket
assertion of boilerplate objections despite the fact that the objections have been waived and their
improper invocation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d), which amounts to a complete
failure to respond to Nationstar’s interrogatories. Accordingly, the requirement to recreate
requests and objections does not apply.
3
See also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory
must be stated with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the
court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”); Jaffe v. Grant, 793 F.2d 1182, 1190 n. 5 (11th
Cir.1986) (finding no error in court ruling that Fifth Amendment privilege was waived by failure
to timely assert it in response to discovery requests); In re U.S., 864 F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir.
1989); (“We readily agree with the district court that as a general rule, when a party fails to
object timely to interrogatories, production requests, or other discovery efforts, objections thereto
are waived”); Wynmoor Cmty. Council, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 280 F.R.D. 681, 686 (S.D. Fla.
(footnote continued)
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Plaintiffs served their responses late. See supra at 2. Moreover, they have failed to offer
any reason for their tardy responses. They waived their objections. The Court should order
plaintiffs to serve amended objection-free responses.
To be clear, this issue is not academic. Relying on their boilerplate objections, plaintiffs
have refused to provide any substantive response to eight interrogatories or any documents in
response to four production requests. See supra n. 1. Some of plaintiffs’ refusals are particularly
galling. For example, Nationstar asked plaintiffs to identify their relationship, if any, with their
attorneys before hiring them. See Exhibit A, interrogatory 21; Exhibit C, interrogatory 18.
Plaintiffs’ prior relationships, if any, with their attorneys – and any conflicts of interest those
relationships could present – are clearly relevant to whether plaintiffs can adequately represent
the class.
4
But plaintiffs refused to provide any response, apparently because they believe the
2012) (holding objections to document requests waived because responses were untimely);
Bailey Indus., Inc. v. CLJP, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 662, 668 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“[W]hen a party fails to
timely object to interrogatories, production requests, or other discovery efforts, the objections are
deemed waived.”) (citation omitted); Enron Corp. Sav. Plan v. Hewitt Associates, L.L.C., 258
F.R.D. 149, 156 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“There is substantial legal precedent supporting the general
rule that if a party fails to respond in writing within thirty days of being served with a request for
production of documents, it is appropriate for the court to find that the party's objections are
waived, unless the court finds good cause and excuses that failure.”); Pitts v. Francis, No.
5:07CV169/RS/EMT, 2008 WL 2229524, at *4 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 2008) (holding that late
responses waived objections); Fonville v. District of Columbia, 230 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.D.C.2005)
(“[I]n the absence of an extension of time or good cause, the failure to object to interrogatories
within the time fixed by Rule 33 constitutes a waiver of any objection.... This is true even when
the party objects to disclosure because it claims that the information sought is privileged.”).
4
See London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding
plaintiff an inadequate class representative where he and his attorney had been close friends
since high school, and had a previous business relationship); see also Martz v. PNC Bank, N.A.,
CIV.A.06-1075, 2007 WL 2343800, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2007) (holding plaintiff
inadequate where he was close personal friend of attorney, was also being represented by
attorney in another putative class action, and lacked basic knowledge of claims asserted);
Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., 264 F.R.D. 76, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding plaintiff inadequate
where he was close personal friend of attorney and may not have fallen within class definition);
(footnote continued)
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requested information is protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Ex. F, response 21, Ex. H,
response 18. Plaintiffs do not bother to explain this objection. In fact, it is inconceivable that
whether plaintiffs had a prior relationship with their attorneys, or the nature of that relationship,
could be protected by the attorney-client privilege. So this objection is frivolous.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ other responses state that the written responses and documents are
provided “subject to” their objections, and “without waiver thereof.” See Ext. F, G, H, I. So, for
these requests, it is not clear if plaintiffs are surreptitiously withholding information or
documents based on their boilerplate objections. Unless plaintiffs are ordered to provide
responses and documents without objection, Nationstar will be deprived of relevant information
and documents it needs for its defense. Moreover, it may not even know what information or
documents are being withheld or why.
Plaintiffs’ responses are unclear for additional reasons. For example, in response to
document requests, plaintiffs often respond that “relevant” documents are being produced. See,
e.g., Ex. G, responses 1-3; Ex. I, responses 1, 2, 3. But they fail to confirm that they are
producing all responsive documents. Instead, the responses strongly suggest that plaintiffs are
withholding unidentified documents for unspecified reasons.
The Court should order plaintiffs to (1) serve amended responses to Nationstar’s
interrogatories and document requests that remove all objections, and (2) provide any
information or documents that were previously withheld on the basis of an objection.
Mowry v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 06 C 4312, 2007 WL 1772142, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 19,
2007)
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B. The Court Should Order Plaintiffs to Serve Amended Interrogatory Responses That
Provide Narrative Responses.
Plaintiffs fail to provide straightforward narrative responses to Nationstar’s
interrogatories. Instead, in response to each interrogatory, plaintiffs purported to invoke Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 34(d), which in certain instances permit a party to identify documents in
response to an interrogatory in lieu of a written response. This was improper for several reasons.
First, a party invoking Rule 33(d) must precisely identify the documents where the
requested information exists. See 8B Fed. Pac. & Proc. Civ. § 2178 (3d ed. 2014); Local Rule
26.1(g)(4)(A) (when a party invokes Rule 33(d) “The specification of business records and
materials to be produced shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to locate
and identify the records and to ascertain the answer as readily as could the party from whom
discovery is sought.”) It is an abuse of Rule 33(d) to direct the requesting part toward a mass of
documents without specifying which document or documents provides responsive information.
See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 33(d) cmts. to 1980 amendment; Mann v. Island Resorts Dev., Inc., No.
3:08CV297/RS/EMT, 2009 WL 6409113, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2009) (rejecting as
“unacceptable” interrogatory response that failed to specify documents that contained responsive
information); T.N. Taube Corp. v. Marine Midland Mortgage Corp., 136 F.R.D. 449, 452
(W.D.N.C. 1991).
But that is exactly what plaintiffs did here. Plaintiffs did not identify a specific document
or documents in response to any interrogatory. Rather, in response to Nationstar’s
interrogatories, plaintiffs reference generally every document they have produced. See Exs. F, H.
They vaguely aver that information responsive to Nationstar’s interrogatories may be found
somewhere within the hundreds of pages they have produced. This is a flagrant and blatant abuse
of Rule 33(d).
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Second, a party invoking Rule 33(d) must confirm that the referenced documents actually
contain all of the information requested. See 8B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2178 (3d ed. 2014);
Stillwagon v. Innsbrook Golf & Marina, LLC, No. 2:13–CV–00018–D, Slip Copy, 2014 WL
1652562, *3 (E.D.N.C. April 23, 2014) citing Oleson v. Kmart Corp., 175 F.R.D. 560, 564
(D.Kan. 1997). Plaintiffs fail to do this either.
For example, Nationstar asked Ms. Alhassid to “Identify each insurance policy that has
been in effect on the PROPERTY from February 2007 to the present.” See Ex. A, interrogatory
1. Ms. Alhassid responded that “records relating to [her] property insurance” are included within
the 494 pages of documents she has produced. See Ex. F, response 1. This does not answer
Nationstar’s question. Specifically, Ms. Alhassid fails to confirm that the documents she has
produced identify “each insurance policy” she has had since February 2007. Plaintiffs’ other
responses are equally vague and evasive and fail to confirm that the documents they have
produced include the information that Nationstar has requested.
Indeed, in many instances it would be impossible for Nationstar to discern a response to
an interrogatory by reviewing plaintiffs’ documents. For example, Nationstar asked Ms. Drennen
to identify each fee Nationstar charged her that she contends was improper. See Ex C,
interrogatory 5. She responds by identifying the same 138 pages of documents she identifies in
response to Nationstar’s other interrogatories. See Ex. H, response 5. Some of those pages reflect
fees that were charged to Ms. Drennen. But Nationstar cannot determine which fees Ms.
Drennen believes were improper by simply reviewing these documents. Only she can do that.
Third, Rule 33(d) is expressly limited to “business records.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 33(d); see
In re Bilzerian, 190 B.R. 964, 965 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1995) (investigative reports were not
business records and, hence, identification of reports in response to interrogatories was
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improper). The records that plaintiffs identified in response to Nationstar’s interrogatories are not
their business records. Plaintiffs’ invocation of Rule 33(d) is improper for this final reason.
In sum, plaintiffs’ reliance on Rule 33(d) was improper and abusive. The Court should
order plaintiffs to serve amended responses that provide narrative responses to Nationstar’s
interrogatories.
C. The Court Should Order Plaintiffs to Serve Verified Responses to Nationstar’s
Interrogatories.
“Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and
fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 33(b)(3). Plaintiffs did not verify their responses
to Nationstar’s interrogatories. See Exs. F, H. Nor have plaintiffs served verifications in the
month since they served their original, unverified responses.
Plaintiffs unverified responses are not evidence. See Hays v. Adam, 512 F. Supp. 2d
1330, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (refusing to consider unverified interrogatory responses on motion
for summary judgment) (citing Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n. 26 (11th Cir. 2003).
They are tantamount to no response at all. In addition to the relief requested above, the Court
should order plaintiffs to serve verified responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories.
5
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Nationstar respectfully requests that the Court order that
plaintiffs (1) serve amended objection-free responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories and
production requests that remove any objections, (2) confirm in their written responses that they
5
See,e..g., Hutchingson v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-24-J-25MCR, 2010 WL 556759,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2010) (granting motion to compel party to serve verified responses to
interrogatories where original responses were unverified); Mann v. Island Resorts Dev., Inc., No.
3:08CV297/RS/EMT, 2009 WL 6409113, at *3-5, (N.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2009) (same); Wilson v.
Farris, No. 607CV-1293-ORL-28KRS, 2008 WL 2695641, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2008)
(same).
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are providing all information or documents responsive to the interrogatories and production
requests; (3) serve amended verified responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories that provide
complete narrative responses to Nationstar’s interrogatories.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)(A), I hereby certify that counsel for the movant has
conferred with all parties or non-parties who may be affected by the relief sought in this motion
in a good faith effort to resolve the issues but has been unable to resolve the issues.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Edenfield
NATHANIEL M. EDENFIELD
DATED: February 19, 2015. Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nathaniel M. Edenfield
ALAN G. GREER
Florida Bar No.: 123294
agreer@richmangreer.com
NATHANIEL M. EDENFIELD
Florida Bar No.: 91034
nedenfield@richmangreer.com
RICHMAN GREER, P.A.
396 Alhambra Circle
North Tower – 14
th
Floor
Miami, FL 33134
Telephone: (305) 373-4000
Facsimile: (305) 373-4099
JOHN B. SULLIVAN (pro hac vice)
jbs@severson.com
MARK D. LONERGAN (pro hac vice)
mdl@severson.com
ERIK KEMP (pro hac vice)
ek@severson.com
JONAH S. VAN ZANDT (pro hac vice)
jvz@severson.com
SEVERSON & WERSON
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 2600
San Francisco, California 94111
Telephone: (415) 398-3344
Facsimile: (415) 956-0439
Attorneys for Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
alleged to be d/b/a Champion Mortgage
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 19, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, was electronically filed with the Clerk using the CM/ECF filing system and served
upon on all counsel of record or pro se parties listed on the attached Service List, either via
transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by the CM/ECF filing system or in some
other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive
electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Edenfield______
NATHANIEL M. EDENFIELD
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SERVICE LIST
HERSSEIN LAW GROUP
650 SE 12
th
Street, #101
Dania Beach, FL 33004
Telephone: (660) 287-4557
Geoff Hirshberg, Esq.
E-mail: Geoff@hersseinlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BEIGHLEY, MYRICK & UDELL, P.A.
150 West Flagler Street, Suite 2050
Miami, FL 33130
Telephone: (305) 349-3930
Maury L. Udell, Esq.
E-mail: mudell@bmulaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
AKERMAN SENTERFITT
SunTrust International Center – 25
th
Floor
One S.E. Third Avenue
Miami, FL 33131-1714
Telephone: (305) 374-5095
Christopher S. Carver
E-Mail: Christopher.carver@akerman.com
Attorneys for Bank of America
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
901 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 2001
Telephone: (202) 346-4000
David L. Permut, pro hac vice
E-Mail: dpermut@goodwinprocter.com
Attorneys for Bank of America
HERSSEIN LAW GROUP
12000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 402
North Miami, FL 33181
Telephone: (305) 531-1431
Iris Joy Herssein, Esq.
E-mail: iris@hersseinlaw.com
Reuven Herssein, Esq.
E-mail: reuven@hersseinlaw.com
Maxwell M. Nelson, Esq.
E-mail: max@hersseinlaw.com
Jeffrey L. Goodman, Esq.
E-mail: Jeffrey@hersseinlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
53 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
Telephone: (617) 570-1000
Matthew G. Lindenbaum, pro hac vice
E-mail: mlindenbaum@goodwinprocter.com
dkantrowitz@goodwinprocter.com
Attorneys for Bank of America
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